

Public Hearing

Audience publique

Commissioners / Commissaires

The Honourable / L'honorable J. Michael MacDonald,
Chair / Président

Leanne J. Fitch (Ret. Police Chief, M.O.M)

Dr. Kim Stanton

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Halifax, Nova Scotia

--- Upon commencing on Tuesday, May 17th, 2022, at 9:31 a.m.

COMMISSIONER FITCH: Hello, and welcome. Bonjour, et bienvenue. We join you from Mi'kma'ki, the ancestral and unceded territory of the Mi'kmaq. We begin proceedings today by remembering those whose lives were taken or were harmed, their families, and all those affected by the April 2020 mass casualty in Nova Scotia.

Yesterday, Commission Counsel presented the Emergency Response Team Foundational Document. This Foundational Document is now available on the website, and related source materials will be posted later this week.

We also heard from retired Corporal Mills and Corporal Milton on the witness panel to provide more clarity around the role of the Emergency Response Team and resources available at the time of the mass casualty.

Today, we will hear from retired Staff Sergeant Steve Halliday, who was the Acting Operations Officer for the Northeast Nova District in the province at the time of the mass casualty. First, Commission Counsel will present the RCMP Command Post, Operational Communications Centre and Command Decisions Foundational Document.

I will now ask Commission Counsel, Anna Mancini, to bring today's presentation. Ms. Mancini?

--- INTRODUCTION OF FOUNDATIONAL DOCUMENTS: RCMP COMMAND POST, OPERATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS CENTRE AND COMMAND DECISIONS:

--- PRESENTATION BY MS. ANNA MANCINI:

MS. ANNA MANCINI: Thank you. Good morning. Thank you for continuing to join us as we continue through our work.

My task today, as Commissioner Fitch indicated, is to introduce the Foundational Document titled, RCMP Command Post, Operational Communications Centre, or OCC, and Command Decisions.

1 Madam Registrar, I would ask that that please be marked and
2 tendered accordingly.

3 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** It's Exhibit 1461.

4 **--- EXHIBIT NO. 1461:**

5 RCMP Command Post, Operational Communications Centre and
6 Command Decisions

7 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Thank you. I'd also seek to mark and
8 tender all supporting documentation associated with this exhibit, please.

9 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** So exhibited.

10 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Thank you. And Madam Registrar, if I
11 could, I'd also seek to mark and tender two additional documents, one being COMM
12 Number 0011832, and the other being COMM0011833.

13 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** And those will be
14 marked 1462 and 1463.

15 **--- EXHIBIT NO. 1462:**

16 (COMM0011832) Supporting Documentation

17 **--- EXHIBIT NO. 1463:**

18 (COMM0011833) Supporting Documentation

19 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Thank you.

20 So the subject matter of this Foundational Document is a summary
21 of information currently available to the Mass Casualty Commission in relation to the
22 actions, decisions, and information-sharing of the RCMP's Critical Incident Command
23 personnel and dispatching staff on April 18th and 19th of 2020, in Nova Scotia. What
24 the document is, is essentially an attempt to consolidate the notes, the recollections, the
25 interview statements pertaining to discussions, decisions, and actions that were taken,
26 both at the OCC and at the Command Post over the course of the mass casualty.

27 The Foundational Document itself is quite lengthy. You'll be
28 relieved to hear that this presentation will not be. In fact, my intention today is simply to

1 provide an overview or sort of a high-level orientation to the document, and really, I'm
2 focussing on two things: One, an orientation of the locations that we're discussing; and
3 two, a broad overview of some of the names of the individuals that are focussed on in
4 that document and the positions that they held at the time of the mass casualty. I am
5 not going to be going into detail about who did what when. That information will be
6 forthcoming from the witnesses themselves.

7 So I'll begin with a broad overview of Nova Scotia with respect to
8 how the RCMP divides the province. The RCMP divides Nova Scotia into three
9 districts. So Northeast Nova District is on the slide in the blue; Southwest Nova District
10 is on -- on the slide it's the green colour; and Halifax District is the red in the centre of
11 the slide. Within each district, there are a number of RCMP detachments, and those
12 are depicted on the map.

13 Of course, Northeast Nova District is our area of focus today
14 because it includes Colchester County, Cumberland County, and the eastern portion of
15 Hants County. And of course, you're very familiar by now with these locations, but as
16 you can see, Northeast Nova District encompasses Portapique in Colchester County;
17 Hunter Road in the north, in Cumberland; as well as Wentworth; Glenholme; Debert,
18 and specifically, Plains Road, running through Colchester County; Onslow and Truro;
19 Shubenacadie on the border of Colchester and Hants Counties; Highway 224; and the
20 Enfield, specifically the Big Stop, which lies on the border between Halifax County and
21 Hants County. So that's to frame some of the key RCMP locations that we're
22 discussing today.

23 So the first that will be discussed is the OCC, or the Operations
24 Communications Centre. Sorry, Operational Communications Centre. And this has
25 been discussed many times. It's the centre where staff are located who receive 9-1-1
26 calls, and it's also the same place where dispatchers who are providing information over
27 the radio to responding officers are situated. It is also the location of the risk managers
28 that we've heard about. So they're sitting alongside the dispatchers in this centre.

1 So at the time of the mass casualty, the OCC was situated in Truro
2 on Prince Street. It has since moved. It's relocated to RCMP Headquarters in
3 Dartmouth, but for today's purposes and for the purposes of this Inquiry, it was situated
4 in Truro.

5 The Bible Hill RCMP detachment you're also familiar with, given
6 that this was the closest detachment to the initial 9-1-1 call from Portapique. You'll
7 recall that Constables Beselt, Merchant, and Patton, and Colford were based out of this
8 location.

9 And this location, I will note, became an initial mustering point for
10 some of the command personnel prior to the establishment of a command post. So
11 those sort of first few hours when folks -- when individuals are coming in and
12 responding to that call, this was where they initially gathered.

13 The RCMP Headquarters, as I indicated, is in Dartmouth, it's
14 located in Burnside. This is the location of the ERT base. So this was where the
15 majority of ERT personnel departed from in response to the call out. It's also where the
16 incident commander departed from as he made his way towards the Command Post.

17 And so the Command Post, the Critical Incident Command Post, as
18 you know, was established at the Great Village Firehall in the early hours of April 19th,
19 2020. So Critical Incident Command Post, unlike the other locations, such as the OCC
20 or the detachment or the headquarters, a Critical Incident Command Post is not a
21 permanent fixture for the RCMP, it's a -- essentially a base that is created in response to
22 a critical incident. And in this case, it was situated about nine-and-a-half kilometres east
23 of Portapique. It was established at about 12:41 a.m. on the 19th.

24 And this was the base of command personnel throughout the
25 course of the mass casualty. It's also where EHS services and fire services for a
26 portion of the events were based here. And beginning at, I guess, around one, shortly
27 after 1:00 a.m. on the 19th, is when command personnel began arriving at this
28 command post.

1 So that's a description of the locations. I'm going to move into
2 discussing some of the relevant parties, who they are and where they are within RCMP
3 rank. It gets a little tedious. Bear with me as we walk through it. It's an attempt to sort
4 of orient who's who and the names I think will become familiar, if they're not already.

5 So with respect to Northeast Nova, so if you remember that blue
6 segment of the Nova Scotia map the sort of overarching authority would be the District
7 Policing Officer, so that District Policing Officer would oversee Northeast Nova District.
8 In April of 2020, that was Superintendent Archie Thompson and, of course, he would be
9 accountable and respond to the CrOps Officer, Chris Leather.

10 So below that is a position referred to as Operations Officer, so this
11 position is meant to be held by an officer, someone in the Inspector rank or above. It
12 had been vacant, so at the time, Staff Sergeant Halliday, who's not an officer, a
13 commissioned officer, but Staff Sergeant Halliday took that role in an acting capacity
14 until it would be filled. He was acting in that capacity of the -- at the time of the mass
15 casualty.

16 So then there's the position referred to as a DANCO, District
17 Advisory Non-Commission Officer. And there are two of these positions in Northeast
18 Nova. Each oversees six districts in Northeast Nova.

19 In April of 2020, there was one vacancy in this role, and Staff
20 Sergeant Halliday had occupied the other role but, of course, was now acting in the
21 operations role and, as a result, Staff Sergeant MacCallum, who was a district
22 commander of Pictou, assumed this position again in an acting capacity.

23 We then have the District Commander for Colchester, and that was
24 Staff Sergeant Al Carroll. And he was based out of the Bible Hill detachment.

25 And assisting him would be his Operations Non-Commissioned
26 Officer, and that was Sergeant O'Brien.

27 So many of these names we've heard. As you move through the
28 Foundational Document and as witnesses provide evidence, I hope it's of some

1 assistance to see the inter-relation.

2 So Superintendent Archie Thompson, as I indicated, is the District
3 Policing Officer for Northeast Nova. He was initially contacted about the events in
4 Portapique by Staff Sergeant Halliday at 10:50 p.m. on April 18th. Staff Sergeant
5 Halliday continued to provide updates by phone to Superintendent Thompson into April
6 19th. Superintendent Thompson was not physically present at the command post over
7 the course of the mass casualty.

8 Staff Sergeant Steve Halliday was, as I indicated, the Acting
9 Operations Officer. He was contacted by the risk manager, Staff Sergeant Brian Rehill,
10 at about 10:35 p.m. on April 18th. He attended his detachment in Stellarton. He
11 gathered his gear and he arrived at the Bible Hill detachment at approximately 11:38
12 p.m., so that would have been prior to the establishment of the command post.

13 He then attended the command post at approximately 2:00 a.m. on
14 the morning of April 19th, and he remained there until the perpetrator was neutralized in
15 Enfield.

16 Staff Sergeant Addie MacCallum, as I indicated, was the Acting
17 DANCO, or District Advisory Non-Commissioned Officer, at the time of the mass
18 casualty. He was contacted by the OCC Dispatch Supervisor, Jen MacCallum, at 10:38
19 p.m. on April 18th. He was also contacted very shortly afterwards by Staff Sergeant
20 Halliday.

21 He arrived at the Bible Hill detachment at 11:08 p.m., or
22 thereabouts. He arrived at the command post in Great Village at approximately 2:00
23 a.m. and he departed the command post, you'll recall in the evidence of Constable
24 Hubley. He departed in response to the Wentworth call.

25 Constable Hubley was a PDS member, Police Dog Services
26 member. He required having oversight, as his focus would have been on his tracking
27 dog. He needed essentially a gunman, and Staff Sergeant MacCallum jumped into the
28 vehicle at that point and departed the command post and essentially engaged in the

1 pursuit for the remainder of the events of the mass casualty.

2 Staff Sergeant Al Carroll was contacted by Sergeant O'Brien at
3 approximately 10:25 p.m. on April 18th, 2020. Staff Sergeant Carroll also received a
4 phone call in the early -- around this time period, around 10:25, from his son, Constable
5 Jordan Carroll, who was a Cumberland member, who advised him that something was
6 occurring in Colchester County. He arrived at the Bible Hill detachment at
7 approximately 11:00 p.m. He arrived at the command post at approximately 2:00 a.m.
8 He left the command post at approximately 9:45 a.m. on the 19th for purposes of
9 conducting scene containment in Portapique.

10 Sergeant Andrew O'Brien, Andy O'Brien, was contacted shortly
11 after 10:00 p.m. by Constable Beselt. Again, you may recall from Constable Beselt's
12 testimony that en route to the initial 9-1-1 call of Jamie Blair, Constable Beselt contacted
13 Sergeant O'Brien to advise him that he believed he was responding to a gun call.

14 Sergeant O'Brien attended the command post the following
15 morning at approximately 9:45 a.m. and departed to assist with scene containment in
16 Portapique along with Staff Sergeant Carroll.

17 So I'll move very briefly into the risk managers who, as I indicated,
18 are located at the OCC in Truro.

19 So the person on shift the night of April 18th and into the morning of
20 the 19th was Staff Sergeant Brian Rehill. He, of course, was on duty at the time of the
21 initial 9-1-1 calls emerging from Portapique. He completed his shift at 7:00 a.m. and
22 was relieved by risk manager Staff Sergeant Bruce Briers.

23 So Bruce Briers -- Staff Sergeant Bruce Briers attended the OCC
24 shortly after 6:00 a.m. and he was briefed over the course of the hour by risk manager
25 Staff Sergeant Rehill. He assumed that role at 7:00 a.m. and remained in that role until
26 the conclusion of the hunt for the perpetrator.

27 So I'll move now into the Critical Incident Command structure.

28 So the Critical Incident structure operates separately from the

1 Northeast Nova command structure. It is essentially the command structure that's
2 engaged in critical incidents.

3 Of course, the Commanding Officer is the ultimate authority, and in
4 April 2020, that would be Lee Bergerman.

5 The Criminal Operations Officer at the time of the mass casualty
6 was Chief Superintendent Chris Leather.

7 So the Support Services Officer was Superintendent Darren
8 Campbell and, as you'll recall from some of yesterday's evidence, part of his role is he
9 approves the deployment of the critical incident package, so that was discussed to
10 some extent yesterday, ERT, EMRT. It's a response to critical incidents and those
11 support services.

12 The Assistant Support Services Officer was Inspector Don Moser.

13 The Critical Incident Commanders are individuals who are trained
14 to fulfil this specific role, and they're available on an on-call basis. So each day, there's
15 an individual who is on the schedule scheduled as the person to call in the event of a
16 critical incident.

17 The person on call the night of April 18th was Staff Sergeant Jeff
18 West, and he assumed the role of Incident Commander at 1:19 a.m. on April 19th.

19 So he remained in that position until he was relieved by the next
20 Incident Commander to take over that role, and that was Dan MacGillivray, who took
21 over at approximately 10:20 a.m. on the 19th.

22 So Superintendent Darren Campbell was contacted by Staff
23 Sergeant Jeff West at approximately 10:46 p.m. Staff Sergeant Jeff West was, as I
24 indicated, the on-call Incident Commander, so he reached out for purposes of securing
25 the critical incident package, which was approved.

26 Staff Sergeant Jeff West was contacted by Staff Sergeant Halliday
27 at 10:42 p.m. You'll recall from yesterday that Staff Sergeant West contacted team lead
28 Corporal Mills at 10:48 p.m.

1 Staff Sergeant West received the call. He travelled to the RCMP
2 headquarters in Dartmouth and departed from there to attend the Great Village Fire
3 Hall, arriving at the Command Post at approximately 1:00 a.m. He remained at the
4 Command Post for the entirety of the mass casualty, although he was technically
5 relieved of his command position, as I indicated, at 10:20 a.m.

6 As you'll hear from some of the witnesses in this case, it was
7 decided that it would be beneficial to have an Assistant Incident Commander, given the
8 circumstances of the situation. S/Sgt. Kevin Surette was the second on-call Incident
9 Commander that evening of April 18th, and he was contacted by S/Sgt. West at 10:59
10 p.m. He resided in Yarmouth, and he departed there at approximately 1:15 a.m., and
11 arrived at the Command Post at 5:40 a.m. on April 19th.

12 And, finally, S/Sgt. Dan MacGillivray attended the Command Post
13 just before 10:00 on April 19th. He took command from S/Sgt. Jeff West. Given the
14 radio traffic at the time, this was not communicated over the radio until 11:21, which, of
15 course, was moments before the perpetrator was stopped at the Enfield Big Stop. Of
16 course he was on scene at the Command Post at the time that this occurred.

17 So, again, that's a very, very brief overview, hopefully of some
18 assistance to that Foundational Document.

19 Commissioners, my intention now would be to call retired S/Sgt.
20 Halliday as a witness. I understand, I think, there's some podium shifting that has to
21 occur, but I propose to proceed straight through, if that's agreeable.

22 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Yes, thank you, Ms. Mancini.
23 And as we did yesterday, we'll simply ask our folks to do the shifts, so we can hear from
24 our witness.

25 Thank you.

26 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Yes.

27 **(SHORT PAUSE)**

28 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you very much for that.

1 Ms. Mancini?

2 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Yes, thank you, Chief Commissioner.

3 So I wish to call retired S/Sgt. Steve Halliday to the stand as the
4 first witness to provide testimony in relation to Exhibit 1461, the Foundational Document
5 referred to this morning.

6 And Madam Registrar, I understand S/Sgt. Halliday has indicated a
7 preference to be Sworn.

8 I'd just ask, sir, if you'd remain standing for that process.

9 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY, Sworn:**

10 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Thank you. Be seated,
11 please.

12 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Thank you.

13 **--- EXAMINATION IN-CHIEF BY MS. ANNE MANCINI:**

14 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Good morning, sir.

15 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Good morning.

16 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** S/Sgt. Steve Halliday, just last name, for the
17 record, is H-a-l-l-i-d-a-y?

18 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes, that's correct.

19 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Thank you very much.

20 So Staff Sergeant -- are you comfortable with me referring to you
21 as Staff Sergeant; I know you've retired.

22 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** That's fine. Whatever you're
23 comfortable with. Steve is fine.

24 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Thank you.

25 I'm going to start our discussion this morning just getting a bit of a
26 sense of your specifically your employment history, and some questions pertaining to
27 that.

28 So I understand you joined the RCMP in 1990 after having served

1 five years with the RNC in Newfoundland?

2 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes, that's right, the Royal
3 Newfoundland Constabulary I started there and then joined the RCMP in 1990.

4 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Thank you. And you were then posted,
5 from 1990 to 1994, in British Columbia?

6 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

7 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** And that was engaging in primarily rural
8 policing in that location?

9 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes, that was rural policing in the
10 interior of British Columbia, frontline uniform policing.

11 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Thank you. And then you were posted in
12 the Arctic area from 1995 to 1999 as a General Duty member?

13 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes, that's right.

14 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Nineteen ninety-nine (1999) you were
15 posted to Bridgetown, Nova Scotia; again, performing frontline General Duty policing?

16 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

17 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. Promoted to corporal in 2001?

18 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes, that's right.

19 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** And at that time, you were transferred to
20 Happy Valley-Goose Bay in Labrador?

21 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

22 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And three years there as a
23 Detachment Supervisor, and one year as General Investigative Section Commander?

24 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes, that's right. I was in charge of
25 the General Investigation Section for the last year that I was there.

26 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay, thank you. Then promoted to
27 sergeant in 2005?

28 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

1 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And that was -- you were transferred
2 to Guysborough, Nova Scotia at that time?

3 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes, I was the District Commander of
4 Guysborough County.

5 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** And in 2009, you were promoted to staff
6 sergeant?

7 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

8 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** And transferred to Pictou, Nova Scotia.

9 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

10 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And in 2015, you took on the role of
11 the District Advisory Non-Commissioned Officer for Northeast Nova, the DANCO
12 position?

13 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

14 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Can you provide us briefly a sense of what
15 that role entails? I know it's somewhat different from frontline policing.

16 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** As an advisory NCO, my
17 responsibility is to oversee the detachment commanders who are responsible for their
18 own individual districts. So in Nova Scotia, each municipality would be referred to as a
19 district. So Pictou County is a district, Guysborough County is a district, Colchester
20 County is a district. So I worked directly under the District Policing Officer who has
21 overarching responsibility for operational and administrative control over those districts.
22 And my job is to provide guidance, direction, advice, support to the District
23 Commanders for each of those municipal units. And by that, you know, I would conduct
24 quality assurance reviews on investigations, review exhibit processes, provide direction
25 in relation to personnel issues, and be there as a sounding board for those commanders
26 who may be, you know, facing operational or administrative challenges, whatever that
27 might be for them.

28 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. So in this position, you're essentially

1 -- well, a portion, you're liaising between District Commanders and the District Policing
2 Officer, sort of the bridge between the two?

3 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

4 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

5 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Exactly.

6 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And then I understand in October of
7 2019, the Operations Officer role was vacant at that time, and you took an acting
8 position in that role?

9 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes. So the incumbent retired from
10 the force in October of 2019 and the position was vacant for a number of months, and
11 during that period I was appointed at the Acting Operations Officer by the district --
12 actually, I think it was by the CrOps officer at that time because the District Policing
13 Officer was also retiring shortly thereafter, so things were a little thin at that time.

14 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** In flux.

15 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes, yeah.

16 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And can you give us, again just
17 briefly, a sense of what the Operations Officer's role is, as compared to the DANCO role
18 that you had previously been in?

19 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** The Operations Officer is responsible,
20 again, for providing oversight, administrative guidance, operational guidance, you know,
21 taking charge of, you know, major operational events that might be going on;
22 responsible for operational planning and those kinds of things to, you know, major
23 events whether it's protest activities. Also looking after discipline issues, those kinds of
24 things, directly with the detachment commander. So it's a step down from the district
25 policing officer and a step up from the advisory NCOs, who are that day-to-day link.
26 They have overarching operational control of all 12 districts versus, you know, a
27 DANCO who looks after primarily their six, in one area or the other.

28 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. So you're still reporting to the district

1 policing officer?

2 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Still report to the district policing
3 officer.

4 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

5 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes. And when the district policing
6 officer is absent for whatever reason, the operations officer would act in their capacity in
7 their absence.

8 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And at the time that you assumed
9 the operations officer role, a district policing officer came in at that point? Or was
10 already there when you started acting?

11 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** So there was one there when I was
12 acting, and then I think retired shortly thereafter. So there was a gap of several months,
13 and in January of 2020, the district policing officer was replaced, and that was Supt
14 Thompson, who was transferred into the position then in January of 2020.

15 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. Thank you. So I understand in your
16 time with the RCMP, you also served as an IARD instructor and a crisis negotiator?

17 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

18 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Can you tell us a bit about what those
19 positions entail and the training required to take on those roles?

20 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** M'hm. I trained as a crisis negotiator
21 in 2004. I was posted in Happy Valley-Goose Bay in Newfoundland and Labrador,
22 which we refer to as B Division.

23 There was a need for a crisis negotiator in Labrador at that time
24 and I was selected as the candidate to go. So I went to the Canadian Police College in
25 Ottawa and I took a training program there and was accredited as a crisis negotiator
26 and continued to update my training on a periodic basis as required by the program.

27 My responsibility with that was to, you know, attend events where
28 there was someone in crisis who, you know, needed to be deescalated, to try to resolve

1 whatever conflict they may be going through at the time, and that could be anything
2 from someone who was going through a mental health crisis to, you know, hostage
3 situations or domestic violence, or someone who had committed a crime and was now
4 barricaded trying to avoid apprehension. Those kinds of things. That was the type of
5 environment I was involved in if I was called upon for that reason.

6 As a IARD instructor, I became involved in the Use of Force
7 Program in around 2001 as a Public and Police Safety Instructor. That eventually
8 evolved into the IARD program, which was born out of the Columbine incident in the
9 United States where, you know, we took on a program of training designed to respond
10 to active shooters in a more effective, strategic manner than what we had previously
11 been doing years earlier.

12 So I began in the IARD program around 2009. It escapes me when
13 I actually did that training.

14 My involvement in that program here in Nova Scotia was as a part
15 time instructor. So the Division had evolved into a full-time training team assigned to
16 provide officer safety, operational skills, maintenance training, recertification on a
17 regular basis to our employees. And my role, my primary role, was either as a district
18 commander in Guysborough or a district commander in Pictou County, but I would be
19 called upon as a part time instructor to come in and share my skills and abilities to
20 support the full-time training unit, because there's not enough staff in there to train all of
21 the members. So they rely on part time instructors like myself to come in and help fill in
22 some of the human resource gaps there in the training program.

23 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. Okay. You mentioned with your role
24 as a crisis negotiator, attending crisis events in that capacity. Did you yourself ever
25 have incident commander -- critical incident commander training?

26 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** No.

27 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. Okay. So thank you for providing
28 that.

