

Public Hearing

Audience publique

Commissioners / Commissaires

The Honourable / L'honorable J. Michael MacDonald,
Chair / Président

Leanne J. Fitch (Ret. Police Chief, M.O.M)

Dr. Kim Stanton

VOLUME 33

Held at :

Halifax Convention Centre
1650 Argyle Street
Halifax, Nova Scotia
B3J 0E6

Tuesday, June 7, 2022

Tenue à:

Centre des congrès d'Halifax
1650, rue Argyle
Halifax, Nouvelle-Écosse
B3J 0E6

Mardi, le 7 juin 2022

INTERNATIONAL REPORTING INC.

www.irri.net
(800)899-0006

II Appearances / Comparutions

Mr. Roger Burrill	Commission Counsel / Conseiller de la commission
Ms. Anna Mancini	Commission Counsel / Conseillère de la commission
Ms. Tara Miller	Counsel / Conseillère
Ms. Patricia MacPhee	Counsel / Conseillère
Ms. Grace MacCormick	Counsel / Conseillère
Mr. Thomas MacDonald	Counsel / Conseiller
Mr. Joshua Bryson	Counsel / Conseiller

III
Table of Content / Table des matières

	PAGE
FOUNDATIONAL DOCUMENTS : RCMP PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS	2
Presentation by Ms. Anna Mancini	2
CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE, Sworn	13
Examination in-Chief by Mr. Roger Burrill	13
Cross-examination by Ms. Tara Miller	54
Cross-examination by Mr. James Russell	80
Cross-examination by Ms. Grace MacCormick	83
GLENN MASON, Sworn	88
Examination in-Chief by Ms. Anna Mancini	88
Cross-examination by Ms. Grace MacCormick	106
SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER, Sworn	109
Examination in-Chief by Ms. Anna Mancini	109
Cross-examination by Mr. Thomas MacDonald	174
Cross-examination by Mr. Joshua Bryson	182
Cross-examination by Ms. Tara Miller	210
Cross-Examination by Ms. Patricia MacPhee	223

IV
Exhibit List / Liste des pièces

No	DESCRIPTION	PAGE
2001	(COMM0058836) Foundational Document – RCMP Public Communications, April 18-19, 2020	3
2002	(COMM0000398) Active shooter situation in Nova Scotia	
2003	(COMM0000400) Active shooter situation in Nova Scotia	
2004	(COMM0001000) Jason Mew text.pdf	
2005	(COMM0001010) Memo - Alert Ready System.docx	
2006	(COMM0001011) EMO Alert Ready Policy_v3 (003).docx	
2007	(COMM0001015) Public Alerting System - June 23-16 (Ver 0 4).pdf	
2008	(COMM0001017) Dominic Fewer text.pdf	
2009	(COMM0007032) Employee org chart for Operation H-Strong. (2 pages)	
2010	(COMM0010544) Email- Media response re: information provided to media by Cpl. CROTEAU. Dated 2020-04-19 (1 page)	
2011	(COMM0000994) PELMOREX User Agreement - AMENDMENT copy.pdf	
2012	(COMM0016615) IMG_1846.jpg	
2013	(COMM0016616) Active shooter	
2014	(COMM0016617) Want me to send tweets for trans?	
2015	(COMM0016627) For translation - urgent tweets	
2016	(COMM0016630) Do we want to put these tweets on FB too?	
2017	(COMM0016631) Re: Do we want to put these tweets on FB too?	
2018	(COMM0016632) 22B11 description	
2019	(COMM0016653) La GRC mène une enquête sur un tireur actif: mises à jour diffusés sur Twitter / RCMP Engaged in Active Shooter Investigation: Information Available on Twitter	

V
Exhibit List / Liste des pièces

No	DESCRIPTION	PAGE
2020	(COMM0016666) Re: Please keep an eye on social media	
2021	(COMM0016669) Re: Please keep an eye on social media	
2022	(COMM0016670) Public asking for use of emergency alert system	
2023	(COMM0017963) Notes	
2024	(COMM0017964) Public Safety Broadcast 2020-04-23.docx	
2025	(COMM00018407) detail incident report 3757.pdf	
2026	(COMM0018411) Emergency Alert	
2027	(COMM0020772) Rodier Phone calls -corrected-	
2028	(COMM0031054) Call from Glenn Mason re Alert Ready.rtf	
2029	(COMM0035867) Public Alerting System - June 23, 2016.pdf	
2030	(COMM0036064) Statement by RCMP Criminal Operations Officer, Chief Superintendent Chris Leather / Déclaration du surintendant principal Chris Leather, officier responsable des enquêtes criminelles de la GRC	
2031	(COMM0036378) Internal Messages April 18 & 19.pdf	
2032	(COMM0043156) SOP-Media Relations_for Risk Managers_2019-07-30, Final	
2033	(COMM0048883) Comments re alert system during incident_2021-03-25.docx	
2034	(COMM0048884) H Strong II Social Media Analytics_Portapique_2021-03-25.docx	
2035	(COMM0048897) Stats from NHQ_H-div_statsanalysis_2020-05-11.docx	

VI
Exhibit List / Liste des pièces

No	DESCRIPTION	PAGE
2036	(COMM0053340) Mass Casualty Commission - Investigations - Supplemental Report - Determine nature of RCMP contact, canvass and attempts to contact person(s) within the Portapique Community during the events of April 18 and 19, 2020	
2037	(COMM0057343) Affidavit of Lia Scanlan	
2038	(COMM0058826) Mass Casualty Commission - Investigations - Transcript of Recorded Interview of Lia Scanlan	
2039	(COMM0054717) Cpl. J. Clarke 45236 Notes to June 23.pdf	
2040	(COMM0058467) HDIV - IMIT - Alert Ready Feasibility Study and Risk Assessment - FINAL - 2022-05-10.pdf	161
2041	(COMM0035866) PSAP Managers Meetings.pdf	225

Halifax, Nova Scotia

--- Upon commencing on Tuesday, June 7th, 2022, at 9:34 a.m.

REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND: Good morning. The proceedings of the Mass Casualty Commission are now in session, with Commissioner Michael MacDonald, Commissioner Leanne Fitch, and Commissioner Kim Stanton presiding.

COMMISSIONER FITCH: Bonjour et bienvenue. Hello and welcome. We join you from Mi'kma'ki, the ancestral and unceded territory of the Mi'kmaq. Please join us in remembering those whose lives were taken, those who were harmed, their families, and all those affected by the April 2020 mass casualty in Nova Scotia.

We appreciate the patience and commitment of everyone who is joining us in this work, including the Participants and members of the public. Since we began public proceedings in February, we have continued to build upon our understanding of what happened. As stated in our interim report:

"The mass casualty cannot be understood in simple, straightforward terms. If it could, we would not need a public inquiry."

For this reason, we continue to layer on information that will ultimately help us understand how the mass casualty could have happened, determine why it happened, to the greatest extent possible, and produce meaningful recommendations to help protect our communities in the future.

Since the mass casualty occurred, we recognize that governments and institutions have been taking some steps to learn lessons and change their policies and procedures. It is important that the Commission is aware of these changes as we go about our work, with an aim to produce meaningful recommendations.

Therefore, further to a recent submission from Participant Counsel, Jane Lenehan, for information about changes made within the RCMP in response to the

1 mass casualty, the Commission has issued a subpoena to the RCMP to provide this
2 information. Once received, it will be shared with the public. Thank you again to
3 Ms. Lenehan and your clients for your submission.

4 This week we are focussing on how police services and service
5 providers in Nova Scotia collaborate to carry out their respective roles in response to a
6 critical incident, including how they communicate with each other and the public, and
7 access resources including air support and radio communications.

8 Yesterday, we learned more about the Truro Police Service,
9 including its processes and role during the mass casualty. Later this week, we will be
10 looking at the role of the Halifax Regional Police.

11 Today, Commission Counsel will present a Foundational Document
12 about RCMP Communications, and then we will hear from an RCMP witness, retired
13 Corporal Jennifer Clarke, civilian member Glenn Mason, and Superintendent Dustine
14 Rodier, who will explain different aspects of public communications during the mass
15 casualty.

16 I will now ask Senior Commission Counsel, Anna Mancini, to begin.
17 Ms. Mancini?

18 **FOUNDATIONAL DOCUMENTS: RCMP PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS:**

19 **--- PRESENTATION BY MS. ANNA MANCINI:**

20 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Thank you, Commissioner. Good morning.
21 My task this morning is to introduce the Foundational Document entitled, RCMP Public
22 Communications, April 18th-19th, 2020. I will attempt to present a brief summary of the
23 Foundational Document to you this morning.

24 And Madam Registrar, I would please ask that this be marked and
25 tendered accordingly.

26 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** That's Exhibit 2001.

27 **--- EXHIBIT NO. 2001:**

28 Foundational Documents: RCMP Public Communications -

1 April 18th-19th, 2020

2 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Thank you. And I'd also seek to mark and
3 tender all supporting documentation associated to the exhibit.

4 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** So exhibited.

5 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Thank you very much.

6 The Foundational Document that I am presenting today is a
7 summary of information currently available to the Mass Casualty Commission in relation
8 to the RCMP's use of public communications during the April 18th and 19th, 2020 mass
9 casualty in Nova Scotia.

10 The narrative of this presentation is essentially broken into three
11 segments: Initially, a very brief portion of time, prior to the engagement of what's
12 referred to as Strategic Communications, just a brief discussion about initial efforts to
13 put warning -- warnings, messages out to residents, specifically of Portapique. I'll then
14 move into a second portion where we discuss Strategic Communications and the
15 narrative or a timeline of the Twitter messages that were posted throughout the course
16 of the mass casualty. And the final portion of my presentation today will just be a brief
17 discussion about some of the communications that were occurring with respect to the
18 use of the Alert Ready system on April 19th.

19 So there's three entities that are discussed in the course of this
20 presentation, and you'll also be hearing some of these terms referred from today's
21 witnesses. So the first entity that I'll be discussing is the RCMP Strategic
22 Communications Unit. This is a unit within the RCMP. It was once referred to as Media
23 Relations but evolved into what's now referred to as Strategic Communications. And
24 this entity is essentially responsible for drafting media releases, liaising with media
25 outlets. Also responsible for communications to the public. So that would include public
26 awareness campaigns, but it would also include information relevant to live ongoing
27 incidents.

28 So an example of a public awareness campaign might be a

1 campaign bringing awareness to an issue such as human trafficking or a specific public
2 education piece. An ongoing incident, of course, is something that the police are
3 responding to and bringing awareness to the public. So for example, a car accident on
4 a highway with a road closure.

5 So in April of 2022, the primary means of disseminating information
6 from the Strategic Communications Unit was through Facebook and Twitter social
7 media platforms.

8 The second entity that we'll be discussing today is the Emergency
9 Management Office of the Province of Nova Scotia. And you've heard some witnesses
10 from this organization already, such as Paul Mason and Rod Legge. They were
11 testifying earlier in May. So this is not the RCMP, this is a provincial agency, and it's
12 responsible for emergency planning and coordination of emergency responses.

13 So the EMO is not specific to public communications, but it's
14 relevant in today's discussion because it is the designated Alert Ready public alerting
15 authority.

16 And so the EMO at the time had what's referred to as trusted
17 sources, such as police agencies, who could request the use of the Alert Ready
18 System, and EMO, once receiving that request, would issue the alert.

19 And the third entity that we're discussing today is the RCMP
20 Emergency Management Section, or EMS. Like EMO, EMS is not specific to public
21 communications, however, it is the section that liaises with EMO, with the Province. So
22 it's essentially the bridge – a bridge between the RCMP and the EMO. And it was the
23 section that was responsible for maintaining the portfolio relevant to Amber Alerts.

24 You'll also hear reference to standing up the DEOC, Divisional
25 Emergency Operations Centre, which is a physical location that can house numerous
26 supports in response to an emergency or disaster, and that is also run out of EMS, or
27 falls under that portfolio.

28 So this section was designed to be staffed by one civilian member

1 and one regular member who report to an officer in charge.

2 So Strategic communications, as I mentioned, in April of 2020, the
3 Strategic Communications Unit of the RCMP was primarily staffed by civilians: the
4 director, as a civilian member -- was a civilian member, Lia Scanlan; the assistant to the
5 director, an individual, Kayla Rees; the senior communications advisor, Cindy Bayers;
6 two communications advisors, Regis Dudley and Cindy MacKenzie; and
7 then two Public Information Officers, Cpl. Croteau and Cpl. Clarke.

8 So as you can see, the majority of the unit is made up by civilians
9 who have a background in communications. Two of the members, the two corporals,
10 were regular members with policing knowledge who would inform the operational side of
11 things.

12 In April of 2020, the EMS section fell under the purview of then Insp
13 Dustine Rodier. The civilian position was staffed by Glenn Mason, who had been
14 transferred from the CrOps office to EMS within the past year, and the regular member
15 position was vacant at the time.

16 Okay. So I'm now going to just move through some of the narrative
17 with respect to communications and discussions about communications to the public
18 throughout the mass casualty.

19 So the initial communication efforts or thought process with respect
20 to warning the public was specific to Portapique when the contact team of Csts Beselt,
21 Patton, and Merchant entered the community. Several of the staff sergeants who
22 testified earlier, well, the previous month, indicated that there was this initial thought of
23 utilizing a reverse 9-1-1 system or a call-back system that could be used in order to
24 contact residents and warn them to shelter in place.

25 It was subsequent to the event that it became clear that the system
26 that was perhaps envisioned was not a technological reality at the OCC. In fact, call-
27 takers at the OCC were essentially searching property registrations and attempting to
28 locate contact information for persons associated to the property in the PROS system

1 and attempting to make contact.

2 So when Cst Beselt inquired at 11:16 p.m. as to whether any kind
3 of emergency broadcast could be made, he was advised that this 9-1-1 reverse
4 mapping or attempt to contact through the OCC was being used.

5 We then move to the engagement with Strategic Communications.
6 So the first call was actually made at 11:20. So that was a brief call from Risk Manager
7 Rehill to Cpl Croteau. And he facilitates a call between Cpl Croteau and Sgt O'Brien,
8 which occurred at 11:30 p.m.

9 And you'll recall from a couple of the previous slides, Cpl Croteau
10 was one of the Public Information Officers within the Strategic Communications Unit.
11 She was the member who was on call that weekend. So she speaks with Sgt O'Brien
12 and at 11:32, a Tweet was issued, she posted a Tweet regarding the incident in
13 Portapique. So this about roughly an hour after the contact team had entered
14 Portapique.

15 Cpl Croteau was contacted at about 3:00 a.m. by CBC but was
16 advised that she had no further updates.

17 Shortly before 5:00 a.m., Cpl Croteau was contacted by S/Sgt
18 Halliday, who asked that she attend the Command Post to manage the media outlets
19 that were anticipated to arrive at that scene.

20 Around 6:00 a.m., the Director of Strategic Communications, Lia
21 Scanlan, awoke, realized she'd missed some calls from Cpl Croteau and she called her
22 back. Croteau -- Cpl Croteau, at that time, was on route to the Command Post.

23 Between 7:00 and 7:45, Ms. Scanlan engaged in a series of calls.
24 She first contacted the OCC. This was just at the time that S/Sgt Rehill and S/Sgt
25 Briers were switching roles as the Risk Manager. So she then contacted Incident
26 Commander Jeff West, who advised her that S/Sgt Halliday would be in touch with her.

27 S/Sgt Halliday called Lia Scanlan at approximately 7:20 a.m. and
28 confirmed that there was an active shooter situation, and she was advised that further

1 updates would come to her through S/Sgt MacCallum.

2 She then spoke with Supt Chris Leather at approximately 7:43 a.m.

3 At 8:02 a.m., she posted a Tweet regarding the situation in

4 Portapique.

5 So these are the two Tweets that were referred to in the previous

6 slides. The first is the one on the left of your slide. That was posted at 11:32,

7 indicating:

8 "...RCMPNS is responding to a firearms complaint in the
9 [...]Portapique area. (Portapique Beach Rd, Bay Shore
10 Rd and Five Houses Rd.) The public is asked to avoid
11 the area and stay in their homes with doors locked at this
12 time."

13 The Tweet on the right was posted at 8:02 a.m.:

14 "...RCMPNS remains on scene in [...]Portapique. This is
15 an active shooter situation. Residents in the area, stay
16 inside your homes & lock your doors. Call 911 if there is
17 anyone on your property. You may not see the police but
18 we are there with you."

19 So as has been previously discussed, at approximately 7:27 a.m.,

20 Sgt Bourdages of Halifax Regional Police sent a photograph of the perpetrator's replica

21 RCMP cruiser and a photograph of the perpetrator to S/Sgt MacCallum.

22 And at 8:02 a.m., S/Sgt MacCallum sent the photograph of the
23 perpetrator to Lia Scanlan directly. And at 8:10 a.m., S/Sgt MacCallum circulated the
24 photograph of the replica cruiser throughout RCMP emails. It's not exactly clear the
25 breadth of who received this email.

26 Staff Sergeant MacCallum indicated he was sending it to everyone
27 he could think of, and he did provide it to the OCC Commander, Glen Byrne, to
28 disseminate further.

1 At 8:54 a.m., Lia Scanlan posted a Tweet with the photograph of
2 the perpetrator's face from the photo that she had received via email.

3 So just before 9:00 a.m., Public Information Officer Corporal Clarke
4 emailed Lia Scanlan with information about the replica cruiser. And her email indicated
5 that the:

6 "...car involved looks like a current RCMP Ford Taurus
7 Interceptor. The only difference is that it has a white
8 antenna [sorry, forgive me, a whip antenna] mounted on
9 the trunk. That is a long antenna about 5 to 6 feet high.
10 22B11 is marked on the C pillar of the car. I will get
11 some pics for you in a separate email."

12 At 9:04 a.m., Ms. Scanlan replied to Corporal Clarke. She
13 indicated:

14 "Perfect. The next tweet is him and a photo etc. After
15 that I am wanting this PC one. Can you have a look at
16 what we have said so far and pull something together.
17 Addie can approve. I will have Regis save it to the doc."

18 At 9:40, Corporal Clarke sent a draft Tweet including the photo of
19 the replica cruiser to Staff Sergeant MacCallum, and she corrected the fact that the C
20 pillar said "28B11", not "22B11", and she further advised that this was not a legitimate
21 call sign for an RCMP cruiser in Nova Scotia.

22 You'll recall that at 9:42, a call had come in regarding an incident in
23 Wentworth that had caused or prompted Staff Sergeant MacCallum to jump into a
24 vehicle with Constable Craig Hubley to respond to that scene. The email that Corporal
25 Clarke had sent did -- went unanswered at that stage.

26 At 9:45, Corporal Clarke forwarded the email to Staff Sergeant
27 Halliday for approval. Corporal Clarke received approval from Staff Sergeant Halliday
28 at 9:49 and forwarded this to her director, Lia Scanlan.

