

Public Hearing

Audience publique

Commissioners / Commissaires

The Honourable / L'honorable J. Michael MacDonald,
Chair / Président

Leanne J. Fitch (Ret. Police Chief, M.O.M)

Dr. Kim Stanton

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Mr. Roger Burrill

Commission Counsel /
Conseiller de la commission

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Halifax, Nova Scotia

1
2 --- Upon commencing on Monday, May 30th, 2022, at 9:36 a.m.

3 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Hello, et bonjour. Today, we
4 thank you for following the work of the Commission.

5 We have been hearing from senior RCMP officers this month,
6 whose testimony has provided further context regarding command decisions made
7 during the mass casualty. Hearing from these witnesses and others builds on the
8 information we have been gathering to date and shared publicly through our
9 proceedings since February.

10 A request for accommodation was made on behalf of today's
11 witness, Staff Sergeant Brian Rehill. As we explained in our May 24th decision, we
12 have directed that the testimony we hear today will be recorded rather than webcast in
13 order to remove the time pressure of a live proceeding, with the aim of obtaining the
14 best information possible in the circumstances. The video will be posted on our website
15 for the public as soon as possible.

16 Participants were invited to submit questions in advance. As well,
17 we will have two breaks to caucus where Participants' Counsel will meet with
18 Commission Counsel to identify additional questions to be put forward before today's
19 testimony is complete.

20 In a moment, we will hear from Staff Sergeant Rehill, who served
21 as Risk Manager during the mass casualty.

22 Media are reminded that there is an embargo on today's
23 proceedings. That embargo will be lifted as soon as our session with this witness is
24 complete. To assist the media, we will make it clear when questioning has concluded
25 and the embargo is lifted.

26 I will now ask Commission Counsel, Roger Burrill, to proceed.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Thank you, Chief Commissioner. I
28 propose to call Staff Sergeant Brian Rehill to the stand to discuss matters.

1 Madam Registrar, Staff Sergeant Rehill has expressed a
2 willingness to be sworn on the Bible.

3 Would you stand, please, Staff Sergeant Rehill?

4 **--- S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL, Sworn:**

5 **--- EXAMINATION IN-CHIEF BY MR. ROGER BURRILL:**

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So I should have made this clear before,
7 but Rehill is spelled R-E-H-I-L-L; am I correct?

8 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And we pronounce it Ree-hill not
10 Ray-hill; am I correct?

11 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Correct, yeah.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Very good. Thank you. Staff Sergeant,
13 there will be a number of questions that are asked of you today throughout the day with
14 the use of the Foundational Documents or a number of Foundational Documents as a
15 guidepost that I will be referring to. If you need some breaks, or you need some time,
16 ask me, and they will be accommodated. The idea is to get as much pertinent
17 information to the Commissioners and to Nova Scotians and Canadians as we can
18 under the circumstances.

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Sure.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Do you understand that?

21 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Certainly, yeah.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay, very good. Then what I will do,
23 then, is proceed in the normal fashion and review your background for purposes of
24 establishing your situation as of April 18th, 19th, 2020. I understand that on
25 March 12th, 1990, you joined the RCMP.

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes, I did. That's true, yeah.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And you graduated Depo November of
28 1990?

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** That's true, yeah.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** 1990, you were posted to the rural
3 Newfoundland detachment of Roddickton on the Northern Peninsula; am I correct?

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes, that's correct, yeah.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And you were there until a transfer to
6 Cornerbrook in western Newfoundland in the Highway Patrol Division in March of 1992;
7 correct?

8 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Am I right to say that you were there until
10 1995, when you were actually reposted back to the Roddickton detachment in general
11 duty services?

12 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes, that's true, yeah.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And you were there until May of, excuse
14 me, until 1998; am I right there?

15 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Correct, yeah.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I understand that during this time, you
17 completed something called the PAPSIC course, or the Police and Public Safety
18 Instructional Course; is that correct?

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes, I did, just at the very tail end of my
20 posting in '98.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And we'll talk a little bit more about
22 that. I understand that in 1999, you completed the Basic Firearms Instructor course; is
23 that correct?

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Correct.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. So 1998 to 2000, I understand
26 that you were engaged at the Happy Valley-Goose Bay ---

27 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- Labrador detachment in general duty --

1 -

2 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- obligations. Okay.

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And June of 2000 to 2002, you worked in
6 the General Investigative Section in Happy Valley-Goose Bay; is that correct?

7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Correct, yeah.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And in July of 2002, you were transferred
9 to the Antigonish detachment or district in Nova Scotia?

10 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And I understand in October, perhaps
12 November of 2002, you were promoted to corporal; am I right?

13 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. 2003, you engaged in and
15 completed the Conductive Energy Weapon Taser Instructor course?

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Am I correct that when you were
18 promoted to corporal you transferred then to the Port Hawkesbury Traffic Service Unit --

19 -

20 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- is that right?

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** That's correct, yeah.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And in 2007, Staff Sergeant, you were
24 promoted to sergeant and became the Operations NCO at the Inverness District; is that
25 correct?

26 **S/SGT. ALLAN CARROLL:** That's correct, yes. Yeah.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** You maintained your general placement
28 out of Port Hawkesbury at that time?

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah. Yes, I worked out of Port
2 Hawkesbury.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And had a responsibility for a number of
4 rural detachments in western Cape Breton?

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. August 2009 to 2015, you became
7 the Operations NCO at the Antigonish District; is that correct?

8 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** That's correct, yeah.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** January 2016, you took on the role as
10 Case Manager or File Case Manager Reviewer for Southwest Nova Scotia District; is
11 that right?

12 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes, that's correct.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. And then, am I correct to say in
14 October of 2018, you were promoted to Staff Sergeant?

15 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And at that time, you also became a Risk
17 Manager at the OCC in Truro; is that right?

18 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** That's correct, yeah.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. I understand that you have been,
20 since September of 2020, off duty/sick on that designation; is that correct, Staff
21 Sergeant?

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** That's correct, yeah.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And that remains the situation to
24 this day?

25 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Tell me, am I correct to say that on
27 April 18th, 2020, you were the Risk Manager on duty at the outset of this mass casualty
28 event?

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Is that right?

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Very good. I want to talk to you
5 about your training situation for purposes of establishing what PAPSIC is.

6 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** That's a term I've heard relatively
8 regularly in exposure to these materials. Can you explain for us what the PAPSIC
9 course is, what it does, what it -- skills it provides to a person who partakes in it?

10 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right. What a PAPSIC is an acronym for
11 Police and Public Safety Instructor Course, but after that, like, I guess you would drop
12 the "C", so you're just a Police and Public Safety Instructor. It was 21 days in Regina,
13 back where I trained initially. It was a long, gruelling course. It's 21 days, and it's
14 weekends as well, and you're working in the evenings, that sort of thing.

15 You become an instructor in many capacities. Like, you become
16 instructor in refreshing the members in their Operational Skills Maintenance, it was
17 called OSM. There's lots of acronyms. Yeah, there's an echo going on.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. Excuse me just a moment.

19 Any chance of that echo being eliminated for us so that we can
20 hear each other properly?

21 **UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE SPEAKER:** Sure.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Thank you.

23 We're just going to look after that, Staff Sergeant because ---

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- we want to -- I want to make sure I
26 hear you properly. Okay, let's continue on, see if they can rectify it as we go.

27 The PAPSIC course, continue on. You were ---

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

2 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** While we were there, we learned a
3 number of different capacities. Like, for instance, we had four different stations. Like,
4 one was called Vehicle Stops. So we would be trained to conduct a proper vehicle stop.
5 So we would do what they call a User Course initially, then they do the instructors
6 component to it before you return. So that was just training on stopping vehicles,
7 approaching safely, you know, reading threat cues, that sort of thing, and dealing with a
8 vehicle stop as safely as you can, and then in turn, when you go back, teaching the
9 same thing to the officers.

10 There was another station that was -- it's called FATS, Firearms,
11 Simulation Training System. We would walk in the room similar to this with a big screen
12 and there'd be -- there'd be a live scenario on there for you. And you had an interactive
13 gun that you wore and that sort of thing that you could shoot at the screen if need be
14 and it would, you know, tell if you had a, you know, a fatal wound, or -- you know, it
15 would -- it would interact with you if you shot the person, like they would go down type
16 of thing. It's like a movie in front of you.

17 We also did Officer Violator Contact, so calls to a home; like, for
18 instance, the domestic dispute, they'd be given a -- we'd be given a scenario, you'd go
19 into that, and you would have instructors watching you and then you would deal with it
20 the best you could, as safe -- it was all about officer safety techniques; looking for threat
21 cues, how to deal with them, how to communicate with people, that sort of thing.

22 We returned to our postings after 21 days. I was actually on the
23 transfer list for Goose Bay at that time. So they called me -- the course was actually for
24 Goose Bay, although I was still stationed to move on to Newfoundland. I was coming
25 there as a new -- as a new member being transferred in, and they wanted someone
26 that's going to have some longevity there, so they asked me to go, and I did. And then
27 -- so when I arrived in Goose Bay, I was the instructor for that area. But we used to
28 hold courses. We started holding courses in headquarters after a while. We developed

1 a syllabus, like a five-day syllabus, and a whole crew of us, and we started running
2 courses in St. John's, Newfoundland, in headquarters.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Great. Thank you. That gives me a good
4 sense of the PAPSIC courses.

5 That was in 1998 when you took that, sometime ago.

6 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** To the best of your knowledge, does that
8 course still remain operational, the PAPSIC course?

9 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I believe it does, yes, but it's evolved a lot
10 and morphed into different things. Like, for instance, later on there was Immediate
11 Action Rapid Deployment courses instructor. I didn't go to that; I was held back for
12 operational reasons. They incorporate that now, I believe, in with the course. So
13 they've kind of curtailed different things and, you know, took more in. Like, I believe
14 they do do an IARD instructor's course while they're there now so you can get it all. I
15 don't know if taser is incorporated with it now for CEW as instructor.

16 The course you mentioned earlier that I took, the CEW course, I
17 took it at as an instructor capacity, too, yeah.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** So -- yeah.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** You've anticipated my question.

21 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I was going to ask you about the IARD
23 portion, ---

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- the Immediate Action Rapid
26 Deployment.

27 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Was that part of the training in 1998?

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** No.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** No.

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** No.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And there has been -- since that PAPSIC
5 course, there has been the incorporation or the -- how shall I say, the initiation of the
6 IARD training course within the service.

7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Is that right?

9 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I believe it's another week on the tail-end
10 of it. You stay behind and become an IARD instructor as well. There are a number of
11 days, yeah.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So can you tell us, then, about our
13 IARD instruction? Have you taken the IARD course?

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I've taken the user course.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yes.

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** But not -- there's online courses
17 prerequisite to the IARD, and then you go out on the IARD course, and -- but I didn't
18 become an instructor ---

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So tell me just for ---

20 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- in that capacity.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So tell me, just for purposes of familiarity,
22 the difference between the user course and the instructor course is...?

23 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, the instructor course, you're fanning
24 it out to the members, and like the use of force course is like the members come one
25 every three years to get their operational skills maintenance updated. They do the
26 IARD refreshers and that sort of thing, where there is instructors. So I go in there, like,
27 twice a year as a part-time instructor. They have a cadre of fulltime instructors there at
28 Cutler Avenue there now in Dartmouth. So they do the bulk of it, and we go in and we

1 help out here and there.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So just for my understanding, you
3 have the user course with the IARD training.

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** But not the instructor course.

6 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah, I'm not an instructor for IARD, no.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Very good. Do you know of any
8 designation entitled, Initial Critical Incident Response Programming? Do you know
9 anything about that?

10 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, yeah, that's a course that -- you
11 know that's offered by the RCMP. Some NCOs, non-commissioned officers like
12 corporals, sergeants, go on it, staff sergeants, to take that course. And to become a
13 Critical Incident Commander that's a prerequisite for that, so you have to take that
14 before you could even go on the Critical Incident Commander's course.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And can you tell us, then, about
16 your exposure or involvement with the initial Critical Incident Response programme?

17 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes. I went on a course in Debert, and I
18 believe it was quite some time ago, around 2000 -- it may be 2000 -- as early as 2011,
19 and that's just a course similar to the Critical Incident Commander, maybe on a more
20 watered-down version of it. Like, holding -- you know, running an event until the Critical
21 Incident Command Post is up and running and everybody's ready to go so you can turn
22 it over to that person. So it involves, you know, analyzing the scene, the containment,
23 maybe a negotiator might be involved early in the process if somebody's armed and
24 barricaded in a house and they're willing to talk to you by phone, that kind of thing.

25 So it's really a person who's doing the prep work and maintaining
26 running that scene as well as they can until the Critical Incident Command takes over.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So you indicated that that course was in
28 January of 2011?

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I think it was around 2011 and then I did
2 some online stuff too, as well.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. Is there recertification or refreshing
4 obligations that a person would have with respect to that?

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Not to that course, I believe, no.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** No.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** You are familiar, of course, with the
9 Codiac, Moncton shooting incident in June of 2014.

10 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes, I am.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. You would have been in the
12 service at that time and would have been aware of what was going on at that time.

13 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I remember it well, yeah.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yes, I'm sure. Can you tell us, please,
15 whether you yourself have been exposed to any specific training or programme that
16 evolved as a result of the response to the Codiac incident?

17 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes. Initially IARD was created, or born,
18 as a result of the Columbine situation. We all trained in IARD, Immediate Action Rapid
19 Deployment, and it was primarily for buildings; like, to enter a school, a corporate
20 building, a post office, you name it; like, any kind of a building where maybe an active
21 shooter entered. So that IARD training is to, the best you can, locate and stop the
22 threat.

23 Once Moncton happened, we had to modify or, I guess, react to
24 that scenario, that situation. They created what's called an outdoor IARD. So that's
25 also at -- I took that training at 89 Cutler in Dartmouth at the training facility.

26 So it's more so -- it's different from what -- I guess you'd call the
27 indoor IARD in the sense that in the indoor IARD we're moving, you know,
28 systematically together down the hallway in a team. You have, like, the point, a team

1 leader, an active team leader, and what we call a rearguard moving down a hall to
2 locate and stop the threat. The outdoor IARD we may have different -- maybe different
3 tactics in that, for instance, one's called loose file. Like, the members aren't together
4 right as if you were going down a hallway in a restricted space, they're moving one
5 behind the other but they're swaying back and forth, sort of thing, weaving, so to
6 prevent blue on blue; like, you don't want to have your firearm up and have your partner
7 pass in front of you. So they've moving like this, and if somebody does pass, they drop
8 the firearm down and that kind of thing. And you're moving fast and as quickly as you
9 can to try to find where's this threat. If you're outdoors, if you're in a neighbourhood or
10 an urban environment, you've got to try to locate that threat and stop that threat. So
11 that was really an adaptation that -- as a result of Moncton.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And that was done through the
13 auspices of H-Division, was it?

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Any national training that you
18 would have been familiar with as a response of Moncton that you would have engaged
19 in or become familiar with?

20 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Not for me, no.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** No.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I want to ask you additionally about that,
24 in terms of whether you can comment on any additional supervisory training that you
25 would have had in terms of critical incident response as a result of the Codiac incident.

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, with respect to supervisory, more
27 tactical, I guess, at 89 Cutler, the training we just spoke of, as a Risk Manager, I never
28 had a specific course on that, like, on Moncton itself, other than what we'd learned in

1 the IARD -- the outdoor IARD training.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. I understand that with the IARD
3 training that you actually played some active role in the scenario engagement and so
4 on?

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes. At the facility in Dartmouth, we run
6 a Monday to Friday course, and we incorporate everything into that, you know, the
7 operational skills maintenance refresher, we start with -- control, the baton, the OC
8 spray. And then later on in the week we get into the IARD, the IARD recert --
9 recertification.

10 We run scenarios where a team will have to -- they're given a
11 scenario, it's read to them, and then they have instructors overseeing them, behind
12 them as they move to where the threat is and locate and isolate that threat and deal
13 with the threat, whether it's using lethal force or the so-called actor or bad guy
14 surrenders based on how the members are conducting themselves, that sort of thing.

15 So I was -- in that case where I'm not an instructor but I do have the
16 background in PAPSIC and taser and basic firearms instructor, they would use me a lot
17 as the bad guy, as the actor, so to speak. So I'd be -- me and maybe one other,
18 sometimes there's two shooters in those scenarios. So I would have to be somewhere
19 in the building and then there's activity and they move in, locate me, and in most cases
20 they shoot me with the simulated guns that they have.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. How often would you have been
22 engaged in that role or that scenario role playing?

23 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** A couple times a year, probably.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

25 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Because we had a rotation where we
26 went in twice a year if you were a part-time instructor.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So you took on this special role as the
2 bad guy.

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes. And it was usually a lot of pain
4 involved in it.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I understand.

6 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Like, the rounds didn't -- they hurt a lot.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. With respect to the supervisory
8 training with that aspect of the IARD involvement, can you make any comment? And I
9 may be reviewing what I said earlier, but I got the sense that you're acting as a bad guy.
10 What about supervisory training for people to assist in that regard?

11 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, just the initial Critical Incident
12 Response Course that I had before.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** But I don't know -- I can't recall any
15 supervisory official training I took with respect to overseeing IARD. I used to oversee,
16 you know, the different reporting and that sort of thing. It's called the SBOR ---

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

18 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- Subject Behavior/Officer Response,
19 kind of thing. I'd oversee those in my district, review them, and send them on to
20 headquarters.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah, okay. I just want to move on then
22 to your training with respect to your Risk Manager role.

23 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Is there something called the Risk
25 Manager Course? The Risk Manager Instructor Course? Or Risk Manager Scenarios?
26 Anything of that nature?

27 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** There wasn't at that time when I was
28 there.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

2 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Do you know whether that's changed? Or
4 can you comment on that?

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I don't know if ---

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right.

7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- it's changed yet or not.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. Well that's -- it would be unfair
9 for me to ask you anything further. But tell me about the training, specialized training,
10 that you would get in terms of becoming a Risk Manager?

11 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well we have to have some familiarity, for
12 sure, with the system they call CIIDS, Computer Integrated ---

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- Dispatch System.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And the CAD and that sort of thing. But I
17 started as a Risk Manager back earlier in my career when I was still a sergeant in
18 Antigonish. They were developing a cadre of part-time Risk Managers, or alternate
19 Risk Managers, as we called them, so that if they had a sick call at the last minute, or
20 they had, you know, a member on leave and somebody took sick, if they ever had a
21 shortage where they needed someone, we could come in and fill in.

22 So at that time, I received training in the computer systems that
23 they have there, in a board room over there.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. I get a sense now that as things
25 develop, we have the IARD training, we have the Critical Incidence Response Training,

26 ---

27 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- we have supervisor and front-line

1 training for those situations.

2 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Is there any similar training that would be
4 required to be a Risk Manager?

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, like a Risk Manager course per say
6 that developed in, like, a four- or five-day syllabus would certainly be helpful in the
7 future that, you know, it's maybe a prerequisite to even apply for the position.

8 But at that time, you know, we relied a lot on our experience over
9 the years, like as District Commanders and operations NCOs. I mean, we've had lots of
10 serious incidents where we've had to be in that role, manage resources, where you're
11 sending them, where you've got to set up containment. That kind of thing. So you rely
12 a lot on your training ---

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Sure.

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- and experience over the years.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** With just finishing the area of questioning
16 here, would you ever, in your training experience, ever had the opportunity to practice
17 the role of a Commander, or a Critical Incident Commander, during an active shooter
18 situation before April 18th, 2020?

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well it may not be particularly an active
20 shooter, but an Initial Critical Incident Response Course. Yeah, there was a scenario
21 and they would rotate us through the scenario. Like, I may do a certain portion of it, and
22 if they were satisfied with what I did, they'd tell me to step down and another sergeant
23 may step in and take the scenario from there, that sort of thing; right?

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Finally then as a Risk Manager, would
25 you ever practice the role of commander during an active shooting incident?

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I didn't at my point. I was there October
27 2018. So I was there about two years. But, like, we didn't have -- I wasn't involved in a
28 tabletop exercise or anything of that effect.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Very good. You initiated some comment
2 in an area I was going to go to with respect to training of a Risk Manager, in particular,
3 the CIIDS system. Are you able to comment on that? What training you would get and
4 what -- how ---

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- important that is to the role of a Risk
7 Manager?

8 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah, well years ago, actually, when I
9 was in Goose Bay, Labrador, I received some CIIDS training.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

11 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And at night before, like especially a night
12 shift, before we went home, we'd go back through all the calls. A lot of the times I was
13 delegated to tell one officer, "You take this call," "You take that call." But in 2014, that's
14 when I had that training at telecoms. I learned a fair bit about CIIDS. But again, if you
15 don't use it every day, it's one of those things, you know, it can -- you can get -- you can
16 lose the -- you get rusty, so to speak, I guess is the right way to say it.

17 So when I went back in there, yes, I mean, S/Sgt Affleck was there
18 at the time and he sat with me, went through a lot of things. My counterpart Bruce
19 Briers, you know, when we did our changeover, you know, may be something I'd ask
20 him about, about certain -- you know, had to do a certain thing. I relied heavily on the
21 dispatchers and the call takers, because they're so good at it, they're so well trained
22 and they're so fluid in what they do. So they do a lot of that. And a lot of it is sent to me
23 by message, or they'll call me by phone, or they'll just talk to me over the screen that's
24 between us.

25 So yeah, we relied heavily on them. But I -- by the time this rolled
26 around, I was fairly -- you know, I was fairly proficient at using CIIDS, and the CAD, and
27 all that sort of thing.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I'm getting the sense that your proficiency

1 may have developed as a result of experience, ---

2 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes. Yes.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- as opposed to a specific formalized
4 training regime. Is that -- is that a proper statement on my part?

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Sure, yeah.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. Do you think that would be of
7 some benefit to Risk Managers ---

8 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Oh, yes.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- to have some official formal training in
10 the CIIDS system?

11 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes, for sure.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** How about the Computer Assisted
13 Dispatch System? What we've called CAD or the CAD log situation.

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Are you in a position to make any
16 comment about training or exposure you would have had to that?

17 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well exposure, I use it every shift. You
18 know, an occurrence comes in, it's posted on there, it comes from call takeover to
19 dispatch, and I see it appear on my screen, I read every one.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

21 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Not every call I'm going to monitor as a
22 Risk Manager. I mean, some of the very minor stuff, there's no need. But serious
23 incidents, we'll go on and monitor right away.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Once again, formalized training in
25 that tool?

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well that was included with the training
27 from 2014.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Thank you. Finally, with respect to

1 mobile workstations. You know what they are?

2 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. Those are the ---

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- computerized system within the
6 vehicles of the members.

7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** The laptop in the police car.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah, the laptop. Are you able to
9 comment with respect to any training or access to training you would have had
10 formalized as to an MWS?

11 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Oh, yes. We had a lot of different training
12 over the years, like, to use the MWS. We had different systems. One was called
13 Roads. And then we moved into PROS. When you first go on shift, you fire up your
14 laptop and you have an identification card that goes in the side. You launch it, enter
15 your information, and you just hit -- literally hit enter and it appears 1036 on the screen,
16 which means you're on duty.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

18 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And right away, telecoms, your
19 dispatcher for your area, will acknowledge you're 1036 and on shift.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So as the shift manager, the three
21 operations that I've discussed, CIIDS, CAD, and MWS, ---

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- would they be routinely involved in any
24 shift that a Risk Manager would be involved in?

25 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well I don't use an MWS ---

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** No.

27 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- because I'm inside.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I understand that.

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** But it's a communication tool, obviously.

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah. Yeah. And all the information
4 goes down to the police car unit.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

6 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** So every call, you know, it's dispatched
7 to the MWS of the police cars and the members working acknowledge that.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So on April 18th, 2020, would you
9 be able to give us a comment as to your degree, and I know it's a self-analysis or self-
10 assessment, of your proficiency with respect to CIIDS and the MWS and the CADS
11 programs?

12 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well it's fairly proficient now with CIIDS
13 and CAD both.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

15 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And MWS, I worked -- I used it a lot,
16 extensively, over the years, especially when I was in Traffic Services as a corporal,
17 because I was on the road all the time.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And I would be going what they call 1011,
20 pulling a vehicle over. You can do that right on your laptop, if you wish. I used to voice
21 it to keep your eyes on the road. But I used it every shift.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. I propose now, Staff Sergeant, to
23 move on to ask you some questions more specifically about the role of the Risk
24 Manager. And I understand that you may have wanted to say something before I
25 initiated that area of comment?

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Certainly. Yes. You know, I wanted to
27 be able to make sure today that I took a moment to offer my sincere condolences to the
28 families on their terrible loss, on behalf of me and my family, the entire organization, I

1 mean, Nova Scotia, Canada. I was out west last summer for a bit and people out there
2 are talking about it, and asking me about it, and saying how terrible it must have been.
3 So we can only imagine their pain. So I'm so sorry for what happened and I'm here
4 today to, I hope, you know, clear some questions up that you may have, or I hope when
5 I leave here, that when I do leave, that you may go away thinking, "Well, I know a bit
6 more now. He's shed some light on some things," and maybe help you to find some
7 more peace with what I have to say today.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. Thank you, Staff Sergeant. We'll
9 move on to more specific questions with respect to the Risk Manager. I asked you
10 about some training on that, you've told me about that, but I'd like to know, from your
11 point of view, as an experienced Risk Manager, what is the Risk Manager? What role
12 do they perform, generally? And then we'll relate it to the incident ---

13 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- a little bit more particularly. But I think
15 it's best for us to get a stronger sense of that position.

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah, well there is a job description that's
17 probably this long in a paragraph. I can't recite it verbatim, but in a nutshell, the Risk
18 Manager, you're on duty and you're there to oversee everything that's going on in the
19 province, more so not -- not as much through the days, because they have their own
20 supervisors working each district and detachment, but to oversee it and provide
21 operational guidance to the members, especially in high-risk situations. Any guidance
22 that the OCC dispatchers may need, or call takers, they have, like, an operational police
23 question, so to speak, that may be outside their realm. Like, I go to them for help with
24 me.

25 So I over see -- we call it an Operations NCO, like I used to do for
26 my district, for the entire province.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** So like something like a hazardous

1 pursuit, one of the dispatchers would say, "Hey, S/Sgt Rehill, we have a pursuit in
2 Digby." And I'll go right on their talk group right away and take charge of that ---

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- and monitor it.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Well let's get you physically situated.
6 You're at the OCC.

7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes. In Truro, yeah.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** In Truro at that time.

9 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And you work amongst a number of other
11 professionals? Communication professionals?

12 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Who were they and what context
14 relationship do you have with them?

15 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, the OCC in Truro, that is now
16 moved to Dartmouth to the headquarters, but at that time, it was up -- the upstairs of the
17 building at Prince Street, as you came up the stairs into a hallway on the left, you had all
18 call take side. So there's several over there, there's several what I call pods or
19 workstations. Each one of them has, like, three to four screens around, they -- over
20 there, they're in the call take side. So the calls, when they come in, can go to that side,
21 and there's no real -- there's no designated area. They just take them as the calls come
22 in. So they listen to the complaint. They're typing as they're listening to it, and then
23 they send it over to dispatch side, sorry, and the dispatcher for the appropriate district,
24 the designated district, sends that down to the police car and voices at the same time,
25 to the member, and they'll say, you know, call for Digby, whatever, and they might say
26 1-Bravo-6, send that to me, and away they go with it. And depending on how serious it
27 is, like, you know, whether one member's going, or several members are going,
28 whatever's on duty, or if they have to ask for backup from another district, so to speak,

1 that's where it goes to the car. And if it's something serious, like, they'll let me know
2 right away. They'll say, "Staff Rehill, have a look at this file or that file." And I'll read it
3 right away. And the ones that I'm going to monitor, I'm going to the screen where the
4 narrative is and I can right-click on it, and it's called benchmark. It says "risk manager
5 monitoring" on the screen, and that will go right down into the CAD log.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So you're at one of these pod stations as
7 well ---

8 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- monitoring a number of ---

10 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- screens?

12 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** On my side there's eight.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And the purpose of this, and can you give
16 us a sort of sense of how you facilitate this monitoring?

17 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, it comes up on my screen because
18 I have the same screen as all they have, and I'm reading them as they come in. I keep
19 a close eye on them. I'll open every one and read them, and the ones that I need to
20 monitor, I'll right-click, and I'll go on, and I'll say risk manager monitoring. I'll click on the
21 screen over here, which is the radio, go to that talk group, and advise them I was risk
22 manager monitoring, and they'll say, "Okay, Staff, thank you." And I'm listening in to the
23 call, waiting -- you know, seeing if they need any operational guidance. If I think they're
24 doing something that maybe I should intervene, I will. A lot of times, they know their
25 stuff quite well, so I listen in. And a lot of times, they may ask me a question.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So I think you indicated this, but it's worth
27 repeating. You indicated that there's a province-wide observation or a province-wide
28 jurisdiction that the risk manager has?

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes, with the exception of HRM, they
2 have their own watch commanders, that sort of thing, and then obviously, your Cape
3 Breton regional police and your Truro police, like, we don't monitor those.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** No, I understand.

