

Public Hearing

Audience publique

Commissioners / Commissaires

The Honourable / L'honorable J. Michael MacDonald,
Chair / Président

Leanne J. Fitch (Ret. Police Chief, M.O.M)

Dr. Kim Stanton

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II Appearances / Comparutions

Mr. Roger Burrill	Commission Counsel / Conseiller de la commission
Mr. Jamie VanWart	Commission Counsel / Conseiller de la commission
Mr. Joshua Bryson	Counsel / Conseiller
Ms. Lori Ward	Counsel / Conseillère
Mr. Tom MacDonald	Counsel / Conseiller
Ms. Jane Lenehan	Counsel / Conseillère
Ms. Linda Hupman	Counsel / Conseillère

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Halifax, Nova Scotia

--- Upon commencing on Thursday, May 25th, 2022, at 9:31 a.m.

REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND: Good morning. The proceedings of the Mass Casualty Commission are now in session, with Commissioner Michael MacDonald, Commissioner Leanne Fitch, and Commissioner Kim Stanton presiding.

COMMISSIONER FITCH: Hello, and welcome. Bonjour, et bienvenue. We join you from Mi'kma'ki, the ancestral and unceded territory of the Mi'kmaq. As we do every day, please join us in remembering those whose lives were taken or were harmed, their families, and all those affected by the April 2020 mass casualty in Nova Scotia.

Our job is to find out what happened, look at how and why it happened, and use everything we learn to help make our communities safer. Through our work so far, we've uncovered new information and shared a large volume of information with the public through witnesses, documents, reports, and source materials. While we have come a long way in this Inquiry, we still have more work to do and much more to learn.

We continue to hear from witnesses and ask difficult questions. We will not allow accommodations to prevent the Commission from gathering necessary information. On the contrary, witness accommodations, when granted, will help us gather necessary information and be able to share it with the public.

Yesterday, we heard from a senior RCMP officer, and today, we will hear from another senior officer. This important testimony builds on last week's work, where we also heard from a number of officers involved in making command decisions on April 18th and 19th, and as we have said, we expect to hear from more RCMP officers and other witnesses in the weeks and months ahead.

As we have said, the Commission is not a criminal or civil court, it is our responsibility as your Commissioners to do our work in a way that is respectful,

1 humane, and gets the best information to inform change to help us keep people safer in
2 the future.

3 Today, we continue our work by hearing from Staff Sergeant Al
4 Carroll, who, like all witnesses we have heard so far, will be asked questions developed
5 by Commission Counsel in the public's interest. The Commission Counsel are impartial
6 and tasked with vigorously seeking the truth.

7 Later today, we will hear Participants' submissions on Foundational
8 Documents that were presented during the week of May 16th, and on Critical Incident
9 planning, preparation, response, and decision-making.

10 I will now ask Senior Commission Counsel Roger Burrill to proceed
11 with our witness. Thank you, Mr. Burrill.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** If I may, Commissioners, before we
13 proceed with the witness, there is one small matter of housekeeping to attend to, and
14 that is I wish to introduce into evidence a report that was created by the Investigative
15 Staff of the Mass Casualty Commission. It is Supplemental Report, COMM
16 Number 0058252. The title of the document and the subject of the document is Further
17 Investigative Analysis of RCMP Involvement in the Portapique Community on April 19th.
18 And I understand that the Registrar is in a position to exhibit that now.

19 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** It's Exhibit 1624.

20 **--- EXHIBIT NO. 1624:**

21 (COMM0058252) Foundational Document - Investigative Analysis
22 of RCMP Involvement in the Portapique Community on April 19th

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** That being the case, Commissioners, we
24 will be able to proceed with the calling of the witness. As the accommodations have
25 arranged, the witness is to be reaching us through Zoom. This is a new experience for
26 me, I suspect it is for the witness as well, so I hope the Commissioners can bear with us
27 as we proceed through what may be technological glitches. I hope not. So I will
28 proceed.

1 You are retired Staff Sergeant Allan Carroll; is that correct?

2 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** That is correct.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** You can hear me all right, Retired Staff
4 Sergeant?

5 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes, I can.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. I understand that you have
7 expressed a willingness to be sworn in your testimony today; is that right?

8 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** That is correct.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. You have a Bible there with you,
10 Staff Sergeant?

11 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes, I do.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Now, the Registrar, who will be out
13 of sight for you, is going to address you with respect to that undertaking.

14 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Okay.

15 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL, Sworn:**

16 **--- EXAMINATION IN-CHIEF BY MR. ROGER BURRILL:**

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So for the record, Staff Sergeant -- would
18 you prefer me to call you Staff Sergeant, Retired Staff Sergeant? How would you wish
19 to be addressed?

20 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I'll leave that up to you.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right.

22 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Staff Sergeant's great.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Very good. Your last name is spelled
24 C-A-R-R-O-L-L?

25 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** That is correct.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. So I propose to engage in a
27 discussion with you using the Foundational Document as a guidepost or as a guide.

28 The Foundational Document is entitled RCMP Command Post Operational

1 Communication Centre and Command Decisions that I understand you've had a chance
2 to review previously. Am I correct there, Staff Sergeant?

3 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I haven't reviewed the Foundational
4 Document.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Oh, forgive me. Have you had a chance
6 to become at all familiar with some of the -- the materials therein?

7 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Not other than my -- other than my
8 statement to the Commission investigators ---

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

10 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** --- and my own notes, that's all I've
11 reviewed.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right, very good. Listen, I want to
13 make it clear to you, Staff Sergeant, that the process today is designed to obtain
14 information for the Commissioners so they can carry on their work. If you need a break,
15 you need some time, please indicate that to me, at which time I will seek permission
16 from the Commissioners, who are within my eyesight here now at this point. Okay?

17 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** All right, thank you.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. So I propose to go over some
19 introductory material so we can find out who exactly Retired Staff Sergeant Allan Carroll
20 is. I understand that you retired November 7th, 2020; is that correct?

21 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** That is my official retirement date,
22 yes.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right on. And you had 40-years of
24 service with the RCMP, Staff Sergeant?

25 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** That is correct.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I understand that in May of 1980, you
27 enrolled in the RCMP and undertook the six month field training requirement at the
28 Rimouski detachment of the RCMP; is that right?

1 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I enrolled in May of 1980. I went to
2 Montreal on a three-month language training course. I then went to -- in September of
3 1980, I went to the RCMP Training Academy and Depo, graduating in March of 1981, at
4 which time I was transferred to Rimouski detachment in Quebec for my six-month field
5 training.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So I got it kind of generally right,
7 but you've specifically clarified that. Thank you very much. Am I right to say that in
8 1981 to 1986, you were then moved and/or posted to the Quebec City detachment; is
9 that right?

10 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** That is correct.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And I understand that you undertook
12 general duty obligations and also were involved in the General Investigative, GIS
13 section?

14 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** We were involved in Quebec and
15 Ontario as all plainclothes, so we did a General Investigative Section, which wouldn't
16 involve normal criminal offences. They're other criminal -- other investigations, federal
17 statutes.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I understand.

19 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I -- and then I -- I did about three
20 years on Quebec City drug section.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. 1986 to 1992, I understand that
22 you were posted to the Ottawa District; is that right?

23 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** That is correct. I went to the
24 headquarters in Ottawa.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm. Were you engaged at sometime in
26 the Prime Minister's protective team?

27 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes, I was involved in VIP duties for
28 dignitaries and ambassadors in the local area, and when the Prime Minister's protective

1 detail was formed I was one of the initial members.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Thank you. Am I correct to say that
3 between 1992 and 1995, you were transferred to the Cheticamp detachment in the
4 Inverness District in Cape Breton, Nova Scotia?

5 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** That is correct. I arrived there in
6 December of 1992 and left in August of 1995.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And your duties there, generally, please,
8 Staff Sergeant?

9 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** General duties policing is a small
10 three-man detachment. For about 10 months we were down -- we were two members.
11 So we did all the -- did all the policing of that area.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I understand. 1995 to 2003, you were
13 posted to the, I want to see if I get this correct, the Truro Drug Section? Is that right?

14 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes, when my time was up in
15 Cheticamp I was offered a transfer to Truro. I thought I was going to Bible Hill, but it
16 ended up being Truro Drug Section.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. You were there for eight years and
18 your responsibilities generally were?

19 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** We took care of north and -- northern
20 Nova Scotia, northern mainland Nova Scotia from Antigonish to Enfield, to Amherst, to
21 Cumberland County. We did drug investigations at all levels in that area.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Thank you.

23 Between 2003 and 2000 -- excuse me -- 2003 you were promoted
24 to Corporal. Does that sound correct, Staff Sergeant?

25 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes. In March of 2003, I was
26 promoted and went to the Metro Integrated Intelligence Unit in Halifax. I was involved
27 mostly in investigating outlaw motorcycle gang activity.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And that was in Halifax District?

1 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** That was in Halifax, in headquarters
2 in Halifax.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Thank you.

4 I understand that you were promoted to Sergeant in 2006.

5 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** In 2006, yes, I -- I left the Integrated
6 Unit for a period of time and went to a specialized unit, a pilot project. At the conclusion
7 of that pilot project experience, I was promoted to Sergeant in charge of the Integrated
8 Intelligence Unit ---

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

10 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** --- returning to Halifax.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Thank you.

12 Am I correct to say that between 2011 and 2014, you were posted
13 to the Amherst detachment operating as the Cumberland District Ops NCO? Is that
14 right?

15 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Basically, yes. I was transferred in, I
16 believe it was, April 2011. I went to Cumberland as the Ops NCO and for a period of
17 time the Staff Sergeant in charge of Cumberland District was -- was off duty sick, and I
18 assumed the roles of District Commander for approximately at 13-month period.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Thank you.

20 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** He returned -- and he returned and I
21 maintained my status as the Ops NCO until 2014.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. I understand you received a
23 promotion to Staff Sergeant at some time, and I'm not entirely clear when that was.

24 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** The Staff Sergeant in charge of
25 Cumberland retired. When he retired, after all the job competition and promotion went
26 through, I ended up getting -- was given the promotion in charge of Cumberland District.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And you were the District Commander in
28 Cumberland District from 2014 to 2016?

1 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** That is correct.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And did you have the rank of Staff
3 Sergeant at that time?

4 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes, I did, 2014 I was promoted to
5 Staff Sergeant.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. Two thousand and sixteen (2016),
7 I understand you were transferred to the Colchester District as the Commander there.
8 Is that right?

9 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes. I think in August of 2016, I
10 arrived in Cumberland -- in Colchester County as the District Commander.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So you retired from the RCMP as the
12 Colchester District Commander. Is that right?

13 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** That is correct.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So in April of 2020, you carried out
15 the role of Colchester District Commander. Am I right there, Staff Sergeant?

16 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes, I was.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Very good.

18 I understand that you have some other specialized skills as well
19 within the RCMP. In particular, since 1995 you've been involved in the Crisis
20 Negotiating or Negotiator Team.

21 Can you tell us about that, please?

22 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Actually, I was trained as a crisis
23 negotiator in 1986 as a result of the attack on the Turkish Embassy in Ottawa. There
24 were a number of us trained to -- for that purpose. And in my role -- when I transferred
25 to Ottawa, I was part of a group that was there to respond should the need -- should the
26 need arise.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

28 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** And I did training in Ottawa with

1 different ERT teams and the SIRT team at the time.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

3 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** When I transferred down to Nova
4 Scotia, I maintained that activity primarily when I came to Truro in 1995. In '97 I joined
5 the team and I've been involved in crisis negotiation ever since.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I understand that in 2012, or thereabouts,
7 you were the H Div -- H Division coordinator of the Crisis Negotiation Team?

8 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes, I'm -- I believe it was around
9 2012 the previous head of the team, he retired and I assumed the responsibility as
10 district coordinator for the crisis negotiators.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And just before we move off the
12 Crisis Negotiation Team topic, I understand in April of 2020 there were 10 crisis
13 negotiators that were trained and available in the province of Nova Scotia?

14 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** About a team of 10.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. And you were coordinating them at
16 that time.

17 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** That is correct.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Can you tell me about availability or on-
19 call of the Crisis Negotiating Team in terms of ability and responsiveness to a critical
20 incident?

21 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I -- there were two of us, myself and I
22 had a second-in-command, Staff Sergeant Royce MacRae. And we would go month
23 on, month off as being on call. And if there were a situation requiring a crisis negotiator
24 that arose within the province, anywhere in the province, we would be contacted either
25 by -- usually by the Operational Command Centre. They would call us and advise a
26 negotiator was needed or that ERT was being stood up and -- and the on-call negotiator
27 would be called and, depending on where it was, he would either go out or appoint or
28 locate two other negotiators who could respond to the call.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** In April of 2020, were you, yourself, on
2 this monthly on-call roster or was it someone else?

3 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I believe I was on call.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And what about Royce MacRae?

5 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Royce would have been -- he would
6 have been just off duty.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. All right.

8 We talked about the Crisis Negotiation Team and that you had
9 been trained since the -- 1986. Would there be recertification or continuing education
10 involved ---

11 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Oh, yes.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- with that particular skill, and could you
13 comment on that for us, please, Staff Sergeant?

14 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes. We recertified, I think it was, on
15 a five-year rotation. We went to Ottawa, the Canadian Police College in Ottawa, and
16 did a recertification training. In between that, there were other practical scenarios that
17 we did with ERT teams. We had some in New Brunswick with the team in New
18 Brunswick and did some training with them as well as the team in Prince Edward Island.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

20 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** In recent -- in recent years, we would
21 get together for a national get-together of negotiators. I would -- and in Regina -- at the
22 RCMP Training Academy in Regina, and we'd go over best practices, current situations,
23 negotiating tactics and techniques. And that would serve as an ongoing training for our
24 functionality.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. With respect to that, I assume that
26 there is some interaction or engagement with critical incident training. Are you able to
27 comment upon that, Staff Sergeant?

28 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** We don't -- I guess when it comes into

1 a scenario, with the ERT scenario we'd have the whole package together and we tried
2 to do it once -- once a year, we do it in either -- Aldershot was one of the places we
3 usually did it. We'd use their facility and we'd run a full-blown scenario whereas the
4 ERT team, crisis negotiators and critical incident would be involved.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Can you tell me, then, about IARD
6 training that you may have had, Immediate Action Rapid Deployment? Any comment in
7 that regard?

8 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I've had IARD training a number of
9 years ago. I forget when it was. It was post-2011. I was in Cumberland County when I
10 had it.

11 We trained, actually, at the -- the old elementary school in Salmon
12 River here in the Truro area.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

14 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** And so I went through an IARD
15 training at least once, maybe twice. I can't quite remember.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. And can you tell me, then, about
17 any training you would have had specifically in critical incident response?

18 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I had one -- one three-day course in
19 Debert, probably in 2012, maybe 2013, about the initial critical incident response.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Thank you.

21 Now, you are familiar, obviously, from your position and your
22 engagement with the RCMP about the incident involving the shooter in Moncton in
23 2014. And I'm wondering if you can comment about any training response changes or
24 engagement that supervisors in your position would have had with respect to a
25 response to that incident?

26 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** In 2014 I was in Cumberland, that
27 incident, and there was a request came in through the OCC ---

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah, I want to interrupt you. I'm going to

1 interrupt you.

2 I don't mean with particular response to the event while ---

3 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Okay.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- you were in Cumberland. I mean with
5 respect to training and involvement in terms of a response by the RCMP for supervisors
6 on an active shooter situation.

7 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Training, there was obviously more
8 carbine training. Carbine rollout was -- was accelerated with -- we had had carbines in
9 Cumberland County, but, actually, the program was accelerated and carbines were
10 made available ---

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

12 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** And training for all members.

13 As for the supervisors, I can't -- nothing comes to mind about some
14 ---

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I'll ask you specifically about whether you
16 can comment on a program, or training, or courses entitled or along the title of Initial
17 Critical Incident Response Program that would have been post-Moncton 2014?
18 Anything you can say about that?

19 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** That was the training I was referring
20 to when I mentioned prior.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And just finalizing this round or
22 area of questioning, supervisory role that you would have had in Cumberland and
23 Colchester, can you say whether there was anything specialized towards the
24 supervisory role for an active shooter situation that you were exposed to in your
25 positions there?

26 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Not that I was exposed to.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Okay. Let me ask you some
28 further questions about your training and your exposure at the RCMP. In particular, are

1 you able to comment on any specific training you might have had with respect to the
2 CIIDS program, which we've been exploring here over the past number of weeks, i.e.,
3 that is the Computer Integrated Information and Dispatching System. Would you have
4 had exposure to training in that regard?

5 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I was never trained on CIIDS. I know
6 it's existence, ---

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

8 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** --- I know it's there, but I don't know
9 how to use it.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I understand. Would you be, in a
11 supervisory position, have been aware of any training programs for those under your
12 charge at that time with respect to the CIIDS programming?

13 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I'm going to -- no, I can't -- I don't
14 know if the team leaders were -- had CIIDS training. I know -- I think the admin
15 assistants were.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

17 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** And dispatchers obviously learned
18 CIIDS, but I -- yeah. And then the admin assistants were, but ---

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

20 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** --- the members themselves were not
21 involved in the dispatching.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I understand. And I want to be fair to you.
23 I'm just wondering if there's any protocols, or designs, or programming with respect to
24 assisting supervisors in being able to train those under their charge with respect to the
25 CIIDS program?

26 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I'm not aware of any.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Tell me about the CAD logging
28 system. Similarly, I'll ask you, is there any training program for supervisors to assist

1 those under their charge with respect to the CAD logging system?

2 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I don't believe so.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

4 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Members log in, log in comes on their
5 mobile workstation, they come on shift, ---

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

7 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** --- and they log in.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Very good.

9 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** All the members are trained to do
10 that.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. And I'm going to ask you a final
12 question in this area with respect to the mobile workstation that you just touched on,
13 that MWS, and its functionality. Would supervisors be trained in the mobile
14 workstation's functionality?

15 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yeah, the frontline supervisors, they
16 were all very adept with it. The Ops NCOs ---

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

18 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** --- had a good working knowledge of
19 it. I struggled with it, ---

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** As ---

21 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** --- personally.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah, I understand. And we'll get to that
23 a little later.

24 With respect to the commanding role that you would have had in
25 both Cumberland and Colchester, would you have had some insight in terms of what
26 training would be available to those working under your charge for the MWS?

27 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** For the MWS, members, I don't think
28 there was a specific training course, ---

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

2 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** --- that I'm aware of.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

4 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Members were -- members were --
5 would be taught by people who initially learned it and you'd come on to shift, or if
6 somebody came out of Metro or some place and transferred to the area that didn't use
7 the MWS, they would be taught, a hands-on teaching of how to use the -- how to use --
8 how to log on to the MWS and how to work and operate it.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Excellent. Thank you for that answer.
10 Let me ask you, as a supervisor, both in Cumberland and Colchester County, did you
11 have any occasion or concern with respect to any of the training of people under your
12 charge with respect to those three areas that I've discussed? CIIDS, CADs, and MWS?

13 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, it didn't seem to be -- it seemed to
14 be ---

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

16 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** --- working -- working well.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Very good. I'm going to continue on with
18 a few more questions on training before we get into some more specific questions.

19 In particular, in your supervisory role in Cumberland and Colchester
20 County, would be you be aware of something called next of kin protocols?

21 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** We did next of kin notifications, ---

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

23 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** --- the specific protocols, had I read
24 them over, I'm sure there's something in policy, but I personally didn't read them over.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Okay. All right. Very good.
26 Thank you.

27 I'm going to ask you a few questions with respect to April 18th and
28 19th 2020 with respect to the structure of command in Northeast Nova, because it's

1 been a struggle for me, I must admit, to try to have people and their role with respect to
2 the structure of command. But am I correct to say, and I think we determined that you
3 were the Colchester District Commander in charge of Bible Hill, Tatamagouche, and
4 Stewiacke Detachments? Is that right?

5 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** That is correct.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. And S/Sgt Addie MacCallum,
7 you're familiar with him?

8 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And am I right to say that he was the
10 District Advisory Non-Commissioned Officer, the DANCO, one of two for Northeast
11 Nova who oversees or oversaw six counties in Northeast Nova? Does that sound right
12 to you, Staff Sergeant?

13 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** That was his role at the time. Addie
14 wasn't -- he was a District Commander in Pictou County and because of a vacancy at
15 the DANCO level, or an upper level, Addie assumed the role of DANCO.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And you're familiar with S/Sgt
17 Steve Halliday, and he was the Acting Operations Officer for Northeast Nova in April of
18 2020?

19 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes. Very familiar with Steve. We
20 have a long history together and he was one of my negotiators.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And finally, you're familiar with
22 Supt Archie Thompson?

23 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes. Archie ---

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** He was the district policing officer for
25 Northeast Nova in April of 2020?

26 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yeah, yes, he was. Archie had
27 transferred in. I forget exactly when he came in from a posting in Newfoundland.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So in terms of hierarchal structure,

1 if I can put it crassly that way, can you tell us who has the responsibility, from the
2 highest to the lowest amongst the four of those people named? Or is it possible even to
3 do that?

4 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Well Archie would be the District
5 Policing Officer. He was in charge of the district. Under Archie was the Operations
6 Inspector or Operations Officer, who would take -- any big files, he would be up there
7 working or taking care of it, guiding, directing. And the two DANCOs would come out
8 and take over their roles and they would provide direct guidance and assistance to each
9 of their respective -- the northern -- north and south areas of the district of Northeast
10 Nova.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And then you would be the next in line in
12 terms of ---

13 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** And then what each of the DANCOs,
14 the DANCO in northern -- in our area, in this area of Northeast Nova, he would provide
15 guidance to all of the staff sergeants and ranking people in his six or seven areas. Two
16 sergeants in Millbrook and Indian Brook, a staff sergeant in Enfield, Pictou,
17 Cumberland, Colchester. We would report up to the Northeast Nova, to our DANCO.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Very good. So on April 18th and
19 19th, when you were engaged in your responsibilities as the Commander for
20 Cumberland District, am I right to say that you were present at both the detachment and
21 at the Command Post over some periods of time during the incident?

22 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I'd just make one correction.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yes.

24 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** You said Cumberland District.
25 Colchester District?

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Forgive me. That's what I meant.

27 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No problem. Yeah, I know what you
28 meant, but ---

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

2 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** --- just to clarify.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Of course.

4 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes, I would have been at the
5 detachment ---

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right.

7 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** --- and also out of the Command Post.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** S/Sgt Halliday was as well?

9 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** S/Sgt MacCallum was as well?

11 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And Supt Thompson, was he there?

13 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** No. And did you yourself have a working
15 knowledge of where Supt Thompson was?

16 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Actually, I didn't.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. That was the responsibility of
18 somebody else on your team in terms of connection to S/Sgt -- sorry, to Supt
19 Thompson?

20 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Either on occasion of if Supt
21 Thompson were away on vacation, or out of the province, S Halliday would assume that
22 role.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And I guess what I'm asking you,
24 in a roundabout uncomfortable way is, any idea why Supt Thompson was not at the
25 Command Post and/or at the detachment on April 18th and 19th? Do you have any
26 insight for us? Or not?

27 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, I don't.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Very good. All right. What I do

1 propose at this stage, Staff Sergeant, is to move now to the actual incident and your
2 involvement in it. And I'm going to use, as indicated, the document as a guidepost. I'm
3 going to ask the registrar, Madam Registrar, to take us to page 39, paragraphs 91 and
4 92. And this will provide us some insight, Staff Sergeant, into what it is I'm proposing to
5 ask you.

6 Paragraph 91 is -- has been raised before you and before the
7 parties here in the proceedings. Indicates that:

8 "At 10:35:28...[the] OCC dispatch[er]...Jen MacCallum
9 called S/Sgt. Carroll to advise him of the situation in
10 Portapique."

11 I understand that you were at home at that time?

12 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I'm trying to -- I'm trying to enlarge
13 that...

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Oh. Oh, please, take your time to ensure
15 you've got a chance to look at it. First line:

16 "...10:35:28...OCC dispatch supervisor Jen
17 MacCallum called S/Sgt. Carroll to advise him of the
18 situation in Portapique. S/Sgt. Carroll informed
19 Ms. MacCallum that he was aware of the situation."

20 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yeah. I'm not sure if I was home or --
21 I was probably still at home at that time.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I understand that at that time you had had
23 no prior knowledge of the incident?

24 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, actually, I -- prior to that, I was -- I
25 was at home on Saturday night watching a hockey game. My son, who is a member in
26 Cumberland County, he called me quickly and advised and just said, "Dad, there's
27 something going on in Cumberland -- in Colchester. We're all responding to a shooting
28 incident."

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I see.

2 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** And ---

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So your son's name, just for the record, is
4 Jordan or Constable Jordan Carroll; is that right?

5 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** That is correct.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. So you first received that
7 information from your son, Jordan, with respect to something going on?

8 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yeah, something going on there. He
9 didn't have a lot of details, he was just responding with the other Cumberland members
10 to a -- to backup Colchester members.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** You had additional contact with members
12 of your team?