1 So as you know, S/Sgt Halliday, the inquiry today is focused
2 primarily on decisions that were made by command personnel throughout the course of
3 the mass casualty. And my intention is to sort of move through and present some
4 portions of that Command Foundation Document to you. Have you had a chance to
5 look at that document?

6 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes, I have.

7 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And you're comfortable with the
8 contents?

9 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

10 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. Okay. And so I'm going to bring
11 those forward. You'll see portions of them on the screen in front of you. And they'll
12 essentially be a way for me to orient my questions, but it's important to me that you
13 don't feel constrained by what's being presented. So if there's corrections to be made,
14 if there's elaborations to be offered, I highly encourage you to do so.

15 So, Madam Registrar, if you don't mind, if I could pull up paragraph
16 89 of that Foundational Document? Thank you. If we could just scroll it down? Perfect.
17 Thank you so much.

18 So this is a paragraph based primarily on your notes, S/Sgt
19 Halliday, which states:

20 According to the notes of S/Sgt. Halliday, he was
21 contacted at his home by RM Rehill at 10:35 p.m. on
22 April 18, 2020. In his interview with the Mass Casualty
23 Commission, S/Sgt. Halliday recalled that RM Rehill
24 indicated that there was a serious incident occurring in
25 Portapique, and that Dave Lilly may be involved. (As
26 previously referenced, Sgt. Lilly's name arose as a result
27 of RM Rehill overhearing a comment by a Cumberland
28 member regarding the location of Sgt. Lilly's cottage):

1 the call came [in] to me first to advise me of what was
2 unfolding in Portapique that night, and the call essentially
3 was that something significant is happening there... (The
4 Risk Manager) said, "There's -- we've got something
5 going on in Portapique, it's very significant. We've had --
6 we've had a shooting; I think we have a couple of people
7 [...] who are deceased. We're not sure where the
8 shooter is, but it's really strange, Steve, it's -- like a
9 marked car is involved, like a police car is involved, and
10 Dave Lilly's name has come up."

11 Does this accord with your memory?

12 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah, that looks like a transcript out
13 of my statement that I gave to the Commission. But yeah, essentially that captures the
14 essence of the call between Brian and myself.

15 I was off duty at the time when that call came to me. I remember
16 very vividly the information in terms of the fact that, you know, it's possibly a marked
17 car. I know Brian seemed to be very perplexed about, you know, the fact that, you
18 know, this is a police car and Dave Lilly's name is associated with it.

19 And my first thought was that, you know, uh oh, this is a very
20 serious issue. We may have an RCMP officer who has now found himself in some kind
21 of crisis or situation and has, you know, has taken a marked police car and has gone
22 and done something heinous in the community. That was my first thought. I believed
23 that there may be some legitimacy to this, that we could have a police officer involved in
24 a shooting.

25 And I think, you know, as a -- you know, as a long serving police
26 officer, we have heard of incidents where, you know, people in positions of authority, for
27 whatever reason, marital issues, mental health issues, whatever the case may be,
28 they're driven to a point to make, you know, unusual decisions. And I was really

1 concerned that this could be the case.

2 So aside from obviously mobilizing the right people to get involved
3 to help support the operation, one of my main concerns was to determine whether or
4 not there was some validity and credibility to this, that in fact Dave Lilly could have, you
5 know, become unglued and taken some kind of action in that community.

6 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. Yeah. And I will ask you about your
7 subsequent call with Sgt Lilly, but with respect to this call, I'm wondering, even more
8 broadly, aside from the substance of the conversation, the dynamic between the risk
9 manager, S/Sgt Rehill, and yourself in your position as operations officer, is it customary
10 for the risk manager to call the individual in your position at the time? Or essentially
11 why is Brian Rehill reaching out to you?

12 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** So depending on the nature of the
13 circumstances, the risk manager's primary role is to provide that supervisory gap that
14 may exist when supervisors are not on in particular units, for whatever reason, whether
15 there's an absence, whether there's a vacancy, whether there's no one scheduled in a
16 particular area. So their function is really to provide that supervisory gap to the frontline
17 members when incidents occur. When an incident of this nature occurs, their
18 responsibility is to take control of the situation and provide guidance and direction.

19 It's not uncommon for a Risk Manager to, depending again on the
20 circumstances, to notify either the District Commander or the Operations NCO in a
21 particular district. If the -- if perhaps maybe they can't get a hold of that individual, or
22 they deem the event significant enough that they should advance this to the next level in
23 the chain of command because of the significance of it, that would be, I guess, at the
24 discretion of the Risk Manager.

25 As a District Commander in my former role, I had taken calls from
26 the Risk Manager to advise me of something that was ongoing in my detachment area,
27 simply for situational awareness, so that I was aware, but that everything was under
28 control, and it was being taken care of. I have had calls from the Risk Manager in my

1 capacity as an Advisory NCO, again, to provide situational awareness with what's taking
2 place at the time. And in this case, I don't know if Brian called me as an Advisory NCO,
3 if he had called me as -- if he even knew I was the Acting Operations Officer at that
4 time. I don't know. But for him to call me I didn't see as uncommon because of the
5 nature of the situation that he was facing.

6 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. So you weren't sure whether or not
7 he's calling you in your Operations Officer role or ---

8 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Right.

9 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** --- or DANCO role.

10 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Right.

11 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** But would it be fair to say what the Risk
12 Manager's doing at this stage, as is expected, is calling sort of the next level up the
13 chain in terms of personnel from that detachment?

14 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

15 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. Okay. And in terms of the
16 conversation you had, I understand it was brief. There's the discussion of Dave Lilly,
17 the marked police car. Did S/Sgt. Rehill provide you with any sense of the sources of
18 the information or was it sort of just a summary?

19 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** No. I didn't have a lot of dialogue with
20 him around where these calls were coming from, who they were coming from at that
21 time. My main concern was to, you know, free him up to manage what was taking place
22 on the ground as effectively as he could and try to take some of the burden from him.
23 So I knew, based on what he had said, that this was going to require, you know, a front-
24 end loading of resources to try and address the issue. Just I don't know if it was a gut
25 instinct, or if it was just, you know, the dialogue between us, the fact that, you know,
26 there's potentially an RCMP member involved and an RCMP car. You know, those are
27 -- that's unheard of. I had never heard that in my career. So it raised significant enough
28 concern with me that I advised Brian I would contact the Critical Incident Commander

1 directly, myself, and allow him to manage the events that were unfolding at the time, so
2 that we could get things rolling as quickly as we could.

3 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. So you took on the task of contacting
4 the Critical Incident Commander?

5 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Right.

6 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** And that's something that you did -- would
7 that be something that the Risk Manager's normally expected to do, but you observed
8 that he's sort of overloaded, or is that fluid? Can you explain that?

9 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I would say that, again, it's
10 situationally dependent. If, you know, circumstances are under control and you have a
11 barricaded person and a situation that's unfolding that's not as dynamic as this sounded
12 like it was, it would be reasonable for the Risk Manager to make that call. They have
13 access to the phone numbers and immediate access. But in this case, you know, there
14 was an immediate response by our detachment members, and it sounded to me as
15 though, you know, it was more important for Brian to focus on dealing with that and I
16 would take care of notifying additional resources up the chain to try to get things
17 moving. I did task him with trying to account for our cars, and which is, you know,
18 something he would be able to begin doing by radio. He has access to that right away.
19 And also, to have his staff mobilize our Air Services Unit in J-Division. That was a
20 request I made during the conversation that we had.

21 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. So it's your understanding, I guess,
22 at this stage, that the Risk Manager is going to set up containment, arrange for Air
23 Services and account for the police vehicles, and these would be tasks consistent with a
24 Risk Manager's duties?

25 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

26 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And you recognized that, you know,
27 you could take this call to the Critical Incident Commander. I'm wondering if your -- if
28 you have any comment or views on the number of tasks that the Risk Manager has at

1 the outset of this, and whether or not that's, you know, a reasonable expectation with
2 how many tasks the Risk Manager has before him, given the nature of the situation, the
3 dynamic situation unfolding, is that a feasible thing for a human being to take on at that
4 stage?

5 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** You know, I think knowing what we
6 know now and the volume of information that was being processed through there, you
7 know, I would say that, you know, Brian was heavily tasked. There's no question.
8 Again, it's situationally dependent. There are times when, you know, they're able to
9 manage that without any issue, and times when they need support in that regard. You
10 know, as this was unfolding, I can't speak for Brian in terms if he was overtasked at that
11 time or not, but when I look at that Foundational Document and I look at what he and his
12 team were achieving there, you know, I think it was remarkable, frankly.

13 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. Well, I'll ask you then about the call
14 that you did make to the Incident Commander. You reached out to S/Sgt. Jeff West?

15 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes. Brian indicated to me that Jeff
16 West was the Critical Incident Commander on call, so I contacted Jeff directly,
17 explained to him what was taking place, that I believe that there may be an active
18 shooting event taking place there, and I wanted him to mobilize his people as quickly as
19 he could.

20 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** And do you recall if you relayed to S/Sgt.
21 West information about the suspect vehicle, about it being a marked police car?

22 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes, I would have passed that on to
23 Jeff at the time.

24 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And at that time, that's legitimate
25 theory that you're working with, the information that you're passing on?

26 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

27 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And you requested that the Critical
28 Incident Package be deployed?

1 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** That's right.

2 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And were there any issues with that?

3 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** No, not that I'm aware of, no.

4 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. All right.

5 Okay. So I understand after that you made a series of phone calls,
6 one to S/Sgt. MacCallum, one to the District Policing Officer, one to Sgt. Dave Lilly. I'll
7 ask you about each of these, the first with S/Sgt. MacCallum. So why reach out to him?

8 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** So Addie was the Advisory NCO,
9 acting in that capacity in my absence. When you have a major event like that, it's, you
10 know, it's kind of an all hands on deck type of approach, because, you know, in my
11 experience, I knew there was going to be an awful lot of tasks that needed to be done in
12 order to prepare for the Critical Incident Package to arrive. So I notified Addie, and, you
13 know, I knew as well that he lived in Bible Hill himself, so he was close by to the
14 detachment. He would be able to get in and, you know, quickly start the process rolling
15 about, you know, some of the things that would need to be done, and ---

16 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** What are those things, the things -- the
17 tasks that have to be taken on?

18 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Well, you know, you have to make
19 sure we know where our perimeters are, how many people are there, how many
20 resources we need, setting up a Command Post, you know, establishing any other
21 operational tools that we might need. One of the things that I asked of him when I
22 spoke to him on the phone was to do what he could to account for our cars, to make
23 sure that we didn't have any missing, to help either validate the information that had
24 come in from Brian or to dispel it, one way or the other. So I had a very brief
25 conversation with Addie at that point. And he had already known about it. My -- he -- I
26 think he had already -- had just received a call himself. I think his wife actually was
27 working in the Communications Centre that night and I think she had been speaking to
28 him to advise him that this has been going on.

1 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And then you contacted the District
2 Policing Officer, Supt. Thompson?

3 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

4 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** And this would be your superior in terms of
5 rank?

6 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

7 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And would you typically call a District
8 Policing Officer as a result of a critical incident call?

9 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes. Part of my role would be to
10 advise the chain of command as to what's happening. You know, it was -- would be
11 reasonable and prudent to ensure that our senior leadership was aware that something
12 like this was taking place in our -- in our division, in our province.

13 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And what expectations, if any, do
14 you have in terms of his response once you've relayed information to him?

15 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** My expectation would be that he
16 would contact the Criminal Operations Officer and advise him and -- who would then
17 advise the Commanding Officer, and you know, maintain situational awareness of what
18 was taking place.

19 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** He never attended the Command Post?

20 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** No.

21 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Does that surprise you?

22 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I didn't have an expectation one way
23 or the other. My service has been, you know, working in relatively remote, isolated
24 areas throughout my career, and, you know, I -- used to working alone, I guess, and
25 regardless of the circumstances I didn't have an expectation one way or the other that
26 Superintendent Thompson would attend. I didn't ask him to attend, and I didn't -- you
27 know, we didn't have any conversation around whether or not he would attend. I was
28 simply calling him to make him situationally aware of what was going on, and I advised

1 him that I was going to be attending to support the operation.

2 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. Have you ever attended a critical
3 incident where the District Policing Officer or someone of similar rank has attended at
4 the critical -- at the Command Post during the incident?

5 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I have been to large-scale events
6 where there have been commissioned officers on the ground involved, yes, absolutely.
7 Critical incidents? I -- I can't say I recall. It doesn't mean that I haven't, but I don't recall
8 anything specifically. But through, you know, protests and, you know, demonstrations,
9 planned events, those kinds of things, you know, yes, I -- I have -- we have seen
10 commissioned officers there for sure.

11 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. Okay, so I understand after that you
12 made efforts, of course, to learn about the status of Sergeant Lilly, Dave Lilly.

13 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

14 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** So can you tell us about that process?

15 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes. So Dave Lilly, at the time, was
16 an Operations sergeant in Cumberland District, so the neighbouring district, the
17 neighbouring county. I -- I made efforts to contact his District Commander to make that
18 call on my behalf. I wasn't able to reach the District Commander, so I made the
19 decision that I would call Sergeant Lilly directly myself to ascertain whether or not, you
20 know, this information that I was receiving had some validity to it.

21 He answered the phone right away. He was very calm. He -- I
22 indicated to him why I was calling, and it was -- it was evident to me, based on his
23 demeanour, the tone of his voice, that he was not involved in the situation in any way,
24 shape, or form.

25 So you know, I remember thinking, you know, "Okay, deep breath
26 here. All right, let's figure out what's going on here. This information is obviously not
27 accurate, it's not Dave Lilly." So, you know, the issue around a marked police car being
28 involved, an RCMP member being involved, and Dave's name being associated with it

1 started to reduce the level of tension to some degree. However, you know, there was
2 always a thought, "Well, maybe it's a -- it's a marked car, but it's not Dave Lilly; maybe
3 it's somebody else." So that's where my thought process was then, at least at that
4 point.

5 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. So I guess your recognition that
6 Dave Lilly's involvement was inaccurate coincided with sort of a scaling back with
7 respect to your assumption or the legitimacy, in your view, of the description of the
8 police vehicle?

9 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I would say for sure that had an
10 impact on -- you know, information coming from someone who's involved in a situation
11 that they were involved in, sometimes, you know, information can be either, you know,
12 wrongly worded or misinterpreted or, you know, miscommunicated. So that certainly
13 factored into my thought process at that time for sure.

14 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And I take it after that you, or
15 ultimately, you made your way towards the Bible Hill detachment?

16 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes, that's right.

17 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And were you monitoring your -- the
18 Colchester radio enroute?

19 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes, I was hearing transmissions.
20 Not sure exactly what time I started monitoring the transmissions, but I was hearing
21 some of the traffic that was going on there.

22 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. All right.

23 Madam Registrar, if I could pull up paragraph 155 of that
24 Foundational Document. Thank you.

25 Again, I'm going to refer to your notes here. So:

26 "According to S/Sgt. Halliday's typed notes, he
27 travelled to the Stellarton RCMP detachment to grab
28 his equipment before making his way to the Bible Hill

1 RCMP detachment. He arrived at Bible Hill at
2 11:38 p.m... His notes in relation to that time period
3 state:
4 'I arrived at Bible Hill. Was monitoring the radio traffic
5 between our responding members, OCC and the risk
6 manager and Ops NCO...Sgt. O'Brien who were
7 coordinating the response and working to set up
8 containment. Members reported fires still burning and
9 had located some victims deceased. Members
10 reported locating...several children believed to be
11 related to some of the victims and were creating a
12 safety plan for them and then reported what they
13 believed were more shots being fired and set out in
14 pursuit of the active gunfire. They were unable to
15 locate the shooter and then reported that they were
16 not sure if they were shots or explosives or perhaps
17 ammunition burning off. Shortly after OCC reports the
18 children believed there was someone in the house
19 where they were hidden and the members returned
20 there in case it was the suspect and to clear the
21 residence. I could hear the members confirm the
22 house was secure and the children were safe."

23 So would this be an accurate reflection of the information you're
24 hearing over the radio at the time that you come into Bible Hill?

25 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah. I -- yes, I would -- I would
26 agree that that's -- that's accurate when I was arriving there. It was -- it was -- there
27 was definitely a lot of things taking place at the scene for sure.

28 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Sure. And -- so you're sort of getting a

1 sense of what the members are relaying as they're responding in Portapique?

2 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

3 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And were you surprised to hear so
4 many individuals focussed on containment or involving themselves over the radio with
5 containment?

6 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I -- I'm not sure ---

7 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Sure.

8 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** --- what you...

9 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** No, that's fair. So you indicate in your notes
10 that Sergeant O'Brien is on the radio coordinating the response to set up containment.
11 You're, of course, aware that the risk manager is setting up containment. Does it
12 surprise you to have multiple voices setting up containment over the radio?

13 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I think at that time, I was -- I was
14 happy that there was someone supporting O'Brien in that regard, and that someone
15 from the detachment was engaged there with him for that purpose. And I didn't see that
16 as -- I didn't see that as a problem, from my position at least, anyway. Yeah, I -- I don't -
17 - I don't -- I didn't see that as a problem when I was there. I -- I actually thought they
18 were coordinating quite well together.

19 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** And in your listening to the radio, you didn't
20 have any sense of members getting confused over who's providing direction or who's in
21 command? Did you have any sense of that, or I take it no?

22 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I didn't hear -- I didn't hear that.
23 Again, you know, I was taking phone calls and, you know, doing other things, so I wasn't
24 -- my ear wasn't to the radio constantly. But I didn't get a sense from what I heard that
25 there was confusion around who was in charge. In fact, I believe it was clearly
26 announced over the radio that Sergeant Rehill had command of the resources.

27 I know -- I know myself, you know, I got on the radio myself at one
28 point and provided direction. No, I'm sorry, not on the radio. I spoke directly with

1 Sergeant O'Brien myself at one point to make sure information was getting relayed to
2 the members in terms of their immediate action response.

3 And you know, that was born out of -- out of an experience that I
4 had had recently in another situation where I was concerned that the members on the
5 ground had some -- it seemed to me some reluctance to use the appropriate amount of
6 force to deal with what they were dealing with at that time, and I wanted to make sure
7 we were clear that the members were clear that, you know, they were to use as much
8 force as was necessary to stop that threat.

9 So you know, there are occasions when someone who's in charge
10 on the radio, you know, may be supported by someone else in a position of authority.
11 That's -- you know, that does happen.

12 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And you -- so you were concerned
13 that members, based on your previous -- this particular previous experience, you were
14 concerned that members might be hesitant to use the force or you wanted that reminder
15 to ---

16 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I wanted to -- I wanted to make sure
17 that they were clear that, you know, they were supported in the fact that they were to
18 use as much force as necessary to stop the threat.

19 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Sure. And so you said you didn't radio that
20 yourself.

21 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** No.

22 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** You called Sergeant O'Brien ---

23 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

24 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** --- and asked him to radio?

25 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

26 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** And what -- what's the reason for that?

27 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Because he had been assisting Brian
28 with radio communications and coordinating some of the resources on the ground.

1 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And is there a reason that Staff
2 Sergeant Halliday yourself doesn't pick up the radio and broadcast those instructions or
3 those orders?

4 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Well, my thought at the time was to
5 try to reduce the level of confusion or mitigate any additional confusion because now we
6 have another, you know, Staff Sergeant on the air providing direction, so to me, it was --
7 it made sense to limit that to the extent that we could, so I chose not to do that.

8 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** So is there a bit of a balance, in your view,
9 then, between having voices over the radio that are offering support in terms of setting
10 up containment and providing instruction or reassurance to responding members versus
11 putting too many voices of additional Staff Sergeants over the air and multiple voices
12 providing instructions?

13 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Sorry. Can you ---

14 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Sorry. Long question.

15 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Can you -- yeah.

16 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** No. I'm just interested because you
17 discussed -- I was asking you about Sergeant O'Brien being on the radio as well as risk
18 manager Rehill providing instructions to members with respect to containment and
19 instructions to the IARD members that are responding. And you had indicated, your
20 previous answer, that you felt that that was a good thing to have somebody supporting
21 containment efforts.

22 What I'm curious about in this circumstance where you feel that it's
23 important that an instruction or a comment be relayed to responding members, you
24 contact Sergeant O'Brien to have him relay that over the radio because you don't want
25 to add another voice of authority over the radio. And I'm wondering how you -- how it is
26 that you view that balance between having members support containment, Staff
27 Sergeants and Sergeants support containment over the air, but not have so many
28 Sergeants over the air that they confuse members.

1 Do you see where -- the question I'm getting at very, very
2 verbosely?

3 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah. No, I think -- you know, I think
4 the issue is sometimes in any incident, whether it's a critical incident or what have you,
5 sometimes there is a challenge in making sure that everyone's not treading on the radio
6 and overtaking all the airspace because there's critical information sometimes that
7 needs to be shared ---

8 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Right.

9 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** --- so limiting that to the extent
10 possible is value added.

11 At the same time, having someone working in tandem with
12 someone to provide, you know, guidance as long as it's consistent and congruent and
13 they're working together, I see there's value in that.

14 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And so you were aware of all of the
15 plans that were be in place -- put in place, but you -- your mindset at that time was to try
16 and refrain from adding another voice to the radio.

17 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah. I don't think it would have
18 served any purpose for me to have gotten on and provided that because the questions
19 then would be, "Well, who really is in charge?". At that point, you know, Brian was
20 controlling those resources and I thought he was doing a very good job and, you know, I
21 -- I don't recall hearing a lot of traffic from Sergeant O'Brien, to be -- to be frank, but
22 there was an awful lot of things going on at that time, so paying particular attention to
23 who was saying what, when, was a little bit of a challenge given, you know, some of the
24 other things that I was undertaking at that time.

25 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Certainly.

26 So with some of the respect to -- or with respect to the planning and
27 the discussions more broadly, there was some discussion both on the radio and
28 presumably at the -- at the Bible Hill detachment at this stage about evacuations being

1 conducted?

2 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

3 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And do you recall those discussions
4 about weighing those options?

5 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah. So one of the -- you know, one
6 of the functions that, I guess, I carry out when I -- when I got there -- well, let me back
7 up a bit.

8 You know, when I arrived, I met with -- I met with Al and Addie, and
9 they were both engaged in -- Addie was, I think, working on maps, pulling up maps and
10 whatnot. Al was -- was coordinating resources of how many he had. He was
11 establishing where the -- where the containment pieces were, those kinds of things.
12 And I went about going through an initial critical incident command sort of checklist just
13 to see where we were because from my point of view, just arriving on the ground,
14 although knowing this had been ongoing for the better part of an hour at that point, in
15 my way of thinking we were still very early on in the situation given, you know, the threat
16 cues that were being emanated over the radio and what I could hear being said, so you
17 know, I was reviewing this checklist in terms of, you know, have we identified the
18 suspect, have we isolated them, have we -- do we have containment, do we have good
19 containment. Do we have lethal force options available? Do we have less lethal
20 options available?

21 You know, we know what our -- what -- and then you get to the
22 point where, okay, so do we evacuate or do we shelter in place? What's the most
23 appropriate thing to do here at this point?

24 We know what our arrest authorities are, obviously, in this regard.
25 And then ensuring that we have, you know, react plans in place.

26 So I was going through this checklist, you know, to make sure we
27 were moving in the right direction in that regard.

28 So when we talk about evacuation versus shelter in place, at that

1 point in time from -- from my point of view, wasn't a good time to be evacuating people.
2 I would -- I was aware that people were leaving on their own early on because there
3 was concerns about people who were leaving that may potentially be the suspect or the
4 suspect being secreted in a vehicle and whatnot, so that was being communicated to
5 the people that were on containment.