1 At 10:04 a.m., following sightings of the perpetrator in Glenholme,
2 communications advisor Regis Dudley posted a Tweet regarding the Hidden Hilltop
3 Campground. So this is the 10:04 Tweet indicating RCMP is advising people to avoid
4 Highway 4 near hidden Hilltop Campground in Glenholme. The perpetrator is in the
5 area. Please stay inside your homes and lock your doors.

6 The Tweet regarding the perpetrator's replica cruiser was posted at
7 10:17 a.m. It indicated that:

8 "The perpetrator may be driving what appears to be an
9 RCMP vehicle and may be wearing an RCMP uniform.
10 There's one difference between his car and our RCMP
11 vehicles, the car number. The suspect's car is 28B11
12 behind rear passenger window. If you see 28B11, call
13 immediately." (As read)

14 And the 28B11 is what's circled and indicated with the arrow in that
15 Tweet.

16 Thereafter, the Tweets appeared to be posted and flow more
17 quickly. At 10:21, there was the indication that the perpetrator was currently in the
18 central Onslow and Debert area in a vehicle that may resemble what appears to be an
19 RCMP vehicle and may be wearing what appears to be an RCMP uniform. Please stay
20 inside and avoid the area.

21 At 10:39, there was the indication to:

22 "Stay tuned to our Twitter account for the latest
23 information on the active shooter investigation. Thank
24 you for your understanding as we work to provide the
25 most updated information while addressing public and
26 officer safety." (As read)

27 At 11:04, a Tweet was issued indicating that:

28 "The suspect in the active shooter investigation was last

1 seen travelling southbound on Highway 102 from
2 Brookfield area in what appears to be RCMP vehicle and
3 may be wearing RCMP uniform. Suspect's car is 28B11
4 behind rear passenger window. If you see 28B11, car
5 911."

6 At 11:06, there was a Tweet posted indicating that:

7 "The suspect in active shooter investigation now
8 believed to be driving small silver Chevrolet SUV
9 travelling southbound on Highway 102 from Brookfield
10 area. If seen, call 911." (As read)

11 And this was, of course, following the incident in Shubenacadie.

12 At 11:24, another Tweet was posted regarding the vehicle:

13 "Confirmed suspect vehicle is silver Chevy Tracker last
14 seen in Milford. If seen, call 911."

15 At 11:35, there was a Tweet indicating:

16 "To clarify, the suspect in our active shooter investigation
17 is not employed by the RCMP, but he may be wearing
18 an RCMP uniform. He is considered armed and
19 dangerous. If you see him, do not approach and call
20 911 immediately." (As read)

21 And finally, at 11:40, the Tweet indicating that:

22 "The suspect in active shooter investigation is now in
23 custody. More information will be released when
24 available. Thank you for your cooperation and support."
25 (As read)

26 So that essentially summarizes the timeline of the Twitter postings
27 issued by the Strategic Communications Unit of the RCMP on April 18th and 19th of
28 2020.

1 So we'll now look at the discussions that were occurring in relation
2 to the use of the Alert Ready system. So it's important to understand out of the gate
3 that this discussion is happening independent -- independently from Strategic
4 Communications, so the discussion about the Alert Ready system actually commenced
5 within the Emergency Management Office of the province.

6 EMO had first become aware of the unfolding incident as a result of
7 the engagement -- the initial engagement of attempts to acquire a DNR helicopter, so
8 because that falls under provincial jurisdiction, EMO had been alerted to the fact that
9 there was an incident occurring.

10 Nova Scotia EMO duty officer, Andrew Mitton, had been made
11 aware of the request for the helicopter and he was also later advised of the request to
12 set up a comfort station.

13 So I'm not going to go through every bullet point here. Suffice to
14 say there was a great deal of communications between various individuals within EMO.
15 But Mr. Mitton essentially starts a series of communications such that by 8:19 a.m.,
16 EMO Executive Director Paul Mason has learned of the situation and has asked to
17 assemble staff and prepare for a potential Alert Ready request from the RCMP.

18 So between 8:22 a.m. and 10:32 a.m., various steps were taken to
19 essentially ensure that all necessary preparations had been made with respect to
20 potentially issuing an Alert Ready message, and this included emailing the National
21 Alert Aggregation and Dissemination System to advise that EMO was on standby.

22 And at 10:32 a.m., Executive Director of EMO Paul Mason
23 instructed Dominic Fewer of EMO to reach out to the RCMP for direction regarding the
24 Alert Ready use.

25 At 10:35 a.m. on April 19th, Mr. Fewer attempted to contact the
26 RCMP DEOC. So DEOC is what I had referred to as falling under the envelope of
27 EMS, the Divisional Emergency Operation System. He was unsuccessful at that time.

28 And at 10:39, Mr. Fewer sent a text message to Corporal Shawn

1 Reynolds to inquire about the use of Alert Ready, and Corporal Reynolds replied that
2 Glenn Mason, who worked within EMS of the RCMP, would contact EMO.

3 At 11:14 a.m., Michael Bennet with EMO was able to contact Glenn
4 Mason of EMS and ask whether the RCMP wished to use the Alert Ready system. And
5 at 11:17, Glenn Mason contacted the risk -- second risk manager who had been brought
6 on at the OCC, Staff Sergeant Steve Ettinger.

7 So we have that call, and I'll play that. You'll note at beginning
8 when the call is being transferred, the audio is barely hard to hear; however, once that
9 transfer is complete, I think you'll be able to hear it a little more clearly.

10 **[AUDIO PLAYBACK]**

11 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** So the conversation that you're hearing
12 there is, of course, Glenn Mason of EMS, as I mentioned, speaking with Risk Manager
13 Staff Sergeant Steve Ettinger. When Staff Sergeant Ettinger is referring to Dustine, he's
14 referring to then Inspector Dustine Rodier, who was on the floor of the OCC at that time.

15 At 11:21, as a result of this conversation, Glenn Mason advised
16 Michael Bennett that the RCMP wished to use the Alert Ready system. He asked Mr.
17 Bennett to contact Inspector Rodier. At 11:28 and 11:31, Michael Bennett attempted to
18 contact Inspector Rodier, and this was, of course, moments after the perpetrator had
19 been killed in Enfield. At 11:31, Mr. Bennett called Glenn Mason and advised that he
20 could not get through to Inspector Rodier. Glenn Mason contacted the OCC again,
21 spoke with Risk Manager Ettinger, who informed Mr. Mason that the perpetrator was
22 now in custody. So Glenn Mason, at that point, provided Michael Bennett's contact
23 information to Risk Manager Ettinger to get in touch with him.

24 At 11:41, Jason Mew of EMO sent a text message to Inspector
25 Rodier, asking for her to confirm that the suspect was in custody and that they could
26 stand down their Alert Ready request. And at that point, Inspector Rodier replied, "Yes,
27 confirmed in custody. Thanks."

28 Commissioners, that is the presentation of the Foundational

1 Document for today's purposes. I know Mr. Burrill will be calling the first witness, and I
2 think there's a two-minute changeover with respect to the podium, but I think we can
3 probably proceed right through.

4 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you so much, Ms.
5 Mancini. It's very helpful and, Mr. Burrill, yes, we will transition now to make
6 arrangements for our first witness for this morning. Thank you.

7 (Short Pause)

8 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you all very much.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** We good, Alex? Good. Thank you. New
10 speed record, Commissioners.

11 In the next phase is to call some witnesses, and I would propose --
12 I wish to call retired Corporal Jennifer Clarke, please. I understand she's available and
13 will come forward.

14 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you, Mr. Burrill.

15 Good morning retired Corporal Clarke. What I'm going to do is ask
16 you to remain standing. The Registrar has been advised that you have indicated a
17 desire to be sworn in these proceedings and she'll conduct that undertaking with you at
18 this point.

19 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Thank you.

20 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** If you can just place
21 your right hand on the Bible, please?

22 **--- CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE, Sworn:**

23 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Thank you. Be seated,
24 please.

25 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Thank you.

26 **--- EXAMINATION IN-CHIEF BY MR. ROGER BURRILL:**

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And for the record, your name is Jennifer
28 Clarke?

1 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yes.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Clarke is C-L-A-R-K-E; am I right?

3 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yeah.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. And you are a retired corporal
5 from the RCMP; is that correct?

6 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** That's correct, yes.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. What I propose to do, retired
8 Corporal Clarke, is just go through some of your background. The idea today is to get a
9 sense of who you are, your professional capacity, your experience, and then we're
10 going to move on to a few questions with respect to, one, Strategic Communications
11 Unit at H-Div, ask you a little bit about that and your experience therein, and then we'll
12 talk a little bit about the communications process on April 18th and 19th. Is that all right
13 with you?

14 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yes.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Very good.

16 Do you have some familiarity with the Foundational Document that
17 was just presented by my colleague this morning?

18 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Some, yes.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Very good. I understand, retired
20 Corporal, that you attended and graduated from Depot between October 1995 and April
21 of 1996; is that right?

22 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** That's correct, yes.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. In April of 1996, you were
24 posted to the Inverness District at the Port Hawkesbury Detachment; is that right?

25 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** That's right, yes.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And you conducted general duty member
27 obligations?

28 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yes.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** December 20th -- sorry, December of
2 2001, you were then posted to a rather unique location in Advocate Harbour; am I
3 correct?

4 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** That's right, yes.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** That's also, or that's within the
6 Cumberland District in Nova Scotia?

7 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yes.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And because it's so unique, perhaps give
9 us a second to tell us about that placement between December 2001 and January
10 2004.

11 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Advocate Harbour is what's known as
12 a residential policing position, so it's a remote community where the police officer lives
13 there, but they're attached to a different detachment. So, for me, it was Parrsboro
14 Detachment was sort of my home unit ---

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

16 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** --- but Advocate Harbour was my sort
17 of primary policing area.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Is there a detachment there?

19 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** There's no detachment there. There's
20 an RCMP-owned house where we lived, I lived with my family.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

22 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** And I basically worked from out of that
23 house.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Any other members associated with
25 Advocate Harbour at that time?

26 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** No, just me.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** It was just you at that point?

28 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** That's right.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And are you familiar with whether that
2 procedure has continued with the RCMP, this residential policing type of idea?

3 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I think so.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

5 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I'm not a hundred percent sure, but I
6 did know a couple of the members who worked there after I did.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. How did you enjoy that
8 experience?

9 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** It was very different than the usual
10 policing. You get a little more involved in the community.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** January 2004, I understand that you
12 transferred to the Amherst Detachment in the Cumberland District; is that right?

13 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yes. Yeah.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And you conducted general duties
15 membership at that time; right?

16 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yes.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. May of 2008, you took a change
18 and went back to Regina, or back to Depot ---

19 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yes.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- and actually took on the role as a
21 teacher at that location; am I correct?

22 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yes.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And for the first two years, you taught
24 what might be called the Applied Police Services or Sciences course?

25 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yes.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And I understand therein or thereafter you
27 were promoted to Corporal?

28 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I was promoted to Corporal during the

1 time that I taught at Applied Police Sciences. The -- I believe February 2012.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Am I correct to say that you also
3 took on the role as a firearms instructor at Depot?

4 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yes.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** How did you take that role on?

6 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** About two years.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And am I also correct to say that in 2011,
8 you transferred back to Nova Scotia, H-Division, by taking up a position with the
9 Yarmouth Rural Detachment?

10 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** That's right.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And that position lasted until 2015; am I
12 right?

13 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yes, June of '15.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And that was general duties as well?

15 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yes.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. 2015, I understand you transferred
17 to the Halifax District; is that correct?

18 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** That's right.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And I understand that you worked
20 primarily out of the Tantallon detachment?

21 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** That's right; yes.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And that you had the role of 2IC, you
23 were second in command as a Watch Commander and/or Acting Watching
24 Commander? Is that right?

25 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yes. Yeah.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And then I understand that in
27 February of 2016, you were transferred to the Strategic Communications Unit as a
28 Public Information Officer?

1 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** That's right.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. And then October of 2020,
3 another transfer. This time you moved from the Strategic Communications Unit to the
4 Professional Standards Division; is that right?

5 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** That's right, yes.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And I'm correct to understand that you
7 retired from the service in April of 2021?

8 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** 2022.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Forgive me. Thank you.

10 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** That's -- yes.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** April of 2022. Okay. So on April of 2020,
12 April 18th-19th, you were acting as a Public Information Officer within the Strategic
13 Communications Unit of H-Div; is that correct?

14 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** That's right; yes.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Well, what I'd like to do, then, as
16 we indicated earlier, I want to ask you a few questions about the structure of the
17 Strategic Communications Unit, how is it that you came to be involved. Let's ask me --
18 let me ask you that first. How is that you came to become involved in the Strategic
19 Communications Unit?

20 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** On the weekend of April 18th and 19th

21 ---

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** No, I want to talk before that. That is ---

23 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Oh, okay.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- how is it that you even got to the Strat
25 Comms Unit. Sorry to interrupt you.

26 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Sure, no problem.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

28 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I wanted a transfer from general duty,

1 and the position came up. I met the requirements. And it was something that I had
2 some interest in over the years, so I requested the position and I got it.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. Was there any experience that you
4 had before with Media Relations?

5 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I had taken the Media Relations
6 course a number of years previous when I was in Yarmouth Rural Detachment. I
7 wanted to take the course because I noticed that a lot of -- a lot of members didn't want
8 to speak to media, they were afraid to say the wrong thing. So I thought that would be a
9 good role for me to take on was to have a little bit more confidence speaking with the
10 media and knowing what to say and not say type thing.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So tell me, where was the Strat
12 Comms Unit actually physically located?

13 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** When I transferred to the unit, the unit
14 was in headquarters in Dartmouth.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And are you able to give us some
16 idea of the structure of the Strat Comms Unit, what it looked like, who was there, what
17 was the hierarchy, if there was one?

18 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right. There was definitely a
19 hierarchy. There was a -- there is a -- there was a civilian director at the time, a civilian
20 2IC, if you will. And if at any point if I'm using acronyms that people need to be
21 explained, then I'm happy to do that. It tends to kind of fall ---

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. I'm getting so used to acronyms ---

23 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yeah.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- I think I might even understand them
25 now.

26 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Sure. Sure.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** But the civilian director was who, please?

28 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** At the time that I joined the unit was

1 Paula Sibley-Fox, but at the time of the incident, it was Lia Scanlan.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And the 2IC at that time?

3 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** At the time of the incident?

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Well, throughout your time there.

5 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Okay. At the beginning, was Lia
6 Scanlan ---

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

8 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** --- and then when the incident
9 occurred, the Portapique incident, Lia was the boss, and the 2IC was a lady whose
10 name is Cindy Bayers.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And there -- I understand that the
12 position that Cindy Bayers undertook was the position of Senior Communications
13 Advisor? Does that sound right?

14 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I think so. Yeah, it's -- I don't really
15 follow the titles of the PS world. It's difficult for me to keep up with.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I understand.

17 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yeah.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

19 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Sure.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** There were other civilian ---

21 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- members as well and/or civilians that
23 were working in the Strat Comms Unit?

24 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right. So the director of the 2IC and
25 three additional communication advisors who were responsible for different things within
26 the unit, and the two police officers, myself and Corporal Lisa Croteau when this -- when
27 this incident occurred.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay, let's talk about the other members,

1 then, besides Lia Scanlan and Cindy Bayers. Who were they?

2 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Regis Dudley, Cindy MacKenzie, and I
3 think the third position might have been vacant. I'm -- I have trouble recalling it actually.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** That's okay.

5 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yeah.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Are you able to give me some idea, then,
7 of what the roles of these people were? Now, I know you've said 2IC ---

8 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- and I have a sense of that, but ---

10 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yeah.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- what were their responsibilities from
12 your point of view?

13 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** In a lot of cases, you know, people
14 would be delegated to do certain things, like social media, on certain incidents, or to
15 work on certain projects that weren't necessarily things that were sort of top of mind in
16 the media, but different projects we might have had going in the background. The
17 specific -- this particular response, there were, you know, different roles delegated to
18 different people, and it took a little while for that to become clear.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And we'll talk a little bit more about
20 the specific ---

21 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Sure.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- response, but just generally, I was
23 trying to get a sense ---

24 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yeah.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- of what the roles of the civilians would
26 be because we're compare it ---

27 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- a little bit to a Public Information

1 Officer, which is a member role.

2 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So can you -- can you tell me
4 about the civilians' role?

5 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** So the civilians in the unit had the PR
6 degrees and training, and that sort of thing. I don't have that training. My role would be
7 simply the operational policing perspective. But the civilians in the unit would have, you
8 know, the knowledge of social media, the knowledge of how to put together a
9 communications plan, how to, you know, do the COMMS strategy for a particular project
10 or a particular initiative. So we work together, we collaborated very well on the different
11 roles.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So that's the civilians we've talked
13 about, and there were members also involved.

14 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And I understand the title of the members
16 that was involved was the Public Information Officer?

17 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yes.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Does that sound right?

19 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yes, yes.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And who were they, please?

21 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** So Corporal Lisa Croteau ---

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

23 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** --- was responsible for Media
24 Relations in Halifax District, so that's Halifax County per se. And then there is myself,
25 who is responsible for Media Relations within the rest of the province.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Can you explain that division for
27 us, please, of how that emerged and what kind of role differential there was?

28 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Halifax District is quite busy, and the

1 number of calls they receive in an evening is probably comparable to the number of
2 calls received in the rest of the province. There are all kinds of political reasons why
3 things are set up the way they are within Halifax District, but suffice it say that they have
4 unique priorities that might not be the same as those for the rest of the province. So
5 they ended up with their own Media Relations officer to help sort of pursue those
6 initiatives.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. What about language
8 proficiencies, any comments on that?

9 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** The provincial Media Relations Officer
10 role was bilingual, so that's -- I had that position based on my language profile. As it
11 turns out, Corporal Croteau was bilingual as well, but she came in after I did and the
12 position that was available was the Halifax one and she took that.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** How does the provincial PIO, if I can call
14 it that ---

15 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** M'hm. Of course.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- interact or relate with the Halifax
17 District PIO?

18 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Often, we would cover off for one
19 another. If, for example, she was away or networking or for whatever reason, couldn't
20 respond that particular day, then I would take it on, and if it ended up being a little bit too
21 much for me to manage, I would give whatever project it was back to her when she
22 returned. We did -- we both took an on-call weekend per month, so to be on call for the
23 media during our off-time.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah, and we'll talk about that in a
25 minute.

26 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Of course. Yeah.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** But was there any job description
28 alignment in terms of what it was you were expected to do, other than the jurisdictional

1 issues ---

2 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- and what Corporal Croteau was
4 expected to do?

5 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Our jobs were very similar, just the
6 geographic area of responsibility was a little bit different.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Okay. Tell me, in terms of the
8 actual workshop setup, can you describe that for us, what the Strat Comms Unit looked
9 like and the interaction between members?