13 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Shortly after, very shortly after I hung
14 up the phone from Jordan, I received a call from Sergeant Andy O'Brien, who advised of
15 the same thing. I believe he had been -- he had been called by Stuart Beselt, who was
16 the team leader that night ---

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

18 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** --- and advised that "Something's
19 going on in the county. We have a shooting. We're responding to a shooting situation.
20 We..." -- they didn't know much about it.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Staff -- forgive me. Go ahead.

22 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, no.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. Sergeant Andy O'Brien was your
24 OPS NCO for Colchester District; am I right?

25 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes, he was.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. So I can understand how it was
27 that he would be informing you as the District Commander of what was going on.

28 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yeah.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I'm a little interested in how Jordan's line
2 of hierarchy would be involved. Why was it that he is contacting you?

3 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** He just -- he's my son. He knew I was
4 in charge of the district. He said, "Hey Dad, you probably want to know about this."

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So -- yeah.

6 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** That was all, just...

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** That sounds more of a personal
8 engagement as opposed to a professional line of response. Would that be an accurate
9 characterisation of it, Staff Sergeant?

10 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** It wouldn't be a professional line. It
11 was personal. No, he knows I'm in charge of the district, he knows I'm involved in
12 Operations and I want to know what's going on in my district.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

14 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** So he was ahead of the -- ahead of
15 the game. Actually, Stuart calling Andy was quite quickly. OCC would have -- OCC
16 usually would have called either myself. I would have gotten a call from the Risk
17 Manager or Sergeant O'Brien, would have -- would have gotten a call from the Risk
18 Manger saying, "Something -- something's going on." You got to -- you to know that.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. I understand that you spoke with
20 Jen MacCallum, the Dispatch Supervisor; does that sound correct?

21 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes, I did receive a call from Jen. I
22 received a -- I spoke to Jen a couple of times that evening. The initial call you're
23 referring to at 10:35, I can't recall if I was at my house or -- if I was still at home or if I
24 was at the office. I know there were -- there were a couple of calls in there I believe.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Let's move to paragraph 92, then,
26 Staff Sergeant, so it's moving along here in terms of the chronology.

27 "According to S/Sgt. Carroll, Sgt. O'Brien advised that
28 he had consumed 'a couple glasses of wine' and

1 would therefore be unable to attend the office.

2 S/Sgt. Carroll advised that he would gear up and
3 attend the office. S/Sgt..."

4 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, I was ---

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:**

6 "...Carroll was en route to the Bible Hill...detachment
7 at the time that he was contacted by Jen
8 MacCallum."

9 Which is referred to earlier in the paragraph 91.

10 Can you make any comment with respect to that, Staff Sergeant?

11 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yeah, that would have been the
12 second phone call when Andy -- second phone call from Andy. The first call was just
13 saying, "We have a situation. Stuart told me we have a situation at Portapique, and
14 there's been some shooting." And then at that time, at the second call, Andy had more
15 information to provide me that there was somebody -- somebody had been shot at on a
16 deck -- on somebody's deck, I believe. He knew more and the seriousness -- the
17 situation was more serious.

18 At that time, he advised that, I thought he said a couple of glasses
19 of wine, he had a couple of drinks that night, and he felt uncomfortable going to the --
20 totally not intoxicated, but going to a scene of that magnitude, he didn't want anybody
21 smelling the alcohol off his breath and he didn't want that to become an issue.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And did that present a problem for
23 you at all, Staff Sergeant, at this point?

24 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Not overly. I -- Andy was very, very
25 calm, cool, collected, and there was no issues with what he was telling me. And I said,
26 "Okay, I'll go out and I'll try to respond."

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And what did you discern, then, at
28 that point, from your point of view, about what the role of Sergeant O'Brien would be

1 given his disclosure of consumption of a few glasses of wine?

2 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** That he wouldn't be taking any
3 command decisions. He wouldn't be, you know, actively -- he wouldn't be out in
4 uniform, he wouldn't be out on scene.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Did you provide any directive in
6 your role as Commander to Andy O'Brien with respect to his involvement or his
7 participation in this, I'm going to -- in this event, or this call?

8 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, I -- not that I -- not that I recall. I
9 just said, "Okay, Andy, you can't come out. I'll go out."

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And I know this is a hypothetical
11 question, and as a result feel comfortable to say you're not comfortable responding, but
12 if Andy O'Brien had been able to go out what would have been your role at that point?
13 Would you have gone out?

14 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Based on the situation we were
15 dealing with, I would have said yes, I would have gone out.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. Thank you. Okay, I understand
17 that you then, and this is an expression that I've learned from my involvement in this file,
18 "geared up". Does that mean anything to you?

19 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I was putting my uniform on, getting
20 my equipment -- my equipment on. I ---

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

22 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** --- dressed at home, drove to the
23 office. And I do not store firearms at my house. All my -- all my hard body armour, my
24 duty, my -- just my services, my duty body belt is at the office, so I had to go to the
25 office to get that on.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. And did it take you long to go
27 from your residence to the office?

28 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I'm probably -- it's probably about a

1 10-minute or ---

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Sure.

3 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** --- 10-minutes at max to drive from
4 one to the other.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And what type of information would you
6 have been either receiving or monitoring during that call, or sorry, during that traverse to
7 the office?

8 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Well, I'd be in a private vehicle, so it
9 would be whatever I had on the -- whatever I was getting on my cell phone. So there
10 was no radio communication.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. Very good.

12 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Prior to -- prior to leaving home, I was
13 contacted when I was trying to get changed to go into the office, I was called by Jeff
14 West.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

16 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Jeff West told me that the ERT team
17 had been set up. There is an incident going around Portapique and that there were --
18 he didn't have many details either, it was just in its infancy of what's going on, but they
19 were on their way. He asked me to -- he asked me to secure two negotiators, to secure
20 negotiators to join the Critical Incident Package. Said, "Okay, Jeff, I'll take care of it and
21 I'll get back to you." So I -- at that time, I called Royce MacRae, gave Royce a quick
22 heads-up of, well what I knew, which wasn't -- which was very little at that time, and he
23 proceeded to get -- call another negotiator, called me back, and then I told Jeff -- I told
24 him, I called him back, I called Jeff back and said, "We have two negotiators. They'll
25 meet you on scene."

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Now, that's something that I
27 should explore a little bit more with you. It sounds to me at this stage that the CIC, Staff
28 Sergeant West, was engaging you in your role as the Crisis Negotiating Team

1 Coordinator. Does that sound accurate?

2 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yeah, that is correct. A little bit -- a
3 little bit of both. I -- Jeff and I have done a number of incidents together, and he knew --
4 he knew I was in charge in Colchester. So he was calling to -- initially to secure the
5 negotiators, but also, that I'm the District Commander, and letting me know what's going
6 on as well.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So at that stage, and please
8 correct me if I'm wrong, it sounds like you were almost wearing two hats as you were
9 engaging in this incident, the Crisis Negotiating Team Coordinator and also the
10 Colchester District Commander.

11 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** It was a very, a very short period of
12 time wearing two hats. Once I turned it over to Royce, that -- I walked from away from
13 the negotiating stuff.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

15 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** And I think the whole evening I might
16 have seen Royce maybe two or three times, but in very short periods of time.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. All right. In terms of your
18 anticipation, when you're on your way to the detachment to gear up, what is it that
19 you're expecting to see or do when you arrive at the detachment?

20 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I expected to grab a vehicle and head
21 out to the scene.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And "head out to the scene" -- at
23 that point, I'm under the impression that there was no command post at that point, that
24 the Critical Incident Commander had just been stood up, that the critical incident
25 package had just been either engaged or soon to be engaged. Heading out to the
26 scene at that point would have served what purpose, Staff Sergeant? Are you able to
27 say?

28 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Just to be -- just to be out, I guess,

1 supervision and some guidance, some help to the members on scene.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. All right.

3 So you attended to the detachment and I understand that you had a
4 conversation with Jen MacCallum again. Am I right?

5 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yeah. There was a -- is that the
6 10:35 conversation? I can't recall if that's when she called, if I was still home at that
7 time or if I had -- if I had moved on the detachment. There were -- I believe Jen's notes
8 to be more detailed than mine.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Sure. Well, maybe what I'll do -- forgive
10 me. I interrupted you, Staff Sergeant Carroll. But I'm going to direct your attention to
11 paragraph 97 in the document that we've been using as a guidepost. And it says -- it's
12 at page 41.

13 This will just assist us in terms of locating times and places.

14 Ninety-seven (97) indicates:

15 "At 10:42:38 p.m., S/Sgt. Carroll received a call from
16 Jen MacCallum informing him that S/Sgt. Craig
17 Learning in Cumberland County requested a count of
18 all Colchester RCMP cars to ensure none were
19 missing."

20 So I'm of the view that this paragraph gives us a sense that you
21 received a second call or an additional call from Jen MacCullum with respect to a
22 particular topic, that is, the count of Colchester police cars. Do you recall that?

23 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I don't recall Jen making that request.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Maybe, then, you can tell us what
25 you recall for purposes of clarifying the record.

26 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I remember that request being -- a
27 request like that being made from Staff Halliday at some point in time.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

1 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Around that same time. I don't
2 remember exactly when the timeframe was ---

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

4 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** --- but I don't remember -- I don't
5 remember that coming from Craig Learning.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. But do you recall a Jen MacCallum
7 engagement?

8 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No. Not -- not for that, I don't.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. The issue of the Colchester cars, I
10 want to just explore that a little bit.

11 It looks like at least some request was made to you to discern
12 Colchester cars availability or whether they are accounted for. What would be the
13 process, Staff Sergeant, for you going about doing that, and was there a protocol for
14 this and can you give us some insight in that regard what you did?

15 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No. There -- there isn't a protocol that
16 I know of, and I didn't -- I didn't fully understand what was being requested of me.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

18 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I thought -- it was my understanding
19 they were looking for where my cars are responding to the scene. That was my
20 understanding. And so on, I knew we had a bunch of cars in the parking lot. Did I go
21 check and see where every one of our vehicles was? No, I did not.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Do you recall at any time indicating that
23 Colchester vehicles were accounted for to anybody?

24 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Were accounted for with the four --
25 the four Colchester vehicles we had on scene at Portapique.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

27 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I may have responded, "Yeah, they're
28 down there". I knew four cars were down there, and that's -- that was the extent of it.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I see. And that would be on the basis of
2 your knowledge from what -- what source?

3 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Knowing that they all went down
4 individually.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. Would there have been a
6 technological or computerized way for you to make a follow-up or check with respect to
7 the accounting for vehicles at that time?

8 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** There would have been -- not -- I
9 mean, it's for the OCC knowing where they were, but vehicles would have logged out
10 whatever shift went off, what vehicles were where. There would have been a couple of
11 on-call members that would have taken cars home with them that night.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. I guess what I'm trying to get at
13 here, Staff Sergeant, is if there was an early concern in this event to account for RCMP
14 vehicles both in Colchester and Cumberland districts, what role would the District
15 Commander have had in terms of trying to ascertain whether those vehicles were all
16 able to be accounted for?

17 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Basically, what -- you know, if there's
18 a vehicle -- if -- there's a board saying where the cars are. Some of the cars may have
19 been in a garage under repairs, just like were out of service.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. And at that time when this
21 information is being discussed, are you in a position to feel comfortable with respect to
22 accounting for the presence of all the vehicles within Colchester District?

23 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I didn't realize -- I did not realize that
24 was the request that was being made.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I see. Okay.
26 So with respect to the request that was being made, what was your
27 understanding?

28 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** To account for the four -- account for

1 the vehicles that were on shift that night that were out there.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I see. I see. So to account for the four
3 that you were aware were responding to Portapique, but you weren't aware that there
4 was anything broader than that with respect to any other vehicles.

5 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No. I didn't realize that was the -- that
6 was the nature of the -- of the request that I was getting.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Very good.

8 Let's move on, then, if we can, to your role with respect to
9 containment efforts because I understand you partook in some role early on in April
10 18th with respect to containment at the Portapique scene. Is that correct?

11 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I'd -- yes, I had some involvement.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Very good.

13 Then what I propose to do is I want to play for you a very brief
14 transmission from Constable Vicki Colford with respect to some information that she
15 had.

16 Madam Registrar, this is the Colchester radio transcript and its
17 accompanying audio.

18 I'm just going to play this for you, Staff Sergeant, and ask you to
19 make some comments on what you know, if anything, about this.

20 **(AUDIO PLAYBACK)**

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So Staff Sergeant, you're familiar with
22 that voice. And who ---

23 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yeah, I recognize the voice. Yes.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And it has been presented
25 throughout these proceedings as being the voice of Constable Vicki Colford.

26 Do you have any difficulty with that?

27 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** No. And it's at 10:48:41, some very

1 significant information with respect to access and egress into and out of Portapique.

2 Are you able to tell us whether you heard that information?

3 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I just heard it now. This is the first
4 time I've heard that transcript -- or that recording. I never heard that before.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So I guess what I will ask you, is
6 there any reason, perhaps, why it is that the District Commander didn't hear this
7 information at this early stage in the proceeding? Can you give us some insight into
8 that?

9 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Not -- not in a room where there's a
10 radio. Where -- I said I was at the office gearing up and there's no radio. There's no
11 radio in that room. It could have been just I was walking from point A to point B in the
12 office. In my office, I could have been on the phone. I could have been on the phone
13 speaking with -- there was phone calls coming in. If I were doing that, I would have
14 missed that conversation coming through by Vicki.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I see. But that conversation, then --
16 excuse me. Forgive me.

17 That transmission as it goes out at 10:48:41, there would be other
18 people other than the District Commander that would be in a position to hear that. Am I
19 right?

20 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I would have to assume so, yes.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. Okay.

22 All right. Given the fact that this is the first time you've heard this
23 today, does this strike you as being important information that might have been useful in
24 terms of your role and your engagement on April 18th?

25 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** It sure would have.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. Okay. We'll move on, then, to
27 continue and discuss further containment efforts.

28 I'm going to direct you to the Colchester transcript involving

1 transmissions at around 11 p.m. on April 18th, and we're going to play the
2 accompanying audio therein.

3 **(AUDIO PLAYBACK)**

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So, Staff Sergeant Carroll, I'm trying to
5 get a sense of what's going on here in the sense that -- and this is reflected,
6 Commissioners, also within the document at paragraph 120. But I'm getting the sense
7 that 11 o'clock, 11:00:08, you're actively engaging in containment efforts; would that be
8 a right sense on my part?

9 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** That was a -- yes, partially it was a
10 right sense. What happened was, if you go back prior to that, we're sitting at -- I'm at
11 the office. I'm still trying to get ready to leave the office and doing what -- answering
12 phone calls. I'm in my office -- or I hear Constable Carroll. He reaches out two or three
13 times to the OCC and there's no answer. It's dead air space.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

15 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** So I got on the air and said, okay. I
16 answered, because, okay, somebody's going to answer, he's asking. And I said, "Okay,
17 what's going on?" And so he shows me then that and we come in and then it's checking
18 out who's got possessions and checking where some of the other guys are, at the same
19 time as obviously it sounds like Patton and Merchant and Beselt are mobile on foot
20 inside as well.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. I'm trying to --

22 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** So, at that time, I knew the other cars
23 were coming in from Colchester -- or from Cumberland.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

25 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** And 1-Bravo-2, I believe that was Jeff
26 Campbell, I recognize the voice, he was coming down, so we're just getting a backup for
27 -- basically a backup at Five Islands *[sic]* Road for Constable Carroll to see what they're
28 dealing with there.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. I'm trying to get a sense of
2 particular roles at this early stage in the proceedings, because we've had a lot of
3 information about what the risk manager's role is to be doing at this stage, perhaps
4 identified as an ad hoc critical incident commander. And I'd like your comments with
5 respect to his role versus what you were doing at 11:00:08 in terms of containment.
6 Would this not be a better role for the risk manager, given his early exposure to this
7 process, to be setting up containment for members around the scene?

8 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes, it would have been. Did I
9 overstep my role? Yes, I did. But when a member's on the air calling out for -- calling
10 for something and nobody's answering ---

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

12 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** --- that's when I jumped in.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

14 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I think it would have been remiss of
15 me if any of the members had of called out for something and nobody answered, I
16 would have jumped in as well.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Sure. And the concern of course, and
18 perhaps this is a direct question to you, that'd be very interesting your response is, is
19 that when the member was speaking and getting no response, that member in particular
20 was your son Jordan; is that right?

21 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** It was my son Jordan, but it's of no --
22 it's ---

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** That's important to me. I'd like to know
24 about the relevance of the relationship with respect to your role at that time.

25 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I answered his call, and if any of the
26 members had answered the same thing, I would have responded as well, what's going -
27 - what do you need.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

1 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** So it just so happened he was the one
2 that arrived at Five Islands *[sic]* Road, and I responded to his request for backup, as the
3 other guys were. Anybody else would have done the same thing.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. As you look back on the manner in
5 which your engagement with the containment process, was this the best way to deal
6 with the containment process given the risk manager's role in this location, or, sorry, this
7 situation?

8 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I wouldn't have changed what I did in
9 that specific situation. However, further on down when there was some -- I'm not going
10 to say confusion or who was trying to figure out, Sergeant O'Brien came on, was on the
11 air, and I didn't know he'd come on the air. That's when I'd come out and said, "Brian
12 Rehill is going to position all the guys, because he has the map, overall map and the
13 GPS stuff. He can see where the cars are coming in from. He can see where it's best
14 to place them." So we did move over to that ---

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

16 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** --- a very short time after that, I
17 believe.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yes, and you've anticipated my next
19 question in the sense that at 11:00:08 hours, when you're conducting or engaging in
20 placement containment, you wouldn't have access to the CIIDS system in terms of
21 where vehicles are particularly situated at that time; would you?

22 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I knew from -- I knew the -- I knew
23 where Five Islands *[sic]* Road is.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

25 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I knew where the Cumberland cars
26 were coming back from, were coming in from.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

28 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** They were either coming the long way

1 through Parrsboro, or they're coming over Ben Mountain Road.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

3 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** So they would be coming. Their first
4 point of where they'd be coming to would be Five ---

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Houses.

6 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** --- Islands [*sic*] Road -- Five Houses,
7 okay. Yeah, it's Five Houses ---

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

9 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** --- Road.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

11 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** So they'd have to drive right by that
12 and the question was, with Jeff Campbell, he was the first one after Constable Carroll,
13 so he gets first backup.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I guess what I'm going to ask you again,
15 Staff Sergeant, is that would you have had access real-time to the placement of those
16 members in the containment structure when you were involved at 11:00:08 hours in
17 placing or engaging these members in their containment?

18 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** First of all, the Cumberland guys
19 hadn't arrived yet. They were still on route.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Ah, okay.

21 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Constable Carroll was the first
22 member arriving. Constable Colford was at the top of Portapique Beach Road. Then
23 the other Campbell came, and then Dow, Blinn and Cheeseman are also following in
24 short order from Cumberland. And they were placed at the -- either at Five Houses
25 Road and the Bayview Road I think it is, is where they ended up ---

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

27 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** --- taking a secondary point.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Given the role of the risk manager prior to

1 your involvement on the air, can you make any comment about whether there might
2 have been a perceived confusion with respect to hierarchy, or who was actually in
3 charge at that point?

4 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I didn't think so.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

6 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Most of the members, if I identify
7 myself on the air, they knew who I was. They knew who the risk manager was.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. But given the circumstances from
9 your point of view, and this will be my final questions in this area, who actually was in
10 charge of containment and placement of officers in a containment situation?

11 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** We -- not being on scene made it
12 hard to do the exact placement which is hence that reasonably we had Rehill -- made
13 the directive that Sergeant -- Staff Rehill would take over placement of members until
14 the command structure got on scene and then we would be looking at it more closely.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So I'll be a little bit more direct with
16 you. At 11:00:08, were you in charge of containment, or was Rehill in charge of
17 containment, or were both of you in charge of containment in some undescribed or to be
18 described manner?

19 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I'd say it was, like, we're working
20 together.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Are you able to give us a comment
22 at 11:00:08 whether your situational awareness would have been as good as Risk
23 Manager Rehill, not as good as Risk Manager Rehill, or about the same? Can you
24 comment on that?

25 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** He would have -- he would probably --
26 he would have had more knowledge of the overall events of the evening. He would
27 have been on the air and heard the transcriptions or heard the radio transmissions.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

1 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** As for where the members were
2 coming in from Cumberland down through Highway 2 and down to Portapique Beach
3 down through -- then through Five Houses Road and that, I would probably -- Brian
4 would be going by the maps I'm going by, having driven and having been there.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Am I correct to say then that you
6 had not been exposed at the office at that time or the detachment to any form of
7 mapping as you were conversing at 11:08 and just relying on your familiarity with the
8 geography of the area?

9 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, there -- I'm trying to remember
10 when Staff MacCallum showed up at the office and we did look at maps of the area. I
11 believe Staff MacCallum was there prior to 11:08, and I -- we're looking at maps.
12 There's some Google Earth maps we looked at of the area and some hard copy maps
13 we looked at of the area.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Are you able to say whether you
15 referenced or made reference to those maps as you were conducting the 11:08
16 conversation with the members? Do you recall?

17 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Again I'll speak to open knowledge. I
18 had seen the layout of the roads, where the roads were, ---

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

20 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** --- and I knew where Bayview was, I
21 knew where Five Houses Road was.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

23 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** And so, yeah, had I seen them on an
24 aerial map? Yeah, I believe I had. Had I seen them on a ground map? I would have
25 seen them. I -- having driven there and driven through there on numerous occasions, I
26 would have had a good idea of where they were.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So with respect to Bayview, when
28 you say Bayview, where is that located?

1 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** That's in-between -- that's in-between
2 Portapique Beach Road and Five Houses Road.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And if I say to you Bayshore Road,
4 would you know where that?

5 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Sorry, Bayshore Road is probably
6 what I said, Bayview.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. All right. Let's continue on then,
8 Staff Sergeant. I'm going to ask the Registrar to bring up page 62, paragraph 133 on a
9 separate topic of interest that I think -- to the Commission. I'll allow you to have a
10 minute to look at it.

11 And for purposes of orienting the issue, it appears that various staff
12 sergeants were of the view that the OCC had a technological capability to contact
13 residents in a particularly -- in a particular area through a reverse 9-1-1 call system and
14 warn residents to shelter in place.

15 I want to ask you about your knowledge of the reverse 9-1-1
16 system in terms of communications with residents and the public. Are you able to
17 comment on your knowledge about a reverse 9-1-1 call system?

18 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** That's an ad hoc way of describing it.
19 Now, my conversation with Jen MacCallum was, "Okay. We have people -- we don't --
20 we know there's houses in the area. We don't know -- we don't know who exactly --"
21 excuse me.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Certainly.

23 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** We don't know what house is
24 occupied. Some of them are residents, I believe down there. I assume 9-1-1 has a list
25 of phone numbers for all houses, it's my belief, of all places, and know -- they can
26 identify who the owner of a property is.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** H'm.

28 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** It's not something police can go and

1 do for investigative purposes. You can't use that to help you get a search warrant,
2 "Okay. Go to the 9-1-1 system and find out if Mr. Roger Burrill lives at X address." You
3 can't do that. But I looked at this situation being extraordinary circumstances. If there's
4 a way to circumvent the protocols and usage parameters, if we could just find the
5 numbers, make phone calls to each of those houses, if we could just get -- advise them
6 what's going on for their own protection. That's what that was about.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So when the expression is used,
8 reverse 9-1-1 call system, I'm left with potentially an impression that there was a system
9 to be engaged in this type of situation. Is that the wrong impression to have?

10 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I believe it is the wrong impression.
11 It's just the way of working with -- or working with -- trying to find phone numbers for
12 people.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Had you ever engaged this type of
14 process before in your experience as the ---

15 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- District Commander? Okay.

17 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, not -- no.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

19 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** This whole process, I've known
20 before.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** No, I understand. And that's perfectly
22 fair. I guess my question is to you, is this a good way to respond to the concerns that
23 residents may have had by this reversed call system, 9-1-1 call system? Did you view it
24 as effective and useful and would you do it again?

25 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** If it gave me a method, gave me a
26 means of contacting people directly in the area via phone call, that I could reach them, -
27 --

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

1 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** --- yes, I'd use it again. If I had the
2 option, I would do that if I could.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Can you give us an assessment of how
4 effective it actually was from your point of view? This reverse 9-1-1 call system?

5 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I really don't know. I don't know what
6 Jen followed up on. And shortly after that, I didn't have anymore contact with Jen for
7 the remainder of the evening.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So there was no follow up from
9 your point of view with respect to how that 9-1-1 reverse call system worked?

10 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yeah, I don't know. I don't know if
11 she was able to do it. I was left with the impression that she was going to give it a try
12 and see what she could get.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

14 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I don't know if ---

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** You'd be familiar, as the Commander at
16 Colchester District, with the Strategic Communications Unit at Halifax Division? Or
17 actually, H Div?

18 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yes.

20 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Okay.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Can you tell us what -- can you tell us
22 what your understanding of the Strategic Communications Unit is, please, Staff
23 Sergeant?

24 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** We use -- they're a unit in Halifax.
25 We refer to them as H Div -- H Div Comms.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

27 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** And they get all messaging out for us
28 that we need to get out to the public through their -- they're the ones that have access to

1 the different Twitter, Facebook, social media accounts. They're the ones that liaise with
2 the media on a regular basis, and they have all these contacts and fan out systems they
3 use.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

5 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Most cases, when serious incidents
6 arise, the OCC, they get -- the Strategic Comms get advised immediately of something
7 going on.