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** But I would guess, and it's purely a guess
7 on my part, without the knowledge, that this could be a particularly busy position at
8 different times of the day or the evening ---

9 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- with respect to the breadth of
11 jurisdiction that you undertake.

12 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** It can be very busy, yes.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** How busy, Staff Sergeant?

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, there's some nights where it's
17 extremely busy, like, you just, you can't believe how many are coming in and how busy
18 you are. And there can be other nights, you know, that it's fairly quiet.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Tell us about coverage in terms of
20 risk managers. Is there always a risk manager on duty, 7 ---

21 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, they have ---

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- 24/7?

23 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- well, they try to provide one 24/7, 7
24 days a week, but they're -- you know, at that time, there is a point where maybe there's -
25 - might be a quiet hour between 5 and 7.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

27 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Like, I might work, like, on a Sunday
28 evening, for example, 1900 to 0500, and then on Monday morning, the next risk

1 manager's coming in 0700 to 1900, the 12 -- so maybe 2-hour gap, but think your
2 Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, Saturdays, like, it's 24 hours.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Can you make any comment for
4 me with respect to volume of calls and perhaps relate it to day shift versus night shift
5 where ---

6 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- there are differences and how that
8 would be handled?

9 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, yeah. Day shift, a lot of the calls
10 are -- you know, they might be more minor in nature, like, say somebody calls in and
11 says, realize that her house was damaged over the weekend, or something to that
12 effect. Through the week, the detachments are up and running, like -- well, they always
13 are, but management is in -- like, their unit management, like, their corporal team
14 leaders are usually working anyway. There's always, like, a team leader on and say a
15 sergeant Ops NCO and district commander. While they are working, like, they're
16 responsible for their districts through the day. Like, we'd be after hours. So for us, like,
17 Monday to Friday through the day as a risk manager probably not as busy as you would
18 be maybe on a Friday or Saturday night when you're working the night shift, with calls
19 coming in all -- from all over the province. So, yeah, so they're responsible for their own
20 districts. For instance, if a hazardous pursuit started in one of the districts and the
21 Operation NCO's working, they should take that and say, you know, Sergeant so-and-
22 so, I'm monitoring this pursuit. I can stand back and provide support in that -- at that
23 time.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I just want to get a sense from you about
25 the risk manager's relationship with district command or district leadership and how that
26 interrelates. And that ---

27 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- leads to my question earlier about the

1 day shift/night shift differential.

2 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right, yes. Yeah.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Can you give us some sense about the
4 risk manager's connection to district leadership?

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, when we're working our -- like, our -
6 - say our evening shifts for sure, our night shifts, there'd be -- like I said, they're working
7 through the day through the week, but if something comes up that's -- that we consider
8 should be serious and that they should -- it's something they should be aware of, we'll
9 have -- we'll contact them, like, their Operation NCO, the district commander. I may not
10 do that directly if I'm very busy, like, one of the dispatchers will do it for me. I can say,
11 could you contact -- in this case, like, Staff Sergeant Carroll, for example ---

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

13 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- and advise them what's happening,
14 and at that time, they'll decide, well, I better come out, or I'm coming out, or just, you
15 know, maybe it's something that I can manage on my own, and then just letting them
16 know for courtesy purposes, this is going on in your district. So we'll ---

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Sorry, for courtesy purposes?

18 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, let them know, like, if they're not
19 coming in to manage the call, like, if I'm going to be -- sometimes I'm not calling and
20 saying that you need to come out. Just letting them know this is happening in your
21 district or something to that effect. And a lot of times they'll get involved. They'll call me
22 and, you know, I'll discuss it with them, or the Ops NCO if I can't reach the district
23 commander. If the district commander is on vacation or on leave, then the second in
24 command's in charge in that district, so we'll keep them advised of what's happening. In
25 some cases, they have to come in.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And that's what I'm trying to get a
27 sense of in terms ---

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- of roles with respect to district
2 commanders, second in commands within the district and the risk manager.

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** When the risk manager communicates
5 with the district leadership ---

6 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- what's the purpose and what's the
8 intention with respect to roles and leadership roles?

9 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, in this situation for sure, it's to --
10 like, you're coming out to this is a major -- you know, the biggest crisis in Canadian
11 history.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

13 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** It was to advise them immediately, let
14 them know, and they're going to be coming in. Staff Sergeant Carroll, I believe, came in
15 as soon as he could. Sergeant O'Brien was involved. I called the district advisory NCO
16 who was the acting operations inspector ---

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** We'll get into that in a minute in terms ---

18 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- of the particulars, but from the point of
20 view of the risk manager's engagement with district leadership ---

21 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- when you contact them ---

23 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- what is your expectation with respect
25 to the role of the risk manager at that time?

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, I'm advising them what's happening
27 and I'm in charge of your -- of this call in your district right now.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And ---

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And once the district leadership gets
3 informed of that ---

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- can you tell me about transition of
6 power or transition of responsibility with respect to the risk manager's role and district
7 leadership's role? That's an -- it's unclear to me in terms of who does what when.

8 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, in most cases, I'm going to continue
9 to be in command of the situation.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

11 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** This situation was extraordinarily, I guess
12 you could say, off the charts with respect to police work. So everybody should be
13 getting involved at that point in time. So, they all came in, and we all ---

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right.

15 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- working as a team on that.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. We'll talk about that a little later. I
17 just thought from a general sort of policy point of view we might be able to get a sense
18 of when the -- what the risk manager's role is with respect to the district command role.

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Any further comment on that before we
21 move on?

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, I'm in command at that point in time
23 ---

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

25 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- you know.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Thank you. Can you tell us then about
27 what might trigger the risk manager's contact to district command, what type of situation
28 might ---

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, if you have a ---

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- lead ---

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- serious domestic dispute going on, if a
4 police officer's involved in a car crash and the police vehicle's been damaged and we
5 have a member injured, we'll certainly let the management know, district management
6 know. Anything that we consider, I guess, a serious call, we're going to be advising
7 them; right?

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And you've just isolated a
9 domestic dispute.

10 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Is that a routine consideration ---

12 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, if it's a very serious one ---

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- of a serious call?

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- like, we won't always let them know.
15 We report on that every night on our report.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

17 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And it goes to all the districts where the
18 calls came in for. Like, we don't send the risk manager report to the entire province.
19 We send it to the designated detachments, so where the calls came in overnight. For
20 instance, if Antigonish had two domestic disputes, it would go to their sergeant and their
21 district commander, so they could read it first thing in the morning.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

23 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And I guess my question is, when would a
25 determination be made by the risk manager ---

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- to call in district leadership on a
28 domestic dispute ---

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well ---

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- as opposed to wait until the morning
3 for the report?

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Oh, I would think if there's somebody
5 seriously injured, or heaven forbid they've been killed, yeah, you're definitely going to be
6 calling them, calling the district manager to get them involved.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So domestic dispute issues you've
8 covered. What about hazardous pursuits? Would that be something where you would
9 engage local leadership?

10 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Not at that time. I would take over the
11 hazardous pursuit, run it, supervise it, and whether we shut it down or we continue.
12 Again, if in that pursuit one of the member's got injured, yes, we would ---

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- we would -- you know, or if the person
15 you're pursuing went off the road and got injured or killed, obviously, you're going to let
16 district management know. But for the most part, if we just resolve it successfully, it'd
17 be on the risk manager report for the morning.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I'm getting a sense, and please correct
19 me if I'm wrong, Staff Sergeant, that the hazardous pursuit interjurisdictionally is
20 something that the risk managers are quite familiar with?

21 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes. Yeah.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And in fact, it's a significant portion of
23 your job, time, and/or responsibility. Am I right in that regard?

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes. Yeah.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. And when I review the materials
26 and look at the Risk Manager's experience, it looks like hazardous pursuits may be a
27 substantive portion of your role. Is that correct?

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, I wouldn't say that there -- ones

1 would happen every shift, so to speak, but it's a very high-risk situation ---

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- that requires strict supervision.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And the Risk Manager would be the
5 expert provincially with respect to hazardous pursuits inter-jurisdictionally; right?

6 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** While you're working, yes.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay, all right. What about lost persons,
8 things of that nature?

9 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Same thing. We would -- you know, we
10 would -- we'd get involved right away. Sometimes, like this day and age with -- there's
11 so much technology and cell phones, sometimes we can communicate with a person in
12 the woods. A lot of times they call it in from the woods. They'd say, "I'm lost", like, you
13 know, "I can't get out of here." One of the first things we're going to get one of the
14 dispatchers to call the Incident Commander for the Search and Rescue Team and brief
15 them on it, and I'd likely have a conversation with that person. They get Search and
16 Rescue launched, the local Search and Rescue Team. They ask me usually to do a
17 couple of tasks for them, like, "This will be our Command Post. Can you advise them of
18 this is where we're going to do our muster point?", that kind of thing. Another thing that
19 I'd be doing in that situation, well, I would authorise right away that if that person is lost
20 and they have a cell phone, to ping the cell phone, and if we can get a good radius on
21 where they are, that helps us a lot.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Is that something unique to the authority
23 of the Risk Manager, the cell phone ping?

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes. Yeah, it had to be authorised by
25 one of us.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Authorised by one of us, meaning?

27 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** The Risk Manager.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Is there protocol for any other person or
3 any other leadership personnel ---

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well ---

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- at the time?

6 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- I think if I was -- I know that if I was
7 absent, then, you know, the Floor Supervisor would make the call.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So we've talked about hazardous
9 pursuits, domestic disputes, lost persons ---

10 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- and cell phone pinging responsibility.

12 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Can you say anything else of regular or
14 routine involvement that the Risk Manager ---

15 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, if it's ---

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- would have?

17 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- a sexual assault we report on those as
18 well overnight, if someone reports a sexual assault, and again, if it's serious enough we
19 would get district management involved. But in most cases, it's a situation where the
20 person could be interviewed at a later date ---

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- and -- so they can look at it in the
23 morning.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So can you tell me, is there any protocol
25 with respect, and this is what I'm driving at here, trying to figure out when it is or what
26 factors are required to engage the district leadership, or is that a -- is that a ---

27 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** It's discretionary. Like ---

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Discretionary.

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Okay. Let's move on, then, to the
3 role of the Risk Manager in a critical incident.

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** What would you define as a critical
6 incident, and is there a definition, a working definition that you would work with as a
7 Risk Manager?

8 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, if something very serious, like an
9 armed and barricaded person, a lot of times domestic disputes end up that way. Like
10 the female, for example, or the partner flees the home, if they can, and the person --
11 and usually substance abuse involved with say the, I'll use the example of a husband
12 and wife, who sometimes remains behind and there's firearms in the house, and
13 sometimes they call themselves and say, "Anybody comes here I'm going to shoot them
14 or kill them", like something to that effect, yeah, you're definitely going to involve district
15 management and let them know.

16 Fatal crashes, we're going to notify them right away "You have a
17 fatal in your area", and if they, you know, they say -- a lot of times they just say "Just
18 keep me advised" because we have everybody coming, the right resources, and that
19 kind of thing.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So you can tell me about the Critical
21 Incident Package, what that is?

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, I'm not a Critical Incident
23 Commander, but I have enough knowledge to say that once they're -- it's launched or
24 it's activated, your Critical Incident Commander is going to make their way to a
25 Command Post in the, you know, in the vicinity of the call. There's negotiators come in,
26 the ERT, Emergency Response Team, Police Dog Services, which we -- you'll see is
27 referred to as PDS a lot through the -- through the documents. For instance, Glen
28 Byrne is in charge of the OCC Logistics, he'll go to that same Command Post and help

1 them get all set up with their gear.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. Tell me then, what's the Risk
3 Manager's role in determining or making determinations that a critical incident has
4 occurred or exists? Are you able to give us some insight on that?

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, for instance, when there is a critical
6 incident there's a -- there's a -- at that time they had a binder there that had all the
7 on-call persons and their schedule for over, like, two or three months. So we have it all
8 there. Like for instance, on this weekend it was Staff Sergeant West was the Critical
9 Incident Commander on-call. So I would go to that. A lot of times I'll check it at the first
10 of my shift so I know, or the dispatchers may have it written somewhere on the -- on the
11 screen "Staff Sergeant West is the CIC this weekend for on-call purposes", that sort of
12 thing. So anything that's really serious, armed and barricaded persons for sure because
13 they get involved in that very much. In this incident, obviously, we're going to engage
14 them right away. And I did that through the District Advisory NCO.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** That would have been Staff Sergeant?

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Staff Sergeant Halliday.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Halliday. We'll get to that as well, I hope,
18 in the upcoming questions. But with respect to your relationship to a Critical Incident
19 Commander, you've said that there's some -- a binder and there's a system in place for
20 access and contact to that person?

21 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes, there is, yeah.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. All right. Finally ---

23 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** The binder would have on-call Critical
24 Incident Commanders, the dogs -- whoever the dog man is for that weekend, whoever
25 the Incident Commander for Search and Rescue. They're all there and it's all laid out
26 for you as to who you're going to call when you need them.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And it's a discretionary decision, then, on
28 the part of the Risk Manager as to who he contacts or she contacts in response to the

1 particular incident that they're faced at that time?

2 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes, but some them, you know, go
3 without saying. Like for instance, an armed and barricaded person, you're going to call
4 Critical Incident Commander, at least have a conversation with them, and they'll decide
5 whether they're going to activate the CIC or not; right?

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Very good. I think that deals with the
7 issues of your relationship with the Critical Incident Commander, but before I leave the
8 Risk Manager's role, I wanted to ask you about your relationship with OCC supervisors,
9 dispatchers and call-takers. I understand there is a intricate relationship that the Risk
10 Manager would have with those folks?

11 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, the call-take side, like, for instance,
12 when I first come into work, I'm able to go over and see who's working and say hello to
13 everybody and that kind of thing, and then on to my side with the dispatch, really for me,
14 you usually say right-hand man, but left to me is it's the Floor Supervisor, who I
15 communicate with a lot, especially in serious incidents, and the rest are dispatchers. I
16 could -- I can contact them through my phone, call them and just say, you know, "Can
17 you help me with this or that or could you ping this phone or that phone?" But usually
18 we're in earshot of each other, so we can do it that way.

19 So we have a strong, working relationship; we work together. You
20 know, there may be situations they'll ask me to authorise something, whereas before in
21 the Risk Manager Program they would have to make that call themselves years ago.
22 So it's a really good operational relationship. They're very strong and they're very good
23 at what they do. I love working with them. I always said it was the best posting I ever
24 had in the RCMP to work there with those people. So yeah, it's a strong working
25 relationship, and I think with the Risk Manager in place it's very cohesive and it works
26 well.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Can you tell us, then, about the on
28 duty Risk Manager's obligations when they come on shift? What do they do and what

1 occurs?

2 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, the first thing that I do is I go 10-36,
3 they call it, on the screen, and that's means your on duty, up and running. And then I
4 send out a global message they call it, it goes out to the entire province, all the mobile
5 workstations, the MWSs. You know, say "Risk Manager, Staff Sergeant Brian Rehill,
6 working this evening from 1900 to 0700. This is my cell number. Any guidance you
7 need please call me." And I'll usually put a little blurb in there about our reporting
8 process. Like I say, you know, "As Risk Manager's, we must report on domestic
9 violence, sudden deaths, lost persons", and that includes youth at risk. Like, sometimes
10 there may be reported as lost, but they're just -- they're just out there with -- hanging out
11 with somebody or, you know, or they're from a home or some sort, so we report on that.
12 And then at the bottom of the report, it's any other knowable occurrences that you want
13 district management to know about, so I'll include that in my -- in my message to them.
14 And then at the bottom, I'll say, "Have a" -- "have a safe shift."

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And this is a routine that you
16 would undertake ---

17 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes, yeah.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- every shift?

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** We all do it every shift, yes.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right on. Okay. So the purpose of that
21 communication is to familiarise members with you and what's going on in the shift?

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes, yeah.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. Tell me, would you have an
24 opportunity to review what is actually going on through the CAD logs or otherwise?

25 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Tell us about that, please.

27 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes. Like for instance, if I come in on a
28 nightshift and my counterpart, Staff Sergeant Bruce Briers, was on dayshift, he would --

1 he would brief me as to what he -- what transpired that day. We'd usually look over the
2 report together at this point, what's there so far. He might tell me something like
3 "Expect a call from so-and-so", or something would be happening later on, or "One of
4 the -- one of the specialised sections is planning an event tonight, so" -- like an arrest or
5 a search or something to that effect, "so just be aware of that." And the dispatchers are
6 all very well briefed in everything that's taking place through the day. And I'll go back in
7 my CIIDS screen, I may be an hour or two before Bruce went off, and I'll read through
8 all the files and I'll review the Risk Manager Report to see what's on there so far and if
9 there's any follow up I need to do in some of the files that aren't finished off yet, that sort
10 of thing.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. I want to go back to a theme I had
12 discussed earlier with respect to the difference between dayshift and nightshift as a Risk
13 Manager.

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Are you able to comment on whether
16 there were any differences, whether you had any preferences ---

17 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- and why those differences exist?

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, like I said, the differences in our
20 role was probably we weren't as busy through the day or called on as much when we
21 have the district management work, and, like, your district manager is working, your
22 sergeant is working, your Operations NCO, and your team leaders are on the road, and
23 a lot -- most of them are on the road in the evenings too. But sergeant and staff
24 sergeant for the most part, are Monday to Friday day shift. And so -- but when they are
25 working all those, we play a much less role in the occurrences. They supervise their
26 own districts, they're responsible for their own districts at that time.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Very good. I think that outlines the
28 Risk Manager's role and your exposure to it. Any further comment with respect to the

1 job of the Risk Manager? I know you said you enjoyed it, you worked with
2 professionals.

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Is there any comment for the
5 Commissioners with respect to the nature of the Risk Manager's role that you wish to
6 make clear to them and/or others?

7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well just it's -- it can be an extremely
8 stressful, high-pressure position that when things come in that are a serious nature,
9 there's a lot of I call it, I guess, rapid fire. There's a lot coming at you at once and you
10 need to -- it's sometimes difficult to manage all the tasks that are coming in. And with
11 this particular occurrence, that was certainly the case.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Good. Then I think what we'll do
13 is then move along, if we can, to your experience with respect to the evening of April
14 18th ---

15 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- by turning to the Foundational
17 Documents to go through some of the comments there. And I'll ask for your remarks.

18 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Sure.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So the Foundational document that is the
20 basis of this discussion today is the RCMP Command Post, OCC and Command
21 Decisions Foundational Document.

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And I want to direct your attention right to
24 the start, page 24, paragraph 52.

25 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Okay.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Paragraph 52 says:

27 "Jamie Blair called 911 at 10:01 p.m. on April 18, 2020.

28 OCC call-taker supervisor Donnalee Williston received

1 her call. The 'Incident Start' time on Ms. Williston's CAD
2 log was 10:01:14 [...]. The call was labelled 'CAD
3 Incident: 2004-03757' and the location at the top of the
4 CAD log showed: 2 Hwy & Portapique Beach Rd."

5 Now, would you have been familiar with this designation at this
6 stage? And what does it mean for us?

7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** With the actual occurrence, it had come
8 in at 22:01.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

10 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I would have become aware of it shortly
11 thereafter.

12 In some cases, when something like this is coming in, one of the
13 other call takers might leave her chair and say, "There's some serious coming in, just to
14 give you the heads up."

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And then it gets dispatched right to our
17 side and I would read it right away.

18 So again, like that information was on an occurrence screen
19 window, like.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. That's what I want to get clear for
21 us.

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So we get a good picture ---

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- of what the Risk Manager does.

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** That's what I do, is I click into the
27 occurrence number, ---

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- and there'll be a category, whether it's
2 urgent, like the priority 1, 2, 3, or 4, ---

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- kind of thing. So right away, I knew
5 once the verbal came across to be ready, I read it immediately. And within that screen,
6 I can go in there with the cursor, right click, and then there's a list of what they call
7 benchmarks, like a tow truck dispatch. Mine says "Risk Manager Reviewing."

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

9 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** So I right click it right away, let them
10 know I'm reviewing, I jumped on the air of the Colchester talk group right away to talk to
11 Stuart Beselt. I said, "Stuart, I'm monitoring this occurrence." "10-4, Staff."

12 So at that time, they had very little information.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So what can you tell us then about the
14 delay that the Risk Manager would have had in terms of getting on to this file? Was
15 there any?

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** No.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And is that normal and routine?

18 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well for minor occurrences maybe, you
19 know, once it comes over, I read it.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

21 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And I'll click on "Risk Manager Reviewed"
22 or "Risk Manager Monitoring".

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** You know, and the minor ones, it will say,
25 "Risk Manager Reviewed", just so they know at least I looked at it, I'm aware of it.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And did you have any assessment
27 at that very earliest of stages of the significance, given the information you had?

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** This here paragraph doesn't show the

1 actual details yet; does it?

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** No. Let's go to paragraph 61. That might
3 be a better incident for you.

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** H'm.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Page 28, paragraph 61. RM in this case,
6 in the document, is short for Risk Manager. I'm sure ---

7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- you understand that.

9 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:**

11 "RM Rehill was also monitoring Jamie Blair's 911 call. The CAD log indicates

12 "risk_manager_monitoring" the file as of 10:04:54 p.m."

13 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Now, we're going to need some
15 clarification on that, because I'm not sure what monitoring means.

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Does that mean actually listening to the
18 call?

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** No, it doesn't.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

21 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** It means I'm monitoring the occurrence.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And in what sense are you
23 monitoring the occurrence? How is that ---

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well right away, like I said, "Risk
25 Manager Monitoring", and then I jumped on the talk group, Colchester, to talk to the
26 Colchester -- the Bible Hill Members.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I said, "Risk Manager is on the air

1 listening, monitoring the call.” And, like, Stuart would say, “10-4, Staff.” Something to
2 that effect.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And at that stage, as you’re
4 starting to monitor the call, what type of information do you have or are you able to filter
5 through?

6 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well we know that when a call first came
7 in, it was a woman that was fairly, I guess you could say, well understandably, panic-
8 stricken and saying that her husband was just shot on the back deck of the house.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. So when you get that type of
10 information, ---

11 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- what does the Risk Manager do at that
13 earliest stage?

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well right away, I start monitoring it
15 immediately, contact the members, start discussing a strategy.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. All right. So paragraph 62 then,
17 Staff Sergeant, says that:

18 “RM Rehill’s notes indicate that he also thought the call
19 might initially be a mental health–related call. His notes
20 state...”

21 And halfway through:

22 “It was also stated it was a police officer the police car
23 was in the driveway.”

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M’hm.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** The mental health aspect of that. Can
26 you give us some insight of what was meant by that by you at that point?

27 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well it was just a thought in the initial part
28 because in the OCC, we receive so many calls of people with mental health issues,

1 whether they be in psychosis, hallucinating, especially elderly people with dementia.
2 We receive calls of -- similarly to that. Like, really outlandish details. And the members
3 will be dispatched and they'll go there quite quickly, only to find out that there's nothing
4 happening at all ---

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

6 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- and that this person, I can think of a
7 number of them that has dementia that would call us with these types of stories.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. So with respect to it being a
9 mental health related call, does that diminish the severity of the call?

10 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** No.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And why would that be of significance to
12 mention in your notes?

13 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** It doesn't diminish it. There's -- we're
14 going to treat it as what was reported and get there as fast as you can.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** But we're saying, "Okay --" and that's part
17 of their information gathering. Stuart and them have to get there to see what we're
18 really dealing with.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm. Okay. Just moving into that quote
20 in the middle of paragraph 62, Staff Sergeant, ---

21 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- where I made reference to the:

23 "2201 call taker side advised dispatch side of a call of a
24 man being shot in the community of Portapique, a small
25 community on Highway 2..."

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:**

28 "...between Great Village and Bass River, Colchester

1 County. Initially it was reported by a female caller
2 reported her husband was shot on the back deck of their
3 home, [...] It was also stated it was a police officer the
4 police car was in the driveway.”

5 You see that there within the notes?

6 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah, it's right in the middle of the
7 paragraph.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah, right in the middle of the
9 paragraph. These would be from your notes.

10 “It was also stated it was a police officer the police car
11 was in the driveway.”

12 So that's some important information.

13 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Can you tell us how that was assessed
15 and what was actually going on in terms of your thinking with respect to that descriptor?

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well I think initially we're like, “What is
17 happening? A police officer in a police car shooting people?” And I remember myself
18 and Jennifer MacCallum, you know, she's to my left. Like, we're like, “What?” Like,
19 what is happening here? Like, how could -- you know, you have -- one has to
20 understand, as a police officer with 30 years experience and, like, one of our police
21 officers is shooting people in people's driveways in this tiny community? It was -- you
22 know, it was -- I guess it was somewhat shocking in the beginning, but we're treating it
23 as real. “You've got to get there, you guys.” But I'm trying to find out what's really
24 happening here. What do we really have?

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** So it was hard -- it was hard to, you
27 know, I guess absorb is the right word, when you hear that.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm. Did that have any impact on the

1 manner in which you and your team would have responded to this call?

2 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** No. Like, Stuart, and Merchant, and
3 Patton, they're going as fast as they can to get there. Vicki Colford was also
4 descending on the call.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Paragraph 63. And this may be
6 somewhat difficult for you, Staff Sergeant:

7 "RM Rehill repeatedly called Jamie Blair's phone
8 number..."

9 You had indicated earlier that you were monitoring the call, and
10 monitoring ---

11 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- meant a sense of a sort of distance
13 overview of what was going on.

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** But this actually looks like more specific
16 and clear engagement in the call. Would I be right in that regard?

17 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes, for sure.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So what happened there, Staff Sergeant?

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well Stuart Beselt asked me, he said,
20 "Staff, can you call the complainant back and see if you can get some more details?"

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And so I attempted to call the number
23 that we had and it just kept ringing, I believe went to voicemail.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Now why is it that the Risk
25 Manager would engage in that specific a role in this instance, as opposed to say,
26 Dispatcher Number 3, ---

27 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- or your supervisor?

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well I guess to the degree of the -- the
2 magnitude of the call and the severity of the details, so I'm going to call them and see
3 as much -- get as much information as we can and try to clarify this very -- police car in
4 the yard and a policeman is shooting people?

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

6 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** So I -- you know, that's something that I
7 should do, as opposed to one of the dispatchers.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I see. Okay. Moving on down further in
9 paragraph 63, you'll see from the notations there, where there's a concern over Dave
10 Lilly.

11 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Dave Lilly is somebody known to you, is
13 it, Staff Sergeant?

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes. Yes, I know Sgt Dave Lilly. Yes.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. And some confusion emerged with
16 respect to Dave Lilly and his potential role in this?

17 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, like I said before, we can't just
18 dismiss the details. It's a police car, and it could be a police officer shooting people, so,
19 like, we are puzzled by it, but yet we're still actively investigating it right away. And on
20 the air, I think it was Jennifer MacCallum, asked about police cars in that general area,
21 any marked police cars, because they were all accounted for on the screen. With
22 respect to the mobile workstation, you can see where the police cars are ---

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- and there was none in the community.
25 So and we said, like, is there anybody out in that general area who would have a
26 marked car at home, and at some point ---

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Now that needs to be explained to me,
28 because you had indicated that you could see the cars on the ---

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- screen.

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And I presume that means those are cars
5 that are marked and/or logged in.

6 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah, and they're working in their
7 districts.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

9 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So you were raising some concern with
11 respect to a vehicle that wasn't logged in or something of that nature?

12 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah, and if you're not logged in on your
13 mobile workstation, we can't see where you are, and that's ---

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Ah.

15 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- a huge mode of contention for, like, a
16 dispatcher. It gives them anxiety. Like, I don't know where you are.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

18 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Get your MWS fired up; right?

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah, yeah. So is that where the Dave
20 Lilly discussion emerged?

21 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, one of the members in the district
22 said, "The only marked car I would know of in that general area is Dave Lilly. Sergeant
23 Lilly has a car at home."

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And what did you do then in
25 response to that?

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, we can't rule out that his car could
27 have been stolen, or a police car from another jurisdiction could have been stolen ---

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- and members are on call in their yard,
2 so we have to still try to figure out is this really a police car or is it not.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So this early stages of the
4 proceedings, is the critical incident commander involved at this point or ---

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Not yet.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- the district leadership?

7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Not yet at that point.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And why is that, Staff Sergeant?

9 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, because it's just the infancy of the
10 call. We're still trying to figure out what's happening here.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. All right. I understand that you
12 make a number of inquiries of the phone number and are unsuccessful in that regard?

13 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes, yeah.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And then you also had made
15 arrangements to do further details or obligations and tasks. What were they?

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right. Well, we'd say, we'll ping her
17 phone right away to see if we can locate where it is, and if it's in the vicinity of where we
18 think the call came in from.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

20 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So paragraph 67, Madam Registrar, it
22 talks about this pinging process.

23 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** We'll just bring that up for you there, Staff
25 Sergeant. Attempt to ping Jamie Blair's cell phone was unsuccessful.

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So this is a routine investigative tool that
28 the risk manager you ---

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- talked about a little earlier would do?