6 I was -- I was aware, I think, at that time that the OCC staff were
7 using the 9-1-1 call system to warn people in the residence that -- or in that area that
8 this was ongoing and to advise them to shelter in place at that time.

9 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. Yeah, I wanted to ask you about
10 that.

11 So you were under the impression that the OCC staff had a 9-1-1
12 callback system for residents in a particular geographic area?

13 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah, I wasn't entirely sure how that
14 worked, but my understanding was that they were using the 9-1-1 call system to be able
15 to reach people in residences in that area.

16 I thought -- I believed that's what was taking place at the time.

17 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And do you recall where that
18 understanding was born from?

19 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah. I -- that was relayed to me
20 from Staff MacCallum because I had asked him to do his best to track who was in and
21 who was out so we could try to understand who was still in those residences and who
22 may be out and where they might be.

23 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And so it wasn't until much later on
24 that you became aware that that technology at the OCC doesn't exist or ---

25 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah.

26 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** --- yeah, doesn't exist in the form you
27 believe?

28 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Right.

1 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

2 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah.

3 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. All right.

4 Well I'll talk a little bit more about what you had touched on with
5 respect to the roles that S/Sgt MacCallum and S/Sgt Carroll are engaged in when you
6 arrive at the Bible Hill Detachment. You indicated that S/Sgt MacCallum was engaged
7 in -- was at the computer and engaged in some mapping?

8 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

9 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And do you recall any discussions
10 with him about mapping and the area and maps available to you?

11 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** After our original -- my initial meeting
12 with them, I actually received a phone call from Dave Lilly. So I was then distracted by
13 this phone call from Dave. And that wasn't long after I got there. And it was in relation
14 to what was taking place at the scene itself.

15 So Dave was relaying information in relation to one of the victims
16 and the potential suspect who might have been involved. So he shared with me some
17 information in relation to what he believed was a relationship between Gabriel Wortman
18 and one of the victims. And in recent days, some of the behaviours of Gabriel Wortman
19 towards that victim had indicated to him that the relationship had obviously soured.

20 And my understanding is that that information came from Dave's
21 wife, who was a colleague of one of the victims and I believe had shared that with
22 Dave's wife, that she was, you know, I used the term, I think in quotes, "creeped out," by
23 this Gabriel Wortman because that was the term that Dave used for me.

24 So Wortman's name had surfaced as a suspect I think early on in
25 the event and I was aware of the name, but Dave kind of confirmed that. And then that
26 became part of S/Sgt MacCallum's role, was to start building a profile of the individual.
27 So one of the things that, you know, we're required to do is to make sure that we have
28 everything available that the critical incident commander may need to orient him or

1 herself with the individual that you're dealing with. So that was part of the role that S
2 MacCallum was playing that night, was getting those documents, getting that profile
3 built, getting maps of the area so that when we get to the command post, the critical
4 incident commander has all that information available to them to rely on.

5 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. So prior to that call with Sgt Lilly, you
6 arrived at the command post, and at that stage, S/Sgt MacCallum is attempting to get
7 maps of the area before building the profile of the perpetrator later, but he was initially
8 trying to get a sense of mapping? Was that your understanding when you arrived?

9 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** That's what I think he was doing.
10 Yeah, again, I have so much information now that I didn't have then. It's difficult to
11 separate what I know now from what I knew then.

12 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Sure.

13 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** But my recollection is yes, that's what
14 he was working on.

15 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Maybe, Madam Secretary, if I could pull up -
16 - or Registrar, sorry, if I could pull up paragraph 156 of the Foundation Document?
17 Thank you very much.

18 So this is from your interview with the Mass Casualty Commission:
19 "S/Sgt. Halliday explained that he was in charge of 'the overall operation' at that point..."

20 This is upon your arrival at Bible Hill.

21 "...and he decided to have S/Sgt. Rehill continue to
22 control resources on the ground as 'ad hoc Incident
23 Commander'"

24 So this is your quote:

25 "So, when I got there, Al (Carroll) was in his office and he
26 was on the radio ... he was working on his computer ...
27 Addie (MacCallum) was at [the] workstation, gathering
28 information and whatnot ... I went into the boardroom ...

1 in Colchester (Bible Hill Detachment). At that time, I was
2 advised that Brian Rehill, the Risk Manager, was still
3 controlling the resources, and he was ... for all intents
4 and purposes, the ad hoc Incident Commander ... there
5 was still an awful lot of support work that needed to be
6 done to make sure we were responding to [the] incident
7 as efficiently and effectively as we could, I decided to
8 leave Brian in that role, allow him to control those
9 resources so [...] I could focus on -- on the big picture.
10 So, when I arrive, I'm in charge, I'm in charge of the
11 overall operation, what's taking place."

12 So I know I'm being repetitive, but I wanted to go back again to this
13 question about roles and responsibilities.

14 So I understand Risk Manager Rehill is the ad hoc incident
15 commander until the arrival of the critical incident commander.

16 You've described yourself as in charge of the overall operation.
17 And then there are other members at the detachment as well, Al Carroll, Addie
18 MacCallum. I'm wondering if you can provide a sense, first, of the difference between
19 ad hoc incident commander, Rehill, and your view of being in charge of the overall
20 operation?

21 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** So when the call initially comes in and
22 Brian starts controlling the resources, he would be the ad hoc incident commander at
23 that time. And he is controlling who is going where, who is doing what, and coordinating
24 that response.

25 By virtue of my position as the acting operations officer and the
26 senior member on the ground as a uniformed personnel, I would be the person who has
27 overarching responsibility for everything that's going on. So my role would be to have
28 an understanding of what's taking place and ensuring that people are in roles carrying

1 out their duties in a manner that supports, you know, the success of the operation.

2 And in this case, given the fact that Brian had been -- had, you
3 know, the best situational awareness of anyone, really, in regards to the information that
4 had already been coming in, who was on the ground, where they were, what they were
5 dealing with, to me it made perfect sense for him to maintain the continuity over that at
6 that time.

7 With respect to getting a profile and creating, you know, escape
8 plans and those kinds of things, that fell to Addie. And I asked S/Sgt Carroll to be in
9 charge of resourcing for containment and to assess our containment process, where we
10 were, whether it was effective and adequate, and whether or not we required more
11 resources to address that issue.

12 So Sgt O'Brien was assisting on the radio. When I first arrived, I
13 was not aware that he was working from home. It wasn't until I arrived that I was aware
14 that he was operating from home.

15 So frankly, at that point, I was glad to have Sgt O'Brien supporting
16 S Rehill in the events itself.

17 So everybody had a role, everybody had a function, everybody
18 knew what that role was. In my view, there was no mistake in that. And, you know, in
19 my view, they were carrying their functions out well and doing what needed to be done -
20 --

21 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

22 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** --- to address the issue.

23 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** So can I ask you about the technology
24 that's available to you at the Bible Hill Detachment? As you're arriving, bringing yourself
25 up to speed, I understand that there had been some efforts to obtain or make use of
26 Pictometry?

27 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

28 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Were you aware of those efforts or engaged

1 in those efforts?

2 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I wasn't engaged myself in those.

3 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

4 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** But I am aware that S MacCallum
5 was making efforts to access that database.

6 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And he -- did he make you aware of
7 his success with that? Or lack of success with that?

8 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah, I -- we weren't able to access it.
9 I don't know why. I don't know what the issue was, but I don't think he was able to
10 access it for some reason.

11 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

12 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** You'd have to ask him.

13 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** And so can you tell me what mapping you
14 resorted to for purposes of ---

15 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah, so one of the maps that was
16 brought to me was, it was a map, I think, that Al had taken off the wall of the
17 detachment, probably one that was provided by the municipality of, you know, the layout
18 of the district. I think some of the other maps that I looked at the time were what we
19 would probably refer to as a standard view of a Google Map. So it just shows the road
20 configuration as opposed to the geometry and the topography. So it was not the
21 satellite view, but ---

22 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** So without the ---

23 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** --- the standard view.

24 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** --- vegetation or it's just with the ---

25 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Right, right.

26 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Yeah ---

27 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah.

28 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** --- gotcha.

1 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah.

2 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. Okay. So you had the map from the
3 wall, and the, what we'll call the standard view Google map of ---

4 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** That's my recollection. You know, I --
5 I believe I said in my interview, I -- I looked at a number of maps that night, but that's my
6 recollection of that, initially. Based on the information that was provided to me, the --
7 yeah, that -- that's what I remember.

8 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Yeah. Sure.

9 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** So I -- it's -- it's challenging.

10 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** No, of course. Just to the best of your
11 recollection.

12 So some other technology that I'm wondering if it's available to you
13 at that location is are the computers there in that detachment able to access kids (ph) or
14 CIIDS?

15 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

16 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Yeah?

17 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes, CIIDS.

18 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** And that would allow for viewing of the
19 placement of police vehicles that have MWSs and therefore GPSs in them?

20 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes. I -- that system is available ---

21 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Yeah.

22 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** --- and I do believe that it does show
23 the police cars that have MWSs on them. I used CIIDS when I was in Goose Bay,
24 which was quite sometime ago. I wasn't using CIIDS much, so I'm sure that technology
25 has evolved, you know, significantly. So I can't really speak to the -- what's available,
26 but I do know that it is available in the detachments for sure ---

27 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

28 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** --- absolutely. Yeah.

1 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. So it's available in the detachment,
2 but you personally didn't have much familiarity with it or use with it?

3 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Not in recent years, no.

4 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And I'm wondering about access to
5 CAD logs at the detachment. Is there an ability to review information that call-takers are
6 noting as they take 9-1-1 calls, which I believe is referred to as the CAD log? Would
7 that be available at the Bible Hill detachment?

8 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** That would be available through the
9 PROS system, so the electronic operational reporting system. Yeah, I believe that once
10 a file is opened on PROS, one could look through what had been catalogued on that file
11 from the 9-1-1 system.

12 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

13 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

14 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** And were those being accessed at the Bible
15 Hill detachment, to your knowledge?

16 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I don't know.

17 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

18 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I didn't see that.

19 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And any comment on information-
20 gathering technology availability at the Bible Hill detachment, generally, whether it could
21 have been used more efficiently or whether there were barriers to it?

22 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I think any time you have an
23 opportunity to reflect on an event like this, you know, there's opportunities to learn
24 things from, and you know, whether that would have been of any benefit at that time, it's
25 difficult to say now, but certainly there's always opportunity for reflection in terms of
26 what you did and what could be done better in the future for sure.

27 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Sure, sure. And I guess my question is,
28 looking forward, do you think utilising the CAD system, the CIIDS system, or making

1 sure by whatever mechanism, that Pictometry is available? Would those have been
2 beneficial in responding to this crisis?

3 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I think Pictometry certainly would
4 have provided, you know, a more clear view, I think, of what we were dealing with in
5 terms of geography and topography than what we used for sure.

6 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. I'm going to move on to another topic
7 area. I do see it's five to eleven, Commissioners. I'm at your disposal in terms of
8 whenever you'd like to take a morning break. I'm happy to continue as well.

9 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** If you're switching topics, then
10 this is a good time. We'll break for 15-minutes. Thank you.

11 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Thank you.

12 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you, Officer.

13 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Thank you.

14 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Thank you. The
15 proceedings are now on break, and will resume in 15-minutes.

16 --- Upon recessing at 10:55 a.m.

17 --- Upon resuming at 11:13 a.m.

18 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Welcome back. The
19 proceedings are again in session.

20 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you.

21 Ms. Mancini?

22 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Thank you, Chief Commissioner, and I'd just
23 ask that Staff Sergeant Halliday return to the stand, please.

24 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY, Resumed:**

25 **--- EXAMINATION IN-CHIEF BY MS. ANNA MANCINI: (Cont'd):**

26 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Thank you, sir, and thank you for your
27 patience as I move through my questions. I wanted to move on to the discussion of air
28 services. My understanding is that shortly after your arrival at the Bible Hill detachment,

1 at about 11:55, you received word from the OCC that air services were unavailable.

2 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** That's right.

3 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** And I'm wondering if you can talk about why
4 you had requested air services and from your vantage point whether or not this -- how
5 this news complicated subsequent decisions.

6 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** M'hm. So yeah, I received a call from
7 one of our personnel at the OCC, and she advised me that our helicopter in Moncton
8 was not available. That particular piece of equipment was important to me because it
9 contained a forward-looking infrared device on it, which gives it the ability to find heat
10 signatures. Given the, you know, the -- what we were dealing with, and we're looking
11 for someone who appeared to be actively engaged in committing murders in that
12 community, I felt that this might be a value-added tool for us from -- you know, from the
13 air to be able to find the individual, perhaps locate, and isolate the individual and deal
14 with it appropriately.

15 When I received word that that asset wasn't available, one of the
16 tasked that I asked Staff MacCallum to address was to see if there perhaps may be
17 other forward-looking infrared devices available somewhere that was accessible to us
18 that we could use locally. And I was also informed at that time that -- because my
19 second, I guess, request would have been something through the Joint Rescue
20 Coordination Centre, one of the Department of National Defence helicopters to support
21 us in that regard, but I was advised that they were not available either. So the only
22 option that was available to me was either a private fixed wing aircraft or a Department
23 of Natural Resources rotary wing aircraft, but they wouldn't fly, they wouldn't be
24 available until daylight.

25 So once those assets were -- you know, I was advised they weren't
26 available, I had to move on to the next -- into the next issue, whatever that was.

27 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Did it surprise you that the air services out
28 of J-Division were unavailable?

1 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I was disappointed, of course,
2 because it was an asset that may have provided some value. Obviously, you know,
3 we'll never know if it -- if it could have in particular at that time, but in my career here in
4 the -- in the RCMP, there are times when certain assets that you're looking for are
5 unavailable for whatever reason. You know, I've had occasions in the past to request
6 the services of the helicopter in my capacity as a Detachment Commander or an
7 Advisory NCO, and that particular asset's not available. Either, you know, the pilot is
8 out of hours or the aircraft itself is undergoing maintenance, or you know, there may be
9 something that prohibits it from being activated.

10 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** And you were initially of the view that the
11 DNR helicopter that would fly daylight had FLIR capability?

12 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I thought it did at the time, yes.

13 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. All right. And I see in your notes that
14 at a certain point you advised both the DPO and the CrOps about the status of your
15 request for air services. Do you recall doing that?

16 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I think I let the DPO know. I don't
17 know if I told the Criminal Operations Officer at that time. I think the DPO was updated
18 that the helicopter wasn't available.

19 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And were you provided with
20 guidance or suggestions, or indications that there might be other alternatives?

21 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I didn't receive any guidance in that
22 regard. I needed the helicopter now, so I was moving on to whatever, but, no, I didn't
23 receive anything further.

24 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** And what was it that drew your thinking to
25 DNR as opposed to, say, bringing in resources from the next RCMP jurisdiction, so,
26 from Montreal, bringing a helicopter in from there?

27 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Well, like I said, DNR was a closer
28 asset and probably would have been able to be airborne quicker than something out of

1 a neighbouring detachment. Like I said, my thought was I needed the asset now, not
2 five or six hours from now, so I just moved on.

3 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

4 All right. Well, I'll move to when you attended the Command Post.
5 I understand that was at about 20 after 2 the morning of April 19th; does that sound
6 about right?

7 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

8 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Yeah, okay. And I'm wondering if I can talk
9 about the mapping that was available or displayed at that location. So you had
10 indicated that at the Bible Hill Detachment, you had seen the map from the wall, and
11 this standard view Google Maps. When you arrived at the Command Post, were you
12 privy or were there other mapping -- maps available to you at that location?

13 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes, there was some of the
14 supporting cast of the Critical Incident Package have access to mapping capabilities
15 and whatnot, and I don't recall specifically when I arrived if they were up and running,
16 but I know through the course of the evening, you know, I did have an opportunity to
17 review those maps. There were other maps on the table as well. I believe, actually,
18 they were hand-drawn maps by one of the scribes, just sort of laying out in a larger
19 format exactly where the containment was, and where our people were located, and
20 some of the places that have been identified as having been burned, I think, and where
21 victims were located.

22 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

23 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** And I'm not sure who produced those,
24 but I do recall seeing those.

25 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Sure. And I might ask Madam Registrar, if
26 you could pull up COMM-11832, and I think Counsel for the Participants, Mr. Topshee,
27 brought this to my attention and I think this may be what you're referring to. I wonder if
28 we could bring that up.

1 So this is one -- what appears to be a hand-drawn map. Do you
2 have a recollection of this, and if so, can you tell us about how it was created or where
3 and when it was created?

4 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah, that's not a hand-drawn map.
5 That's a copy of a map. And I'm not sure where it originated, but it was a map that was
6 provided in terms of identifying who was where. The red mark that you see on there is -
7 - indicates what I would refer to as the hot zone, where most of the activity based -- that
8 we were dealing with was based, and then the members who were positioned around
9 various containment locations.

10 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. So you saw this map while -- at
11 some point, presumably, at the Command Post?

12 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

13 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And was it you who had put these
14 individual's names on the map or put the notations?

15 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** No.

16 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** No.

17 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** No, that's not my handwriting.

18 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

19 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** No.

20 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And so in your view, this is capturing
21 the hot zone as well as the containment members around the area?

22 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

23 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

24 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** That's -- I'm not going to say who
25 produced it, but Staff Carroll had been -- he had been tasked with that particular
26 process, so my initials appear there at the bottom on April 19th, and I knew that that map
27 eventually would be required for the file, or whatever, you know, reviews were
28 necessary, so I just acknowledged my initials on it that I had viewed that map.

1 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And, Madam Registrar, if we could
2 pull up 11833? It's perhaps when you refer to -- well, you tell me, is this the hand-drawn
3 map?

4 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

5 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Yes.

6 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes, that's ---

7 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

8 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** --- the hand-drawn map that I was
9 referring to. And, again, that depicts the location of containment people, where they
10 were, and my -- I recall specifically the -- there's names that are scratched out there.
11 Those were the original people who were at those, and then the names that have been
12 placed in after are names of people who had replaced those, or who had been called in
13 to replace the people that originally manned those locations.

14 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And so is this sort of on the wall at
15 the Command Post, or how is this -- how are you operating around this map?

16 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** That was on one of the tables where
17 we were operating from, just to kind or orient us to who was where and doing what, just
18 kind of maintaining situational awareness of who was controlling what intersections.

19 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And would you say, you know, in
20 terms of Command Post and layperson viewing, to a certain extent, the mapping, hand-
21 drawn mapping, it almost appears a bit rudimentary in terms of what's taking place. Is
22 this -- do you have a comment on this? Is this being supplemented, or is this -- there a
23 reason why sort of hand-drawn map is what you're utilizing?

24 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah, I can't speak to that. There
25 were other -- other maps were used as well. Google satellite view was also produced
26 out at the Command Post as well.

27 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

28 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** This may have been produced by the

1 scribe, just, again, right, a hand-drawn facsimile until they were able to get things up
2 and running. I can't answer that ---

3 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Sure.

4 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** --- why that was produced, or who
5 produced it.

6 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

7 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I can't answer that either.

8 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. You do recall seeing it though?

9 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Oh, yes.

10 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

11 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Definitely, yes.

12 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. Madam Registrar, if I can bother you
13 a third time, I'm wondering if you wouldn't mind pulling up paragraph 344 of the
14 Foundation Document?

15 So this is a quote from your interview with respect to recognition of
16 Brown Loop. So,

17 "S/Sgt. Halliday told the Commission that units were
18 moved to Brown Loop to seal off the 'blueberry field
19 road' route out of Portapique after they considered the
20 possibility that it may be traversable in an ATV or on
21 foot..."

22 And then your quote here is,

23 "...that's when I think I was looking at the ... [...] the
24 earth view [map --] of the map of that area, and I
25 remember looking at Brown's [sic] Loop, and looking
26 at the road directly across from that, and looking at a
27 line up, up a field, and I said, "What [...] is this? This
28 [...] looks like, you know, this could be a road." And I

1 don't know who it was, I don't recall, there [were] a lot
2 of people there, but it was evident that it was not a
3 road, that this was [...] not a road, this was a field that
4 went to a dead end; you could turn left there but you
5 couldn't come out. And I remember, you know,
6 saying, "Well, you know what? What if there's an
7 ATV or what if he comes out on foot [...]? Let's move
8 a car up to that [...] area just to kind of seal that off."
9 But that wasn't [un]til you know, that would[...] have
10 been [about] 'til 4:00 in the morning or so. So, that
11 was well after our initial arrival [...] the other
12 containment was predicated on the fact that by
13 vehicle there was one way in and one way [...] of that
14 area..."

15 So I'm wondering if you can provide some context with respect to
16 how the Brown Loop exit point, the blueberry field road exit route was observed and
17 what maps you were looking at when this observation took place.

18 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** So I'll go back to the detachment ---

19 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

20 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** --- first to help with the context, I
21 guess.

22 With the maps that I viewed at the detachment, and the information
23 that I had from local knowledge, and that was from S/Sgt Carroll, and I believe
24 information that was emanating from the OCC as well, that there was only one way in
25 and one way out of Portapique, and that would have been the main road that -- where
26 containment had been set up.

27 Browns Loop was evident on the maps that I saw at the
28 detachment, but there was no indication that there was any egress or access point from

1 there. So I was satisfied that based on the information I had at that time, that our
2 containment was set up in such a manner that anybody who was escaping, you know,
3 in a vehicle, would be intercepted. There would be nowhere for them to go from the
4 area of the village itself.

5 Recognizing, of course, that this is a, you know, relatively remote
6 geographic area that has water on many sides, it's forested on other sides, there's open
7 fields, anyone who was intent on escaping on foot or some other mode of
8 transportation, perhaps and ATV or something along those lines, likely would have had
9 lots of opportunity to flee the area if that was their intention, simply by virtue of the fact,
10 you know, I don't think there was anyway to adequately seal that entire geographic area
11 off, given, you know, the terrain and what we were dealing with there.

12 So once I'm at the Command Post, you know, there's a constant
13 assessment and reassessment of what is taking place and there's significant threat
14 cues emanating from that area throughout the night that would suggest that whoever
15 was responsible for what was going on down there was still in the area. And that was
16 based on, you know, reports of gunfire, reports of fires appearing to have been lit after
17 our members had been in there for some time, explosions, there were reports of
18 flashlights in the woods, vehicles in the area that were flashing lights. So there was all
19 kinds of stimuli that was coming from the scene that would suggest that the individual
20 was still in that area, which is why the Emergency Response Team and our first group
21 of members had been down in the area, you know, looking for the individual/individuals
22 who might have been doing that.

23 So as part of that reassessment in the evening, I had an
24 opportunity to see the Google Earth view of that and -- on one of the big screens that
25 was on the -- at the Command Post.

26 And I remember seeing this, what appeared to be a white line
27 connecting to the bottom of Brown Loop. And I brought this to the attention of, you
28 know, Al and Addie to say, you know, "What about this? This looks like it maybe of --

1 you know, there may be a point of egress here.” And, you know, at that time, I think
2 there was a belief that there was no road way there at all, that, you know, no one could
3 get out there in a car, perhaps maybe on foot or on some other type of, you know, all
4 terrain vehicle or whatever.

5 But I just felt that regardless, to err on the side of caution, I would
6 like to maybe look at moving our containment up to that area, in case, as this continues
7 on, the individual finds a way out up there. It was just, you know, it was just another
8 observation that I had made that perhaps maybe, to be safe rather than sorry, kind of
9 thing, let’s move somebody up to that area.

10 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. So you’re saying that you initially
11 viewed the line, what we’ll call the blueberry field road on a Google Map. Was that at
12 the detachment or at the Command Post? Sorry, I ---

13 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah, I ---

14 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Not sure?

15 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah, no, I really don’t think I had the
16 satellite view at the office.