8 And I'd also asked Jen earlier in one of our conversations if she
9 could engage H Div Comms and get any messaging out there that we could to advise
10 people what we had going on here.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So given the circumstances that
12 you had requested the reverse 9-1-1 call system being involved, did you make any
13 follow up with respect to the engagement of Strat Coms or H Div Coms being involved
14 to assist this process?

15 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I assumed it was automatic that they'd
16 be engaged.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And you assumed it would be
18 automatic on the basis of how would it be triggered or engaged?

19 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Well when messaging goes out, OCC
20 would send a message out to H Div Strat Comms. There's -- there would be -- one of
21 their -- one of the H Div Comm members would be on call for the weekend and anything
22 that had to get out would go through that person.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And once again, just for clarity,
24 would you have made a specific directive in that regard?

25 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I made a request to Jen that she
26 contact -- that she make sure that ---

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

28 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** --- H Div Comms was engaged.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Any follow up on your part, Staff
2 Sergeant, with respect to the request to Jen?

3 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, I didn't.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Thank you. We'll move on then to
5 paragraph 135 of the Foundational Document. It's a brief paragraph and it wraps up the
6 reverse 9-1-1 system information:

7 "In his interview with the Mass Casualty Commission,
8 OCC commander Glen Byrne indicated that the OCC's
9 911 system does not have a reverse-system per se;
10 rather, 'we look at maps, we look at addresses, we query
11 our records management system, we find phone
12 numbers..."

13 Is that your understanding now of the reverse 9-1-1 system? Is that
14 in accordance with Commander Byrne?

15 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I can't refute. I can't deny what he
16 said. Glen is going to be more knowledgeable than me.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

18 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** When I was speaking with Jen, it
19 seemed like it was possible to look. I didn't know that all they did was find the
20 addresses off the 9-1-1, I thought there'd be more information on there.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. All right.

22 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** So ---

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Sorry.

24 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, I was going to say, that's -- if -- it
25 was my understanding from the early days of 9-1-1 that all the information would be
26 contained, would be housed in that database and it could access it. And I looked at this
27 as being an exigent circumstance and let's do whatever we could to use it, to get the
28 information.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And it's interesting, your use of the
2 expression "exigent circumstances" for purposes of obtaining information about
3 residents in the community. Were there any other exigent circumstance resources or
4 activities on your part that you thought might be assisting in getting information to the
5 residents in that community?

6 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Like I said, the H Div Comms getting
7 the -- it was my anticipation that all the warnings would go out via social media and
8 would go to the radio stations, there would be a broadcast on the radio stations, they'd
9 go ---

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

11 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** That was my assumption of what
12 would be coming through from H Div Comms and they'd get that out there.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Are you -- this is perhaps a personal
14 question, are you a user or familiar with social media? Twitter, Facebook?

15 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** A little bit.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Are you a user?

17 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I use Facebook. I don't use Twitter.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Do you follow the RCMP NS Twitter
19 account?

20 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I follow the RCMP Nova Scotia ---

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

22 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** --- on Facebook. Not -- not -- I don't
23 do Twitter very well.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. Well, I understand that. Okay.
25 Very good.

26 Madam Registrar, I'd like to now move to the Mass Casualty
27 Commission interview of S/Sgt. Carroll of November 10th, 2021.

28 And S/Sgt. Carroll, I'm going to direct you to a portion at page 25; in

1 particular, with respect to this issue in terms of getting in touch with people and social
2 media. And at the 9:33 mark, you indicated the following, at page 25:

3 “Steve was doing calls with ... I’m sure he was calling
4 on the line with senior management out of Halifax and
5 doing the chain of command. I know I had ... I had
6 spoken with Jen MacCallum and I said, ‘We’ve got to
7 get something out there through our media
8 communications, through our... I’m ... out of H Div ...
9 H Div comms. They’re [our, not ‘out’] media people,
10 get in touch with them so they can get something out
11 by their... In my mind, their normal channels, which is
12 their... social media, which would be Facebook, would
13 be Twitter, whatever... however they’re advising. Get
14 that type of advisory out. And I had asked Jen if she
15 could look after that.”

16 Is that what you were referring to earlier when you were speaking
17 of your communication with Jen?

18 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes, it is.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And can you provide us any
20 further information as to whether you engaged in follow-up with Jen or any other
21 functionary with respect to Facebook, Twitter, and other social media communications?

22 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, I didn’t follow up.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay, all right.

24 I think that closes the book on that particular area. I’m now going
25 to move on to questions about mapping, Chief Commissioner. This might be 20
26 minutes or so. I’m prepared to proceed at your direction.

27 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** How are you doing, S/Sgt.
28 Carroll? You want to continue for another 20 minutes and break then, or would you like

1 to break now?

2 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I think I'm okay.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Great. Then I'll proceed then. Thank
4 you, Staff Sergeant.

5 We'll move now to the issue of mapping, and I'm going to refer you
6 again to the Mass Casualty Commission interview that you provided on November 10th,
7 at page 20; and, in particular, at the top third, the DANCO at page 20.

8 Just scroll -- yeah, more up, if you would, please, Madam Registrar.
9 Great. There we are.

10 So right at the top, it goes to the expression about the DANCO, in
11 the middle of that paragraph, the "DANCO, District Advisory" Officer -- sorry; "District
12 Advisory NCO. So he's involved in that capacity."

13 Let me just step back a bit. I want to start at the expression:
14 "Staff Halliday was in an acting role, higher up the chain as the next... as the
15 Commander and Addie MacCallum had taken over as the ... the DANCO, the District
16 Advisory NCO. So, he's ... he's involved in that capacity. So, Addie's coming over,
17 Addie's in, we chat. There's more radio contact,
18 hearing talking with more, getting a ... getting a game
19 plan together, looking at where we're going to ... just
20 what's going on. We still have a lot of information
21 about... about... about the shooter, about how many
22 people are dead or that type of stuff, that's all coming
23 in. And then when we're ... Addie was trying ... like,
24 Addie ... [had] previously [been] stationed in Bible Hill
25 and he had [a] good knowledge of the area[...]; he
26 lives in Bible Hill."

27 "So, we're talking, getting our maps out. Addie's on
28 the computer, getting ... he's accessing the area,

1 looking at the ... [...]... I don't know if you want to call it
2 Google Earth. We have access to something called
3 Pictometry, or I think I ... I think that's the way you say
4 it, it was something new that came out. I didn't know
5 how to use it, I hadn't been trained in it, but Addie was
6 pulling up maps and looking at the area. We looked
7 at... we looked at the roads. We had a ... we had a
8 hard map, we took it off the wall, looked at that.
9 We're seeing ... I remember Addie showing, he said,
10 'Okay, this big field over there, we're not seeing any
11 roads, there's no egre ... there's no ... there's no roads
12 in that area. So, it looks like a blueberry field or
13 something like that.' You can see the roads going
14 down to Port... down to the beach. [...] I know the
15 roads now, I didn't know the names of the Portapique
16 Beach Road, Faris Road ... Faris Lane and Orchard
17 Beach Road."

18 So I want to ask you some questions, Staff Sergeant, about a few
19 things that were raised in that short passage. In particular, I understand that you're
20 engaged with S/Sgt. MacCallum for purposes of determining mapping and getting a
21 sense of the geography, topography of the area. Is that right?

22 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Addie had come back -- I didn't know
23 Addie was coming to the office. Somehow either through a -- he either called me -- he
24 ended up at the back door of Bible Hill Detachment. He didn't have a key to get in. And
25 somehow he communicated, whether -- it could have been by radio, said, "Hey, is
26 anybody in the office? Can you let me in? I'm at the back door."

27 So that's where I went to meet Addie. He immediately came in and
28 started on the computer, we're kind of going over the situation. He pulled up -- I guess

1 it would have been Google Earth, of the Google Earth overhead imagery of the area;
2 shows the roads, showed the fields, showed the general area.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So to help you a little bit on that, Staff
4 Sergeant -- I don't mean to interrupt, but how does he access that? In what manner
5 does he access that particular tool?

6 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** He goes on -- he goes on one of the
7 computers in one of the work stations and he accessed it.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And what were you doing when
9 S/Sgt. MacCallum was accessing this tool?

10 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I was in the office. I was answering
11 some calls. I was -- he interrupted whatever I was doing, trying to gear up, trying to get
12 ready to get out.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

14 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** And ---

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Sorry; I interrupted you.

16 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, no. No, go ahead.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Would you have the opportunity or
18 the ability to access the tool or the function that S/Sgt. MacCallum did?

19 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I probably could have if I had have
20 worked at it. He was -- Addie was much better on the computer than I am, and he just
21 sat down and started pulling up images and looking at things. So I just went, stayed
22 with him, and what he showed me, the maps he was pulling up, and we knew the area -
23 - he knew the area as well as I did.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So tell me, then about Pictometry,
25 which was referenced in the excerpt that I just referred to.

26 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yeah. Pictometry is a -- I know they
27 have it in the OCC, I know members can access it. I'm not familiar with its workings but
28 it's a -- it's good imagery of what -- of the area we're dealing with. Actually, I know in

1 the OCC there's three screens where they can call it up and they get great images of
2 roadways, of areas, so on and so forth.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Would the district detachment at Bible Hill
4 have access to that Pictometry program?

5 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I believe we did.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. When you say, "I believe" I get a
7 sense of some hesitancy in that regard.

8 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I never used it and I don't know if -- I
9 don't know if the guys used it all that much. There was some training going on about it
10 and I just don't -- it was something, it was new.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And when you say, "New" can you give us
12 a sense of how new? Approximate, how new that might have been? Any idea?

13 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I've been out -- I've been gone now
14 for almost two years. I don't know; maybe a year.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

16 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Maybe a year, year and a half. I
17 can't say.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I understand. And would the District
19 Commander have been part of that particular training regime or regimen?

20 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I didn't -- I didn't get trained on it. I
21 didn't. I think there's some access, you go into it. And it's kind of like Google Earth; you
22 get into it and you play with it, you learn how to use it.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** We heard yesterday about the use of user
24 name and a password for purposes of access to it. Did you have ---

25 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Okay.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Did you have a user name or a password
27 to access Pictometry?

28 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Not to my recollection.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And can you give us some insight
2 why the Detachment Commander may not have had the training or the ability to access
3 the Pictometry programme in April of 2020?

4 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** April of 2020 I was -- I was, for all
5 intents and purposes, one month away from my retirement, so I didn't take on a lot of
6 new stuff at that time.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I understand that. Would you have been
8 in a position to assign or provide direction to somebody at Colchester District
9 Detachments to be responsible for accessing Pictometry and/or providing guidance and
10 training for access to Pictometry?

11 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Would I have been in a position to
12 assign somebody?

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah, did you -- what did you do about
14 making sure that personnel knew how to access Pictometry, as the Commander?

15 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I think the -- I really don't know how it
16 was rolled out. Nobody was assigned to do it, that I'm aware of. I think the Street
17 Crime Unit and some of the JS members may have it used it more than others, but I
18 don't know if the general membership were using it on a regular basis.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. The document that I just referred
20 earlier to has attributed a comment to you that I read, "I don't know if you want to call it
21 Google Earth. That, too, is a tool that would be useful in mapping." What did you
22 mean, "I don't know if you want to call it Google Earth"?

23 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I guess Google Maps, Google Earth,
24 whatever. There's -- I guess there's different programs you can look at. I call it Google
25 Earth sometimes, but I know there's Google Maps out there as well.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And would you have had a
27 functional working capacity with Google Earth or Google Maps?

28 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I could -- I can access them. Am I --

1 am I comfortable with them? Not a great amount. I can play around with it.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. All right.

3 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** In this situation, Addie was on the
4 map, he had called it up, he was working with it actively. So I didn't -- I didn't bother
5 trying to get on. I'm over his shoulder looking at -- he's showing me on the map.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay, I understand. With respect to the
7 Google Maps tool or function, are you able to tell us whether -- what kind of view it was,
8 animated view, standard view, topographical view, satellite view? Do you have any
9 insight for us in terms of what it was you were looking at?

10 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Well, it wasn't -- it wasn't
11 topographical that I recall. It was -- could you call it a satellite? It showed very clearly
12 fields, it showed -- it showed the roadways, it showed -- yeah. That's the best I can -- I
13 can recall.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** No, I understand. We haven't heard from
15 Staff Sergeant MacCallum yet, but we will eventually, and I recall from some of his
16 information or material that he may have indicated that he had a concern over the tool,
17 Google Earth, actually creating roads where there were no roads. Do you have any
18 comment on that?

19 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, I don't.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Then let me ask you more
21 specifically about the blueberry road. What can you tell us about your information that
22 you had learned while you and Staff Sergeant MacCallum accessed the maps about the
23 blueberry road? Did you know anything about it?

24 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No. Addie -- we looked at the -- we
25 looked at the overhead view we had of that side of -- that side of the -- that would be the
26 east -- the east side of the -- of Portapique Beach area, looked at the overhead of what
27 we're seeing from the Google imagery, whatever it was, a satellite, I don't know what
28 Addie was on, looking at that, and we're not seeing any roadways.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

2 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** It looks like a -- just a big field. Just a
3 big open field is all it looks like. Like I said, we're not seeing a roadway, and we looked
4 and we're not seeing an egress point of the -- in that area.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Did you feel comfortable, then,
6 with your enquiries, mapping enquiries with respect to access and egress into that area,
7 determining routes in and out? Did you feel that you had done that properly?

8 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I feel we had worked -- made --
9 looked at what we had. To look at, it showed nothing that we could determine was -- it
10 wasn't an active roadway. At the same time, the images from the OCC would have
11 been, I believe, Pictometry, and relying on them, seeing if any roadways are there, if
12 there's any other egress point.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. All right. I had mentioned earlier
14 to Staff Sergeant MacCallum's comments on this. I think I should take you to that,
15 specifically. In particular, paragraph 159 on page 71 of the Foundational Document is a
16 portion of a quote from Staff Sergeant MacCallum's interview with the Mass Casualty
17 Commission.

18 And I'm going to ask if Madam Registrar can bring up
19 paragraph 159, and I'm going to read a small excerpt from the quotation and ask you to
20 comment. It starts in the -- about one-third down the quote. It says -- this is Staff
21 Sergeant MacCallum talking:

22 "\"So, I get Google Earth fired up. It's okay, but it's not
23 very good. It's making roads where there's no roads.
24 I can tell, like it's ... it's got layers on it, it's not what I
25 want to see. So, I start trying to go and find
26 Pictometry, which each detachment's supposed to
27 have. I couldn't find it, and Al didn't know where it
28 was, either, at that time, either. I couldn't find it,

1 which is an extremely good satellite imaging that is up
2 to date, as opposed to something what it looked like
3 eight years ago. I couldn't find that, so, we end[ed] up
4 pulling ... I end up pulling a map off the wall. We put it
5 on the table and start hand-drawing on it so that
6 we...could be around it, as in [S/Sgt. Carroll] and
7 myself. [S/Sgt. Halliday] wasn't there yet. And I also
8 pulled out ... an Atlas ... road Atlas, so I was looking
9 at four different maps trying to get a lay of the land."

10 So with respect to that, Staff Sergeant Carroll, you've told us about
11 Pictometry and you've told us about Google Map, can you tell us about the map off the
12 wall?

13 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** The map off the wall, we had just --
14 we had several maps of the area that were just basic roadmaps of -- in Colchester
15 County. It was for members coming in, they were on the way to the back door where
16 members would go to their -- go get in their police cars, and if they get a call to a certain
17 area, and they just come take a quick look on, "Okay, this is -- okay, here's what I'm
18 looking at. Here's the roadways", and just give them a quick idea before they got out on
19 the road.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

21 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** It was -- it was a -- it was a tool for the
22 members to use to see different roads in the area, different side roads, main roads,
23 back roads, secondary roads.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. And is this the map that was taken
25 off the wall?

26 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. Give us some descriptor of the
28 map. How big is it? What -- how old is it? Are you able to give us a sense of that, Staff

1 Sergeant?

2 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** It's probably, I want to say, three by
3 three anyway. It's a good-sized map.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Three feet by three feet?

5 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Three feet by three feet.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yes, thank you.

7 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yeah, it's a -- and it just shows -- that
8 was a section of the -- of the county. We had one specifically for Stewiacke area and
9 one for Tatamagouche area I believe.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

11 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I think -- I think there three maps on
12 the wall that we had.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And just to make sure, three maps
14 on the wall on the way out, one of the Stewiacke area and one of the Tatamagouche
15 area, and the third map ---

16 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** And one of this area, one of the shore
17 area, or this area going up to Cumberland.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And what was it titled, just so I
19 don't mix it up in the future?

20 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I have no idea what it was titled.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

22 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** It was...

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Can you give us a description or an
24 understanding of how dated that map may have been, whether it was there when you
25 came or whether you attained it later? I don't want to suggest ---

26 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, I think -- I think it was -- it was
27 attained after I got there.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And do you know where it was

1 attained from?

2 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** It was a production. I don't know if it
3 was a provincial map, I don't know if it came through -- I don't know where it came from.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. All right. Are you able to make
5 any comment with respect to the accuracy of that map and the detail of that map?

6 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** It was -- it was a good map. There
7 was no issues with it. I can't -- I don't think it was a topographical map, I don't think it
8 showed elevations, it just showed basic roadways, and were going down Highway 2 and
9 it shows the roads off of Highway 2, the main roads off of Highway 2.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Did it show railway markings or
11 trail markings or bridge markings, river markings, things of that nature in a normal
12 topographical or geographical map?

13 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I believe it did. I can't say.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. The excerpt that I read to you
15 indicated that there was some handwriting or some hand markings that were placed on
16 it. Do you recall that?

17 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** We took the map down and just come
18 into the boardroom. We didn't have a -- we didn't have a map our boardroom.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I see.

20 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** So when Steve Halliday come over,
21 we had a -- my office is small and we switched, said, "Okay, let's go to the boardroom."
22 Set up in the boardroom, and we talked to Steve. We all had this -- had a big map. We
23 put this three by three map on the -- on the -- on the boardroom table and we started
24 looking at it. Said, "Okay. Here's where -- here's the geographical area we're dealing
25 with. Here are the roads", and then we looked at the other map, the... You know, you
26 just know this is basically the area we're dealing with.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Did you at that time or thereafter
28 have any concern with respect to the accuracy of the mapping that you were looking at?

1 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, I didn't. I didn't know there was a
2 concern with it.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Then just continuing on on this,
4 there is discussion in the excerpt that I read to you from Staff Sergeant MacCallum
5 about use of an Atlas. Does that ring ---

6 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I think ---

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- a bell to you?

8 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I think he pulled it out in the
9 boardroom and laid it on the map on the table and it was probably more refined or
10 specific to that area, and I ---

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Do you have -- sorry, I interrupted you
12 again, and I didn't mean to.

13 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Did you have any recall of the use of an
15 Atlas?

16 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, I didn't.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. All right. So from your point of
18 view, the working tool with respect to mapping was the three by three map off the wall of
19 that area.

20 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Well, it was one of them then looked
21 at the Google Earth maps that we had showing the roadways of the day that Addie had
22 pulled up on one of the office computers.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. All right. Very good. Well I am
24 now prepared to move on from this issue to the next issue, which will be a discussion
25 about command and who was in command at different stages of the event. I'm
26 prepared to proceed. It's 11:00 o'clock. Your call, Commissioners.

27 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Well we should take a break.
28 Thank you, S/Sgt Carroll. We'll break now for 15 minutes and you can -- if you don't

1 mind, you can obviously take a break as well, but we'll report back in 15 minutes.

2 Thank you.

3 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Thank you, sir.

4 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Thank you. The
5 proceedings are now on break and will resume in 15 minutes.

6 --- Upon breaking at 11:01 a.m.

7 --- Upon resuming at 11:20 a.m.

8 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL, Resumed:**

9 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Welcome back. The
10 proceedings are again in session.

11 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you.

12 Mr. Burrill?

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Thank you, Commissioners. We'll get
14 S/Sgt Carroll back with us.

15 He's with everybody else except me. Oh, there he is. Great.

16 Thank you, S/Sgt Carroll. We have concluded our discussion about
17 mapping and I want to move on to, at this point, about issues of command and some of
18 the concerns that I had raised earlier with respect to clarity of command. I'm going to
19 ask the registrar, Madam Registrar, to bring up paragraph 167 at page 74 of the
20 Foundational Document.

21 And this, Staff Sergeant, is an excerpt of a transmission from Cst
22 Bill Neil, who I believe you'd be familiar with, as a member from Pictou who was
23 responding to the complaint that night.

24 At 167, the Foundational Document indicates:

25 "At 11:45:29 p.m. on April 18, 2020, Cst. Bill Neil inquired
26 about who had command of RCMP operations in
27 Portapique. He sought guidance from the risk manager
28 on what members at the head of Portapique Beach Road

1 and Highway 2 should be doing:
2 11:45:29 PM [...] I don't know who's got the Command.
3 11:45:35 PM – S/Sgt. CARROLL [...] Staff REHILL has
4 Command, folks – Staff REHILL has Command.”

5 Now, what I'd like to ask you, Staff Sergeant, is at 11:45 p.m., the
6 matter has been on for some period of time, an hour and a half, perhaps more. I'm
7 curious as to why there appears to be this ambiguity about command at this point. And
8 do you have any comment on that, given the fact it was Cst Neil that was discussing it
9 but you were the one that responded? Can you give us some insight about the clarity of
10 command situation?

11 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I don't recall that comment from Neil
12 happening. I thought we made it clear -- I thought it was earlier that we made it clear
13 that S/Sgt. Rehill was taking charge and placing people and telling people what to do
14 until such a point in time as the Command Group was out at the firehall.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. And it's clear that the command
16 group you're referring to, MacCallum, Halliday, and Carroll, were not at the Command
17 Post at this point?

18 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, that is correct.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. So I guess my next question for
20 you would be, given your lack of recall, but review of paragraph 167, how is it that S/Sgt
21 Carroll would be responding to this lack of clarity, as opposed to Risk Manager Rehill
22 actually undertaking the responsibility of clarifying a lack of clarity? Are you able to tell
23 us?

24 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Is there a paragraph popping up
25 there? I missed what you were saying.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** No. Same paragraph.

27 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Oh. Same paragraph.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** One sixty-seven (167). We've got S/Sgt

1 Carroll responding. And I'm asking you why isn't Rehill, the Risk Manager who is
2 ostensibly in charge at this time, responding? Because you're not even at the
3 Command Post.

4 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, I probably jumped the gun and
5 answered before Brian had the chance to.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Was that a problem, in your view,
7 in terms of jumping the gun before Brian had a chance to?

8 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** It wasn't, in my view. Maybe it was
9 for somebody else.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. I guess what I'm leading my
11 questions to is, given the fact that you responded, and now you've indicated jumped the
12 gun, I was wondering whether it's presumptive that the District Commander responds to
13 this type of situation for clarity? Or should it have been the Risk Manager? I don't
14 know.

15 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I don't know. I don't know how much
16 of a delay it was when Cst Neil asked his question or was expressing his concern.

17 At the same time, the OCC was -- is a busy place to work in and if
18 that was a quick answer to Bill without Brian having to stop what he was doing to
19 answer -- to make the answer, then that's why I would have jumped in.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. Continuing on, Madam
21 Registrar, page 86, paragraph 185.

22 And this is moving on narratively, Staff Sergeant. Paragraph 185
23 says:

24 "At 12:04 [...], S/Sgt. Carroll called OCC dispatch
25 supervisor Jen MacCallum, seeking an update with
26 respect to RCMP members present in and around
27 Portapique. Ms. MacCallum provided him with the
28 names, RCMP cruiser call-signs, and positions of all

1 that point, that it may not have been a useful use of your time, your experience, and
2 your resources to sort of duplicate that. Would that be a proper statement or an
3 improper statement?

4 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I don't think it's a valid statement.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

6 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** You'd -- it's -- you'd still have to know
7 whether when Rehill is no longer in -- so if we go down and take over and we go to the
8 scene, once the Command Post is set up, et cetera, ---

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

10 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** --- we have to know who is out there.
11 So that information is going to be passed on by Rehill. I was getting it ahead of time.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Would that information had been
13 available independently through technology? The CIIDS program, in particular?

14 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

16 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** It could have been accessed through
17 CIIDS, through the GPS mapping system.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

19 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Correct.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And was CIIDS -- forgive me, I may have
21 asked you this before, CIIDS available to you at the detachment at that point?

22 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I'm not familiar with it. I couldn't use
23 it.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I see. Okay. Very good. Let's move on
25 then to the next topic, about the IARD team and the Contact team that you were
26 involved with. That is, you were familiar, of course, with those officers that responded
27 down to Portapique? No doubt about that; am I right?

28 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. At paragraph 143 of the
2 Foundational Document, there's reference to discussion about a second IARD team.

3 Paragraph 133, if we could bring that up, please? At page 65.

4 "At 11:21:03 [...], Cst. Grund again called the risk
5 manager, indicating that another team of RCMP
6 members could be sent into Portapique. Sgt. O'Brien
7 answered Cst. Grund, and instructed him to hold off due
8 to concerns about potential blue-on-blue [...]