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, yeah, but there's fairly strict
4 guidelines to using it. You can't -- I can't just ping somebody's phone because I want to
5 know where they are, or the officers can't. It has to be a situation that warrants us to
6 ping it because there is *Privacy Act* issues. There's the CRTC ---

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

8 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- that monitor these things. So we have
9 to be, you know, respect the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, and only ping when we
10 feel it's necessary we have to ping.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And ---

12 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And this was certainly a situation where,
13 yeah, you would. So we were trying to isolate where is that phone? Is it coming from
14 123 Orchard -- and sometimes the radius is so big that you still wouldn't be able to tell
15 that, it's in the general area, but sometimes the radius is quite small, like, 50 metres.
16 And so we tried to ping it and we didn't get anything.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. Does that -- when you don't get
18 anything, does that indicate anything to you?

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, it's either off or out of the area. It
20 could have been shut off ---

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. All right.

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- you know, by someone.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. Further inquiries were
24 undertaken in paragraph 67. The PROS database was searched. Can you tell us
25 about what the PROS database is?

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, it's just a police database we use
27 for doing all our investigations on, entering all our data. Like, if I pulled you over, for
28 example, and had your license and registration, insurance, all that data would go into

1 this -- if I wrote you a ticket or a warning, all that data would be entered into the PROS
2 database ---

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- as an occurrence.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

6 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So the purpose then of you accessing
8 PROS was to do what about this ---

9 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, to query her name, Jamie Blair.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. Okay.

11 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And we got some results of a Jamie
12 Gratto.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. We have heard some evidence,
14 information from other witnesses with respect to something called Versadex.

15 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Are you able to tell us about what
17 Versadex is?

18 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, Versadex is the system, I guess, is
19 the PROS version in Halifax, what they use in the Halifax Regional Municipality, it's
20 called ---

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- Versadex.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And were you able to access Versadex at
26 this stage?

27 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, I'm not trained in Versadex ---

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- and we don't -- had it on our desktop,
2 but we also had in PROS called the Police Information Portal, PIP.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** So if we run a name and date of birth on
5 that, we will get some -- we'll get HRM's files ---

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- or somebody's ---

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Before we get to PIP, let's get to
9 Versadex. It's just ---

10 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- so that it can be clear to me.

12 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** You indicated the Versadex database is
14 something different than the PROS database.

15 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes, yeah.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Does it contain the identical information,
17 different information, or is there an overlap; do you know?

18 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, just -- I can't say. I mean, I don't
19 know what the screens look like. I know what our subject screen looks like, our car
20 vehicle screen, you're adding a car. I don't know. I'm not trained in Versadex. I can't
21 say a whole lot about it.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** No, I understand that. Would Versadex
23 database have been of some substance, assistance to you in terms of what ---

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, it'd be just another databank. We
25 could search for information.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

27 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I guess I'm a little puzzled as to why that

1 other databank may not have been available to the risk manager at that point in time.

2 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I don't know, other than the fact that we
3 didn't get to that point yet, I think when -- I think my counterpart Bruce Briers had been
4 asking about it ---

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yes.

6 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- for some time.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And we heard from Staff Sergeant
8 Briers ---

9 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- with respect to his efforts on Versadex.

11 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And I'm just wondering whether you can
13 give us some insight as to whether the risk manager's position there was no inquiry
14 made before 6, 6:30 a.m. about Versadex.

15 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, I can't say once they took over, but I
16 wasn't on Versadex myself. I don't know how to use it. But ---

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

18 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- I guess the only option would be to get
19 a dispatcher to call them and say can you run this in Versadex ---

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

21 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- and tell us what you have.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And would that be part of the protocol or
23 the routine to try to ---

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well ---

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- expand your informational sources?

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, there's not anything written in black
27 and white.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** You're just trying to think as much as you
2 can what can we do here to gather more information.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** You know, if that was the case, I would
5 say to Jennifer, or she may -- if I gave it to her, she would probably delegate to
6 someone else and say ---

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

8 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- call in HR right away ---

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

10 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- see what you can find out.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Do you think it'd be a good idea for the
12 risk manager not only to have access to PROS but also the Versadex database ---

13 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Oh, yeah. Yes, for sure.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

15 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And be well trained and well versed in it.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. So you had told us, and I
17 interrupted you, about something called PIP, the Police Information Portal.

18 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Could you fill that in for us, please, so that
20 we don't have an inaccurate picture of what type of information and database the risk
21 manager would have?

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, on the PROS screen itself, when
23 you go in to search an occurrence, there's a more detailed portion down below, you can
24 select. There's a checkmark, Police Information Portable -- Portal, sorry.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** No.

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And there's also CPIC, that kind of thing,
27 you can check. And if you wanted them to run all those databases at one -- with
28 somebody's, you know, information.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

2 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** So you could run it on PIP and see if you
3 can get anything with respect to, say, her name, or if she had any occurrences in
4 Halifax regional area and that sort of thing.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So there is a way sort of to backdoor the
6 Versadex ---

7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Somewhat.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- database.

9 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** But it's not as detailed information.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

11 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right.

13 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** You're not going to get the information
14 you're going to get if you were actually on Versadex.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. I understand there's some sort of
16 functionality issues to you accessing ---

17 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I don't know if that's it, or it's -- there's
18 restrictions on how much data they're going to release through that portal. I don't know
19 how that works.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Does that sound like a problem to you,
21 Staff Sergeant, in terms of access to information at the early stages of a critical
22 incident?

23 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, it could be, if -- yeah, if we need --
24 we should be querying as many databanks as we can that are available to us.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. All right. Let's move on then to
26 paragraph 70 with respect to the process of the complaint. We've got the initial
27 complaint, we've got your efforts at the PROS databank system, and efforts to try to
28 ping the phone.

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.
2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Paragraph 70,
3 "Risk Manager Rehill's notes appear to briefly
4 reference [...] information received from [...] children
5 that someone in a police car had shot their parents..."

6 So there is additional information coming from children at this point,
7 Staff Sergeant?

8 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I'm sorry, you're at paragraph 70; is it?

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yes, 7-0.

10 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Okay.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** "Risk Manager Rehill's notes..."

12 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah. Yeah, sorry, yeah.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** No, no, that's okay.

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** "... appear to briefly reference the
16 information received from the children that someone
17 in a police car had shot their parents:
18 We received a second call of another shooting again
19 it was stated a police officer was shooting people."

20 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes, but I believe a second shooting in
21 that 123 Orchard was the first and then 135. This came from the children that called
22 back in around 22:16, I believe.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Very good. So we have a second call
26 coming from 135, wherein a police officer was shooting people. And I guess what I'm
27 going to ask you as the risk manager, you now have a second source of ---

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- information. What -- about a police
2 officer was shooting people. What did that lead you to think at that stage?

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, again, you're still quite puzzled, but
4 I kind of considered that the same occurrence that came in because it was the children
5 of Jamie Blair and Lisa McCully. And they were describing what they had seen. The
6 real occurrence that made me think what is going on, we have something serious here,
7 was when the MacDonald's call ---

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah, we'll get to that in a second.

9 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Sure.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I guess what I'm going to ask you about
11 paragraph 70, when the second call came from the children, did that have any bearing
12 or impact with respect to whether this was a fanciful or a mental health call, from your
13 point of view?

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** No, no.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** No.

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** For me, that was conclusive, that we
17 have something going on here that's involving a police car ---

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- or something to that effect.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And I think we got to nail that down with
21 respect ---

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- to the mental health call ---

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- or the potential that this was not a
26 serious critical ---

27 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- incident.

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** When was that decision, from your point
3 of view, made?

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, that was just a thought. Like I said,
5 I mean, I believe we had something serious going on, that people saw what they saw,
6 and then when the kids said this, I said, there's something to this. This is not a mental
7 health call.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

9 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** But I'm not in touch with Donnalee across
10 the hallway, like, you know, like I could talk to her person-to-person, but ---

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

12 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- Jennifer is -- and I are working
13 together.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And when you say Donnalee, you mean
15 the call-taker ---

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Call-taker ---

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- Donnalee Williston?

18 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- Donnalee Williston, yes.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And Jennifer MacCallum, the ---

20 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes, yeah.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- Dispatch Supervisor?

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay, very good. I just wanted to make
24 sure we had that correct. I want to now go to the topic that you just alluded to when you
25 felt things were serious, and that is ---

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- the Andrew and Kate MacDonald.

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So at paragraph 81, this is
2 referenced in the Foundational Document to at 10:28, Carol Howardson, who is a
3 dispatcher in the OCC?

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

6 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** On the call -- on the call-take side, I
7 believe.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Oh, forgive me. She's a call-taker.

9 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** She transferred the call to me, yeah.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. And so this is interesting to me
11 again. You're getting a direct transfer from a complainant or somebody engaged in the
12 actual event?

13 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. Once again, tell me about that. Is
15 that a regular type of occurrence? We're at paragraph 81.

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah. But she -- I thought she had called
17 first, and then at some point she transferred it to me. But yes, sometimes, yes, if they
18 have, I don't know, say for a public complaint, for example, somebody's irate with an
19 officer, they'll transfer them through to me, or if they feel that there is information that
20 the Risk Manager needs to know like right now, and you know, they'll transfer them
21 through, that kind of thing, and they'll let me know, "I'm transferring so-and-so to you."

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And would that be an assessment of the -
23 - of the severity or the relative seriousness of the event?

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes, yeah.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. All right. So you took the call, and
26 I want to direct your attention to page 35, and the quote in particular, where—at the top
27 of the next page, Madam Registrar, there we go—Risk Manager is associated as
28 saying, "Do you see a car?":

1 "Did you see a car?"

2 "K MacDonald: 'Yes.'"

3 Now, this is a conversation with Kate MacDonald?

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Can you give us the context of
6 that, please, Staff Sergeant? What was the nature of the call? How was it going on?
7 How were you were exchanging and receiving and filtering information?

8 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes. Well, I believe that they saw
9 something they -- that they needed to call in for, and obviously, they're -- they had been
10 shot at, she said, by someone in a -- she thought it was a cop car shot at them. So
11 when I say, "What" there, like I don't want to lead her and say, "Was it a police car?", I
12 say, "Well what", you know, "did you see a car?" "Yes." "What", and it's:

13 "Somebody in a cop car shot at us."

14 And again, I say:

15 "In [the] cop car."

16 And she says:

17 "We thought it was a cop car, I don't know."

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So that's important information.

19 Now, a third source of information ---

20 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- with respect to ---

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- the cop car?

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And what did that mean to you at that
26 point, Staff Sergeant?

27 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, it's conclusive to me we have
28 something very serious going on and it could be one of our police cars involved.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And were you putting your mind to
2 what type of police car that would have been involved at this stage?

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, it would have to be marked
4 because people are talking about stripes. Then we're trying to nail down what type of
5 stripes, like that kind of thing later on; right?

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm. Okay. Continuing on in the quote,
7 there's a question from the Risk Manager:

8 "Did you see any roof lights..."

9 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:**

11 "K MacDonald: 'No.'"

12 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And then it continues on. Why was that
14 question asked?

15 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, because they said they saw a
16 police car in the yard, and we're trying to determine is this actually a marked car or is it
17 something that maybe resembles a police car that people thought was a police car? So
18 I'm asking about roof lights, if they -- if they saw anything, and they said they didn't,
19 which is understandable in that scenario with what's going on there.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. Okay. And once again, for
21 purposes of me trying to get a sense of what the Risk Manager was thinking at that
22 point in time ---

23 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- what can you tell us?

25 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, I thinking, do we actually have one
26 our police cars that's being used or one of our members that's doing this, you know.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right? Now, I understand at some
28 point in time after this call, you would have made arrangements to engage the Critical

1 Incident ---

2 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- Commander?

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I knew at that point that we have
5 something very serious and I have to get this rolling.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. So what's the -- what -- how do
7 you get it rolling?

8 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, again, the CIC on-call is Jeff West,
9 but I -- I contacted Staff Sergeant Halliday immediately.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. Now, that's what I want to ask you
11 about because I got the sense earlier if a critical incident you call the Critical Incident
12 Commander.

13 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** But in this case, you call the District
15 Commander.

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I believe I delegated this incident, "Can
17 somebody call Staff West while I call Staff Halliday?"

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And the purpose for doing that,
19 Staff Sergeant, was what?

20 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, to simultaneously get them
21 educated on what's happening and let them know what's really going on here.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And can you tell us, then, about
23 your conversation with Staff Halliday?

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, I called Staff Halliday, and I
25 remember one of specific things I said to him is, "First, you know, I'd never joke about
26 you", or something like this. I said, "We have an active shooter." And I think he was
27 probably as we were when the initial call came in as to the details that were surrounding
28 it; right? And he kind of went silent, and I said, "Steve, we have an active shooter, and

1 it's in a small community." I said, "We have four confirmed dead, I believe at this point,
2 and one person wounded or injured."

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. And did you advise him with
4 respect to the preliminary investigative steps you had taken?

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes. I said, "We're getting information
6 that someone in a police car or a police officer is shooting people in the small
7 community of Portapique." I said, "We have no idea what's really going on here. We
8 got to get on this right away and try to get to the bottom of it."

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. With respect to your
10 communication and engagement with Kate and Andrew MacDonald ---

11 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- would -- that information you had told
13 us or told me earlier was significant in terms of ---

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Oh, for sure.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- information of ---

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- what you thought was a critical
18 incident. I presume, or can you tell us about any communication you had with Staff
19 Sergeant Halliday about that discussion?

20 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, not only did we have initially Jamie
21 Blair saying it was a copy car in the yard, and then the children, which you're still saying,
22 Okay -- and it's very dark there, I understand, and they got -- in releasing what they
23 thought they saw, is it -- what is it? Is it those white cars we used to -- that are
24 decommissioned out there? We don't know at what point what are they calling a cop
25 car. And then the Dave Lilly comment, like, I'm saying, what is going on here? Do we
26 have a police officer out there or did a police officer's car get stolen? So I'm saying to
27 Steve, "This is -- this is the second", I guess I could say, "independent witness." Apart
28 from the initial occurrence at the Blairs and the McCully's, I said, "We now have a

1 second person who was able to call us and say 'it looked like a police car' they were
2 shot at. She said her husband was hit in the arm or the shoulder area, and that it
3 looked like a cop car." And I'm thinking -- it's overwhelming to think that that's
4 happening when you're a police officer of so many years.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** No, I understand that.

6 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** But with respect to the exchange of
8 information with respect to Andrew and Kate MacDonald ---

9 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- to Staff ---

11 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes, I passed -- I passed it on because I
12 knew -- that's what prompted my call.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I said, "Okay. Now, we have two -- we
15 have people dead, and now we have somebody saying in a different location in the
16 community away from there that they were shot at, but it looks -- by somebody that
17 looked like a police car." So I called him right away and said, "We" -- like, "we have
18 something very serious going on."

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And what kind of details would you have
20 provided to Staff Halliday with respect to the whereabouts and the ongoings of Kate and
21 Andrew MacDonald?

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, I said that they -- "She stated that
23 they got shot at", and "are you able to leave the community?" At some point I believe
24 she said, "He went back in the community", meaning the person in the car.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** What about hospitalisation and/or
26 availability or access to Kate and Andrew MacDonald later?

27 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I don't know what we discussed at that
28 point. I just -- the fact that we have this going on, and we knew that we were going to

1 be activating.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So there has been information
3 provided to the Commission from other sources with respect to a debriefing by Staff
4 Sergeants Halliday, Carroll and MacCallum at around 3:30 a.m., after a meeting with
5 the Contact Team ---

6 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- when they debriefed the Contact Team
8 at the Great Village Firehall ---

9 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- in which those members indicate that
11 when they became aware by one of the members of the Contact Team that there was a
12 shooting of Andrew MacDonald, they were surprised and didn't know of that information.
13 Are you able to make any comment on that?

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I don't know how, I mean, because I
15 know that that's -- that call is what prompted me to contact Halliday right away and get
16 the situation, like the, you know, the Critical Incident Command Package up and
17 running.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I don't know. For no other reason that,
20 you know, for him, just probably like me, it was so overwhelming to think that this was
21 actually happening and could one of our police cars be involved. Whether he didn't
22 hear that or whatever, but I know I said, "We have somebody who was shot in the arm,
23 her husband was shot in the arm, and he said it looked like a cop car." So that was
24 what prompted my call, in addition to the initial ones; right?

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Because once we got there, like we had
27 to take time to get there. By the time we get there and then started assessing this ---

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- you're well into well after 10:30, and I
2 call him at 10:35.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. And the length of that conversation
4 with Staff Halliday was how long?

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** About seven minutes, I believe.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And was there any reason to believe
9 there would have been a confusion or inability to understand what you were
10 communicating to him?

11 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I didn't know it at the time, I guess I do
12 now, but I didn't know that he was confused or missed any details or anything to that
13 effect.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. All right. Have you had the
15 opportunity to review your notes? Did you make any notes of this conversation, in
16 particular, the details of Andrew and Kate MacDonald?

17 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, that's where, you know -- all the
18 calls and telecoms on the landlines are recorded, and the radio stuff's recorded, all the
19 radio talk, and when I look back on it, I can see the synopsis of what we talked about.
20 So I'm think at this point I must have called him on the Risk Manager cell phone as
21 opposed to the landline if it wasn't recorded because that's -- the Risk Manager phone
22 is not recorded. So I -- you know, I was scribbling notes here and there, and then later
23 on I was off for a whole week, so I really didn't get a chance to make any thorough
24 notes until I returned to work, but I know that that was the crux of it right then and there.
25 We had four dead and one wounded.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

27 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I passed it on.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. All right. Let's move on then to the

1 characterization of the police vehicle, because this is something that has been
2 significant in terms of information provision amongst human beings ---

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- and command decision in terms of
5 what they were thinking.

6 At paragraph 82:

7 "RM Rehill's handwritten notes reference his call with [...]
8 MacDonald. He characterized the perpetrator's vehicle
9 as being a 'possible police car'...

10 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Now, that's an interesting expression,
12 "possible police car", given what you've said to us ---

13 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- up until this point. Is there a diminution
15 of your thinking with respect to it being a police car by that adjective "possible"?

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, when you go back to what Kate
17 MacDonald says, that:

18 "We thought it was a cop car, I don't know."

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

20 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And there was a number of times where
21 people said, "I'm not sure."

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

23 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** That kind of thing. So we're still trying to
24 say, okay, conclusively, can we say this is a police car? So I said it's possibly a police
25 car.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

27 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** So we have to try to now account for our
28 vehicles.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm. And what are you thinking at that
2 point with respect to the status of the car?

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Again, still -- we don't know if it's
4 something that looks like a police car or if it's actually one of our police cars.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. Paragraph 83 is interesting,
6 Staff Sergeant, in the sense that it attributes some comments to you:

7 "In his interview with the Mass Casualty Commission, RM
8 Rehill similarly recalled his exchange with Kate
9 MacDonald..."

10 And I'm just going to read this quote over, because I want to ask
11 you about the "decommissioned car" component of the quote.

12 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:**

14 "She and her husband were in a car and I can't
15 remember if it was leaving the community or going into
16 the community, and her husband was shot as [the] car
17 passed, and she said, 'I think it could have been a police
18 car, it looked like a police car.'"

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:**

21 "So, then we're still back to, 'I think it could have been ...
22 I'm pretty sure it looked like a police car.'"

23 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And this is what I want to ask you about:

25 "And then there was actually people in Telecoms who I
26 think knew of this guy because there is some of them live
27 out in that rural area, and they said, 'That's the guy that
28 collects those decommissioned cars.' So, then

1 everybody said, 'Okay, that's what we're looking for, one
2 of these white, Ford Tauruses.'"

3 Now, I need you to comment on that, if you would, please, with
4 respect to the engagement of folks in telecoms and the knowledge about ---

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- decommissioned cars? Are you able
7 to make any remarks on that?

8 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well firstly, when I say telecoms, I think --
9 I just know the information came from somewhere other than my screen. They were
10 talking and somebody said:

11 "That's that guy that collects decommissioned police
12 cars."

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And we still have the fact that she's still
15 saying, "Well, it looked like a police car." So we're not conclusive at that point. But
16 when you think in terms of we do as police officers, and especially 30 years like me,
17 okay, I can say -- like, I give the analogy of different police departments. You know,
18 somebody might say to you, "Oh, I saw a police officer here," or, "Somebody pulled me
19 over there." I'll say, "Was it --" you know, "Was it Halifax Police or RCMP?" "Oh, I don't
20 know. I don't -- what's the difference?" Like, you know, some out there, they do think
21 that way. They can't really tell the difference between a municipal police officer, an
22 RCMP officer, and they'll say, "well I didn't really make note of that."

23 So in my mind, and I think in all of our minds, we're starting to think,
24 "Okay, this is something I conceivably say -- think that a lay person would say looked
25 like a police car. It has those stripes." Because the decommissioned police cars, when
26 they're decommissioned and sent out there by auction, when you see them around,
27 whether they're cab drivers driving them or somebody else, you can look and you can
28 clearly see the remnants of the stripe kit and you can see the scar where the buffalo

1 was, and even the car number.

2 So we're starting to think, "Okay. Is this what they mean by a
3 police car? Is that what he's driving?"

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. And that's why I was interested in
5 it, because that seems to me, in terms of the narrative, to be the first introduction of the
6 word "decommissioned".

7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Up until this point, ---

9 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- we didn't hear that phraseology.

11 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** No. No.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And are you able to give us some insight
13 as to why that decommissioned phraseology emerged at this point?

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well because there's so many out there.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And even one of the members on scene
17 said, "There's a lady just up the road that serves documents. She has one of those."
18 So we started getting in this thought process, okay, you know, the benefit of the doubt
19 to the people, they're saying it's a police car, but is that what they're calling a police
20 car? Because if he drove this car around the community on a regular basis, they're
21 probably saying, "There's that old police car."

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** What about the person in telecoms or the
23 source of the information in telecoms? Can you give us any insight about that? I.e.,
24 "This is the guy that collects those decommissioned cars."

25 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And I don't know if that came from them
26 talking, or it was actually callers or stuff on the --- because I'm ---

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I've got so much going on. They're doing

1 a lot of research in the background too.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** So maybe that's where -- because I know
4 one member stop him in one of those decommissioned police cars.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So this is important, and you made
6 reference to it, what -- and when you say "so much going on", what do you mean "so
7 much going on", at this stage of the process?

8 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well there's phone calls coming in, I'm ---

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Phone calls from where?

10 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well I'm trying to talk to S/Sgt. Halliday,
11 get off the phone with him, then I'm trying to reacquaint myself with what's happening,
12 where are we now?

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** At one point S/Sgt. MacCallum wanted
15 me to call him. At another point, I had to call -- or Richard Ellison was on the phone
16 asking for me.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

18 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And then I talked to -- I talked to Kate
19 MacDonald prior to that and then I was talking with Lisa Croteau in tele ---

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

21 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- in Media Services all within that hour --
22 -

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- and try to manage this crisis that's
25 going on.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah, all right. Very good. We'll continue
27 on to paragraph 84, which is along the same theme about the vehicle -- police vehicle --
28 how shall I say -- the characterization of the police vehicle.

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:**

3 “Between 10:29 [...] and 10:30 [...] RM Rehill was
4 speaking [with] Kate MacDonald, [and] CAD ‘Remarks’
5 were added to the Jamie Blair 911 call [...] by [...] Patrick
6 Brent, who was still on the line with the Blair and McCully
7 children...”

8 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** At the very bottom of that CAD remark, it
10 says:

11 “com saying they are seeing logs falling from the fire...”

12 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Oh.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Com ---

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Oh.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- saying -- it says “cam”, but I believe ---

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- it’s:

18 “[com] saying the soc veh[ichle] looked like...”

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** ---

21 “...a cop car with the symbol on the side”

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So you see what I’m suggesting you here

24 ---

25 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M’hm.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- is that once again, we have a
27 diminution of the original description of it being a fully marked police vehicle, ---

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- to something that looks like a cop car.

2 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Can you have any insight for us as to how
4 that ---

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well ---

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- may have occurred?

7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- I think that Brent is referring to the kids
8 as the complainants, is he not, there?

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

10 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Was he on the phone with them?

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah, yeah.

12 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** They say:

13 "...he is a psycho' they say the house was bought by
14 him"

15 And then down below you get into that conversation about "looked
16 like a police car".

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

18 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And again, we know from the members
19 on the ground there that it's so dark you can't see your hand in front of you, apparently.
20 And I'm just wondering, you know, and we're thinking, okay, like, I just said before, is
21 this what they refer to as a police car?

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. Okay.

23 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Because there's stripes and you can see
24 the buffalo on the side, although it's just kind of white, but you can see the shape of it
25 and everything.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. And then I'm going to continue on
27 in the same thing by moving us to paragraph 85. And this is the transmission of Cst
28 Patton, who at that time, would have been engaging with the MacDonalds. At

1 paragraph 85 on page 36/37.

2 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** At 10:30:21, Cst Patton:

4 "It's somebody names [...], he has a car that looks like a
5 police car, he's 50-60 years old."

6 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Now, would you have been listening to
8 the comms at that point from Cst Patton or would you have been in a position to hear
9 that?

10 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well it is 10:30 and I know I spoke to
11 Kate MacDonald right around this same time, so I don't know if I'm on the phone with
12 her at that point ---

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- Yeah.

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- in time at all. But again, we're getting
15 back to -- and I don't know where he got that from.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

17 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Did he get it from somebody in the
18 community? Did he get it from one of the other members? And then again, you're still
19 kind of in that realm, okay, it looked like a police car. He has a car that looks like a
20 police car.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And it was common knowledge. He
23 drove these cars. So we're trying to figure out, is that what they mean by this? Is that
24 what they're referring to?

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I wonder -- I was wondering whether that
26 transmission would have had any impact on your thinking with respect to the nature of
27 the police car?

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I think we're still open to everything. I am

1 at that time, because at some point, I said to somebody, "We have to be open to
2 anything. We don't know what's going on here."

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Very good. Then I'll ask you to
4 move to paragraph 88. And this is the incidence of telephone call to S/Sgt Kevin
5 Dunlevy, ---

6 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- to inquire who the DANCO was.

8 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So and I'll read it through for purposes of
10 being sure that we're correct here:

11 "At 10:32:05 [...] RM Rehill called S/Sgt. Kevin Dunlevy
12 to inquire who the district authority non-commissioned
13 [...] (DANCO) for the Northeast Nova district was. [...]
14 Dunlevy referred RM Rehill to S/Sgts. MacCallum and
15 Halliday."

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:**

18 "...Rehill described his initial understanding of the scene
19 to S/Sgt. Dunlevy as follows..."

20 And page 38, the top of page 38, if you could scroll up, Madam
21 Registrar? Thank you.

22 There's comments attributed to you, Staff Sergeant, as follows:

23 "...yeah well no, they're, they're saying someone in a
24 police car is shooting people and we can't nail it down.
25 But we don't think it's a police car. I think somebody's
26 mixed up here but, [...] on scene right now there is, there
27 is victims..."

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So this is your conversation with Dunlevy
2 in terms of accessing district command.

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** But you have made a conclusion or a
5 comment at this point that I would encourage you to comment upon, ---

6 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- that you did not think it's a police car.
8 And the reason I'm asking you that is because we've gone from fully marked police car,
9 ---

10 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- to looks like a police car, to now we
12 don't think it's a police car.

13 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well ---

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Are you able to give us some insight on
15 that?

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well what I meant in that situation was it
17 was not -- I don't believe it's a fully marked car ---

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Ah.

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- identical to what we drive.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Ah.

21 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** That it could be this, you know, older
22 police car with the scar tissue on it and the stripes you can still see. That kind of thing.
23 It could be that we're looking at. And that's what lay people may refer to, ---

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

25 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- because they might say, you know,
26 the guy who owned it, he has them, he drives them in the community, that's the guy with
27 the police car. So we think is that what they're meaning here? Is that their thought
28 process? Because we still don't know yet. We haven't encountered this car. We don't

1 know for sure exactly what they're talking about.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Somebody is mixed up there. Any
3 comment on that?

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** That's what I meant by, like, yeah, I don't
5 know -- they have to be mixed up. Because, like, if we had a missing marked police
6 car, we would have heard about it, like, one of the district commanders, whoever had
7 that car home, would have reported it. If it was out of New Brunswick, for example, they
8 would have certainly notified us that we have a police car missing. That would be
9 serious -- that would be something that'd be communicated immediately to everybody if
10 we had a missing police car.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. All right. Paragraph 89,
12 "According to the notes of [Staff] Halliday, he was
13 contacted at his home by Risk Manager Rehill at
14 10:35."

15 This is what you referred to earlier.

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I would like to ask you just a -- a number
18 of questions with respect to what we touched on earlier. Why is it that you're not calling
19 the CIC and you're calling Halliday?

20 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, because I know they're going to be
21 involved and he's the DANCO. Because Staff Sergeant Dunlevy had left us and gone to
22 the Northeast Nova Office as a DANCO, so I had communicated with him, I say,
23 "Who's" -- I didn't even know he was off at the time. He said he was off. He had
24 surgery or something, I think. I didn't know he was off. I thought he was the DANCO,
25 so I called him first. He said, "No, it's Halliday." And so I contacted Halliday and I
26 advised somebody to -- said, "Get on this and call Staff Sergeant West, like ---"

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Did you ---

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And I don't know who that would be. I'm

1 just barking out stuff at that time; right?