10 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right. So it's, you know, just a big,
11 open office, and the desks were all open to one another. So there was -- it was very
12 conducive to collaboration and brainstorming, teambuilding, that sort of -- that sort of
13 idea. It was a very -- a very productive area, and just based on the number and the
14 type of individuals who worked there, it was a really productive, fairly positive place to
15 be.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. And I'm always loathe to ask this
17 question, but could you give us a sense of what a typical day might be like in the role of
18 a PIO at the Strat Comms? And if it can't -- if you can't, say you can't.

19 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Sure. Yeah, sure. So every day, I
20 would come in, and we have something called a Watch Report. Are you familiar with
21 that?

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I've got some sense of it.

23 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** You've heard of that. Right.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Maybe you could ---

25 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- explain that for us, though, please.

27 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Of course. So every morning, I would
28 come in and review the Watch Report, and see if there was anything that basically

1 needed a release. So I would go through and probably review files, and based on the
2 notes and things that were in the Watch Report, maybe dig into the files to make sure
3 there was anything that, A, was necessary for sort of public safety, and then related to
4 more along the public-interest line of things, in that they're two completely different
5 things; right? If there's anything related to, say, a road closure or something that might
6 affect people's sort of daily routine, we would do a release or a social media post to
7 maybe address that.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

9 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** And then there were things that were
10 of interest that people might want to know about, but didn't necessarily need to know
11 about. So we would prioritize those. And once I got through the watch report and
12 maybe had a quick look through social media to see if there was anything kind of
13 brewing from the overnight hours, you might make note of things like that, then we
14 would have a morning meeting every morning at about 8:15 to go over the day's
15 priorities and see where everyone was and how we could divvy up the tasks that were
16 necessary.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. All right. Can you tell us then
18 about use of, generally, social media, in terms of your role and use of that platform?

19 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I was very much a neophyte to social
20 media when I first arrived at the unit. You know, you have your sort of, as a parent,
21 you're involved with social media for, you know, kids' sports teams and things like that,
22 but I had generally not really used it a whole lot in my daily life. Just really didn't have
23 time for that sort of thing.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

25 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** But as we evolved with – as I evolved
26 in the role, it became fairly obvious how that worked with our unit. And I became much
27 more proficient with Twitter in particular. I really hadn't used that before at all.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

1 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** And it just – you know, every media
2 release or every incident would generate a media release, and a Facebook post, and a
3 Tweet, and then there was the monitoring of said posts on both platforms, just to see
4 how people were reacting to it and how that was kind of sitting with people, and if it was
5 accomplishing what we wanted it to accomplish.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So if I said you became relatively
7 comfortable with that social network or that platform, would you agree with that?

8 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Very much so with both.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And in terms of the way in which
10 Strat Comms communicated with the public, what was the primary methodology? Are
11 you able to give us a sense of that?

12 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** It really depended on the incident.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

14 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** If, for example, we're writing a media
15 release about a drug seizure, you know, usually we would write the release and do the
16 social media posts on Facebook and Twitter and, you know, people would be generally
17 be pretty happy to know that the police did something really positive in their community.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

19 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** If it was something like I remember
20 particularly, I know the night they had to close the Causeway because there was a
21 fatality I believe just on the mainland side, I think it was Thanksgiving weekend for some
22 reason. But anyway, just, you know, communicating with people. I was communicating
23 with them directly, just letting them know what we knew and trying to reassure people.
24 And like, yeah, that's a big deal, if you can't go where you need to go and there's only
25 one way to get there. That was something that I was able to do in real time with people
26 and I hope some people found it helpful, but there were a lot of sorrys that came out of
27 that. so there was sort of the front-line aspect of it, and then sort of the more, I guess
28 the more proactive and the more reactive ---

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

2 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** --- ways that we used, but those were
3 the only ways that we communicated with people sort of in real time.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Are you able then, just to move on
5 a bit, to give us a sense of whether there was any impact of COVID-19 in terms of
6 workplace structure and how you were carrying out your duties as a PIO?

7 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right. So in March, I think the
8 decision was made, and I couldn't give you the date, but when, you know, it was
9 declared to be a pandemic, we elected to be working from home. And I think there was
10 some rotation of, you know, who was in the office on which day. So you're trying to
11 minimize the contact of people and sort of the density of people within the office. So I
12 think that went on for a little while. And I think once the Portapique incident happened,
13 we were all in the office full time for ---

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Sorry, once it happened, you were all in
15 an office full time?

16 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** We were all in there full time, save
17 one person who had particular concerns, but we were all in there for a couple of months
18 anyway.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And is this in follow-up to the
20 Portapique incident ---

21 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yes.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- that we're discussing? I see.

23 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yeah.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So I'm just trying to get a sense, in
25 terms of, physically, where were the participants of the Strat Comms Unit? Where were
26 the employees on April 18th/19th? Were they working in the office in this collaborative
27 manner that you described earlier or was it something different?

28 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Well that was a weekend, so the

1 Saturday, there wouldn't be anybody in the office; right? Most people would be off duty.

2 So typically on the weekends, you would have a PIO ---

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

4 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** --- if I may, on call.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

6 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** A Comms advisor, any one of the five
7 on call with them, and the rest of the team would be not working.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So you had indicated earlier, and I
9 may have interrupted you, that there was an on-call structure or system.

10 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** A one in four I think you said it was?

12 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I did one weekend per month.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

14 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yeah.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And on April 18th and 19th, who
16 was on call, please?

17 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Cpl Croteau was on call.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. Very good. I think that outlines
19 us or gives us a sense of Strategic Communications Unit. Anything further in terms of
20 your point of view with respect to descriptive nature of that unit that's important for you
21 to say?

22 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I don't think so. No.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Very good. Then let's move on to
24 April 18th and 19th.

25 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Sure.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I understand that you were home and
27 you received some communication from your director? Is that right?

28 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I did, yeah.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Can you tell us about that, please?

2 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** So at 8:07, I received a call from Lia
3 Scanlan, who was the director of the unit.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Eight oh seven a.m. (8:07 a.m.).

5 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Eight oh seven (8:07), yes.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** April 19th?

7 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yes.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And you were doing what?

9 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I was making breakfast.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I see. Okay.

11 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yeah.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Very good.

13 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** It was the weekend. I was home with
14 my husband and we were making breakfast ---

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

16 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** --- and doing all the weekend things.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

18 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** And she phoned and she explained
19 what was happening.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

21 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** And I think at that point, all I knew was
22 that there had been multiple homicides in the Portapique area. That's really all I knew.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

24 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I didn't know anything about what the
25 suspect was or wasn't doing, or where they were.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

27 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** But, you know, there was some talk
28 about, you know, "How are we going to deal with this? I need your help. I need you to

1 kind of gear up and turn your computer on and dig in and help.”

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Had you experienced a call from
3 your director previously when you were not on call at home?

4 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I had, yeah.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So was this something that
6 surprised you at all?

7 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** You never really want to be called into
8 work when you're not working, because you're kind of not really ready for that, ---

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

10 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** --- but, you know, I understood that
11 that was – that could happen.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

13 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** If there was a big incident. It would
14 be, you know, full steam ahead with everyone and we would get it done.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So when you received this
16 information, I think I interrupted you, you had some understanding of what was going on
17 at Portapique?

18 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** A little bit, yeah.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And how would you have obtained that?

20 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Lia told me that there had been
21 multiple homicides.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. All right.

23 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** And yeah.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So what happened next then, please?

25 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I turned on my computer and kind of
26 tried to imagine what that was like and what I would be doing ---

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

28 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** --- to help. Eventually it turned out

1 that she wanted – it just was very confusing at first not really knowing what I was doing,
2 but wanting to do something. So eventually it turned out she wanted me to put out a
3 social media post about the car that was involved.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Very good. Then what we'll do
5 then, Madam Registrar, if we can, is we'll go to the RCMP Public Communications
6 document that has been tendered here within the last half hour. I ask you to turn to
7 paragraph 90, which is on page 49, and then I'll ask the retired corporal to review that
8 paragraph with me and have some comments on it.

9 So paragraph 90 is in a section of the document entitled "Tweets
10 About Replica RCMP Cruiser Prepared by Strategic Communications Team". And
11 paragraph 90 says that:

12 "At 8:59 a.m., RCMP public information officer [...]
13 Jennifer Clarke emailed Lia Scanlan with an update
14 regarding the perpetrator's replica police [vehicle]."

15 Do you see that?

16 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I do.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And then the email states some
18 information. So I want to just step back from this in terms of how it is you received
19 some information about the perpetrator's replica police cruiser, ---

20 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** M'hm.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- how you received it, under what
22 circumstances, and what did you do in advance of sending that email to Lia Scanlan?

23 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Okay.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Can you tell us about that?

25 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I remember a phone call from Lia
26 saying, "He's got a police car."

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

28 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** And I think like a lot of people, I just

1 assumed it was a crappy old white Ford Taurus.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

3 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** And you know, she called back and
4 confirmed, she said, "No, it's fully marked."

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

6 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** And I just remember thinking how in
7 the world are we going to distinguish that from all of our legit police cars? How am I
8 going to make that -- how am I going to make that clear to people? I'm going to send
9 this out, how do I do that without putting a target on every one of our member's backs?
10 She did tell me he was in uniform as well.

11 I don't know where I received it, but I know that I got a text on my
12 work phone with a picture of the police car, and that's the one that I sent out. '

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. That's what I wanted to ask you
14 about.

15 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Was that text that you received after your
17 conversation with Director Scanlan?

18 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I don't know at what time I received it
19 or what the sequence was.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

21 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** It was very, very chaotic and with our
22 computers, they're on something called a VPN when you work from home ---

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

24 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** --- it's a bit of a complicated process of
25 logging in. You've got to log into the RCMP's internet from your house through a secure
26 portal.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

28 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** So things don't always come in when

1 they're sent. You might receive an email that's not really in sequence. So I honestly
2 couldn't say what the sequence was. All I do recall is that someone sent me a text. I
3 don't know who it was.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And now that's ---

5 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** It was that picture.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- that's interesting. You don't recall who
7 it was that sent you the text?

8 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** That's right.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

10 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I have no idea.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. Any reason for that, retired
12 Corporal?

13 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** In a lot of cases, most people know
14 the PIO's phone number.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

16 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I don't know everyone else's phone
17 number, and I might not have had that in my contact's list.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

19 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** So unless I've added it, I can't see
20 who sent it.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And when you received that text,
22 what did the text display or depict?

23 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** It was the picture of the police car, the
24 mock police car that I used to send that Tweet.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Now I presume, at that stage, that
26 would be information to -- of some substance to you or of importance to you?

27 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Absolutely.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

1 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yeah.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And I'm just curious as to why it might
3 have been you didn't follow up or check with respect to the source, or the source of that
4 text.

5 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** It didn't matter.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Are you able to say with respect to
7 what -- any comment about the veracity of the source at that point?

8 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I just assumed it had to be Addie or
9 Steve ---

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

11 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** --- Staff Sergeant Halliday or Staff
12 MacCallum.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right.

14 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** It had to be somebody who had
15 knowledge of it.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Now you assumed it was Addie or
17 Steve. Who are Addie and Steve, please?

18 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right. So Staff Sergeant Addie
19 MacCallum was in charge of Pictou District ---

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

21 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** --- and Staff Sergeant Steve Halliday
22 was the Acting, I believe, Advisory NCO, or I'm not sure what his role was, but he was --
23 -

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Are these people that you would have
25 had some familiarity with ---

26 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Oh, yes.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- as a Public Information Officer?

28 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Absolutely.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Would you have had any concern with
2 respect to the quality of the information that they might be providing you?

3 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Absolutely not.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. So when you got that text, not
5 being sure of the source, what exactly did you think about what you were looking at?

6 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Well, again, the thought went through
7 my mind that how in the world are we going to make this distinct from every other police
8 car that's on the road? How do I help people understand that this is different?

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

10 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** And I see in the email that the car
11 number was 22-B-11, or 22-Bravo-11.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

13 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** That caused me a lot of concern, but
14 once I got the picture, it was 28-Bravo-11.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. So let's talk about what you did
16 when you got the text, because I understand there was some sort of technological ---

17 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** There is.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- rigmarole in terms of how you
19 accessed the information. Are you able to provide us some insight into that?

20 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Sure. The work phones that the
21 RCMP issues us ---

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

23 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** --- are -- there's a work side and a
24 personal side on those, and I don't know if that's a common thing for a work phone. I
25 have no idea, but I just know what those phones are like. So you can't share
26 information from the work side to the personal side. So if I receive a text that comes
27 into the personal side, and I can't save that text, the picture, I can't save it to the phone
28 and then spit it out from the work side. It doesn't work like that.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Oh.

2 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** So the only way for me to get that
3 picture, I needed to get it on my computer, so I could send it with a Tweet, I had to text it
4 back to my personal phone ---

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

6 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** --- and then email that picture from my
7 personal phone to my work email address, so that I could get it on the computer, and
8 then I could edit and crop the picture ---

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

10 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** --- and make it small enough in size,
11 so that I could send it out in a Tweet.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So did you undertake that process
13 under these ---

14 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I did.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- circumstances? And the purpose to
16 get it on your work computer again was what?

17 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** So I could use a program on the
18 computer to edit and crop the picture.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And why would you be editing and
20 cropping a picture that had been sent to you from Command personnel?

21 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right. So you only -- you want the
22 picture to be exactly what you want people to see, without anything extra. It'd be, like,
23 zooming in on something that you want to see in a picture.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

25 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** You don't want the entire picture. You
26 just want that thing that you're trying to get people to pay attention to, and that would be
27 just the car.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So with that picture or depiction of

1 the car, what did you do to it?

2 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I believe I cropped it to some degree.
3 I -- probably not a whole lot.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

5 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** But what I wanted people to see was
6 the car number.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

8 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** That's 28-Bravo-11.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Now at that point, when you were
10 cropping and emphasizing portions of the photo, were you under any instructions or any
11 -- did you have any sense of your responsibilities at that point from your director or
12 otherwise?

13 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I knew that she wanted a Tweet sent
14 out to ---

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

16 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** --- help people identify what the car
17 looked like ---

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

19 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** --- and how to distinguish that from
20 every other police car, so that was my job. She didn't tell me how to do it, she just told
21 me to do it.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. That's -- and we'll get to that in the
23 materials. But in terms of a cropping feature, are you familiar with doing that?

24 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Of course.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Any other features that -- technologically
26 that you would have to have undertaken?

27 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I used the program, it's called Paint.
28 It's on a lot of, you know, Windows computers, but that's what we typically use because

1 it was simple.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

3 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** And I added the circle around the car
4 number and the arrow pointing at the circle to draw attention to that particular feature.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So let's look, if we can, Madam
6 Registrar, at paragraph 92, in particular, the depiction beyond paragraph 92 of a police
7 vehicle with 28-B-11 circled. Are you able to say how that circle got there?

8 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Oh, I put it there.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

10 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yeah.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** There also appears to be a broad white
12 arrow ---

13 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yeah.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- on that. Are you able to say how that
15 broad white arrow got there?

16 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I put that there as well.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So is this just part of the process
18 that you're undertaking with respect to the receipt of the text that you've turned into
19 something that goes onto your computer ---

20 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- for purposes of tearing this out?

22 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** M'hm.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Very good. So going back then to
24 paragraph 90, Madam Registrar,

25 "At 8:59 a.m., RCMP public information officer Cpl.
26 Jennifer Clarke emailed [...] Scanlan with an update
27 regarding the perpetrator's replica police cruiser. The
28 email stated:

1 The car involved looks like a current RCMP Ford
2 Taurus Interceptor. The only difference is that it has a
3 'whip' antenna mounted on the trunk. That is a long
4 antenna that is about 5 to 6 feet high. 22B11 is
5 marked on the "C" pillar of the car like our..."

6 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** M'hm.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** "...PC numbers are usually marked. [I'll]
8 get some pics [to] you in a separate email."

9 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So what's the purpose of you sending this
11 email to your director at that time?

12 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I didn't know what she knew.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

14 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** So I'm trying to make sure that she
15 knows, because I know that Lia is communicating with senior management ---

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

17 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** --- that she was our conduit for that.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** How did you know that?

19 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Because I knew she would be. That
20 was the process.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

22 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** So I wanted to make sure she had that
23 information.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

25 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** And I believe, thinking about this right
26 now, that's from a conversation I had with Staff Sergeant MacCallum, that he described
27 the car to me.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

1 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** And then for -- it may have been him
2 who sent the text with the picture to me.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm. Okay. So in terms of this
4 information, did you have a sense of the importance of these particular physical
5 attributes that you were describing?

6 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** A hundred percent.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

8 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yeah.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** How important were they to you in terms
10 of what you were thinking?

11 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Like I said earlier, I had to do this in
12 such a way that people that were looking at that Twitter feed would understand how it
13 was different from every other police car. I was thinking about vigilantism. I was
14 concerned that if I got it wrong, I could be making some of our members a target, and I
15 didn't obviously want to do that. So I needed to make it clear to anyone looking at that
16 Twitter feed how what I was showing ---

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

18 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** --- was different than the rest of the
19 police cars.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So what was the purpose of
21 outlining the five to six foot whip antenna?

22 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I knew that Lia probably wouldn't know
23 what a whip antenna was.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

25 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** So that's why I described it to her.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. Now, given the importance of
27 this information, would it ever have occurred to you as the public information officer that
28 perhaps you could reach out to higher members in command in a way of providing this

1 information to them?

2 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Do you mean from the operational
3 perspective?

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** No, I mean from eliminating Lia Scanlan
5 as a person who was reporting to other people within the command structure at H-Div.

6 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I understand what you're saying.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

8 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** There was definitely an incredible
9 sense of urgency there, but, at the time, to override the process wouldn't be. My job
10 was to make sure that she knew what I was doing ---

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

12 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** --- and to make sure that I shared
13 whatever information I had with her ---

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

15 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** --- and that's what I did.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So given the fact that you would have had
17 the photograph for some period of time before that 8:59 a.m. email, are you able to give
18 us any insight as to why it might have taken you a half an hour or so to communicate
19 with Lia Scanlan with respect to the details of the photo?

20 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** There was a lot going on in the
21 background, including speaking with Corporal Croteau, who was on the ground in
22 Portapique.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

24 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** She didn't know where the suspect
25 was.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

27 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** She didn't know what was happening.
28 She's trying to deal with the constant phone calls, and I was concerned that she needed

1 to keep her head up and know what was going on, just because she's sitting in a
2 marked police car wearing a uniform and may have to respond operationally as
3 opposed to, to the phone and to media relations, so there was that aspect of things.
4 There was simply trying to grasp the idea that there was someone who was basically
5 hiding in plain sight using, you know, the uniform and a police car looked just like us,
6 and trying to understand that, and then trying to get the information. There were two or
7 three phone calls that I made to Staff Halliday and Staff MacCallum trying to get
8 information, and as I was making those phone calls, people were being killed. That was
9 very obvious to me from their reactions, and, like, they would simply hang the phone up
10 and be doing operational police things as I was trying to get this post together. And in
11 addition, I was working with Cindy Bayers from our unit, she did a lot of the wording.
12 We conferred back and forth on that ---

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. All right.