9 11:21:03 PM – Cst. GRUND [...]: Risk Manager. Just
10 checking, I know we have one team up there of three. I
11 think we have another three back here, we can send
12 another team up that way.

13 11:21:18 PM – Sgt. O'BRIEN [...]: Hold off on the second
14 team, I only want
15 one team in there if we can avoid having anybody else in
16 the crossfire."

17 At paragraph 144, in the midst of the first quote at the tail end:

18 "Sgt. O'Brien indicate[s] that:
19 [...] I followed this up with a call to S/Sgt. Carroll to
20 confirm my thought process and
21 ensure that he was aware of [movement] member [...] on
22 site."

23 So were you familiar with the fact that there was a request for a
24 second IARD team coming from members at the scene at Portapique Beach Road?

25 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, I wasn't.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And if there was, would you have
27 had a position with respect to the movement of a second IARD team into Portapique
28 Beach Road?

1 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I would have been concerned with it
2 for the blue-on-blue situation. That's the darkest end, the darkest down there. There's
3 no street lights, members trying to identify each other, it would be a scary situation.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So Sergeant O'Brien indicated at
5 11:21:18, "Hold off on the second team. I only want one team up there -- in there, if we
6 can avoid having anybody else in the crossfire." Was he directed to say that by you,
7 Staff Sergeant ---

8 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- Carroll?

10 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No. No.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. Well, then let me ask you the
12 follow-up question in that regard. Given your knowledge of Sergeant O'Brien's situation,
13 what leadership role was he playing, or command role was he playing at this time?

14 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** At the very end, it was just helping us
15 out. It was monitoring, he was passing on information as need be to the rest of us, to
16 myself, and I think he was liaising with the members on scene.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I'm getting a sense from his direction
18 there that he may have been doing more than helping out. He would have been
19 providing direction to members at the scene with respect to what they could do and
20 what they couldn't do.

21 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** He was -- yeah, he was very
22 concerned about the blue-on-blue situation at that time, and that's something Sergeant
23 Rehill would have been -- that would have -- that could have easily come from Sergeant
24 Rehill.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

26 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** That interaction from the -- comment
27 from Constable Grund, I was not aware of that.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. But with respect to clarity of

1 command, going back to questions that I had raised earlier with you on a couple of
2 occasions, this looks like a third voice of direction that's being induced or involved in this
3 matter, Sergeant O'Brien. Is that ---

4 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- a problem for you, Staff Sergeant?

6 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Andy -- Sergeant O'Brien is very
7 concerned about the members' wellbeing, and he was just pointing out the perils or
8 maybe the dangers of having a second IARD team in there, because of the -- it made a
9 real -- potential serious, potential blue-on-blue situation.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yes, I understand that, that answer with
11 respect to his concern. I guess what I'm concerned about and inquiring about is, was
12 that a proper role for Sergeant O'Brien, given the importance of command structure at
13 that time?

14 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** It may have been -- there may have
15 been a breach of command structure.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** What do you mean by that, Staff
17 Sergeant?

18 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Well, I just -- it was, like, saying
19 should he have -- should Andy have made that decision? He should have run it up the
20 chain, run it up to the other people either through Rehill, or see if the command group
21 under Staff West coming in, is that something that -- that's prior to Staff West arising --
22 arriving ---

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

24 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** --- I assume.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right.

26 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Is that something that we would have
27 looked at others, Halliday, Addie, Halliday, MacCallum and myself discuss this, do we
28 bring a team in. That would have been a better form. It was a -- that was -- Andy could

1 have -- probably should have floated it up to -- pushed that up the line to see if there is
2 another decision before he went back and made a categoric decision.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Given that fact that there may
4 have been a breach of command structure or protocol in that regard, was there anything
5 done in terms of clarifying command roles at that point, Staff Sergeant?

6 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, I don't -- not that I'm aware of.
7 And I thought we had already done that earlier, and not knowing that Andy had made
8 that direction out there.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Looking back in terms of the
10 passage of two years and the manner in which the command structure activated and
11 decisions were made, do you have any concerns about what I might colloquially
12 describe as too many cooks in the kitchen?

13 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I think everybody was working
14 together towards the same objective, and all are well meaning. Sergeant O'Brien's
15 comments were well meaning, and for the best interests of the members there. Much to
16 the same as you can relate my comments when I jumped on the air to respond to the
17 member who was asking for help, not getting a response, who just happened to be my
18 son, it wouldn't have -- as I said before, it wouldn't have mattered if it was my son or not.
19 I would have had the same response to any of the members out there who if you asked
20 two or three times on the air, you're saying something and nobody's answering you, in
21 full respect of the OCC being busy ---

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

23 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** --- I was in a position to respond,
24 which I did. And I believe Andy was in the same vein. I don't think he wanted -- I think
25 he was trying to prevent people just going down, taking three people, and on Constable
26 Grund's recommendation, and just, okay, let's go in ourself. He was preventing that
27 from happening.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. No, I ---

1 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** So ---

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- I appreciate that. And the question
3 that I put to you specifically was that expression too many cooks in the kitchen. I don't
4 know if you are able to respond to that expression or prefer not to, but I think it's fair that
5 I put it to you again for clarification.

6 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yeah. It's better to have one cook,
7 one chief cook in the kitchen. There's -- that's for sure. Are there times when
8 somebody else can help out there? Sure.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. And following up on that question,
10 would you view that as something that could be improved in the future in terms of
11 command structure in response to this type of critical incident?

12 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I think in trying to answer that
13 question realistically, in any incident there is so much happening at any given time, to
14 go -- like, Staff Halliday, if you say whoever's in command, he's dealing with a number
15 of issues, for all of a sudden him to have to respond to every little thing, bang, bang,
16 bang, it becomes hard to do. And it would have -- might have taken some time to do
17 that. Yeah, and in a perfect world, one person, you can easily -- you can direct
18 everything, but this is not a perfect situation, and it's a bizarre situation, to say the least.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Thank you. I'll move on from that
20 then. The Mass Casualty Commission interview of Staff Sergeant Carroll, page 24, the
21 last paragraph indicates,

22 "I initially didn't realize that Andy was on board and he
23 kind of surprised me when he came on the air. And
24 he had been [on] contact with Staff Rehill."

25 I want to ask you about that. How is it under these circumstances
26 that the commander can be surprised by his two IC being on the air under those
27 circumstances?

28 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I didn't realize when Andy -- when I

1 had gone out and Andy had -- this goes a way back at the first -- second call from Andy,
2 when he said he wasn't coming out.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

4 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I didn't think he was going to be
5 involved in the situation. I thought he was staying at home. I didn't realize that he had a
6 portable radio and was able to engage. I was not aware of that. And so then when he
7 came on the air, and that was in a different context when I said to -- just for everybody,
8 he was start -- I think he was starting to place people at checkpoints or containment
9 points. I said, "Wait, wait, that's Rehill doing that. What's -- we have this in mind and
10 this, and, no, we got to do that." So that's when I got -- initially said, "Brian Rehill's in
11 charge."

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

13 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** In fact, he's doing that. So that's what
14 surprised me. And I ---

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Sorry.

16 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, that's it.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Good. Given the concerns with
18 respect to alcohol consumption, can you say whether there was any response from the
19 commanders or the commanding team directly to Andy O'Brien in terms of his
20 involvement in here, in this?

21 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I would have known I was on the -- I
22 was talking to Andy afterwards, and we just said, no, we -- probably said we had it, but
23 there's -- no, I didn't -- if he's helping out, another set of ears on what's going on, I'm not
24 -- I wasn't concerned about that. I had no concern about Andy's -- he had a couple
25 drinks and I was not concerned about his ability to function.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Thank you. I'll move on from that.
27 I think we've covered that.

28 I want to ask you questions about comfort centre and your

1 involvement with respect to that. At page 92, paragraph 197, there's a reference in the
2 Foundational Document to Stuart Beselt.

3 "Cst. Beselt advised dispatch that some of the
4 residents leaving Portapique did not know where to
5 go. S/Sgt. Carroll replied that RCMP would try to set
6 up an evacuation centre at the Great Village fire hall:

7 [...]

8 [At] 12:22:40 [...] - S[...] CARROLL [says]: Stuart,
9 we'll try to hook-up with ah, Great Village Fire
10 Department and have those people moved to that
11 location."

12 My questions for you with respect to that passage is at 12:22 a.m.,
13 the incident has been going on for two hours and a bit. Were you tasked with respect to
14 the engagement of the comfort station?

15 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, not to my knowledge. We had
16 just -- we were looking at bringing about some sites. I think after I looked at the -- I
17 thought they were going to the -- not Great Village, but the Bass River fire hall. I think
18 that was being looked at as well.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

20 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Because there was too many -- there
21 was too many people at Great Village.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. And I'm trying to get a sense that
23 when there is an incident on this scale, what type of priority is provided by the command
24 team with respect to the provision, setup of a comfort centre or a comfort station for
25 evacuees or people in that community.

26 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Trying to get a place where they can
27 come and get together. That was -- there was discussion about it and I said -- I know
28 one lady did come to -- did come to the Great Village fire hall and I think others were

1 directed to try to be moved out to the Bass River, but nobody actually showed up.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. In terms of my question, though,
3 about prioritization of a comfort centre, are you able to have any comment as -- as the
4 District Commander involved in this type of critical incident?

5 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** It's something that's needed. You
6 have to have a place for these people to go to.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And we do know that at 8:30 a.m., or
8 thereabouts, the Onslow-Belmont fire hall or fire brigade was actually booted up and
9 ready to go as a comfort centre.

10 At 12:20, or thereabout, it doesn't look like there was any refined or
11 specific effort to have that comfort station put together. Am I correct in that regard or
12 am I overstating it?

13 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, I'd say you're probably correct.
14 We're still dealing with -- we're still trying to deal with what's going on and it's -- yeah,
15 did that get overlooked at some point in time? It possibly was. Should it have been a
16 priority? Yes, it should have been.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Did you feel comfortable in your
18 role as one of the three command decision-makers, Halliday, Carroll and MacCallum,
19 about the manner in which the comfort station's situation was dealt with?

20 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I didn't -- I didn't give it any more
21 consideration at that time.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Very good.

23 Moving on, then, to the command post, I understand you did attend
24 at the command post at around 2:00 a.m. Does that sound right, Staff Sergeant
25 Carroll?

26 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I think -- I think it was before that.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

28 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I'd say -- I'd say before that. I met

1 Staff West there at some point. I think it was around 1 o'clock, 1:15, maybe.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. I'm looking again at the
3 Foundational Document, in particular paragraph 265.

4 And let's go to that if we could, Madam Registrar, just for purposes
5 of seeing whether this clarifies things.

6 "265. S/Sgt. MacCallum arrived at the Command
7 Post in Great Village at approximately 2:00 a.m. on
8 April 19, 2020. Shortly thereafter, at 2:02 a.m., S/Sgt.
9 Carroll broadcast that he was at the Command Post
10 in Great Village."

11 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Okay.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Now, I would be interested in your
13 comment on that, that 2:02 a.m. That would have been material that staff would have
14 put together for the Foundational Document ---

15 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yeah.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- derived from the materials.
17 Are you -- do you have a difficulty with that time?

18 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, I don't. I thought it was earlier.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

20 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Staff MacCallum, he departed Bible
21 Hill before me, so he would have been earlier, and I guess that was -- I was behind.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So 2:02 is, you know, three hours,
23 three and a half hours, almost four hours, after the incident had commenced.

24 Are you able to give us any commentary onto why -- as to why that
25 may be, that the command team attended four hours after the incident commenced?

26 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** By the time I got to the Bible Hill
27 detachment, dealt with Addy MacCallum and with what -- we were looking at the
28 mappings and trying to determine where we were going, waited for Staff Halliday to

1 show up. We did some planning with Staff Halliday and then we made our way out to
2 Great Village.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. Did you discern or determine if
4 there was any unnecessary delays, or is that just the way it was?

5 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Time seemed to just -- everything --
6 everything just sped up or slowed down, whichever way you want to look at it. There
7 was -- there was always a phone call here, a phone call there, distracting.

8 Then at the -- at the time we were getting ready to leave, Beselt
9 and them -- Beselt and the three others are the -- yeah, the three others with Bill Neil as
10 well. They went mobile. They were dealing with the -- the kids down in.

11 They were looking for an active, looking for what they believed
12 going towards a shooting, an active shooter. And so didn't want to be away from the
13 radio while they were -- while they were active, so that delayed -- that delayed moving
14 out.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I see.

16 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** And their XO, listening to that, I just
17 didn't want to be driving and -- while they're -- while they're going into what was a very -
18 - very scary situation for them.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And what role, perhaps, would you be
20 playing by listening to them and to that very scary situation?

21 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Hopefully -- hopefully provide -- if they
22 needed guidance. I'm not going to get on the air and tell them to move left, move right.
23 They're the ones that have current IARD training. They know what they're dealing with.
24 And the last thing they need is me in their ear telling them to do this, that or another
25 thing. But just simply providing any guidance to hear what they're saying.

26 Also, I don't know if all of the four of them had -- were wearing
27 earpieces, and the last thing you want is a radio broadcast coming over the air saying --
28 to alert somebody to their presence.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I see. Okay.

2 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** So -- so that -- that delayed departure
3 from Bible Hill just to -- to see what's going on.

4 Then they're back with the kids and -- they're back in the house
5 with the kids and there's other noise going on in the -- the kids are hearing noises.
6 They call. We called the IARD team back to go back to the house to make sure the kids
7 are safe. And there's -- yeah.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. I'm getting a sense, then, of why
9 the timing as you've described was as it was.

10 But I want to ask you another question on that in terms of given the
11 fact that you had information, you had technology, you had functionality at the Bible Hill
12 detachment, why is it that you even decided to go to the command post and why would
13 it be necessary for three senior NCOs to go to the command post under these
14 circumstances?

15 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Because it's easier. If you separate --
16 historically, we always -- we set up a command post in all of the -- all the critical
17 incidents. There's a command post set up as -- in proximity to the location where the
18 situation is taking place.

19 It's convenient to have everybody together in the same place so
20 they can make those -- those decisions. They can easily reach out to each other. They
21 can have contact with the people on the ground.

22 The Incident Commander doesn't have to reach out with phone call,
23 phone everybody or the Critical Incident Commander, he has his people nearby that he
24 can get the information and it's all fed into the same area.

25 You could set it up a long distance apart. Sometimes, in some
26 areas, cell service and radio service is not 100 percent, so there are dead spots out in
27 that area where you're not going to get good radio communications, so being there,
28 we're able to cover that off.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** In terms of access to the technological
2 advantages at the command post compared to Bible Hill, are you able to comment?
3 Which is better? Where was the -- where was the technological advance?

4 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Actually, when the ERT team moves
5 in, when they bring all their technology and their package comes in with their critical --
6 their response team, they bring with them a radio tech. They bring their own antenna.
7 They set up a mobile repeater so their radios work better, so communications.

8 They also bring in the computer techs. They set up -- I think it's the
9 ATAK system where they're tracking their ERT members and their GPSing. They can
10 see in real time what is happening and where everything is going on.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

12 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** So ---

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Are you able to comment, then, in terms
14 of advantage or disadvantage technologically from the command post point of view or to
15 the Bible Hill detachment? Are you able?

16 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Well, I think with that -- with all the
17 stuff they have there, we can piggyback on it and we were seeing that. Rather, if we
18 stayed at Bible Hill, we would not be seeing that.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. You used the expression earlier
20 about historically, we have used command posts close to the scene.

21 Do you have any point of that now given your experience, whether
22 that's a good use of resources and time to have all members and all command parties
23 attend at the Command Post? Even though you did it historically, things change. Do
24 you think that's a good idea still?

25 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I still think it's a good idea. I still ---

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

27 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I still support that.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. Very good. When you attend at

1 the Great Village Fire Hall Command Post, I'm trying to get a sense of what
2 responsibility S/Sgt Carroll would have undertaken at that point? Can you enlighten
3 me?

4 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Actually, there were -- excuse me,
5 there were different -- I liaised a lot with the local firemen to give us access to certain
6 rooms, to get other places where we could have a break off room where the
7 investigative team could function out of, either move vehicles out of the garage so we
8 could use their service bays, liaise with the firemen for further information, we liaise with
9 them to get their contact numbers where we could provide food for the member, get
10 food -- yeah, get food for the members.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

12 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Then get food and water, like, that's
13 going to be needed.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

15 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** At the same time, the -- I was looking
16 at the position of our checkpoints, of our containment team for that, where they were,
17 and I was -- I guess I was liaising with them and keeping track of that and feeding that
18 back up to the Command Centre, the Command Triangle.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yes, very good. I was going to refer you
20 to, again, to paragraph 265, the last sentence of that in the Foundational Document. If
21 we could have that, it's at page 129 and we just had a look at it, Madam Registrar.

22 At paragraph 265, the last sentence says:

23 "The role of S/Sgts. MacCallum and Carroll at the time
24 was to assist S/Sgt. Halliday in the deployment of
25 uniformed resources, including monitoring and evaluating
26 perimeter containment."

27 Is that an accurate statement, S/Sgt Carroll?

28 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes, that's part of it.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. And I guess -- once again, I'm
2 trying to discern roles. Isn't this the role of the Risk Manager for purposes of managing
3 the deployment of uniform resources?

4 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Once the containment -- once the
5 other resources are on scene, then the Risk Manager could take a step back and he's
6 got other responsibilities throughout the province, so he would kind of take a step back
7 and the Ops Team people would take over and look after what's on the ground.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So is it your view then that once the
9 Command Team of the three non-commissioned officers we discussed, they arrive at
10 the Command Post, that the role of the Risk Manager recedes? Is that what my
11 understanding is?

12 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I think that would be -- yes. I think
13 that's accurate.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. All right. All right. In terms of your
15 role, with respect to containment, was there -- did you take that over or was that
16 MacCallum? Was that MacCallum and you and Halliday? How did that go about?

17 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I just kind of took over this, took over,
18 just -- I advised where it was, what we had in position, and kept it updated.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Then I'll direct your attention to
20 your interview to the Mass Casualty Commission on page 28, where there is reference
21 to this role that you undertook. The bottom of page 28, at the 19:53 minute mark, you
22 say the following:

23 "Well, working ... Once we get into the command post,
24 the scribe ... actually, Rob Lewis was the scribe, he drew
25 a map up ... he was drawing ... he was drawing a map
26 up, sketched a map and we pirated his map and I think
27 Steve kept it ... Steve kept it. And we used that to keep
28 track of where the resources were around the perimeter,

1 around what we had for containment. And I was taking
2 care of ... I was keeping that map updated, who we had
3 on site, [and] who we had on duty at what given time.”

4 So my question to you on this is that we’re talking now about
5 another hand drawn map?

6 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And once again, can you give us
8 your understanding or knowledge of the blueberry road situation? Did you have any
9 awareness of that at this point?

10 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** The hand drawn map was a --- Rob
11 Lewis was the sergeant -- he was the scribe for Jeff West. And he sat down and off the
12 maps I had on the wall, or the maps that they were bringing up from the CIC Team, I’m
13 going to say, the deployment team, he drew a hand -- he had a hand drawn map that
14 showed the -- basically the grid we’re covering off of.

15 So I said, “Hey, Rob, that’s exactly what I have, what we need. It’s
16 better than what we have.” Because we didn’t take that big three-by-three-foot map
17 down with us. This was a drawing not to scale, it was very -- it showed all the roads, it
18 showed where we’re -- Portapique Beach Road, and Orchard Beach Road, and showed
19 the area.

20 And so we looked at that and said, “Okay. Our members -- I’d just
21 like to give a snapshot, an overhead snapshot, a quick reference on the table, just,
22 “Halliday, here is where our members are placed.”

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

24 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** “We have two people here, two
25 people here, three/four people here, three or four people here, and a couple others.”

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

27 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** So that’s what that map was used for.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. But would you have had access to

1 Pictometry at that point, given the fact that there was some ERT technological expertise
2 there?

3 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I'm sure they did. I'm sure it was. I
4 didn't think this map fit the bill for us, what we needed. We didn't need big specifics on
5 that. The blueberry field road, the field was there. The road never came into
6 knowledge at that point in time.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I guess my question would be, the road
8 never came into knowledge at that stage because perhaps you were using an
9 antiquated hand-drawn map and that if you had some technological assist, you might
10 have been able to see that? Is that a fair assessment?

11 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, that isn't.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

13 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Pictometry, the ERT team, they were
14 looking at that and they were not picking that out. We didn't get that from their maps.
15 The map that we had was just -- it was just a drawing of the -- of any map we looked at.
16 We could have looked at -- we could have taken that map we took from -- the three-by-
17 three-foot map. We could have put that out in ---

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

19 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** --- out in -- and said the same thing, X
20 marks where the members are.

21 This was a good representation.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

23 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** At that time, we did not know this
24 other egress route.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. We had the opportunity to have a
26 number of exhibits introduced recently of hand drawn maps that were actually provided
27 to us with the assistance of some of the participants. Exhibit 1462 and Exhibit 1463, I'm
28 going to ask you to comment on whether this is the hand-drawn map or whether you

1 have any knowledge.

2 So I'm going to ask the Registrar to bring up Exhibit 1462.

3 And that's before you now, S/Sgt Carroll. Do you recognize Exhibit
4 1462?

5 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I'm trying to ---

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Take your time.

7 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** --- enlarge.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

9 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I'm just trying to ---

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah, please, take your time.

11 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I'm just trying to enlarge it. That's all.

12 Yeah, I just wish I'd get a large copy of it. I'm pretty sure I do
13 recognize that. And I think it does look like my writing is on it.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Can we make it a little larger,
15 Madam Registrar?

16 Are you comfortable?

17 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yeah. Yeah, that's the -- I don't know
18 where that map came from, and I was presented, but that's the more -- that was
19 obviously printed off of something.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. Is that ---

21 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** And that's ---

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Sorry, is that the hand-drawn map that
23 you pirated from Sgt Lewis?

24 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, that map is -- this is not -- that's
25 not a hand drawn map. That's -- I don't know where that came into play or how we
26 ended up getting that, but I took the information off of Sgt Lewis' map and would have
27 transposed it onto this map.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And is that in your handwriting?

1 Exhibit 1462?

2 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes. I believe.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And the purpose of that map again, just
4 for clarity?

5 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Just for a quick reference to S/Sgt.
6 Halliday and those in the Command Post sitting at the table and said, "Okay, here is the
7 overall area ---

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right.

9 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** --- that we're looking at. This is where
10 our containment teams are placed at this point in time. These are the resources we
11 have." And these are the -- like, the south and then being in the critical zone.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So just for clarity, this is an
13 additional map to the hand drawn map that you pirated from Sgt Lewis?

14 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes, it would be.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Thank you. Let's look at Exhibit
16 1463, please, Madam Registrar. This is another hand drawn map that was -- we
17 received some assistance from the Participants in terms of its existence?

18 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** The map you just showed me wasn't a
19 hand-drawn map ---

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** No.

21 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** --- if that's ---

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** No, that's -- you're quite correct. 1463
23 that I'm showing you now, have you any comment on that?

24 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Okay. I'm just looking at that.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

26 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** That'd be enlarged.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

28 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** That's ---

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

2 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** --- that's the map that Constable --
3 Sergeant Lewis prepared, and as a working map for keeping track of who was at
4 checkpoint, or the -- where we were doing our checkpoints, our members are stationed.
5 So that's -- that was that one.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So just for determining and
7 finalizing this, 1463 that you're seeing now is the hand-drawn map that was pirated from
8 Sergeant Lewis; am I right on that?

9 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Correct.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Very good. Okay. I think ---

11 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** This one, this one here, that's the
12 hand-drawn one.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** This is the hand-drawn one?

14 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yeah.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. Thank you. Okay.

16 Let's continue on then with respect to your responsibilities at the
17 Command Post. You had said that you were doing perimeter work and containment
18 assignment. And you involved yourself, I believe at some point, with the GIS,
19 Constables Brown and Constables Melanson, and ---

20 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- and engaged some instructions with
22 Sergeant O'Brien to get some rest. Are you able to comment on that, please?

23 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Engage some -- yeah, we called out
24 Melanson and Brown for ---

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

26 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** --- the GIS team to do the -- to be
27 extra bodies to do footwork, to do backgrounds, to do -- gather more information as we
28 needed.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Was that you doing that, or was that
2 assigned to some other member, and you were aware of the officer's involvement, or
3 the member's involvement?

4 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, I called them out.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

6 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I called Brown and Melanson out, and
7 then we looked at one of the tasks that I gave, and we looked at the toll plaza -- all the
8 highways in Nova Scotia, they have cameras on them, and I want to see, as a possible
9 investigative tool, can you find out if those toll plazas, if that's recorded or not.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm. And the purpose ---

11 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** But just to see. We had a few
12 vehicles identified two workman, and just in case we'd see one of those going through a
13 -- going through or going through one of the cameras.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right.