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I hear you. Did you ever speak to CIC
3 West at that point?

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Not at that point, no.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

6 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** No.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. I'm wondering if the line of
8 command from the risk manager's point of view, and I want to be direct in how I ask
9 you, whether your first response was to the district command as opposed to the critical
10 incident commander, and I ---

11 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** It looks like it's to district command and I
13 want you to make some comment on that.

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, yeah, I'm calling district command,
15 but I'm asking for them to contact CIC at the simultaneously, so we can get as many
16 people notified right now as we can.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. But that introduces a third person,
18 right ---

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- to explain the circumstances. And you
21 as the risk manager with your direct exposure to what was ---

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- going on here ---

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- the kids, the Blair call, and the Kate
26 and Andrew MacDonald ---

27 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- situation ---

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- wouldn't that have been more effective
3 for you to call the CIC directly?

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, it may be, maybe not, but I'm calling
5 Halliday, and I said to him ---

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- "Staff Sergeant West is coming in on
8 this one for sure, so, you know, you guys need to get rolling." So I briefed him on
9 everything.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

11 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And he wanted to get going as fast as he
12 could on it.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. I think we've covered that then.

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** It's 11:08. I don't know about you, but I'm
16 a little tired. I ---

17 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Sure.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- would think we should take a 15-
19 minute break and then resume with respect to the topic of perimeter and containment.
20 Is that all right with you?

21 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Okay. Certainly, yeah.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Great.

23 --- Upon breaking at 11:08 a.m.

24 --- Upon resuming at 11:26 a.m.

25 **--- S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL, Resumed:**

26 **--- EXAMINATION IN-CHIEF BY MR. ROGER BURRILL, (Cont'd):**

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Sergeant Rehill, we have talked about
28 initial contact with the call, initial thoughts with respect to the police car, and your

1 contact with the detachment command and the critical incident commander.

2 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I'm going to move on now to another topic
4 entirely, perimeter setup and containment.

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** That's fine.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And for purposes of reference, I'm going
7 to take us to paragraph 99 in the Foundational Document.

8 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And Foundational Document speaks
10 about a portion of a transcript on the Colchester radio that we have now actually
11 brought up on screen from about 10:43:59, and it's an engagement of Staff Sergeant
12 Rehill and a number of participants with respect to containment placement.

13 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** What I'm going to do is play the audio,
15 and you can follow through on the Colchester radio. I think we've accurately described
16 it. So after we hear the audio, I'm going to ask you a few questions about what we've
17 heard and what was going on; okay?

18 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

19 **[AUDIO PLAYBACK]**

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So, Staff Sergeant, we've heard an
21 excerpt of initial containment efforts being made by the risk manager at that stage.

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And what I think it is, is describing
24 directions to members with respect to locations in the Portapique area for purposes of
25 perimeter containment; am I right in that regard?

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** That's correct, yes.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So in terms of the information that
28 you're accessing with respect to Five Houses, Bayshore, Hillview Lane, how are you

1 getting that information?

2 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I'm looking at my map.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Ah, tell us about the map, please.

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, the mapping is right on the 9-1-1
5 system. Like, when the call comes in and it's dispatched, the dispatchers -- again, I
6 don't know how to do this, but they -- there's a star on the location of where the
7 occurrence is, so the members -- the mobile workstations and the GPS capabilities, if
8 it's in the area they're not familiar with, they can just use that and take them right to it.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

10 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** So when I'm looking at that map, I can
11 spread it out, or make it smaller, that kind of thing. I'm looking at Highway 2 and where
12 should be we be putting people with respect to this occurrence for containment.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. Would you have any familiarity
14 with that particular location in Portapique?

15 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Not really, no.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** No.

17 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Because I got to say, I'm supervising the
18 whole province, like, you know, I don't know all the rural areas and ---

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Oh, I'm sure.

20 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And I understand that. In terms of your
22 knowledge of the area then, it's coming from the maps, is it, that you're ---

23 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- consulting at that point?

25 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah, and then a general idea that's
26 Highway 2 that takes you to, like, Five Islands or three -- or Bass River ---

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- all the way through to Parrsboro.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. Would there have been any other
2 source available to the risk manager for purposes of familiarization with perimeter and
3 containment other than the mapping system that you had at that point?

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, there's also -- excuse me -- Google
5 Maps that we can reference, just by using the internet, and there's also Pictometry we
6 call it.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

8 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** It's a program that the dispatchers, again,
9 get that up and running for you, for the most part, and they have a big screen, a huge
10 screen TV right over where Jennifer is, PP08, right above there, there's a big screen,
11 and there's a computer between myself and Jennifer. I believe Jennifer's over there
12 getting it up and running, and you can see a topographical -- looks like a satellite image
13 map, but probably better quality than you'd see, like, on Google Maps.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So ---

15 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** It's more clarity and that kind of thing;
16 right?

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** At 10:44 ---

18 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- when this transcription -- or, sorry, this
20 broadcast was provided and transcribed, what mapping are you looking at specifically
21 for placement of these officers?

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I'm looking at mine right in front of me.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And that's ---

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Because I'd have to be looking like this to
25 -- you know, and I'm trying to ---

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

27 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- see what I have there and where
28 should I put people.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Sure. And you've referenced Pictometry,
2 you've referenced Google Earth and my map. Which one was it and ---

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** My map on the 9-1-1 ---

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** The 9-1-1 map?

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah, the 9-1 screen, the map, yeah,
6 where ---

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

8 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- where you're seeing the call and that
9 kind of thing. You can also switch from that over to more of, like, a similar to what
10 Google Map looks like. You can see the trees ---

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

12 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- and that kind of thing; whereas ---

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- opposed to just a beige road and that
15 kind of thing, you know.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. And that was my ---

17 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- next question for you.

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** There's a satellite view, topographical
21 view, standard ---

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah, you can switch ---

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- view, animated views, are you able to
24 comment on what kind of views ---

25 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, it looks like -- when you're right-
26 clicking, you switch over to what I call the satellite view ---

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- it's, like, you're looking right down on

1 the community. You can see -- if you zoom in, you can see the houses, the trees, the
2 roads ---

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- everything; right?

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. Did you do that ---

6 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Oh, yeah, yes.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- at 10:44?

8 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes, yeah.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. So in terms of placement of
10 these members, you had indicated at 10:44:25 that you were going seal off Highway 2,
11 and there was an exchange of information with Constable Grund ---

12 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- that's referred to in paragraph 99. Now
14 I understand that there may have been some misunderstanding, from your point of view,
15 with respect to the sealing off on the east side of Portapique ---

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- and can you provide us any insight into
18 that?

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, yes, and it looks to me, like, there
20 probably was a misunderstanding. When I say looks like Hillview Lane might be a good
21 spot -- because after I say we're going to seal it off, right away Grund says, "I'm on my
22 way." And when I'm listening to that video -- the audio, I find Grund and Carroll sound a
23 lot alike.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

25 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** In any event, he says, "I'm on my way."
26 They're out at Highway 4 and the 102, at that point, near Masstown.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Which leads coming from the community

1 out to the main highway. He says, "I'm on my way." And then I'm speaking with Carroll,
2 "Do you want to 29-Bravo-01 and then seal off Highway 2 towards Parrsboro." And we
3 talk about that, but at some point, I say,

4 "Looks [...] like Hillview Lane might be a good spot,
5 there's an intersection [...] of a small side road, that --
6 it might be a good spot to seal off -- don't want traffic
7 in there."

8 That's the east end.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

10 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And Grund's coming in from the highway,
11 and those were my directions to him. And then Carroll, we talk about the west end and
12 Five Houses Road. Because I'm looking at my map, and beyond Five Houses Road, I
13 can't see anywhere where if he went across the river that he can get out beyond that;
14 that he has to access either Bay Shore Road or Five Houses Road to get to the main
15 road, Highway 2.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. But my concern, at least, was with
17 the potential misunderstanding about containment on the east side of Portapique.

18 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Are you able to comment with respect to
20 that engagement with Grund in that regard?

21 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, that's where I wanted him to go,
22 and I guess in the busyness of the moment, so to speak, that maybe it didn't get
23 clarified good enough and he went past that, I believe.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. All right, very good.

25 And your understanding of containment on the west side was what?

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Five Houses Road and Bay Shore that it
27 was all set up and we were in good position there.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And your understanding of

1 perimeter on the east side was what?

2 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** My understanding was Grund was there.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay, okay. Would you be able to mark
4 or locate where Grund's vehicle was on your CIIDS system?

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, yeah. I'd be able to see -- like, if he
6 stopped somewhere, I'd be able to see his car number.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

8 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And if I touch it, I think, with the cursor, it
9 gives you the GPS coordinates and that kind of thing, and who's in it, like.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

11 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. But were you able to confirm that
13 Cst. Grund was actually at Hillview Lane, like you had anticipated him going to?

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, obviously now not. I mean, I
15 thought he was there. Again, I was continuing with trying to manage.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

17 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And sometimes you make assumptions
18 that, yeah, he went there, and then maybe he didn't.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I understand, okay.

20 With respect to information you would have had at the Risk
21 Manager's desk about the Blueberry Road, ---

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- are you able to make any comment on
24 what you knew about Blueberry Road?

25 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I knew nothing of it.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Paragraph 100 in the Foundational
27 Document is a excerpt from your interview with the Mass Casualty commission. The
28 final five lines say:

1 "You have to come out Portapique Beach Road,
2 which goes to the main road, and the others, you can't
3 access the main road from the mapping that I had.
4 So, that's where I had all the containment set up. But
5 again, without local knowledge, and like, maybe
6 there's a little dirt path that he could have driven on, I
7 don't know, right. And that's the challenges we face
8 in rural policing,..."

9 So with respect to that comment, "You can't access the main road
10 from the mapping that I had," ---

11 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- you know, hindsight 20/20 we know
13 that there was access to that main road.

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** How is it that you weren't able to observe
16 that, and do you have any comment on the quality of the mapping that you had?

17 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** The quality of the mapping with the 9-1-1
18 mapping system, was good quality.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

20 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I mean, and when you do look at it, you
21 can zoom in.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

23 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Like, you can -- just a little wheel on your
24 mouse, ---

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- you can bring it right down and look.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** So then sometimes, like, I'd cross-

1 reference to Google Maps and say, okay, could that -- it's just another source of
2 information. Could there be something there that's not on ours, or vice versa?

3 So I did look at the Google Maps and I zoomed down. And Google
4 Maps, I don't really care for it in the sense that it tends to show you what looks like
5 roads that aren't roads, they're not there.

6 And so when I looked at Brown Loop, for example, you couldn't
7 access it from the community, that I knew of. And looking at the maps, that was
8 consistent with what I -- you know, by looking at that, said, "You can't get there. You
9 have to come to the Portapique Beach Road to get back to the main road." And I
10 looked elsewhere. The Google Maps, for example, I zoomed right down. And you'll see
11 these, like, grey tubes or something, I mean they come down -- and it looks like a road,
12 but then when you zoom in, they're kind of like translucent grey; you can see through it,
13 it's all trees. There's no road there at all.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So when you said, "You can't access the
15 main road from the mapping that I had," ---

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- was that reference to what we now
18 know is the Blueberry Road; your degree of knowledge about that Blueberry Road?

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, I didn't see anything called
20 Blueberry Road; I didn't see any paths that I thought could -- you could traverse a
21 vehicle through or manoeuvre any vehicle through, ---

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

23 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- without going through Highway 2 to
24 Portapique Beach Road.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So given what we know now, ---

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- two years later, ---

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- as we look back on this tragedy, ---

2 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- can you make any comment with
4 respect to the quality of the mapping that you had, or would you prefer not to?

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, I understood it was -- and it is --
6 quality mapping. Sometimes, I guess, maybe some of these paths and trails are so
7 rigid or -- what's the right word I'm looking for? That you wouldn't -- they wouldn't show
8 on a map anyway, like, regardless. Like, there may be trails cut through some bushes
9 or something, that kind of thing. That's why local knowledge is important for members
10 on the ground that know the community well and that kind of thing, right?

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** That's a good point with respect to local
12 knowledge, because you reference that in your statement as well.

13 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah. And none of the members told me
14 at any point, "Well, you know what, down there, wherever, you might be able to get out
15 there". We didn't get that from any of the members.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** From the Risk Manager's point of view,
17 how could you possibly access local knowledge about the blueberry field road, given the
18 circumstances?

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, other than, like I said, the members.
20 If one of the members knew. Like, I know that some members probably swung through
21 there here and there. And, like, you know, it's a fairly quiet community so they probably
22 weren't in there on a regular basis.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** What about access to additional or other
24 local knowledge; DNR, local fire -- volunteer firefighters, local EHS folks? Any way you
25 can possibly envision that type of information being available to the risk manager for
26 purposes of ---

27 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, ---

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- full and proper containment?

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- I wouldn't be doing that. If anything, I
2 would ask a dispatcher or somebody, try to get them on the phone if that was the case,
3 right?

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** That didn't occur, though, this time.

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Everyone was so busy, like, you know.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay, all right. So there was a comment
7 made that I heard on the broadcast about "Put a star on it".

8 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Do you remember that? That means
10 something, doesn't it?

11 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** To the members it does. Like, if you
12 want me to go here, they -- the GPS -- I don't know how they do it, but they put a star on
13 it ---

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

15 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- so he can look and -- look and say,
16 "That's where they want me," he goes right to it.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So could that have been done for Cst.
18 Grund with respect to Hillview Lane on the east side?

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, it could have been but it was only
20 minutes from the time he left Highway 2, and Highway 4 -- sorry; Highway 2 and the
21 104, ---

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

23 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- to when he came in. And I look back
24 on it, I think it was -- there was 10 minutes from the time he went from there to -- or 8
25 minutes, to Portapique Beach Road. I suppose it could have been done but, again, in
26 the -- just in the busyness of the moment and stuff, and ---

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And I'll finish on this particular issue with
28 respect to Grund.

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Because we know that Cst. Grund went to
3 Portapique Beach Road ---

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- and Highway 2, ---

6 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- and set up there with the other
8 members that were out there that occasion. Any way of double checking where he
9 might have been in order to get him back to the east ---

10 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, looking at -- looking at the road
11 itself, if his car's not there, I could be saying, ---

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

13 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- "Where are you? You were supposed
14 to go here," wherever.

15 But, you know, to be truthful, ---

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yes.

17 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- I didn't think it was a huge concern
18 because I truly believed that you couldn't -- you couldn't get out anyway. That our
19 people -- if he's going to try to make a run from that community, he's going to come out
20 this way and we're going to need several members there, if what we think is going to
21 unfold is going -- unfolds.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

23 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** So it wasn't a huge deal to me that he
24 wasn't there at that time.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right, okay, thank you.

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And we still believe he's in the
27 community.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Great, I appreciate that.

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** With respect to perimeter containment,
3 who's responsible for that at this early stage in the proceedings?

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** It would be me, Risk Manager.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah, okay.

6 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** But also, this is an exceptional event, so
7 when S/Sgt. Carroll is up, and Sgt. O'Brien is up -- I mean up and working, like, on the
8 air.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

10 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Halliday's involved. I know that S/Sgt.
11 West was voicing some things from his car on the way. There were several of us
12 working together.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And there's a wealth of knowledge and
15 experience among all of us.

16 For instance, S/Sgt. Carroll might come on and say, "Well, put
17 someone here, there." And you might be saying, "Well, that's a good idea," or
18 whatever. So it's kind of a real team effort at that point.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. We'll get to that in a minute.

20 In terms of your listening to the radio at that stage, I assume it
21 would be relatively acute, given the placement of ---

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- members and locations.

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And information coming from those
26 members would be significant to you, in terms of placement and so on.

27 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. I'm going to turn to paragraph 101

1 and -- sorry; the next audio clip I'm going to play for you is the audio clip of 10:48:41, as
2 shown here in the transmission from the Colchester radio.

3 If we could play that 10:48:41, please?

4 **[AUDIO PLAYBACK]**

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Very short -- very short clip, Staff
6 Sergeant.

7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** But I'm under the impression that you
9 were listening to the radio at that stage, for purposes of containment.

10 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** This information is coming from Member
12 Colford, ---

13 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- Cst. Colford, with respect to local
15 knowledge or information. Did you hear that clip?

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I can't honestly say that I did. You know
17 there was so much radio traffic, I very well could have heard it. I don't remember
18 hearing it. I don't recall hearing it at all.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. If you had heard what we have
20 heard today ---

21 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- just a second ago, would it have made
23 any difference to you in terms of your active role in containment and perimeter
24 containment?

25 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, if you look at the time, ---

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

27 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- Grund is on route at that time ---

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- when she says it. And I already have
2 him in my mind going to Hillview Lane.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** So I understood we had it covered off
5 once he got there and he stopped. And what I was looking for, like down around the
6 peripheral part of the community, there's farmers' fields; you can see in the map, you
7 can see what looks like paths when you look, and they're not. And you look like, "Okay,
8 this one called Clarke Road, I was kind of fascinated -- not fascinated but I'd made note
9 of, and I said, "Okay, could he get to that and then get out that way?" So that's why I
10 put -- I assigned him further down so if he does come out that way, he's going to
11 encounter a police car. And if he goes left, he's going to encounter more police cars.
12 So ---

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. My only ---

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- that was my thought process for
15 putting him there.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** No, I understand that and appreciate you
17 explaining that. But my concern is the 10:48 transmission ---

18 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- would give a sense to those in a
20 position of placing perimeter and containment ---

21 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- that there might be an alternate way
23 out as opposed ---

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- to Portapique Beach Road and No. 2.

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And I'm just wondering, you -- you've told
28 us about that.

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Would it have made any difference to you
3 in your thought process if you had heard that?

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** If I had heard that, and again, when I say
5 I don't remember, I don't remember hearing it. But now that I see that, I say, "Well, I
6 had that covered off anyway", until I realised that Grund didn't stop there. So yeah, but I
7 would have been sure that there was somebody there back at Hillview Lane or
8 whatever.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

10 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** You know, the thing that really, I guess, I
11 struggle with that too, is the fact that we don't know, I guess we know now what time he
12 actually left, but we didn't have sufficient information at that point in time to know that it
13 was a fully-marked car like it did, and the photograph we saw the next day shocked us
14 all. And if Grund and Jamieson were there and he encountered them, I don't know what
15 would have happened, it's a hypothetical situation, so it's difficult to answer. So -- but
16 we could have had two police officers executed or maybe they would have made an
17 assumption, "That it's just one of the guys heading back to Great Village", and drove
18 right through. We don't know; right?

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. No, I understand that, and it's
20 perfectly reasonable for that to be pointed out.

21 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** My concern of course by people looking
23 in on this ---

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah, yeah.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- process is the lack of containment on
26 the east side.

27 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And you've provided some commentary.

1 Any further comment on ---

2 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, you know, I have to own that. If he
3 -- if he missed -- that went by and I didn't follow up and make sure that he was there,
4 then, you know, it's -- you know, I -- I don't know want to say that he's at fault, I mean,
5 it's a two-way street, a two-way communication. Like, could he have said, "Staff, repeat
6 where you want me, or I'm here now", like yes, and I could have followed up too, and
7 said, "Chris, are you sure you know where I -- where I want you?", like something to that
8 effect; right?

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. No, I think we've covered that.

10 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Then let's move on, then, to the next
12 thing. And you had actually anticipated my questions when I was talking to you about --
13 -

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- who was in charge of perimeter, you
16 had indicated that you were in charge of perimeter, but sometimes there's additional
17 input ---

18 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- by other people on a command
20 structure.

21 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I want to play for you the Colchester radio
23 clip from 11:00 p.m. to about 11:02. And in front of you now will be the transcript of that
24 audio clip for purposes of the engagement of a number of other members, including
25 Staff Sergeant Carroll with respect to perimeter placement. This is -- this will be -- yeah,
26 let's listen to it at this stage ---

27 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Sure.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- and follow along if you would and I'll

1 ask you to comment.

2 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah, yeah.

3 **[BEGIN AUDIO PLAYBACK]**

4 **[END AUDIO PLAYBACK]**

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So Staff Sergeant Rehill, I want to ask
6 you about the dynamic within that audio transcript, sorry, audio transmission.

7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right. Can you tell me which paragraph
8 it is? I'm trying to find it there because I may have made a note or something on it.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. I don't think we've got this
10 particular ---

11 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes ---

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- this particular audio in the
13 Foundational Document or this portion. We've brought it up, obviously ---

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah, I remember reading it. It's page 55
15 on my document.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Well, you're a step ahead of me, Staff
17 Sergeant.

18 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm. Yeah.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Thank you. Yeah, exactly. This is --
20 yeah, you're -- very good. Paragraph 120, this is the reference to Staff
21 Sergeant Carroll's involvement?

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And I was concerned, or at least there's
24 some concern with respect to either duplication or multiplicity of services ---

25 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- and directions coming from parties,
27 and you had made some comment about that earlier. My sense of this is that Staff
28 Sergeant Carroll was relatively late to the game ---

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- he has less situational awareness than
3 Staff Sergeant Rehill, given your exposure to this from 10:01 ---

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- yet, he takes on what appears to be a
6 directive role in terms of placement of members.

7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I want to ask you, is that the appropriate
9 use of his command at that stage?

10 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, he is the District Commander, and
11 he has 40 years experience. He's very knowledgeable. So I welcome the help of
12 people like that in this scenario. Like if this was a regular, I guess you could say
13 run-of-the-mill occurrence on a Saturday night, and they're sitting at home and they're
14 intervening with their portable or something, then that's, yeah, not appropriate, but in an
15 occurrence of this magnitude I'm more than happy to take the help. He was well aware
16 of it from a call -- actually Jordan Carroll is his son. He contacted him at some point and
17 then Sergeant O'Brien did almost right afterward.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** So whether he said, "I'm by myself up
20 here", I don't know, but we had backup going to him. He -- there was backup there
21 within two minutes.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I understand that, but I guess my concern
23 would be with respect to the role of the Risk Manager as the ad hoc commander at this
24 point ---

25 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right. Yeah.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- and then all of a sudden you got
27 District Command coming in ---

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right, yeah.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- and it looks to me, with the greatest
2 respect, that you kind of back off a little bit ---

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- in terms of the communications. Is
5 that -- is that a fair assessment on my part?

6 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, like I said about the Monday to
7 Friday dayshift, once their people are up and running ---

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

9 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- then they should be managing it;
10 right? And with something of this magnitude and overwhelming, more than -- you know,
11 more than happy to accept the assistance, and if he's on the air now, yeah, well I
12 probably could have started taking a backseat. Then you get O'Brien, who is their OPS
13 NCO, so they have their Number 1 in charge and Number 2 in charge of the district now
14 up and running and working on this.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Staff Halliday is on his way.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

18 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Jeff West is on -- they're all -- they're all
19 coming now; right?

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So in terms of division of labour, if I can
21 use ---

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- that pedestrian ---

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- term ---

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- is Carroll in charge or are you in
28 charge ---

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I'm still in charge, but I think he has a
2 concern with one member being there by themselves at that dirt road, that Five Houses
3 Road where he believes he can see the headlights down the way.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** So -- but I had people on the way, and
6 that's -- that was my intention to get them there anyway, so I guess he wouldn't be
7 aware it. I had my intentions that we were going to start pairing them up. As they
8 arrive, "you go there, you go there." So now, we not only have one, we have two
9 members all together.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Final question. Any concern over
11 duplicity of authority at that stage?

12 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** No, I had no concerns with it.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. All right, very good. Let's move on
14 to another topic, then, the -- your tactical role with the -- with the Contact Team. And in
15 particular, I want to go to paragraph 112.

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Oh, go back.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah, in the Foundational Document now
18 on the screen in front of you.

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Okay.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:**

21 "RM Rehill told the Commission, 'When I read the
22 radio log now that I got it, to me, it just appears to me
23 that I played a fairly ... fairly small role in' directing the
24 IARD members at the McCully residence, other than a
25 direction at 11:14 p.m. to shelter in place and a
26 direction at 11:47 p.m..."

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I want you to comment in terms of your
28 tactical role as a Risk Manager at this stage, your ability to provide instruction, direction,

1 given your access to mapping and resources, to the Contact Team in the community at
2 that point?

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, maybe I used the wrong
4 terminology when I said "small role". What I mean is they're so well trained, especially
5 the guys that went in there, and Stuart Beselt is such a leader that I find I have to give
6 very little direction, if any, when he is working in Bible Hill. And it was such a relief
7 when the call came in. And like, firstly, when I start my shift, I'll see who is working in
8 what district, so I'll say, "Ah, Stuart's working tonight. Great." Because it takes a lot of
9 onus off me because he's -- he is so competent in what he does. He's a strong leader,
10 he's a big guy with a big stature, and he's articulate, so he does so well. So I -- I have
11 to intervene rarely, ever, with them, if at all.

12 So that's what I meant by that, that Stuart's leading the way, I'm
13 confident with that, I can work on other things. I'm listening, but I know what he's doing,
14 and he's going where he should be going, and doing what they should be doing, like the
15 IARD, and loose file going down the dirt road, like that kind of thing; right?

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So with respect to your knowledge of
17 IARD intervention and IARD tactics ---

18 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- did you have any concerns at this
20 stage as to how the Contact Team was acting?

21 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** No, not at all.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** No.

23 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** They were doing -- they were doing a
24 great job.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Tell me, then, please, about your
26 concern, if any, over the engagement of having a second Contact Team enter into the
27 Portapique community.

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Okay. The second Contact Team would

1 be, firstly, contravention or contrary to our training principles. In this scenario, there's an
2 extremely high risk of what we would call "blue-on-blue", like members could shoot each
3 other if they get in there on foot in the darkness, gravel road, a lot of wood, very heavily
4 wooded community. Even at one point, Stuart says, "We're severely disadvantaged.
5 It's pitch black", and I knew that. And there's no second team for that very reason in
6 scenarios.

7 Now, if we had -- let's go to a building, for example, or even a rural
8 community. If we had the bad guy, we know, pinned down in one area, and we know
9 for sure he's there, and then we had activity say two streets over ---

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

11 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- that team would stay put and I'd send
12 a second team, but we didn't have that. We never ever had anything concrete to say
13 "He's active here." Anymore 9-1-1 -- after the MacDonalds, there was no more 9-1-1
14 calls or anything other than, you know. And Stuart was always saying stuff like, "Well I
15 don't know if it's shots or it's fire or what it is."

16 So and the second thing too for me as a Risk Manager, extremely
17 difficult to try to manage that if I did that. Like, once the members leave the police car, I
18 lose sight of them.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** What do you mean by that?

20 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, the police car has the MWS and a
21 GPS, so I can see where it's going, I can see what road they're on, how fast they're
22 going, the whole works. But when they leave that car, that's it. It's -- to me, I'm just
23 lost. I -- you can't see them. Like, there's a technology out there that the portable radio
24 has a chip in it, or a GPS chip that I can see all three of them, say, marching down the
25 road together. But we didn't have that technology that night and that was extremely
26 stressful for me and high anxiety to say, "I don't know where they are."

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So you couldn't track these members ---

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** No.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- individually at all in the Portapique
2 community?

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** No. Not at all.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So with that disability, how could you
5 have any tactical or operational role with those members?

6 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Other than just voicing and staying up to
7 date with what's happening, and where you are, and the dispatcher is responsible for
8 that too, as to their location. It's highly stressful for me. I don't know where they are.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. That being the case, in terms of
10 their operational undertakings, you're also dealing with the perimeter at that point, I
11 understand, ---

12 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- continuously and ongoing?

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Is that right?

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes. Yeah.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Is this too much for one person at this
18 stage in the proceedings?

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, like I said before, this is
20 unprecedented. It's the worst mass murder in Canadian history. It's a crisis beyond
21 thinkable to comprehend it. It was a lot for me, yes. But that's why I say in this
22 scenario, when Al Carroll had come on the air and Andy O'Brien, ---

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- that was a relief in the sense that I
25 have some help here; right? Al Carroll, also, has worked several shifts as a Risk
26 Manager. So he has a lot of know how.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I understand that, but -- and I'm -- and I'm
28 not personalizing it, ---

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- was it too much for you. I'm
3 attempting to ask you, is it too much for the Risk Manager in the context of what
4 everything was being balanced at this time at around ---

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- 11:00 p.m.?

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** It's a lot. It's a lot for me. I mean, yeah, it
8 was a lot. And one person did say to me, "They put way too much on you."

9 So I mean, looking back on that time, you think you're doing well
10 and that kind of thing, and you were, you were doing everything humanly possible to --
11 your heart, your head, your soul, everything was into this, and you're trying to locate this
12 guy and put a stop to him. And it was frustrating, the fact that the number of resources
13 kept showing up and, like, at one point, more members went down to Faris Lane. And
14 we never once encountered this so-called marked police car. Never saw him. So,
15 yeah, it was frustrating. It was a lot.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. I want to go back to containment,
17 or the actual containment, and I'm going to refer you now to the Containment
18 Foundational Document that was also ---

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Oh, okay.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- produced. This is a separate
21 document ---

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- entirely. And the purposes of referring
24 this to you is for your comments with respect to the ultimate placement of members in --
25 -

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- and around the community ---

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- so that we can have a sense.