14 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** --- to get the wording as succinct as
15 we could get it.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right on. Let's move on, then, to
17 paragraph 91, because ---

18 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Sure.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- after you send the email to
20 Director Scanlan, it would appear you received a response from Director Scanlan at
21 around 9:04. The reply was as follows:

22 "Perfect. The next tweet is him and a photo etc.
23 After that I am wanting this PC one. Can you have a
24 look at what we have said so far and pull something
25 together, Addie [...] can approve. I will have [Regis]
26 save it to the doc."

27 So I'm interested in what the -- this email response to you meant to
28 you in terms of what your obligations were and what it was that you were being

1 expected to do.

2 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right. So I believe Lia took care of
3 sending out the picture of the suspect, and she wanted to follow was the picture of the
4 police car. So she is asking me to do something to get that picture and the tweet ready,
5 and she wanted to have the picture of his face out there first.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

7 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And did that have any bearing in
9 terms of what you were doing in accessing or providing information to the public about
10 the car?

11 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I just knew that she was sending out
12 the picture of his face, which is a big deal. We didn't often send out pictures of suspects
13 because of the whole *Privacy Act* issue to do with -- you know, accusing someone of
14 doing something and putting their face out there, you can't take that back.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

16 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** That's a big deal.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. But in terms of the direction:

18 "Can you have a look at what we have said so far
19 and pull something together, Addie..."

20 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

21 "...can approve.

22 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** What did that mean to you?

24 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** That meant I needed to get the
25 wording for the tweet together, and that's what I was doing with Cindy Bayers in the
26 background.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. Paragraph 92 reads as follows:

28 "At 9:40 [...] a draft tweet had been prepared by

1 Cpl. Clarke with a photo of the perpetrator's replica
2 police cruiser and forwarded to S/Sgt. MacCallum for
3 approval."

4 Do you recall that?

5 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yes.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And that draft tweet that was
7 prepared was in conjunction with Ms. Bayers as well?

8 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yes, it was.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. And this is at 9:40, but the
10 direction appeared to come to you at 9:04.

11 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** M'hm.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I wonder if you can explain the
13 36-minutes that existed between the direction and what eventually was a request to
14 Addie MacCallum for approval of tweet. Are you able to give us any insight into that
15 36-minute delay, if I can use that word?

16 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right. Right. It seems like a really
17 long time.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** It does.

19 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Time really stands still when these
20 things are happening.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yes?

22 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** All I know is I was going steady trying
23 to get the information correct and trying to verify things back and forth, and that includes
24 the two or three phone calls to MacCallum and Halliday trying to verify things and things
25 are happening in the operational world at the same time. Trying to grasp the magnitude
26 of what's going on, and trying to decide where I needed to be and trying to, as well,
27 confer with Corporal Croteau on how we were going to move forward, and -- yeah.
28 That's, that's ---

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Did you have a sense at all, while you
2 were in the maelstrom of this ---

3 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** M'hm.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- that there were any unnecessary
5 delays and/or barriers that were put in your way with respect to providing the
6 information that had been requested of you?

7 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I don't know that I could've worked any
8 quicker. I was doing the very best with the information and the abilities that I had with
9 me. I could not send that information out without it being approved.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

11 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I didn't want to negatively impact the
12 operational side of things. And again, sending out that picture out, either the face or the
13 car, they're big deals.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. We'll talk about that in a minute -
15 --

16 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Sure.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- but we'll go through the next steps and
18 the narrative by now moving on to paragraph 92 that we had talked about. And this is
19 the email to Staff Sergeant MacCallum:

20 "Addie - I received the info about the uniform from HD
21 members. The car...is 28b11 not 22b11 as I was told
22 earlier. This is good because 28 is Oxford and they
23 don't have 11 B cars. There is no way the real
24 version of that car # is on the road anywhere in NS.
25 For approval please..."

26 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** M'hm.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And then the tweet, sorry, the paragraph
28 goes on and shows a text ---

1 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yeah.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- of a tweet with the photo depiction;
3 okay?

4 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Now, the 28B11 versus the 22B11
6 discussion, was that something that you had undertaken in terms of your own ---

7 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Absolutely.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- investigations?

9 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yeah.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Tell us about that because that may have
11 some bearing on timing or it may not, I don't know.

12 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** So the -- should I explain the car
13 numbering?

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Sorry?

15 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Should I explain the number on the
16 police cars?

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah, please.

18 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Should I make that clear?

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah, I think it's important.

20 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Sure. So the 28 refers to a
21 detachment, that this is how the cars are numbered all through the Province of Nova
22 Scotia. And it's different in different provinces for the RCMP. The letter identifies the
23 type of duty the car is on, and the last number, the 11 is the sequence. So 28, Oxford
24 Detachment is 28; B is Bravo, means it's a rural car.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** It means it's a what?

26 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** A rural car. It's on GD, rural duty.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

28 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** And 11 is the sequence, so that would

1 be the 11th car Oxford Rural has.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

3 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Oxford has five police officers, or they
4 used to when I worked there. There is no way they have 11 police cars.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

6 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** And initially, when I thought it was
7 22-Bravo-11, Lower Sackville is 22, so I phoned and I said, "Where the hell is 22-Bravo-
8 11?"

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

10 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** And I knew from working there, that it
11 should have said LS11, but there are some older cars that are down there, and some of
12 the cars that don't get much mileage that might have the old numbering system on
13 them, so that's why I wanted to know where it was. And they said, "No, there is no
14 22B11 here." And then I got the information that the car was 28 from the picture, and
15 then I knew there was no question that was the way to identify the car to the public
16 because the number was -- there is no way that was a legitimate police car number in
17 this province.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And those are all enquiries that go
19 into your preparation of the tweet?

20 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yeah. Yes.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. Okay.

22 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yeah, we have -- you have to check
23 every detail. We can't be wrong.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. Okay. Okay. So the photograph
25 that we have seen is the actual product that you produced, I think you've said that
26 earlier?

27 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** It is, yeah.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Paragraph 93:

1 "Cpl. Clarke's email request to S/Sgt. MacCallum
2 went unanswered."

3 Have you any comment on that?

4 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** It doesn't surprise me. He's driving a
5 police car. He's involved in a real-time crazy, crazy situation. There's -- it doesn't
6 surprise me that -- that he didn't respond.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. and what did you do at that time,
8 given the fact it was unanswered and you were in possession of this ---

9 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yeah.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- important information?

11 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I think I went to Halliday to get
12 approval.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So we have got paragraph 94:

14 "At 9:45 a.m...Cpl. Clarke appears to have forwarded
15 the request for approval to S/Sgt. Halliday.

16 Cpl. Clarke's email [says]: 'Steve - need
17 approval....Addie is 10-6...Thanks Jen.'"

18 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** What's that mean?

20 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Addie's busy.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Addie's busy. That's the 10-6 tone ---

22 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Ten-six (10-6) is busy, yeah.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- term for busy?

24 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yes.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And so your recollection is that you sent it
26 to Steve?

27 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** M'hm.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Moving on, then, paragraph 95, I'll

1 ask you for a comment on it:

2 "At 9:49...Cpl. Clarke appears to have received
3 approval of the replica RCMP cruiser tweet from
4 [Staff] Halliday. She sent an email to Lia Scanlan,
5 copying Regis Dudley, with the subject line
6 'APPROVED [in bold] by Steve Halliday: Tweet for
7 approval – immediate pls: 22B11 description.' The
8 body of the email stated:
9 'Pls note they are responding to another incident,
10 suspect is on the run/ Tweet is approved....'"

11 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yeah.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Now, what was the purpose of you
13 sending that at 9:49 to Director Scanlan?

14 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** So the general rule of thumb would be
15 that the bigger the incident the more approval is required. On something a little more, I
16 hate to say run-of-the-mill because it doesn't really -- it doesn't really confer the right
17 thought, that's all I can come up with right now, but something a little more routine ---

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

19 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** --- I would send the tweet out myself.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

21 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I needed her to know what I was
22 doing, and on any other larger or more serious or any type of more high profile incident,
23 I would make sure the Director approved whatever I was doing. We needed to know
24 where the other was.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. So we have heard the
26 presentation this morning that the actual tweet with respect to your work product was
27 sent out at 10:17 a.m. Does that sound right to you?

28 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** That's right.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So we've got a difference of ---

2 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Twenty-seven (27) minutes.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- 28 -- 27, 28-minutes ---

4 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yeah.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- between the approval and the actual
6 tweet. Can you provide any insight into that, what you were doing, what you were ---

7 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- thinking, and what your thought
9 process was?

10 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I was waiting for approval. I know I
11 sent the email at least twice to Lia. I knew she was busy. I don't know if I called, I'm
12 pretty sure I probably did. I was pacing the floor. It was the longest 27-minutes of my
13 life, waiting to get told that I was good to send that, but again, it's huge to send out a
14 picture of a replica RCMP car which probably the average police officer wouldn't even
15 know was different than our own.

16 And to get approval to send that out, again, how am I affecting our
17 members on the road. I know there are an unknown number of police officers
18 responding to this and what is that doing to them.

19 So it's -- it's a big deal.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Given the circumstances here and the
21 importance of the information that you had, while you were pacing the floor waiting for
22 Lia Scanlan, would there have been other options that you could have utilized to get the
23 approval to get that piece of information out to the public?

24 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** No.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** There are more people besides Lia
26 Scanlan that would have had an involvement in this process and would have some
27 familiarity with ---

28 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- Strat Comms.

2 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Did you reach them or reach out to them?

4 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Do you mean Cindy Bayers or any of
5 those types?

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Sure.

7 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** No, I didn't. Lia was the conduit at
8 that point and that was the person that I needed approval from.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. There are also people above Lia
10 Scanlan in terms of the command structure at H Div.

11 Would you have thought, given the substance of the information
12 that you had, to reach out to those particular people?

13 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** No. It just -- it wouldn't be appropriate
14 for me to. You have to stay within the chain of command.

15 I know it seems very trivial when you consider what happened, but
16 that was -- that was the way things worked in that unit and I wasn't going to stray from it
17 at that point.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** We know that in looking at paragraph 98
19 that there was a Tweet at 10:04 sent out with respect to the RCMP advising the public
20 to stay away from Hidden Hilltop given some significant information that they had with
21 respect to the Fisher residence in Glenholme at that time.

22 Would you have been privy to the information coming in about
23 what's going on on the road or at the road?

24 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I had a little bit of information. You
25 can see in my notes I wrote down "Silver Tracker".

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

27 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** That was one of the vehicles that was
28 involved.

1 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I guess the importance of this question
2 with respect to paragraph 98 is that this is the Tweet for Hidden Hilltop at 10:04. This
3 falls in between that time period of 9:49 ---

4 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** It does.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- to 10:17, and we've got some Tweet
6 action from Strat Comms.

7 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yeah.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And it was not obviously you. It was
9 some other operative within the ---

10 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- division.

12 Would you have been aware that that Tweet is coming out?

13 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Unless I saw it, but probably not.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Given the importance of the
15 information that you had at that point, did you call anyone else besides -- I'm thinking
16 Regis Dudley, who was responsible for this Tweet.

17 Did you contact her for purposes of getting advice on what you
18 had?

19 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** No.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. As you look back on those very
21 difficult 28 minutes, I'm sure, anything that could have been done differently with
22 respect to the information that you had to get it out to the public?

23 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I don't know what else I could have
24 done. There was -- there was a lot going on there in the background.

25 I -- look, I wish I could have gotten it out earlier. I don't know. I
26 don't know if I could have saved someone or -- I don't know.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

28 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I don't know that I could have worked

1 any faster given the -- given the format that I was working in, given the usual process
2 and it -- it simply wouldn't have been productive to anyone to start going rogue, so to
3 speak, and trying to get approval from different sources than the one that I had.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And just to tie this up to make sure that
5 we're not missing any factual circumstances, when the Tweet was sent out at 10:17,
6 you're the one pressing "send" on that?

7 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Oh, yes. Yeah.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And what was it that made you send that
9 10:17 Tweet out?

10 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I either received a phone call or an
11 email from Lia saying "do it".

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right.

13 Those are my questions for this witness, Commissioners.

14 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you so much, Mr. Burrill.
15 Even though you're retired, I'll refer to you as Corporal Clarke, if
16 that's okay.

17 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Thank you.

18 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Corporal, the process we will be
19 following is that we'll take a break now and Mr. Burrill and other Commission Counsel
20 will meet with Counsel for the Participants and determine if there are further questions
21 for you and, if so, who will be asking them.

22 So we'll take a break for 20 minutes, Mr. Burrill?

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yes.

24 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** If you need more time, let us
25 know.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Certainly.

27 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** So that will us to, let's say,
28 11:15, then. Thank you.

1 **--- CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. TARA MILLER:**

2 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Good morning, Cpl. Clarke. My name is Tara
3 Miller, and with my colleague, Alix Digout, we represent a family member of Kristen
4 Beaton.

5 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Okay.

6 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Is it okay if I continue to call you Cpl. Clarke?
7 I know you're retired, but...

8 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** That's fine. Thank you.

9 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Thank you. Okay.

10 I want to start with having a better understanding, Cpl. Clarke, of
11 training that would have been done after you arrived at the Strategic Communications
12 Centre in 2016, specifically with respect to handling incidents of a critical incident
13 magnitude.

14 So can you share with us what kind of training would have been
15 done from 2016 on, in terms of that division that you were working within?

16 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Training with respect to just social
17 media, or the entire function of the unit? Which?

18 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Well, I'll take all of the training.

19 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** All of it?

20 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And I want it to be broader than just there's a
21 car accident in the traffic. I would like you to focus on training that would have been
22 specifically dealing with critical incident matters that would have initiated the critical
23 incident command.

24 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** So it wasn't really so much training as
25 more of a job shadowing thing. So, you know, at first I was basically held by the hand
26 and led through the process of, you know, doing my job, essentially, from start to finish.
27 And as I became more proficient with it, I required less supervision.

28 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. And would you have done any sort of

1 tabletop exercises within that division from 2016 on to plan and prepare proactively for
2 incidents of this type of magnitude that would require critical incident?

3 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** The only thing that I can really
4 compare it to would be an Amber Alert type of scenario. So we did do some work with
5 the Operational Communications Centre and the other members of the unit doing
6 tabletop-type exercises on that sort of incident.

7 **MS. TARA MILLER:** So the only thing that you can recall would be
8 an Amber Alert training.

9 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

10 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. Nothing about an active shooter? Do
11 you have any ---

12 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** No.

13 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- recollection?

14 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** No formal training on something like
15 that, no.

16 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And any training within your group with
17 respect to the EMO alert system from 2016 forward?

18 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** The only conversation I had with
19 anyone about Alert Ready was in the days following April 19, so that week following.
20 Because I think on the Friday of that week, an alert went out. And the only conversation
21 I had was to ask the Director why didn't we use it, and the response was it had never
22 been used for operational policing response.

23 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay.

24 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** And that was the end of the
25 conversation for me.

26 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And when you say, "The Director," that would
27 have been Director Scanlan?

28 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yes.

1 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. And so it had never been used within
2 that group, and is it fair to say you weren't even aware it would have been a tool prior to
3 that subsequent Alert Ready going out, after the mass casualty?

4 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** That's right. Right.

5 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Thank you. I'm going to move around here.

6 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Sure.

7 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Certainly Mr. Burrill covered much of the -- a
8 lot of the relevant information. I just want to drill down on some of the things that you
9 addressed.

10 One of the pieces of information, Cpl. Clarke, that you had at 8:59
11 a.m., and this in paragraph 90 of the Foundational Document, and we can bring it up,
12 but I think you're familiar with it. At 8:59 you email Director Scanlan with an update
13 about the perpetrator's police car, and you talk about it:

14 "...looks like a current RCMP Ford Taurus Interceptor.
15 The only difference is that it has a 'whip' antenna
16 mounted on the [truck -- sorry] trunk."

17 Where did you get that information from at that point?

18 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I think it was a conversation I had over
19 the phone with S/Sgt. MacCallum. We were trying to figure out how it was I was going
20 to make that distinct from the legitimate police cars.

21 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. And do you have a recollection of how
22 he had that information?

23 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** No.

24 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Did he tell you that he had a photo at that
25 time with that information?

26 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I don't remember. Maybe it was that
27 one of them was going to send me the picture.

28 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay.

1 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** But I don't know how he knew that.

2 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. And he -- that's why I was wondering
3 where you got the information, "Whip' antenna mounted on the trunk"; that came from
4 S/Sgt. MacCallum?

5 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I think that was in a conversation I had
6 with him, yes.

7 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay, thank you. And we know from looking
8 through the Facebook and the Twitter notification that went out; the Twitter at 10:17, the
9 Facebook at 10:19 -- let me back up a little bit. You were responsible for posting, both
10 on Twitter and Facebook, the dissemination of social media information about the car
11 detail; was that you doing both the Twitter and the Facebook?

12 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I don't remember the Facebook post,
13 but I do remember the Twitter one.

14 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. And is there any reason why
15 reference to the whip antenna, Cpl. Clarke, didn't make it into the descriptor of the car
16 as another piece of distinguishing information for the public ---

17 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

18 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- to be able to discern?

19 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** So the whip antenna, I knew that my
20 boss didn't know what a whip antenna was. And I didn't know what members of the
21 public would or wouldn't know if I used that description. I know that some of our traffic
22 cars may have a whip antenna on them, so did I didn't think it was descriptive or distinct
23 enough for me to use that criterion. And that applies as well to the push bar. I know
24 that some detachments have push bars on their vehicles and some don't.

25 **MS. TARA MILLER:** So I was going to ask you about the push
26 bar. You were aware that this vehicle did have a push bar on it?

27 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I think that's in some of the emails
28 back and forth but, to me, it wasn't distinctive enough to make it easy to make it clear

1 that that wasn't our car.

2 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And why was that? You understood, I think
3 you said, a lot of vehicles had push bars on them?

4 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Some detachments do.

5 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay.

6 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** And from my experience with the
7 response to the incident in Moncton, I knew that police cars had come from all over the
8 province to help with that. So I didn't know which units were in the area and which units
9 may have had push bars on their vehicles.

10 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. So evidence the Commission has
11 heard to date is that there really was only one other vehicle in the province that may
12 have had a push bar on it, and it was in the Valley. Does that strike you as -- you seem
13 to have a sense that there were far more vehicles than one other vehicle with a push
14 bar on it.

15 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I can tell you for sure that Meteghan
16 Detachment, they were putting push bars on their cars, because they were hitting a lot
17 of deer.

18 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay.

19 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Just because of the geography of the
20 area.

21 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And the whip antenna, are you -- we had
22 evidence as well from another witness earlier that the whip antennas would only have
23 been placed on the older cars. Were you aware of that?