15 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** It was a long shot, but it was a hope --

16 -

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

18 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** They also went to the toll plaza. I
19 think there was a possible vehicle, related vehicle that went through the toll plaza, and I
20 believe Brown and Melanson went up to the toll plaza and reviewed their -- secured
21 their video.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. Great. I understand as well that
23 at some time, you were involved in the debriefing process around 3:30 a.m. of the
24 contact or the IARD team; am I right there?

25 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yeah.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

27 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes, that was after the ERT was able
28 to get the TAV in, they removed the children. I don't know if it was at the -- I don't know

1 if they removed the children at the same time as Mr. Ellison finally came out to the ERT
2 team after a number of tries.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

4 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** And so, yeah, then Stuart and Adam
5 and Aaron, we debriefed in a room off the main Command Post.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

7 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** That was -- yeah, that was around
8 3:30, 3:30 plus.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And the purpose of that debriefing, and
10 this may be obvious, but just for clarification, was what?

11 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** To see how that -- to see how they
12 were. They were in a critical, stressful situation, dealing with what they dealt with, what
13 they were faced with, and to -- just to -- a big of comfort with them at the same time, and
14 also, getting whatever information we could from them that would help with the rest of
15 the investigation, rest of the situation.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And I understand at this stage, Staff
17 Sergeant, that you obtain some new information with respect to Andrew MacDonald,
18 who had been a ---

19 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yeah.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- shooting victim many hours earlier; is
21 that right?

22 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes, that is correct. As part of our
23 debriefing process, and we're just talking over from their arrival and walking down, they
24 said -- and just out of the blue, I think Patton brought it up, they talked about this
25 Andrew MacDonald. Andy said, "Yeah, he had been shot." And I was kind of, "What?
26 He got shot?" He said, "Yeah, I had triaged him. I helped him out." I think he cut his --
27 I think he got shot in the arm or something, and he cut his sleeve off and did some
28 preliminary medical treatment before passing him over to the EMTs. And then when he

1 was doing that, he said, "Yeah, and when I was taking it off, this slug fell out, that was a
2 piece of brass, copper, whatever it was, it was the actual bullet." He said, "Here it is. It
3 fell out." And he reached in his pocket and pulled it out and showed it to us. And that's
4 the first I'd ever heard of MacDonald of the situation, of this incident.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Now we know in retrospect, looking back,
6 that Mr. MacDonald would have been a victim of a shooting some time around 10:26,
7 10:30 p.m. ---

8 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yeah.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- the night before. We're talking the
10 passage now of four hours, Staff Sergeant Carroll. Are you able to provide any insight
11 how this fundamentally important piece of information with respect to identification of the
12 perpetrator himself and his vehicle could not be known to the command decision
13 makers until 3:30 in the morning?

14 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I can't explain, and I can't explain how
15 it never got up, it never -- it didn't come from the OCC. We were never advised of it.
16 Stuart and Aaron and Adam, they were heavily engaged in what they were doing. I
17 could see that, and not feeding that up, and just not thinking of it. Mr. MacDonald was
18 removed from the scene. He was taken to the hospital. And Staff Halliday had no
19 knowledge of it either. None of us had any knowledge of it. And I can't explain why.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** You have become aware thereafter that
21 there was a broadcast in which there was some information in that regard. Do you
22 know anything about that with respect to Andrew MacDonald? No?

23 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I'm ---

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Do you know anything about a broadcast
25 prior to 3:30 about information coming from Andrew MacDonald?

26 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Did you know anything about a 9-
28 1-1 call or have the ability to access a 9-1-1 call information from Kate or Andrew

1 MacDonald from 10:26 the night before?

2 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Didn't access it, didn't look for it, didn't
3 know it existed.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

5 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** When we were briefed by the OCC on
6 what had happened, that connection wasn't made, didn't come to us.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Thank you. So I'm correct to say that
8 around 7:18, or thereafter, you became aware of information coming from Lisa
9 Banfield?

10 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Sound right? Okay. And that information

12 ---

13 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** There was.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- that information had some impact upon
15 you in terms of what it was you felt was going on and what it was happening in terms of
16 the movement and/or activity of the perpetrator?

17 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** We knew that there was a marked
18 police car involved and that was totally something we didn't know.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And what type of response,
20 generally, I know there was a great deal of response, but once you got that information
21 from Lisa Banfield, what did the command structure do?

22 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** When that information came in, I was
23 outside, outside the Command Post, and Lisa Banfield arrived in an ambulance and
24 other police were arriving. Constable Brown had been in the ambulance talking to her.
25 He gave some information to Constable Melanson. Constable Melanson came up to
26 me, told me about the information. I said, "Look, I'm not going to try to take all what
27 you're telling me. Go up to the Command Post. Speak to Staff Halliday and give him
28 this information. This is very important to know, and I don't want to have it third-hand

1 information. Go tell him directly."

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

3 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** So Constable Melanson went up and
4 spoke with Halliday, spoke in the Command Post. I assume Staff West was there at the
5 same time. I can't be certain.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Let's move then to page 212,
7 paragraph 437, Madam Registrar. And if we can, paragraph 437 indicates that,
8 "Risk Manager Briers called S/Sgt. Carroll to ask
9 about [a] report out of Halifax that the perpetrator
10 possessed a fully marked RCMP vehicle. S/Sgt.
11 Carroll advised [...] the perpetrator apparently had a
12 fully marked police vehicle, but it sounded like it was
13 burned in Portapique."

14 I think we have a copy of the audio of that. 7:29.

15 **[AUDIO PLAYBACK]**

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So Staff Sergeant, at that stage, you're
17 having a conversation with Risk Manager Briers, and I assume that there's a great deal
18 of information coming into the Command Post and to the various commanders at that
19 point. Is that right?

20 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes, there was.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. So what is the engagement with
22 Risk Manager Briers at this stage, and what is it that you're learning, and what is it that
23 you're positing or providing to him, and for what purpose?

24 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** At that time, Bruce called and advised
25 of what was coming out of Halifax, and I wasn't aware of all that information coming out
26 of Halifax. I know that the -- we looked and we had some burned out vehicles in the --
27 in the Portapique area, a burned out Taurus, and the ERT team was sent down, was
28 dispatched to go down and confirm the -- that -- if any of these Taurus's were fully

1 marked or if the picture fit the description of a fully-marked vehicle.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. So ---

3 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** So they were -- they were dispatched
4 just to confirm that.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Risk Manager Briers is contacting you,
6 but the information that you had from Lisa Banfield you moved immediately up the line,
7 that is, go to directly to the CIC Staff Sergeant West.

8 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** This information that's coming from Risk -
10 - from Risk Manager Briers deals with a identifier number and information with respect
11 to that vehicle. Did you pass that on and along up the -- up the line to the ---

12 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yeah.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- Staff Sergeant?

14 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yeah, Bruce had -- Bruce had sent
15 that up the line to -- as well, I believe, and is the only one who's saying he's sending it
16 up to Halliday and West, I believe, I'm not sure.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So what did you do with respect to this
18 information that you received from the Risk Manager?

19 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I didn't do anything directly. I believe I
20 was -- I don't know when I -- I don't know where I was when I received that, but I'm -- I
21 think I would have gone back up to the Command Post and there would have been a
22 discussion point up there. I can't remember. I mean...

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** In terms of that conversation, did you
24 view your more -- role more as providing information to the Risk Manager or receiving
25 information of substance from the Risk Manager?

26 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Six of one-half and a dozen of the
27 other.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

1 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes, we received information from
2 Bruce about the car. We knew about a bunch of other vehicles. Addie had done a
3 search and found a whole bunch of vehicles that we knew of, that there was one Taurus
4 still in Halifax, we knew that there were two burned out in Portapique. So it's kind of
5 exchanging that, that Bruce may or may not have known some of that when he called.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

7 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** So there was an exchange of
8 information.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I guess the reason I'm asking that
10 question is, once again, I had asked you earlier about too many cooks in the kitchen.
11 Seems like there's a lot of people with a lot of pieces of information and that may not
12 have got to the right location for purposes of acting upon. Is that a fair assessment or
13 an unfair assessment?

14 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I can't answer that. I thought the
15 information was passed up from the OCC to the Command Post in that degree.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

17 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I would have to think that additional
18 information would go directly to CIC as well.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Let me ask you additionally, with this
20 information about the fact that there was a fully-marked vehicle emerging from a
21 number of sources, would there have been made any -- any effort made on your part for
22 purposes of public communication, revisiting the issue of Jen MacCallum that had -- you
23 had had earlier in the -- in the incident?

24 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, there wasn't at that point. I know
25 Bruce Briers did call. At some point in time, there was contact between myself and
26 Bruce about similar broadcasts to Halifax or something. That -- that car thing, I believe,
27 did go out to the membership, the members on scene.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

1 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** So I remember that the members
2 were aware of that.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** In terms of provision of information to the
4 public at this time, post 7:29, was there any direction, suggestion, or otherwise from you
5 that this information should be disseminated to the public as soon as possible?

6 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. All right. I'm going to reference,
8 then, exactly what you made comment about. Paragraph 506, at page 239 is a
9 conversation that you had with Staff Sergeant Briers at around 9:57 or 9:00:57 a.m.
10 This is a telephone call you had with Staff Sergeant Briers in which there was an
11 enquiry about an Enfield member's regarding a media release.

12 **[AUDIO PLAYBACK]**

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So Staff Sergeant, you'll see there's a
14 request there from the Risk Manager at the time with respect to doing a media release
15 about the vehicle from nine o'clock. Your response was:

16 "'"I'll run it by later, later on, I uh...[whenever, I'll] bring
17 it up...[to them again].'"

18 Can you comment on that for us, please, Staff Sergeant, about the
19 dynamic there and what you mean about running it up and, or sorry, "I'll run it by later"?

20 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I was running it up to Command of the
21 -- at the Command Post, and just to discuss whether... I know -- I know there have
22 been this -- you know, obviously there's been some discussion about it ---

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

24 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** --- and whether we can -- and it's not
25 my decision to release it.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. Can you tell us, what sort of
27 discussion had been undertaken at that point with respect to media release and
28 information about that vehicle?

1 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Looking at the -- I think there's some
2 concern about whether he would have access to social media, then hear that and know
3 what we're looking for, or just give him the advantage of -- advantage over -- over our
4 pursuit, our efforts to find it -- find the vehicle.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Did you partake in that conversation with
6 the other Command deciders?

7 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I -- I was part of that, I believe. Yeah,
8 yeah, I believe I did.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Did you have any concerns with respect
10 to the release of information about the vehicle and the vehicle identifiers?

11 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I know it was being -- I know it was
12 being discussed and whether it was going to be released. I didn't know exactly when it
13 was going to be released, but then the impression was that we all -- it'll be released at
14 some point in time when we have to. We'll just give it a few minutes, give it a little bit of
15 while and we'll look at it.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Do you have any explanation as to
17 why there may have been a delay with respect to the release of that information about
18 the marked police vehicle, 28B11?

19 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No.

20 Okay. Madam Registrar -- no, sorry; paragraph 509 of page 242.

21 (SHORT PAUSE)

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** No. Paragraph 508 is the excerpt I'm
23 looking for, Madam Registrar.

24 And I'm going to read this carefully to you, Staff Sergeant, because
25 I think it's important for your response.

26 Five oh eight (508) says:

27 "As discussed in the RCMP Public Communications,
28 April 18–19, 2020 Foundational Document, at 9:08...,

1 S/Sgt. Carroll sent an email to [Risk Manager] Briers
2 in relation to the media release inquiry made by Cst.
3 Stevenson about the perpetrator's fully marked replica
4 RCMP cruiser. S/Sgt. Carroll's email said that a
5 decision had been made not to release the
6 information about the perpetrator's replica RCMP
7 cruiser to the media. It stated: 'Thought was given to
8 give release about vehicle, but decision was made not
9 to.' RM Briers replied back to S/Sgt. Carroll seven
10 minutes later, stating: 'Very good. Kind of figured they
11 may not want to release.'"

12 Are you able to make any comment, S/Sgt. Carroll, with respect to
13 the decision not to release and how that was indicated to Risk Manager Briers?

14 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** That -- I know I reached out to Staff
15 Halliday via phone, and that was the end result of the discussion, that it's not going to
16 be released at this point in time.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Whose decision ---

18 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** And I just had to ---

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Whose decision was it, S/Sgt. Carroll?

20 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** That was a collective decision with
21 Halliday and myself, whether it was Halliday was speaking to somebody else. The
22 rationale that they provided was, was it going to create havoc, create concern, create a
23 lost opportunity to find this car. Then it's going to be revisited shortly, and obviously it
24 was revisited very quickly because I think the broadcast sent out.

25 There was some delay in me getting back to Bruce Briers because I
26 believe I tried to call him on the phone, and this was an email I sent to him while driving
27 out to Portapique.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So when I asked you the question, whose

1 decision was it made, you said it was a collective. Who's the collective involved in that
2 -- making that decision?

3 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I know Halliday -- Halliday and I talked
4 about it. Staff Halliday and myself spoke about it. I don't know who else Staff Halliday
5 may have spoken with prior to or -- and that's -- that I can't answer.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** With respect to the earlier discussion that
7 we had, you said that you had to run it up the chain, that type of -- that type of request.
8 When you run it up the chain, what do you mean by that, and who are you running it to?

9 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I'm running it up to -- running it up to
10 Staff Halliday.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So when you ran it up the chain,
12 did you get a decision?

13 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** The decision was we're not going to
14 release it at this point in time.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And was Staff Halliday part of that
16 decision-making process?

17 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Well, we were on the phone together.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Paragraph 509 of the document,
19 Staff Sergeant.

20 Five oh nine (509) says:

21 "S/Sgt. Halliday was asked about the email
22 between...Briers and...Carroll in his interview with the
23 Mass Casualty Commission. He stated that it was
24 'absolutely inaccurate' to say that the request to
25 release the vehicle's description had been denied.
26 S/Sgt. Halliday stated that '[t]here was no...no point
27 ever at any point did I have any conversation with
28 anyone who denied any release of any information'."

1 Do you have any comment on that, S/Sgt. Carroll?

2 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** The phrase that I discussed -- I
3 discussed with S/Sgt. Halliday and the release was not going to happen at that time, but
4 it was going to be looked at later on, and it was going to be still -- still subject to
5 discussion, still subject to is it going to happen, it's going to happen.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. All right, thank you.

7 I'm going to move on to another topic, and this is a topic that is
8 covered at paragraph 551 at page 257 of the document.

9 Paragraph 551 says:

10 "Between 9:47...and 9:50 a.m. on April 19,...Sgt.
11 O'Brien arrived at the Command Post in Great
12 Village. S/Sgt. Carroll tasked...O'Brien with control of
13 the [scene] in Portapique."

14 Do you recall that tasking process, and can you provide for us
15 information with respect to the scene, containment, control, and management at
16 Portapique at around this time?

17 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yeah, that was at the time, right
18 around that time, we're doing a transition. I was breaking off, I was done, we were
19 transitioning the Command Post to a second team: New CIC, new Incident -- Halliday
20 was being replaced. Inspector Bell was coming in from Halifax; he was taking over Staff
21 Halliday's role. So we're taking onto a dayshift. We've been going for a lot of hours and
22 it was time to do a rotation. So, yeah, Andy was taking over what -- the functions I was
23 doing and looking at getting more resources in to replace resources, as need be.

24 That didn't materialize because things kind of went -- things kind of
25 went dynamic right away and the rest of it happened.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And this is the 9:42:30 call that you're
27 referring to with respect to the shooting at Wentworth?

28 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes, it would have been -- it would

1 have been at the J-Division ERT team, New Brunswick -- the ERT team from New
2 Brunswick was coming; they were going to transition replace. I was outside the
3 Command Post, making arrangements to -- for a place where they could bring their
4 vehicles in, speaking with the on-site ---

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

6 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** --- on-site security. And then the call
7 -- then the call came in from the person on the highway. Initially it was a pedestrian-
8 vehicle accident and quickly changed to -- quickly changed to it was a marked police car
9 in the fray and a shooting, or somebody had been shot.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. And we've heard much information
11 from other witnesses with respect to the mobilization to that call and how it was diverted
12 to another residence in the Glenholme area. But I want to ask you about your
13 involvement in Portapique. You did not respond to the Glenholme-Wentworth ---

14 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- call?

16 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, we didn't.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

18 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** And then, all of a sudden -- all of a
19 sudden, at the same time coming in you have, "Oh, there's a house on fire in Hunter
20 Road." And so it's, "Oh my God, is this related?" And obviously it was.

21 So I go back up to the Command Post and all this is coming in at
22 the same time and I speak with Staff Halliday and said, Okay, because cars -- vehicles
23 were moving, they were taking off, the ERT team was taking, other members were
24 going. I said to Steve, "Okay, Andy and I will go out to Portapique, and we will set up
25 and maintain the scene at Portapique until it gets turned over to Major Crime."

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. That's what I want to ask you
27 about.

28 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Okay.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So in terms of our role and Andy's, Sgt.
2 O'Brien's role, you attended at that location. Can you tell me with who and how, and
3 what was set up and what was done generally? And then I'll ask you some more
4 specifics.

5 Who went?

6 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yeah. No, I'm just -- the members
7 were -- the members were already there quite close. They were -- we had three
8 checkpoints that were there; there was one right at the end of Portapique Road, so they
9 were still there.

10 We brought the -- when Andy and I got there, we brought all the
11 other members in from the ones at Five Houses Road, Bay Shore, and another one just
12 farther down. I don't know the exact ones now. And we brought them all in, said, okay,
13 we released two of them. Two of them went down to help out. So we had Dorrington,
14 we had Lafferty, and the other members helping us out were the Cumberland members.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

16 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I forget -- I forget which ones. I think
17 Matthews was there, Galbraith, Blinn. No, Blinn may have been earlier. But, anyway,
18 they set out the -- made sure we blocked the entrances off at the upper end, at the
19 entrance to Portapique Beach Road, didn't let people have access.

20 Cst. Lafferty went in and he parked his police car; there were two
21 bodies on the -- two bodies on the side of the road. And Staff MacCallum had gotten
22 covers for those bodies earlier, so -- we were expecting a helicopter flyover, so they
23 wouldn't be visible. So Lafferty took care -- Lafferty was taking care of that.

24 Cst. Dorrington was inside the -- inside and O'Brien and myself, I
25 drove around a little bit and then set up and just maintained the area. Ran into one of
26 the -- one resident of the area; we talked to him for a period of time. Bjorn; I forget his
27 last name. But his neighbour's house had been burned, and unfortunately, there were
28 two people deceased.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So when you returned to that scene -- or
2 attend at that scene, that scene, there's probably a better expression, what is your
3 goal? What is it that you're doing? What's being decided?

4 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** We're just maintaining the scene until
5 it can be turned over to a Major Crime Examiner and they start doing their processing of
6 the scene.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Would there be an effort to canvas the
8 area at this stage?

9 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** We didn't think of it at that time.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And looking back on that, I just
11 want to ask you about whether that would have been a decision of some substance not
12 to canvas. And I'm asking you why that wasn't done?

13 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** We're still -- it wasn't -- we were still in
14 -- everything was still active, we're chasing down Mr. Wortman, we're chasing him down
15 trying to find that. we just didn't consider going in and doing a door-to-door at that time.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Of?

17 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Of the properties we -- the properties
18 we looked at, they were -- I think there were four or five -- four houses, five houses that
19 were burned, to my recollection.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** You would have been aware that
21 obtaining information with respect to potential witnesses might be of some importance
22 for subsequent investigation?

23 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes, at that stage of the investigation,
24 we -- everything was still in a dynamic situation. We weren't thinking of going beyond
25 that. And that was being left over to the Major Crime contingent when they came in.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** You would have known, obviously, that
27 there were a number of deceased that had been discovered, you made reference to
28 them. Were there any efforts to canvas the area, the community, for potentially other

1 deceased?

2 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And are you able to say why that
4 may or may not have been?

5 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No. We just -- I can't. I stayed there
6 for a short period of time, a couple of hours, and then I departed.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

8 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** We just -- I guess there's just so much
9 going on in the whole -- when we get to Wentworth, Hunter Road, Debert, and then so
10 on, everything was still fluid and we just never got to that stage of doing things.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Do you know where Cobequid Court
12 was?

13 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** It's down at the bottom, yes.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm. Do you have a recollection of
15 being at Cobequid Court at any time during your time in the scene containment or
16 management?

17 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I went to -- I remember driving
18 Cobequid Court. I believe it was that day. I know I was down another day with S/Sgt.
19 Halliday.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

21 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** But over to the east side, I remember
22 driving down there. That was heading towards the blueberry field, where the egress
23 was. And driving down there, I see basically -- I believe it was a chain, I think it was a
24 chain barrier or a wire barrier across the top of a couple fence posts with -- providing
25 access to the blueberry field.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And are you able to estimate or
27 give us some sense of what time that would have been when you made that
28 observation?

1 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Between 10:00 and 12:00. I believe I
2 probably left Portapique Beach area -- Portapique Beach Road area around 12:00. So
3 yeah, between 10:00 and 12:00 is when I drove down.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm. And when you made that
5 observation, was it of any significance to you, given your knowledge of the area at that
6 point?

7 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** At that point, I looked in, "Okay.
8 Here's a road into the blueberry field that we hadn't found before. And there looked to
9 be a roadway in the blueberry field."

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Now, that's a description of what you saw
11 on the east side of Cobequid Court. Did you attend at the western side of Cobequid
12 Court? The other end?

13 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, I don't think so.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Would you ---

15 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I don't recall going down there.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Would you be familiar with the residences
17 of 46 Cobequid Court and 41 Cobequid Court? Would you be able to place them
18 geographically in the area?

19 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I am now because subsequent to their
20 ---

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

22 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** The discoveries there.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

24 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** At that time -- at that time, I would
25 have driven down, I would have seen some houses, but that was it. I didn't take any
26 civic numbers, et cetera. No knowledge of that.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. With respect to crime scene
28 management and containment, would you, yourself, have received any specialized

1 training with respect to that topic ---

2 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- in terms of your involvement? Sorry?

4 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** No?

6 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Thank you. With respect to scene
8 canvassing or accessing witnesses and/or important information in the area, would you
9 have received any specialized training in that regard?

10 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, but that's something we all do in a
11 normal situation. You would go -- you'll do neighbourhood -- go out in the
12 neighbourhood and look around.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

14 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** But once things calm down, that is
15 done.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

17 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** This is still -- we're still at the early
18 stages. We have an incredibly tragic situation and it's still ongoing. We never looked
19 at, "Okay. We're all here now. Let's start canvassing the neighbourhood." That was
20 usually left to the Major Crime guys and usually the front-line guys. We don't do that. to
21 get into a murder scene? Major Crime comes in, they take over it. They do all of that
22 stuff.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I see. Thank you. All right.

24 Madam Registrar, with respect to further questions in this regard,
25 the Exhibit 1624 that was marked this morning called "The Investigation Supplementary
26 Report", could you bring up page 13 on that exhibit for us? I'll just ask the Staff
27 Sergeant to comment on some of the findings there.

28 So page 13 indicates, and I'll stop you there, Madam Registrar ---

1 "GPS data for 05B09 reveals that Cst Dorrington entered
2 Portapique community 9:57:55, travelled back and forth
3 between containment point, Portapique Beach Road, and
4 Orchard Beach Drive. He then heads to Cobequid Court,
5 where he travelled approximately four kilometres per
6 hour, stopping in front of the Bond residence at 10:26.
7 The vehicle remains stationary at this location for
8 approximately 30 seconds." (As read)

9 And turning over to page 14:

10 "Cst Dorrington continued travelling on Cobequid Court,
11 drives past the Tuck Family residence at 41 Cobequid
12 Court. There's no indication that his vehicle entered the
13 property prior to proceeding south on Bayview Court."
14 (As read)

15 S/Sgt Carroll, would you have any familiarity with the movements of
16 Cst Dorrington's vehicle at around 10:28/10:30, in terms of his engagement and
17 involvement with 46 and 41 Cobequid Court?

18 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I knew he was in the area, but where
19 exactly he went, I couldn't tell you.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So I understand that you left shortly
21 thereafter, or around noon hour, I think you had indicated? Is that ---

22 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I believe it was around noon hour,
23 yes.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah, and the purpose for you leaving the
25 scene was what, Staff Sergeant?

26 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** When I left, it would have been -- it
27 was after Wortman had the incident at the -- in Enfield at the Irving.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I see.

1 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** So that was done. The person we
2 were looking for was deceased. Too many other people were deceased as well. We
3 were breaking or dismantling the Command Post and we're all -- we're making our way
4 back to Bible Hill Boardroom for a debriefing.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And you actually attended at that
6 debriefing in Bible Hill?

7 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I eventually made it there, yes.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. I understand you had some role in
9 the breaking down of the Command Post as well. Is that fair?

10 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Very short role.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

12 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I think we took things out of the --
13 whatever had to be carried out of the Command Post, we took out of it.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So in terms -- forgive me, I interrupted
15 you. Sorry?

16 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, I was going to say all the ERT
17 package, the Critical Incident package, they would be dismantling their gear and moving
18 it out as well.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So in terms of what took place at the
20 Portapique community area after you left, Sgt O'Brien was left in charge of that scene?
21 Is that fair?