17 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

18 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** But I recall distinctly having that view
19 at the Command Post.

20 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

21 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** So.

22 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** And you’re saying you observed it, raised it,
23 but that the suggestion, based on local knowledge, was that it wasn’t a containment
24 area to be concerned about?

25 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Right. Right.

26 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And then what prompted the
27 containment to ultimately be moved there then?

28 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Just a decision that okay, so maybe a

1 car can't get out, but perhaps somebody could traverse it some other way, so let's get
2 someone up there regardless.

3 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. I understand that you had also
4 contacted Angela MacKay, the, I guess, acting sergeant of the Major Crime Unit around
5 midnight on the 18th into the 19th?

6 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Into the 19th. Yeah. So that was still
7 back at the Bible Hill Detachment then. I've tasked Addie and Al with these
8 responsibilities, I've taken this phone call from Dave Lilly, I've updated the District
9 Policing Officer, I've received information now that the helicopter is not available.

10 Looking at, again, what appears to be the significance of events,
11 because go back to the Command Post, the significance has been, you know, of the
12 events have been much more greatly enhanced because we know more information
13 than what we knew at the time at Bible Hill.

14 So at the front end, I decided to call the Major Crime Unit to get
15 them in and on top of things so that they had, you know, as early an opportunity on the
16 ground floor as possible so that there was some situational awareness from their point
17 of view, because it was obvious that they were going to be required, you know, to
18 manage this investigation, you know, once the scene was secured, but that perhaps
19 they could provide some additional support in terms of, you know, information gathering,
20 profile building, you know, whatever else they could help with in the interim, perhaps
21 maybe with taskings that may come up while we were still working on securing that
22 scene.

23 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Right. And that's kind of what I'm interested
24 in. Is it typical, in a critical incident, to engage MCU, Major Crime, in the course of the
25 critical incident? My layman person's understanding is that they sort of come in
26 afterwards and commence their investigation. Is this a normal step as part of, "A critical
27 incident is ongoing, I'm going to engage MCU at this stage"?

28 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I would say my experience is that no,

1 typically they would be called in once the scene is secured, not that they wouldn't be
2 given some advance notice of what was taking place. But again, my thought process at
3 that time was to get them in as soon as I could to front end load, you know, what
4 apparently was becoming, you know, a major and significant event.

5 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And that kind of leads me to ask
6 some questions about obtaining information from witnesses.

7 So we know at this stage, when -- by the time you've arrived at the
8 Command Post, we know that four children who were witnesses had been transported
9 to the hospital alongside two officers. Was there any discussion at that stage of
10 ascertaining information that those children had relayed to the Command Post, whether
11 through MCU investigators or through the officers that had attended at the hospital with
12 them?

13 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** So just so I'm clear, ---

14 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Sure. Yeah.

15 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** --- because I'm not sure, can you just
16 repeat the question again? I know ---

17 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Yeah, sure.

18 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** --- where that's coming, but I just ---

19 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** I know. I know.

20 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** --- want to make sure I answer it for
21 you. So I ---

22 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** I get a bit ---

23 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** --- apologize.

24 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** --- long winded.

25 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** No, it's okay.

26 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** So I guess my question is, was there a
27 focus at that stage of engaging MCU or using any other means in order ---

28 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** To interview the children?

1 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** --- in order to get information ---

2 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I see.

3 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** --- from the children?

4 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** So the kids had been contained in the
5 house for quite some time after the arrival of the initial team. It wasn't until there were
6 more resources there that were available to be able to do that, where it was prudent to
7 sort of evacuate them from there. And even that was, you know, in my view, somewhat
8 of a risk, but it was weighing the risk of leaving them there versus removing them, and I
9 think in the middle of that process there was more gunfire, what was believed to be
10 gunfire erupting. So that was interrupted for sometime.

11 My concern with the children was more around their safety and
12 having them looked after than having them interviewed. You know, I -- I didn't task
13 anybody to interview them, and I think my thought process was likely around the
14 wellness of the children more so than anything. Because one of the tasks that was on
15 my list of things to do relative to the children was to engage the Department of
16 Community Services to find some way of, you know, providing whatever support could
17 be provided given the circumstances that they had just been through. So...

18 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Sure. So you recall that Sergeant Lilly had
19 attended the hospital with the children?

20 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes, I knew that.

21 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

22 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah.

23 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** And do you recall him returning to the
24 Command Post after being at the hospital?

25 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I do recall him returning.

26 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

27 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I don't recall what, if any, conversation
28 other than that the kids had been -- they've been looked after, they're okay, I think was -

1 - you know, that's all I remember.

2 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And I understand that the IARD
3 members had been evacuated. I guess around three in the morning they were at the
4 Command Post for a debrief.

5 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah, it was around 3:30, I think.

6 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Three-thirty?

7 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah.

8 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

9 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Somewhere around there.

10 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Yeah. And they arrived there with Clinton
11 Ellison, who had also been extracted?

12 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah. I didn't deal with Clinton. I
13 think Jason Pennoyer was tasked. So he was one of the other members on the scene.
14 I think he was tasked with dealing with Olsen [sic].

15 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. So an individual or a member was ---

16 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Or Ellison, sorry.

17 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** --- given the instructions to ascertain
18 information ---

19 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

20 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** --- from this witness?

21 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

22 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And do you recall getting any
23 information?

24 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** There was nothing to offer relative to
25 what we were looking for. He didn't have any information to provide us.

26 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** And then after the debrief, or in the course
27 of the debrief, you became aware of two witnesses, Andrew MacDonald and Kate
28 MacDonald ---

1 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

2 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** --- in Portapique.

3 And if I can, Madam Registrar, pull up paragraph 371.

4 I believe you tasked Corporal Rose-Berthiaume to conduct an
5 interview with Mr. MacDonald.

6 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

7 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Does that sound about right? And at
8 paragraph 371, we have:

9 "At 6:10 a.m., [Cpl. Rose-Berthiaume] told
10 S/Sgt. Halliday that Andrew MacDonald had been
11 interviewed. According to S/Sgt. Halliday's notes,
12 Mr. MacDonald said he saw the perpetrator flee in a
13 Ford Taurus in the opposite direction of the police,
14 and that Mr. MacDonald thought the suspect was
15 contained in Portapique 'because he fled away from
16 police and there was no other way out because police
17 have him blocked off. MacDonald can't see anyway
18 [sic] he could get out of the area.' The notes
19 continued: 'Information that all of [suspect's] prized
20 possessions are burned out, Motorbikes, tools, the
21 entire Quonset hut. Info passed on to CIC for their
22 info. Consultation with negotiators indicates that
23 much of the evidence points to possible closure
24 motivated behaviors.'"

25 So this was the information that had been relayed to you from
26 Cpl. Rose-Berthiaume?

27 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

28 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And then you later became aware

1 that this information was actually not an entirely accurate reflection of Andrew
2 MacDonald's statement with respect to the description of the vehicle, specifically?

3 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah. So when I spoke to
4 Cpl. Berthiaume [sic], what's contained in my notes is, you know, what I recall of our
5 conversation. And it's important, I think, to note at this time that by this time in the
6 morning, you know, we had initially a report of a marked RCMP car and possibly a -- an
7 RCMP officer being involved. There was -- that information had been, in terms of Dave
8 Lilly being involved, had been dispelled fairly early on in the evening.

9 We came -- we became aware early on in the evening, based on
10 information coming back from the scene, from the members, that they passed by or
11 witnessed a vehicle fitting the description of a white Ford Taurus or a Ford Taurus
12 burning at the scene and that they believed that to be associated to the events.

13 As the investigation continued, early on in the evening, I -- we were
14 aware that the suspect had three Ford Taurus's registered to him of an age that would
15 be consistent with those of decommissioned police cars. One of those was located at
16 the scene, or one -- a vehicle fitting that description was believed to have been linked
17 with the suspect at the scene by those members who were there; a second vehicle had
18 been located at the residence of Gabriel Wortman at Portland Street in Dartmouth; and
19 later on, in the early morning hours of the 19th, the third or a third vehicle was located at
20 a cottage that was believed to have been owned by Gabriel Wortman. So for a number
21 of hours in the morning, we have three vehicles that fit a description similar to that that
22 had been described by some of the witnesses who had been -- who had called in.

23 By the members who were at the scene, who were actually seeing
24 this, by members of the Halifax Regional Police, who saw this vehicle in the -- in the
25 parking lot of the -- of the suspect's residence, it was our -- my deduction that the three
26 vehicles that were registered to Gabriel Wortman had been -- were likely located there
27 at that scene. And you know, I believe that those of us in the Command Post were of
28 similar mind that the suspect vehicles that the -- that had been registered to him, three

1 vehicles that were similar in nature that were burning at that -- two of which were
2 burning at the scene, one was at the residence, had been accounted for.

3 So the information around a marked police car being involved,
4 again, it's really important to understand what we knew then versus what we know now
5 in relation to that vehicle, and following, you know -- deciphering through that
6 information to try to make reasonable assessments about what's taking place here.
7 Because there had been conflicting information about the description of the car. Some
8 described it as a marked police car.

9 You know, I'm aware myself, through my personal experience, that
10 there are lots of decommissioned police cars, particularly here in Nova Scotia, they
11 seem to be very popular, particularly in rural areas, and there have been occasions
12 when those decommissioned cars have residual markings left on them. Either the
13 decaling, as it's being removed is -- you know, there are -- there's adhesive that remains
14 that certainly gives the appearance. The side of an RCMP is, I would suggest, to most
15 Canadians unmistakable in terms of the decaling that goes on it, and there are times
16 when the reflective decaling on the rear bumpers is not removed at all for whatever
17 reason.

18 So you know, these are -- these are things that I'm formulating in
19 my head that, you know -- around the information with this marked car, and as it relates
20 to the vehicles that were registered to him, and as that relates to what we found at the
21 scene, combined with the threat cues that were coming out of there, that would suggest
22 someone is still in that area, for me it was reasonable to assess that the mode of
23 transportation that had initially been reported was one of those vehicles that was at that
24 scene that our members reported finding.

25 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Certainly. And I appreciate the information
26 that was available or that you knew at the time, but I guess what I'm wondering is -- as
27 you indicated, with hindsight, we know that the Blair and McCully children had a great
28 deal of knowledge, or had made a great deal of observations about the perpetrator and

1 his vehicles; you'd agree with me with that?

2 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

3 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** And we know that Andrew MacDonald in his
4 statement indicated that this was a vehicle with decals, and that there was also
5 potentially another road out of Portapique; we know that in hindsight. That was -- you'd
6 agree with me that that was important information? Yeah?

7 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** The second road out of Portapique,
8 you mean?

9 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Yes.

10 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah.

11 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** That he had indicated -- yeah, that would
12 have been important at that time. We know it now, but that's important information.

13 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I just want to back up a second.

14 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Sure.

15 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** So Andrew MacDonald said there
16 was a second road out of...?

17 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** In his statement that he provided at 5:00 in
18 the morning ---

19 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Right.

20 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** --- to Cst. MacFarlane, he indicated -- and
21 we can pull that up if necessary, but he indicated that there were decals on the car, and
22 was asked about other roads out of Portapique. And I don't have his statement in front
23 of me, I apologize, but he had indicated that behind a church -- and I'm paraphrasing --
24 there might be another access point with an ATV.

25 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Okay.

26 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** So that would have been important
27 information at the time, if you had obtained that information; is that fair to say?

28 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

1 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** And so I guess what I'm wondering is in
2 your view, looking forward, you had engaged MCU, and I know that there was
3 involvement of some GIS members, but in your view, is there a way that that information
4 from witnesses might more efficiently be relayed to members at Command Post so that
5 that information becomes available sooner? Do you have any thoughts on that regard?

6 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Well, I think that, you know, at the
7 time, when I received that call from Gerry, I don't know if I asked him, you know, at what
8 point he was interviewed, so I would have guessed that I was getting that information
9 fairly soon thereafter. My recollection of my call with Gerry was that the suspect had
10 driven down towards the water and there was -- that he was trapped down there; that
11 there was nowhere for him to go. That's my recollection of that. So that, to me, was
12 important information because it enhanced, you know, my belief that the suspect was
13 probably down still down in that area with that car.

14 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Yeah.

15 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** So...

16 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** I know when Lisa Banfield was located and
17 interviewed by Csts. Brown and Melanson at the Command Post, ---

18 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

19 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** --- do you recall whether the information
20 from Ms. Banfield was relayed to you directly from Csts. Brown and Melanson?

21 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** To...?

22 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** To yourself.

23 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** To me?

24 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Yes.

25 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I did have a conversation with Cst.
26 Brown, getting details from him in relation to her statement that she had taken, yes.

27 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And you were certainly able to
28 engage with him directly about the statement that he had just taken from her ---

1 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

2 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** --- the information he had just taken?

3 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

4 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. All right. Well, I'll move on and talk
5 about public communications.

6 I understand that you had initially contacted Cpl. Croteau around
7 5:00 a.m. on the morning of the 19th?

8 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

9 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** And you had actually asked her to come
10 and attend the Command Post?

11 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

12 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And that was in order to manage
13 media that you anticipated would arrive on scene?

14 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** That's right.

15 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And so there was no discussion at
16 that stage, was there, about content of tweets, or content of messaging to the public, I
17 should say, more broadly?

18 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** No, that wouldn't have been a
19 conversation that I would have had with Lisa.

20 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

21 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Again, we were dealing, at that time,
22 with the static incident, so my expectation would be that at some point media would
23 likely show up asking questions and looking for someone to provide information to them,
24 so Lisa was asked to come there in that capacity.

25 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** And then I understand it was later in the
26 morning around 7:00 a.m. that Lia Scanlan, the Director of Strategic Communications,
27 contacted the Command Post. I believe she contacted S/Sgt. West, and that he asked
28 for you to take on that task. Does that accord with your memory?

1 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes, I did have a conversation with
2 Lia ---

3 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

4 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** --- that morning, yes.

5 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. I'll pull up, if I can, Madam Registrar,
6 paragraph 453, 454.

7 **(SHORT PAUSE)**

8 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Yes, thanks.

9 So, yeah, the paragraph above indicates that S/Sgt. West had
10 spoken to Ms. Scanlan and had advised her to contact you. And then paragraph 454:

11 "At 7:15 a.m., S/Sgt. Halliday spoke with Lia Scanlan.
12 He updated Ms. Scanlan on the current situation and
13 advised that she contact S/Sgt. MacCallum."

14 Do you recall anything about that phone call or that specific
15 discussion?

16 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah. That was in relation to, you
17 know, the fact that, you know, we would need to start getting some messaging out to
18 the community about what was going on, and how that was going to be disseminated
19 and what that would look like.

20 How that message was -- how they were going to deliver that
21 message wasn't -- you know, I don't recall being part of the conversation, in terms of
22 platforms, but just around, you know how we were going to get word out that this was
23 taking place without either (a) compromising what was going on or (b) creating, you
24 know, a more difficult situation for us to manage. So that was really what we were
25 talking about at that time.

26 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** And it indicated that -- or the notes indicate
27 that you referred Ms. Scanlan to S/Sgt. MacCallum. Any specific reason for that or just
28 delegation of ---

1 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** So, again, at that point we are -- we
2 have had contact with Lisa Banfield and, you know, information was surfacing around
3 this additional car, this fourth car that was marked and contained equipment that
4 replicated, you know, an RCMP vehicle.

5 So from the time that we received that information from her,
6 meaning Lisa Banfield, again, there was a tasking to have the Emergency Response
7 Team check those vehicles that were located at the scene for -- to determine whether or
8 not it was potentially that they were -- you know, had lightbars and silent patrolmen.
9 Because I think the initial information was that there were guns on the front seat of the
10 car, and as more information became available through the interview, I think then it was
11 -- you know, it's there's a silent patrolman, there's roof lights. So the Emergency
12 Response Team were tasked to go down to, you know, eliminate or confirm that, in fact,
13 one of those two burned-out vehicles could potentially be the vehicle that Lisa Banfield
14 was referring to.

15 So when I talked to Lia at that time, we still would have been
16 working on confirming whether or not this was actually, possibly, still at the scene.

17 So it wasn't until just before eight a.m., we get word back from the
18 Emergency Response Team that they've had a very close look at these vehicles and
19 have determined that there's nothing -- even though, you know, they were fairly
20 significantly burnt, there was nothing to indicate that the remnants of a silent patrolman
21 or firearms were in the car. So it wasn't until then that, you know, there was a
22 confirmation that the cars that we have accounted for don't fit the description now that
23 Lisa Banfield was giving. So, obviously, now, you know, there's a fourth car that has
24 been unaccounted for. Having said that, there was still -- we didn't know where that car
25 was, and we didn't know where Gabriel Wortman was, but the area had not been
26 searched aerially. There were other areas there that potential existed that that car
27 could still be somewhere down in that area. And so in my conversation with Lia, at that
28 time, I don't expect that there was a suggestion that there would be a release of the

1 vehicle at that time, given the fact that it hadn't been -- you know, hadn't been ruled out
2 as potentially being one of those burned at the scene until almost eight o'clock, if that ---

3 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Yeah.

4 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** --- if that answers ---

5 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Yeah.

6 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** --- your question?

7 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Yeah, so why not -- you know, you haven't
8 been able to confirm it's there. Why not release it anyway? What's the thinking in terms
9 of we have this information? We haven't been able to account for that vehicle yet. But
10 why not just release it right out of the gate?

11 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah, I don't know if there was any
12 plan to not release it, you know, right away. My thought on that is when I passed that
13 information on to Comms, there's a plan in place that's moving forward to, you know,
14 address the issue and that's it. So when that was delegated out to Addie around eight
15 o'clock in the morning, there was conversation around -- you know, I think it's important
16 to understand that you have to make sure you followed all the steps before you start
17 getting ahead of yourself. And part of that is strategically, systematically taking those
18 steps to validate the information that you have is factual; right? And the fact that one of
19 those cars, or that car could potentially have been one burned at the scene, I think, is
20 important. Putting it out any sooner than that may have created an even more difficult
21 situation for our members to be dealing with, at that time. So I wouldn't have seen --
22 myself, I don't think I would have seen that going out before it was literally confirmed
23 that it wasn't one of those vehicles that was burned out at the scene.

24 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** And when you refer to difficulties for the
25 members, what do you mean by that in terms of if you release it in a premature fashion,
26 what kind of difficulties are you referring to?

27 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Well, you -- you know, you have a
28 marked police car that's on the road that may potentially contain someone in it, you

1 know, puts strain on our communications system, puts a strain on our members in terms
2 of their own safety, and how people may react to that, you know, so.

3 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Do you feel that the concern about creating
4 public panic or chaos was given priority over informing the public about the events as
5 they were unfolding and the information as it was unfolding?

6 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I think that that response was
7 balanced given the circumstances, I guess.

8 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. I wonder if I can move into sort of
9 more specifically, and I don't know to what extent this falls under your umbrella or under
10 the Strategic Communications umbrella, but the specific process with respect to -- I
11 know Tweets are crafted, presumably, by Strategic Communications?

12 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

13 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And that's with input or commentary
14 from the Command members at the scene?

15 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** You know, generally, we would not
16 get involved with the content of that unless it was something that might compromise the
17 operation or the investigation.

18 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. All right. And so once that message
19 is crafted by Strategic Communications, are they -- is it your view that they're in a
20 position to be able to publish instantaneously, or is that run for approval through
21 someone at the Command Post?

22 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** If they're -- you know, I'll speak from a
23 general detachment point of view first. You know, if they're -- if Strategic Comms is
24 carrying out messaging on behalf of a detachment, normally a Detachment Commander
25 would authorize the message going out, it would be reviewed, and it would go out. In
26 this case here, again, my thought would be that there was, you know, a fair bit of work
27 being done behind the scenes in order to craft that up. And, you know, I trust the
28 judgment of our communications people and how they operate, but I am aware that

1 there was approval requests coming to us to send these Tweets out. So in the first
2 instance, I hadn't been contacted because that had been delegated to Staff MacCallum.
3 So I will make the leap that those were coming back to him for approval. I didn't know
4 that, I don't think, at the time. Whether I believed that that was going to be the process,
5 I don't think I was necessarily focussed on that at the time. But I do know that there was
6 one that did eventually come to me for approval at 9:45 in the morning by email, and I
7 don't recall seeing that email until well after 9:45. But I did take a call from one of our
8 Comms people to approve a message with a photograph of the vehicle to go out.

9 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** That was Cpl. Clarke?

10 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** That's right.

11 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

12 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah.

13 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** All right.

14 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** So I'm aware that -- I am aware that
15 the -- at eight o'clock in the morning, that process had begun about, you know, the
16 messaging and how that was all going to go, and I'm also aware that prior to nine a.m.,
17 there was, you know, discussions around that messaging going out with the car prior to
18 nine a.m. So what was going on between eight and nine, I don't -- I can't answer that.

19 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And that does lead me to, Madam
20 Registrar, if you kindly could pull up paragraph 508 of the document? And it's a bit
21 lengthy, but this refers to -- and I realize you're not a direct party in these
22 communications, but I do want your commentary on it. So,

23 "As discussed in the *RCMP Public Communications*,
24 [...] Foundational Document..."

25 Which has not yet been exhibit, but,

26 "...at 9:08 a.m., S/Sgt. Carroll sent an email to [Risk
27 Manager] Briers in relation to the media release
28 inquiry made by Cst. Stevenson about the

1 perpetrator's fully marked replica RCMP cruiser.
2 S/Sgt. Carroll's email said that a decision had been
3 made not to release the information about the
4 perpetrator's replica RCMP cruiser to the media. It
5 stated: "Thought was given to [...] release about [the]
6 vehicle, but decision was made not to." [Risk
7 Manager] Briers replied back to S/Sgt. Carroll seven
8 minutes later, stating: "Very good. Kind of figured
9 they may not want to release.' S/Sgt. Carroll
10 recounted this exchange in his interview with the [...]
11 Commission..."

12 So he says:

13 "[Briers] had asked me about releasing information or
14 the photograph [...] I believe it was the photograph, I
15 [...] can't be a hundred percent certain. I said, 'Well
16 [...] I can't make that call. I'll have to feed that up [...]
17 and see what we're going to do with it,' which I did.
18 Hard to get a hold of people. I was on ... when Bruce
19 was talking to me, I was out ... I was mobile, I wasn't
20 at the command post. I did end up speaking with
21 Staff Halliday about it. I can't remember if he gave
22 me an answer right away or he was checking back,
23 but he came back at some point in time and I was
24 trying to get back to Briers. I couldn't get a hold of
25 him right away. I ended up sending him ... I sent him
26 an email saying, 'Yeah, they ... discussed, not going
27 to send it out right now. It's still under discussion,' or
28 still being looked at or whatever. I know it was sent

1 out afterwards.”

2 So I know you were presented with this at your own interview with
3 the Commission, but I am wondering if you can comment with respect to, in particular,
4 what your recollection is with respect to your discussions that you had with S/Sgt Carroll
5 about a media release in this regard?

6 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah, I was surprised to see that
7 email during my interview. I wasn't aware of its existence at the time. And I was
8 surprised to see the content of it because I had no recollection of anyone saying that
9 they would not be releasing the information. And that was the context to me that the
10 email was written in, and I was quite taken aback by that.

11 Frankly, I don't recall the conversation with S/Sgt Carroll. I'm not
12 saying it didn't occur, but I'm not sure of the context in which it occurred. And when I
13 look at, you know, the content of his interview, to me its not congruent with the content
14 of the email.

15 I think I would also say that at 9:08 a.m., it had already been
16 contemplated and prepared to have been set out long before that. So I'm just not -- I'm
17 not sure how that all sort of unfolded, which is why when I saw that email, I was very
18 surprised to see that.