2 The containment points in and around Portapique Document
3 paragraph 14 is a statement I just want to put to you for purposes of confirming
4 locations of members at particular locations.

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:**

7 “The intersection of Five Houses Road and Highway 2
8 was contained between 10:51 [...] and 9:42 [...] on April
9 19[th] [...]. At least five general-duty [...] members [were]
10 stationed at the head of Five Houses Road during that
11 time...”

12 So the operative time that that document indicates Five Houses
13 Road was 10:51:43. Does that accord with your understanding, generally?

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Cst Jordan Carroll. Yeah.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. Paragraph 19 indicates that:

18 “The intersection of Bay Shore Road and Highway 2...”

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:**

21 “...was contained between 11:04 [...] on April 18[th] [...] and 9:42...”

22 Is that your understanding as well that accord with your
23 understanding that the Bayshore Road was at 11:04?

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes. Cst Dow went there. Travis Dow.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Thank you. And I'm just going to continue
26 on with that to make sure that we've got things correct.

27 Paragraph 23 says:

1 "Highway 2 was contained near civic address 7787..."

2 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:**

4 "...between 12:01 [...] and 4:58 [...] on April 19[th] [...]."

5 And then there was some movement. But the operative time is
6 about 12:01. Does that ---

7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- accord with your understanding? That
9 location at 7787 on the east side was at midnight or thereabout?

10 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah, in the document, that's what it
11 states.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. From your understanding and your
13 review does it sound right?

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Paragraph 26, continuing on in the
18 document:

19 "Highway 2 near civic address 7276 [Highway 2]..."

20 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:**

22 "...was contained [at around midnight] 12:01:08 [as
23 well]."

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah. Yeah.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Does that accord with your
26 understanding? That would be Cst MacDonald and Cst Dubois. Does that sound about
27 right to you?

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes. Yeah.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And then paragraph 27:

2 “The intersection of the eastern prong of Brown Loop and
3 Highway 2 was contained between 5:02 [...] a.m. and
4 9:51 a.m. ...”

5 So that’s around 5:02 or 5:00 a.m. before that particular intersection
6 gets contained. Does that sound right to you as well, Staff Sergeant?

7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well again, I was nowhere near in charge
8 at that time. So I guess that’s when they must have put somebody there.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. I guess what I wanted to put to you
10 directly, Staff Sergeant, is it appears that the western side of Portapique got contained
11 relatively quickly and efficiently.

12 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Are you referring to the other side of the
13 river?

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yes. The western side ---

15 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes, yes.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- closest to Parrsboro.

17 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** The eastern side closer to Truro would
19 appear not to have been contained until about midnight. So some significant passage
20 of time.

21 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Do you have any insight into that? And
23 was there an effort made to prioritize that? Or is that just going back to where we were
24 earlier?

25 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** The mic just fell off the side.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Oh.

27 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I’ll just lay it there.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Sure.

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Again, when I said we needed the
2 containment and Grund said "10-4 coming" and I said, "Hillview Lane", that's where I
3 wanted him. And again, ---

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- it's really only until recently, when I'm
6 doing the review, that I got my head around that, because there was so much
7 happening.

8 But again, like, in my mind, when I looked at it and I did my analysis
9 of the maps, I said it's kind of a moot point because he can't get out without coming to
10 the main road.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

12 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And I remember, that's why I was
13 confused when we found out that was -- like, "What? I know I had people there."
14 Because I remember seeing the cars on the map, and these are the people that you just
15 showed me here. You can see, like, one or -- I think two cars here and two cars there.
16 And I said, "There's no way he's getting out." And everything indicated to us at that time
17 that he was still in the community, with the activity -- the activity in the Five Houses
18 Road, and then you had the call on Faris Lane saying, "There's somebody in our yard,"
19 and flashlights, and everything that was going on after the fact. Maybe the sounds were
20 ammunition detonating in people's houses ---

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- because it's a rural community.

23 So we all believed he was still in there. And, you know, the fact
24 that Grund came in, and maybe there was an extra hour there where there was nobody
25 up that way, when I truly thought that he can't get out anyway.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

27 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And then once we had them there, I said,
28 "Okay. We're all set." Like, "We're good."

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

2 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right?

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** We're set -- although, Staff Sergeant,
4 you'll agree with me, there was some significant delay ---

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- on that east side until about midnight?

7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** That may have made a difference, in your
9 view? Or were you prepared to comment on that?

10 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I can't -- I deal with realities.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

12 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I can't comment on hypothetical
13 scenarios. I can't predict an outcome for it. So I don't know.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

15 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I really don't know.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** No, fair enough. All right. Thank you. I
17 think that ties that down. And I had wanted to make sure that we'd had a chance to look
18 at that Foundational Document to ensure where we were.

19 I want to go now to paragraph 131 of the Command Decisions
20 Document, talking about first responders seeking instructions.

21 So at paragraph 131, at 11:14, ---

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:**

24 "...the first-responding RCMP members on the ground in
25 Portapique sought instructions from RM Rehill on how to
26 proceed:

27 ... BESELT [...]: Staff REHILL..."

28 I said Rehill. I'm sorry about that.

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:**

3 "...Staff REHILL, do you want us just to sit tight here
4 [be]cause, if this is active shooter I don't want to ah, I just
5 don't know where he is right now."

6 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:**

8 "...Staff REHILL [...] The best thing we can do is all
9 shelter-in- place the best we can, ERT is on route. Um,
10 Staff HALLIDAY's heading to Colchester. Ah, do as
11 much as we can just to stay safe for now until ERT
12 arrives on [the] scene."

13 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Now that's a direction coming from you ---

15 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- with respect to the IARD, ---

17 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- in terms of what you're telling them to
19 do, ---

20 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- even given the experience of Cst
22 Beselt.

23 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** What does S/Sgt Halliday's heading to
25 Colchester make any difference under the circumstances here?

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well the fact that we got things up and
27 running, the CIC is being activated, ERT's on the way, Jeff West is on the way, and right
28 now we don't have anything positive to indicate where he is.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

2 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Like for instance, if we had obvious
3 activity that we know conclusively, ---

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- I would be saying to them, "Leave that
6 house and go there."

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

8 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** "Move the team to that point." But we
9 don't. It's what we call the situation has gone static, like, in the sense that we don't
10 have anything conclusive of any activity of where he might be.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah, no, I understand that. And I get the
12 direction that is to shelter in place. I'm just wondering about the concern or the
13 comment about Halliday's heading to Colchester. Did that may any difference in terms
14 of your decision to have them shelter in place?

15 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Not really, no. I'm just kind off -- I'm
16 throwing it out there that, "We're rolling, guys. Don't worry."

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

18 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** "We have the help coming," I guess.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** No.

20 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And he's their Ops NCO.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah, thank you. And I was just
22 wondering whether it had any impact with respect to command structure, ---

23 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** No.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- whether you waiting for Halliday to get
25 situated so that you could hand over your ad hoc Critical Incident Commander status ---

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** No.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- situation to him? None at all?

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** No. I'm just saying, like, "For now,

1 shelter in place, be safe with those kids.”

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I don't want the kids going out if we don't
4 know where he is.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

6 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And if we do get activity, they're going to
7 have leave -- at least leave one with the children and the other two will go look,
8 something like that, but we didn't have that. So I'm saying let's just stay still until we see
9 if there's any more activity.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Let's move on to paragraph 132 in
11 terms of your discussion with the IARD or the contact team members.

12 "Shortly [...]after, [...] 11:16:29 [...], Cst. Beselt
13 inquired as [...] whether there['s] a way to warn the
14 residents in the area..."

15 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And you'll see where he makes that
17 inquiry.

18 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And then Rehill, at the top of page 62,
20 Staff Sergeant Rehill says ---

21 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- that,

23 "They[re] using the 911 map to call as many as they
24 can to tell them to shelter-in-place."

25 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Now, we've had some people comment
27 about the 9-1-1 map here over these ---

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- course of these proceedings. What is
2 the 9-1-1 map, and how did it assist you in sheltering in place, and do you have any
3 familiarity with this system or the ---

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, it's ---

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- process before?

6 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- it's the map that we work with, that I
7 work with too.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

9 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Like, for instance, when you have the
10 community of Portapique, like I said, if you zoom down, it's with the regular -- what looks
11 like what I'm working with at all times. I haven't switched over to a different mode of it,
12 or whatever.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** You can zoom down, and you can see,
15 like, little houses along the road and ---

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

17 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- and there's -- if you go close enough,
18 you'll see the civic numbers. So the operators -- and again, they took them on
19 themselves to do that. I found that out from them, and I thought, well, that's a great
20 idea. Like, they ---

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- Jennifer and Alex Benoit, they're very
23 experienced people. They decided among themselves, let's start calling people,
24 because you can -- like, our PROS databank is getting there with respect to it's been
25 around long enough that we have tons of data in there. And, like, you query 121
26 Portapique Beach Road, for example, and in most cases, you're going to see a name
27 and phone number, that kind of thing. So they would call it. I don't know what else they
28 cross-referenced. There could be something else to cross-reference ---

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

2 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- but they're calling people and saying,
3 "Stay in your house. Go to your basement. Lock the doors. Don't answer the door
4 from anybody," is what I understand they were doing, something to that effect, like.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah, and I got the impression from
6 reviewing the materials and listening to other witnesses that there was something called
7 a reverse 9-1-1 system referred to. Is that something you're familiar with?

8 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Not at all.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So was it your sense that this was sort of
10 an ad hoc effort made under the circumstances of the incident by the professionals in
11 the OCC to institute some system to contact residents?

12 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I wouldn't use the word ad hoc because
13 they never cease to amaze me the things they can do ---

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

15 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- in the system, and how well ---

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

17 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- they know these systems. So I just
18 thought it was something that they're doing, that there's a capacity within there that I
19 don't know about ---

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

21 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- and that they know how to use, and
22 this is what they're using to contact residents.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Is there a regular protocol for an
24 evacuation plan in a disastrous situation like this that the risk manager would be made
25 aware of, or be familiar with?

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, like, we have different things we
27 use.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Like, the ICLEAR model is right here next
2 to me, like, on at -- there's a filing cabinet there, like ---

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- that kind of thing, but ---

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

6 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- evacuate, the E is evacuate, or shelter
7 in place. So ---

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

9 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- in a lot of cases, we're going to tell
10 people to shelter in place.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

12 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Because if there's danger outside and we
13 don't know where it is, especially in the darkness -- you know, one of the things I've
14 learned over the years, an experienced officer, I can't remember who it was told me this,
15 he said, if you don't have an emergency, don't create one. Yeah, well, obviously, we
16 already have an ongoing emergency, but don't create another emergency within an
17 emergency. So if they can shelter in place safely, stay there, because if we say, no,
18 let's evacuate them, and then he's lying in wait and he starts shooting people, they're
19 going to say, "What the heck were you thinking? They were safe in their basement."

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

21 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** You know?

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** No, I understand that. I guess what I'm
23 suggesting to you is it would have been useful to have had a checklist for evacuation
24 under these circumstances that you, as the risk manager -- just like you referred to the -
25 --

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- concepts in the ICLEAR ---

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- to actually attend to a document that
2 would assist you in making decisions on evacuation in the incident of an active shooter
3 in a remote isolated community like this. Do you -- would you agree with me in that
4 regard?

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Are you referring to a checklist of all the
6 residents and we say, yeah ---

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah, sure.

8 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- we know that one's already emptied,
9 that one's already ---

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Or ---

11 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well ---

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- or a protocol on how to access that
13 information, because it doesn't look like there was anything other than sort of generally -
14 --

15 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- you had professionals that were doing
17 their very best to find out ---

18 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- some information.

20 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Exactly.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** You see what I'm saying?

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah. Yeah, I would agree to that. At
23 that time, we're still -- you know, it's still early in the occurrence, and I know that the CIC
24 and them are probably going to be doing something to that effect. They're going to
25 make decisions as to are we going to evacuate, are we not.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

27 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** But I think you're -- are you referring to,
28 like, a -- some kind of a databank that could be created or ---

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I'm referring to anything. I don't know. It
2 just seems to me, at this stage, the reverse 9-1-1 system that has been discussed by a
3 number of ---

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- people in these proceedings ---

6 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- didn't seem to be all that effective or
8 even substantive. That is, it looks to be it was quite ad hoc. And ---

9 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Okay, yeah.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- and I'm wondering if there's any better
11 way to do this, to evacuate, give notice to people on that hot zone or that red zone
12 there.

13 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, there very well could be, and I think
14 that's something that, hopefully, we can learn a new process out of this and maybe
15 some brainstorming and come up with something that's more effective than that.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. No, I hear you. Okay.

17 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** If, in fact, it was, yeah, futile, I mean.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. Okay.

19 The decisions being made with respect -- and I'm going to move on
20 -- to shelter in place or evacuate, at this point, where did that decision rest with? Who
21 had that responsibility?

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, me, for the most part, yeah.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah, when I tell the IARD team to stay
25 put?

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

27 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes, it's me.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. In terms of the IARD team or the

1 contact team contacting people or residents in that community, you were aware that
2 they had some engagement with some residents as they moved ---

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- about that community?

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** What were the instructions to them, Risk
7 Manager -- or Staff ---

8 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, there was a ---

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- Sergeant?

10 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- there was a point there when I asked
11 Stuart Beselt -- I have to be truthful in the sense that sometimes they do things without
12 advising me.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** You know? And they do that because of
15 the autonomy that I give them and other risk managers because they are so well
16 trained, and they make sound decisions.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

18 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** They're well trained.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

20 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And I believe it was Al Carroll asked me,
21 at some point, are we for evacuating. I had to ask Stuart Beselt. He said, well, we have
22 some, we have evacuated some houses.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And I -- he said, "We haven't cleared
25 them," in the sense that they didn't go through every room to make sure the bad guy's
26 not in there.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** They just got people out of the house, if

1 they chose to leave. Some people wanted to stay put.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. But that's kind of what I'm getting
3 at.

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** There doesn't appear to have been a
6 decision made from a command level down to the contact ---

7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- team on what they were going to do.

9 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah, like ---

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** It appears that it was left with the contact
11 team.

12 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes, for instance, we didn't order people
13 out of their houses.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

15 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Like, we didn't say to them, "No, you tell
16 them they have to come."

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

18 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** "And if not, arrest them for obstruction
19 and get them out of the community." We didn't do that, like ---

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. But nor did you order them to
21 shelter in place at that point.

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** No.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** No. The decision was left with the
24 contact team?

25 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. Okay. Very good.

27 All right. Let's move on then to another topic of substance,
28 paragraph 138, Madam Registrar, speaks about RCMP Air Services helicopter.

1 Paragraph 138 characterizes a discussion that was had where the risk manager
2 became aware at 11:16:53 that there was no air support available from RCMP Atlantic
3 Region Air Services. Do you recall that, Staff Sergeant ---

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- Rehill?

6 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes, yeah.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** That must have been an important piece
8 of information for you and maybe even somewhat concerning. Are you able to
9 comment?

10 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes, it was very concerning that this is
11 something that would be, you know, very helpful to us and it wasn't available, so it was
12 frustrating, yes.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Are you able to comment with
14 respect to your experience as a risk manager in terms of the availability of air support?

15 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, I haven't, to be truthful, a whole lot
16 of experience with Air Services as a risk manager. I mean ---

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

18 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- many times, like, if there's a lost
19 person, for example, and it may be just, you know, coincidental sometimes that when
20 we do need them, it's down for maintenance, or they have -- they're very strict about the
21 number of hours they're allowed to fly, so they could be grounded because they have
22 too many hours in for that month, or something to that effect ---

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- or just regular routine maintenance.
25 So when that happens, we -- our contingency plan is to go to, like, it was KNX's DNR,
26 let's get a hold of Department of Natural Resources.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And ---

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Sorry.

2 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Sorry, go ahead.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** No, no, were you surprised at the
4 unavailability of air support at this point?

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, more so disappointed I guess is the
6 right word; right?

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I know, but I used the word surprised.

8 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Do you have a comment on that?

10 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Not really because, like, I don't know their
11 schedule and how they work. They're in New Brunswick as opposed to Nova Scotia,
12 but the fact that they weren't available, you know -- I don't know if I would say it's a
13 common theme, but it certainly has happened before.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Is that a concern for you, Staff Sergeant?

15 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Oh, yes. I think they should be available
16 24/7, if we need to staff enough pilots to the -- if one person's maxed out, then you're on
17 deck, or whatever; right?

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah, so in terms of unavailability of the
19 RCMP helicopter, would there be any contingency plans provided to you in advance of
20 a critical incident like this, or ---

21 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** No.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- or any information given to the risk
23 manager about not available between day 1 and day 10 ---

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Okay.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- and you need to know about that.

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah, so ---

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** That's what I want to know.

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- I know what you're saying now. Yes.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

2 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** That does get communicated that they're
3 not ---

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- available, but I -- at that -- like, I didn't
6 know that.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

8 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And I guess our -- the rest of our people
9 didn't know that. So then we deflect to DNR to see if they'll come; right?

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So what's your point of view with
11 respect to I think you said 24/7 with respect to ---

12 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- air support? This is a problem, or this
14 is not a problem?

15 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, this has obviously exposed issues
16 that need to be addressed. For instance, if you have a pilot that's maxed out for their
17 hours, then we better have somebody else available ---

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- and maybe two or three available,
20 because if the next guy is -- you call him and he's down with illness, then you need
21 somebody else. And if we need -- and if the aircraft is down for maintenance, well, then
22 maybe we need more aircraft, so when one's down for maintenance, there's another
23 one available. But I believe, you know, we should have people ready to go 24/7.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. In terms of contingency, I think
25 you've mentioned it ---

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- tangentially that it wasn't available,
28 you're going to do something in terms of a contingency or a response.

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** What was that?

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** The Department of Natural Resources.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I believe -- one of the dispatchers
6 probably called them for me, and they said they wouldn't cover an active shooter
7 anyway.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So you're given another handcuff
9 here that is ---

10 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Another roadblock, yeah.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah, another roadblock. What do you
12 say about that, Staff Sergeant?

13 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, again, it's frustrating. So like,
14 getting back to this, you know, and understandably, DNR aren't police officers, so
15 maybe, you know, we shouldn't expect -- we shouldn't expect them to come in a
16 scenario like that, or we shouldn't be surprised if they say, "We're not coming in that
17 scenario." So if we had what I just mentioned available, we wouldn't have to contact
18 them, and our guys would be -- you know, they're trained to deal with -- they probably --
19 maybe they could do some scenarios with (inaudible), how are you going to play this
20 with respect to air services.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I think that that's certainly something that
23 needs to be looked at, and that -- the fact that we had no air services, no pilot available
24 in this scenario, for me, as an organisation, I don't think that's acceptable. I don't.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** It needs to be addressed.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. Okay, let's move on, then, to
28 another topic. I think we've covered the air support issue.

1 Paragraph 141 and 142 talk about a second Contact Team going
2 into that community.

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Paragraph 141:

5 "At 11:20:08...[Cst. Grund] radioed from the head of
6 Portapique...Road, asking if another team should be
7 sent [in]..."

8 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** At 11:20:08, Cst. Grund says:

10 "Risk Manager. Should we be sending in another
11 team to help out there?"

12 One-forty-two (142):

13 "Risk Manager Rehill did not immediately respond to
14 Cst. Grund's broadcast, as he had called Cpl. Lisa
15 Croteau..."

16 So we've got a member looking for direction from the Risk
17 Manager, and the Risk Manager not being available because of dealing with other
18 obligations ---

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- Lisa Croteau, Public Communications.

21 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** That seems like a, you know, significant
23 request by a member offering services to get there and ---

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- so on, but you're not available.

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** That seems problematic to me.

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** What about somebody else that could fill
2 in for purposes of making decisions in that regard?

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, like I said, this being a different
4 scenario all together, and Andy O'Brien answered because I was on the phone with
5 Corporal Croteau trying to get something together to get out to the public ---

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- and gladly -- glad that night that he
8 was there to answer them. He knows the concepts and the training of IARD and that
9 sort of thing, so ---

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

11 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- he did answer. And at that time, I had
12 my headset on talking to her through probably the main phone. So when that happens
13 and the radio sound isn't coming through your headset if you're on the phone; right?

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

15 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Because my headset is hooked here up
16 to my phone, so when I'm talking to her, I'm not going to hear that unless -- like, I can
17 hear it, yes, but it's white noise, you know what I mean? I'm trying to concentrate on
18 what I'm saying to her ---

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

20 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- and they may be asking for something.
21 And in some cases, I recognise it, and say, "Stand by", and go to them, but in this
22 scenario here, Andy O'Brien was right there to pinch hit for me.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. So O'Brien pinch hits for you and
24 he, at paragraph 143, says:

25 " Hold off on the second team, I only want one team in
26 there..."

27 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Is that consistent with what your

1 understanding would have been and what your direction would have been?

2 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah ---

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- (inaudible).

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Are you and O'Brien corresponding
6 before he takes up this position?

7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** At some point, we've -- well, I can't
8 remember if he called me or not, but we talked a couple of times throughout the night.
9 But that's what I mean by I welcomed their assistance because ---

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

11 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- Carroll and O'Brien and West, all of
12 them are so experienced. There's nothing any of them did that I would feel like they
13 were stepping on my toes or intervening or making a call that I would never make.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

15 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Everything they said was, "Yeah, I would
16 do that. Yes, I would do that."

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right, and I understand that, and I
18 appreciate your commentary on that.

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I'm just trying to get a sense of how
21 there's a construct of a line of authority because it looks like ---

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- O'Brien just picks this up ad hoc on the
24 basis that you were busy with Croteau.

25 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** No ---

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Am I mistaken in that regard?

27 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, when he realises I didn't answer the
28 first time and he knows it has to be answered, he steps in.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

2 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. What about the possibility of
4 having somebody consistently, routinely, always on the line to deal with issues ---

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- coming from members ---

7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** That's right.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- as opposed to the Risk Manager
9 dealing sometimes with member's calls, sometimes dealing with public comms calls ---

10 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- sometimes dealing with other calls,
12 children's and family services calls.

13 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** What about that idea of one guy for those
15 members to contact?

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** That's right.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** What do you say about that?

18 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** That's a great idea, and I can -- I've been
19 giving it a lot of thought, and I think that in the future that -- and the CIC I guess is
20 somewhat like this, but at the OCC now in Dartmouth, that when we get a serious
21 occurrence then we have a cadre of Risk Managers that are available to come in so
22 that, like for instance, "I'm just responsible for looking at this map and the containment
23 and what the members are doing. All these extraneous activities, calls coming in, you
24 handle those. You, you're responsible for these." And we'd work as a team.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. And you've indicated that you have
26 worked as a team. My sense is, however, and ---

27 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- correct me if I'm wrong ---

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- is that the particular roles of different
3 team members wasn't as defined, perhaps, as well as it could have been. Is that an
4 inaccurate ---

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, probably at that time is I'm doing it
6 all.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

8 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** But when they got up and running, I can
9 see where MacCallum had a role, and so-and-so had a role. So I think at that time,
10 later on, yeah, there's distinct roles, but for me, I'm kind of trying to manage it all at that
11 time.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. Okay, let's go to paragraph 167,
13 please, Staff Sergeant. And this is again a question about command and
14 communication of who's got command:

15 "At 11:45:29...on April 18, 2020, Cst. Bill Neil inquired
16 about who had command of [the] RCMP operations in
17 Portapique. He sought guidance from the risk
18 manager on what members at the head of Portapique
19 Beach Road and Highway 2 should be doing:

20 NEIL...: 'I don't know who's got the Command.'"

21 "CARROLL...: '[Rehill] Staff REHILL has Command,
22 folks...'"

23 "NEIL...: 'Staff REHILL from NEIL we've got five
24 members down at the end of Portapique...Beach
25 road, at number 2. Give us something to do.'"

26 My concern here is that you have an active member involved in the
27 operation ---

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- he has a confusion about who is in
2 command as of 11:45:29.

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Does that surprise you?

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Not in the circumstances because we do
6 have me on the air and we have Carroll on the air, who he knows is District Commander
7 ---

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

9 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- and he hears Andy O'Brien, who he
10 knows is OPS NCO.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

12 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And in fairness to him, he just arrived
13 from Pictou County, coming over Mount Thom and into the area, so he's hearing several
14 voices on the air of people of ---

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- higher rank than him. So it's a fair
17 question in that I don't think he's trying to slight me at all in saying, "Are you in charge or
18 are you not?", he's trying to say, "Okay. Have you guys took this and Rehill's stepping
19 back, or like, who's in charge?" And so he just voices it's Rehill at this time.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** But isn't there a -- an established protocol
21 that the Risk Manager would be ---

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- in control ad hoc of the critical incident
24 until West gets there?

25 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes, but like I said ---

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So that's why I'm asking the question.

27 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** How is it that a guy like Neil, a member ---

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- could be confused?

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Because of the sheer volume or the
4 magnitude of the incident, there is so many of us involved, I think that's what caused or
5 created that confusion.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Okay, paragraph 168, there's a
7 decision made at 11:47:12 by Staff Sergeant Rehill, and this is right in the middle of the
8 quote, Staff Sergeant:

9 "REHILL...: 'If we can guys, get them out of there if
10 it's safe to do so, if [it's] not, somebody's got to
11 stay...and protect them.'"

12 This is talking about the kids.

13 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So there's a decision made within minutes
15 of the -- of the dispatch by, excuse me, of the broadcast by Constable Neil ---

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- there's a decision made by the Risk
18 Manager to actually send folks in.

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Can you give us some insight into how it
21 was that the authorisation of the second team emerges immediately after the members
22 are saying, "We need something to do"?

23 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Can you back it up a bit so I can see the
24 top part of that?

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Of course. Of course we can.
26 Paragraph 168.

27 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:**

28 "...the IARD team...discussed what should be done

1 about the Blair and McCully children..."

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:**

4 "...who were at that point sheltering in the basement
5 of the McCully home in Portapique. RM Rehill
6 suggested either evacuating the children or having an
7 RCMP...stay with them:"

8 Okay, so:

9 "...– is anyone with the children..."

10 Then Patton says, "10-10" because I believe they left -- this is the
11 point where they may have left for that Faris Lane call.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

13 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Constable Merchant says:

14 "That's what we're saying; [we're hearing] gunshots
15 so we left after them. We think someone should go
16 back..."

17 So like I said before, when they're sheltered in place or whatever,
18 they hear the gunshots so they have left.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

20 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** The team's going to where they think
21 there could be a threat. And Beselt says, "Well..."

22 "...get them out of there [all together] – then we don't
23 [got] to worry about them..."

24 So yes, I see what he's saying, but if they're safe in the house in a
25 basement, but there was a time there when they left and nobody told me they left the
26 kids.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Oh.

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I said -- I said, "Pardon me? What?"

1 They said, "No, they left. They're on foot." And I was surprised that had they -- that
2 they had done that, did they not leave a member with the kids ---

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- so they weren't in that house by
5 themselves?

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** So they returned at some point, and from
8 there on, I said if they leave, they're leaving somebody with those children. So I'm just
9 at the point now where I'm saying, "Okay. Right now, I don't have an emergency within
10 an emergency, so don't create one." So the kids are in the basement, they're safe, and
11 if we put a member with them I think they're fairly safe. So do I take them out and if bad
12 guy is around or laying in wait and he starts shooting children, then -- like I'm constantly
13 balancing options, "What do I do here? Should -- do I do this? If do, what could
14 happen?" So if that did happen, they'd be saying, "What the heck were you thinking?
15 They were safe in the house. Why did you take them out?" So that's just why I'm going
16 back and forth with them. That's why I say, "If it's safe to do so, if you guys are
17 confident that you can get them out safely, then by all means go ahead and do it. But if
18 you don't think it's safe, then not."

19 And I think later on, just what they thought were shots across the
20 road, I think Patton or Merchant says, "Well if the shots don't take them out." So this is
21 what we're dealing with; right?

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** No, I understand.

23 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** We're trying to assess the risk to get
24 them out of there.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So what I was trying to get determined
26 was what was the change from paragraph 167 to 168? That is, Neil comes and says,
27 "We've got something to do. Give us something to do."

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And then at 168, the Risk Manager says,
2 "Well if you can get them out of there, get them out of there."

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And is it your testimony, you're saying at
5 this stage, that once you became aware that there was nobody with the kids, then that's
6 ---

7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- when you made the instruction?

9 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I have this many available to me, ---

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

11 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- and based on the discussion, I come
12 to the point and say, "Okay, if we think we can do it, then let's do it."

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So that's information coming to
14 you from the head of Portapique Beach Road with respect to access to resources.

15 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And you then activate?

17 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah. And then Stuart says, "We'll get
18 them out of there all together if we can." And I said, "Well that's not a bad idea because
19 then we don't have to worry about them anymore."