22 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes, he was.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. All right. I'm almost to the end of
24 my questioning, Staff Sergeant. I have a couple more areas that I want to speak to you
25 about. In particular, I'd like to ask you questions about the blue-on-blue incident and
26 your role with respect to the Onslow Belmont Fire Hall Brigade.

27 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Are you comfortable to proceed on?

1 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes, I am.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Very good. Thank you.

3 Page 279, paragraph 614, I'm going to ask you to comment on,
4 Staff Sergeant.

5 "According to the notes of S/Sgt. Carroll, he received a
6 phone call from Cst. Brown after the blue-on-blue
7 incident in Onslow. Cst. Brown advised that he had
8 discharged his weapon. S/Sgt. Carroll confirmed that no
9 one was injured. Given the 'dynamic' situation, with the
10 perpetrator still not in custody, S/Sgt. Carroll advised Cst.
11 Brown that the incident would be dealt with later."

12 Does that accord with your understanding of what took place with
13 that conversation on Constable Brown?

14 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes, it does, with some background
15 information to go along with that, yes.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yes, would you be -- provide us with that
17 background information, please?

18 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Sure.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

20 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** We were down -- we're down in
21 Portapique Beach Road, or down in Portapique Beach area. Everybody else had gone.
22 We're hearing the situation of Corporal Peterson encountering the marked police vehicle
23 and the gentlemen in the Visi-Vest. We're hearing that. Then we're also hearing of the
24 situation in Glenholme, and we know everybody's -- there was a lot of scrambling
25 around. Members are rushing to get to the area, and Debert, and all that. And then all
26 of a sudden, the time -- time seems to stand still of how things were happening. And I
27 guess seconds became minutes, minutes became a lot longer. And it just seemed like
28 they were trying to pin the situation, the ERT members and the other uniform member

1 and ununiformed members who were there. So, all of a sudden, you're sitting in here,
2 "Blue-on-blue, blue-on-blue." I said, "Oh, my God, what's happening?" And in my mind,
3 I'm thinking, okay, this is -- somebody has come out and somebody's had a -- fired a
4 shot at one of the ERT members.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I'm sorry, somebody has done what?

6 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I thought that somebody had a
7 discharge at one of the ERT members, didn't realize who it was, and there was a
8 mistake maybe that way. That was going through the back of my mind. And then
9 Constable Brown called, and he just said -- because Constable Brown works -- he's one
10 of my subordinates. And he called and said -- just letting me know. He said, "Yeah, I
11 had a -- I discharged my firearm." And I looked at, okay -- I didn't know where it was. I
12 didn't ask where it was. The first thing I asked was, "Okay, is anybody hurt?"
13 "Nobody's hurt." "Are you guys okay?" So on and so forth. Constable Brown didn't tell
14 me it was at the fire hall, didn't tell me it was a carbine discharge, and I didn't ask. I
15 didn't ask any further questions. The biggest thing was, in my mind at that time, and I
16 didn't know there more than one -- there was more than one shot fired off, that nobody
17 was injured, everybody's healthy, everybody's safe. I did -- like I said, I didn't know
18 anything different. They asked what to do, and I looked at -- I thought about it and I
19 said, "Okay, this is -- we can -- we'll resolve this later. We'll deal with this later.
20 Nobody's hurt." And I was just thinking it was a -- just involved police officers and that
21 was my thought process. And then this -- Terry asked if he could continue. I looked it
22 up, okay, we've got two trained members, we've got two carbine trained members. We
23 have, I'm going to call for lack of a better term, a mad man out there shooting people. If
24 I can get more guns on the street, let's go. And I'm not -- I wasn't concerned about a
25 blue-on-blue accidental discharge, or a discharge on a blue-on-blue in that situation. So
26 I gave him the green light. If they were okay, if they were -- felt good about it, to
27 continue on, to continue on and engage.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. You've learned some additional

1 information, obviously, over the passage of time with respect to what took place ---

2 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Oh, yes.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- at the Onslow Belmont Fire Brigade
4 Hall.

5 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And I think you made reference to the fact
7 that you didn't know the number of shots, you didn't know that a civilian was involved,
8 and you didn't know that it was at a fire hall; have I characterized that properly?

9 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes, you've characterized that
10 properly.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

12 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I didn't find that out -- or we didn't find
13 that out -- actually, when the blue-on-blue happened, we were on the other channel,
14 because we changed radio channels and we heard that come in. There was -- nobody
15 responded to the blue-on-blue situation. It just -- it passed. There was no response
16 anywhere on it. We got back to our debriefing in the after -- back at Bible Detachment,
17 started doing our debriefing ---

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I want to interrupt you though before ---

19 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yeah.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- we get to the debriefing, Staff Sergeant
21 ---

22 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Sure.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- and ask you about given the fact that
24 you now know this additional information, the civilian, the number of shots, the fact that
25 it was at a fire hall, would your decision have been the same with respect to having
26 Constables Brown and Melanson continue on in search of the perpetrator?

27 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I would have -- yes, I would have, but
28 I would have attended the fire hall right away. Had I known it was at the fire hall, I

1 would have shown up.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Now given the fact that there was
3 an absence of information, Staff Sergeant, with respect to some pivotal points, can you
4 give us any sense of how that might have been improved and why that information was
5 not known to you as the commander of Colchester?

6 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I didn't know that there was a -- I'm
7 just going to -- warming centre set up at the Onslow Fire Hall. If that was set up, I
8 missed it in the briefings and when -- actually, when this one was set up, I didn't -- I
9 missed that. The other stuff, I should have asked -- it's my -- it falls on me. I should
10 have asked more questions. I was just so happy that -- I was just so content, not
11 happy, but just so content that nobody was injured, and I didn't ask the questions I
12 should have asked. That falls on me.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Anything further on the blue-on-
14 blue that you wish to comment on?

15 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** When we got back, and it wasn't just
16 me who didn't know, but it seems like we got back to our Bible Detachment, and I don't
17 know if you were going there or not, but we're doing our debriefing. And when we
18 started talking about it, said this topic of blue-on-blue came up. And when it did come
19 up, I said, "Well, the guy was in camo." And they kind of looked, said, "Who was in
20 camo?" Said, "Didn't the guy they shoot at, that they discharged their weapon at, wasn't
21 he dressed in camo?" And we said, we -- nobody seemed to have the answer. So
22 Terry and Dave had arrived at the office just short, we said, well, let's go -- either
23 Halliday or I said, "Let's go talk to them." So that's when we went and talked to Brown
24 and Melanson, that we got the full scope of what actually transpired.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. I'm going to suggest to you, or ask
26 your comment, that this seems like another instance of a communication breakdown
27 with respect to command's response to this critical incident. Would you agree with me
28 in that regard?

1 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** The break down was me not asking
2 the proper -- the appropriate questions when my member -- when Constable Brown
3 revealed that to me. There was a -- yeah, Terry could -- Constable Brown, if he had of
4 mentioned fire hall, would have tweaked a little bit more, it would have obviously
5 tweaked a whole lot more of my questioning. I should have asked the questions and I
6 didn't ask.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

8 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** My -- our focus and I think
9 everybody's focus there was -- at that time, was let's end this situation. We still have
10 this -- there was some indication that this vehicle was coming back. There was false
11 information that was passed in that the -- another vehicle may be heading towards --
12 was seen in the Truro Sobey's parking lot. And I think our members were still on the go,
13 trying to find out about that and refute that information. We -- I knew it was wrong
14 because I heard it. There's no way the timing would permit it, but it had to be found out.
15 So, yeah, it -- with the members going, we knew we needed get guns on the street.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

17 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** We needed the bodies that can do it
18 and I'll stand by that.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Do you have any comment for the
20 Commissioners with respect to potential ways of improving communications and the
21 delivery of information among decision makers in a critical incident?

22 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** In a perfect world, it would be
23 seamless. You -- I've been involved in a number of situations over the years, and
24 communications are always going to be an issue, whether it's radio communications
25 breaking down, overtalking on the radio. Our radios, they're based on cell phone
26 system, and I'm sure you've heard that the members were toning out. You just couldn't
27 get on to say something. That causes problems in communication. There's always
28 place for improved communication, I guess. All you can do is try your best.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay, Staff, Sergeant, I am almost at the
2 end. I want to follow up and just wrap up a few areas with respect to public
3 communication. You have indicated that you spoke to Jen MacCallum to engage H-Div
4 Strat Comms very early in your involvement to responding to the crisis. Did you have
5 any follow-up with either Ms. MacCallum or anybody from Strategic Communications in
6 terms of the provision of information to the public about this fully marked vehicle and the
7 perpetrator?

8 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, I didn't.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And then finally, I'm going to ask
10 you, are you familiar with the Alert Ready situation or system in Nova Scotia and its
11 availability to RCMP sources on April of -- April 18th, 19th of 2020?

12 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I had no knowledge of it at that time.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

14 Okay. Commissioners, those are the questions I have for Staff
15 Sergeant Carroll. We'll take your direction in terms of next steps.

16 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you very much,
17 Mr. Burrill, and Thank you, Staff Sergeant Carroll. The process we'll be following is that
18 we'll break for lunch now and return at two o'clock. During the break, our counsel,
19 Mr. Burrill, and others will be meeting with counsel for the Participants and discussions
20 will be had as to whether further questions should be asked of you and who will be
21 asking those questions. So thank you so far for your -- for being here and answering
22 these questions, and we would ask you to kindly make yourself available at 2:00 p.m.
23 potentially for further questions.

24 So thank you, and we'll break until 2:00 p.m.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Thank you.

26 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Thank you, sir.

27 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Thank you. The
28 proceedings are now on break and will resume at 2:00 p.m.

1 --- Upon recessing at 12:51 p.m.

2 --- Upon resuming at 2:06 p.m.

3 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Welcome back. The
4 proceedings are again in session.

5 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you.

6 Mr. Burrill?

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yes. Commissioners, counsels have met,
8 and I understand that there will be some questions posed, first from Mr. Bryson, and
9 then to be followed by Ms. Ward. That's the approach that's going to be taken.

10 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you. And so we can bring
11 the witness ---

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Oh, yes, please.

13 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** --- back?

14 And Mr. Bryson, whenever you're ready, and you can explain who
15 you represent to the witness.

16 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL, Resumed:**

17 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Good afternoon, and thank you
18 again, Staff Sergeant Carroll. Can you hear me okay? It's Commissioner MacDonald
19 here.

20 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes, I can.

21 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** All right, thank you.

22 Mr. Josh Bryson is at the podium. I don't know if you can see him
23 yet or not, but...

24 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I think I can see him now.

25 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Okay, great.

26 **--- CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:**

27 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Good afternoon, Staff Sergeant Carroll.

28 My name is Josh Bryson. I represent the family of Peter and Joy Bond. They resided at

1 46 Cobequid Court. And so I have some questions for you, and I'm also asking
2 questions on behalf of the Oliver/Tuck family, who resided at 41 Cobequid Court, and
3 also, the Goulet family in Middle Stewiacke. So thank you for being here and answering
4 questions.

5 So the first topic I want to go over is the topic of Pictometry. I have
6 a couple of follow up questions on that. Okay? So I heard in your direct evidence that -
7 - you indicated that images from the OCC would have been obtained through
8 Pictometry. Did I hear that correctly?

9 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I believe that the OCC do use
10 Pictometry.

11 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. Do you know if they were using it
12 on April 18th and 19th, 2020?

13 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I cannot comment on that. I ---

14 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. Where did you get the sense that
15 that -- that they were possibly using Pictometry when you were asked?

16 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Well, I thought I used -- I have been to
17 the OCC as a alternative Risk Manager in the past, and I believe I was told at the time
18 that they would have the -- they could bring it up and they'd bring the Pictometry images
19 up on the wall -- up on the screens if need be. That's where that comes from.

20 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. So besides the discussions you
21 had with Staff Sergeant MacCallum about Pictometry, did you hear anyone else talk
22 about Pictometry on April 18th or 19th?

23 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I don't think I had any discussions
24 about staff -- with Staff MacCallum about Pictometry. He was using -- whatever
25 platform he was using, I believe it was Google Earth, those were the only discussions I
26 had. I don't recall anybody else talking about Pictometry.

27 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. I'm just going to put something to
28 you for your -- for your response. We have had the benefit of obtaining a Pictometry

1 report that forms part of the documents we have and that we can use. And as part of
2 that report, and just for the Commissioners' understanding and for Participants, it's
3 COMM Number 56422, and I'm referring to page 11. And the Pictometry analysis
4 shows that you can see Cobequid Court merging with the blueberry field road, and the
5 opinion, at least in this report, is that the images from Pictometry show that blueberry
6 field road is traversable by vehicle.

7 So my question to you is did you hear anyone talking about
8 blueberry field road in this manner via reference ---

9 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, I -- no, I did not.

10 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. So you heard nothing about what
11 I'm suggesting to you now on April 18th or 19th?

12 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, I did not.

13 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. Yeah.

14 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Mr. Bryson, sorry, could you just let
15 me know who is the author of that report? Could you just describe it a little. I don't think
16 I know it offhand.

17 And ---

18 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay.

19 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** --- I'm sorry, Staff Sergeant Carroll,
20 it's Commissioner Stanton speaking. I'm just asking a question about that.

21 And you said, sorry, COMM56422?

22 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yes. Page 11.

23 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Okay.

24 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** It's a commissioned -- MCC
25 commissioned report.

26 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Okay.

27 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Unfortunately, I do not know the author
28 offhand, but they compared Google Maps with Pictometry.

1 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Oh, it's the supplementary report of
2 the investigators.

3 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yes.

4 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** One of those.

5 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** That's it, yes.

6 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Oh, I'm sorry.

7 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah.

8 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Okay, I do know which one it is. I
9 just needed to be clear.

10 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah.

11 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Thank you. There's quite a few
12 reports, and I'm ---

13 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yes.

14 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** --- always trying to keep track of
15 them, so thank you.

16 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Staff Sergeant, I want to go back to the
17 hand drawn map that you were asked questions about earlier.

18 So if we could bring up Exhibit 1463, please.

19 Staff Sergeant, can you see the diagram?

20 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I can. It's very small on my computer,
21 but I can see some of it.

22 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. And we can certainly scroll
23 around. Perhaps we can scroll to the very bottom first, and we can see some -- see
24 some, it's the bottom left of our screen, well, I guess depending on which monitor you
25 look at. At the bottom of the screen there's some initials. Do you know whose initials
26 they are?

27 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I can't see them very well. I think
28 there's one set of my initials. I've seen this before.

1 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay.

2 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I believe -- I can't -- I can't make it out
3 on my computer.

4 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Perhaps we could ---

5 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I'm sorry. I think ---

6 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** --- just magnify that portion.

7 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Okay. Those are -- what I'm seeing
8 on the left side are not my initials.

9 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. What about on -- the initials on
10 that side?

11 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** That is my writing, I believe.

12 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. And I'm just looking -- and just --
13 and we can bring it back in focus, the whole document. I'm trying to get a better sense
14 of what exactly this hand drawn map was used for.

15 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** As I explained earlier, the hand drawn
16 map was -- that map was drawn by Sergeant Rob Lewis, and it just gives a
17 representation that we could use at the Command Post at our -- at our Command table,
18 just quickly depicting where the -- where the members were, where our containment
19 people were, where our checkpoints were at the -- at Five Houses Road, at Bay Shore,
20 and Portapique Beach Road, and Highway 2, and farther east.

21 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** So would this map be the best map in
22 terms of what reflects those issues you're discussing, the -- in terms of where members
23 were located?

24 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** It was just -- it was just -- it was just a
25 quick reference map saying, "Okay, who was at -- who was the checkpoint at
26 Bayshore?", and we could look quickly and say, "Okay, that was...", and in the early
27 stages the members that were there, I think it was Blinn, Dow, maybe somebody else. I
28 -- just a quick reference is what it was for.

1 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. And was this the one you used
2 throughout the night?

3 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** We -- as you can see there's some
4 black marks there that -- depict the members when they rotated, they changed off shift,
5 and some other members came in and replaced them.

6 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. Now, just in terms of this map
7 here, and I'm just wondering if this caused you any concern at the time, or perhaps you
8 didn't notice, but Brown Loop Road, for example, is not noted on this particular hand
9 drawn map.

10 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yeah, I knew Brown Loop, it's not
11 noted on that, but it does go -- and did not know that -- did not know that it went down to
12 the blueberry fields.

13 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. So you realised it when you were
14 working from this map that it did not contain Brown Loop?

15 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes.

16 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And that didn't cause you any concern?

17 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Well, from what I had seen prior to
18 back at the -- back at Bible detachment and Staff MacCallum, we were not making a
19 connection between Brown Loop and any egress points coming out of the area.

20 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. And in terms of some streets
21 have names, how did you decide which streets to name on this hand-drawn map; do
22 you recall?

23 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Sir, I don't know if I named them. I
24 think they were named by -- I think Sergeant Lewis is spelling that out, if I'm not
25 mistaken, and perhaps I picked the map up from before he completed it. I have no
26 recollection of that.

27 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. And so, for example, Cobequid
28 Court is not listed on this particular map. Were you aware of that at the time?

1 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** The map itself was not -- it was meant
2 for checkpoints, not the inner workings of Portapique Beach, Orchard Beach and the
3 other streets in there. It wasn't reflective of that.

4 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Madam Registrar, if we can switch now
5 to the next Exhibit 1462? This is the other map you made reference to that was used.

6 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes.

7 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. Thank you. So are you able to
8 distinguish for us when you used this map versus the hand-drawn map?

9 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I can't remember when that map
10 came into play. I know it was obviously -- I believe it was after the hand-drawn map at
11 some point in time during the evening. I don't know who printed it off, and I ended up
12 just taking the positions I had from the hand-drawn map and placed them with the
13 names to similar areas on this computer-generated map I'm going to call it.

14 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. And I see, for example, Constable
15 Colford's name is in the vicinity of Brown Loop, but she was actually stationed on
16 Portapique Beach Road. Is this just simply meant to indicate that she was near
17 Portapique Beach Road? Or what does ---

18 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes.

19 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** --- the Colford entry mean?

20 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** It's just that she was near -- vicinity of
21 Portapique Beach Road that -- I think they're almost visible one to the other, one end of
22 Brown Loop is anyway.

23 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And based on this map, you can see the
24 presence of Brown Loop, and -- but again, you didn't see that as an ingress/regress
25 point out of Portapique?

26 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, I didn't -- at that point in time, no.

27 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And you didn't turn your mind to
28 dispatching resources to contain Brown Loop; is that fair?

1 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** We didn't have the resources on
2 Brown Loop. There were other resources farther down -- farther east on Highway 2.

3 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And on this map, there are initials as well
4 and it's dated April 19th. Perhaps I can just ask you to -- I don't think you were asked
5 that on direct, but we can scroll down to the initials. Do you recognize those initials?

6 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yeah, those are mine, sorry, the ones
7 on the left are mine. I don't know whose the other ones are.

8 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. So while we're on this topic,
9 perhaps we can just bring up the transcript from Staff Sergeant Halliday.

10 Okay, Staff Sergeant, if you could just start reading where it says
11 "and I remember seeing this" and then we'll skip to the next page. You can just let me
12 know when you're done and then we'll scroll to the next page.

13 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Okay. I'm sorry. My eyes are not
14 quite that good to see a screen that small. I -- so, "and I remember seeing this, what
15 appeared to be a white line."

16 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yes. Yeah, keep going until you get to
17 the end of that page, and you can let me know when you're done.

18 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** It's not scrolling down for me.

19 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay.

20 And, again, you're reading Staff Sergeant Halliday's testimony at
21 this inquiry.

22 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Okay.

23 Okay.

24 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. We'll just keep scrolling.

25 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Okay.

26 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. We'll keep going once you're
27 done.

28 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Okay. Scroll down, please.

1 Okay.

2 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. We'll keep going.

3 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Okay.

4 Okay.

5 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Stop there for a moment. If I can just
6 have a moment in place, I just have to orient.

7 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Mr. Bryson's just conferring with
8 the Registrar, Staff Sergeant Carroll.

9 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Thank you.

10 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yes, thank you, Staff Sergeant. So,
11 basically, what we were looking at was that exchange with Commission Counsel about
12 Brown Loop and about perhaps having that contained. And the suggestion was that,
13 based on local knowledge, that it would not be necessary to contain that particular loop.
14 Do you recall any discussions about that in particular, about what you just read?

15 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, I don't recall hearing of a -- with
16 Staff Halliday talking about seeing a potential roadway there. I don't know what
17 timeframe you're referring to in that. We did move the checkpoint up closer to Brown
18 Loop. It was moved up. I can't remember what time it was, but they were very near
19 Brown Loop at the end of that, at some point in time in the evening. I don't know what
20 time that would have been.

21 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And ---

22 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** But I do not -- sorry.

23 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Sorry, finish your thought there.

24 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, I don't recall anybody asking to go
25 down Brown Loop or doing that.

26 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And the suggestion that based on local
27 knowledge that it was not necessary, were you considered the local knowledge as the
28 district commander?

1 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I don't know. With the local
2 knowledge that we were -- my knowledge of that area was with respect to what we
3 looked up on the Google Earth Maps and was showing what was there. And that's --
4 that was what Staff MacCallum and myself, in the early stages of Bible Hill Detachment,
5 to determine there was -- there -- in our mind, there was no egress point from that field -
6 - or onto Brown Loop from the blueberry field.

7 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** So you're aware of Brown Loop but you
8 just weren't aware of the blueberry field road? Is that fair?

9 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** That's correct.

10 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay.

11 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** That's fair.

12 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Now just in terms of the containment, I
13 just want to go to the next day for a moment. So you left around noon Portapique?

14 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Correct.

15 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And so in terms of scene containment,
16 what is supposed to happen after you depart? How does that work?

17 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Well, after -- it's a major crime, it's a
18 major scene, and it gets turned over to Major -- to MCU, Major Crimes Unit, and they
19 determine what -- how the scene is going to be processed and what's going to happen.
20 Members -- uniform members will be called in to maintain security of the scene. But all
21 the goings on is -- whatever transpires is in the realm of Major Crime and how they
22 conduct their investigations.

23 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** What makes it a major crime scene?

24 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** A major -- I think that's rather obvious.
25 It's -- we had multiple homicides in that area. It doesn't get anymore major than that, in
26 my mind.

27 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah.

28 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Major Crime, our Major Crime Unit we

1 have with the province, they basically, unless it's a -- the only crimes they take care of
2 are homicides, for the most part. There might be some other ones where they do get
3 tasked to do the investigation, but they're specifically tasked to do homicide
4 investigations, this being multiple homicide investigations.

5 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** So my question is, so what if some of the
6 residents didn't require Major Crime, they required emergency medical services, for
7 example? Was that thought attended to?

8 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I would say it wasn't. It wasn't at the
9 time. We -- everything was places where things had transpired, the houses were
10 burned, the structures were burned to the ground, with the exception of the Blair's and
11 the school teacher's house, everything else was burnt to the ground.

12 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** In addition to the other homes that were
13 in Portapique not burnt to the ground though; right? Because there's roughly 30 homes
14 or so in Portapique and there was only about ---

15 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes.

16 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** There was only about four or so
17 structures, four or five structures that weren't burnt?

18 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I wouldn't -- yes.

19 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah. So the other 25 structures were
20 not burned down?

21 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, they were not.

22 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah. And in terms of containing the
23 scene for Major Crime, so you've addressed that, but containing the area, is the
24 understanding that the entire area of Portapique is going to be locked down until Major
25 Crime can get in there?

26 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Just that confined area where we're
27 dealing with all the goings on, all the houses burned, and people that are murdered.

28 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. And at that time, you didn't know

1 the extent of the -- for example, you didn't know about the five people that were
2 deceased on Cobequid Court; right?

3 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No. No. No, we had no knowledge of
4 that.

5 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah. So in terms of the containment, it
6 would be at the head of Portapique Beach Road?

7 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** We had -- yes. We had vehicles
8 containing at Portapique Beach Road to prevent anybody from coming into the area.
9 And then there were, as I said before in previous Cst Lafferty was down at the -- across
10 from the Blair residence, where the two bodies were found on the ground on the
11 roadside. He was maintaining integrity of that location. And some other vehicles were
12 inside the perimeter just making sure there was nobody that had walked in from another
13 access point, or nobody was around.

14 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. So for example, if we have, and
15 we do have, some evidence, it hasn't been tested yet, but there's some evidence to
16 suggest that someone did in fact drive down Brown Loop and drove part way down
17 blueberry field road, it's in the COMM documents, and took a photograph. And again, it
18 hasn't been tested, it's been produced with a timestamp, but there hasn't been
19 opportunity to investigate it yet. But the suggestion is that somebody drove down at
20 roughly 2:00 o'clock on the 19th. So this would be after your departure. Would you
21 expect that Brown Loop would have been contained at roughly this time to prevent
22 people from being able to drive into Portapique on the 19th on the afternoon?

23 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** That I can't comment on.

24 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** What would your understanding be when
25 you left as to scene security for Portapique?

26 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Maintaining Portapique Beach Road
27 and the inner areas where the houses were burned and that location.

28 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. So before your departure, you

1 would have saw the blueberry field road with the gate that you saw that you testified to?

2 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes. Yes.

3 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. Did you go up blueberry field road
4 at that time?

5 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, I didn't.