19 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And so you would -- do you recall
20 having a phone discussion with S/Sgt Carroll around that time in the morning? Or were
21 you contacting him by phone regularly?

22 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** There was a lot going on at that time,
23 So I don't -- I don't recall that conversation. No.

24 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And I know you can't speak to the
25 observations of S/Sgt Carroll or his reasoning, but can you provide maybe some insight
26 into discussions that were being had that resulted in this email? Or is it just impossible
27 for you to say?

28 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I can only go by what's in the material

1 here, ---

2 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Sure.

3 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** --- that it was prompted by a question
4 from Cst Stevenson.

5 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Oh, yes. No. I just mean in terms of is
6 there any insight that you have as to why S/Sgt Carroll, and I know you can't speak to
7 his mindsight, but the discussions that were happening that could have created his
8 response, saying not ready to -- or that, "No, we're not going to release"? Decision
9 making ---

10 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** You'd have to ask him, because I
11 don't have a recollection of that.

12 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. So were you ever having any
13 conversations where you saying the decision was made not to release information to --
14 publicly?

15 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** No, because I didn't talk to anyone
16 who said that that information was not going to be released. I never heard that from
17 anyone.

18 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. All right. Very briefly, I know that
19 you were tasked with setting up a comfort centre for people evacuating from Portapique.
20 Is that correct?

21 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

22 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And you spoke to EMO in order to
23 facilitate that? Emergency Management Office?

24 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** That's right. Yes.

25 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And just -- I think I know the answer,
26 but in the course of your discussions with EMO at that stage, anything with discussion --
27 with respect to Alert Ready or alerting come up in that discussion?

28 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** No.

1 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And did you have any awareness or
2 had prior use of Alert or any comment on use of Alert Ready?

3 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah, no, I was unfamiliar with that
4 particular asset, I guess, if you will, being used in our environment. I, myself, didn't
5 receive the Alert Ready about the COVID one. Everyone else was receiving it and that
6 was about the extent of my knowledge of that, and I hadn't seen it used in the context,
7 and it simply wasn't in our playbook, that I was aware of, for sure.

8 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. Madam Registrar, I'm hoping if I can
9 pull up an audio clip, and I'll have the text presented as well alongside that.

10 And this is a radio communication, S/Sgt Halliday, that took place in
11 the morning, late morning, on the 19th.

12 And if you're able to play that, that would be great.

13 **[AUDIO PLAYBACK]**

14 So that's, as you can see, around just before 11:00. And there's a
15 couple of questions for me emerging out of this, but the first is this discussion about
16 shutting down Highway 4. Can you talk to me about what your mindset was and what
17 the discussions were with respect to road closures in response to this situation?

18 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** First of all, I think I misspoke. It was
19 Highway 2 I was referring to and I think Staff -- or Sgt Bernard was aware of that.

20 My mindset was, at that time, we had, you know, narrowed the
21 location of the vehicle down exponentially over where it had been, you know,
22 geographically earlier. We had more recent sightings of where the vehicle was. I
23 believe that that was around the time that Heidi had been ---

24 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** It's shortly afterwards. That's right. Yeah.

25 Had there been, prior to -- prior to that discussion, had there been -
26 - or that broadcast, I should say, had there been discussion about road closures as they
27 -- as an option?

28 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes, there had been conversation in

1 the Command Post about whether to block roads or whether to create sort of
2 checkpoints, or whether to have vehicles, you know, located strategically along, you
3 know, certain areas. And the decision was made to -- not to set up roadblocks, as it
4 were, because it posed an increased risk to the public with, you know, having, excuse
5 me, target rich environments, you know, set up where people were stationary in cars or
6 perhaps maybe faced with the subject, thinking it might have been a police officer. And
7 that was early on when the situation went dynamic.

8 At that point, after Heidi was shot and, you know, we had that net
9 sort of tightening down, it was my thought that, you know, we had the individual sort of
10 isolated in a much rural small area where we could maybe contain by having cars, you
11 know, surround that whole highway.

12 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** So it was essentially, as you say, getting a
13 geographical sense, a recent sighting, that's what prompted the discussion about
14 actually closing down specific roads? Okay. All right.

15 And the other thing I just wanted to ask you about, just from the
16 audio clip, is that you've asked Risk Manager Briers to coordinate that effort, ---

17 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

18 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** --- and I'm just wondering if you can offer
19 insight into the rationale for delegating that to the Risk Manager?

20 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** So earlier on in the -- in the event,
21 once it went dynamic, the control of the police cars on the road had been delegated to
22 the risk managers by the Incident Commander, just given, I guess, the -- their ability to
23 see who was where, who was on, where they were located, and to start moving those
24 vehicles in certain areas to try to anticipate the movements of the subject. They were in
25 a much better position to manage and control those than we were in the Command
26 Post.

27 And, you know, once the situation went dynamic, it became -- it
28 was no longer static. And in the traditional sense of a, you know, a CIC response in a --

1 in a static incident, the CIC—and you know what, probably the CIC's would be better left
2 to answer that question—but once the -- once it went from a static, traditional, sort of
3 barricaded type contained situation and it went mobile, you know, that was -- it made
4 sense to transition control of those on-road resources to the risk managers would could,
5 like I said, easier -- more easily maintain control and observation of who was where,
6 who was coming on, where they were, where they were going.

7 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Because of the technology they have at --
8 yeah. Okay. All right. And did you feel that communication between OCC and
9 Command Post was fairly smooth, given the circumstances?

10 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah, I think it -- you know, I thought
11 it was quite good, frankly, at the time. It seemed to be well controlled and everybody
12 seemed calm and working towards the common goal of addressing this issue.

13 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. Almost finished.

14 Madam Registrar, if you could pull up paragraph 386.

15 And Staff Sergeant Halliday, this is earlier in the morning when
16 you're starting to think ahead about replacing -- basically getting fresh people at various
17 locations. And at approximately 6:30 on April 19th, you brief the CrOps Officer and
18 District Policing Officer on the situation:

19 "His notes indicate that he advised that the
20 perpetrator remained at large in an unknown
21 location...was believed to be in the area."

22 We discussed:

23 "S/Sgt. Halliday's notes state that he advised that
24 relief for the current CIC team as well as himself
25 would need to be organized as the day continued on.
26 He also suggested that an 'Officer'" be present given
27 the magnitude of the situation. He confirmed that a
28 comfort centre had been set up and evacuation of

1 remaining Portapique residents would begin once air
2 support was overhead."

3 So of course, this is at 6:30 in the morning.

4 But I'm interested in your comment with respect to having an officer
5 present. What prompted you to make note of that, or what was your thinking at the
6 time?

7 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Well, I think, given the magnitude of
8 what we had been dealing with that night, that organisationally it would have been
9 appropriate to have someone in a senior command position be representative of the
10 organisation there, not only, you know, to demonstrate that, you know, that leadership
11 to our folks on the ground, but also, you know, I just felt it was appropriate that someone
12 in a senior position be there to understand what was going on and be a part of that.

13 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** And I understand Inspector Bell, I believe,
14 came -- attended the scene ---

15 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

16 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** --- sometime later that morning. And prior
17 to that, that officer position wasn't present at the Command Post?

18 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

19 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. All right. Those are all my questions,
20 Staff Sergeant Halliday. Thank you for assisting me with my direct. I'll perhaps turn it
21 over to the Commissioners at this point. Thank you.

22 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you very much,
23 Ms. Mancini.

24 Thank you, Officer. The process we have been following is that
25 once you've given your testimony proper, which you just have, we will break and
26 Commission Counsel will meet with counsel for the various Participants and decide if
27 there are any further questions for you, and if so, who would be asking them. So that's
28 what we'll do now.

1 And we will break until 1:45. Ms. Mancini, if you need more time,
2 just let me know.

3 So thank you.

4 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Thank you. The
5 proceedings are now on break and will resume at 1:45.

6 --- Upon recessing at 12:24 p.m.

7 --- Upon resuming at 1:48 p.m.

8 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Welcome back. The
9 proceedings are again in session.

10 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Good afternoon, everyone. And
11 thank you, Counsel, for meeting and discussing some further questions for our witness.
12 And I understand after agreement we will have three Participant Counsel,
13 Ms. McCulloch, Mr. Bryson, and Ms. Miller, posing additional questions. Thank you for
14 that. I will leave it to you, Counsel, to briefly introduce yourselves to the -- to the
15 witness.

16 So Ms. Mancini?

17 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Thank you, Chief Commissioner. So I --
18 we'd ask at this point for Staff Sergeant Halliday to return to the stand.

19 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you.

20 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** And I'll turn things over to Ms. McCulloch.

21 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY, Resumed:**

22 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you, Officer. Just to let
23 you know that following a meeting with Commission Counsel and counsel for the
24 Participants, three different counsel will be asking you some follow up questions,
25 beginning with Ms. McCulloch. And the counsel will introduce themselves and who they
26 represent.

27 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Thank you.

28 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** All right.

1 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Thank you.

2 **--- CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:**

3 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Good afternoon, Staff Sergeant, my
4 name is Sandra McCulloch. I'm a lawyer with Patterson Law, and our firm represents a
5 majority of the Participants identified as those most affected, including a number of the
6 families of deceased victims and individual Participants as well.

7 Staff Sergeant Halliday, I wanted to follow up on a variety of areas.
8 I have a number of questions, so it may across a little bouncing around, but I'll try to be
9 as efficient as I can.

10 I wanted to follow up on an area in relation to the perpetrator's
11 marked police vehicle. As I understand it, the earliest indication of that, of which you
12 were aware, was conveyed to you by Staff Sergeant Rehill during your very earliest
13 conversation with him ---

14 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes, that's fair.

15 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** --- correct?

16 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

17 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. And I understand that he
18 provided words to the effect of there being a police car or a marked-up car being
19 involved that was relayed to you by Staff Sergeant Rehill. Yes?

20 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** That is correct, yes.

21 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Thank you. He didn't convey the
22 source of that information to you?

23 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** No, I don't recall him telling me who --
24 where that came from. I would have made the leap that it came from a caller, one of --
25 one of the 9-1-1 calls ---

26 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay.

27 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** --- that had come in.

28 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** And it was during that conversation

1 that you understand that, or understood, rather, that there was a suggestion of a
2 member potentially being involved?

3 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes, that's correct.

4 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. And so is it fair for me to
5 describe that the idea that a member might have been involved somewhat legitimised
6 the idea that there might be a marked police vehicle involved as well?

7 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I think it's -- yes, it's -- it's safe to say
8 that when the information that Dave Lilly could potentially have been involved as a
9 member, and the inference that there could potentially be a marked car involved, that
10 that sort of validated the potential for that existence.

11 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** And so I understand that after you
12 determined that the member in question was not involved that you started re-reflecting
13 on the information that Staff Sergeant Rehill had conveyed to you. I understand from
14 your statement that you, and this is a portion at page 8 of your statement, you describe
15 it as:

16 "..."I started playing back, you know, in my head the
17 information that Brian had provided and something
18 strange, it's like a marked car, something along those
19 lines."

20 And then in your statement, you go on to talk about your knowledge
21 about decommissioned vehicles in the province.

22 Do you recall that -- communicating that to the Commission -- the
23 Mass Casualty Commission in your statement?

24 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah, so as I said earlier, when it was
25 confirmed through me that Dave was not involved, I started thinking about other
26 possibilities, given the fact that sometimes references to old police cars, or, you know,
27 an RCMP car with decals sometimes, as I mentioned, the decals stay on there, so the
28 glue sometimes stays on, so I just started thinking about other possibilities that may

1 have transpired.

2 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** So that was a thought process that
3 happened quite early on in the RCMP's response?

4 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** In my thought process, for sure. It
5 was after I had confirmed that Dave was not involved, just reflecting on other potential
6 possibilities.

7 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Is it fair to say that this other
8 potential possibility of the vehicle in question being a decommissioned vehicle, is it fair
9 to say that that almost made a little more sense at the time?

10 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I would say, yes, that to fathom, you
11 know, an RCMP car as we know now turned out to be in existence, that wasn't realistic
12 to me, so that was part of my thought process for sure.

13 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. And again, if I understand
14 you correctly from this morning, at that point, you were not working with information that
15 was conveyed from Andrew and Kate MacDonald, witnesses who had seen the vehicle
16 on the ground?

17 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** No, I didn't know about that at that
18 time.

19 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Right. And as I understand it, you
20 weren't aware about the MacDonald's, even their existence, much less their encounter
21 with the perpetrator until quite a bit later, around 3:30 in the morning?

22 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah, when I first had a debrief with
23 the contact team. I think that's the first time that I was aware of their existence.

24 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. And just for point of
25 clarification, in your materials you use the phrase "contact team" a lot. Are you referring
26 to the IARD team when you ---

27 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Sorry.

28 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** --- use that phrase?

1 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes, that's right.

2 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. Thank you. So you just
3 indicated that it was the contact team or the IARD team that brought this information to
4 your attention. So if others were aware, such as S/Sgt. Rehill, if others were aware of
5 this encounter that the MacDonalds had and the information they had, that hadn't been
6 relayed to you by them?

7 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Not at that point.

8 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** S/Sgt. Halliday, in your materials, in
9 particular your statement to the Mass Casualty Commission, you describe having
10 tasked S/Sgt. MacCallum, and this is at page 25, you describe it as,

11 "Tasking S/Sgt. MacCallum as well with the residents
12 who had been evacuated and those who hadn't, to do
13 his best to sort of track that for us, so that we would,
14 you know, in the end, know who was out and who
15 wasn't out." (As read)

16 So can you describe what instructions you provided to S/Sgt.
17 MacCallum in that regard?

18 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I would say they were along the lines
19 of what's contained in my statement, just to do the best he could to try to determine who
20 was out of that area and who might still remain there.

21 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. So was there instructions to
22 gather, for example, names and addresses of people who were exiting the community?

23 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

24 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. Was there any instructions to
25 query these individuals with any pertinent information or intelligence that would benefit
26 the RCMP's response on the ground?

27 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** No, I wouldn't -- I didn't ask him to do
28 that, no.

1 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** And are you aware of whether and
2 how any sort of record of that information was compiled?

3 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I'm aware that there was a list
4 contained on the Command Post wall, I think, of residences that had been cleared, but
5 I'm not aware of the existence of a list of residents that was compiled.

6 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. So if somebody was making
7 a note of names and addresses of people who were driving out of the community, you're
8 not aware of that?

9 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I haven't seen that.

10 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. Thank you.

11 In the context of information that you have provided about these --
12 what you describe as threat cues within the Portapique community, you reference a
13 number of times in your materials, and you said so again this morning of members on
14 the ground seeing fires where they hadn't been fires before. And I'm curious, I'm aware
15 of -- or has been brought out in public proceedings that one of the homes, the home of
16 John Zahl and Joanne Thomas, not being observed on fire during a first pass by the
17 IARD team and then later seeing that home ablaze during a later pass by that
18 residence. What other fires, when you use the plural in your materials, what other fires
19 are you referring to as being lit at a later time?

20 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Nothing specific. Based on the radio
21 traffic that I heard, I referred to fires in the plural because I knew there was more than
22 one fire burning.

23 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. So in terms of identifying a
24 specific fire that wasn't there and then was there later, you don't have any other
25 examples to provide?

26 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I don't have any information on where
27 specifically that fire started or didn't. I just heard reference to a fire starting after their
28 arrival, or at least being noticed after their arrival.

1 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. Thank you. And that brings
2 me to my next comment, and I wanted to put it to you that while there's a suggestion
3 that a fire could have been lit, you know, after members had exited an area, it's certainly
4 plausible that those fires could have been previously lit and, you know, generated into a
5 visible fire or engulfing a home over a longer period of time?

6 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

7 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. So it's not necessarily an
8 indicator of the perpetrator's continued presence in the area?

9 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I would say it's not necessarily, but
10 given what was going on down there, it was consistent with an observation that would
11 be plausible.

12 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. There's a reference in your
13 statement, sir, it's found at page 33 of your statement to the Mass Casualty Commission
14 -- and forgive me, Commissioners, I've referenced the statement a number of times
15 without describing the identifier to that. That's been exhibited as number 1072. It has a
16 COMM Number of 19379. So my apologies for not indicating that earlier.

17 S/Sgt. Halliday, there's a reference at page 35 of that statement
18 where you describe,

19 "Our contact team believed they had chased the
20 suspect through the woods at 1:30, 2 o'clock in the
21 morning, you know, and lost the person in the woods."

22 (As read)

23 Are you aware of which members described having chased the
24 perpetrator through the -- or chased who they believed to be the suspect through the
25 woods at 1:30 or 2 o'clock in the morning?

26 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Based on the radio traffic, it was Cst.
27 Beselt, Cst. Patton, Cst. Merchant.

28 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Is -- now I understand this 1:30, 2

1 o'clock in the morning to be after the children were removed and before the IARD team
2 themselves were removed as well.

3 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah.

4 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** So I just want to put it to you, are
5 you certain in saying 1:30 or 2 o'clock, are you certain that that's your recollection?

6 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I heard a transmission of that nature.
7 To tell you specifically what time that was now, I can't.

8 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. And you mentioned it being
9 either Csts. Beselt, or Merchant, or Patton. You can't tell me specifically who you recall
10 relaying that?

11 S/Sgt. Halliday, a number of times in your documents, including the
12 statement to the Mass Casualty Commission that I just mentioned, you describe
13 learning from the IARD team, and this would have been around 3:30 in the morning,
14 that they were reporting 5 deceased victims that they had located in the Portapique
15 community. Do you recall who those victims were?

16 Do you recall whether there was any indication about where those
17 victims were found by the IARD team?

18 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I will say it's, again, a bit of a
19 challenge to separate what I know now from what I knew then, and I -- there was a male
20 on the road near one of the fires, and I remember conversation about a female victim in
21 a yard near a fence. Other than that, no, I can't.

22 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. So you can't help me to
23 understand who the third, or fourth, or fifth deceased victim was?

24 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I don't even know who the ones that
25 I'm talking about now ---

26 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay.

27 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** --- were.

28 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Very good.

1 And a similar question, sir, in your materials, and I find this in the --
2 your notes, which is identified as COMM No. 10697, and that has an exhibit number of
3 161, for the record.

4 You indicate that the IARD team, in addition to reporting five
5 deceased, you indicate that they can confirm that there may be more given the number
6 of fires burning and you used the number six, that there were six fires burning.

7 Are you able to identify, are you -- when you put that in your
8 materials, are you referring to buildings that were on fire or some other types of fire?

9 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I don't know if those fires included
10 vehicles or a vehicle that was burning. I don't -- I don't know.

11 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. Earlier this morning, sir, you
12 spoke about the -- your exposure to maps during your time overnight, and I'm not going
13 to ask you those questions again. But I wanted to clarify, I understand that from your
14 review of the maps, you were satisfied that there was just one way in and one way out
15 of Portapique by vehicle. That's correct?

16 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

17 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. Are you -- were you aware of
18 the broadcast that Constable Colford had made earlier that evening at 10:48 where she
19 described being told there's a road "kind of a road that someone could come out before
20 here"?

21 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** At 10:48?

22 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Ten forty-eight (10:48), yes.

23 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I hadn't left my residence at that point,
24 so I wouldn't have been on the radio then. I wouldn't have heard that and I wasn't
25 aware of it.

26 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. So you didn't hear for it
27 yourself and nobody relayed that information to you subsequently.

28 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** No.

1 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Is it fair to me to say, sir, that if you
2 had been made known that Constable Colford had received information of a possible
3 other way out of Portapique that that would have -- that would have impacted how you
4 assessed maps and the containment situation in Portapique?

5 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Certainly. Any information that would
6 have come in, you know, at that point would have been under consideration, for sure.

7 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** And just back to the point that I dealt
8 with a moment ago, your conclusion that there was only way in and out of Portapique by
9 vehicle, I understand that you made that conclusion from your review of Google Maps?

10 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** That was in combination with
11 information provided to me as well by Staff Sergeant Carroll, who I took to know the
12 area.

13 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. So at that point, there hadn't
14 been anyone sent out to investigate the roadways in Portapique to see if that was a
15 plausible way out, the white line that you had identified.

16 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** In those early stages, my
17 understanding of the focus from those members that were on the ground was about
18 dealing with the immediate issue at hand, so I don't know if that answers your question
19 or not. I'm sorry.

20 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** No, I believe so.
21 I just wanted to clarify that it wasn't under consideration to have
22 somebody actually take a vehicle down and inspect that white line that you had
23 observed on the maps.

24 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** That white line, I don't think I
25 observed until quite some time later in the morning, and after that was observed I took
26 steps to move someone up into that position so I didn't send anybody out to go verify
27 that. I just sent someone up to cover that area off.

28 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Thank you.

1 I wanted to follow up. You had mentioned -- earlier today you had
2 described FLIR technology. Can you remind us what the acronym for that stands for?

3 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes. Forward-Looking InfraRed.

4 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** And I understand that you had
5 believed that the -- the DNR helicopter that you were looking into securing had that
6 capability?

7 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

8 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. Now, I understand from
9 reading your materials that it had also been a consideration as to whether any local fire
10 departments might have had that technology, okay, but that wasn't an option that was
11 pursued.

12 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** The issue around FLIR in that area, I
13 think, by the time it was secured, our Emergency Response Team, who have similar
14 technology, were getting close to arriving at the scene. The other consideration with
15 those devices is ensuring that you have someone who's capable of operating it. We
16 wouldn't have allowed the fire department or anything like that in there to manage that.

17 But those were some of the things that were on the checklist early
18 on in the -- in the event, one, the helicopter wasn't available, what else is available. And
19 I think by the time I was aware of that, our ERT guys were -- were pretty much
20 approaching the scene, so.

21 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. So in terms of just because
22 of that timing, that inquiry hadn't been made of any local fire departments to see if they -
23 - they might have that technology to assist.

24 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I think there was -- there was inquiries
25 made with local fire departments, yeah.

26 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. Who would have made those
27 inquiries?

28 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Staff MacCallum, I think, made those

1 calls.

2 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** So it's your understanding that Staff
3 Sergeant MacCallum would have made those inquiries?

4 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

5 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. Sir, you had spoken earlier
6 about you having assumed responsibility for making arrangements for the comfort
7 centre.

8 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes

9 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. And that was the comfort
10 centre that was eventually set up at the Onslow-Belmont Fire Brigade?

11 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

12 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Who was responsible for informing
13 members about this comfort centre having been set up at that location?

14 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** That would have been broadcast with
15 those members who were escorting the -- the remaining residents out of the area, and
16 at that time, that would have been the Emergency Response Team members.

17 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. So would you have asked
18 the ERT for relaying that information or would somebody else?

19 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** That would have been the Critical
20 Incident Commander.

21 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. So at that point, that would
22 have been Staff Sergeant West?

23 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Staff Sergeant West, yes.

24 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** So he would have conveyed the
25 information to the ERT team that this comfort centre was established and open for
26 business, so to speak.

27 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes. Yes.

28 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. What about -- you described

1 that -- the ERT team being responsible for conveying that to individuals coming out of
2 Portapique. Was that information to be conveyed to the general public -- excuse me,
3 the general membership of the RCMP, the existence of this comfort centre?

4 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Are you talking about a general
5 broadcast that something's out there? I don't know if that was done, and I don't know if
6 that was considered. I don't recall that.

7 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Do I understand you correctly that if
8 that was going to be done, that would have been a responsibility of Staff Sergeant
9 West, to make that decision?

10 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Whether or not to broadcast that to
11 everybody?

12 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Yes.

13 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah, I think that would certainly rest
14 in his -- in his domain, for sure.

15 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Now, sir, I understand from
16 reviewing your materials that at some point you provided an instruction to convey
17 information to the Truro police department in terms of locking down the town in some
18 fashion when the perpetrator was -- had moved on from Debert.