24 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I wasn't aware of that, and I didn't
25 want -- I just didn't feel safe enough to maybe do that.

26 **MS. TARA MILLER:** So you made the decision to remove
27 information about the presence of a push bar and a whip antenna from the descriptor of
28 the vehicle?

1 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** It's not that I removed it. And Twitter,
2 you can only use 140 characters. So the information that you do send in a Tweet has to
3 be really distinct.

4 **MS. TARA MILLER:** There's also a Facebook post though that
5 goes out at 10:19, and certainly you'll agree with me that there's no limit in terms of the
6 characters that you can put in a Facebook post?

7 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** No.

8 **MS. TARA MILLER:** So in terms of the Facebook post, and that's
9 what I'd ask you earlier, had you any role in posting the 10:19 Facebook post?

10 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I don't know.

11 **MS. TARA MILLER:** You don't ---

12 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** It says "Tweet sent" in my notes.
13 There's nothing about the Facebook post. I don't recall sending it if I did.

14 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And you'd agree with me though that in a
15 Facebook post, there could have been room to add additional detail?

16 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Of course.

17 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Including the whip -- the presence of the whip
18 antenna and the push bar?

19 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

20 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. Thank you. There was -- the ordering
21 of the Tweets, we know, was first to push out information about the perpetrator's
22 identification with his face.

23 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** M'hm.

24 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And then the car came later.

25 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

26 **MS. TARA MILLER:** The concern being that you wanted to be
27 accurate about getting the car detail out. But wouldn't it had made more sense to get
28 the car detail out? Because that wasn't going to disclose ---

1 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

2 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- an individual's identity, perhaps, in the
3 wrong manner. Would you agree with that?

4 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** The decision about the order of the
5 Tweets and the posts wasn't up to me.

6 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. And that was Director Scanlan?

7 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yes.

8 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. Thank you. We've also heard
9 roundtable evidence in terms of public communication and keeping the public informed
10 about ongoing information in a critical incident, Cpl Clarke, about the focus should be on
11 getting some information out and then filling in the detail as things unfold. Is that
12 something you would have learned in your time in the Strategic Communications Unit?

13 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I can tell you that for a more major
14 incident, the kind of overall approach, and script, and strategy would not be something
15 that I would be involved in developing. I would be involved in doing press conferences,
16 responding to media inquiries, that sort of thing, like the strategy wouldn't be my role to
17 come up with that.

18 **MS. TARA MILLER:** When you say strategy, in terms -- but you
19 were playing a part and a role ---

20 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** M'hm.

21 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- on the -- certainly the events of the mass
22 casualty ---

23 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

24 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- in getting information out to the public.

25 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

26 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Is that something you had not normally
27 played?

28 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Again, I did play a role, but I was

1 doing the role – completing the role that I was told to complete.

2 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Right.

3 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I wasn't on duty that day. I was called
4 in to help and I was asked to do certain things, and those are what I did.

5 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. Thank you.

6 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** M'hm.

7 **MS. TARA MILLER:** But separate and apart from that, I just want
8 to make sure I'm clear in your evidence, Cpl Clarke, are you saying that prior to the
9 events of the mass casualty, your role would not have been to draft Tweets and
10 Facebook posts and get them out into the social media domain? Was that ---

11 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I certainly would have. But again, for
12 a larger event, it might be something like this one where I was told to get a picture of the
13 police car out.

14 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. How many larger events had you
15 been involved in prior to the mass casualty event in 2020, would you say?

16 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** The Guysborough incident, that
17 particular incident I was involved in as well.

18 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Is it the Desmond ---

19 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yeah, yes.

20 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay.

21 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** A lot of the more high-profile incidents
22 over the five-ish years that I was working for Strategic Communications, I was involved
23 in. Nothing as sort of operationally intense as this one.

24 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. Anything as fluid as this one?

25 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

26 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay.

27 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** That's a good way to describe it, yes.

28 **MS. TARA MILLER:** So that would be the marked difference

1 certainly between the Guysborough Desmond incident and this ---

2 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

3 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- incident? That that ---

4 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

5 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- was not fluid?

6 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

7 **MS. TARA MILLER:** It was not dynamic?

8 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

9 **MS. TARA MILLER:** This one was?

10 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** It was more – we were more reactive,
11 as opposed to proactive in that one.

12 **MS. TARA MILLER:** You were more reactive in the Desmond
13 inquiry or more reactive in the Portapique mass casualty?

14 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** We were more reactive with Desmond
15 because the suspect was deceased by the time we were dealing with that one.

16 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Thank you.

17 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** M'hm.

18 **MS. TARA MILLER:** We worked through the timelines and we
19 have that evidence in the Foundational Document. I want to ask you a few questions
20 about some of the pieces of detail around the timelines, Cpl Clarke.

21 One of the reasons you gave for some delay in terms of actioning
22 things, I understood, was because you were in touch with various people, one being Cpl
23 Croteau, and I think you said she was sitting in her car with her uniform on in an
24 operational capacity and you were worried about her.

25 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** M'hm.

26 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Where was she actually physically located at
27 this point?

28 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I'm not 100 percent sure. I know she

1 was in the general area of Portapique. I'm not sure 100 percent where she was, but
2 she was -- we didn't know where he was.

3 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. Did you understand that she was at
4 Command Post or that she was actually on scene in Portapique?

5 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yeah, I really don't know.

6 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay.

7 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I'm not sure.

8 **MS. TARA MILLER:** So is that an assumption that you made, that
9 she was sitting in her car with her uniform on?

10 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Once I realized that she was there and
11 we didn't know where the suspect was -- it's very, very chaotic doing the Public
12 Information Officer job when something is happening because you don't have the
13 information to get to the reporters as they want it. It's very demanding. And I wanted
14 her to have her eyes up and to know what was going on, to have some more situational
15 awareness than I realize she probably had.

16 **MS. TARA MILLER:** When you said, "Once I realized she was
17 there," ---

18 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** M'hm.

19 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Again, I'm just trying to pinpoint, ---

20 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

21 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- to the best of your -- and maybe you don't
22 know.

23 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

24 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Was she at the Command Centre --
25 Command Post?

26 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

27 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Or was she somewhere outside of the
28 Command Post?

1 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** So I think you might have already
2 asked me if she was at the Command Post, and I don't know exactly where she was. It
3 would be very typical for the director to require the PIO to go to the scene. And again,
4 we didn't even know how many scenes there were at that point. I knew she was in the
5 general area, and I also knew we didn't know where the suspect was.

6 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. Thank you.

7 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** That caused me some concern.

8 **MS. TARA MILLER:** I also want to just clarify with you, to the
9 extent that you can recall, when was it that you actually did receive the photo of the car?

10 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I don't know.

11 **MS. TARA MILLER:** You don't know?

12 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I don't have that phone anymore, so I
13 couldn't tell you when I received the text.

14 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. Thank you. You also talked about at
15 9:40 you would have sent the Tweet for approval to S/Sgt Addie MacCallum, there was
16 no response, and your evidence was that "That didn't surprise me" because you knew
17 that he was responding ---

18 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** M'hm.

19 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- to the Wentworth incident and was in an
20 operational mode.

21 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

22 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Part of what -- a large part of this inquiry to
23 make sure that we're looking forward and making ---

24 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** M'hm.

25 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- suggestions for the future. It strikes me
26 that S/Sgt MacCallum was playing two roles that day, that morning. We know that he
27 had been delegated to deal with communications by S/Sgt Halliday, ---

28 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

1 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And that was why you were going to him for
2 approval with this Tweet; correct?

3 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Okay. I was told to go to him for
4 approval, so that would be my assumption.

5 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And who told you to go to him for approval?

6 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Lia, I believe.

7 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Yeah. And we do have that evidence that
8 S/Sgt Halliday ---

9 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** M'hm.

10 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- had delegated that to him. So that does
11 make sense ---

12 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

13 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- that you would have gotten that direction.

14 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

15 **MS. TARA MILLER:** But it also appears that he was playing an
16 operational role, and certainly at that point, your evidence is that he was driving his car
17 and he wasn't available so it didn't surprise you that he couldn't respond to give
18 approval.

19 Does it strike you that in the future it would be better if the person
20 giving approval really only had one job to do, to liaise in terms of the communication
21 piece?

22 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** It's difficult. You know, it's not really
23 for me to say. It seems to make sense. But it's also very difficult not to help when
24 you're a police officer and you're at a scene. And there may be a potential for you to be
25 able to help.

26 **MS. TARA MILLER:** But police officers help in different ways and
27 certainly the aspect ---

28 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

1 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- of policing that deals with public safety and
2 public communication, that's a pretty critical role in an event ---

3 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** M'hm.

4 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- of this magnitude; would you agree with
5 me?

6 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** It is. It's huge.

7 **MS. TARA MILLER:** You did get approval from S/Sgt Halliday at
8 9:45. And then you sent the same Tweet to Director Scanlan two to three times
9 between 9:49 and 10:17 when you got approval.

10 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

11 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And your answer for that was -- you were
12 asked why you had to go to her for approval, and your answer was that:

13 "As a general rule of thumb, the bigger the incident, the
14 more the approval is required." (As read)

15 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

16 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Where is that rule?

17 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** It's not written down in there. I mean,
18 there are -- it's a very -- it's a difficult role for a police officer to go to that unit, simply
19 because in a lot of cases, the rules aren't written down, the rules are understood. And
20 that was definitely something that I understood while I worked there was that if the
21 higher profile the incident, the more approval was required. And there was no way I
22 was going to send that Tweet without her knowing what I was doing.

23 **MS. TARA MILLER:** You say the rule was understood.

24 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yes.

25 **MS. TARA MILLER:** It's not written down. Were you given any
26 instruction during your time at the Strategic Communications Unit from 2016 forward
27 that you needed to have escalating levels of approval for different things?

28 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** There were always more hands

1 involved on a more serious incident, whether it be an operational or more a responding
2 type of incident that we were dealing with as the Strategic Comms Unit.

3 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay.

4 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** That would be my – have been my
5 experience, that the, again, the higher the profile, the more approval required. And I
6 needed Lia to know what I was doing, because I knew she was communicating with
7 senior management.

8 **MS. TARA MILLER:** But Lia – Director Scanlan knew what you
9 were doing, she had ---

10 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

11 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- asked you to do that.

12 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** She did.

13 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Correct?

14 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yeah.

15 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And you had received approval from Staff
16 Sergeant Halliday?

17 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** M'hm.

18 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And yet, you felt that you still had to go up, I
19 guess, go up the chain to her ---

20 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** M'hm.

21 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- to get further level approval? Okay.

22 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

23 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And so you'll agree with me again, with a
24 forward-looking view, Corporal Clarke, that having to get different levels of approval
25 when you've gotten a level of approval for somebody who is in a command structure ---

26 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** M'hm.

27 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- that that slows things down?

28 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Things were changing very quickly ---

1 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Yes.

2 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** --- that morning, and I wanted to make
3 sure that nothing had changed that would prevent me or make it difficult or challenging
4 or risky for us to send that tweet at that time.

5 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And what would have been risky about
6 sending that tweet? You had confirmed the car ---

7 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Perhaps the suspect was in custody,
8 perhaps something had changed, perhaps he was in a different vehicle.

9 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay, let me just break that down a little bit.

10 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Sure.

11 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Perhaps he was in custody.

12 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** M'hm.

13 **MS. TARA MILLER:** So would there have been any challenge with
14 having sent out a tweet with correct information, although the fact that he had been in
15 custody? What would have been the problem with that?

16 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I think it would cause unnecessary risk
17 to our members to send a picture of a police car out saying our suspect is driving this
18 vehicle. If he was already in custody and that was no longer the case, it seems an
19 unnecessary risk to take.

20 **MS. TARA MILLER:** For who?

21 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** For us to basically target all of our
22 members.

23 **MS. TARA MILLER:** So an unnecessary risk for the RCMP versus
24 the public safety?

25 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yeah, I'm not putting one against the
26 other. I'm simply saying that it would be unnecessary to send that post if the risk was
27 no longer there.

28 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Sorry, Ms. Miller ---

1 **MS. TARA MILLER:** But you quickly ---

2 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Ms. Miller?

3 **MS. PATRICIA MacPHEE** Thank you. She's already answered
4 the question, but we'll just keep this handy for next time.

5 **MS. TARA MILLER:** You'd agree with me, Corporal Clarke, that if
6 you sent out that type of a tweet you can very -- and found out that the suspect was in
7 custody, you could very quickly follow up a tweet to clarify that, "Stand down ---

8 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Sure.

9 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- suspect in custody, all good?"

10 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Whatever. That day would not have
11 been the time to change the process, and out of respect for the process in our unit, that
12 was the way we did things, and I wasn't going to change it that morning.

13 **MS. TARA MILLER:** So then this is a process that you said wasn't
14 written down ---

15 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** That's right.

16 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- it's just a general understanding?

17 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** That's right.

18 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Thank you. We have in the Foundational
19 Document -- have you had a chance to review the Foundational Document,
20 Corporal Clarke?

21 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I've read it, yes.

22 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay.

23 And I'm going to have Madam Registrar bring up the Foundational
24 Document at page 15. And what I want to do, Corporal Clarke, is have a sense from
25 you, I think I know the answer to this, but there are a number of social media posts,
26 Twitter, Facebook, et cetera, throughout the morning. I'm not going to take you through
27 them all, but certainly up until the 10:17, 10:19 information, I just want to be clear about
28 what you were responsible for ---

1 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

2 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- in terms of drafting and posting.

3 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Sure.

4 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay? So the first tweet is at 11:32 p.m.,
5 that's on April the 18th. I understand you were not even involved at that point.

6 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I wasn't, no.

7 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And that would have been Corporal Croteau
8 is what we understand would have been in charge of that?

9 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I don't know who sent that.

10 **MS. TARA MILLER:** You don't know? Okay, you -- fair enough.
11 Then at 8:02, there is a tweet that advises that there is an active shooter situation in
12 Portapique. Were you involved with that tweet?

13 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** No.

14 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. And then at 8:45, this is the tweet
15 dealing with release of the perpetrator's name. Is that something you were involved in?

16 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** No.

17 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. And that was the one I think that we
18 understood that Director Scanlan was involved in getting out the information about the
19 identity of the perpetrator; correct?

20 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

21 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. Then we have a 9:12 a.m. Facebook
22 post, which says that:

23 "[the RCMP ...] is responding to a firearms complaint
24 in the...Portapique area."

25 Remaining on scene there with an active shooter situation. Would
26 you have been involved in any way with respect to that communication on Facebook?

27 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** No.

28 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. And do you know who was?

1 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** No.

2 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. Then we move to Number 5 on
3 page 16. This is the 10:04 tweet from the RCMP:

4 "...advising people to avoid Hwy 4 near [the] Hidden
5 Hilltop Campground..."

6 You weren't involved in that tweet either, were you?

7 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** No. The first tweet I was involved with
8 was the Number 7.

9 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. And you had no knowledge of that
10 tweet either or that information; correct?

11 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I wasn't watching what other things
12 were doing, I was focussing on my own task.

13 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. And so you're part of the Strategic
14 Communications Unit. I appreciate you're working from home because of COVID ---

15 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

16 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- and you had been not on duty, but is there
17 no broad picture of what all other team members are doing in terms of your unit with
18 communication that morning?

19 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** At that stage of the game, no.

20 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. So is it fair to say that you were
21 effectively operating in your own silo working on your information with respect to the
22 release of the car information?

23 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Essentially, for that time, yes.

24 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And then we see the -- a 10:10 a.m.
25 Facebook post, which looks to be exactly the same as the Twitter post, again advising
26 people in the Glenholme area about the Hilden -- Hidden Hilden Campground.

27 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I had no involvement with that.

28 **MS. TARA MILLER:** No involvement with that.

1 Okay, so the first involvement, as we know, were -- well, you were
2 working on this, but 10:17 there's the Twitter post, and then at 10:19 there's the
3 Facebook post. And basically, they're mirror for mirror in terms of the information. You
4 can see that?

5 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yeah.

6 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And it's your evidence that you have no idea
7 who posted that Facebook post?

8 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I don't, no.

9 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. But it wasn't you?

10 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** It wasn't me.

11 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. From your evidence, Corporal Clarke,
12 I just want to review the list of people that you interacted with that morning in terms ---

13 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** M'hm.

14 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- of communication around this tweet, which
15 was restricted to information about the RCMP car. So it was ---

16 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Sure.

17 **MS. TARA MILLER:** -- certainly Director Scanlan; correct?

18 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yes.

19 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Staff Sergeant Addie MacCallum?

20 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yes.

21 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. Staff Sergeant Halliday?

22 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yes.

23 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Corporal Croteau?

24 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yes.

25 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. Cindy Bayers?

26 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yes.

27 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. Anybody else that you would have
28 interacted with or communicated with on that morning?

1 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I don't think so.

2 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay.

3 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I really don't recall anyone else.

4 **MS. TARA MILLER:** I know you copied Regis Dudley on a -- on --
5 on an email.

6 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yes.

7 **MS. TARA MILLER:** So would she have been involved?

8 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Not in the writing of the tweet. I think
9 from the notes earlier, I think Regis was running like a -- basically, a transcript of what
10 we were doing, I think that was her role. So ---

11 **MS. TARA MILLER:** But you learned that after the fact.

12 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yes.

13 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. Did anyone give you direction at all
14 through that morning, Corporal Clarke, not to release information in a tweet?

15 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I don't think so, no.

16 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And are you aware of anybody else that you
17 talked to about the preparation, dissemination or holding back of information in tweets
18 that morning?

19 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I don't think so, no.

20 **MS. TARA MILLER:** We know that there was interaction between
21 two members, Staff Sergeants Carroll and Briers, with respect earlier in the morning
22 about doing a media release around the police car. Would you have had any
23 involvement in that communication?

24 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** No.

25 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. I want to talk to you a little bit now
26 about the use of the social media platforms, the Twitter and the Facebook.

27 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** M'hm.

28 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Those were the primary avenues of

1 communication that you would have used within the Strategic Communications Unit for
2 the public?

3 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

4 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. And certainly, the media would fall into
5 a different frame. But -- and those are helpful. Would you -- that's helpful to use the
6 social media, those channels, to get information out to the public?

7 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** It's -- it picks up a different
8 demographic than might be picked up by the news. Social media people are pretty
9 active on there, so it's -- it's a -- it's a different way to engage with people.

10 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And so for people who are engaged in social
11 media it's a good way to push out information quickly?

12 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

13 **MS. TARA MILLER:** I want to take us now to—and
14 Madam Registrar, if we could go to the Plains Road Foundational Document, and at
15 page 33.

16 Have you had an opportunity, Corporal Clarke, to review any of the
17 material in this Foundational Document?

18 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** No, I haven't.

19 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. So this is a section of the document
20 that deals with my client's family member, Kristen Beaton, and I want to take you
21 through a few paragraphs in the context of, as you said, there's a demographic that
22 actually will see and respond to information going out by social media.