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

21 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** So then I say, "If we can do it safely, then
22 let's do it, by all means."

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Great. Thank you.

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Can we take a break now?

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Absolutely. Absolutely.

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Is this a lunch break? Are we going to

1 come back and ---

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Oh, yes.

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- then do lunch later or?

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** My goodness, yeah. It's been -- it's
5 12:24. I think we should take a lunch break. And perhaps return what, 2:00 -- 1:45? Is
6 that agreeable? One forty-five (1:45) for people in the room here.

7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Sure.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Is that all right with you, Staff Sergeant?

9 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yes, thank you.

11 --- Upon breaking at 12:24 p.m.

12 --- Upon resuming at 1:45 p.m.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So, S/Sgt Rehill, before the break, we
14 were talking about the position of the Risk Manager and the responsibilities that were
15 associated there to going through the Foundational Document.

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I want to continue along that line for
18 purposes of ensuring that we all have a sense of what was being undertaken that night
19 by the Risk Manager.

20 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** In particular, I want to just move on in the
22 document to paragraph 201. And this is a small point, but it perhaps is symbolic or
23 representative of many chores that are being dealt with by the Risk Manager:

24 " [At] 12:23 [...] ERT team leader [...] Mills and [...] West
25 had received a photograph of the perpetrator. [...] Mills
26 called [...] West and suggested that this photo be sent
27 out as a BOLO message to all RCMP members. S/Sgt.
28 West told Cpl. Mills that he would advise RM Rehill of this

1 request.”

2 So is it ---

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- the responsibility of the Risk Manager
5 as well to manage and disperse BOLOs, or Be On The Lookout information?

6 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah, that would come -- like, one of our
7 dispatchers would do that.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

9 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Like, at that time, he was probably still on
10 the road and en route, so maybe that's why he delegated that over to me. So with the
11 information there, our dispatchers are pretty -- you know, they're very skilled at crafting
12 a BOLO fairly quick and getting that out there.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Sure. I'm just getting the sense that at
14 12:23, you're the ad hoc commander and somebody -- some information is being
15 delegated to you.

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah. Yeah.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** That strikes me as contradictory.

18 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Somewhat, because they're not officially
19 up and running yet. But there is S/Sgt. Carroll, there's S/Sgt. Halliday, MacCallum's on
20 the go, Sgt O'Brien's on the go. But the technology exists at the OCC to get that done
21 fairly quickly and out; right? So ---

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. They wouldn't need to engage the
23 Risk Manager? That could come through ---

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** No, I could ---

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- a supervisor?

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah. Bring it to my attention, I can say,
27 “You know, Jennifer, can you get somebody to put something together?” Something to
28 that effect, and then get it done; right?

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So this is yet another responsibility on the
2 Risk Manager at this early stage in the mass casualty event?

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I don't know if they're viewing it all as,
6 "I'm giving this to the Risk Manager," as opposed to, "I'm giving this to the OCC and the
7 Risk Manager will see to it that it's gets done," like, something to that effect maybe. I
8 don't know. I can't say what their thought process is. But yeah, I mean they put it
9 through us and if they give it to me, then they're confident it's going to get done for sure;
10 right?

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah, for sure. And we had talked
12 earlier, before the break, about you actually engaging in a conversation with Cpl Lisa
13 Croteau from StratComms earlier ---

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- that actually interrupted your ability to
16 receive some information ---

17 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- from members in the ---

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- in the Portapique community.

21 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Are you also dealing with Strategic
23 Communications at this stage?

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah. Well it was about an hour before
25 that, I think, at about 11:30, ---

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

27 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- I think the first Tweet came out.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And in fact, I know people saw it and we
2 actually -- I think we had a call later on, a guy said, "I just saw this on Facebook and I've
3 got six children here." So ---

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- people were looking on social media
6 and were aware of it.

7 So yeah, I was busy with her prior to that, but at that particular time,
8 I don't know exactly what I was doing, other than monitoring the radio ---

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

10 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** -- and watching what's going on.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Would you have had a role in formulating,
12 at this stage in the proceedings, the wording of Tweets or being consulted as to public --

13 -

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, not really.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- distribution of information?

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** No. I would trust them to go ahead and
17 put it together. They may ask me to give it a quick look, but they're fairly, like I said,
18 fairly skilled at putting things together based on the information we have.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Did you have any recollection, Staff
20 Sergeant, ---

21 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I don't have any recollection ---

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- of reviewing the wording of the Tweet
23 initially?

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** No. It probably went out to all the mobile
25 workstations so the municipal agencies get it and ---

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

27 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- everybody knows at that point.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** So yeah, I wouldn't.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Other than Lisa Croteau, Cpl Croteau
3 contacting you from StratComms, did you direct any additional communications publicly
4 during your time as the ad hoc commander/Risk Manager?

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I can't remember. I don't think I did. And
6 if I did, you know, it may be in the document, but I don't remember reading anything or
7 seeing anything.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah, no, there's nothing ---

9 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** No.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- in the document that I have a recall of.

11 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** No.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And that's why I was asking whether you
13 had any?

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** No. And, like, whenever it gets -- we get
15 any kind of significant occurrence, like, obviously nothing compares to this, but I don't
16 know, there's something happening in New Minas or something, and next thing you
17 know, media is calling and they're getting our Media section, so they're calling and
18 they're saying, "Okay. What's happening?" And you haven't had time to even let Media
19 know yet.

20 So a lot of times, if I'm 10-6, what they call busy, the dispatcher or
21 call taker will say, "He'll get back to you," and I'll get a message, "Please call Media
22 when you get a chance." Or something to that effect. So I'll call them, we'll discuss
23 what's happening, and they'll craft something and get it out.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. All right. Let's move on then to
25 some other responsibilities that you may or may not have had. Paragraph 204 talks
26 about the Department of Community Services. And paragraph 228, if we could go
27 there?

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Are you going to deal with -- okay. I'm

1 going to go right to 228.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah, let's go to 228.

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Okay.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Both of these talk about the same topic.

5 Two two eight (228):

6 "..."Rehill called Child Welfare Services to inform them
7 that the Blair and McCully children had been taken to
8 Great Village fire hall. Child Welfare Services again
9 asked for the names, ages, and family members of the
10 children..."

11 As I review the Foundational Document, there appears to be quite
12 an excessive amount of contact between ---

13 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- representatives from Child Family
15 Services and the Risk Manager at this time with respect to the managing and handling
16 of the children that were evacuated from Portapique.

17 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Do you have any comment on that, Staff
19 Sergeant?

20 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well again, you look at it like this, it's like
21 another task that maybe somebody else could be doing. And again, we become kind of
22 like, kind of the melting pot of the building sometimes, where if anything -- they'll get us
23 to deal with a lot of things. But this particular issue, I guess just due to the magnitude of
24 the call and stuff, and how sensitive it was, they wanted me to speak to Child and
25 Family Services, and they're asking for, sometimes, a lot of data that I don't have right
26 now. There's just no way I have it.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Like name, date of birth, and who is there

1 -- you know, like, I'm just saying, like, we just need this now ---

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- at the Great Village Fire Hall. And I
4 believe the plan at that point was to take them to the hospital.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

6 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** So go there. Meet them. I just can't deal
7 with this right now. Just please go out, you know.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Can you give us a comment on your
9 ability to successfully or non-successfully deal with people from Children and Family
10 Services?

11 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Overall, like, we have a strong
12 relationship with them. I mean, we don't have a problem. This ---

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Like, usually that's the standard
15 questions they'd ask, and then usually it's not an urgent emergency going -- on going
16 right now.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

18 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And they were asking questions that I
19 really just can't deal with at this time.

20 So yeah, maybe on that particular isolated incident, it was a bit of
21 frustration, but for the most part, they're good and we have a good relationship with
22 them.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** No, I understand that. I just got a sense
24 from looking at 228 there was a degree of frustration, and it seems to me that maybe
25 this is a job better fit for somebody else ---

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- than the Risk Manager, the ad hoc
28 commander, dealing with kids getting -- sorry, the kids and Children's Family

1 Services getting the names and date of birth ---

2 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- to a functionary at a lower level.

4 Would you agree with me on that?

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes. And in all likelihood, in that
6 scenario, they'd call in and call take receives it and then transfers them to me, as
7 opposed to keeping it over there.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

9 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right?

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. Doesn't seem like a good
11 expenditure of the Risk Manager's time at this point.

12 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Probably not, no.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. Very good. Let's go to page
14 116, paragraph 240.

15 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Two forty (240).

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** This is a short paragraph, but I'm going to
17 play an audio clip of your communication with the ERT team in terms of providing
18 directions and instruction to them and ask you to comment on that.

19 So at paragraph 240:

20 "At 1:23 [...] Rehill called ERT team lead [...] Mills directly
21 to provide [...] directions to Five Houses, there being
22 significant radio traffic at the time."

23 So I propose to present for you the transcript and the audio of that
24 exchange with you and Cpl Mills.

25 If we could, please?

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

27 **[AUDIO PLAYBACK]**

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So, Staff Sergeant, you've heard this

1 exchange between you and the ERT team leader.

2 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** It seems to me to be an excessive
4 amount of time respect -- of providing instructions and directions to get around. From
5 the risk manager's role ---

6 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- is this a good use of your time and
8 your expertise?

9 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, in this scenario, I would say yes,
10 you know, to a certain extent, because I have extensive knowledge of what's happening
11 here at that time.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

13 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And if you notice, the paragraph before
14 that, it says at 1:22, so that's right before ---

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- Jeff West voices he's in charge. He
17 tried it over 1:19 and it was inaudible, so then they go again. So, at that point, I'm still
18 waiting for the official. So at 1:22, and I know that this call has come in, and I also know
19 that Constable Carroll and the others there have seen a car down Five Houses Road
20 they believe with lights flashing, that this very well could be our guy. So with Jeff --
21 giving Jeff the benefit of the doubt that he's just arriving, getting set up, and not having
22 as much knowledge of the community at that point that I did, I said, I'm going to
23 continue here and just to finish up a few loose ends on my part, so I directed him right to
24 that call.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. But I'm concerned about the
26 direction part. It seems like an ---

27 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- expansive time ---

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- when, you know, the ERT team could
3 get there a lot easier without having to talk to the risk manager in Truro about how to get
4 there.

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, yeah, and, like, in that situation, the
6 risk manager -- sorry, the ERT vehicle, like, they call it the TAV ---

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

8 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- I understand there's probably not a
9 mobile workstation in it. If there is, it probably was never -- I don't know if it was up and
10 running or not, but I don't know if they had one. But in that case, if they did have one,
11 and they have it up and running, the star would be there, and ---

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

13 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- they could just direct themselves to it.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So you could put a star on the location ---

15 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah, well, the dispatcher.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- in this case, the Bayshore address?

17 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah, the call taker would do that, or, you
18 know, or dispatch -- I think it would be probably call taker.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

20 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And then he'd see if right in front of him
21 and he's just going to drive down, like any other GPS, it shows I go left, I go right to it,
22 as opposed to me to have to direct him.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. Well, but you did direct him in this

24 ---

25 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- context and you ---

27 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- directed him in this context because?

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, I understand they don't have an
2 MWS, and so he needed somebody to direct him there. And I don't -- I wasn't sure Jeff
3 West was ready to do it at that point.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. Simple suggestion from you with
5 respect to tactical and operational response would be for the ---

6 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** All the ERT vehicles to have the mobile
7 workstations, be well versed in how to use them, and have them up and running before
8 you leave headquarters, or wherever they left for in their -- to the muster point.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So when you're conducting your
10 responsibilities at the risk manager location, did you know that they didn't have this GPS
11 or this compatibility?

12 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I didn't know for sure whether they had
13 an MWS or not.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

15 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Mobile workstation.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. All right. Let's move then to the
17 next audio clip and this is a brief audio clip talking about the transition from the risk
18 manager to the critical incident commander at 1:23 you made reference to.

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Okay, yeah.

20 **[AUDIO PLAYBACK]**

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. That's a short clip but that's a
22 significant clip in terms of your ---

23 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- role as the risk manager no doubt.

25 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** What does this mean to you, Staff
27 Sergeant?

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, at this point, I'm going to step back,

1 and I still play an assistance role. Whatever they need me to do, I'll do it; right?

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** But he's taking over from that point.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. And when you say assistance role,
5 you'll do what you -- needed to be done, how does that work out?

6 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, if they're there, and they're busy,
7 and, like, they have their -- all their tasks delegated and they need me to do something
8 on the peripheral edge, to help out or whatever, they may call me and say, "Can you do
9 this or do that?"

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So your actions at this time are
11 responsive to directions from the CIC at this point?

12 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah, but I'm on a diminished capacity
13 and now I'll go back to managing the rest of the province.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And did you actually do that,
15 manage any other calls that night, at the -- in the rest of the province?

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I have to know outside of that what I
17 might have meant. It was nothing major that would have had a note of it; right?

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. All right. Well, then let's just
19 continue on then in the document with respect to what it was that you were doing in that
20 role as stepping back. At 254, Grund at 1:41, we're at paragraph 254 ---

21 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right. Okay.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- Madam Registrar, page 122. This is
23 just an example. At 1:41 -- and that would have been after the critical incident
24 commander takes over,

25 "...Constable [...] Grund called the OCC and asked to
26 speak with Risk Manager Rehill. Risk Manager Rehill
27 was unavailable and Constable Grund spoke [to the]
28 call-taker Patrick Brent instead. Constable Grund told

1 [...] Brent that the Blair and McCully children had
2 described seeing the perpetrator with "possibly an
3 assault rifle like an AK47 or something in that nature."

4 "

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** "Further, the children "once again
7 described it as a police vehicle." "

8 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** "Patrick Brent indicated he would pass
10 [this] information [on] to S/Sgt. Rehill."

11 I guess my question to you at this stage, this information is coming
12 to the risk manager when the CIC is in charge.

13 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** It seems odd to me that you're ---

15 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- getting this type of information and
17 we're having these difficulties in terms of who gets the proper information for ---

18 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- purposes of making the proper
20 decisions.

21 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah. And that's a good point. That
22 should have went straight to Jeff West and, again, Patrick Brent indicated -- like, I don't
23 know -- it's -- for me right now, it's two years ago, and ---

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

25 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- I'm going through all this, but I don't
26 know that he did pass on. But even if he didn't, I know I remember hearing ERT on the
27 air when they -- at some of the scenes they're saying, "We're seeing what looks like 223
28 rounds here," which is similar to an AK47.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

2 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** So they're aware he had some kind of a
3 serious assault rifle and handguns from ---

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. I suppose at 1:49:31, information
5 coming from the kids at the hospital ---

6 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- followed up by Constable Grund would
8 have been significant information for the critical incident commander; wouldn't it?

9 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah. The only thing different they
10 mentioned was the AK47. That wasn't ---

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

12 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- mentioned back at, like, 22:16. They
13 talked about the police car then but not this rifle.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. But this is important information to
15 get to the critical incident commander and ---

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- I'm not sure it got there. Are you, Staff
18 Sergeant?

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I'm not sure that it did. I don't know. I
20 can't say for sure.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. All right.

22 Paragraph 264, getting into the hour 5 narrative, as your role is
23 diminishing, it talks about at 2 in the morning, Risk Manager Rehill speaks with Tracy
24 Hey, a dispatcher at Halifax Integrated Emergency Services ---

25 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- regarding 193 Portland Street, the
27 perpetrator's residence and denture clinic; do you recall that?

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And what was your role in that,
2 Staff Sergeant, and how was that tasked or assigned to you at that point?

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I don't know how it was assigned to me. I
4 can't remember that, but I do remember talking to them. We were trying to eliminate
5 these four Taurus, because he had three or four, I'm not sure, I think he had three, and
6 we're trying to determine, okay, by process of elimination, where these are, are they
7 accounted for. So there was one there and it was covered with snow, apparently, and it
8 was the GMK9 something, 905 or something, so that was accounted for. And then we
9 had two more burnt at ---

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

11 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- Portapique.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I guess what I'm trying to get at is how is
13 it that you're taking upon this role yourself? Are you being tasked, or are you just trying
14 to find some information, or it was just brought to you by Tracy Hey, a dispatcher at
15 IES? See what I'm trying to say?

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** How is it that you're taking on this role,
18 and is it an assigned role, or is it an assumed ---

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well ---

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- role?

21 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- I think now, looking at it as a I read it --
22 -

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- because it says at 2:01, Rehill spoke
25 with Tracy. It doesn't say I called her.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

27 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I believe she called back through the call
28 takers, and they transfer her to me.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. And then ---

2 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- what did you do with that information?

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** We relayed it on to -- let them know that
5 this car -- and they also had members there.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Sorry, are you comfortable that you
7 relayed that information on to the critical incident commander or the command post?

8 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** One second here.

9 Yeah, well, Jennifer did over the radio.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

11 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** You can see, and on Portland Street, it's
12 the white Ford Taurus. It's not a Mercedes, because at some point, a white Mercedes
13 entered in the picture.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

15 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I think Lisa Banfield had been stopped in
16 a ---

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

18 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- Mercedes SUV at one point.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. Would you have been familiar then
20 with Staff Sergeant MacCallum's efforts in terms of his communication with HRP and ---

21 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** No.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- what he was doing in terms of 193
23 Portland Street?

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** No. They mustered at Bible Hill
25 Detachment, he, Halliday, and Carroll, and eventually made their way to the Great
26 Village ---

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- firehall, so everything they're doing

1 over there, like, I'm not even aware what they're putting together and what ---

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. I'm going to suggest to you that
3 Staff Sergeant MacCallum was actually assigned to be the liaise or the person to
4 communicate with HRP ---

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- for purposes of setting up containment
7 and/or watching 193 Portland Street.

8 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I'm getting the sense that the risk
10 manager didn't know that.

11 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Is that possible?

13 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Is that correct?

15 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I would say so, yes.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

17 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. All right.

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I think that it would have been
20 appropriate for when Jeff West takes charge is to communicate that all incoming
21 messages, correspondence, anything pertinent to this whatsoever, all be directed to the
22 Command Post and the CIC ---

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- and bypass me at that point.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. So in that sense, it appears that
26 you're getting some residual calls, ---

27 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- given your *ad hoc* commander status

1 earlier.

2 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** How do we fix that?

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I guess clearly state in the future that
5 once the CIC takes charge, that everything goes through them.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay, all right.

7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And, again, you know, in fairness there's
8 so many of us working. Grund may have thought, "I've got to get this to Rehill, or to
9 whoever. Like, as long as I get it to somebody..." ---

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

11 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- "...of senior rank". And then -- but,
12 also, we have to make sure that it gets through to the right people.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Well, we had had a number of
14 conversations with other witnesses about the -- using the expression, too many cooks in
15 the kitchen.

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And I put that to you; do you feel that
18 under these circumstances that there were too many cooks in the kitchen, in terms of
19 delivering, filtering, and processing information?

20 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, like I said earlier, like, in a regular
21 occurrence -- like, I shouldn't say regular; none of them are regular, but on a regular
22 Saturday night, a run-of-the-mill call might be -- I don't know, there's -- say there's a
23 fight outside of a bar and there's three or four members responding. If an OPS NCO
24 was sitting at home on a Saturday night and they're micromanaging by having their
25 portable on and they've got a laptop up and running, and they start intervening, wanting
26 to run the show, I would probably say to them, "Step back. I've got this," type of thing.
27 But in this scenario, like we said earlier, of this magnitude, I think we need -- I found it
28 helpful to have them helping me in the system because there was so much going on.

1 But when it comes to the communication and the information
2 getting through, we could easily -- it's obvious we can improve on that, ---

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- and make it clear that everything goes
5 to Jeff West from this point forward, or somebody there working with him on his team.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. So if I said there was some
7 deficiencies in getting information to the Critical Incident Commander, would you agree
8 or disagree?

9 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** It's hard to say either one because some
10 of the stuff may have gotten to -- and I don't know that it did or didn't. Like, maybe
11 Jennifer -- Jennifer broadcasted by the air, and Jeff's listening on that radio talk group,
12 so he should have got it, right?

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Paragraph 271, and I won't read it,
14 and 277, essentially talk about the role of the Risk Manager in the recovery of Clinton
15 Ellison by providing TAV directions.

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And actually provides -- at 277, you'll see
18 a reference to:

19 "R[isk] M[anager] Rehill suggested to ERT team
20 leader...Mills that he pick up the general-duty IARD
21 members while en route out of Portapique."

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And then it recites that transmission. So
24 once again, I'm a little concerned here, I need your insight as to how it is at 2:21, when
25 the Critical Incident Commander has taken over, you're providing instruction
26 operationally on how to get Clinton Ellison out of there and actually picking up the IARD
27 members.

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right. Well, again, I had my head around

1 this quite well by then as to where everybody was in the community.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And when I saw that we had received a
4 phone call from his father and where he was on Portapique Crescent, down at the
5 bottom corner, and we were working on a plan to get the IARD team out of there at this
6 point now that ERT was in there, at some point I just took it on -- and, again, I didn't
7 hear -- I don't know that I heard Jeff west on the air talking about this plan. I'm
8 discussing a plan to get the IARD members out of there.

9 And so I spoke to him; I think I talked to him by phone at one point
10 and I said, "You know, when you retrieve Clinton Ellison, you're going to come to a T-
11 intersection, Orchard Beach Drive, and you're going to go right to come back out.
12 You're going to go right by the IARD guys, so do you want to pick them up now, as
13 opposed to taking Ellison out and coming back again? Just get them all out and take it
14 from there." And he said he would -- he said was going to pick them up at that point.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. All right. Let's move on again,
16 then, to 286 and 287. And this is another example of after the declaration by CIC West
17 that he's in charge, that the Risk Manager is also still completely involved in some
18 operational activity. It looks like Lilly at page -- at paragraph 286.

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** You spoke to Lilly with respect to
21 differences between Ms. McCully and Ms. Banfield, given the confusion of the first
22 names in that regard.

23 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And then Rehill at 287:

25 "...called Cpl. Mills at 2:48....RM Rehill updated Cpl.
26 Mills on his discussion with Sgt. Lilly:"

27 Now, my question to you is, at 287, Rehill calls Mills at 2:48; why
28 are you calling Mills instead of CIC West at this point? Do you see what I'm saying?

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah, I see what you're saying.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah. And another point could be Lilly
4 got -- called Jeff West directly and says, "Keep me out of the equation."

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

6 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** But that's not up to you to talk about ---

8 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- because that's Lilly's action.

10 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I'm just saying that you go straight to Mills
12 as opposed to Rehill -- forgive me. You go straight to Mills instead of West, and it
13 strikes me as that there's a lot of cooks.

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah, but I'm also thinking at that time
15 how busy is Jeff West in the CIC and how much is going on there when I can just deal
16 with this myself. I've been communicating with Cpl. Mills throughout the evening -- well,
17 since they arrived on scene, by radio and cell phone. So I just deal with it. It's kind of
18 just the way I'm driven and the way I'm wired, and most of us are in the RCMP; "Just do
19 it," and that's what I did, I guess.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. And I'm just wondering that this
21 instinct that you have as you were ---

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- wired to do it, and other members just
24 to do it, may have impaired the critical response.

25 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I can't say that; that's a hypothetical
26 scenario.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Fair enough.

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. Okay.
2 Paragraph 297 at page 144 is an interesting exchange.
3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Two ninety-seven (297)?
4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Two nine seven (297).
5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Okay.
6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** At 3:01.
7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.
8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** “At 3:01 a.m. on April 19, 2020, R[isk]
9 M[anager] Rehill called Sgt. O’Brien. RM Rehill
10 advised that CIC West had called and told him that
11 the CIC would be managing all resources responding
12 to Portapique. Sgt. O’Brien told RM Rehill that he had
13 just received a call from S/Sgt. Al Carroll at the
14 Command Post instructing him to ‘sort the
15 checkpoints’.”
16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.
17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** S/Sgt. Rehill: “Andy, it’s Brian...”
18 O’Brien:
19 “Hey Brian.”
20 Rehill:
21 “Things are getting awfully confusing. Ah, Jeff West
22 called me and said that they’re managing all
23 resources from the C-I-C now.”
24 O’Brien:
25 “Yeah.”
26 Rehill:
27 “I think they want you and I to step back and they’re
28 gonna run the show.”

1 My question to you is; that's 3:01, S/Sgt. Rehill.

2 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** One twenty-three (1:23), the CIC takes
4 over.

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** It seems to me that we're talking about an
7 hour and a half and so of everybody doing something and there has to be a direction to
8 O'Brien and Rehill to step back. Does that -- have I got that properly characterized?

9 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah. Not necessarily that it needs to
10 be, I guess. We were still trying to be helpful; everybody wants to help, and it's just
11 reached the point where I say, "No, hands off completely. Let them run the show,"
12 right?

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. Did you get a direction from West
14 to ---

15 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Only the 1:23 thing.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- back off? Yeah.

17 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** He called and said we're going to
18 manage resources.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

20 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** So from that, I took, yeah, okay, we'll
21 step back completely. I guess you don't need my help anymore. And I didn't -- I wasn't
22 offended by that.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** No.

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I guess I know what he's saying, like, we
25 -- you know ---

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** No, and I'm not expecting you to be
27 personally offended.

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah, yeah.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** But I'm just saying why didn't that happen
2 at 1:23, given the changeover of command structure?

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** All I can say is there's, I guess, my driven
4 personality that I want to get things done and sometimes I feel I just want to keep
5 helping, that kind of thing. I can't -- any other explanation, other than that.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. No, okay, that's fine.
7 I need to ask you a question about public alerting.

8 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Okay.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** The Alert Ready process.

10 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Can you make a comment on your
12 familiarity with Alert Ready?

13 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, we at that time didn't have the
14 authority or training to do it as Risk Managers. We dealt with Amber Alerts, and I
15 believe that even had to go through Criminal Operations before it would go out. But at
16 that time, we didn't have this alert system that they have, ---

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

18 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- our capability right here for me to do at
19 the OCC. I couldn't say to Jennifer, for example, "Get one out," and she would compile,
20 like, a BOLO and send it right out. That wasn't the case.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Well, how do you mean it wasn't
22 the case?

23 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, we didn't do public alerts right at
24 our level.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Was public alerts done at any level from
28 your point of ---

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, ---

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- view or knowledge?

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- again, when I contacted Halliday, who
4 was the Acting Inspector for Northeast Nova, he in turn notifies Superintendent Archie
5 Thompson, who then -- it's a chain of command, and like -- who then would
6 communicate with the SSO Darren Campbell and Chris Leather. I would hope at that
7 level, and I expected at that level, they'd have that conversation because that's where
8 that should come from, I thought; that they would make a decision as to put this out or
9 not put this out.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** As the Risk Manager at that time, you
11 would have been aware of the significance of public information.

12 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Would you not have the opportunity or the
14 ability to say, "Get somebody up the chain to make an effort to get that public alert out
15 as soon as possible?"

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, I probably would but that's on
17 DANCO Halliday, him and Supt. Campbell -- sorry; Thompson, I think should have had
18 that conversation, if they didn't, and get something out now. But there's so much to
19 consider before we do that, right?

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. No.

21 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** It's just not easy black and white and do
22 it.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** No, I understand that. And we've had
24 conversation with other people who are talking about whether it was a tool in the toolbox
25 or whether it was a tool that nobody knew how to use.

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Or whether it was even there.

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, I believe it was EMO at the time

1 that would have issued them.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. So what's preventing Risk
3 Manager Rehill from calling EMO or instructing somebody from the OCC to call EMO to
4 get that public alert out?

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, once I passed it on to Halliday and
6 the CIC is being initiated, they would have that conversation. Let me keep doing what
7 I'm doing because again, it's just taking away from what I'm doing at that time; right?

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

9 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And I have so much going on.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah, okay. The -- it's so interesting you
11 used that expression. We've heard from other witnesses about a term, not "too many
12 cooks in the kitchen", but the term "drinking from a firehose." Did you ever hear that
13 expression before?

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** No, my counterpart, Bruce Briers ---

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- it's one of his favourite sayings.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

18 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** What do you say about that, Staff
20 Sergeant?

21 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, he can call it that; I can call it a
22 tsunami. You know, there's -- it was -- it was a lot.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Was it possible for a person in the
26 position of a Risk Manager to be able to handle the tsunami?

27 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** To the best of their ability, but like you
28 say, moving forward, if we're going to brainstorm this and come up with a model, I think

1 we can improve.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** You know, we could have a situation
4 where, like I said, maybe three or four Risk Managers come into the (inaudible) one and
5 say, "Okay, you're doing nothing but the screen and containment. You're doing -- you're
6 fielding all the calls. You're doing the alert. You're doing this", like, and have a team
7 that can come together. And similar to the CIC, only away from the CIC, and -- and
8 somebody be assigned nothing but communication to the CIC, "and anything comes in
9 that they need to know about, that's your job." Something to that effect, you know?

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

11 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Because like it was drinking from water
12 from a hose, and so that's what it was like.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right.

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right?

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Great. Thank you. I'm almost done. The
16 -- I understand that Staff Sergeant Briers took over from you at ---

17 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- six or seven, and I'm looking now at
19 paragraph 369, just for purposes of orienting you.