6 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. Did you get out of your vehicle at
7 any point while within Portapique?

8 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** At the top of the road I was -- yes, I
9 would have been at the top of Portapique Beach Road. I was speaking with the other
10 people on scene. Sgt O'Brien and the other constables who were there.

11 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Did you get out of your vehicle at any
12 other point? Do you recall?

13 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Not that I recall.

14 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. And in terms of -- did you say --
15 did you spend time on Cobequid Court on the morning of April 19th?

16 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, I just ---

17 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Besides the gate that you had testified
18 about, did you spend ---

19 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Not that I -- no. The gate, I dove
20 down there, I think I drove down to the beach, and then I drove back.

21 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. Do you recall seeing any homes
22 on Cobequid Court?

23 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I have to remember. There was
24 obviously -- I believe you could see them from the intersection of Orchard Beach Road.
25 I think you could see them from there. I'm not sure.

26 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. So here's a concern of the Bond
27 family, I'm just going to put it to you, and then you can tell me if you have any evidence
28 to offer about it.

1 So we do have the GPS report now of Cst Dorrington driving down
2 to 46 Cobequid Court at 10:26 a.m. and staying for roughly 30 seconds. You recall Mr.
3 Burrill asking you questions about that?

4 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes, I do.

5 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. So we have Cst Dorrington at 46
6 Cobequid Court for roughly 30 seconds. So what the Bond family is aware of, and what
7 others are aware of is the fact that the door was slightly ajar because Mr. Bond was
8 deceased within the door, that the driveway is only about 30 feet long, and that the front
9 door is visible from the driveway so that if you're sitting in a car, looking at 46 Cobequid
10 Court for 30 seconds, you're -- you must be seeing -- and again, I'm not asking you to
11 testify as to what Dorrington saw, but if you're in the driveway, you're going to be able to
12 see the front door.

13 So do you have any evidence or any comment you can make about
14 Dorrington's brief stay at 46 Cobequid Court or?

15 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No. I just know he was circulating in
16 the area, driving around the roads. He was in Cobequid Road, he would have done
17 Portapique Beach Road. He would have driven by Orchard Beach Road. I'm sure if
18 you check all his GPS, is he covered all those areas.

19 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And after you left at lunch time, what was
20 your expectation as to when the entire area of Portapique would have been canvassed?

21 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I don't know if I had any expectation.
22 It was being turned over to Major Crime and I believe we were waiting for direction from
23 Major Crime of the time of, "Okay. What's next? Where do we go? What do you want -
24 - what do you want done?"

25 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. So again, Major Crime would be
26 attending to the known crime scenes; correct? They're not looking for new crime
27 scenes?

28 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** That is correct. Yes.

1 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** So there were no resources on April 19th
2 deployed to canvas the area then?

3 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, I know afterwards that, you're
4 probably leading up to that, is when Cpl MacDonald and I believe Cst Foster, when they
5 ended up going down and checking those residences.

6 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. But again, you had no
7 expectation as to time, or when, or if that would occur on the 19th in terms of
8 canvassing?

9 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No. No.

10 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay.

11 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** As I said, at that time, we're still
12 dealing with everything else that's going on and all the multiple scenes. And I guess
13 we're still trying to get our head around things. And maybe that would have come out in
14 a debriefing and a tasking during the afternoon, but I ended up getting spun off on the
15 SiRT investigation and I just branched off into that side of things.

16 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Did you have any subsequent
17 involvement or knowledge at the time of the eventual canvassing that occurred on
18 Cobequid Court that discovered the Bonds at 4:46 p.m. and then the Tucks at roughly
19 4:50 p.m.? Did you have any involvement?

20 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I had no involvement, but I was made
21 aware of it. Cpl MacDonald, who had come on shift to assist, he -- I know he ended up
22 being tasked with going down and he made those discoveries.

23 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. And final question on this, and
24 just to be clear, so to your knowledge, there was no canvassing of Cobequid Court or
25 other parts of Portapique prior to your departure at noon ---

26 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No.

27 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** --- on the 19th?

28 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, there wasn't.

1 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Now, I just want to ask you a few
2 questions about the perpetrator's cop car. Do you recall it being discussed, the fact that
3 the cop car had a push bar?

4 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No. I found that out after the fact.

5 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. Did you see the 7:27 a.m.
6 photograph from HRP that showed the image of the cop car; do you recall?

7 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I would have seen it at some time, but
8 I don't know when I saw that photograph.

9 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Do you recall anyone bringing a push bar
10 to your attention, either by what they heard on the comms channels, or in other ways ---

11 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No.

12 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** --- that morning?

13 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No.

14 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Did you see or were you aware of any
15 other cars on the road that day that had a push bar?

16 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I ---

17 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** RCMP cars.

18 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yeah. No, I realize -- I -- no, I don't
19 think, no. I know none of my cars in Bible Hill had them. I don't think any of the
20 Cumberland County cars had them either. So, no, I don't think so.

21 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** The other observation that's been noted
22 about the vehicle is the fact that it had a whip antenna. Is that a common accessory
23 with an RCMP car, to your knowledge?

24 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** It used to be in the past but now
25 everything's been -- the antennas are much smaller than they used to be.

26 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** When was the last ---

27 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Just -- sorry; go ahead.

28 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** When was the last time you saw a whip

1 antenna on an RCMP car?

2 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** It's got to be a long time.

3 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Just a couple questions on the Belmont
4 Fire Hall.

5 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Okay.

6 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** So you talked about what direction you
7 gave. I'm just wondering if there's policy for this type of false -- misfiring where you're
8 shooting? What is supposed to happen?

9 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Well, we investigate it. The weapons
10 -- the weapons -- the weapon gets seized, and we usually -- probably there's an
11 investigation done. Obviously, it's -- yeah, there's an investigation done on it. I'm not
12 so sure -- I'm sure there was policy of how -- step 1, step 2, step 3.

13 This wasn't a normal situation. We're not dealing with -- most
14 misfires or some other stuff will happen, different scenario. We've had misfires that are
15 at our range; we've had misfires in the detachment. And this one, like I said in the direct
16 this morning, I thought it was a member involving with ERT who were actively searching
17 for -- for Mr. Wortman. I had no knowledge it was at the fire hall until later on that
18 afternoon.

19 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Is that where you got the idea about the
20 camo? Was that just something you had imagined?

21 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, it's -- no, it's just very distinctly
22 that there -- everything's happening all at once. You've got the situation in Wentworth;
23 you have in Glenholme; you have in Debert; you have ERT scrambling out trying to get
24 involved in these people. Everything -- you have the radio communication going on.

25 And then all of a sudden, in the midst of all this, and the timeframe,
26 you hear, [sound effect] so in my mind, it registered, okay, there's somebody --
27 somebody mobile and somebody's out of the car. Cst. Brown, Cst. Melanson were
28 plainclothes, and somebody accidentally discharged a round. That was my take -- that

1 was my interpretation of it; that's the way I -- my assumption at the time. My
2 assumption was wrong.

3 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** But where did you get the idea that the
4 other -- that the victim was in camouflage, or camo?

5 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** ERT members are wearing camo.

6 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. So no-one had suggested to you

7 ---

8 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, nobody suggested it to me.

9 Sorry; it was just an assumption, because everything happening all at once, it got
10 jumbled up.

11 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah.

12 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** And that's the assumption I got.

13 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** So at what point -- just so I understand,
14 at what point is someone relieved of active duty? What type of incident is involved
15 when a member should be relieved of active duty -- from active duty?

16 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** It's possibly should have been in this
17 one; however, we're looking at -- we've got a mass murderer out there, and if I can have
18 capable bodies, they were functional -- actually, I didn't know the full parameters of what
19 happened at the fire hall. I didn't know it was a fire hall.

20 But any of the same decision, we had to stop this guy, and if these
21 two members were not injured, fit, capable, and if they could help stop this madman,
22 then, yeah, I'm going to let them go. I'm going to -- I didn't stop them down. And be
23 criticized for it? So be it if I am but that was my decision at the time, and I'll stick with it.

24 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah. Thank you.

25 And at the time you made that decision, were you aware of what
26 had occurred? You mentioned Wentworth. But just at roughly 9:52 at Glenholme
27 where Brown and Melanson also thought they saw the perpetrator, and on the comms
28 you can read, "Break, break, break. We've got eyes on a marked PC on the side of the

1 highway ahead of us.” And then they were disabused of that notion, stating that, “No,
2 it’s -- I think they said it’s MacDonald, I think. I might have the name wrong, but they
3 clarified that it’s not the perpetrator.

4 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes. I think -- I think I remember
5 hearing that.

6 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. And then afterwards were you
7 aware of the incident at 11:17 when Brown and Melanson had another encounter with
8 an HRP member. They didn’t know it was HRP at the time but on the transcript, we can
9 see:

10 “That person has a firearm in their hand. We’re gonna
11 take him down here.”

12 And then someone came on comms and said:

13 “That person is [an] HRP officer.”

14 Were you aware of that incident at 11:17 a.m.?

15 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Where did that take place? That was
16 in Truro, was it not, or...?

17 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** I forget -- yeah, I forget the exact location
18 now, it was around Truro.

19 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Well, “Take him down”; I think there
20 was some miscommunication of somebody -- there was something with a vehicle at one
21 of the grocery stores, one of the Sobeys or something. This member was walking
22 around with a firearm and Brown and Melanson are going to effect a takedown, stop the
23 person, police, that’s what I’m assuming a takedown they were doing.

24 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** “Takedown” means what? Take him
25 down?

26 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Take -- arrest.

27 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And, actually this one, I believe it
28 occurred about 100 metres before a checkpoint and the HRP officer was in an

1 unmarked vehicle on the side of the road near the checkpoint, and he may have had a
2 carbine out.

3 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I -- I can't comment on that.

4 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. So would that incident ---

5 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I don't know.

6 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah. At that point -- so you weren't
7 aware of that incident in real time, were you?

8 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I don't think so, while it was going on
9 there.

10 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah. So hearing these three incidents
11 put together, is this a situation where perhaps Brown and Melanson could have been
12 relived, no later than the third incident, from active duty?

13 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** They were performing -- they were
14 performing their duties. You could -- you could say yes; you could say no. We're still
15 looking at stopping this individual. If somebody's walking around with a weapon, yeah,
16 we've got to take care of that.

17 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. So that's the priority?

18 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Well, we have to -- you've got to -- I'm
19 losing something in the translation here. We're trying to stop a mass murderer, and
20 right now we don't know where he is. And somebody walking down the streets with a
21 weapon, you're going to effect a police takedown.

22 Justin Bourque in Moncton was walking around neighbourhoods
23 with a carbine. Yes, police were trying to take him down, and I would hope they would -
24 - I'd hope they would have done the same thing, which is basically what Brown and
25 Melanson were doing with this unidentified -- unidentified police officer, somebody that
26 they didn't know who he was. He wasn't identified as a police officer, and he's sitting
27 there with a carbine. So they were effecting -- they're doing their job. Sorry.

28 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. So had you been apprised of that

1 incident in real time, same decision, "Take a breath, carry on"; is that fair?

2 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** They had had this person identified.

3 Once he was identified as a police officer, business as usual.

4 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Thank you.

5 Do you know if Colchester, or any detachment, actually, in Nova
6 Scotia, has a threat assessment coordinator?

7 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Colchester doesn't.

8 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** What about ---

9 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I don't ---

10 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** --- Cumberland?

11 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I'm not -- no, we didn't in Cumberland.

12 I'm not -- no, I don't know. That's not a position that exists to my knowledge, sorry.

13 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah. And in terms of, do you recall any
14 briefing after the Mayerthorpe Inquiry and one of the recommendations that perhaps
15 detachments look at having a threat assessment coordinator?

16 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, I was -- in those years, I was not
17 involved in detachment policing.

18 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** When you were involved, do you recall
19 anyone briefing you on that Mayerthorpe Inquiry and its recommendations?

20 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No. No, I don't.

21 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Just a point of clarification perhaps you
22 can help me with. I'm trying to understand the difference between the CAD Activity Log
23 and the CAD Activity Log when it's sent over to PROS. Does that give you enough
24 information to be able to distinguish between the two and help me understand the
25 differences?

26 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yeah, I'm not the person to direct that
27 to because I -- I don't use CAD, and mostly that was the OPS NCO was taking care of
28 CAD and CIIDS and that type of stuff. I didn't have those programs on my computer.

1 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** That's all my questions. Thank you,
2 Commissioners.

3 Thank you, Staff Sergeant.

4 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Thank you.

5 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you, Mr. Bryson.
6 Ms. Ward?

7 **--- CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. LORI WARD:**

8 **MS. LORI WARD:** Good afternoon, Staff Sergeant Carroll. As you
9 know, my name is ---

10 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Good afternoon.

11 **MS. LORI WARD:** My name is Lori Ward, and I represent the
12 Attorney General of Canada, and I think I have only one question for you.

13 In your evidence this morning, I believe you said that you had
14 asked Jen MacCallum at the OCC to engage with Strategic Communications. Is that
15 correct?

16 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I didn't use the words "Strategic
17 Communications", I used the words "H Div Comms".

18 **MS. LORI WARD:** Okay.

19 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** And that's the common knowledge of
20 it. That's our email address. You email something, and H Div Comms, and they're the
21 ones that take care of it.

22 **MS. LORI WARD:** Thank you. And then Mr. Burrill asked if you
23 had followed up with Comms, and you said no you had not. And I'm just wondering,
24 when you spoke to Jen MacCallum about this and asked her to engage with Comms,
25 what was your expectation of what she would do?

26 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Jen is an excellent OCC operator,
27 she's a very competent individual, and I fully expected she would reach out to H Div
28 Comms, as per my request, and engage them in getting some messaging out via their

1 social media platforms or whatever they use.

2 **MS. LORI WARD:** And I guess in that situation, or in general,
3 when you task someone with something do you expect that you're going to need to
4 follow up in some way?

5 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Jen is a -- especially now with
6 Jennifer, she's a -- like I said, she's an excellent operator, and I have the utmost
7 confidence in her doing what was asked. And knowing the importance of it, I had no
8 doubt that she would reach out.

9 **MS. LORI WARD:** Thank you, that's my -- those are my questions.

10 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you, Ms. Ward.

11 Mr. Burrill?

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** That would be the extent of counsels'
13 questioning this afternoon.

14 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you, Mr. Burrill.

15 Commissioner Fitch?

16 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Thank you, Staff Sergeant Carroll. It's
17 Commission Fitch speaking now. I just have a few questions for you, and some of them
18 are forward-looking as we seek to find some solutions and recommendations, and then
19 there's a few questions I have just for clarification from your testimony today.

20 But first before I launch into my questions, for -- just to clarify for the
21 record, when you were making reference to blue-on-blue just recently in your follow up
22 with Mr. Bryson, you had also referred to it as an accidental discharge. And we'd like to
23 give you the opportunity to clarify the difference between blue-on-blue and an accidental
24 discharge.

25 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Sorry, that was -- yes. The blue-
26 on-blue was a shot was fired towards a police officer and it's a -- just uniform colour
27 blue. Accidental discharge was not the right terminology to use in that sense.

28 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay, thank you. Typically, the

1 response to a blue-on-blue situation would be different than an accidental discharge.

2 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes.

3 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Thank you. One of the questions that I
4 had from early on in your testimony today was with reference to the police car, and if
5 you could help us better understand when you may have first heard about a
6 decommissioned or an old police car being used and how you came to know that
7 information.

8 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** That would have come from
9 Staff Rehill when I was speaking with him, that at some point in time in the evening,
10 10:30, 11 o'clock in the Bible Hill detachment when he's referring to the -- I believe the
11 CIIDS that called it "Gabe's old police car". And there's a lot of the old decommissioned
12 police cars out there. They're used for multiple purposes, and I know in Amherst there's
13 a -- one guy, it's almost like security work he does with the old police cars, the old
14 decommissioned cars.

15 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Thank you. In reference to a question
16 that was asked about the advantage or disadvantage of having yourself and your fellow
17 staff sergeants at the Command Post you gave a number of advantages to that, but as
18 we listened to the testimony we know that there was considerable breakdown in
19 communication. So I'm just wondering in the Command Post, in the role that you were
20 taking on there, if you could explain to us what process was in place for facilitating the
21 sharing of Critical Incident information between yourself and the Critical Incident
22 Commander?

23 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** After the -- my initial meeting with Jeff
24 West, early after arriving at the Command Post, I don't know if I had any further contact
25 or much further contact with Jeff. Any information that was received I would be filtering
26 that up through Staff Halliday, who was meeting with -- who would pass it along to Jeff
27 West rather than having every -- everybody running to Jeff West, so the information that
28 would follow a path of where it needed to get to. There were different times when in the

1 Command Post we would, and I believe Staff West would be part of that as well, where
2 we'd just sit and do a quick brainstorming session, "Okay. Where are we at now? What
3 are the -- what's the latest? What's new? Where -- what's our next step?" I know
4 there's probably a number of times during the evening, in the course of the evening or
5 the early morning hours that I was involved in a brainstorming session with
6 Staff Halliday, with Staff Halliday, Staff MacCallum, and Staff West if he were out there
7 at the time.

8 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** So in addition to these brainstorming
9 sessions, presuming that there was a sharing of information there ---

10 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Oh, yeah.

11 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** --- was there any place in the Command
12 Post set up that you were all able to look at the latest incoming information?

13 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I think there were -- there were boards
14 set up on the wall, I think. In the negotiating world, we use basically flowcharts and tape
15 them to the wall and it's kind of a timeline of events that are happening. I am trying to
16 remember if I saw those up in the -- up in the Command Post, I can't recall.

17 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. There was a question posed to
18 you about technologies when you were talking about the benefits of being in the
19 Command Post because of dead zones with radio communications or cell phones. And
20 as District Commander, you would have a sense of the resources and assets that your
21 members would have access to in the field?

22 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** In what respect are you referring to,
23 ma'am?

24 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** So as District Commander, would you
25 have knowledge of the tools and technologies that are available to your members when
26 a Critical Incident Package is rolled out?

27 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I believe so. I'm just wondering -- I'm
28 not quite following up to ---

1 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay.

2 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** --- what we're ---

3 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** So I'll jump right to my question directly.

4 Do you know if the RCMP in Nova Scotia, or even nationally, ever make use of an
5 encrypted military grade satellite phone? Would they ever be part of a rollout package?

6 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** There was a while back where we all
7 were asked to procure satellite phones just in case there was some areas, and I don't
8 know whatever became of those satellite phones. I have never -- we've never used one
9 in Colchester County, and I think I purchased two for some other remote areas of -- I
10 think Parrsboro and down, down in that Bay of Fundy coastline because there's some
11 major dead zones down there. Were they used very much? No.

12 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. In your view, would that be
13 something that might be of benefit as part of the Critical Incident Package toolkit that
14 gets rolled out?

15 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I guess you'd have to look at that as
16 how many sat phones are we talking about, or you're not going to have enough for
17 every -- every member has a cell phone. There's -- is every member going to have a
18 satellite phone now as well? I ---

19 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. Thank you.

20 And I understand that either yourself or Staff Sergeant MacCallum,
21 I believe, was tasked with doing a follow up on a media release at one point?

22 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** It was -- it was not me. If it was Staff
23 MacCallum, I have no knowledge of that, no.

24 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** And it may have been Halliday. What
25 I'm wondering, and I'm just -- I'm thinking about Major Crime investigations, so I'm
26 flipping a little bit over to the Major Crime side, typically, the lead on a Major Crime
27 would be the one to have kind of final say on what gets released into the public realm,
28 so as to not to ---

1 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes.

2 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** --- compromise an investigation.

3 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes.

4 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** In the critical incident command
5 structure, would it not make sense that the critical incident commander would have that
6 same responsibility? And the reason I'm asking ---

7 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** It would.

8 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Yeah. The reason I'm asking that -- I'm
9 sorry, I cut you off -- was I'm just wondering why Staff Sergeant Halliday would have
10 been the person up the chain that you ran the request by to have a media release done
11 and why that wouldn't have gone directly to the critical incident commander.

12 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I guess it would have been better
13 placed with the critical incident commander. I was dealing directly with Staff Halliday as
14 my supervisor, as my direct report. I'm reporting to him. And I'm assuming that Staff
15 Halliday would speak to Staff West or -- in that triangle setting.

16 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. And during your brainstorming
17 sessions that you referred to during the course of the early morning hours, was the topic
18 of a media release discussed in that form?

19 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I don't think so because we -- the last
20 brainstorming session I can think of is we didn't have that information about the fully
21 marked police car going around. That came later after the last get-together I can think
22 of.

23 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. Thank you.

24 Back to the Portapique area and the canvassing, I would suggest
25 that there's a couple of different reasons that we would canvass a neighbourhood after
26 a major incident such as this and mass casualties, and one is to look for witnesses, and
27 one could be to check on the wellbeing of other people in the neighbourhood. Was
28 there consideration or discussion at any point that there is the possibility that

1 neighbours could have been hit with stray shots, not even as intended victims?

2 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, we -- I mean, a lot of people had
3 left the area over the night. People had made their own exit. And so I don't really know
4 how many people were left down there. There was -- there really wasn't any -- there
5 wasn't consideration given. Just never came to the -- never became a topic to explore.

6 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. Thank you. And this is the last
7 question that I have for you. Oftentimes, police will get phone calls for wellbeing checks
8 when people are concerned about family members or friends that they can't locate and
9 so forth. And we understand from the information that we've covered to date that there
10 were a number of phone calls that were coming in to OCC with family members
11 wondering about the wellbeing of their loved ones that lived in and around the area.
12 And I'm wondering if anybody was specifically assigned to those wellbeing checks and
13 following those up, or if anybody was assigned -- I'm sorry, sir -- or if anybody was
14 assigned to at least coordinating that?

15 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** They -- I don't recall ever getting any
16 advisory that these were coming in.

17 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Sorry, you cut out.

18 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** So I don't ---

19 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** You cut out.

20 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I don't know where -- oh, sorry about
21 that. I don't recall getting any advisory or any indication or any messaging from OCC
22 that these calls were coming in. I don't know what time of day that was or -- so I don't
23 know where they ended up.

24 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. And recognizing this was
25 anything but a typical situation, what would the typical procedure be if somebody were
26 to call in to ask the police for a wellbeing check if they're concerned about their safety
27 and ---

28 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** We make a patrol.

1 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Would you -- it would have a case or a
2 CAD number made up for that call for service?

3 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes, that would be -- yeah, there
4 definitely would be a -- there'd be a number made up, a file number.

5 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay.

6 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** A CAD entry and created into a PROS
7 file.

8 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. And then somebody would be
9 assigned to that task?

10 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yeah. Yeah, somebody would take
11 care of the tasking.

12 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** And there would either be a report or
13 not a report as a result of that?

14 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes, there would be.

15 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. Thank you very much, sir. I
16 really appreciate your candid answers, and I'll turn the floor over to Commissioner
17 MacDonald.

18 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Commissioner Stanton?

19 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Thank you, Ma'am.

20 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Thanks very much. Most of my
21 questions have been covered. I have one though that I'd like to go over with you. You
22 mentioned earlier the debrief with the IARD members at about 3:30, I think it was, in the
23 morning of April 19th.

24 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes, yes.

25 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** At the Command Post; correct?

26 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** That is correct.

27 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Okay. And do you recall who was
28 present for that debrief?

1 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Staff Halliday, Constable Beselt,
2 Constable Merchant, Constable Patton, and I think Constable Neil was there as well as
3 myself.

4 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Okay. Staff Sergeant West was not
5 there?

6 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No, Staff Sergeant West was not
7 there.

8 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Okay. And during that debrief, did
9 you understand -- what information did you understand about Andrew MacDonald being
10 shot by the perpetrator? Were you told about the car that the perpetrator was said to be
11 driving?

12 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No.

13 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** There was no information in that?

14 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** No information about what was being
15 driven. There was no mention of it being a fully marked vehicle at that time.

16 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Okay. And again, you became
17 aware that it was a fully marked vehicle at what point in this?

18 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** We became aware when Lisa
19 Banfield was -- came out of the woods with Leon Joudry, and she was brought back to
20 the Command Post by ambulance with Constable Brown and Constable Melanson.
21 Brown fed the information to Melanson, who gave me a quick information on it, and I
22 sent him up to see Halliday to pass that up the chain.

23 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Okay. And would you have
24 expected -- it sounds as though you would have expected that any information that was
25 provided to you and Halliday, Halliday would then have passed that to Staff Sergeant
26 West?

27 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** I have no doubt.

28 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** I see. Okay. So when you say up

1 the chain, you mean from you to Halliday, Halliday to West?

2 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Yes. Yes, yes. It would definitely flow
3 it up to where it had to go.

4 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Okay. Okay. Thank you.

5 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you, Staff Sergeant
6 Carroll. I have no questions for you, but I do want to thank you. This is very difficult
7 work we're engaged in and we very much appreciate your being here and assisting us
8 with our important work. It's not an easy day for you but we thank you.

9 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** Thank you, sir.

10 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Okay. I guess technologically,
11 we can turn it off. Thank you again, sir.

12 Mr. Burrill, I understand there will be some submissions from
13 counsel, so we'll take a 15-minute break.

14 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Thank you. The
15 proceedings are now on break and will resume in 15 minutes.