23 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Okay.

24 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Ms. Miller, there's a --
25 Ms. MacPhee has something to say.

26 **MS. PATRICIA MacPHEE:** Thank you. I'm just going to ask
27 Counsel to perhaps tie this into Corporal Clarke's testimony and the relevance of this to
28 her testimony this morning with respect to Strategic Comms that morning.

1 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Ms. Miller?

2 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Well, I've laid the framework, and I think Ms. -
3 - Corporal Clarke has already indicated that there is a demographic of people who are
4 certainly reached by social media that may not receive the news information through the
5 traditional news sources, such as the radio or the newspaper.

6 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Right, but what relevance does
7 the reference to that aspect of the Foundational Document have to that? Maybe you
8 could help me.

9 **MS. TARA MILLER:** I want to take this witness through,
10 Commissioner MacDonald, the timing of the information and the fact that Kristen Beaton
11 was very much plugged into social media and looking for this information.

12 **MS. PATRICIA MacPHEE:** Commissioners, if I ---

13 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Oh, I'm sorry, Ms. MacPhee.
14 Sorry.

15 **MS. PATRICIA MacPHEE:** No, sorry, I would just suggest that the
16 line of questioning I think my friend is going down is not appropriate and certainly not
17 trauma informed. If she wants to talk about a certain demographic and describe it in
18 general terms, fine, but if it's to take her to what Ms. Beaton was doing that morning, I
19 don't think it's appropriate for this witness to have to answer that.

20 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** I'm going to direct, Ms. Miller,
21 that you attempt to ask your questions without necessarily walking through the
22 document, but you know the information in the document.

23 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay.

24 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** We're not comfortable that this
25 witness has enough information vis-à-vis that document, so we would direct that you
26 certainly can continue in that line of questioning, but not ---

27 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Thank you.

28 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** --- in reference to the document.

1 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Thank you. Fair enough, and I certainly
2 would never profess to do anything that wouldn't be trauma informed. I think suggesting
3 that would be tainting the model.

4 In any event, Corporal Clarke, we know from the evidence with
5 respect to Kristen Beaton on the morning of April the 19th, she was in Debert on Plains
6 Road, and she was very much aware of the Portapique incident. She had seen a social
7 media update on Facebook from the Firefighters of Nova Scotia media site. That was
8 early in the morning hours. At nine a.m., she actually had taken the initiative to warn
9 her coworkers by posting on a group Facebook page a link to the RCMP Twitter page
10 with information that had been posted, so she was one of the demographic that you
11 would have been targeting, fair enough, with respect to social media information
12 through Twitter and Facebook. Given that background, you'd agree with that?

13 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I don't know what you're asking me to
14 say, but you're saying that she was aware of it, yes ---

15 **MS. TARA MILLER:** She was aware of it, yeah.

16 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** --- that's good.

17 **MS. TARA MILLER:** She had accessed ---

18 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yes.

19 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- the RCMP Facebook site and had actually
20 ---

21 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Okay.

22 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- taken the initiative to post that for her
23 coworkers to cascade that information out, and that's what you would want people to do
24 in social media, to be able to help share and enhance the public safety by sharing that
25 information; correct?

26 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Of course.

27 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And she did that at nine a.m. And then she
28 received at 9:37:39 a.m., she received a Facebook screenshot from her husband,

1 again, with further information. This would have been the 9:12 Facebook post.

2 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Okay.

3 **MS. TARA MILLER:** So, again, this is what you want people to do,
4 to take that information, to process it, and spread it out to their friends, family and
5 coworkers to help magnify the reach ---

6 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Sure.

7 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- of the communication. And then we know
8 at 10:01:06, she receives a text from her husband, and then, of course, there's no
9 information. We know that based on the -- sorry, I'll rephrase that. We know that from
10 that point on it is evident that she would -- became a victim of the perpetrator.

11 Knowing that this was a person who was very plugged into social
12 media and actively looking for information and sharing it, is it fair to say that it would
13 have been better to move that information more quickly, had you been able to post with
14 approval, had you been able to post the 10:17 post, is it fair to say that that very well
15 could have been relevant and helpful for other people to allow them to have that
16 information as quickly as possible?

17 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Ms. Miller? Ms. MacPhee.

18 **MS. PATRICIA MacPHEE:** I'm going to object to that. Again, I'm
19 going to say that I think this line of question is frankly abusive. The facts are in the
20 record. We know the timeline. If Ms. Miller wants to make argument about the timeline,
21 the posting of Tweets, it's fair for her to do so, but it is argument. It's not appropriate
22 questioning for this witness.

23 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Yeah, I agree with the objection,
24 Ms. Miller -- or, sorry, you respond, Ms. Miller.

25 **MS. TARA MILLER:** What I'm looking for is this witness to share
26 her views, having worked in this section from 2016 forward, about the timeliness of --
27 the importance of timeliness of getting information and whether it would have changed
28 anything from -- whether she would have changed anything in terms of getting this

1 information out, had she been able to get approval earlier than 10:17.

2 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Well, Mr. Burrill asked her that
3 question. If you want to ask her that question, by all means, go ahead, but you've
4 already made the point about the fact that Kristen Beaton was active on social media
5 before her -- tragically her life was taken. You've made that point. And if your question
6 is ---

7 **MS. TARA MILLER:** I'll ---

8 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** --- it's essentially the same as
9 when ---

10 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- I'm reframe it.

11 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** --- the same as the one that Mr.
12 Burrill asked but ---

13 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Yeah.

14 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** --- if you want to ask ---

15 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Yeah.

16 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** --- it again ---

17 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Yeah.

18 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** --- in a different way, by all
19 means.

20 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Thank you.

21 Corporal Clarke, you wanted to get that 10:17 information out a lot
22 earlier than it was ultimately put out because you were waiting for an approval; correct?

23 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** One hundred (100) percent.

24 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Thank you. And if you could go back and
25 change that, it would just simply to be get -- to be able to get approval on a quicker
26 basis; correct?

27 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Absolutely.

28 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. Thank you, Corporal Clarke.

1 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Mr. Russell?

2 **--- CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. JAMES RUSSELL:**

3 **MR. JAMES RUSSELL:** Good morning, Corporal Clarke. My
4 name is James Russell, and along with my colleagues, Stephen Topshee and Linda
5 Hupman, of Burchell, MacDougall, we represent the family of -- or the Tuck Oliver
6 family, as well as the Hyslop Campbell family.

7 I have just a few questions. I won't be very long. Are you aware
8 that Truro has at least two radio stations being Bounce Radio 100.9 FM and True
9 Country Radio, it's 99.5 FM?

10 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I wouldn't have been able to tell you
11 how many radio stations Truro has, but obviously they have them.

12 **MR. JAMES RUSSELL:** Were you aware of those two in
13 particular?

14 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I'd done media clips with both over the
15 years that I had been in the unit.

16 **MR. JAMES RUSSELL:** Okay. Were other media streams
17 considered by you, or to your knowledge, by others at the Strategic Comms Unit during
18 the mass casualty?

19 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Do you mean other ways of notifying
20 the media?

21 **MR. JAMES RUSSELL:** Yeah, I'm thinking of ---

22 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Okay.

23 **MR. JAMES RUSSELL:** --- radio as an example ---

24 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

25 **MR. JAMES RUSSELL:** --- television as another example.

26 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** So the use of social media and/or
27 media releases, but more social media, it's a quicker way to get information out to a
28 bigger group of people. And often, when something would be going on, something fairly

1 minor, right up to something unimaginable like this, the media stations will follow our
2 social media pages, so that we can inadvertently -- well, not inadvertently, but by default
3 notify them when we're notifying the public.

4 **MR. JAMES RUSSELL:** Would you agree that there's a delay
5 potentially in waiting for media to react to your response on Twitter or Facebook rather
6 than approaching them directly to send something out?

7 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** During the that I was with the Strategic
8 Communications Unit, we wouldn't routinely phone a radio station. It just -- it's not --
9 years back, earlier on in my service with the RCMP, we would definitely have used that
10 as a conduit to get information out to people before the advent of social media. And
11 once social media became a little more commonplace, that was the way to notify the
12 media, in some cases, and the public of things that were happening.

13 **MR. JAMES RUSSELL:** So, to your knowledge, neither you nor
14 those that you were in contact with at the Strategic Comms Unit considered that as a
15 possibility?

16 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** We did not. I know that ---

17 **MR. JAMES RUSSELL:** Okay.

18 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** --- in some of the smaller units, for
19 some matters, police officers would ask telecoms to call a radio station to notify them of
20 something very local, but something large scale, that wouldn't be the way to go.

21 **MR. JAMES RUSSELL:** I guess I have two follow-up questions on
22 that. One, am I understanding correctly that the use by, sorry, Strategic Comms ---

23 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

24 **MR. JAMES RUSSELL:** --- of Twitter and Facebook has replaced
25 the use of radio and television by the RCMP?

26 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I wouldn't say it's replaced it, but it's
27 seen as something that's much more streamlined.

28 **MR. JAMES RUSSELL:** Okay. No, that's good.

1 Was anyone else involved in the decision or discussion to not
2 include the reference to the push bar, that you're aware of, that was noted in the photo?

3 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** There are a number of reasons why I
4 chose to use the car number as the distinguishing factor, and it was my decision to not
5 use the whip antenna or the push bar, because I felt that the car number was the best
6 way, the clearest way for people to understand which vehicle that they were looking for.

7 **MR. JAMES RUSSELL:** Were you the only one involved in that
8 decision or were there others involved in ---

9 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I think I probably had the conversation
10 with Cindy Bayers as well when we were working out ---

11 **MR. JAMES RUSSELL:** Okay.

12 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** --- working out the wording of the
13 tweet, keeping in mind you get 140 characters, and it's got to be clear and it's got to be
14 really to the point.

15 **MR. JAMES RUSSELL:** Okay. And actually, this leads me into my
16 next question. Are you aware that Twitter did change their ---

17 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** They did.

18 **MR. JAMES RUSSELL:** --- character limits, so ---

19 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** And I don't know ---

20 **MR. JAMES RUSSELL:** --- 2017?

21 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** It is 2017. Okay, fair enough. And I
22 think it went up to -- I don't know what the number was.

23 **MR. JAMES RUSSELL:** Two-hundred-and-eighty (280) is what I
24 understand.

25 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Okay, very good.

26 **MR. JAMES RUSSELL:** Does that accord ---

27 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** That does make sense.

28 **MR. JAMES RUSSELL:** --- with your understanding? Okay.

1 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Bells are going off.

2 **MR. JAMES RUSSELL:** Am I correct that you weren't aware of the
3 situation occurring in Portapique prior to your call on April 19th with ---

4 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Absolutely not.

5 **MR. JAMES RUSSELL:** Okay.

6 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I was off, and when I wasn't at work I
7 was completely unplugged.

8 **MR. JAMES RUSSELL:** So it wasn't until your call with Lia
9 Scanlan that you knew about anything about Portapique?

10 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** That's right.

11 **MR. JAMES RUSSELL:** Okay. Did you see any tweets
12 concerning the situation in Portapique? I take it that you didn't.

13 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Before?

14 **MR. JAMES RUSSELL:** Prior to that call with Scanlan, sorry.

15 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I have no interest in social media
16 when I wasn't working. Zero.

17 **MR. JAMES RUSSELL:** Okay. No, those are -- those are my
18 questions.

19 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you ---

20 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Thank you.

21 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** --- Mr. Russell.

22 Ms. MacCormick?

23 **MS. GRACE MacCORMICK:** Thank you, Commissioners.

24 **--- CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. GRACE MacCORMICK:**

25 **MS. GRACE MacCORMICK:** Good morning, Corporal Clarke.

26 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Good morning.

27 **MS. GRACE MacCORMICK:** My name is Grace MacCormick, and
28 I'm an associate lawyer at Patterson Law, and together, with a number of my

1 colleagues, we represent the majority of the families of those who were killed in April of
2 2020, as well as a number of surviving victims.

3 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Okay.

4 **MS. GRACE MacCORMICK:** So first, I'm following one of my
5 friend, Mr. Russell's questions.

6 I'd like to ask the Registrar, please, to pull up Exhibit No. 2039.

7 And so Corporal Clarke, I believe that these are your notes from
8 April 19th; is that correct?

9 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** They are, yes.

10 **MS. GRACE MacCORMICK:** So you had just mentioned that you
11 had no information about the car, the events prior to that phone call with Lia Scanlan?

12 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

13 **MS. GRACE MacCORMICK:** Now, just referring you to your notes
14 there, there is a notation at eight o'clock that appears to have a description of the car,
15 and then a second notation saying that at 8:07 Lia called.

16 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

17 **MS. GRACE MacCORMICK:** Does that refresh your memory at all
18 as to the -- whether you had any information prior to the conversation with Ms. Scanlan?

19 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I'm not sure why that is, the way it is,
20 and I think in a lot of cases you think, "Oh, geez, I should have made that note at the
21 time when this all started", but then I went back and looked at my phone, and you could
22 see in the call history that she phoned me at 8:07.

23 **MS. GRACE MacCORMICK:** Okay. Then the second thing you
24 had mentioned with both my friend, Mr. Russell and Ms. Miller, is the issue with the
25 number of characters in a tweet.

26 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

27 **MS. GRACE MacCORMICK:** And I'm -- I am wondering whether
28 there was any consideration given to putting out a series of tweets, you know, those

1 multiple tweets where you say this is one of two, this is two of two, this is ---

2 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right. Yes.

3 **MS. GRACE MacCORMICK:** --- et cetera. Was that something
4 you considered?

5 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Again, I didn't think the -- I didn't think
6 the whip antenna and the push bar were features that would be easy for -- I get that the
7 push bar would be easy to see, but I didn't know which units were in the area, there
8 could be some New Brunswick cars in the area, I didn't know what their take was on
9 using push bars on operational police vehicles. So again, I thought that was a little bit
10 risky to use. The car number was -- it was not a legitimate police car number in the
11 province, that's why I chose that.

12 **MS. GRACE MacCORMICK:** And now, Madam Registrar, if I could
13 take you to another document. This would be Exhibit No. 1545.

14 So this again is the email chain between you and Ms. Scanlan. Do
15 you recognise the document?

16 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yes.

17 **MS. GRACE MacCORMICK:** Okay. And I recognise you've
18 spoken a lot about this email chain throughout the morning, and we've spoken, in
19 particular, about that 9:49 email. But you'd mentioned that you had in fact sent this
20 email to Ms. Scanlan a number of times, and so in fairness to you and the Commission I
21 wanted to bring this document to your attention.

22 So it looks to me as though you send the same email to
23 Ms. Scanlan at 10:13 a.m. Does that accord with your recollection?

24 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Sure. Yes.

25 **MS. GRACE MacCORMICK:** And then again, at 10:15:11, you
26 send the same email.

27 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

28 **MS. GRACE MacCORMICK:** And of course, we know that the

1 tweet went out at around 10:17.

2 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yes.

3 **MS. GRACE MacCORMICK:** So presumably, it was after your
4 third email to Ms. Scanlan that you received permission to tweet that information.

5 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Right.

6 **MS. GRACE MacCORMICK:** Those are my questions.

7 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Okay.

8 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you, Ms. MacCormick.
9 Mr. Burrill.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Thank you, Commissioners. I was just
11 checking with other counsel, given what took place in cross-examination, and there will
12 be no further questions.

13 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you.

14 Commissioner Fitch?

15 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Thank you, Commissioner MacDonald.

16 And Corporal, thank you very much for sharing with us today. And
17 Participant Counsel, you've asked all of my questions.

18 So there's only one question that I have for you this morning, and
19 it's really related to the forward-looking aspect of our work in making recommendations.

20 Am I to understand that the only official formal training that you had for a Public
21 Information Officer was the course that you took in 2012 when stationed to Yarmouth?

22 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** That's right.

23 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** And who did you take that course from?

24 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** The people that were giving the
25 course at the time were Paula Sibley-Fox and Lia Scanlan.

26 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. So it was an internal PIO
27 course?

28 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yes.

1 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Was there a certification with that
2 course?

3 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I did receive a certificate, yes.

4 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. And during your tenure as a PIO,
5 I know that you answered some questions around training, but do you recall anything
6 specific to crisis management communication?

7 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I did attend a course in Ottawa at
8 some point during my time there, I think it was toward the end. It was really related to
9 crisis communications, but it was me that me that was there, and I was picking up on
10 things that the civilian members of the unit knew already and had -- you know, had been
11 prepared for.

12 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Are you aware of a course at the
13 Canadian Police College on effective crisis communication?

14 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I'm not, no.

15 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. Those are all my questions.
16 Thank you.

17 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you.
18 Commissioner Stanton?

19 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Thanks.

20 I just wondered if you can recall when you first had the
21 conversation on the morning of the 19th? I think it was with Lia Scanlan, the initial
22 conversation where you learned about ---

23 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yes.

24 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** --- the events? Do you recall in that
25 conversation, or other phone conversations over the course of the following couple of
26 hours, whether she mentioned having spoken with Sergeant -- Staff Sergeant Halliday
27 or did you have a conversation with Staff Sergeant Halliday during that time?

28 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** I think when I couldn't reach

1 Staff MacCallum, I went to Staff Halliday for approval of that tweet, and he's the person
2 who did approve it in the end.

3 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Okay. And so that was with the
4 information about the car?

5 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Yes.

6 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Okay. And that would have been
7 just in that time period prior to -- sorry, between 9:04 and 9:40, something like that, or ---

8 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Forty-nine (49), yes.

9 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Okay. Okay, thank you very much.

10 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you, and thank you,
11 Corporal Clarke. I -- all of my questions have been answered, so it falls to me to thank
12 you for your attendance here today. It's very difficult work we're involved with and a
13 very difficult situation for you, obviously, and we appreciate the fact that you've provided
14 your testimony to us today and contribute to our work. So we ---

15 **CPL. JENNIFER CLARKE:** Thank you.

16 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** --- appreciate that, and thank
17 you. You're free to go.

18 Ms. Mancini?

19 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Commissioner MacDonald, if the
20 Commission is willing to be a little bit flexible, I think we've been able to push lunch to
21 about one o'clock, and I would suggest we proceed with calling our next witness for this,
22 well, this afternoon, Mr. Glenn Mason, if that's agreeable.

23 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you.

24 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Thank you, Mr. Mason. And I'm just going
25 to ask you to remain standing.

26 Madam Registrar, I believe Mr. Mason has expressed a preference
27 to be sworn this morning.

28 **--- GLENN MASON, Sworn:**

1 **--- EXAMINATION IN-CHIEF BY MS. ANNA MANCINI:**

2 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Thank you, Mr. Mason, for joining us. I
3 know you've had a long wait, I'm sure, this morning. And just for the record, your name
4 is Glenn with two Ns? G-L-E-N-N?

5 **MR. GLENN MASON:** That is correct.

6 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** And then last name, M-A-S-O-N?

7 **MR. GLENN MASON:** Yes.