19 Can you -- can you explain that a little more what instruction you
20 sent out, and to whom?

21 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes. I spoke with Staff Sergeant Dan
22 MacGillivray, who was arriving at the command centre. I'm not exactly what time he
23 arrived, but he was there and I looked at Dan and asked Dan to get in touch with Truro
24 police department and ask them to, you know, close access to their town down.

25 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Are you aware if he did that?

26 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes. Yes, he did. Yeah.

27 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** You indicated earlier here today, sir,
28 that part of your responsibilities prior to your retirement involved being a participant in

1 IARD training.

2 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

3 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** And you discussed this a little bit in
4 your statement to the Mass Casualty Commission, and at one point you used the
5 phrase, "Our folks simply weren't trained for that type of IARD".

6 I wonder if you can elaborate on that for our benefit today.

7 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** The situation that our members were
8 dealing with there, although it's an immediate active threat, so an immediate active
9 event, they were using tactics and skills based on -- you know, the information that I
10 was gleaning from what they were doing, they were using some of the tactics and
11 techniques and skills that were taught to them in our traditional IARD training.

12 However, when I look at the geography and the topography and,
13 you know, the type of rural environment that they were operating in, I would equate that
14 more to a bush tracking event than I would a traditional IARD response. And when I
15 make that reference that our members simply weren't trained for that, my reference is
16 around our members going into rural wooded areas in the dark without the aid of night
17 vision and those kinds of assets is not something that they've trained for.

18 And this is a bit of a challenge for me to talk about this, because
19 those are probably some of the bravest people that, you know, I ever met and they put
20 themselves at great risk and great harm to do good in that community and when I look
21 at what they did based on the training and the equipment that they had, it's really quite
22 remarkable.

23 So when I talk about they're not trained for that, I'm talking about
24 the fact that they're not trained to track armed suspects through the woods in the dark in
25 rural areas. That's what I'm referring to.

26 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. And I think that in your
27 statement, you used the phrase that the IARD training often takes place in well lit areas
28 with clearly defined boundaries and spaces?

1 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

2 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. And that's what you're
3 referring to here today?

4 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes, that's right.

5 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** And so thinking ahead to takeaways
6 from the Commission's work, is it fair for me to say that it would -- that you would agree
7 that tactical training -- tactical IARD training in the future could only benefit from
8 inserting other variables into the scenarios that members are exposed to, such as, as
9 you say, outdoor scenarios, different lighting, and so forth?

10 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I certainly recognize the challenges
11 that go with that type of training. And I recognize the fact that when you have an event
12 like this, that no one has ever been faced with before, that there has to be opportunities
13 to look and assess what we can approve on, what we can learn, to provide our
14 members with, you know, the best opportunity for success to protect the public.

15 And I think that when we look at past events, you know, such as
16 Columbine, as an example, which I think, for all intents and purposes, was the
17 beginning of immediate action type deployment training for police officers, it was
18 certainly effective and had proven to be effective in the environments for which it was
19 designed. And now we are faced with another level of situation that requires an
20 adaptation and a reflection on whether or not the current IARD tactics are adequate for
21 that type of event and whether or not we could put ourselves in a position, a better
22 position to be successful in that regard.

23 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Sure. And just to follow up on a
24 point you've made describing this as a new type of environment, I think it's fair to say
25 that the type of environment has always existed, but perhaps the threat hasn't been --
26 you know, that sort of event hasn't happened before?

27 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Sorry, let me clarify. When I refer to
28 environment, I mean operating environment. So when I say that term, I mean operating

1 in an operational situation where we have an armed gunman in the dark, trapezing
2 through the woods, lighting fires, doing those kinds of things. I don't mean specifically
3 the, you know, the rural environment, but the operational environment in and of itself,
4 because that includes the following day when the individual is operating in a marked
5 RCMP car, armed, and continuing on, you know, those events.

6 So when I say that -- but to include the geographic environment
7 and the challenges that no light, low light areas present in, you know, in rural
8 communities across the country.

9 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** So just in light of the fact that we
10 have these rural communities and, you know, these sorts of exterior conditions all
11 across our country, is it fair for me to say that it is an opportunity for IARD training to
12 expand somewhat to encompass these different kinds of variables in training in the
13 future?

14 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

15 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. I wanted to follow up on a
16 point in relation to your communications with Lia Scanlan. Earlier today you had given
17 evidence that come the 8:00 o'clock hour, or at or around the 8:00 o'clock hour, the
18 ERT had confirmed that the burned-out vehicle in Portapique didn't have the signs of a
19 silent patrolman or firearms, and therefore there was the possibility of another unknown
20 vehicle that was a marked police vehicle being in the community.

21 And, Madam Registrar, if you could please pull up, this is S/Sgt
22 Halliday's notes. This is Document 10697, Exhibit 161.

23 And I just -- I want to put -- give you the benefit of your notes before
24 I ask you questions of them.

25 And this is the timestamp, Madam Registrar, of 7:55 in the morning
26 of the 19th.

27 So, S/Sgt Halliday, we see in your notes, and I don't know the exact
28 moment that these would have gone into your notes, but it's somewhere between the

1 7:55 timestamp and the next time stamp of 8:18 in the morning.

2 The bottom portion of that large paragraph, you record that:

3 "We are concerned though there is a possibility he may
4 be on the run in a fully marked RCMP PPMV 28B11.

5 This has to be communicated out to the members, J
6 Division, All municipal agencies, PD's and border
7 crossings and we have to get it out to the public ASAP."

8 Do you recall recording that into your notes?

9 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

10 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. And I just want to clarify, I
11 know that you spoke about this at some length this morning, but I want to make sure
12 that we're perfectly clear. When you indicate that you're describing this police cruiser,
13 the 28B11 cruiser the perpetrator was believed to have and needing to get information
14 out to the public ASAP, I want -- I just want to be perfectly clear, what is it that you
15 expected to be communicated to the public and when?

16 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** My thought at that time was that we
17 somehow needed to let the public know that this car was out there, along with the
18 individual. I tasked that to S/Sgt MacCallum to continue those conversations and get
19 that out. And that was my expectation, that that was going to take place in the
20 immediate future.

21 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** And you're satisfied that S/Sgt
22 MacCallum and Ms. Scanlan both understood your expectations?

23 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I'm confident that Addie did for sure. I
24 don't know if there -- was there any -- I don't know if there was any misunderstanding
25 between Lia and I, but that would have been my thought process at the time.

26 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** You had no information or indication
27 from Ms. Scanlan that she didn't understand you?

28 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Not that I recall, no.

1 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** And I understand from your
2 information this morning that if there were subsequent discussions that declined or
3 opted not to provide the information to the public, you weren't involved in those
4 discussions? Okay. And you weren't informed of any such discussions?

5 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** No.

6 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** And as between you as the
7 operations officer and the other commanding officers, and I'm thinking particularly of
8 S/Sgt West, who is the critical incident commander, who would have been responsible
9 for making decisions about informing or warning the public of something like the
10 perpetrator's vehicle?

11 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** That was tasked to me by Jeff at 7:00
12 a.m. to deal with the comms people. And then I delegated that to Addie to work with
13 comms on that.

14 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. Thank you, sir. Those are
15 my questions.

16 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you, Ms. McCulloch.
17 Mr. Bryson?

18 **--- CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:**

19 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Good afternoon, Staff Sergeant Halliday.
20 My name is Josh Bryson. I represent the family of Peter and Joy Bond. They resided in
21 Portapique.

22 Do you require a break before we continue?

23 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** No, I think -- I'm fine for now, thank
24 you.

25 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. So by 8:00 a.m. that morning,
26 April 19th, you had tasked staff sergeants to get information out to the public in regards
27 to the mock cruiser. Is that correct?

28 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

1 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. So does it surprise you that the --
2 that the Tweet that was subsequently released depicting the mock cruiser didn't go out
3 until 10:17 a.m., roughly well over two hours after that direction was given?

4 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

5 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. So that was not acceptable to
6 you?

7 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I didn't know about that until quite
8 sometime later.

9 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. So I -- because I just want to also
10 pick up on some developments that occurred after eight o'clock.

11 And Madam Registrar, can you queue up Colchester call logs,
12 COMM3806, please? This is line 4496. This is an exhibit in this proceeding.

13 Did you continue to be apprised of the matter as it -- as it was
14 unfolding on the morning of April 19th, Staff Sergeant?

15 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I'm sorry, I'm -- I'm looking at this, I'm
16 sorry...

17 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay, sorry. I'll just -- I'll ask my
18 question ---

19 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah.

20 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** --- then I'll refer you ---

21 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Okay.

22 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** --- to some text ---

23 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

24 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** --- and I'll certainly give you an
25 opportunity ---

26 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

27 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** --- to take your time ---

28 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes, yes.

1 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** --- and read it.

2 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Sorry, sorry. Yeah.

3 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** So you continued to be involved, you
4 continued to be apprised of the developments in Colchester County and surrounding
5 counties as this matter unfolded on the morning of April 19th?

6 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

7 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. So this particular ---

8 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** To the -- to the extent possible.
9 There was a lot of information going on at that time, but yes, absolutely.

10 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. So line item 4496. This is the first
11 account I believe we have that the perpetrator is active the next day. This ---

12 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

13 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** --- recounts the, what we later learned, to
14 be the death of Ms. Campbell. And an RCMP vehicle is described there, observed ---

15 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

16 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** --- left, heading towards Truro. So you
17 were aware of this development?

18 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

19 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. And again, that's a -- that's a
20 clear indication too that this is likely our perpetrator and he's definitely out of Portapique.

21 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** That's correct.

22 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah. And I believe at this time ERT
23 was now responding, and they were treating this as the perpetrator as well at this time?

24 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

25 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay.

26 Madam Registrar, if we can go to line 4558.

27 We then have at line 4458 [sic], we have Corporal Peterson, this is
28 when Corporal Peterson was actually travelling Highway 4 and came face-to-face with

1 the perpetrator, and indicates that:

2 "He just passed me going to Masstown. He has a
3 reflective vest on."

4 Do -- were you aware of this development in real time?

5 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I don't know if I heard the
6 transmission, but I certainly knew that morning, yes, that that had transpired.

7 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. And just above that, he's
8 indicating that:

9 "The car we're looking for is a fully PC, 28-Bravo-
10 11..."

11 Okay? And that's ---

12 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

13 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** --- more information that was obtained ---

14 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

15 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** --- as this was unfolding?

16 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** That's right.

17 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And then further down, we have
18 Constable Fahie at 4576, and Constable Fahie indicates:

19 "And heads-up, he has a front push bar --- front push
20 bar [in the vehicle]."

21 Do you recall hearing that discussed at around this time?

22 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I don't know if I heard that specific
23 transmission.

24 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay.

25 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah.

26 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Did you know the vehicle had a push bar
27 on it around this time?

28 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I had seen the photograph of the car -

1 --

2 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yes.

3 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** --- that had been received by Staff
4 Sergeant MacCallum, and it was on a cell phone. I don't recall if I specifically took note
5 that there was a front push bar on that car at that time.

6 So -- yeah, I don't -- I don't know -- I don't remember if I did see
7 that. I was looking at the car and just couldn't believe that this had been reproduced.
8 But...

9 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** So just to back up with what you're
10 saying. So the photograph you indicate that you saw is the photograph that Staff
11 Sergeant MacCallum had received from HRP ---

12 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

13 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** --- at roughly 7:27 a.m. on April 19th.
14 And you don't recall if you could see a push bar in that photo or not?

15 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I'm not saying that it wasn't visible, I
16 just don't recall if I picked that out as a -- as a remarkable feature.

17 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. You'd agree that that would be a
18 distinctive detail in Nova Scotia to see a push bar on an RCMP vehicle?

19 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Not necessarily. There are RCMP
20 vehicles, or there were RCMP vehicles with push bars on them, but they were not
21 common.

22 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay.

23 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah.

24 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** So it would be a distinctive feature of the
25 vehicle?

26 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** As I say, there were other cars with --
27 RCMP cars with push bars, but it would be noticeable for sure. A push bar would be
28 noticeable, yes.

1 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay.

2 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah.

3 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And in fact, and hopefully I'll do my best
4 to try to characterise this correctly, but we had Constable Fahie that testified to this
5 Commission, and he gave evidence that he was in -- at some point in charge of the fleet
6 for police cars, and he noticed the push bar from that photo, and he indicated words to
7 the effect that that was a distinctive feature ---

8 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Right.

9 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** --- for him.

10 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** M'hm.

11 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** So -- so you don't disagree with that
12 particular statement?

13 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah. I can't speak to what his
14 thoughts are on it, but ---

15 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah.

16 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** --- I have seen RCMP cars with... But
17 if you're asking me if that's something that was -- would be important in a description, I
18 would agree, yes.

19 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay.

20 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes, yes.

21 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And that's essentially what I'm getting at,
22 that it would be an important descriptor. That it would certainly be a way to distinguish
23 this car from the other -- most of the other police cars that were on the road on
24 April 19th.

25 So there was a decision made to Tweet a picture of the imitation
26 cruiser; correct?

27 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

28 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yes. And you were involved in that

1 decision to send out that Tweet?

2 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Not the Tweet, specifically, but to get
3 the information out. I think I mentioned earlier this morning, I wasn't privy to the
4 platform I don't think, or at least wasn't alive to the platform that was going to be used to
5 get that out.

6 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay, thank you.

7 Madam Registrar, can we please queue up COMM16645? This is
8 not an exhibit, it's a message. It's -- I'll wait until we get it on the screen there.

9 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Shall we make it an
10 exhibit?

11 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** I would ask that we do so.

12 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** It's 1545.

13 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Thank you.

14 Staff Sergeant, just take a moment to look at this, starting at the
15 top.

16 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

17 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:**

18 "Approved by Steve Halliday." (As read)

19 That's yourself?

20 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

21 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:**

22 "Tweet for approval. Immediate, please. 22B11 -
23 description." (As read)

24 And that was the erroneous description that was later corrected;
25 right? Initially, there was an understanding that it was 22B11, but that was amended to
26 reflect the understanding that it was 28B11?

27 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes. Yeah.

28 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay.

1 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** So -- I can't -- I can't see the ---

2 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay.

3 Madam Registrar ---

4 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** --- photo. Sorry.

5 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** --- if we can please scroll down so we
6 can see the picture.

7 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Twenty-eight (28), yes.

8 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah. So do you recall approving that
9 this Tweet be sent out?

10 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** By phone.

11 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** By phone.

12 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah.

13 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay.

14 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** So there was an email sent. This
15 email was sent to Staff Sergeant MacCallum at 9:40 a.m. I think that was just minutes
16 before the information had come in about the shooting on Highway 4 in Wentworth.
17 And the next email I think is 9:45 to me, asking for me to approve it because Addie,
18 Staff MacCallum was busy. My understanding is that Staff MacCallum had jumped
19 aboard with the Police Dog Service to go and deal with the individual.

20 And I would have been heavily tasked at 9:45 with what was taking
21 place there at that time, so I wouldn't have been checking my emails. So my
22 recollection is that Jen had called me on the phone, and I don't -- I don't recall what I
23 said to her, but I think it was something along the lines of, "Yeah, just get it out",
24 whatever that would have been because I would have been distracted with the events
25 that were unfolding at that moment.

26 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. So just a few questions in that
27 regard. So first, this is the content that you expected to be delivered shortly after
28 8:00 a.m.? Some of the content that you expected to be delivered to the public shortly

1 after 8:00 a.m.?

2 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Again, I delegated to Addie to work
3 with Communications on that. How that message would go, typically we would, you
4 know, the -- give them the latitude to be able to frame that, you know, to the best
5 advantage that we could.

6 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Well, were you -- did you express
7 outrage, dismay that here we are at 9:49, that this information still has not been
8 conveyed to the public?

9 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I don't recall expressing dismay. I
10 was certainly dismayed about what was taking place on the road at that time as well, so
11 I'm not sure what my emotions were in relation to the media piece.

12 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah. Do you know why this wasn't
13 done shortly after eight o'clock as you had thought it would be taken care of?

14 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** No.

15 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** You don't know?

16 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** No, I ---

17 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay.

18 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** --- don't know.

19 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** So just -- I just want to cover off a few
20 delays here that are apparent from this email exchange. So the first, correct me if I'm
21 wrong, but they're seeking your approval at 9:40, and that approval only comes at 9:49;
22 is that your understanding of the chronology? So there's a nine-minute delay there in
23 obtaining your approval for this particular Tweet?

24 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** So at 9:40, as I read that, it was ---

25 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah.

26 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** --- sent to S/Sgt. MacCallum for
27 approval.

28 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay.

1 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** But he wasn't available, and so I'm
2 going to suggest that it took some time to understand that he wasn't responding to the
3 email, and wasn't aware of what was taking place, so the next step would have been to
4 me because I had delegated that responsibility to Addie. So had it come to me then, I
5 would be able to approve it. And as I said, it looks as though it came to me at 9:45, and
6 then at 9:49, that is sent to whomever. I'm not sure -- I guess it's Lia.

7 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah.

8 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** But I'm not -- I can't answer that
9 based on what's there on that email. But that -- I don't know any more about that than
10 that.

11 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** You'd agree that in a mass casualty with
12 a perpetrator on the move and mobile with what we now know and what we were
13 learning at the time was that, unfortunately, the casualties are occurring at a very rapid
14 pace, that this nine minutes is an unacceptable delay?

15 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I would agree that the sooner that
16 information is out, the better.

17 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yes. And the next delay I want to go
18 over with you is that -- so at 9:49, RCMP have approval that this Tweet can go out to
19 the public, and this Tweet is not posted until 10:17 a.m. Were you aware of that?

20 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** No.

21 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Are you just learning of that now, or did
22 you know it at ---

23 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I knew before I came today, but I
24 wasn't aware at that time.

25 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah, did you expect your order to
26 approve this, and it be sent out to happen immediately?

27 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I would have expected that, yes.

28 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah, so this 28-minute delay, do you

1 have any explanation for why it took 20 minutes to post this particular Tweet? No?

2 And, again, that would be an unacceptable delay in this mass
3 casualty?

4 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I would agree.

5 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah. And, unfortunately, during this
6 time, we did suffer some additional casualties.

7 So that's with the delay. Now I want to move to the content. So if
8 we can go back to the picture, please, Madam Registrar?

9 So we have references from Cst. Fahey that he recognized that this
10 picture -- and again, this picture really doesn't do it justice because you can see more of
11 the end. You can see the top part of the push bar in the actual Tweet itself. This is
12 cutting off ---

13 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Okay.

14 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** --- the edge of the content there. But we
15 have Cst. Fahey identifying a push bar. He notes that in the comms. This is before the
16 Tweet is publicized. However, there's a decision made not to disclose that this imitation
17 replica cruiser, that it did not have a push bar. There's no mention of a push bar. Was
18 that a conscious decision, to your knowledge?

19 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I didn't create the message, so I don't
20 know ---

21 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah.

22 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** --- how the message was crafted or
23 why it was crafted the way that it was crafted. I see no value in purposely eliminating
24 that information, if it was purposely eliminated.

25 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah.

26 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** It's a suggestion, I guess, that it was
27 purposely eliminated. I don't know that that's the case.

28 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** I'm just suggesting that the information

1 there was for the -- the information was there. We can see it in the comms that this
2 cruiser had a push bar and the -- and I'm just asking you if it was a conscious decision
3 to omit that information from the ---

4 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Not ---

5 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** --- Tweet.

6 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** --- not from my standpoint.

7 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. And you did approve this Tweet;
8 right? This is ---

9 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Again, I don't recall seeing that. That
10 was approved by me, my recollection is, over the telephone.

11 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay.

12 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** So, again, there was an awful lot of
13 things going on at that time, so when someone's asking to release information about the
14 car, it would be, yes, get it out.

15 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay.

16 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** So I don't recall seeing that email until
17 after the fact.

18 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. So from the time that you gave
19 the direction to publicize this to the public, to the time that this was posted, we're over
20 two hours. You've indicated that that's an unacceptable delay. And in the future, what
21 message -- what can we do to improve?

22 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Well, I certainly think that that's, you
23 know, very important information that the Commission and others who have undertaken
24 inquiries in relation to this incident will assess, and, you know, provide some
25 recommendations that could improve and enhance that information sharing in the
26 future.

27 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Just a couple questions on perimeter
28 containment. So you indicated to my friend there you did not hear the transmission of

1 Cst. Colford indicating that there was another way out of Portapique ---

2 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** No, I wasn't mobile at that point. I
3 was on the phone. I would have been on the phone at that time.

4 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Right. Okay. So you had tasked O'Brien
5 and Rehill to be in charge of containment; is that correct?

6 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** In charge of managing the response
7 to the situation, yes, which would have included those ---

8 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah.

9 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** --- early, early hours of containment,
10 yes.

11 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Do you recall either member mentioning
12 to you about this other way out of Portapique within the first few hours of this mass
13 casualty?

14 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** No.

15 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Do you recall seeing any efforts within
16 the -- or hearing about any efforts within the first few hours of this mass casualty to
17 contain, for example, Brown Loop?

18 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** No, I -- again, I wasn't privy to things
19 in the initial stages. When I arrived, there had been containment set up at various
20 points that, for me, I was satisfied based on the information that I had that would
21 prevent an egress by a vehicle from that scene.

22 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And what time did you task -- and sorry if
23 you already answered this, what time did you task Rehill and O'Brien with containment
24 duties?

25 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** When I spoke to Brian initially, you
26 know, the conversation with him was to do your best to contain the situation with what
27 you have right now. So I didn't actually task Andy O'Brien with that. When I came on
28 duty and became part of the response, Andy was already on the air helping Brian out.

1 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Madam Registrar, can we queue up the
2 Containment Document, please, I noted? It's Figure 2.

3 So this is our understanding of what has occurred -- what occurred
4 based on all available resources. This is the Perimeter Containment Foundational
5 Document that's been submitted to this Commission for their consideration. I just want
6 to draw your attention to Brown Loop containment point, April 19th, 5:02 a.m. When did
7 you learn that you could exit Portapique via Brown Loop -- sorry, via the blueberry field
8 road and out through Brown Loop; do you recall?

9 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah, not until days after the event.

10 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. Yeah. And is that your
11 understanding that Brown Loop was not contained until 5:02 a.m.?

12 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I thought it was around 4:30 ---

13 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay.

14 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** --- was when that was established.

15 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And hearing my friend read you the Cst.
16 Colford transmission about there's another way out of here, are you aware of any other
17 way out of Portapique besides the Brown Loop ---

18 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** No.

19 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** --- way?

20 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Other than the main road, no.

21 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. And again, I think you said no one
22 brought that to your attention, the Constable Colford transmission. No one spoke to you
23 about that, or another way out of Portapique.

24 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** No.

25 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** I just want to turn briefly to your notes.
26 Madam Registrar, if we can bring up COMM11831.

27 So I just have a question about the very top. Do you see it?

28 These are your handwritten notes.

1 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

2 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah. And do I read them
3 chronologically, in other words, you're making the entries as per the time stamp? So if
4 I'm looking at 2338, they're time -- they're entries you would have made from 2338
5 going forward?

6 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

7 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. And just above that, see at the
8 very top it says April 18th, 2020 -- well, can you read to me what the top says, starting
9 with "Requested air service"?

10 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** "Service HPA carbine, stay out of
11 cars".

12 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** So my question is in relation to "stay out
13 of cars".

14 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

15 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Is this a direction that you're giving to the
16 IARD team or is this information you're receiving?

17 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** That's my information to Brian relative
18 to not having members sitting in the -- in the cabs of their cars during the event.