16 --- Upon breaking at 3:05 p.m.

17 --- Upon resuming at 3:25 p.m.

18 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Welcome back. The
19 proceedings are again in session.

20 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you.

21 Mr. VanWart?

22 **--- SUBMISSIONS BY MR. JAMIE VanWART:**

23 **MR. JAMIE VanWART:** Good afternoon. The next scheduled
24 feature of this afternoon's proceedings is submissions by Participants.

25 However, before we commence that part of the proceedings, I just
26 wanted to take this moment to address some outstanding exhibits that need to be
27 tendered. And I'll just start and I'll go through them, Commissioners.

28 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you.

1 **MR. JAMIE VanWART:** The first three are in relation to the
2 proceedings that occurred on the 3rd and 4th of May. This was with regards to the
3 Firearms Foundational Document and the subsequent evidence that followed.

4 There was an exhibit entered, and it's Exhibit 001124, which was a
5 report authored by Gary Mauser that was tendered by the Coalition of -- Canadian
6 Coalition for Firearms Rights and Canada's National Firearms Association. This was
7 done during their submissions.

8 There was a series of follow up questions that were drafted and
9 sent to the author of that report by Emma Cunliffe, who is the Director of Policy and
10 Research with the Mass Casualty Commission. And these questions were sent by an
11 email on April 29, 2022. And the author of the report, Dr. Mauser, provided a response
12 to these questions via email on the 30th of April 2022.

13 The email from Dr. Cunliffe is captured in COMM00573. I'd ask
14 that that be exhibited.

15 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** It's Exhibit 1625.

16 **--- EXHIBIT NUMBER 1625:**

17 (COMM00573) Email from Dr. Cunliffe

18 **MR. JAMIE VanWART:** And the -- I'm actually going to correct
19 myself. The -- it's backwards to logic, but that should be -- the email with the questions
20 is 0057374. That could be the exhibit that you just indicated, Madam Registrar.

21 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** One six two five (1625).

22 **MR. JAMIE VanWART:** And then the response from Dr. Mauser
23 was COMM0057373.

24 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** That's 1626.

25 **--- EXHIBIT NUMBER 1626:**

26 (COMM0057373) Email response from Dr. Mauser

27 **MR. JAMIE VanWART:** Thank you. And the next document
28 counsel is seeking to enter relates to Exhibit number 002109, which was a report

1 entitled "Mass Shootings and Masculinity". It was authored by Dr. Bridges and Dr.
2 Tober.

3 On May 6th, 2022, Dr. Cunliffe emailed the authors some follow up
4 questions and a response was provided by the authors on the same day. Both emails
5 are captured in COMM number 0058279. If that could be tendered as an exhibit?

6 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** That's 1627.

7 **--- EXHIBIT NUMBER 1627:**

8 (COMM0058279) May 6th, 2022 emails

9 **MR. JAMIE VanWART:** Thank you. The next exhibits all relate to
10 a series of roundtables that are scheduled for the 1st and 2nd of June 2022. They're four
11 roundtables on the topic of Critical Incident Decision Making and Preparedness.

12 Commission Counsel has provided a list of 291 documents to
13 Madam Registrar to be exhibited. The documents are all in relation to these four
14 roundtables. They consist mostly of academic articles and training manuals for the
15 RCMP.

16 I don't propose to read out each of the 291 documents. I will, I
17 think, highlight three, as there is -- in those 291 documents, there were three reports
18 that were commissioned by the Mass Casualty Commission. I'll just mention those
19 three.

20 COMM number 0058374 was an article entitled "Police and First
21 Responder Decision Making during Mass Casualty Events" by Bjørn Ivar Kruke.

22 COMM number 0058373 is an article entitled "Exercising
23 Judgement: Understanding Police Discretion in Canada" by Benjamin Goold.

24 And COMM number 0057772 is entitled "Critical Incident Decision
25 Making Challenges of Managing Unique and High Consequence Events" by Laurence
26 Alison and Neil Shortland.

27 I would ask, Madam Registrar, if the 291 documents could be
28 exhibited?

1 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** So exhibited.

2 **MR. JAMIE VanWART:** And I would just also emphasize that
3 these documents, once exhibited, will make their way to the Mass Casualty Commission
4 website for the public to be able to access.

5 That completes the housekeeping. If I could move on to
6 introducing the submissions from Participants.

7 As indicated in the opening remarks, the Commission will hear
8 submissions with regards to critical incident planning, preparedness response, and
9 decision making, and in relation to the Foundational Documents that were tendered
10 during the week of May 16th, which were the RCMP Emergency Response Team and
11 the RCMP Command Post, Operational Communication Centre and Command
12 Decisions FDs.

13 I anticipate we'll be hearing from at least three counsel, perhaps
14 four. We'll start with Mr. Tom MacDonald. I'll allow counsel to -- I'd suggest counsel
15 maybe introduce who they represent as they commence their submissions.

16 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you.

17 Mr. MacDonald?

18 **--- SUBMISSIONS BY MR. TOM MacDONALD:**

19 **MR. TOM MacDONALD:** Good afternoon, Commissioners. I'm
20 Thomas MacDonald. And as I've said before, I am the lawyer for Tara Long.

21 My comments will be brief. They will all relate to the RCMP
22 Command Post Foundational Document and they will be discreet comments in terms of
23 only certain issues by way of overview.

24 Really, they will be somewhat incomplete, because of course we
25 haven't heard from every witness with respect to that Foundational Document yet.
26 There are more coming, as we know, Monday and Tuesday. So they're tempered by
27 not having those witnesses' evidence before us yet, although we do have statements, of
28 course.

1 The real issue to start with, I think, is readiness and response, was
2 it adequate? Was it acceptable in terms of the RCMP's readiness and response to this
3 mass casualty incident in the first hours in Portapique and with respect to on the 18th of
4 April? Containment and those types of issues.

5 We've heard the phrase last week, this week, too many cooks in
6 the kitchen. I would submit that it's more now than just a phrase. Really, it is a
7 benchmark in terms of RCMP decision making. We would submit there were too many
8 cooks in the kitchen in those initial hours. Well intended, trying to do the best, but
9 outside the command structure. And I wanted to start, Registrar, if I could, please, and
10 so it's Exhibit P001461, which is the RCMP Command Post Operational
11 Communications Centre and Command Decisions. My version is 3.0, the exhibit, and
12 it's page 15, paragraph 31.

13 I'm not going to read all of it, but I want to highlight some of it, and I
14 will read that.

15 So it begins:

16 "When faced with a critical incident, the risk manager
17 'will immediately take command and control over the
18 situation, deploy resources and direct the response.'"

19 And then two lines down, it begins, "The Risk Manager", and I will
20 jump ahead:

21 "...maintains control of the critical incident until it ends
22 or the CIC...."

23 Who we know as the Critical Incident Commander:

24 "...takes over from them."

25 And what's important at the bottom of that paragraph, by the bullet
26 highlight, is H Division Risk Manager Program, and of course it gives the COMM
27 number, but what is also important, it references page 1. Page 1 of the Risk Manager
28 Manual Policy says very clearly who is in charge of the situation until the Critical

1 Incident Commander arrives on scene.

2 Now, from the evidence that we've heard, whether it's Staff
3 Sergeant Halliday or Staff Sergeant Carroll that we just heard from, we heard from Staff
4 Sergeant West, who we know was the Critical Incident Commander, and we know that
5 Staff Sergeant Rehill was the Risk Manager, the point being Staff Sergeant West was
6 very clear in saying he didn't have command until he arrived in Portapique at -- on the
7 19th at 1:19 a.m., and in that interim role, we had for the Risk Manager, Staff
8 Sergeant Rehill. But we also know, it would appear, that Staff Sergeant Carroll was
9 giving some direction, and perhaps also Staff Sergeant Halliday. Well intended, I am
10 sure, but outside the chain of command if you look at the policy.

11 The policy should have been Staff Sergeant Rehill, he was in
12 charge, he should have been giving the orders. I'm not saying he wasn't giving the
13 orders, but in some ways he may have been in a bit of an impossible situation.
14 Certainly, you had the District Commander issuing some orders, who would be higher
15 than Staff Sergeant Rehill I guess in the ultimate chain of command, but not for those
16 first hours, because the policy says it's Staff Sergeant Rehill. And so we don't know yet,
17 but was Staff Sergeant Rehill reluctant to override those directions and make it explicitly
18 clear, "I'm in charge of the situation"? "Why?" "Because the Risk Manager Policy says I
19 am until the Critical Incident Commander arrives."

20 So I think for the Commission an important issue is to ascertain
21 when you Commissioners make your findings of fact what was the chain of command
22 supposed to be and what was it actually in those first few hours . And if the chain of
23 command was broken in the sense that others got in, then I think it needs to be said,
24 "Yes, it was, and it shouldn't happen, and everybody should be very clear in these
25 critical incidents, the initial response before the Critical Incident Commander takes over,
26 that the Risk Manager is in charge." And that should be widely known through the
27 RCMP and should be, in my view, a recommendation, so in other words, say it should
28 be fixed if indeed it was broken that night. We would submit it was broken.

1 The other issue I think to look at, of course, is the RCMP debriefing
2 response, whether it was -- and there's different names for it. We've heard Staff
3 Sergeant Carroll I think use the term debriefing. Last week, I used the word lessons
4 learned. Whatever reviews the RCMP did respect to those early hours in Portapique on
5 the 18th of April, we should know what those debriefings were, what the results were in
6 detail so that if they identified, for example, a break in the chain of command by their
7 officers, then the Commission should know that and the public should know that.
8 Everybody, I accept, trying to do the best they could under difficult circumstances.

9 That brings me really to the next issue, and we've heard Staff
10 Sergeant West say last week, and others have said as well from the RCMP perspective,
11 and he's speaking for himself, I assume, because he's retired now, this was -- this mass
12 casualty was a one-of incident. How do you plan for the one-of incident? I accept what
13 he's saying, but I respectfully disagree. I disagree because we only need to look south
14 of the border at our neighbour, who unfortunately has a long and tragic history of mass
15 casualty events.

16 And so the point is there must have been resources available to the
17 RCMP over all of the years to plan for table top, is I think the term they use, a mass
18 casualty event, particularly in a rural area. This is the National Police Force. This is the
19 police force that is not only national, but it's the local police force for many of the rural
20 areas across this country, across this province. So it's not on the, necessarily, the local
21 response RCMP members ,but as a national force, in our submission, there should
22 have been more planning for a mass casualty event, especially in a rural area.
23 Especially in a rural area.

24 The next issue that I would like to address, really, are two
25 recommendations. One is -- goes back, clarify the chain of command so that in future
26 every RCMP officer should know if there's a situation what the chain of command is,
27 they should understand it, and they should follow it religiously until someone tells them
28 not to who is in authority over them.

1 And the last point is in my view there is a gap. We heard Staff
2 Sergeant West address some of it. And that gap is from the time it was declared on
3 April 18th a critical incident, so that Staff Halliday makes the call and Staff
4 Sergeant West gears up, there is this two-and-a-half hours where the Risk Manager,
5 Staff Rehill, is running the show, for lack of a better word, running the response. He's
6 the Response Manager in Portapique for those two-and-a-half hours until Rehill arrives,
7 sorry, West arrives and takes command at 1:19. Is it worth having someone from the
8 RCMP, a new position, label it whatever it needs to be labelled, especially where it's
9 happening in a rural area, so that the Risk Manager, if he was overwhelmed, he may
10 not have been, we'll find out I guess, has someone who he could turn to, or she, above
11 the chain of command, in other words, an alternate or a temporary or an ad hoc Critical
12 Incident Commander trained in critical incidents who can give some advice, if
13 necessary, in that gap period until the Critical Incident Commander actually arrives and
14 takes command.

15 So I see it as a gap, where if Staff Rehill is reaching out, who is he
16 reaching out to? My understanding would be if it was reaching out to Staff
17 Sergeant West, Staff Sergeant West would say, "I don't have command until I get there"
18 in effect. So to have someone, if necessary, on call who could be, call it a temporary
19 Critical Incident Commander, but someone the Risk Manager can turn to if necessary.

20 Those are comments, Commissioners. Thank you.

21 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you, Mr. MacDonald.

22 Ms. Lenehan?

23 **MS. JANE LENEHAN:** Thank you.

24 **--- SUBMISSIONS BY MS. JANE LENEHAN:**

25 **MS. JANE LENEHAN:** I represent the family of Gina Goulet.

26 Thank you for giving me this opportunity to speak about the two Foundational
27 Documents in Critical Incident Planning.

28 With respect, these are highly technical policing areas, and they're

1 not easy for the public and the Participants to digest and understand. As one reporter
2 commented a couple of weeks ago, "The 309-page Command Decision Foundational
3 Document is virtually impenetrable." Now, I'm not suggesting that the Commission
4 investigators and the Commission Counsel haven't done a good job in gathering and
5 putting this information together for us and presenting it. In fact, I think they've done an
6 excellent job, and they've done it in a very short timeframe.

7 Further, the RCMP witnesses that we've heard from last week and
8 this, as well as the two that we'll hear from next week, have been critical in helping us
9 understand what policing decisions were made on April 18 and 19, and why they were
10 made.

11 However, given the amount of material the Participants have been
12 provided with during the course of this Commission to review, last evening there were
13 58,441 documents uploaded onto Relativity. In the very short timeframe the
14 Commission has to do its work, we have about four months left by my count until our
15 final submissions are due and your final report is due a couple of weeks later, so, at this
16 point, I respectfully submit that all Participants need to work collaboratively and focus on
17 giving you, the Commissioners, our best work on what meaningful recommendations to
18 avoid a repeat of the April 18 and 19, 2020 tragedy could look like and should look like.
19 I don't have that for you today. But what I do have is a request that the Goulet family
20 believes would help the Participants do their job at this inquiry, and ideally, would start
21 to rebuild some of the trust and the confidence that's been lost between Nova Scotians
22 and the RCMP since April of 2020.

23 The Goulet family requests that the Commissioners direct, pursuant
24 to their authority under Section 4 of the *Federal Inquiries Act*, that the Federal
25 Department of Justice prepare an institutional report which answers the following
26 questions. One, we're now 2 years past the April 2020 mass casualty. What are the
27 lessons learned for the RCMP? Two, in response to the events of April 18 and 19,
28 2020, what changes have the RCMP already implemented? Three, when were those

1 changes implemented? Four, in response to the events of April 18 and 19, 2020, what
2 changes does the RCMP believe should be implemented but have not been
3 implemented due to financial or other barriers. And five, specifically, what are those
4 barriers?

5 We've received some answers about changes made since April
6 2020 throughout the process of this inquiry. We know, for instance, that the RCMP in
7 the province has signed a memorandum of understanding, so that the RCMP can now
8 send out alerts without the assistance of the province. And we learned from Staff
9 Sergeant Briers yesterday that a second risk manager can now be called in if the
10 situation warrants. But the Participants shouldn't have to be slowly putting together this
11 list of lessons learned by the RCMP for the mass casualty with respect that information
12 should have already been volunteered by the RCMP at this stage.

13 I wrote to my colleagues, Counsel for the Federal DOJ on May 3rd,
14 asking for answers to those questions. My letter was acknowledged, and I fully expect
15 that if Counsel for the DOJ had instructions to provide me with that information, I would
16 have it. So I submit that a clear direction from the Commissioners is necessary to get
17 this information and that the time for that direction is now.

18 I further would submit that this information is needed well in
19 advance of the week of July 25, when we're due to hear from senior RCMP witnesses,
20 including Commissioner Lucki. If we had answers to those questions, the Participants'
21 questions for these senior institutional witnesses would be more focussed and more
22 effective, and with respect, much more helpful to the Commissioners.

23 Those are my submissions. Thank you.

24 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you so much, Ms.
25 Lenehan.

26 Ms. Hupman?

27 **--- SUBMISSIONS BY MS. LINDA HUPMAN:**

28 **MS. LINDA HUPMAN:** Yes, thank you. Good afternoon,

1 Commissioners. For the record, I am Linda Hupman, and with my co-counsel Steve
2 Topshee and James Russell of Burcell MacDougall. We represent the family members
3 of Lillian Campbell and the Oliver Tuck family.

4 These submissions will be brief today. First of all, in respect of the
5 two Foundational Documents from last week, the -- in regards to the ERT team and the
6 RCMP Command Post, et cetera, we will be making -- in our submissions that are due I
7 think around the end of June on various -- on the Foundational Documents to date, we
8 will, at that time, address those documents and the others more thoroughly and with
9 some -- probably some -- also some thoughts towards recommendations. So today, I'm
10 just basically -- have a few comments with respect to the Command Post document.

11 First, I do want to express support for the comments just made by
12 my two colleagues, Mr. MacDonald, in respect of the areas he spoke to, and certainly,
13 second, Ms. Lenehan's request for that interim institutional report from the RCMP, which
14 I echo her thoughts that that would be an extremely beneficial approach to take at this
15 point in time.

16 So that being said, with respect to even the RCMP Command Post
17 document, as -- like Mr. MacDonald stated, we still have witnesses to hear from with
18 respect to that on various levels, so we're not making any detailed comments on that
19 today. We do want to raise a point for potential follow-up by Commission Counsel or
20 investigators, and that is in relation to the information in -- actually in the supplemental
21 investigative report on the movements in Portapique, which was talked about today,
22 which dealt with the placement of Constable Dorrington and Cobequid Court for a short
23 period of time that morning, which until that report came out had not really been known.
24 And we suggest that it would be -- he may have nothing more to add, but as Mr. Bryson
25 has indicated, the -- there were signs at the Bond residence of something having
26 happened. There was an open door and possibly damage to a door, possibly ability to
27 see Mr. Bond in the doorway. So we think it might be useful to follow up with Constable
28 Dorrington, whether it's supplemental questions to him by investigators to see if they

1 can touch base with him on that -- on any observations he had during his brief time
2 there on Cobequid Court. So we do think that that should be -- that we would make that
3 request as an additional bit of information.

4 Moving slightly off topic, but at the request of the representative of
5 our Oliver Tuck family for some comments to be made today, we want to refer to the
6 fact that we continue to be here this week and will be participating in the virtual sessions
7 next Monday and Tuesday, on instructions from our client, to participate to the greatest
8 extent possible, but our client did expressly ask that we ensure that the Commissioners
9 are aware that they are disappointed and disheartened with the result of the
10 accommodation decision which leads us to that virtual session next week. And in
11 particular, our client representative spoke of -- in addition to their disappointment with
12 this, but nonetheless instructing us to continue to appear on their behalf and to
13 participate, she wants to share, through us, her own experience, to the extent -- to the
14 fact that she and her family are and have been traumatized, that they suffered and
15 struggle daily, but nonetheless, they have to carry on. They have jobs to go to. They
16 have family to care for, but yet, they're missing their loved ones, and they no longer
17 have those people to reach out to. But she -- in her words, she says, "We have no
18 accommodation for that." So those -- I share those with you at her request. And those
19 are my comments today. Thank you.

20 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you very much, Ms.
21 Hupman.

22 Ms. Ward?

23 **MS. LORI WARD:** Thank you, Commissioner.

24 **--- SUBMISSIONS BY MS. LORI WARD:**

25 **MS. LORI WARD:** With respect to command decisions issues, it's
26 difficult to make submissions in advance of hearing significant evidence on the topic.
27 And as you know, we'll be hearing from other crucial command decision makers next
28 week, and there'll be further document and reports to come, but I want to speak

1 specifically to Ms. Lenehan's request for an institutional report and her letter of May 3rd.
2 The whole raison d'être of this inquiry is to figure out what happened, whether we can
3 improve things, and if so, how. And I can assure the Commissioners, Participants and
4 the public that those issues have been top of mind for the RCMP since day one.
5 Obviously, they're always striving to make improvements. It's a tragedy for everyone.
6 And if they can do things better and avoid such situations in the future, they surely want
7 to do so.

8 Counsel have acknowledged the tight timeframes we're dealing
9 with, and I think we can all acknowledge that everybody is trying their best to canvass
10 every possible area, disclose every possible document, invite every possible witness,
11 make every possible report to further these efforts.

12 The request for an institutional report, I would submit, would be
13 redundant at this point. As I said, that's the whole point of this exercise. And the RCMP
14 is not withholding any information on its efforts to improve things in future. And you'll be
15 hearing more about that from further witnesses to come.

16 With respect to Ms. Lenehan's letter of May 3rd, it was
17 acknowledged -- what's today -- today's the 26th of May, 23 days. With respect, I would
18 have to put it on the record that 23 days from the request for someone in the federal
19 government realm, you would understand why such a report, or letter, or whatever had
20 not yet been forthcoming. I can assure Ms. Lenehan ---

21 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** I don't think she -- sorry, I
22 apologize, Ms. Ward. I don't think Ms. Lenehan was asking for the report by now. I
23 think she was asking more an acknowledgement of the letter.

24 **MS. LORI WARD:** That's correct, and I didn't mean a report, but a
25 response. So I want to put it on the record that her letter has been taken seriously. The
26 RCMP is working on a response, but just in this timeline, with everything else that the
27 RCMP and the federal government are trying to do in furtherance of the inquiry, I
28 apologize for no response after the acknowledgement, but it's just not realistic for us to

1 have responded by now, but we will be doing so.

2 So those are my remarks on that, and I have nothing further on the
3 documents.

4 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you. Just one question, if
5 I may. You referred to many of the questions being raised on d'être of this inquiry,
6 granted that, but we are finding out about things the RCMP did on an *ad hoc* basis by
7 chance coming from witnesses like, yeah, there's now a second risk manager can be
8 brought in. There's a memorandum vis-à-vis the alert. And wouldn't it be -- and I take
9 your point on the time crunch, but on the merits of it, as opposed to waiting for us to do
10 it, I mean, isn't our job made much -- so much more efficient if we know what's -- like,
11 why would we be musing about potential recommendations that are already
12 implemented?

13 **MS. LORI WARD:** And I can assure you, we will be making a
14 response. So I take your point about ad hoc information coming out. I think when
15 you're hearing from some of the senior management, and in advance of that, there will
16 be interviews of those people, so there will be more information on the record to come.
17 It's just those witnesses have not yet been interviewed, and we will be making a
18 response, which will be shared with the Commission and all Participants.

19 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you so much.

20 **MS. LORI WARD:** Thank you.

21 **MR. JAMIE VanWART:** Commissioners, that does conclude the
22 submissions from Participant Counsel.

23 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you, Mr. VanWart.

24 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Thanks so much to Participants for
25 your submissions today. We will consider them carefully as we do, and they are
26 appreciated. It's helpful to hear, as we're going along, the kinds of things that are
27 occurring to you and helps us to think ahead as well. So we do appreciate it. We have
28 thanked Staff Sergeant Al Carroll, but we did appreciate hearing from him today, and

1 hearing him answer some of the questions that people have. And we thank all of you
2 who've taken part in the process.

3 We know the public is watching both in person and remotely, and
4 engaging with the information and the 57,000 plus documents that we know are in play,
5 although of course not all exhibited, and that is a big process to review those in order to
6 find the ones that do need to be on the public record for people to -- to help people
7 understand what happened, and how and why it happened. The whole point of this, of
8 course, being that we want to be able to make meaningful recommendations to help
9 protect Canadians and make safer communities in the future, if we can.

10 Once our work is complete and our final report is shared, it will be
11 up to all Canadians, including policy makers and public institutions, community groups
12 and members of the public to take the recommendations and turn them into action
13 across the country.

14 We've heard from a number of individuals and organizations across
15 Canada who've shared their input and recommendations for the Commission to
16 consider when making our final report. If you have research or recommendations
17 related to our mandate that you want to share as members of the public, please do so.
18 We want to hear your ideas and we're accepting submissions on our website. Thanks
19 to those who've taken part so far. And remember, as we go along, if you hear
20 something else that makes you realize you have more to contribute, you can make
21 more than one submission. With the help of the public and witnesses and Participants,
22 we do continue to make progress on understanding what happened on April 18th and
23 19th, as well as why and how it happened.

24 We've now heard from another senior RCMP officer as a witness,
25 adding to over 215 witnesses we've spoken to in the investigation to date. In the weeks
26 ahead, we'll continue to share more Foundational Documents and to hear from RCMP,
27 civilian and institutional witnesses to explore how and why things happened as they did.

28 As you heard today from Mr. VanWart, we have more

1 commissioned reports ahead, round tables as well, and the first small group sessions to
2 come. Public proceedings will resume next week. Thank you so much.

3 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Thank you. The
4 proceedings are adjourned until Monday, May the 30th, 2022, at 9:30 a.m.
5 --- Upon adjourning at 4:03 p.m.

6

7

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

8

9 I, Sandrine Marineau-Lupien, a certified court reporter, hereby certify the foregoing
10 pages to be an accurate transcription of my notes/records to the best of my skill and
11 ability, and I so swear.

12

13 Je, Sandrine Marineau-Lupien, une sténographe officiel, certifie que les pages ci-hautes
14 sont une transcription conforme de mes notes/enregistrements au meilleur de mes
15 capacités, et je le jure.

16

17

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'S. Marineau-Lupien', is written over a horizontal line.

18

Sandrine Marineau-Lupien

19

20

21