8 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** All right. Perfect. Thank you. So our
9 purpose here today, Mr. Mason, is to have you cover some evidence, or provide some
10 evidence pertaining to discussions on April 19th, 2020, particularly around the use of
11 that Alert Ready system. It's the view of the Commission that you have some
12 information that would be helpful to us and help us understand that a little bit more, so
13 we're grateful for your assistance today.

14 I'm wondering if we can start off asking you a little bit about your
15 employment history with the RCMP? Is that okay?

16 All right. So I understand that you joined the RCMP about 25 years
17 ago as a civilian member?

18 **MR. GLENN MASON:** That's correct.

19 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And as a civilian member, you were
20 working in the radio workshop?

21 **MR. GLENN MASON:** I started in the radio workshop as a
22 technician.

23 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And then in 2008, you became an
24 informatics officer?

25 **MR. GLENN MASON:** Yes. I managed the IT program for the
26 Division.

27 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Managing the IT program. Okay. So you
28 had kind of gone from the radio workshop to IT information technology?

1 **MR. GLENN MASON:** Then that encompassed both the radio
2 workshop and the computer services aspect of the ---

3 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

4 **MR. GLENN MASON:** --- organization.

5 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And still a civilian member?

6 **MR. GLENN MASON:** Still a civilian member.

7 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And then in 2016, you joined the
8 CrOps office in a support role there?

9 **MR. GLENN MASON:** Yes.

10 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And what were your duties there, Mr.
11 Mason?

12 **MR. GLENN MASON:** I managed high-risk inventories.

13 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

14 **MR. GLENN MASON:** I was responsible to show that all the
15 members had hard body armour. I did -- was doing inventory on the CA carbines.

16 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

17 **MR. GLENN MASON:** And managing some budgetary work. I was
18 involved in the -- when we started recalling the equipment from old -- from retired
19 members, old uniforms, boots, things like that, I was part of that project. We recovered
20 several tons of old equipment and disposed of it properly.

21 There were various other projects. One was Operation SABOT,
22 which was the eradication of marijuana. I managed that program for them for a couple
23 of years.

24 And just basic day to day operations that supported the front-line
25 membership in the Criminal Operations Office. We wrote briefing notes, we did
26 budgets, we were sort of a catch basin for everything operational.

27 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. So essentially managing -- among
28 other things, managing a ton of resources in the CrOps office?

1 **MR. GLENN MASON:** Yeah, we were ---

2 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Yeah.

3 **MR. GLENN MASON:** We were support service program for
4 CrOps, for Criminal Operations Officer.

5 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And so then I understand in 2020,
6 you were moved to the Emergency Management Section?

7 **MR. GLENN MASON:** Yes.

8 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. Do you recall exactly when that was
9 in 2020?

10 **MR. GLENN MASON:** It was in January -- the first week of
11 February is when I actually physically moved down to the office, but I was approached
12 back in -- just after Christmas to take the position.

13 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And you were in that position in April
14 of 2020?

15 **MR. GLENN MASON:** Yes.

16 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And we'll come back to that, but I
17 understand that after that, you were transferred back to the CrOps office in September
18 of 2020? Does that ---

19 **MR. GLENN MASON:** I went back to CrOps in September.

20 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And you've since retired?

21 **MR. GLENN MASON:** I have retired.

22 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

23 **MR. GLENN MASON:** In January.

24 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** January of 20?

25 **MR. GLENN MASON:** Of 2022.

26 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. Okay. So yeah, I'll go -- take you
27 back to the Emergency Management Section, and your transfer there, your time there.
28 And I'll ask you, essentially, who you -- who were you working alongside at that -- in that

1 ---

2 **MR. GLENN MASON:** Emergency Management?

3 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Yeah.

4 **MR. GLENN MASON:** Insp Dustine Rodier was my supervisor.

5 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

6 **MR. GLENN MASON:** And there was one other person in the
7 program, just started shortly after I did, but they moved to the Pandemic Relief part of
8 our program we had set up for distributing PPE and equipment and resourcing that. So
9 she moved down there. So pretty much from March on, I was on my own.

10 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. So in April of 2020, Glenn Mason is
11 the only person in EMS?

12 **MR. GLENN MASON:** Yes.

13 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And do you have any sense of how
14 many people would normally, if all the positions were filled, would be in the EMS
15 section?

16 **MR. GLENN MASON:** I think there was supposed to be the
17 manager's position, which I sat in, plus two other positions. But they were never filled at
18 that time and the program had sat empty for quite some time because of staffing issues.

19 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Sorry, can you say that again? The
20 program ---

21 **MR. GLENN MASON:** The program had sat -- was empty ---

22 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

23 **MR. GLENN MASON:** --- for quite some time before I got there
24 because of staffing issues. The two people that were there had retired.

25 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** I see. Okay. Did you have a sense of how
26 long it had sat empty?

27 **MR. GLENN MASON:** It was probably empty for the best part of
28 four to six months.

1 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. Prior to you moving in?

2 **MR. GLENN MASON:** Yes.

3 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. Can you give us a sense of what
4 some of your responsibilities in EMS would have been?

5 **MR. GLENN MASON:** The original program was set up on the
6 heels of 9/11 ---

7 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

8 **MR. GLENN MASON:** --- and for business continuity plans. And
9 that was the original concept of the manager, that they ensure the business continuity
10 plans were created, maintained, kept up to date.

11 The other side of the program was a liaison with the other public
12 service safety agencies, whether it be on the federal level, the provincial level, or the
13 municipal level. It was somebody who represented a constant representation for the
14 RCMP, somebody that everybody recognized, knew who to contact, and on my side, it
15 was to make those contacts. So if you needed something from HRM in a jam, you knew
16 who to contact, that "Yes, we need to borrow this," or, "We need you to support us with
17 that." It was the same thing on the Province's side.

18 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. So is it -- is my understanding
19 correct that in EMS, the Emergency Management Section, you're essentially engaging
20 with other emergency management operations from other organizations?

21 **MR. GLENN MASON:** That's correct.

22 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** You're sort of the representative?

23 **MR. GLENN MASON:** Yeah.

24 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. All right. So you would have
25 become fairly familiar working with the Emergency Management Office of Nova Scotia?

26 **MR. GLENN MASON:** Yes, I've -- it's a small community so
27 everybody knows everybody. I knew a lot of the people in that program from my
28 previous role in informatics and in the radio workshop. You know, 25 years of dealing

1 with communications and being at events, like Swissair, plane crash at the airport,
2 something like that. you know, you got to know all those people. So it was sort of a
3 homecoming in the sense that I knew everybody, they knew me.

4 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And then in the EMS role, were you
5 engaging with people from other organizations on a regular basis or?

6 **MR. GLENN MASON:** I was because of the pandemic.

7 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

8 **MR. GLENN MASON:** We had daily teleconferences morning and
9 afternoon to do updates. One was with the provincial partners, one was with the federal
10 partners. So yes, I was meeting with -- in contact with those people on a regular basis.

11 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And were you given any specific
12 training when you moved into EMS specific to that role?

13 **MR. GLENN MASON:** Other -- not -- when I went in the program,
14 they didn't say, no, "You need to take these courses." No. But I have 25 years
15 operational experience. When I was in CrOps, I took -- they offered an Incident
16 Command Management Program. There are four levels. I took the three levels. The
17 fourth level required going out of province somewhere where they had to -- it was more
18 intensive course. But I -- I've been trained to ICS level 300.

19 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And you did that training mostly
20 while you were in the CrOps office; was it?

21 **MR. GLENN MASON:** In CrOps and over the years ---

22 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

23 **MR. GLENN MASON:** --- I had the opportunity to take the course.

24 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. and so was it your sense when you
25 came into the position that you -- the training that you had received throughout the
26 years was relevant in moving into that EMS position?

27 **MR. GLENN MASON:** Somewhat, yeah, because I've had the
28 operational experience. For 12 years I was the embedded radio tech with ERT, so I

1 saw a lot of frontline exposure to critical incidents; saw how it worked, what it -- was
2 required, and again, I knew a lot of the people in the EMS world in the province because
3 of just my time in the division.

4 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And I think you already answered
5 this, but who was it that you reported to in that division?

6 **MR. GLENN MASON:** Insp. Rodier.

7 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay, all right. Anybody else?

8 **MR. GLENN MASON:** That I reported up to in EMS?

9 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Yeah.

10 **MR. GLENN MASON:** No.

11 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. So what I'm going to do, Mr. Mason,
12 is take you to April 19th, 2020.

13 And I'm going to ask Madam Registrar, if you could pull up the
14 Foundational Document that was presented this morning, Exhibit 2001, I believe?

15 And what I'm going to do, Mr. Mason, is pull up a specific
16 paragraph of that. That's the Foundational Document on public communications,
17 RCMP Public Communications, April 18th and 19th of 2020. Have you had a chance to
18 look at that document?

19 **MR. GLENN MASON:** I have seen it, yes.

20 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And what I'm going to do is refer to
21 some specific paragraphs and ask you some questions about them. If you can't see, let
22 me know, I'll read it out loud to you. And the other thing is, if you think that there's
23 something that's not correct, or if you think that there's something that needs to be
24 explained further than as it's presented here, I'd encourage you to do that, okay?

25 All right. So the first paragraph I'm going to take you to is
26 paragraph 137, and it's fairly lengthy, so I'm going to break it down a little bit. The first
27 portion says:

28 "Glenn Mason, RCMP EMS manager, was not

1 working on April 19, 2020, and had not heard about
2 the events overnight in Portapique until he received a
3 text message from a co-worker while eating
4 breakfast.”

5 So I'm actually going to stop there and just ask you; you weren't
6 formally advised in any capacity?

7 **MR. GLENN MASON:** I had no idea. It was Sunday morning; we
8 didn't even have the radio on that morning.

9 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And so the text message that you
10 received, was that kind of in a casual, from a friend, sort of thing?

11 **MR. GLENN MASON:** It was casual from a coworker, yes.

12 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And working as the EMS Manager,
13 were you surprised that you hadn't been notified or would there be a process for you to
14 be notified of a critical incident?

15 **MR. GLENN MASON:** No. It was an ERT call so it was -- had
16 nothing to do with EMS ---

17 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

18 **MR. GLENN MASON:** --- in that respect. I mean, it was -- ERT
19 operates autonomously.

20 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Right.

21 **MR. GLENN MASON:** They go -- they go all the -- I shouldn't say
22 go all the time, but they go at various hours of the day and night, whenever required,
23 and EMS isn't notified for that.

24 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. So there's no sort of automatically
25 once ERT ---

26 **MR. GLENN MASON:** No.

27 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** --- is called out, the Emergency
28 Management Office isn't related to that callout.

1 **MR. GLENN MASON:** No.

2 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. All right. So I'll continue on. So in
3 the paragraph it says:

4 “Mr. Mason told the Mass Casualty Commission that
5 at around or shortly after 9:00 a.m., he received a
6 phone call from Christian Gallant, a civilian member
7 with the RCMP who was the acting informatics officer
8 at the time, asking if he wanted him to ‘turn up the
9 DEOC’.”

10 So I've tried -- I've attempted to briefly describe what DEOC is this
11 morning, Mr. Mason, but can you tell me what DEOC is?

12 **MR. GLENN MASON:** DEOC is an Emergency Operations Centre
13 that will support a particular event, and the DEOC we have today was created on the
14 heels of Swissair, ---

15 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

16 **MR. GLENN MASON:** --- is what it was designed for. So the event
17 happens, and then if it's going to be ongoing for more than 24 hours, DEOC will be
18 brought up to support that event. So people will be brought in to do logistics, order
19 meals, bring port-a-potties onsite, make sure crew were changed out on a regular basis,
20 make sure flights were arranged if we were bringing people in from outside the
21 province, ensure that rental cars -- things like -- as simple as rental cars or
22 transportation and whatnot, whatever goes on with that event, they would provide that --
23 what's the word I'm looking for -- administrative support.

24 There would be somebody in DEOC that would track all the
25 finances and there would be somebody who would be a liaison with outside agencies.
26 And there are several positions within DEOC, there's probably eight, and we sit around
27 a table, and everybody has a specific duty to do that.

28 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. Is it all specific to within the RCMP,

1 everybody who's in attendance in DEOC?

2 **MR. GLENN MASON:** Yes.

3 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

4 **MR. GLENN MASON:** And it is the EMS Manager's job is to
5 manage that room. It is not my responsibility -- it is not my responsibility to man it or to
6 put people there; it was to ensure the room was functional so if DEOC was up and
7 running and, we'll say, a television monitor wasn't working, they would call me, say,
8 "Glenn, can you arrange to get this monitor working? We need you to order meals for
9 us," or something like that. That would be my specific job, would be to manage that
10 room, not to the man the room or manage what's going on in that room.

11 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay, okay. So I'll carry on from there. So
12 the next portion of the paragraph:

13 "Mr. Mason told the Commission that he then called
14 Insp. Rodier , who was on her way to the OCC, and
15 she advised him that it was not necessary to activate
16 the DEOC at that time."

17 So can you tell me about your memory of making that call?

18 **MR. GLENN MASON:** Yeah, Christian called me, then I called
19 Insp. Rodier and asked her if we were going -- if she wanted to flash it up, and she said,
20 "Not at this time. I'm on my way to the OCC and we'll make that determination at that
21 time."

22 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And you're contacting Insp. Rodier
23 because she's ---

24 **MR. GLENN MASON:** She's my line officer.

25 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. Chain of command?

26 **MR. GLENN MASON:** Chain of command.

27 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And did the response surprise you?

28 Is this something that would normally be started up for an incident like this?

1 **MR. GLENN MASON:** No.

2 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** No? Okay.

3 **MR. GLENN MASON:** No, and I had no real concept of how big
4 the event was or how big it was going to get. But on the heels of it, like, the next day, it
5 would make sense to bring it up.

6 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** I see, okay.

7 **MR. GLENN MASON:** You know, because now it's an ongoing
8 investigation and it's a much bigger event. It would be like with Swissair, we didn't flash
9 DEOC up until the next day, until we realized, "Whoa, this is big. This is going to be
10 something that's going on for multiple days or weeks."

11 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Understood. Okay. So DEOC isn't an
12 operational environment or making operational decisions; it's assisting sort of with the
13 practicalities?

14 **MR. GLENN MASON:** It's assisting with the practicality, and it
15 gives that event a point of contact.

16 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay, okay. And Insp. -- or Supt. Rodier
17 says she advised that that this question about standing up DEOC would have been
18 referred -- would be more appropriately referred to the Support Services Officer, and
19 that's what she had indicated to you. Is that -- that's not your recollection?

20 **MR. GLENN MASON:** That's not my recollection, but a lot was
21 going on at that time, so...

22 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. Do you recall anything about a
23 referral to the Support Services Officer?

24 **MR. GLENN MASON:** Not directly, but again, that would have
25 been her call to go to the Support Services Officer, not me.

26 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** I see. Okay.

27 Okay, so we'll carry on, and it says:

28 "Mr. Mason's notes state that at approximately 10:15

1 a.m., he received a call from Michael Bennett, the
2 EMO's incident commander at the PCC, asking if the
3 RCMP wanted to send an alert. According to Mr.
4 Mason, he called Insp. Rodier again and she
5 responded, 'yeah, yeah great idea.' Mr. Mason said
6 that he then called Mr. Bennett back and advised him
7 to contact Insp. Rodier directly."

8 So I have a couple of questions about this. The first is; 10:15, is
9 this the time that you recall speaking with Michael Bennett of EMO?

10 **MR. GLENN MASON:** Yes, but from looking at the timelines, on
11 Monday morning, I reached out to Shared Services to get a printout from my data dump
12 from my phone.

13 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

14 **MR. GLENN MASON:** And my phone was with Bell.

15 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

16 **MR. GLENN MASON:** And that would have come -- that would
17 have been provided from Montreal, which is in a different time zone. So my timelines
18 are out by an hour.

19 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** I see, okay. So your recollection of 10:15 is
20 based off of your call history notes.

21 **MR. GLENN MASON:** Yes.

22 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And you're saying your call history is
23 generated out of Eastern Standard Time?

24 **MR. GLENN MASON:** Yes.

25 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** I see. So, in actuality, your conversation
26 with Mr. Bennett would have been ---

27 **MR. GLENN MASON:** Probably would have been 11:15 ---

28 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** 11:15?

1 **MR. GLENN MASON:** --- which would ---

2 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

3 **MR. GLENN MASON:** --- work with everybody else's timelines and
4 in telephone conversations that have been recorded and everything else.

5 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. Okay. The second question I
6 wanted to ask you about this is with respect to your subsequent call. You recall getting
7 in touch directly with Inspector Rodier to ask the question about the alert?

8 **MR. GLENN MASON:** Yes.

9 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And you recall that conversation?

10 **MR. GLENN MASON:** She was still on her way to the OCC, my
11 understanding. And it's that -- she said, "Yeah, it sounds like a good idea. Yeah, let's
12 do it." But it was -- again, there's a million things going through everybody's head at
13 that time so.

14 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Is it possible, I'll just suggest to you, that --
15 that instead of speaking directly with Inspector Rodier, that you might have called the
16 OCC to relay the request that way?

17 **MR. GLENN MASON:** I may have, yes.

18 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And maybe what I'll do, Madam
19 Registrar, if we could pull up the audio clip that was played this morning? And I'll --
20 what I'll do, Mr. Mason, is we'll just -- we'll play an audio clip and I'll see -- ask you if it
21 helps you refresh your memory at all, and we'll take it from there. If Madam Registrar's
22 able to do so? Sorry to put you in the spot there. Yeah.

23 **[AUDIO PLAYBACK]**

24 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Does that refresh your memory at all, Mr.
25 Mason? Do you remember making that telephone call?

26 **MR. GLENN MASON:** I do.

27 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And do you think this happened in
28 addition to the call that you had previously mentioned about asking Inspector Rodier

1 about the alert, or do you think this was the call that took place? Did they both happen
2 or did just one of them ---

3 **MR. GLENN MASON:** They both happened.

4 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** They both, okay.

5 **MR. GLENN MASON:** But, again, it was the information. We -- I
6 couldn't send the information. We had -- Michael told me we had 156 characters that
7 we could send, and it had to be specific, and that's why I reached out to them for the
8 specific information.

9 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. So it seems to me from the nature of
10 the call, that seems as though you're first advising the OCC about that alert, but you
11 recall it differently?

12 **MR. GLENN MASON:** It's been two years.

13 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Yeah, that's fair. That's fair. Okay.

14 Okay. What I'll do, Mr. Mason, is pull up paragraph 146 of the
15 Foundational Document. Thank you, Madam Registrar. Okay. So this says,

16 "At 11:21 a.m., Glenn Mason confirmed with Michael
17 Bennett that the RCMP wished to make use of the
18 Alert Ready system. He instructed Michael Bennett to
19 contact Insp. Rodier."

20 Do you recall this conversation with Mr. Bennett?

21 **MR. GLENN MASON:** I do.