19 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. Does this have anything to do
20 with IARD's decision to enter Portapique on foot?

21 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I don't know if that had any influence
22 on that. I can't say.

23 My rationale was based on my training and experience during
24 active events of that nature. Members put themselves in a very vulnerable position
25 establishing containment in their car in the driver's seat because it's -- it becomes an
26 easy point of aim for someone who may be intent on taking their lives.

27 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** They're all my questions. Thank you
28 very much for your time.

1 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you, Mr. Bryson.

2 Ms. Miller?

3 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Commissioner, if I could just as one
4 housekeeping note just to avoid confusion, my friend, Mr. Bryson, had pulled up the
5 Colchester Radio transcript, COMM3806. And just to prevent confusion, that is shown
6 in Eastern Standard Time, so the time stamps referred to would have been off by an
7 hour.

8 I just wanted to flag it at this stage so it doesn't create any
9 confusion.

10 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you.

11 And did we mark that exhibit when Mr. Bryson asked?

12 Okay. Thank you.

13 Then Ms. Miller?

14 **--- CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. TARA MILLER:**

15 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Good afternoon, Staff Sergeant Halliday. My
16 name is Tara Miller and with my colleague, Alex Digout, we represent a family member
17 of Kristen Beaton, so I'm going to ask you some questions and they are questions that
18 we have, but also some questions that other family counsel have as well.

19 I'm going to start, sir, with questions around the air support piece of
20 your role that evening and on that weekend.

21 As I understand it, you were in charge of or at least took on the
22 responsibility of trying to locate FLIR capabilities, and included the helicopter -- the
23 RCMP helicopter. Is that correct?

24 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

25 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. And would this have been -- FLIR
26 capabilities and air support assets, would that have been something on your checklist?

27 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** No. No, that just would have been
28 something from experience, that that asset is available.

1 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Right. And that was your responsibility.

2 You knew there were no night -- no night vision goggles available to
3 members on the ground; correct?

4 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** It's individual. Some individual
5 detachments do have access to some of those, but I think it's on an individual basis. To
6 my knowledge, there's no -- no deployment of those on a -- you know, on an
7 organizational basis, if you know what I mean.

8 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Thank you.

9 And regardless of what individual detachments may have had, you
10 wanted to get eyes in the sky that would have the FLIR as well; correct?

11 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I thought that that may -- may benefit
12 the operation.

13 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Yes.

14 And I understand that -- we've heard evidence about this that, of
15 course, the reach-out would have been to Moncton for the RCMP helicopter, and that
16 was not available. It was down for maintenance; correct?

17 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

18 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. And after learning that information, I
19 believe that came through to you from OCC, what steps did you take next to source
20 alternate air support?

21 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Once I was advised that DNR would
22 be available, my focus shifted from obtaining air support from somewhere else because,
23 as I said earlier, I needed the asset now ---

24 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Yes.

25 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** --- not later, so I didn't pursue that any
26 further at that point.

27 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. But before you learned that DNR was
28 available -- that's the Department of Natural Resources -- you had had reach-out to --

1 through the military, correct, to JRCC, Joint Rescue Coordination ---

2 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** That was ---

3 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- Centre?

4 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** That was done by our OCC staff, who
5 relayed the information to me.

6 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay.

7 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I think they had taken that step initially
8 before. I didn't have to ask for that. I think they had taken that and then passed on the
9 information that they had done that.

10 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Yeah. They passed the information on to you
11 and said they wouldn't -- JRCC, Rescue Coordination Centre ---

12 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

13 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- wouldn't fly into a hot zone.

14 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** That's right.

15 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And did you follow up with them, Staff
16 Sergeant Halliday, to see if they would check to see if there were any air support assets
17 available in Greenwood?

18 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** No, because they would be one and
19 the same. Those would be the assets I would have been referring to.

20 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. Because that is -- of course,
21 Greenwood is the search and rescue centre ---

22 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

23 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- in Nova Scotia.

24 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

25 **MS. TARA MILLER:** What about in Shearwater? Did you ask
26 OCC to follow up with assets that might be available in Shearwater?

27 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** No. My experience that that would
28 have been -- required an agreement between the RCMP and DND around sharing of

1 assets in that regard. My hope was that the JRCC piece because we have -- we have
2 fairly close working relationship with them on that side of their -- of their program, that
3 that might have been an asset.

4 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. So no follow-up to Shearwater, and
5 I'm assuming from that no follow-up with Gagetown to see if there were any air assets --
6 -

7 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** No.

8 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- that they could assist with the FLIR
9 deployment.

10 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** No.

11 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. And you said, of course, that you
12 needed the asset now. That was your priority, and then it became apparent that
13 Department of Natural Resources had an asset that would be available for you.

14 But what turned out to be is that that asset really wasn't available
15 now. It wasn't available in probably five or six hours; correct?

16 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** It wasn't available till daylight, yeah.
17 That's right.

18 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Yeah. So sourcing a helicopter from the
19 RCMP through Montreal, for example, would have gotten you a helicopter equally as
20 timely as the DNR and with the FLIR capability. Is that fair to say?

21 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I didn't follow up with them, so I don't
22 know. I don't know to this day if they have FLIR capability or if they have even a rotary-
23 wing aircraft there. I don't know that.

24 **MS. TARA MILLER:** So in terms of understanding what assets the
25 RCMP would have had available, Moncton wasn't available. That's where you normally
26 would have gone. But in terms of assets from the RCMP in Montreal or other
27 jurisdictions to the west of us, did you make any inquiries about that at that time?

28 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I did not, no.

1 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. That's my final question on the air
2 support. And again, it's forward-thinking, Staff Sergeant Halliday.

3 You know, is there any insight that you can provide into why there
4 isn't a closer working relationship between the RCMP and the military in terms of
5 supporting each other with air assets?

6 And we heard, of course, from Corporal Mills yesterday that the
7 helicopter in Moncton was down a lot. He used 80 percent as a conservative estimate.

8 You didn't give us a percentage, but in your statement you talked
9 about it wasn't uncommon for that one asset to be unavailable, it was in maintenance or
10 in use or deployed somewhere else.

11 So any insight you can give us why there might not be a closer
12 working relationship between those two federal entities?

13 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I can't answer that. That's at a much
14 higher level than I am.

15 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Yeah. Would you agree that there could be
16 some benefits to that, though, from somebody who's on the ground trying to source
17 resources that the -- a working relationship between the military and the RCMP would
18 be beneficial, particularly given this issue?

19 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I think any time there's an opportunity
20 to share those assets of that nature, yes, absolutely.

21 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. Thank you.

22 I'm going to move on now to questions around alerting and some of
23 your training, Staff Sergeant Halliday.

24 I understand that you, yourself, were trained as a negotiator. That
25 was in your statement, and I think that was 2004 in Ottawa at CPC.

26 What is CPC?

27 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Sorry. It's the Canadian Police
28 College.

1 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Thank you.

2 And that training took place in 2004. What did that involve?

3 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** It's a course training standard that
4 involves us learning how to negotiate with persons who are in crisis and understanding
5 what -- what may be driving their crisis and create strategies and tactics to help them
6 relieve whatever issues is that they're having to bring them back to normalcy to -- so
7 that they can think more clearly.

8 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Okay. And that training you did in
9 2004, was there a requirement to do updates on that training to keep it current?

10 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

11 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. And had you engaged in those
12 updates for current training?

13 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I had engaged in an update there and
14 there was ongoing in-service training too, as well.

15 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. So as of the date of the mass casualty
16 event in April of 2020, did you have updated certification and training for a negotiator?

17 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

18 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. But as I understand it, on the night of
19 this, or at least the 18th and 19th, you were not the negotiator, but there was a negotiator
20 on scene; correct?

21 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

22 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Yeah, and that was Royce MacRae?

23 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

24 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Is there any reason why you didn't serve that
25 role that night?

26 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** That was not my responsibility that
27 night.

28 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Also just reviewing some of your background,

1 I understand in 2015 you were the DANCO for Northeast Nova?

2 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

3 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. And in 2019, you were the acting
4 operations manager?

5 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Operations officer.

6 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Officer. Okay.

7 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

8 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And that was certainly the position you held
9 the night in question; correct?

10 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes. In an acting capacity.

11 **MS. TARA MILLER:** We heard from Paul Mason from Emergency
12 Measures ---

13 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

14 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- last week, along with other witnesses,
15 about alerting. Would you have been familiar with Paul Mason in his role with
16 Emergency Measures?

17 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** No.

18 **MS. TARA MILLER:** No? You'd never --- through the course of
19 your experience, you'd never met him or worked with him in ---

20 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I don't recall that name.

21 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. All right.

22 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah.

23 **MS. TARA MILLER:** So then that may answer my next question.
24 I'm going to ask it anyway. Would you have attended the 2016 presentation that Mr.
25 Mason gave to RCMP, HRPD, and Cape Breton Regional Police about becoming
26 trusted users of the Alert Ready system?

27 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I don't recall. I don't recall that, no.

28 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. You did say that you're unfamiliar with

1 the Alert Ready system. I think you said that it was not in your playbook, that you were
2 aware of; correct?

3 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

4 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. Are you aware of any of your
5 colleagues who may have attended that session?

6 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** No.

7 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay.

8 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** No.

9 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Thank you. Just to follow up on one point
10 with respect to Cst Lilly, one of the things that becomes apparent through your notes
11 and your statement is that there was confusion through the night, correct me if I'm
12 mischaracterizing this, S/Sgt Halliday, confusion through the night about who Lisa
13 Banfield was and who Lisa McCully was? Is that fair to say?

14 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes, there was -- we were trying to
15 determine whether they were one and the same person. That was the issue. Lisa
16 McCully, I knew through Dave, or I had been informed through Dave potentially was one
17 of the victims who had potentially had a relationship with Gabriel Wortman. And Lisa
18 Banfield was associated to a vehicle that had been registered to Gabriel Wortman. So I
19 was just trying to determine whether there was -- they were one in the same or whether
20 they were two different people.

21 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Right. And of course, they are two different
22 people.

23 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

24 **MS. TARA MILLER:** We certainly know that now.

25 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

26 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And I think that became evident through the
27 night.

28 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

1 **MS. TARA MILLER:** My question, you had a direct conversation
2 with Cst Lilly; correct? And it was Dave Lilly ---

3 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Sgt Lilly, yes.

4 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Sorry. I'm sorry.

5 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah, that's okay.

6 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Sgt Lilly.

7 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah.

8 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Sorry.

9 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

10 **MS. TARA MILLER:** My apologies to Sgt Lilly.

11 You had a direct conversation with him. You spoke with him, I
12 think, a couple times that night, ---

13 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

14 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- and I think in one of the last conversations
15 with you, he was clear with you that the breakup was with Lisa McCully, a teacher who
16 had worked with his wife? Is that correct? The recent breakup?

17 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I don't know if it was a breakup. My --
18 it was -- I think they had been in a relationship of some type. And I don't know the
19 extent of that, but I garnered from that that the issue could be potentially domestic
20 violence related.

21 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. Thank you. I'm going to move now
22 onto just a small topic with respect to public communications. Certainly my friends have
23 covered with you your role in the Twitter post.

24 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

25 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And one of the things I wanted to review with
26 you though was about the training, S/Sgt Halliday, that you and your colleagues in
27 Command Centre would have had with sending out messages of that type? And the
28 reason I ask that is because at paragraph -- we can pull the -- your statement up, and

1 that is Exhibit 1072 at page 34. And I'm looking in the middle of the page, it's a long
2 segment.

3 S/Sgt Halliday, the part I wanted to review with you is your
4 comment:

5 "I don't ... none of us had ever had any experience with
6 sending a message like that out to the public. You know,
7 it was ... [...] it was pretty heavy, it was very heavy, I
8 have to say [that] at that time."

9 So that was the line of questions I wanted to follow up on with you.

10 When you say:

11 "... none of us had experience with sending [...] message[s] [...] out to the public..."

12 This is something that you've been tasked to do, and your comment
13 is that nobody had any experience. So when you say "us", who is "us"?

14 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I guess I'm probably framing it in the
15 collective of police officers in general. And when I say that, it's in the context of, you
16 know, we had never experienced having to report to the public that there's an armed
17 gunman on the loose dressed as an RCMP officer operating a marked RCMP car. So it
18 was a situation that none of us had ever been faced with ---

19 **MS. TARA MILLER:** M'hm.

20 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** --- and had ever, you know, tried to
21 create a message in that regard to get that out to the public. So that's the context that
22 that was said in.

23 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Had you had any experience with sending
24 other messages out to the public, working with Lia Scanlan, for example, to craft other
25 messages ---

26 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

27 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- for other situations?
28

1 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

2 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. And in terms of those messages, did
3 you receive any training in any of your -- in any of the years leading up to this? Had you
4 received any training in crafting messages and what should be or shouldn't be
5 included?

6 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** You know, I don't think I've ever
7 received any media relations training. I think by virtue of my own experiences, both as
8 a front-line police officer at the constable rank and then through the NCO rank, you
9 become experienced in doing that, working with your strategic communications people,
10 and I think learning as you go. So.

11 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Separate and apart from media relations
12 training, ---

13 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

14 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- did you ever receive any training about
15 how you would craft messaging like this for the public, who is ultimately going to be
16 receiving it?

17 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** No.

18 **MS. TARA MILLER:** No. Okay. And any training you would have
19 received on any facet of this in your negotiation course?

20 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Messages in relation to dealing with
21 persons in crisis, yes, but not, you know, something of the nature that we're talking
22 about here. It would be specific to the individual that you're dealing with in crisis and
23 what their individual issue is.

24 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. And certainly would you have had any
25 experience with Amber Alerts when you were dealing with your negotiation course?

26 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** No.

27 **MS. TARA MILLER:** No. Okay.

28 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** No.

1 **MS. TARA MILLER:** You indicated in your evidence earlier today
2 that you had concerns about creating public panic and safety issues for your members
3 with disseminating this information, but nonetheless, then you did work with the
4 communications folks to get this message out.

5 Your concern, S/Sgt Halliday, about creating public panic and
6 safety issues for your members, was that based on your opinion? If you had no training
7 in creating messages, I'm assuming that that would be based on your opinion of what
8 might happen? Is that fair to say?

9 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I think based on 35 years of
10 experience, you know the impact some messages have and what not. So I mean it
11 would be reasonable to assess that this would be a fairly significant message that is
12 going out to the public.

13 You know, the other part of that too is I think when I gave that
14 evidence earlier on, it was around the context of doing that before we had actually
15 confirmed and corroborated the information that had been provided to us about that
16 vehicle was not still at that scene and one of those two burned-out cars that was at the
17 scene. I think that was what that was in relation to when I said that.

18 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. I want to move now into a different
19 area to address. And this involves, again, your role in Command Centre with deploying
20 assets to, I guess, block roads or to put in place road checks.

21 So again, Madam Registrar, if we could go to S/Sgt Halliday's
22 statement again? That's Exhibit 1072. And I'm looking at page 36. If we can go to the
23 bottom of the page, or sort of the lower one third of the page?

24 You identify two things in terms of considerations, S/Sgt Halliday,
25 that I wanted to review with you.

26 The first consideration is you talk about:

27 "...putt[ing] cars in strategic locations along the way where
28 we think this person may go [to] try [and] intercept [...] him..."

1 Is that a factor that was present for you that night and that
2 weekend?

3 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

4 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. And you certainly would need
5 information about the perpetrator's intended movement to action something like that;
6 correct?

7 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah, of course, if we had known
8 exactly where they were going, it would have made things easier, of course, but this
9 was based on his address, the address of his parents, those kinds of things, in terms of
10 which direction he may be headed.

11 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. And then the next factor, which is
12 lower down and probably five lines from the bottom, four lines, you say,

13 "The other challenge is the fact that we live in rural
14 Nova Scotia, and, you know there are literally
15 hundreds of roads that connect to hundreds of roads,
16 and it's quite literally impossible to have set up any
17 [kind] of roadblock on all of those roads, there's just
18 not enough [...] people to do that."

19 And I can certainly -- we can appreciate the logistics challenge of
20 that, but I want to direct you specifically in terms of what I'm calling the choke point of
21 where sort of northern Nova Scotia moves into more southern Nova Scotia, and that is
22 around the Truro area where we have the Trans-Canada Highway coming in from Cape
23 Breton, and we have the Trans-Canada Highway coming from Amherst to Truro, the
24 104, and we have the secondary road Highway 4 coming in to that sort of central area
25 there at Truro. You know, if you were going to pick a place where you would be able to
26 efficiently deploy resources for something like this, would you agree with me that that
27 would be, if you're trying to monitor traffic, or the travel -- potential travel of someone
28 from north to south, that would be an optimal place to deploy resources to intercept an

1 individual; would you agree with me on that?

2 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

3 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Thank you.

4 And I want to take you to early in the morning of the 19th and we
5 know from the ERT team yesterday that when Lisa Banfield comes out of the woods,
6 she conveys to the ERT team members that -- well, she conveys several things, but the
7 piece that I'm most interested in reviewing with you is that she says, "He's going to go
8 after my sister, and she lives in Russell Lake in Dartmouth." Were you aware of that
9 piece of information?

10 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I wasn't aware of it right away, but I
11 was -- I did become aware of that later on.

12 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And when did you become aware of that later
13 on?

14 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I don't know ---

15 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay.

16 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** --- exactly when.

17 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Would you agree with me that that would be
18 a critical piece of information, specific information about where the perpetrator might be
19 headed that you could act on in terms of deploying resources?

20 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

21 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. And then at 9:42, when we have the
22 9-1-1 call come in with the perpetrator being -- first known indication the perpetrator is
23 mobile and on the move that morning, and he's moving in a southerly direction from
24 Wentworth towards Truro, that's more information in terms of where the perpetrator was
25 headed at that time; is that fair to say?

26 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes. And I -- there was a lot of
27 information coming in at that time in terms of the fact that he may have switched to a
28 Ford pickup truck that we had not recovered at that point. And I think there was some

1 talk somewhere, and I don't recall specifically where this came from, but I think even
2 heading towards the Pictou County area. I don't know why that's in my head, but, so,
3 yeah, it was definitely headed either east or south.

4 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Right. But we know from the 9-1-1 broadcast
5 that morning and the OCC Dispatch call that he was in a marked police car at 9:42;
6 correct?

7 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

8 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay.

9 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes, yeah.

10 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And that was the most current information
11 you had, he was travelling in a southerly direction ---

12 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** That's right.

13 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- at that time, yes.

14 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah.

15 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And so my question for you, S/Sgt. Halliday,
16 is now knowing where you got this information from Ms. Banfield about intended
17 direction to Halifax, to cause harm to her sister, and knowing that he is travelling, he's
18 on the road in a marked police car, he's travelling south ---

19 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** M'hm.

20 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- from Wentworth towards in a southerly
21 direction, why not deploy resources at that time to that choke point in Truro, to
22 effectively be able to cut off the perpetrator from moving from the northern part of the
23 province to the southern part of the province? Did you give consideration to that at all?

24 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** So at 9:42 when that happens, of
25 course, the immediate response is to go and intercept the suspect. That's -- that was
26 the priority at that point. And within a very, very short period of time, the individual then
27 is at a residence near Masstown. And I can't think of the name of the community --
28 Glenholme -- was it Glenholme? I can't think ---

1 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Yes.

2 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** --- of the name of the community.

3 And so while our members are responding to the initial shooting, within a very short
4 period of time, the individual is now at this residence at Glenholme. And if you lay the
5 transcript of the radios and what's taking place with the operators and what's going on
6 with our ERT people, I can tell you that it was my -- and I'll speak -- I speak only for
7 myself, it was my belief that that individual was going to be dealt with at that particular
8 location, that containment at that residence had been established, that our Emergency
9 Response Team had been deployed, and that that individual was going to be taken into
10 custody.

11 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay.

12 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** So, at that point, that was the focus of
13 our operation. And very shortly after that incident occurs, it's become evident that he's
14 no longer there and he's now active again. So the point of me saying that is the fact
15 that we believed, at that time, that we were going to establish contact with the individual,
16 and that was the focus of the operation at that point.

17 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. So the focus of the operation, as you
18 said, was to intercept him in where you thought he would as opposed to having a
19 secondary focus, which would be to place some resources strategically along the way
20 where you thought the person may be going, to try and intercept them there; correct?

21 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I mean, we were working on the
22 information that we had then at that time, and it was my belief that we were going to
23 intercept that individual there at that time.

24 **MS. TARA MILLER:** But the information that you had at that time,
25 S/Sgt. Halliday, correct me if I'm wrong, you have to look at things in a global picture ---

26 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** M'hm.

27 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- correct?

28 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** M'hm.

1 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And the global picture included the
2 information from Ms. Banfield from seven o'clock in the morning about his ---

3 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Right.

4 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- where she believed where he told her he
5 was going to go ---

6 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Right.

7 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- and also that he was moving south ---

8 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** M'hm.

9 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- through northern Nova ---

10 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Right.

11 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- Scotia.

12 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Right.

13 **MS. TARA MILLER:** That was part of the complete picture;
14 correct?

15 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** M'hm. Sure.

16 **MS. TARA MILLER:** The last area I want to review with you,
17 S/Sgt. Halliday, is with respect to Pictometry. And you were asked some questions
18 about that this morning by my friend, Ms. Mancini. Pictometry, as I understand it, is a
19 computer program which allows you to access some geographical and topographical
20 mapping; correct?

21 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes, I'm not overly familiar with the
22 platform, but my understanding is that, yes, that's correct.

23 **MS. TARA MILLER:** So on the weekend of the mass casualty,
24 who would have had access to the Pictometry program?

25 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I don't know within our group who
26 would have had access to that. My understanding is that Staff MacCallum was making
27 efforts to access that program in Bible Hill.

28 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. And once he relocated to the

1 Command Centre, who in Command Centre is your understanding was making efforts
2 to access Pictometry?

3 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I don't know.

4 **MS. TARA MILLER:** You don't know if anybody was?

5 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I don't know who was.

6 **MS. TARA MILLER:** You don't.

7 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah, yeah.

8 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Or if anybody was?

9 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I don't know, no.

10 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. The only person you have some
11 awareness that may have been looking to access this program would have been
12 MacCallum when he was in Bible Hill ---

13 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

14 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- at the detachment there. Okay.

15 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** That's the only conversation I had
16 with anybody about that particular platform.

17 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Did you task anybody to review the
18 Pictometry topographic geography of the Portapique area? Are you aware of anybody
19 in Command Centre that tasked anybody to review the Pictometry program?

20 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I'm not aware of any -- if anybody was
21 tasked with that, no.

22 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Yeah. And I think you said earlier and this
23 morning that, you know, having that access to that program would have provided a
24 more clear view of what we were dealing with in terms of geography and topography;
25 correct?

26 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** It may have, yes, for sure.

27 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Yeah. And I'd suggest to you that having that
28 more clear view of geography and topography would have been very helpful in terms of

1 assessing containment in Portapique that night. Would you ---

2 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Certainly ---

3 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- agree with that?

4 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** --- certainly if the connection to Brown
5 Loop was, you know, part of that, you know, that would have been helpful to know, yes.

6 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Yeah. I'm going to ask Madam Registrar to
7 bring up a document, and it has not yet been exhibited. It is COMM Number 56422,
8 and it is -- and if we could have that made an exhibit, Madam Registrar.

9 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** 1546.

10 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Thank you.

11 And this, Staff Sergeant Halliday, is an Investigation Supplementary
12 Report, dated April 21st, 2022, and it is authored by Brian Corbett. Brian Corbett is an
13 intelligence analyst with the Mass Casualty Commission group.

14 Have you had an opportunity to review this report?

15 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I've never seen it.