20 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:**

22 "...Briers recalled...the conversation he had...during
23 his drive to the OCC:"

24 He basically communicated with you for the purposes of getting
25 situational awareness; is that right?

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right. Yeah, we do that a lot. Like we
27 call each other if we're going to be -- maybe like seven o'clock, I know I'm going to be
28 7:05 getting there because I hit traffic or something, I call Bruce and say, "What's

1 happening?", and he'll brief me or I'll brief him on what's taking place.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So Briers took over at seven?

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And you hung around?

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Not very long.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Why not?

7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Because I was just so mentally
8 exhausted I just needed to get some sleep.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah, okay. Did you have any
10 operational role whatsoever after Briers attended?

11 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** No.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. All right. Finally, then, after this
13 was completed, this -- your role in it, were you ever invited to attend or participate in an
14 operational debrief or a review of the -- of the incident and the police response to it?

15 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I can't remember if I was invited to one or
16 not. I know I went to a critical incident stress debriefing midweek, the following week. I
17 was off for a week after that. As far as an operational debrief, they may have held one
18 at Bible Hill detachment, and I don't know -- I wasn't there, I know that, and I can't
19 remember I didn't -- just didn't go or I wasn't invited, I don't know. I really can't
20 remember, but I didn't go to an Operation debriefing.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. All right.

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right, Staff Sergeant, those are my
24 questions. Anything further that you wanted to say before the conclusion and the
25 meeting with counsel for purposes of following up?

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, will I have time later after the
27 questions to speak?

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Sure. Sure.

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Okay. Sure, I can wait until then.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

3 Perhaps a half-an-hour break would be appropriate,

4 Madam Registrar?

5 --- Upon recessing at 2:18 p.m.

6 --- Upon resuming at 3:34 p.m.

7 **--- S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL, Resumed:**

8 **--- EXAMINATION IN-CHIEF BY MR. ROGER BURRILL:**

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So Staff Sergeant Rehill, we have had the
10 opportunity to meet with a number of Participants' -- counsel for Participants ---

11 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- and review some of the materials and
13 the examination, and I have been provided a number of questions that has been
14 requested that I ask of you.

15 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So I am doing my very best to interpret
17 those questions and I've formatted them, and I'm going to ask them of you now.

18 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Okay, sure.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So it's a bit of an awkward process, but
20 we'll do our best here under the circumstances.

21 The first question I am charged to ask you is "Did Staff
22 Sergeant Rehill speak to Staff Sergeant West directly" during your time in your role as
23 the Risk Manager?

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Only when he called at, I think it was
25 three o'clock-ish, was it, and said, "We're going to manage all resources from here", and
26 I called O'Brien. Before that no; Halliday I spoke to..

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Second question.

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Okay.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** When you called Staff Sergeant Halliday
2 to contact Staff Sergeant West ---

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- did you delegate anyone else to
5 contact Staff Sergeant West to institute the Critical Incident Package or take any other
6 action?

7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I can't remember for sure, but I thought I
8 had said to one of them, "Can somebody get Jeff on the line while I call Halliday?" in the
9 OCC, and I called Steve, and then Steve said to me, "Let me call Jeff West to take
10 some burden off you guys." So he made the phone call.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So the question being was there any
12 other person delegated to contact Staff Sergeant West to institute the Critical Incident
13 Package?

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** The truthful answer is I can't remember
15 for sure.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

17 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Next question.

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Okay.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Did you ever listen to the 9-1-1 call, the
21 replay of the 9-1-1 call of Jamie Blair?

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** The audio part of it?

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I don't think so, no.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I was monitoring -- I was monitoring the
27 occurrence, not the phone call.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Next question. When you set up
3 containment at Five Houses Road ---

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- how did you think the perpetrator
6 would leave the area in through that decision that you made?

7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** How did they get to Five Houses Road or
8 how would they get out?

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** How did you think that was a relevant or a
10 proper decision? How did you think that the perpetrator could leave through that
11 location?

12 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, looking at the map, and like I said,
13 there was a river, and I don't know without local knowledge, like sometimes you'll see a
14 river on a -- on a map and it's really an ankle deep brook. So I don't know if he had the
15 ability to get over to that side through the river, like whether there was -- you could drive
16 an ATV or even a vehicle through there, or did he come out to the main road, could he
17 have possibly moved over there and then -- we didn't -- then when -- especially when
18 Constable Carroll saw what he thought was somebody flashing lights at him and not
19 moving, we were -- you know, the thought process was there also that could this be the
20 guy and he's trying to lure him down. So it was quite some time there where we were
21 focussed, not focussed, but that was an option that is he still on this side of Portapique
22 or did he cross the river to Five Houses and Bay Shore? Because we had, you know,
23 indications on both sides that he could be on either side, so that's why I put containment
24 on that side because if he was down in there at Five Houses Road and Bay Shore, he
25 wouldn't be able to get out without encountering us.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So the follow up question that I have been
27 requested to ask is did you think the perpetrator could get to Five Houses without going
28 through the Portapique Road Number 2 intersection?

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I didn't know. I was doing that in case he
2 could.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Next question.

6 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Okay.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** As far as you were aware ---

8 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- was there a threat assessment officer
10 assigned to each district or districts that you would be aware of in Nova Scotia?

11 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** No.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** A threat assessment officer?

13 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I'm not -- I'm not aware of any. It doesn't
14 mean they don't exist, but ---

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- I'm not aware of any.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Do you know what that term "threat
18 assessment officer" means? Are you familiar with it?

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Not necessarily. Are you talking specific
20 to this occurrence or just ---

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** No, generally.

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- for a district in general?

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I'm not aware of that process. It could be
25 out there, but I don't -- I don't know.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

27 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Next question.

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Okay.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Why wasn't Sergeant Bernard, the OPS
3 officer in Millbrook, called by the Risk Manager?

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, the occurrence wasn't in his area,
5 for one thing, and his people were coming as backup and we were going to slide Enfield
6 down towards their area to cover off their calls. And I think he's a negotiator, maybe, or
7 something, I don't know, but that would be something that the CIC would decide. Did
8 we need -- like, for instance, Jeff West called on Staff Sergeant Surette way down in
9 Yarmouth to "Start making your way this way for" -- he's also a Critical Incident
10 Commander, I believe. And you know, I know Bernard is involved in that team
11 somewhere, he might be one of the players, but you know, to come out -- they were all
12 coming out at once. Like they have different -- you know, they have so many
13 negotiators, so many commanders, and then they rotate. So no, I didn't call. If it had
14 have been his district, for sure, yeah, I would have let him know.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** My understanding is that he was the OPS
16 NCO in that detachment.

17 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I think -- yeah, I think it's a sergeant in
18 charge there.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Sergeant in charge ---

20 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I think he's the sergeant.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- is a better term

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah, yeah. Yeah.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And any reason you didn't contact him,
24 given the fact that Millbrook members were attending to the complaint at that time?

25 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** No. For no other reason than how busy I
26 was. And sometimes when the members are leaving their area like that to help out
27 they'll let them know themselves, much like Stuart Beselt called Andy O'Brien while en
28 route; right?

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

2 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** So.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. Continuing on, then.

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Okay.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Is there a binder or resource material
6 available to the Risk Manager listing available assets that you would have at your -- at
7 disposal, for instance, air support services?

8 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah, well we have the binder that has
9 the Critical Incident Commanders, the on-call dog man, the on-call Incident Commander
10 for Search and Rescue, Iden sections. It's all there in a binder, and I'm not sure if air
11 service is in there or not, it very ---

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

13 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- well probably is.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Who is responsible for maintaining and
15 updating that binder or that resource material?

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, the supervisors, I think, of the OCC,
17 like the Floor Supervisors or the -- somebody may be delegated that to make sure --
18 because I've often seen them go over to the binder and, you know, manage the who's
19 on call, who's not, that kind of thing, update it, that sort of thing.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

21 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** So that'd be a good question for maybe
22 Glen Byrne or even Jennifer to answer, Derek Wood, like, one of them. They're all
23 supervisors who maintains that and keeps things up to date. I think, like, you know, for
24 instance, a guy will call in and he'd say, "I'm the on-call incident commander for search
25 and rescue as of midnight," for example, "and I am right through until seven or eight
26 days from now." So they'll put all that in the binder, and they'll let you know who's on
27 call after him or her, and if they can't reach them, who's on alternate, like, that kind of
28 thing. There's a good binder in place in there.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah, and then following up, who's
2 responsible for keeping that up to date?

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I can't answer you that. That would have
4 to be Glen Byrne or somebody to tell you that.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Next line of question. Did you look
6 or actually look at the Pictometry mapping during your involvement in this incident?

7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** In terms of that, like, yeah, looking at it
8 here and there, but I'm so busy watching my screen, listening to the resources, where's
9 the cars, and all the requests for calls, like, calling people, can you call the media, and
10 that gets -- you know, it starts getting a bit overwhelming at times. So, yeah, I did refer
11 to it here and there but it's very similar to what I was seeing. It's -- it might be just a
12 sharper picture, something to that effect, but ---

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Did you specifically call it up on your own
14 initiative?

15 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** No. Usually, the supervisor, DP08 there,
16 will go over and fire it up if something we're going to use so.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Do you have a recall of it actually being
18 physically available for your consultation that night?

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I think it probably was, but I can't say for
20 sure. I'm pretty sure Jennifer would have fired that up right away and it was up on the
21 big screen. So it's helpful that way. I mean, like, if somebody else was -- you know,
22 like, I guess when I know that did they struggle with maps at Bible Hill and Pictometry's
23 available, and if they couldn't get it available, the OCC has everything you need; right?
24 So, yeah, it's ---

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Did you have familiarity with Pictometry's
26 functionality at that time?

27 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes, a little, but not very much. Like,
28 nothing like they do. Like, they can work it so well.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

2 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Like, I knew there was a username and a
3 password to get it up and that kind of thing, and you had to Google Pictometry or
4 something. There was two different options you can go into, or three, and you had to
5 click the right one, and then put username and password and then it would come up.
6 And then you'd have to punch in, let's say, Pictou County, Nova Scotia.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

8 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And then that would come up. And then
9 you would try to hone in on a more specific area of Pictou County ---

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

11 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- that kind of thing.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Do you recall honing in, or doing any
13 functioning at all with respect to Pictometry that night?

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Not really. I was using my 9-1-1 map.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

16 Next question

17 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Can you give us some insight as to how
19 long a message sent to the MS -- MWS ---

20 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- from the risk manager about you being
22 on duty ---

23 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- how long would that stay as a text in
25 the MWS?

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, as long as the member was working
27 and the MWS was up and running ---

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- you know. Whoever's up and running
2 at that time when I come on duty, and who's ever MWS is fired up, they're going to
3 receive the message. If a car is sitting idle in the parking lot, for example, and hasn't
4 been used, when they turn on their MWS, my message I don't believe is there.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** That's -- I guess the follow-up question is
6 ---

7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- if a new member comes on ---

9 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- would that message be accessible that
11 you were the person, or would a -- that is, you were the risk manager, or that -- would
12 they have to make special inquiries to ---

13 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah, usually they'll ---

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- determine who ---

15 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- they call RTT, request to talk, and say,
16 "Who is the risk manager?" And one of the dispatchers would tell them.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

18 And the next question ---

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- series of questions is how is a person
21 selected and qualify as a risk manager?

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, again, that's probably something for
23 CDR, Career Development and Management people to say, like -- there's a job
24 description there, that sort of thing, but in my case -- well, they post promotional
25 bulletins, first of all, and you have to meet all the criteria in the -- what they call our
26 organizational or functional competencies to be considered for it. Well, you submitted a
27 package, and if -- it's either you make the grade or you don't, so to speak. If you don't
28 get past a certain level, like, I'm trying to think of the word that -- we used to do them all

1 the time -- validation. I used to sit on validation committees for promotion too.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And you won't make it to the process.

4 So, I guess, you know, for now, I don't know -- it's been a year-and-a-half since I
5 worked, so whether that job description's been modified, I don't know, but, like, for
6 instance, if I was selecting somebody, I would want to see that they had the initial
7 critical incident response course, they had a very extensive background in operations
8 NCO, at least have been a team leader, and then into the operation NCO, you know, at
9 the sergeant's rank. Or even a district commander who's going to do what we call a
10 lateral transfer, it's not a promotion, they're just going from staff sergeant to staff
11 sergeant in a different role, you're still going to want to know that they meet the
12 competency ---

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- the competencies for that job; right?

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Would you have competed for this job, for
16 the risk manager's job?

17 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** No, not in this situation.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** There was some special consideration
21 applied?

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** No, it was as a result of a grievance ---

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I see.

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- and I had been in there so much
25 working, and I could hit the ground running, so to speak, they had satisfied the
26 grievance with this position.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. No further questions on that. We'll
28 move on.

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Okay.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Can you advise us or confirm who the
3 designated crisis negotiator on the Critical Incident Package that night was?

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** No, I wouldn't know that. I -- once the
5 CIC's up and running, Jeff West then would take care of all of that ---

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- and the dispatchers.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Continuing on. Would you agree that
9 night vision and FLIR capacity would be of assistance to first responders?

10 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Hundred percent.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Would you agree that the use of
12 Conservation officers to assist in obtaining local knowledge of the area would be of
13 assistance to you in your role as risk manager?

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** It probably would, yes.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Are you aware of any members during
16 your shift between 10 p.m. and 7 a.m. that were not logged on to the MWS?

17 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** No.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** In an active shooter situation, can you
19 provide us any insight as to why the contact team is given autonomy to make their own
20 tactical decisions?

21 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, in this scenario too, like I said, there
22 was still a lot happening. And right around when they arrived at the community, I
23 believe I was dealing with the Kate MacDonald call and speaking to her, and Stuart and
24 them were probably getting ready to enter, if not already in. And Stuart and I talked
25 about that, and he said, "You know, you have to be out of your vehicle, like, after
26 Moncton. Like, you're a sitting duck in your vehicle." So they dismounted from their
27 vehicles, if you want to call it that, and they formed up. And Adam, from what I
28 understand reading the information now too, Adam and Stuart were making their way

1 down the road, and Patton was coming in a bit later.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. But are you able to tell us why the
3 contact team would be given autonomy ---

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well ---

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- to make operational decision ---

6 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** It's not that they were given autonomy.
7 It's more in a sense that the trust that I have in Stuart Beselt, and knowing that he will
8 make the right calls, and he did, to my -- you know, I'm satisfied that he did -- he did an
9 excellent job, and the fact that I was busy, he may have just decided we're just going to
10 ahead and do this, and I didn't have a problem with it, to tell you the truth. He -- I guess
11 at some times, you're going to delegate that down, I guess, in certain situations.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. All right. I'll move on to some
13 additional questions, if I can. Are you able to tell us if IR training incorporates the use of
14 more than one IARD team when responding to a critical incident? If you don't know the
15 answer, tell us that, but are you able to give us any insight in that regard?

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, like I explained earlier, like, for
17 instance, if I can use a building for example, we do, like, an ad hoc -- like, a scenario at
18 the end of the IARD training, like, kind of a big finale. And, like, when we used to do it
19 at what they call Agritech Park in Truro, and Salmon River, and we've had quite a few
20 training facilities until we ended up where we are, for instance, if we have shooting on
21 the second floor, and our IARD team makes their way up the stairwells, they go down
22 the hallway, they come down there with authority, and they're seeking out this person, if
23 they have this person they know cornered, let's say, in a classroom, for example ---

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

25 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- and they have him in there, and
26 they're trying to negotiate or deal with him, and then there's activity at the second -- first
27 floor or the third floor, and we know conclusively there's a second threat, then a second
28 team goes in.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

2 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And the first team maintains contact with
3 this person.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So the question being posed is do you
5 know if IARD training incorporates the use of more than one IARD team when
6 responding to a critical incident; what would you say?

7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** If the circumstances warrant, yes.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** The training does?

9 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** It'll involve more than one team?

11 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Like, I say -- what I just said.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

13 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah, if there's more ---

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

15 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- than one threat and we can
16 conclusively know that, then we'll send a second team after the other threat.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Thank you. Can you tell me whether
18 IARD training incorporates the role of the risk manager in their training?

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** When we had the -- that's something
20 recent too, the training in Cutler Drive. We've had dispatchers come in to take part in
21 the training. They had, like, a mock little dispatch room set up. I don't know that they've
22 had a risk manager there doing that. It was more so the dispatchers ---

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- the call take and the dispatcher to see
25 how we do it, and how it all operates, but I don't recall ever seeing a risk manager in
26 there taking part on a tabletop exercise or something to that effect.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So the amalgamation of IARD and
28 risk managers together in there training, does that take place in terms of knowing

1 people's roles and ---

2 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, we're all ---

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- engagement?

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- we're all IARD training, like, you know,
5 as ---

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- users; right?

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

9 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** So they know their roles. Like, the -- you
10 know, the point -- the team leader, the acting -- yeah, I guess it's the team leader, and
11 then the rear guard, they all know their roles, what they're supposed to be doing. And
12 sometimes you may not have a four-man IARD team. You may have just a two-man
13 IARD team. And there's times where you may have a one-man IARD team. You just
14 may have to go. So they know their roles. And our Risk Managers are all trained in
15 IARD.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Are there instances in which you
17 have participated in training that include IARD and Risk Managers in live training
18 scenarios?

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Live training scenarios?

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

21 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** The only training scenarios we do is at 89
22 Cutler, in that building.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah. There has been one Pictou
25 County ran in a school somewhere over -- I think it's the one where the West Pictou
26 was, Northumberland.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** They'd start and put on some kind of a

1 scenario-based real risk, real IARD scenario, like, in a real school.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I didn't take part in that, no. And I don't
4 know if a Risk Manager was involved in that.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. As a Risk Manager, can you give
6 us a sense of what the top priorities are when you're managing a critical incident?

7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, I guess once you know -- you've
8 gathered enough information to know exactly what's happening, and if you have a
9 location on, say, the offender, --- are you referring to active shooter or just anything?

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Anything. And then we can transition to
11 active shooter.

12 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Okay. So let's say if we have a person
13 who we know is armed and barricaded. I've taken part in many of them. The members
14 on scene will, through our direction, sometimes they help us in a sense, I say, "What are
15 you looking at there? What are you seeing? Like, to me on the map, it looks like this or
16 that." And they can clarify. So if they want to set up containment, like, almost in a
17 diamond formation, where they can see -- one guy can see two sides of the house, ---

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- and the other person can see two
20 sides of the house.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** But in terms of the question, which was
22 being priorities, ---

23 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- are you able to itemize priorities as the
25 Risk Manager in responding to a critical incident?

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well one of our priorities would be
27 containing the subject. Like, you know, the threat.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And at that time, they could contain --
2 keep surveilling the house while we figure out what's going on, and if need be, we're
3 going to contact the CIC and they're going to decide if they're coming or not. And in
4 most cases, something like that, an armed or barricaded person, they're -- in all
5 likelihood, they're coming.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** ERT can be activated and their whole
8 team, there's negotiator, the dog man, the whole works comes. But in that scenario,
9 okay, as long as we know that he's in there or she's in there, we can contain, and then
10 we can also consider whether we're going to evacuate the neighbouring houses or ask
11 them to shelter in place, stay low, stay in your basement, lock your doors, that kind of
12 thing, and then move from there.

13 And then once we get on scene, trying to establish contact with that
14 person through the negotiator, those are kind of the priorities we're going to do. We're
15 going to isolate, contain, long guns, evacuate, or shelter-in-place.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** It sounds to me like you've just recited the
17 ICLEAR ---

18 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- checklist.

20 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And is that where you isolate your
22 priorities?

23 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Do an ICLEAR?

25 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And what authorities do we have? Like,
26 obviously the person, in most cases, they're arrestable. And then you're react plans,
27 what we're going to do.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Can you give us some insight as

1 to whether there is a process for transitioning to the Critical Incident Commander from
2 you as the Risk Manager, the ad hoc commander?

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah, well similar to what happened
4 here, and I shouldn't say similar, like what happened here, ---

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

6 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- once Jeff West gets up and running
7 and he decides we're -- "Okay. We're ready to go. We're up and running," they take
8 over from there.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Would you have had a briefing or an
10 exchange of information with the Critical Incident Commander, S/Sgt West, when he
11 takes over?

12 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** No. He voiced he was taking over and
13 then there was the phone call at 3:00-ish saying, "We're going to manage all resources
14 from here."

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. And have you any insight for us as
16 to how the information that the Risk Manager would have had and dealt with gets to the
17 Critical Incident Commander?

18 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well the team they had there, Carroll,
19 MacCallum, Halliday, they all had the information that we had. They knew what was
20 going on.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And then they call on a need basis. I
23 know S/Sgt. MacCallum called in a couple of times. I spoke to Jennifer and maybe
24 someone else to maybe gather whatever -- any information he might need, some clarity,
25 that kind of thing.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

27 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** They spoke to dispatchers.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. I'll move on to a few more

1 questions.

2 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Does the OCC and the Risk Manager
4 notify RCMP Commanding Officers of serious incidents that are taking place in the
5 province? That is, does the OCC call or send notifications to the Commanding Officer
6 for some events that are being -- unfolding to increase their awareness?

7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Through the chain of command we do.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

9 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Like what I said earlier, I contacted
10 Halliday.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

12 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** His job would be to notify the District
13 Policing Officer, Archie Thompson.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

15 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** His job would be to notify the SSO,
16 Darren Campbell, and/or Chris Leather.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

18 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And then Chris Leather, I would think,
19 would notify the CO. And if there's no CO, you know, in the seat at the time, I think it
20 may be vacant right now, he's the Acting Commanding Officer.

21 So it goes up the chain of command.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So once you've had your contact with
23 Halliday, ---

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- given his role at that time, ---

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- is your responsible with -- is your
28 responsibility with respect to informing senior officers undertaken and completed?

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I don't do that. They take care of that.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. Okay. Do you ever have any
3 contact with higher up Commanding Officers or Commissioned Officers?

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well when I feel the higher ups need to
5 know, I go through the District Advisory NCO or the Operational Inspector.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. All right.

7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Have you ever done training or
9 participated in training with the OCC staff for a critical incident management?

10 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Not any tabletop exercises. That's what
11 we'd be using, tabletop.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

13 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** That I can remember.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Have you ever done any critical incident
15 training with other agencies? For example, fire departments, other police services, ---

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- or EHS?

18 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah, we've done tabletop exercises out
19 of Antigonish and that kind of thing on a flood. I think Antigonish was the scenario.
20 That kind of thing.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** So working with all the stakeholders,
23 bringing it to a successful conclusion, that kind of thing.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. I'll just move on. And almost
25 through.

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Do you, as the Risk Manager, have a way
28 to relisten to information coming into the OCC by way of 9-1-1 calls?

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah. You could have asked them to
2 replay something for you if need be.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** They can replay it. I've often heard them
5 replaying calls to themselves if they thought they missed a detail or something, ---

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- that kind of thing; right? Yeah, that
8 ability is there.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And we spoke about this, I believe,
10 earlier, but just for clarification, did you, during your role as the Risk Manager that night,
11 ever relisten to incoming information on a 9-1-1 call?

12 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** No.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Okay. Those are the questions
14 that I have now for you, Staff Sergeant.

15 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Okay.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** We go through the continuing and
17 ongoing process of assessing whether there are additional questions, but we're almost
18 there.

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Okay.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Perhaps if we have 20 minutes, ---

21 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Okay.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- we'll return and revisit the issues.

23 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Okay.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Thank you, Staff Sergeant.

25 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Thank you.

26 --- Upon breaking at 3:58 p.m.

27 --- Upon resuming at 4:23 p.m.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I can report that there are no further

1 questions for you from Counsel, but I can also report that the Commissioners will have
2 some questions for you in terms of the proceedings here today. So I'm going to be
3 seated. The Commissioners will appear before you and ask you your questions, and
4 then I'll address you at the end.

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Okay.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

7 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Good afternoon, Staff Sergeant, can
8 you hear me okay?

9 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes, I can hear you, yeah.

10 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. First and foremost, I want to
11 thank you very much for being with us today. It's been a long day, and it's been quite
12 helpful to have you here with us, sharing your experience and hearing from you
13 firsthand. I do have some additional questions, if you would bear with me. As I've told
14 other witnesses who have appeared before us, some of the questions are to help us
15 understand better what you were going through in your role, as you made your
16 decisions, and some of our questions are really very directed at not the what happened
17 but what we can look forward to in terms of change and improvement going forward. So
18 if you'll just bear with me, I have a number of questions.

19 And I'll start with, first of all, at shift change, you talked a little bit
20 about shift change, and exchanging information with your oncoming risk manager. And
21 I also understand that OCC has shift change, and I believe it's probably at the same
22 time.

23 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

24 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** But I'm not certain, so you might be able
25 to tell us that. Is there any type of coordination or sharing of information or a structured
26 way in which you hand off that information to the oncoming OCC supervisor as well as
27 the oncoming risk manager? Do you do that jointly, or separately, or how does that
28 happen? If you could just flesh that out a little more for us, that would be helpful.

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah, well, for instance, in this scenario,
2 and as we always do, Bruce and I have a conversation about what happened through
3 the day. Let's say if Bruce worked day shift and I'm on night shift, he -- and he has
4 something ongoing that's not resolved yet, he'll go through it with me, and make a note
5 for me what the occurrence number is, then there's the running risk manager's report
6 that's always up and running, and we're constantly adding to it all day. So that's up, and
7 I read that once I get in. Basically, yeah, it's very informal in the sense that we talk
8 together, letting each other know what's happening. And the dispatchers, call takers,
9 they do the same thing. Like, we're 7 to 7, and they're the same, but I think they have --
10 at that time, they have some kind of agreement amongst themselves where they start
11 coming at about 6:30, just to let the night shift go home, and then same thing that
12 evening. The night shift will come in a bit early, and I've always seen or heard them all
13 the time briefing each other on what's happening. Like, Jennifer, for example, would
14 brief the next supervisor coming on, on what's going on, what they need to look after,
15 that sort of thing.

16 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Specifically on the morning of the 19th --
17 -

18 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

19 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** --- did you and Jen and the oncoming
20 OCC supervisor and Staff Briers, did the four of you sit down, discuss, what was the
21 conversation like, when you were briefing one another, or did you do those separately?

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** They were separately, I believe, yes, and
23 Bruce, I talked to him by phone on his way in. Then once he arrived, I stayed and
24 updated him and stuff. I'd probably stayed around until 7:15, 7:20, maybe even 7:30. I
25 don't remember. And Jennifer, I believe it was Brian Green coming in, in the morning. I
26 think at one point there, I thought Brian Green was the one who came over when the
27 call came in, but it wasn't. Brian was in in the morning, but Brian has done that so many
28 times, that's who I thought it was, I guess. But in any event, yeah, she would brief Brian

1 in the morning, and she's right to my left anyway, at DP08, so we're kind of hearing
2 each other and the conversations that are going on. So it's not a formal four of us leave
3 the floor, because they really can't do that. They need somebody on the floor. So they
4 do, like, an informal chat with each other to see what's happening. And this one in
5 particular, like, for example, when I told Bruce what was happening by phone, like, it
6 was kind of a silence. Like, he -- I don't know if he knew I was serious or not. I said,
7 "No, this is really happening." So I briefed him as much as I could and then in person
8 when he got there, and that's usually the case how we do it.

9 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. Were you using any notes to
10 brief him?

11 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, just what I had in my notebook
12 there, but I just did it all verbally. I mean, I knew it quite well by that time, and then I had
13 been relieved for quite some time, so I had time to think about it and absorb it and pass
14 it all on to him. But I told him the bulk of it while he was driving in, and he started
15 looking for vehicles, like, white vehicles and stuff that could be, you know, the shooter
16 on his way in. So, yeah, at that time, it was all verbal.

17 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. And you felt that you gave him a
18 sufficiently thorough briefing?

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes, and furthermore, like, maybe the
20 advantage I could say, if I could say that, that he had that I didn't is that the CIC was
21 already up and running and running the show; whereas, I had to manage, and manage
22 as best I could until they got up and running.

23 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. Thank you for that.

24 The -- you'd made reference of I think in a response to question of
25 trying to access information on Versadex, and you're able to do so through the Police
26 Information Portal or PIP. Can you tell me if that works both ways? So can Halifax also
27 access PROS through Versadex through PIP?

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I don't know that. They probably have

1 access to PIP, but I don't have access at all to Versadex. And to be truthful, I wouldn't
2 even know how to use it. I'm told it's a -- some people say it's more user friendly and
3 some say, no, I don't agree, I like PROS better. So I don't know.

4 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** So when you go through the Police
5 Information Portal to check what records Halifax Regional Police may have in their
6 databank, are you -- what are you accessing on the other side of ---

7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, I'm on the ---

8 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** --- that portal?

9 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- what they call the PROS -- like, if they
10 call -- they refer to it as the launching pad. You can be on your screen. It's a little,
11 narrow window, like, when PROS is up and running, or you can maximize it out all the
12 way, but there's -- you go into currents, what they call, like, a rapid search, whatever, or
13 a quick find, and then there's also a detailed search, a detailed occurrence search. So
14 when you go into that, it opens a huge window. You punch in, let's say, a name, date of
15 birth, that sort of thing. And down -- it's going to query PROS, but also when you click
16 Police Information Portal at the bottom ---

17 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** M'hm.

18 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- you can also select CPIC. I don't
19 know if PIRS is still on there or not. PIRS was an old system. CPIC -- and it's going to
20 run them through all the databases available, including Halifax records, Versadex.

21 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Right.

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And when you do get a hit, I find that we
23 may be -- we can probably improve on having Versadex right in the office and being
24 well trained on it because when you go into it, you'll see maybe a whole list of people
25 with the same name, and I find ---

26 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** M'hm.

27 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- you have to go straight -- there's a little
28 plus mark. You click into that, and then all the ---

1 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** M'hm.

2 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- occurrence associated to that person
3 drop down and then you got to start reading them all. And ---

4 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** M'hm.

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- there's limited information there
6 anyway. So I think if we had full access to Versadex, we'd be able to glean more
7 information.

8 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Right. Okay. But you're not certain,
9 and I can pose this question to somebody else as we go along, that if HRP, when they
10 were doing some of their investigative work, if they would have been able to access
11 through PIP into RCMP records in PROS?

12 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I -- yeah, I don't know. They probably
13 could. Maybe Versadex has the same feature as PROS or with ---

14 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Yeah.

15 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** PIP ---

16 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Yeah, yeah.

17 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- I don't know.

18 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Yeah. Yeah, they do, yeah.

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah. Okay.

20 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay, thank you. I just don't know if
21 there's access that -- with the -- with the national force or not.

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Okay.

23 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** We talked a little bit about the
24 evacuation and decision to evacuate or to shelter in place and very difficult decisions,
25 most certainly.

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

27 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Can you share with us what things you
28 may have considered when you were either instructing or getting reports from the field

1 on evacuation planning or sheltering in place?

2 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

3 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** And where I'm going with this, Staff
4 Sergeant, is I'm wondering what precautions or planning may have taken place to
5 determine if the perpetrator was sheltering in place in one of those homes in that
6 immediate area or if possibly that perpetrator was evacuating with others that could
7 have been in the area. We know now that that's not the case ---

8 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm. Right.

9 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** --- but was there consideration or
10 direction given to you as Risk Manager to the people that were in the field ---

11 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

12 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** --- with regards to both of those
13 decisions?

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right. I remember at one point, and I
15 think it was Al Carroll or one of them asked me if we were evacuating, and I had to ask
16 Stuart Beselt, "Have we been evacuating?" because I wasn't privy to it if we were, and
17 he said, "We have been some", and I believe one of them was the Faris Lane address.
18 I remember Stuart and them saying, and I remember in the documents here as well,
19 saying that they're in the yard, and they made the yard safe and checked the vehicle to
20 make the vehicle was safe, and then they evacuated I believe five or six people out of
21 that house I thought. And then on top of that, when they left to go to Highway 2 in
22 Portapique Beach Road, we had people at the checkpoint rechecking the vehicle to
23 make sure the shooter wasn't in the vehicle with them or somebody wasn't aiding him to
24 escape. Yeah, yeah.

25 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay.

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** So was there more to the question?

27 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Thank you.

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I don't know if I answered it all.

1 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** No, I think I've ---

2 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

3 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** --- I think I'm satisfied with that.

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Good.

5 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Thank you. This one's pertaining to the
6 use of alerting. And you've been a seasoned Risk Manager. Over the course of your
7 time as Risk Manager, did you have any opportunity to be involved with an Amber Alert
8 for a missing child? And the reason I'm asking that is if so, do you know who gives the
9 authorisation to issue an Amber Alert, who activates that process and gives
10 authorisation?

11 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I don't believe I was ever involved in
12 actually activating an Amber Alert. I remember being called at home one day by, I think
13 again it was Jennifer MacCallum, about the possibility of one, and I wasn't in until that
14 evening, and there was -- there was some decisions made—I was at home, actually—
15 and an Amber Alert was issued for that day on a certain situation we had going on. I
16 believe that has to go through Criminal Operations. Don't quote me on that, I'm not
17 100-percent sure, but I don't think it's... And I know Paul Vickers, I believe, was
18 responsible for the Amber Alert Program when he came on with us, and after this, he's
19 now in a different job. But I don't know all the ins and outs. I know we use it, but
20 whether we can just issue it if there as a Risk Manager, or if we have to go up the line to
21 say, "Yes, go ahead and do it", then we do it, that sort of thing; right?

22 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. Okay. And that's what I was
23 looking to get confirmation on one way or the other.

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I want people to bear in mind, too, that
25 I've been off a year-and-a-half since -- and I'm very rusty with the policies, and if you
26 had asked me that back when I was still working, I could just probably just run it right
27 off, but I'm a bit foggy on all the policies right now.

28 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** I fully appreciate that, most certainly. I

1 think you've already answered this. I know that it's not your practice to have to report
2 up through the chain of command beyond your ---

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

4 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** --- immediate supervisor, and I
5 understand in this case it was Staff Sergeant Halliday. The question I want to ask you,
6 though, is, is at any time did you get some -- a call from anybody in the senior command
7 structure, beyond Staff Sergeant Halliday or Carroll, asking you for any type of a
8 situational report or a verbal update on what was transpiring on the ground?

9 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes, I received a call from
10 Inspector Rodier, Dustine Rodier. She was our, at that time, the OIC of Telecoms. I
11 had been very busy, like I said, with Halliday and everything that was happening, and
12 sometimes you just get so much going on that you either neglect or just forget to call
13 your immediate supervisor, and she called in and she said, like, "What's happening?
14 What's going on?" So I gave her a very short synopsis because I said, "I got to go", and
15 that was it from there. But I didn't hear from the CrOps officer that night or anything like
16 that, or Darren Campbell, the Superintendent and the SSO. It was Halliday, and then
17 she called me later.

18 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. Do you have any recollection
19 thereabouts when you would have received that call?

20 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I'm thinking about 10:01 the call came in,
21 and really, I would have read it about 2204 when it was on the dispatch screen, and
22 then things were happening. I'm thinking probably as far as 2250 or 11 o'clock maybe,
23 2300, maybe somewhere in that vicinity she may have -- she called in.

24 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay.

25 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

26 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** And are you able to tell me who she
27 may have been the direct report to?

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Who does she report to? I believe the

1 Support Services Officer ---

2 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay.

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- Darren Campbell, probably. Yeah,
4 because he would oversee that kind of immediate -- that would fall under Support
5 Services, the OCC.

6 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. Thank you. My next question is
7 in relation to the mobile workstations. My recollection is that there is a text, like a text
8 feature from car to car.

9 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm. Yeah.

10 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Are you able to also text from your
11 workstation to the mobile workstation ---

12 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

13 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** --- text?

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah, on the -- on the keyboard, like
15 more so, not a text with a phone, but I can bring up the car and send messages, I
16 believe, again, it's been so long, what the command is, and then there's a window I can
17 -- I can just type it in and hit enter and then it'll go through to them. Much like I do ---

18 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay.

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- with the global message at the first of
20 the shift, it goes ---

21 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Right.

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** --- to all the mobile workstations.

23 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. Do you recall if there was much
24 by way of back and forth communication with the -- with the members in the field
25 through that means?

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** No, I don't recall, no.

27 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. Thank you. I'm getting there.

28 We're ---

1 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Okay.

2 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** --- almost -- we're almost through. In
3 your mind, recognising that you are a Risk Manager, could you feel a responsibility for
4 ensuring that relevant and timely information was getting to the frontline officers and
5 responders and the decision-makers? Where would that -- where would that fall?

6 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, as you can see in the documents,
7 there was -- there was a number of us involved. I tried to get as much to them as I
8 could. And dispatchers too, they do a lot of the relaying of information when calls come
9 in, or if somebody called in and said, "Listen, I know that fella" or whatever, they would
10 get the information to them. I would be doing some of it.

11 And in this scenario, like I guess -- again, like I said from the
12 beginning, it's -- it was totally different in that due to the magnitude, the sheer volume of
13 what we had to deal with, Staff Sergeant Carroll got involved, O'Brien, Halliday came in,
14 MacCallum came in. And so there's a lot going on there, a lot of rank and a lot of
15 expertise and a lot of experience.

16 So for the most part, I guess at some point most of them added
17 some input. I know Al Carroll spoke to them a couple of times, I know Andy O'Brien did,
18 and I did. I don't know that Steve Halliday or MacCallum spoke to the members directly
19 over the air on the radio until they took over, but in the beginning it was mainly me,
20 Andy O'Brien, and Al Carroll doing most of the communicating. And Al was limited. He
21 didn't speak very much on the radio, nor did Andy. A couple of times.

22 But it didn't create any situation for me that made it convoluted or
23 confused matters any, and I welcomed the assistance to tell you the truth. It would be
24 similar to calling in a second Risk Manager right into the OCC, I kind of had them on the
25 road, like Al and Andy and those guys were giving -- were helping. I thought it was
26 helpful. It wasn't a hindrance to me.

27 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay.

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

1 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** If you -- who would you have considered
2 to be your scene commander?

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well, on the scene, like right at the scene
4 where everything's happening, Stuart Beselt because he was the -- like the senior
5 constable in charge. He's been in an Acting Team Leader position for quite sometime.
6 Strong leadership skills. So when they say in charge, that would be me, but on the
7 scene is what ERT asked me at one point, on scene, I said, "Well, that would be Stuart
8 Beselt, and he'd have the most knowledge of the -- like the roadways, what he's seen
9 so far, and that kind of thing."

10 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** It's -- is it reasonable, do you think, and
11 recognising we're looking at this in hindsight, that somebody entrusted with scene
12 command would be the one that is in response mode, on foot, in the heart of the
13 incident, when the scene itself involves perimeter containment ---

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

15 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** --- responsibilities, potentially
16 evacuation, medical support, ---

17 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

18 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** --- and that type of thing.

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

20 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** If you were to help us in looking forward,
21 would you suggest that having a scene commander who wasn't responsible for leading
22 the IARD formation would have been helpful to you as Risk Manager?

23 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I think when we look at that, and that part
24 we discussed about when the ERT guy asked me that, just the way I interpreted it, and
25 maybe it was wrong for me to interpret it that way, I thought he meant, like, who is on
26 the ground there that I would consider in charge? And that would be Stuart Beselt. But
27 with respect to what you're talking about, containment and everything, that would be my
28 job as a Risk Manager under Jeff West and his team take over.

1 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay.

2 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And I'm sorry, and you said moving
3 forward. Yes, I've given it a lot of thought. Like, for instance, I think I spoke about it this
4 morning, like if something major like this comes in, if we have a cadre of risk managers
5 ready, ready, you know, willing and able to come in, if they're on call, you could say,
6 "Okay. Your job is just this. This only." "Your job is to take this." "Like any phone calls
7 coming in looking for the Risk Manager, you would deal with that." "You deal with the
8 media." "I'm going to focus on the screen and containment." Like something that effect;
9 right? Where we delegate tasks exclusively.

10 And I think at the CIC, when I read about MacCallum and those
11 guys, that's what they do there.

12 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** M'hm.

13 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** But I didn't have that advantage to me,
14 like, until that all got up and running.

15 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Right. Okay.

16 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

17 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** In terms of the 9-1-1 calls that come in, I
18 understand that there's ability to replay those calls so you can hear first hand the
19 information that's coming in. and I understand that you didn't have opportunity to go to
20 the 9-1-1 side of the house, so to speak, ---

21 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

22 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** --- to hear those calls on your own. Do
23 you know if anybody else in the command structure at any time surfaced those 9-1-1
24 calls to hear that incoming information first hand as the event was unfolding?

25 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** The CIC team, they very well could have
26 called in one of them and asked them to play it back to them. I don't know if they did.
27 When it came in, I had all the details in front of me that I thought I needed. And so now
28 I'm getting -- I'm contacting Stuart and we're starting to strategically plan at that point in

1 time. So I didn't feel at that time I had the time to stop and relisten to it all over again.

2 And the same thing when I think it was Andrew and Kate
3 MacDonald called in. I had the details there and they actually put her through to me.
4 So I'm juggling a lot of balls at that time. So I didn't feel I had time to listen to the call all
5 over again. I'm just get cracking with Stuart and his team, "What are we going to do
6 here?"

7 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay.

8 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Right.

9 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay.

10 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I wanted to mention too that bear in mind
11 that when the call came in, I had four resources. I had four members working in Bible
12 Hill.

13 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** M'hm.

14 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** They all went to the call. Three went in
15 and Vicki Colford stayed on the road. So until I get back up arriving from Parrsboro,
16 from Amherst, from Millbrook, it takes time from rural policing to get containment set up.

17 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** M'hm.

18 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** And, you know, you're up at 10:45, 10:50
19 and more before you're really getting any kind of containment set up on the area. And
20 there's so many ways to go.

21 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Yeah.

22 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Not out of this community, but once
23 you're outside, there's so many -- such a system of roads in Nova Scotia.

24 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Absolutely. It's -- that's a good context
25 for the -- some of the challenges, I'm sure.

26 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

27 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** And speaking of that, and the various
28 roadways, and back roads, and highways, and secondary highways, did you at any time

1 reach out to any of your law enforcement partners directly as Risk Manager before you
2 turned over the reigns to seek their assistance?

3 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Who are you referring to of law
4 enforcement?

5 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Truro, Bridge Authorities, HRP, New
6 Glasgow, ---

7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** No, not at that time.

8 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** --- Amherst?

9 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I mean, I kind of saw, I guess, at that
10 time, that we all believed he was still in the community, we had him contained, and
11 Truro Police being a municipal agency, like, they're aware of it, yeah, that this is going
12 on, but I didn't have to consider their roadways within the Municipality of Truro at that
13 time. So.

14 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Right. Right. Would it be outside of the
15 scope of your operational reach to ask for their assistance if you needed more members
16 ---

17 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

18 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** --- to help in the area?

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Would it be outside of my scope?

20 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Yeah.

21 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** No, it would be within my scope to ask for
22 assistance, yeah.

23 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay.

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I mean, one of them called and said,
25 "Could we do anything?" And, like, again, I was overwhelmed at the time and thinking,
26 "I can't think right now what you could do for me," and I guess I got myself -- I wasn't
27 thinking outside the box enough in the sense that they're a municipal agency and we're
28 way out in Portapique.

1 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** M'hm.

2 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** But in hindsight, I would have asked them
3 to come over and do what we call lethal overwatch in our building.

4 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay.

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

6 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay.

7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Protect our building in case he did get out
8 and he comes into town.

9 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. Thank you.

10 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Because we need to be safe to do our
11 job.

12 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Absolutely.

13 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

14 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Absolutely. And this is my last question.
15 Were you privy to or involved in any operational debriefs after the incident? Not to be
16 mistaken for a Critical Incident Stress Debriefing, but more of an operational ---

17 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

18 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** --- After Action exercise?

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Again, I was asked that earlier, and I
20 went to the Critical Incident one, but I don't recall being at any operational briefing. And
21 that's not to say that there wasn't one. I'm pretty sure there was one at Bible Hill. And if
22 I remember correctly, I believe that was on night shift, and when you're on night shift,
23 you're sleeping through the day, and I just didn't get over to it. I don't know if Bruce was
24 there or not, but I didn't take part, no.

25 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. Staff Sergeant, I truly appreciate
26 your candid response and I'll turn over to my fellow Commissioner Stanton at this time.
27 I thank you very much again.

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Okay.

1 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Thanks very much.

2 I'm just interested in a bit more about the IARD training, and in
3 particular, the outdoor IARD training.

4 There's -- I know that you've been asked some questions about
5 this, but I just want to be a bit more clear on your response with respect to the role of
6 the Risk Manager when IARD is deployed.

7 In the training scenarios and in the outdoor training scenarios in
8 particular, is there communication between a person in the Risk Manager role and a
9 person in the IARD formation?

10 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Well I would say, like, in a real situation,
11 yeah, they're communicating with the Risk Manager. But in our training scenarios up at
12 Cutler Avenue, we have, like, an ad hoc person in charge. So they're communicating
13 with them.

14 Outdoor, we used a big gymnasium to kind of simulate an outdoor
15 training session. We had barricades and things we had to move from point A to B as
16 safely as we could and that kind of thing.

17 So in a real situation, it would be a Risk Manager would be who
18 they're going to be communicating with. Like we call ad hoc in -- we call it ad hoc, I
19 guess, because it's a scenario-based training, but it would be the Risk Manager who
20 they're speaking with, or if it's through the daytime, it's going to be the District
21 Commander of that district or the operations NCO.

22 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** So in the training though itself,
23 there's no one in the role of Risk Manager in the training scenario?

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I don't recall that there was. I know that
25 we've had our dispatchers in the area take part and they found it very beneficial. They
26 had a little room set up where they can sit in kind of a simulated dispatcher set up. And
27 they all thoroughly enjoyed it, but I don't remember a risk manager that did -- that's not
28 to say that there wasn't. I was only there twice a year, so they could have had risk

1 managers in on other exercises. I'm not sure. But I wasn't in there as a Risk Manager.
2 I was always in there as a candidate and an instructor assisting, in my role.

3 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** And you said the outdoor training
4 scenario took place in a gymnasium?

5 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes, it's a big building on Cutler Drive.
6 And it would be difficult for there to have members running around with guns outside.
7 It's all like an industrial park area. So we do it inside with -- we simulate it the best we
8 can as an outdoor scenario. It's quite a big space, so they set it up to simulate an
9 outdoor scenario where, like I said, we're moving in what we call loose file format.
10 We're not clumped together, so you can't -- they can't just shoot at one target of people.

11 It's different in a building because you have to stay confined going
12 down a narrow hallway.

13 So on the outdoor one, they move about -- they've done some dark
14 exercises too without light, where they have to find somebody wounded and find them
15 and then treat them with the tourniquets and that kind of thing, and bandaging. Things
16 like that.

17 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Okay. And so in the training
18 scenario, is there a use of the radios? Either a car radio or portables or both?

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I know in the car they had a car there set
20 up and I thought it had a radio in it. Or it's just a simulated radio. And then the outdoor
21 one, I don't know that we did, because the instructors are right there and they're
22 hollering out instructions and they're communicating with the team and that kind of
23 thing, just verbally. They don't use radios, I don't believe, in that scenario. Like, in what
24 we're doing there in the training scenario.

25 In the -- when they have to go seek them out in the building, yeah,
26 you're trying to communicate with each other and portable radios and that sort of thing.

27 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Okay.

28 Yeah, I was just trying to get a sense of how they're learning to

1 communicate with whoever's overseeing things while they're in the training centre so.

2 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah. I know when they had the
3 dispatchers in there, they were communicating with the dispatchers with the portables
4 and telling them what they're seeing and that sort of thing, dispatch directing them, or
5 dispatch might say, "We have another threat at the other end of the building, so
6 therefore, team 2 goes in," like that kind of thing; right?

7 But the outdoor one, I can't remember if we used radios outside or
8 not.

9 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** And then I just had a question about
10 the timing of your call, I believe, with Staff Sergeant Halliday. I think it was at 10:35
11 p.m.

12 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

13 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** That was -- so that was just after
14 you spoke with Kate MacDonald about 10:28, 10:29, something like that?

15 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Correct, yeah.

16 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Okay. And so in the 10:35 call to
17 Staff Sergeant Halliday, you provided the information to him that you had learned from
18 Kate MacDonald?

19 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yes, yeah.

20 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** And you recall telling him about her
21 reporting her husband having been shot and that the person had been driving a police
22 car?

23 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah, I know that he said he didn't get
24 that information, but I know that's what prompted my call. The fact that -- see, I said
25 earlier that the first two, 123 and 135 Orchard Beach Terrace, kind of seemed like it was
26 the first occurrence to me. Like, Jamie Blair called in and then things happened next
27 door as well. And the information that came from that one more isolated scene, if you
28 will, was that somebody thought it could have been a police car. So we're still struggling

1 with that and saying what is going on. And then when I have a -- somebody on the line
2 that says, "A guy shot at us and it looked like a police car," away from the first incident, I
3 says, okay, now we have two different occurrences, you know, a significant distance
4 apart in the community, and the second -- this is the second one now where they're
5 saying it was a police car, it was very alarming. And I said, "We got to get the -- excuse
6 me -- the CIC rolling," and I contacted him right away. So for me not to mention that,
7 like, I don't have a note on it, and I use the risk manager cell phone, which does not
8 record -- I didn't know that until just now, he says I didn't -- he didn't have that
9 information. I don't know how he didn't because I know that's what prompted my call to
10 him, the fact that we had a second caller saying it's a police car. So really, two
11 independent reports at that point, in my mind, that it's a police car.

12 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Thanks. That's helpful to confirm it.
13 I'm just checking through the timing. Then you said about setting up containment 10:44,
14 and into ---

15 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

16 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** --- I think it's a few minutes there
17 where you're focussed on containment. So that's ---

18 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

19 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** --- starting around 10:44.

20 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Something like that. So I got off the
21 phone I believe with Halliday at 22:42, so within 2 minutes, I'm starting to work on
22 containment, and I have -- still have -- most of the members I'm going to use are still on
23 route, what we call 10-17. So, like, Jordan Carroll's making his way from Parrisboro,
24 and we have Jeff Campbell coming in from Amherst. There's a Constable Cheeseman,
25 Grund is coming in from Millbrook, so we have a lot of people on route, but I don't have
26 hardly any resources yet to do much containment at that point.

27 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Right.

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** We had to wait for them to get there.

1 Yeah.

2 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** And do you think you were on a call
3 as well around 10:48?

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** 10:48. Oh, that's when Vicki voiced it.

5 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Yeah.

6 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** I don't know that I was. I know that I was
7 very busy, there was a lot going on, and if she said that, I could very well have missed
8 it. I don't remember it, to tell you the truth.

9 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Okay. No, I appreciate that.
10 Thanks very much for clarifying the timeline for me. I appreciate it.

11 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Okay.

12 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Those are my questions.

13 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Okay.

14 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you so much, Staff
15 Sergeant Rehill. I just have one question for you and it's the same question I asked
16 Staff Sergeant Halliday. I believe earlier today you referenced the participation of
17 Sergeant O'Brien and Staff Sergeant Halliday as collaborative. And the question I have
18 is, it's one thing to be collaborative and it's another thing to have a clear chain of
19 command that everybody's aware of, and it just struck me that officers superior, at least
20 one superior to you, but officers superior to the people and other officers that Sergeant
21 O'Brien and Staff Sergeant Halliday are speaking to appear to be giving directions when
22 you are clearly in charge. And, you know, I'm thinking about the report we have to write,
23 and we have to make recommendations. And ---

24 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

25 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** --- it just strikes me that the
26 recommendation should be that there should be clear chain of command and that
27 everybody's aware of it ---

28 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

1 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** --- and as opposed to
2 necessarily saying it should be -- and I'm not saying -- I think everybody understood you
3 were -- now that you were in command, but I just would like your help with this. Is --
4 would it be -- there should be a clear chain of command when -- and everybody knows
5 that you're in command and any suggestions they have should go through you as
6 opposed to directly to people who report to them ---

7 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** M'hm.

8 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** --- or should it be more collaborative
9 as has been also suggested? So just some clarification on that would be greatly ---

10 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah.

11 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** --- helpful for me, Staff Sergeant.

12 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Yeah, well, I mentioned earlier too as well
13 that due to the sheer magnitude of this occurrence, like, you know, we know now that
14 it's the worst mass murder in Canadian history, so I guess you could say the worst crisis
15 in Canadian history, if not one of them. And in regular occurrence, like I said before, on
16 a Saturday evening or something, if somebody's home micro-managing and they're
17 going to start, you know, intervening and wanting to give out commands, I mean, we'd
18 put a stop to that fairly quick, but this wasn't a regular occurrence. This was
19 extraordinary circumstances. And, yes, I said I welcomed the assistance, but I can see
20 where you're saying that the members at certain point in time were taking in direction
21 from several people of higher rank. And when Bill Neilson, who's in charge, I thought --
22 when I look back at that, I thought that was actually a reasonable question, because he
23 just entered from Pictou County. So when he does that, he changes talk groups over to
24 Colchester, so he hears all this activity, and he hears Staff Carroll, he hears me, he
25 hears Sergeant O'Brien and others on the air. So he's, at that point when he arrives, he
26 said, "Okay, who's in charge? Who am I taking direction from?" So that's a fair
27 question by him.

28 I've had a conversation with my counterpart, Bruce and -- Briers,

1 and, you know, we're kind of the opinion now that once Staff Sergeant -- once the
2 District Commander for that district is up and running, and he has, say, MacCallum and
3 Halliday and them all there with him, collaborating together in Bible Hill, maybe that's at
4 the point where they should say, "We have this." Because they also had Jeff West
5 coming on the radio while he's on route. So now you have West, you have MacCallum,
6 you have Halliday, you have Carroll, O'Brien. So, at that point, maybe it's time for us to
7 stand back right away and take a -- even though they don't have their official CIC up
8 and rolling, let them take the ball from there and let us fall back into an assistance role.
9 I think that's certainly worth looking at. Or if it's just going to be me, then you have to
10 have radio silence from all those guys, but they have such valuable input, I don't know if
11 that's the right way to go. And sometimes they knew I was so darn busy, they decided
12 to voice to the members directly instead of trying to call me. So there's so many ways
13 we can look at that. But we do need to get something clear and concise for the future.

14 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Yeah. Thank you. Thank you
15 so much, Staff Sergeant.

16 Mr. Burrill?

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yes. Yes, thank you, Commissioners.
18 We're at the tail end of the proceedings here. Long day for the Staff Sergeant, but I
19 know in conversations with the Staff Sergeant earlier that he'd indicated that he may
20 have a final comment, and if there is that, I wish to provide him, with your permission,
21 Commissioners, the opportunity to make that comment. If you have anything to say,
22 Staff Sergeant, in closing, this would be the time to do so.

23 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Okay. Sure, yeah.

24 As I -- when I started out, again, I'd like to reiterate our condolences
25 to the families. It has to be so terrible -- terribly hard for all of them. It's a very sad
26 circumstance, very tragic. But I want -- you know, I want people to bear in mind, not just
27 the families, but Nova Scotians and Canadians that we're human beings that just -- we
28 put on our uniform, and we go to work, and we put our lives at risk all the time. And my

1 father-in-law always used to say to me, you know, I have a lot of regard for anybody
2 who has to strap on a gun to go to work. So but we are just regular people going to
3 work to support our families. Everybody I believe that night and the following day had
4 their heart and soul into this. They were doing their best, despite now looking at, you
5 know, the -- you know, when you dissect it, it looks like you could have done better
6 here, and we're not denying that. This is certainly -- you know, despite us all trying our
7 best, there's certainly ways we can improve in the future. And I just ask them to all bear
8 that in mind. And, you know, we're people too, and there's -- it's been very tough. It's
9 been very tough for all of us. Our dispatchers, our call-takers; everybody's traumatized
10 by this. Yes, we didn't lose a loved one, but it's been very tough, especially for me.
11 Like, I think about it 24/7 and it doesn't leave me alone. I have nightmares; I have
12 trouble sleeping. And, you know, I'm in a grocery store, it's on my mind. I'm walking
13 down the street, it's on my mind. You know, it never leaves me. And I'm sure they're
14 the same way, if not worse.

15 So I just hope that I did something here today positive that can help
16 these people, the families, and maybe find another minute, you know, bit of peace from
17 what I've told them today. I've been here -- I've been open and honest, and I've told
18 them all I can from what I know, and I just hope that someday they can move forward
19 and have some peace in their life.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Thank you, S/Sgt. Rehill.

21 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Okay.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Commissioners.

23 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** All right.

24 Yes, I will add my thanks as well, S/Sgt. Rehill. It's a difficult task
25 we have, and you've had a long day and -- conjuring up difficult memories, and we very
26 much do appreciate that. And we appreciate your sharing your information with us; it's
27 crucial, and again, you have our thanks and appreciation for that.

28 I can say tomorrow that we will conduct a similar process with Sgt.

1 Andy O'Brien. And, as well, I can confirm now at this moment that the media embargo
2 that we placed on the testimony we heard today is lifted, and we post the video
3 emanating from today at the very earliest opportunity on our website.

4 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Sure.

5 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** So thank everyone for
6 participating today in this process, and again, thank you again, S/Sgt. Rehill, and again,
7 the process -- a similar process will begin tomorrow at 9:30.

8 So thank you so much, everyone.

9 **S/SGT. BRIAN REHILL:** Okay, thank you. You're welcome.

10 --- Upon adjourning at 5:03 p.m.

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CERTIFICATION

14

15 I, Sandrine Marineau-Lupien, a certified court reporter, hereby certify the foregoing
16 pages to be an accurate transcription of my notes/records to the best of my skill and
17 ability, and I so swear.

18

19 Je, Sandrine Marineau-Lupien, une sténographe officiel, certifie que les pages ci-hautes
20 sont une transcription conforme de mes notes/enregistrements au meilleur de mes
21 capacités, et je le jure.

22

23



24 Sandrine Marineau-Lupien

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