16 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay, you've never seen it. It's now an
17 exhibit, and I will high-level summarise what I understand this report to be. It is a report
18 that Mr. Corbett wrote to look and see what imagery would have been available to the
19 MCC in April of 2020 with respect to the Portapique area, and examining that versus
20 Google Maps and other options.

21 He, at the bottom of page 1, says:

22 "For the purposes of this report, the writer has used
23 this tool to demonstrate what imagery would have
24 been available through Pictometry to the RCMP on
25 the 18th and 19th of April 2020." (As read)

26 So Madam Registrar, I'm going to ask you to go to page 2, and
27 there is a Pictometry image.

28 And Staff Sergeant Halliday, I appreciate this is the first time you've

1 seen this report, but when you look at this image, and I wish I had a pointer, but it looks
2 very apparent to me that there is a road to the left, or sorry, rather, to the right of what
3 we understand to be Portapique Crescent, and a road that runs parallel up to the top of
4 the page and intercepts with Brown Loop. Do you see that road?

5 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I see Brown Loop, but I'm not sure
6 which area there you're referring to.

7 **MS. TARA MILLER:** If I may, Commissioners, approach just to
8 point, I think to make it easier for the witness?

9 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Okay.

10 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes, I see what you're referring to
11 there. Yeah.

12 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And I traced with my pen this road that we
13 now know to be the blueberry field road, which intersects with the left hand bottom U of
14 Brown Loop. Okay.

15 And you didn't have access to that photo, or you're not aware of
16 anybody in the Command Centre having access to that photo on the weekend of the
17 mass casualty event?

18 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** We were -- we had definitely had
19 access to a photo similar to that in the Command Post that I recall seeing, which was
20 why that particular road that you're talking about there now, which doesn't -- we know
21 it's a road, so it looks like a road, but could easily be an ATV trail from that viewpoint.
22 My point is, is that we had access to a map certainly similar to that, which was what
23 drew my attention to the fact that maybe we need to move some cars up into that area
24 in case that is accessible by a vehicle.

25 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And when did that come to your attention?

26 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** That would have been around 4:00,
27 4:30, somewhere ---

28 **MS. TARA MILLER:** In the morning.

1 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** --- when we were a revisit of our ---

2 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Yeah.

3 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** --- containment and our assets

4 "Where are we now?"

5 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. So you'd agree with me, Staff
6 Sergeant Halliday, that if access to this photo was done early on in the evening ---

7 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** M'hm.

8 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- in terms of the initial containment efforts
9 done ---

10 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Right.

11 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- from 10 o'clock on, that would have been
12 very helpful for the members on the ground and those first responders who were on
13 scene to be able to understand, have a better, complete picture of the in and out access
14 points to Portapique; correct?

15 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** For sure, establish a containment like
16 that at 10 o'clock, I don't know if it would have been that early because I'm not sure
17 exactly how long it took our people to get there, but I think it was well after 10 o'clock
18 before we had all of those areas where members were stations set up. So...

19 **MS. TARA MILLER:** But certainly, those members enroute may
20 not have been able to access this, but those in OCC and those other RCMP members
21 above, who are deploying assets and resources, if they had access to this and then
22 could transfer that information, that would have been very helpful in terms of informing
23 those first responders where to set up containment points?

24 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Of the potential that there could be an
25 escape route there in that area, yeah.

26 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Because up until this information nobody --
27 people -- as you said, you only understood there was one way in and out until Brown
28 Loop?

1 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** That's right.

2

3 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. Thank you, Staff Sergeant Halliday. Those are my
4 questions.

5 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you, Ms. Miller.

6 Ms. Mancini?

7 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Yes, thank you, Commissioners. I don't
8 believe there's any redirect arising. So that would conclude our involvement and
9 engagement with Staff Sergeant Halliday.

10 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you.

11 Commissioner Fitch?

12 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Thank you. Thank you, Ms. Mancini,
13 and Staff Sergeant Halliday.

14 I just have a few follow up questions there for you. Some of them
15 are just for clarification, and some are intended for forward thinking as we go through
16 the Commission. So just bear with me, I -- back to the beginning of my notes from
17 today.

18 And I'm sorry I don't have this committed to memory, but it seems
19 to me when you were describing your qualifications, you have been crisis negotiator
20 trained but you have not been trained as a Critical Incident Commander?

21 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** That's correct. Those two entities
22 don't normally intersect. They work congruent to one another.

23 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** So in the Command Post, a crisis
24 negotiator is part of the command triangle. Have you had an opportunity in your past
25 role as crisis negotiator to be operating within a crisis negotiator, pardon me, within a
26 Command Post?

27 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

28 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay, so you've had experience working

1 in a Command Post before. In your role on the night or early morning of 18th and 19th,
2 what was your purpose for going to the Command Post?

3 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** As the general duty, the senior officer
4 on general duty that night, I was there to support the Critical Incident Commander with
5 any frontline duty resources or frontline support that he required in carrying out his role.
6 So although he takes full command of what's happening and the movement of people
7 and the decision-making, I see my role as critical to his in terms of assets that he may
8 require, you know, whether it's to, you know, have additional resources brought in to
9 support either containment or to ensure that the resources are refreshed and replaced;
10 that, you know, they have food and water, those kinds of things; and to carry out any
11 other tasks that don't fall, you know, directly within the event itself, but will support the
12 event.

13 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Would that typically be a role for the
14 service support officer?

15 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** The support services officer?

16 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** M'hm.

17 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I haven't seen that myself occur over
18 the years. Typically, it would be, depending on the scale of the event, it would typically
19 be the Detachment Commander who would provide that. But given, you know, the
20 magnitude of this one, I stepped in in that role to provide that support.

21 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** And just if you would refresh my
22 memory. Approximately how long were you at the Command Post?

23 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I was called in at about 10:40. I
24 arrived in Bible Hill at about 11:40. I was at the Command Post between 2:00 and 2:20,
25 and I wasn't out of there until probably twelve-thirty, quarter-to-one somewhere around
26 there in the afternoon.

27 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. For the -- for the benefit of the
28 people who are following our proceedings, could you give us a snapshot or a visual

1 image of how the Command Post is set up, what one would expect to see in a
2 Command Post?

3 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** The environment that we were
4 operating in that particular evening was the upstairs of a firehall, and in rural Nova
5 Scotia, that typically acts as a command post if it's in some type of close proximity to the
6 event itself. And the layout of those vary, depending on the fire department that you're
7 in. In this particular firehall, it was generally an open space, you know, much like a
8 meeting room like this, not quite of large, of course, and then off of that is -- you know,
9 there's a washroom, there's a separate office space that was quite tight and cluttered,
10 but that was being used by the negotiators. So the Command Post itself was set up
11 sort of strategically in terms of having all of the technical -- technological support at the
12 front of the room, working together side by side, then the incident commander, his
13 scribe, you know, sort of having center console, if you will, of a table, and then the
14 general duty support guys, so S MacCallum, myself, and S/Sgt Carroll at the back of the
15 room so that, you know, he could -- the Incident Commander could have his space and
16 interact with people as he felt necessary, but have room to move around, update the
17 boards on the wall.

18 So there's situational boards that are on the wall that contain, you
19 know, the mission, important updates, information that anyone who is coming into the
20 Command Post could look at and get sort of a situational update on where we are now.

21 And that's essentially it for that. That's typical of rural places.

22 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. Did I understand you correctly, or
23 it would have been through the presentation perhaps, that emergency health services
24 and fire services were also staged at the Command Post?

25 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

26 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Did they have representatives inside of
27 the Command Post?

28 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** So there were occasions when their

1 supervisor would come up for an update, but access is, you know, we try to limit access
2 to the extent we can, simply for security reasons and, you know, to maintain integrity of
3 the investigation, and to allow those who are involved to stay focused on what they're
4 doing.

5 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** And on that very point of kind of the
6 restrictions on the Command Post, you had made mention earlier that given the nature
7 of this dynamic and very extreme situation that was being managed, that you would
8 expected to have seen a senior commissioned officer at the Command Post?

9 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** No, not that it was my expectation
10 that night to see one there. My expectation -- my suggestion, I guess, during my
11 briefing with the Criminal Operations Officer and the DPO is that it might be a good idea
12 if someone -- if we had sent a commissioned officer out. You know, I think
13 organizationally, it would have been beneficial from a support standpoint. But also, I
14 think having that senior leadership on the floor there, given what had transpired over the
15 night, helping manage the events would have been optimal. That was just my
16 suggestion.

17 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. And I appreciate that you haven't
18 been CIC trained, but is it fair to say that having a senior commanding officer arrive in a
19 Command Post would disrupt natural critical incident command structure, that they
20 would be, by their very presence, the ones most responsible ---

21 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** M'hm.

22 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** --- and basically usurp the
23 responsibilities of the Critical Incident Commander?

24 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah, I see that being a potential
25 issue for sure.

26 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. And on that point, I recognize
27 that yourself and others that were operating in the Command Post were of equal rank,
28 in terms of being staff sergeants?

1 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

2 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** And I'm sure there's seniority within the
3 ranks as well. My question is, having members of the same rank within the Critical
4 Incident Command Post, knowing that the Critical Incident Commander is supposed to
5 be responsible for the entire operation, ---

6 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

7 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** --- does that leave itself to confusion,
8 either in the Command Post or in communications with members working in the field?

9 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** That has not been my experience.
10 With that, I think those that have operated in the Command Triangle are aware of who
11 the Incident Commander is, and regardless of their rank, recognize their position within
12 the triangle.

13 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** There was an exhibit that was put up on
14 the screen at one point, and unfortunately, I can't find it in my notes right now. So if
15 anybody can help me with that? It was in reference to saying that basically you were
16 responsible or in command of the events at one point.

17 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Of the overall operation, I think ---

18 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Yeah.

19 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** --- when I arrived in Bible Hill?

20 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Yes.

21 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

22 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Yes. Yes. Yeah. So would that --
23 sorry, ---

24 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** I was just going to suggest I
25 think it might have been in his statement, but I'm ---

26 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

27 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** --- not sure you need to pull it
28 up.

1 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah, that's right. Yeah.

2 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** I think it was in his statement.

3 So my -- where I was going with that question is would that
4 statement lead to confusion as to who was responsible for what activity where at any
5 given time?

6 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I don't see that myself. I think it was
7 clear who was in charge of controlling the resources at that particular time, and I think it
8 was clear who was doing what and what their responsibilities were, and those tasks that
9 had been assigned and delegated had been carried out. And I think, you know, for me,
10 from my perspective, it was making sure that, you know, things I felt that needed to be
11 done were getting done.

12 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** And on that point, did you have a
13 system for yourself to track any of those tasks or assignments to ensure that they'd
14 been completed and what the outcome of the task completion was?

15 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** So I was hoping that that was going to
16 part of your point in terms of moving forward.

17 Having never been exposed to an event of this magnitude, and the
18 volume of information that we were managing, and the number of tasks that were
19 undertaken, I think that someone in my position, moving forward, should have a scribe
20 as well assigned to them so that they can ensure that that information is not only taken
21 care of, but, you know, accurately recorded so that we can go back later on and make
22 sure those tasks have been done and completed and follow up with that.

23 And, you know, regrettably, I didn't have the benefit of that that
24 night. So everything that was done was through notation and, you know, to keep track
25 of it.

26 So because of the volume of information that was coming in and
27 the amount of tasks that were required, there were times when that was challenging, no
28 question, without the benefit of that.

1 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Thank you. And that is where I'm going
2 with a number of these questions are ultimately interrelated.

3 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Right.

4 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Your notes to file, which were quite
5 detailed, were those notes made contemporaneously with your actions? Or done as
6 soon as practical? If you could ---

7 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** So ---

8 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** --- fill us in on your ---

9 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah, so rough notes were made at
10 the time, as things were happening, and then at 5:30 the following morning, I sat down
11 and completed the rest of my notes.

12 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. And back to my earlier question
13 about the set up of the Command Post, and you had made reference to the boards for
14 situational awareness for anybody who comes into the Command Post, can you advise
15 us, who was responsible for maintaining those boards? And was there more than one
16 person that was tracking significant information points that were coming into the
17 Command Post and the resulting actions or directions stemming from that incoming
18 information? And there's a third part to it. Was there anybody specifically assigned to
19 ensuring that those messages and key decision points were communicated broadly
20 within the members that were working on the ground?

21 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I think that -- with all due respect, I
22 think that that might be better left for Jeff, because I don't have a lot of information to
23 share with you in relation to how that was managed.

24 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. Thank you. And I think that's all
25 of my questions. Thank you very much.

26 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Commissioner Stanton?

27 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Thank you. Just further to
28 Commissioner Fitch's question about whether your notes were contemporaneous and

1 you'd said that -- so I'm assuming the ones that were brought up earlier that were typed,
2 the document number was 10697, and I think it's referred to as your member report.

3 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** M'hm, yes.

4 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** So you said that they were written
5 at 5:30 a.m. the next day. Do you mean April 20th?

6 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** April 20th, yes.

7 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Okay.

8 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

9 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** And then the handwritten ones that
10 we saw were contemporaneous?

11 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

12 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Okay. And with the ones that you
13 wrote the following day, document 10697, the notes that Ms. McCulloch asked you
14 about, and I believe Mr. Bryson did as well, at 7:55, where you said that you expected
15 the notice about the fully marked cruiser would go out right away ---

16 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

17 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** --- words to that effect, and you
18 agreed with Mr. Bryson that the sooner the information would go out the better, and that
19 you expected the information should have gone out immediately.

20 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

21 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Okay. And so earlier, when you
22 were speaking with Ms. Mancini, you talked about how the -- you were surprised when
23 you saw an email, I believe from S/Sgt. Carroll, that said that the -- there had been a
24 decision made not to release the information.

25 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

26 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** And you talked about how it's
27 important to check facts and put out information that would have been accurate, of
28 course. But you talked about how putting out information would have created a more

1 difficult situation for members.

2 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

3 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** So once you had decided that the
4 information should go out right away, did you have the same concern about how it might
5 make the situation more difficult?

6 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes, which is when I refer to the fact
7 that none of us had ever been involved in, you know, creating a media release of that
8 type, given this magnitude that you're not sure what -- how challenging that's going to
9 be for, you know, for our people on the road and what kind of other trouble that could
10 create for them in managing the situation based on the public response to that.

11 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Okay. I'm just trying to, I guess,
12 understand the -- how your thought process worked then. If you've got the information,
13 you've said you expected that the notice would go out immediately, but then you also
14 referenced a concern about -- let's see if I can find it -- creating panic, creating a strain
15 on the Commission -- on the communication system, and how people might react to that
16 and on member's safety. So, at what point did your thinking switch from one to the
17 other?

18 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** So the issue I think early on around,
19 you know, the panic is creating unnecessary panic, that was the point between I think
20 around seven and eight when the information had come in about the car from Lisa
21 Banfield, that it -- the potential was that there was a fourth car that we were not aware
22 of, and the fact that we, the ERT guys had been tasked back to the scene to validate
23 whether or not these cars -- this car could be one of the two burned out cars. So
24 sending that information out without validating it, ahead of the thing -- ahead of
25 confirming that and corroborating that was causing -- had caused some conversation
26 between Lia and I about how that information was going to get out. But once we knew
27 that that was not the car, I -- in my view, I don't think we had any choice about the fact
28 that it had to go out, regardless of what impact that was going to have, but then

1 ensuring that the message got out, you know, in as timely a fashion as you could, but as
2 effective as it could be as well.

3 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** So the evening before when you
4 had information from 9-1-1 calls that there was a marked police car involved, and it
5 seems as though, for one reason or another, people discounted that possibility ---

6 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** I think it was a combination of factors
7 collectively that led to that, yes.

8 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Okay. So it wasn't until you
9 essentially saw a photo of the marked cruiser that you believed that it was, in fact, a ---

10 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

11 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** --- marked -- a fully marked car?

12 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

13 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** I see. And I wonder about the
14 hand-drawn map that we saw earlier today. And actually, this is perhaps a question for
15 Counsel for DOJ or perhaps for Commission Counsel. I just wonder, I gather that there
16 are other such documents, flip chart documents and so on from the -- from that
17 Command Centre, and I just want to ensure that those have all made their way into
18 disclosure, and that we'll have a picture of everything that they did have access to. So it
19 might just be that I'm unaware of it at this stage, but I just want to ensure that we do
20 have those.

21 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Advise that there are references in the
22 Command Decisions Foundation Document that was exhibited today, there are source
23 materials that include papers that were posted on the wall of the Command Post, if
24 that's what you're referring to.

25 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** I think it is. Thank you. That's very
26 helpful.

27 Okay. I think I'll leave it there. Thank you.

28 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Commissioner Fitch, you

1 indicated you had a follow-up question?

2 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Thank you. One is just a -- just for the
3 record. What I was looking for was actually in my Command Decision Document, and it
4 was from paragraph 156, in the event that you needed that for the record. It was 156
5 and the quote from your statement, S/Sgt. Halliday, that Halliday had said that you
6 decided to leave Brian in his role and allow him to control the resources, so that you
7 could focus on the big picture.

8 "So when I arrive, I'm in charge, I'm in charge of the
9 overall operation, what's taking place."

10 So can you just explain that a little bit better for me, so I have an
11 understanding or so that we all have an understanding of what it was that you felt that
12 you were in charge of in terms of the overall operation?

13 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Well, as I mentioned, just making sure
14 that, you know, all of the tasks that needed to be required in anticipation of the CIC
15 were getting down. So, everything from, you know, looking at a helicopter, making sure
16 that a profile was being done, making sure that we had sufficient resources on the
17 ground to deal with the containment piece that was there, sourcing other equipment that
18 might be required by the members, so maps, those kinds of things, calling out the Major
19 Crime Team. So all of those other things that take time on phone calls and updating,
20 you know, people about what's taking place, and securing other assets fell to me, so
21 that those folks that were currently engaged at the operational level at the event could
22 focus on that.

23 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. And I do want to make note that
24 it was good to see that Major Crime was called out early on in the process.

25 Just one final question if I could, and you may not be in a position
26 to answer this, and if not, I'm sure there will be others who will follow. You were among
27 the first to hear that there was concern that Sgt. Lilly may have been involved in some
28 fashion, or there in some capacity in a marked police car.

1 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

2 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** And I recognize that this is a difficult
3 question, in any of the considerations that you were privy to during the conversation
4 about having -- possibility of having a serving member in a marked car involved in any
5 way shape or form in what was unfolding, was there discussion that you were privy to
6 about how to manage that information in consideration of the reputation of the RCMP,
7 the fact that it could potentially be a member, and at what point was somebody higher in
8 the senior command staff made aware of any consideration or any concerns regarding
9 having an actual member in a car involved on the scene?

10 Thank you.

11 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** So for clarify, do you mean
12 subsequent to the events themselves, or you mean at that moment as that was
13 unfolding?

14 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** At that moment ---

15 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Okay.

16 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** --- when that was unfolding, when the
17 information came forward that it was -- could potentially be a member in a marked car.

18 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Right.

19 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** What I'm looking for is what the general
20 consensus was on how to manage that information, and who to notify that there was a
21 concern that there could be a serving member in an RCMP car involved.

22 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** So initially that was reported, you
23 know, immediately to the District Policing Officer once, you know, the assets were
24 mobilized. I haven't had any conversations with anyone in relation to that. I didn't have
25 any further conversation with anybody, I think, by and large, because the information
26 that had come in had proven to be inaccurate. So I didn't have any further conversation
27 with anyone else about how we would manage that, if that were to have been the case.

28 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** And I'm sorry; this is my last question,

1 Commissioner MacDonald.

2 The timeframe in which you determined that it wasn't Cst. Lilly, that
3 was -- or Sgt. Lilly, that was a fairly short turnaround time?

4 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes. Yes, within -- with 10 minutes,
5 15 minutes, somewhere along there.

6 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. Thank you very much.

7 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you so much.

8 I just have one line of question. It involves an early part of your
9 testimony. And if I understood correctly, I thought you were suggesting that it was a
10 benefit, as opposed to anything else, that Sgt. O'Brien was giving directions, if I
11 understood correctly, simultaneously with S/Sgt. Rehill, who I understood was in
12 charge.

13 So I'm having difficulty understanding why that would be a good
14 thing.

15 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** For me at that point in time because
16 there had been -- there was such a volume of things happening, you know, I was glad
17 that, you know, someone from the district was engaged and supporting him. I didn't see
18 him as treading on Brian's toes or anything of that nature. I just -- I saw it as a benefit
19 that if, for whatever reason, you know, Brian became distracted with something else, or
20 more information was coming in, that there was someone there to provide that backup
21 to him on the radio at that time. That was my thought around that.

22 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Okay. So if we were to give
23 recommendations, ---

24 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes.

25 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** --- I just want to make sure I
26 understand you. If we were to give recommendations about how to handle -- hopefully
27 never again, but an incident of this nature, it's better to have two as opposed to one
28 person giving directions? I guess intuitively I would think ---

1 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yeah.

2 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** --- that it's better for everybody if
3 someone's in charge ---

4 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Yes, yes.

5 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** --- and you know is in charge ---

6 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** And I agree with that.

7 In that case, early on there is a tendency for there to be, you know,
8 more than one person involved because of the dynamics. And, again, right, there was
9 an awful lot of things going on and happening at that time. And I -- you know, I agree
10 with you that one person, when at all possible. Inevitably, in police operations like that,
11 sometimes there is a tendency for there to be multiple people, and it can create trouble
12 with (a) who's in charge and who's providing the advice and guidance, and (b) tying up
13 the radios so that, you know, vital or critical information may not be -- necessarily be
14 able to get through.

15 So I think ideally, you know one person should be the point person
16 on the radio but I'm not sure that it would be easy to say one size fits all, depending on
17 the circumstances that are at hand at any particular given time.

18 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you so much for that.
19 And, more importantly, thank you for your testimony today, for being here and helping
20 us. It's a difficult day for you, I'm sure, but it's very important for us, and we very much
21 appreciate it. Not just sharing your experience but also -- the experience you bring but
22 also your experience during the event -- the mass casualty.

23 So thank you very much. It's greatly appreciated.

24 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Thank you, Commissioners.

25 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** You're free to go.

26 **S/SGT. STEVE HALLIDAY:** Thank you.

27 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Thanks so much to Participants and
28 their counsel. And to Commission Counsel for assisting us in hearing from the witness

1 today.

2 Later in our proceedings we'll continue to hear from additional
3 senior RCMP officers involved in making command decisions. In addition to those
4 scheduled this week, we'll hear from civilian and institutional witnesses as needed to
5 provide more clarity about what happened and why, and continue to hear submissions
6 from Participants about additional witnesses. We'll continue to post the schedule for the
7 coming week of proceedings, including witnesses on Fridays.

8 Tomorrow we'll be hearing from two more witnesses, Staff
9 Sergeants Jeff West and Kevin Surette; they'll provide additional clarity around the
10 emergency response during the mass casualty. Please note there won't be
11 proceedings this Thursday, but we will see you here tomorrow at 9:30.

12 Thank you.

13 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Thank you.

14 The proceedings are adjourned until May the 18th, 2022 at 9:30
15 a.m.

16 --- Upon adjourning at 3:49 p.m.

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CERTIFICATION

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
3 I, Sandrine Marineau-Lupien, a certified court reporter, hereby certify the foregoing
4 pages to be an accurate transcription of my notes/records to the best of my skill and
5 ability, and I so swear.

6

7 Je, Sandrine Marineau-Lupien, une sténographe officiel, certifie que les pages ci-hauts
8 sont une transcription conforme de mes notes/enregistrements au meilleur de mes
9 capacités, et je le jure.

10

11

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'S. Marineau-Lupien', is written over a horizontal line.

12 Sandrine Marineau-Lupien

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15