22 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And do you recall why you referred
23 Mr. Bennett to Inspector Rodier?

24 **MR. GLENN MASON:** There was no mincing words in translation.
25 There was no -- to pass it on -- pass me the message to pass the message to Michael,
26 it's too risky to lose in translation. The OCC is where things were happening, they had
27 the information, access to the information, and it was much easier -- it took that risk of
28 having the wrong message delivered.

1 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** I see. So you were of the view that
2 Inspector Rodier had more situational awareness ---

3 **MR. GLENN MASON:** Yeah, I was using ---

4 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** --- than some ---

5 **MR. GLENN MASON:** --- the OCC.

6 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. Okay. All right. And if I can move
7 down to paragraph 150? Thank you. So,

8 "At 11:33 [...] Glenn Mason again called the risk
9 manager at the OCC. He advised the call-taker that
10 the EMO had been trying to get in contact with
11 someone at the OCC to issue the Alert Ready
12 notification. He also advised that the EMO was
13 unable to reach Insp. Rodier and that they could not
14 issue the Alert Ready without receiving exact wording
15 from the RCMP. The call-taker transferred the call to
16 S/Sgt. Ettinger, who informed Mr. Mason that the
17 perpetrator was now "in custody," but that the RCMP
18 may want to issue an alert to inform citizens that there
19 is no longer an active threat. Mr. Mason provided
20 Michael Bennett's contact information to S/Sgt.
21 Ettinger and suggested [that] S/Sgt. Ettinger contact
22 Mr. Bennett when ready."

23 Does this all accord with your memory, Mr. Mason?

24 **MR. GLENN MASON:** Yes.

25 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. I'm going to ask you a couple of
26 questions. So can you comment between sort of your call to Michael Bennett to contact
27 Inspector Rodier, can you -- and then your call to the OCC advising that Mr. Bennett
28 wasn't able to get in touch, had you heard from Michael Bennett again?

1 **MR. GLENN MASON:** Yeah, he ---

2 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

3 **MR. GLENN MASON:** --- he reached out ---

4 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

5 **MR. GLENN MASON:** --- he tried to reach out.

6 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Yeah.

7 **MR. GLENN MASON:** Didn't have success, then he called me
8 back, and that's when I call the OCC.

9 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

10 **MR. GLENN MASON:** That would have been the last time.

11 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** I see. Okay. And you recall learning from
12 Staff Sergeant Ettinger that, at that time, the perpetrator was in custody?

13 **MR. GLENN MASON:** Yeah, when I called, he said, "Just a
14 minute, I think we have him."

15 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

16 **MR. GLENN MASON:** And he put me on hold, he come back 20
17 seconds later, said, "Yeah, it's over."

18 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. Okay. And then you provided
19 Michael Bennett's contact information to Staff Sergeant Ettinger and asked Staff
20 Sergeant Ettinger to contact Mr. Bennett?

21 **MR. GLENN MASON:** Yes.

22 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And this might be an insignificant
23 question, but why not call Mr. Bennett back yourself?

24 **MR. GLENN MASON:** I did call Michael back.

25 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Oh, I see.

26 **MR. GLENN MASON:** I did call Mr. Bennett back ---

27 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

28 **MR. GLENN MASON:** --- afterwards, but I gave him -- I gave Staff

1 Sergeant Ettinger his contact information if they wanted to send an Alert Ready out at
2 the end.

3 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** I see. Okay. I see.

4 Okay, Mr. Mason, well, would you feel this is a fair summarization
5 of your involvement regarding your discussions of Alert Ready on April 19th, 2020?

6 **MR. GLENN MASON:** Yes.

7 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. Anything else that you think is
8 relevant to add?

9 Okay. Mr. Mason, those are my questions for you. We'll hopefully
10 do a fairly brief caucus with my friends who might have some questions for you, and we
11 can -- I'll take your direction, Commissioners, on how to proceed.

12 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** My sense is we could -- sorry,
13 Mr. Mason, but it looks like the most practical thing to do would be to break for lunch
14 now, and have you come back. The process is that Commission Counsel will meet with
15 Counsel for the Participants and discuss whether or not there are any further questions
16 for you. So I'm sorry you have to wait even longer, but just to -- for logistical reasons, it
17 makes sense to have that meeting over lunch as opposed to breaking now and then
18 having to break for lunch later. So we'll break until 1:45, if you can come back then,
19 there likely will be some more questions for you.

20 **MR. GLENN MASON:** Very good.

21 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you.

22 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Thank you. The
23 proceedings are now on break and will resume at 1:45.

24 --- Upon recessing at 12:39 p.m.

25 --- Upon resuming at 1:49 p.m.

26 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Welcome back. The
27 proceedings are again in session.

28 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Ms. Mancini?

1 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Chief Commissioner, I believe that there is
2 only one counsel for Participants, Ms. MacCormick, who would have a few questions for
3 Mr. Mason. So I'd just ask if Mr. Mason could return to the stand and I'll turn this over to
4 Ms. MacCormick.

5 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you, Ms. Mancini.

6 **--- GLENN MASON, Resumed:**

7 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you again, Mr. Mason.
8 Ms. Grace MacCormick will be asking you some questions, and she will first identify the
9 Participants that she represents. Thank you.

10 **MS. GRACE MacCORMICK:** Thank you,
11 Commissioner MacDonald.

12 **--- CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. GRACE MacCORMICK:**

13 **MS. GRACE MacCORMICK:** Good afternoon, Mr. Mason. My
14 name is Grace MacCormick, and I am an associate lawyer at Patterson Law, and
15 together, with a number of my colleagues, we represent the majority of those -- those --
16 families of those who were killed in April 2020, as well as a number of surviving victims
17 of the mass casualty event.

18 So I won't be long with you. I just do have a couple of questions for
19 you if that's all right?

20 **MR. GLENN MASON:** Sure.

21 **MS. GRACE MacCORMICK:** So it strikes me from your statement
22 and your conversation this morning that you do have some familiarity with the Alert
23 Ready system.

24 **MR. GLENN MASON:** Yes.

25 **MS. GRACE MacCORMICK:** And it seems to me that you were
26 familiar with that system prior to the events of April 2020; is that correct?

27 **MR. GLENN MASON:** Yes. The Alert Ready was, we called it
28 Amber Alert, and it was designed for if someone was abducted and they were in

1 imminent danger of being harmed or killed. It was never ever implied in -- before I went
2 in the EMS that Amber Alert was anything other than that.

3 **MS. GRACE MacCORMICK:** And I think you'd mentioned at some
4 point in your statement something about if there were weather events, that kind of thing,
5 there might be an alert. Is that correct?

6 **MR. GLENN MASON:** And that came out of more from watching
7 the Weather Network, you would see a weather alert go across, but yeah, it was never
8 ever other than something very basic, you know, shelter in place for high winds,
9 tornado, or something like that, no.

10 **MS. GRACE MacCORMICK:** Sure. And so this familiarity that you
11 do have with Alert Ready, and these sorts of alerts, where -- how would you have gotten
12 familiar with that?

13 **MR. GLENN MASON:** I was in the Information Technology
14 Program for over 20-years, and it was just sort of an osmosis or a migration of learning
15 that technologies are -- become available.

16 **MS. GRACE MacCORMICK:** So would it have anything to do with
17 your role at EMS or with the DEOC that these sorts of alerts would be discussed?

18 **MR. GLENN MASON:** No. At that time, no. I mean, when I went
19 into EMS we were entering a pandemic, so we were in, I don't want to say survival
20 mode, but our operation was very limited to what we were doing because there was no
21 real interaction with anybody other than a phone call.

22 **MS. GRACE MacCORMICK:** Sure. So Mr. Bennett, he originally
23 tried to call Inspector Rodier, Staff Sergeant [sic], my apologies, but then he called you.
24 Do you know why he called you?

25 **MR. GLENN MASON:** Why he called me the first time?

26 **MS. GRACE MacCORMICK:** Yeah.

27 **MR. GLENN MASON:** Because I was the point of contact. And
28 that's what I spoke about earlier this morning, was that that is part of the position that

1 you are a point of contact for other public service agencies -- public safety agencies.

2 **MS. GRACE MacCORMICK:** So if the RCMP were to issue an
3 alert, it would come from your department?

4 **MR. GLENN MASON:** No.

5 **MS. GRACE MacCORMICK:** Okay. So you were the point of
6 contact for this particular alert, but not for any other sorts of alerts?

7 **MR. GLENN MASON:** No. We wouldn't -- my program wouldn't
8 send that alert. That would be -- that decision, that would be -- I would have to make
9 the assumption that it would be made by somebody higher up in the -- in the
10 organisation. Because the wording has to be such that it's very clear and very precise
11 and that you have to be well-informed of what's going on to make that decision.

12 **MS. GRACE MacCORMICK:** So were you surprised when
13 Mr. Bennett reached out to you?

14 **MR. GLENN MASON:** I was because I really had no idea what
15 was -- what was unfolding that day.

16 **MS. GRACE MacCORMICK:** Well, thank you. Those are my
17 questions for you.

18 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you, Ms. MacCormick.
19 Ms. Mancini?

20 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Thank you, Chief Commissioner. I believe
21 those are all the questions for Mr. Mason.

22 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you.
23 Commissioner Fitch?

24 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** I have no further questions, so thank
25 you very much.

26 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Nor does
27 Commissioner Stanton, nor do I, Mr. Mason. So it falls to me to thank you for your
28 attendance here today, and thank you for your patience.

1 **MR. GLENN MASON:** No problem.

2 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** We kept you waiting to testify
3 originally and then over lunch, but that's the way it unfolded, unfortunately, but we do
4 appreciate your patience, and of course, more importantly than that, we appreciate your
5 contribution to the work we're doing. So ---

6 **MR. GLENN MASON:** You're welcome.

7 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** --- thank you very much, and
8 you're free to go.

9 Ms. Mancini?

10 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Thank you, Chief Commissioner. My
11 proposal would be at this stage to call Superintendent Dustine Rodier as a witness.
12 Perhaps what I'll do is just put a fresh waterglass on the table and we could hopefully
13 roll right through. In fact, I think, as always, the tech -- Ashley's well ahead of me.

14 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you.

15 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Thank you.

16 Thank you, Superintendent Rodier. I'm just going to ask you to
17 remain standing.

18 Madam Registrar, I believe Superintendent Rodier has indicated a
19 desire or a preference to be sworn this afternoon.

20 **--- SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER, Sworn:**

21 **--- EXAMINATION IN-CHIEF BY MS. ANNA MANCINI:**

22 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Thank you, Superintendent Rodier. And
23 just for the record, Rodier is R-O-D-I-E-R?

24 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** That's correct.

25 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay, thank you very much. So the
26 purpose today, Superintendent Rodier, is primarily for the Commission to ascertain
27 information regarding Alert Ready use. So that would include knowledge prior to the
28 events of 2020, discussions on -- during the mass casualty in 2020, and work that's

1 been done in this regard since the event.

2 Where I'd like to start off, though, is just getting to know a little bit
3 more about you and your work history. So my understanding is that your work with the
4 RCMP actually began as a dispatcher.

5 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** That's correct.

6 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And that was in Surrey, B.C.?

7 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Yes.

8 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. In 1994.

9 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Yes.

10 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** All right. And it was in 2000, that you
11 attended Depot?

12 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** That's correct.

13 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And you became a regular member
14 at that time?

15 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I did.

16 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And you went to the Richmond
17 Detachment in ---

18 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Yes.

19 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** --- British Columbia? Okay. And then in
20 2003, I understand you went into what was called the Burglary Section in the Richmond
21 Detachment?

22 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Correct.

23 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And then in 2005, you transferred to
24 the Serious Crime Section?

25 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Yes, I did.

26 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And is it fair to say, Serious Crime
27 Section is similar to MCU, the term we've heard here, the Major Crime Unit?

28 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** It is in that we did all serious crimes up

1 to homicide. We had an integrated or still have an Integrated Homicide Team that takes
2 all the homicides in the Lower Mainland.

3 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. All right. And it was during your time
4 in the Serious Crime Section that you were promoted to Corporal?

5 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I promoted into Serious Crimes ---

6 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** I see.

7 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** --- as Corporal.

8 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. So that was in 2005 you made the
9 promotion into Corporal and then into Serious Crime?

10 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Correct.

11 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And 2010, you joined the
12 Specialized Victims Unit?

13 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Yes. It was a brand new unit that we
14 built in within the Serious Crimes Team, specialising in serious domestic violence and
15 offences against children.

16 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And this was still out of Richmond?

17 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Correct.

18 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And then I understand in 2013 is
19 when you came east to Saint John, New Brunswick?

20 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** That's right.

21 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And that was into the Federal
22 Serious Organized Crime?

23 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Correct.

24 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And then 2016, promoted to
25 Sergeant?

26 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Yes.

27 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

28 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** In Hampton, New Brunswick.

1 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Hampton, New Brunswick. And you
2 became the Detachment Commander in Hampton, New Brunswick?

3 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Correct.

4 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And just for those of us trying to still
5 get used to positions and roles within the RCMP structure, working as the Detachment
6 Commander in Hampton, New Brunswick, would that be a position that's equivalent or
7 similar to the position that we heard Sergeant O'Brien testify to with respect to his role in
8 the Colchester Detachment?

9 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Similar. As a Detachment
10 Commander, I was the highest ranking member at the detachment, but I reported up to
11 a Staff Sergeant.

12 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. So you're supervising members out
13 of that particular detachment?

14 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Correct.

15 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And then in 2018, that was when you
16 were promoted to Inspector?

17 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Yes.

18 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And you took on the role of Officer in
19 Charge of Operational Support and Communications Centre.

20 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Correct.

21 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And we'll talk more about that
22 specific position in a bit, but I'm wondering if you can tell me a little bit, at this stage
23 you've promoted to Inspector, and my understanding is that at that stage you've
24 become a commissioned officer; is that correct?

25 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** That's correct.

26 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. Can you tell me a little bit about the
27 difference between a non-commissioned officer and a commissioned officer, what the
28 difference between the two is?

1 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** The difference is, is an officer, as an
2 inspector, you're commissioned, so with that comes much more responsibility. It's more
3 strategic leadership, supporting the division in rolling out priorities for the division and
4 supporting multiple teams.

5 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. All right. Does it have any
6 implications with respect to Operations or engagement in frontline policing?

7 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** It depends on the position.

8 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

9 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** There are some positions, for example
10 within the Halifax District, the district is the divided into two sides, an east and a west.
11 Each of those sides of the district would have an Operations Inspector. So they are
12 very much involved in Frontline operations much more than my position fell under the
13 Support Services side of the organisation in the division. So I was in charge of several
14 units, including the Operational Communications Centre and other support units that
15 would assist in supporting Operations to Frontline.

16 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And that was the position you were
17 acting in in 2020; correct?

18 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** That's correct.

19 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And I understand in 2021, you took
20 on the position of Executive Officer to the Commanding Officer?

21 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I did.

22 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. Can you tell me a little bit about,
23 briefly, what that role is?

24 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** So that role is, there's a lot of work
25 with liaising with government, supporting this -- the Commanding Officer in priorities for
26 the division. Any hot button topics or urgent matters that come up through the, or
27 pardon me, through the Commanding Officer's office will come through that role.
28 There's a lot of liaising with our National Headquarters. It's a very interesting job, very,

1 very different than anything that I had ever done before.

2 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And then in 2022, you were
3 promoted to Superintendent?

4 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** That's correct.

5 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And the Administration and
6 Personnel Officer. Have I got that title ---

7 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Yes.

8 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** --- correct?

9 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Yes.

10 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And is that similar to the role you
11 were carrying on just a year prior or is it different?

12 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** No, it's different in that my role now is
13 to -- again, it's still supporting the Frontline, but there is -- the units that I am now in
14 charge of include our departmental Security and Staffing, Human Resources, Planning,
15 our Conduct Unit.

16 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Bigger portfolio?

17 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Yes, a bit bigger of a portfolio.

18 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. All right. Well, I'll go back, then, to
19 the role of Officer in Charge of Operational Support and Communications Centre, the
20 role you were occupying in 2020. And what I'd first like to do is just get a sense of
21 where that role fits within RCMP structure. So I understand this to be one of three
22 branches under the Support Services Officer; is that correct?

23 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** That's correct, yes.

24 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. Can you tell me a little bit about your
25 role, how it fits within the other branches, how it fits within the overall scheme of the
26 RCMP structure?

27 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Certainly. So the overall command of
28 the division is on the Commanding Officer. Under the Commanding Officer is the

1 Criminal Operations Officer, and then it kind of branches out from there. On the
2 Support Services side of the house, my direct supervisor is the Support Services
3 Officer, or pardon me, at the time was the Support Services Officer, and then under that
4 umbrella it branches out again. There was -- there is the Assistant Support Services
5 Officer, which that position oversees a lot of our tactical units; for example, ERT, our
6 dog section, Underwater Recovery Team, Traffic, our collision analyst, Forensic Ident,
7 those kinds of units. They also oversee community policing, our Community Policing
8 Unit. And then another branch of Support Services is Major Crime Unit and Behavioural
9 Sciences, and then my position at that time was the OIC of Operational Support and the
10 Communications Centre. So my units included, obviously, the Communications Centre,
11 EMS, Crimestoppers, risk manager, callback unit, case managers, and DEOC.

12 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay, another big portfolio. Okay, so in
13 2020, then, you would have the CrOps Officer, Chris Leather.

14 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Correct.

15 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** And reporting to him would be the Support
16 Services Officer, Supt. Darren Campbell?

17 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** That's correct.

18 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And then there are three branches
19 underneath the SSO, the sort of Tactical Operations, okay. And who was managing
20 that in 2020; do you recall?

21 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** It was Insp. Don Moser.

22 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And then you'd also have the Major
23 Crime, Behavioural Sciences branch?

24 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Correct.

25 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** And do you recall who was managing that in
26 2020?

27 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I believe in 2020 Sgt. Glenn Bonvie
28 may have been acting ---

1 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Acting, okay.

2 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** --- as the Inspector.

3 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And then you have your branch,
4 which is the Communications, with its numerous subdivisions underneath that.

5 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Correct.

6 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay, all right. Okay, so I'd like to talk
7 about each of those that are obviously underneath your purview in 2020. So we'll talk
8 about each one sort of generally; we don't need to focus on the April mass casualty
9 event.

10 So OCC generally, you're responsible for the call-takers and the
11 dispatchers at the OCC; is that fair?

12 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** The -- my direct subordinate was
13 civilian member Glen Byrne; he was the OCC Commander.

14 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

15 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** And then out of the OCC, we also
16 have five risk manager positions.

17 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

18 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** And then under Glen, there's four
19 teams of dispatchers and call-takers.

20 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And each of those would have
21 supervisors?

22 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Correct.

23 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

24 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** When we first started, we had one
25 supervisor per team, which was a lot for them. There would be one person supervising,
26 it could be up to 12, 14 people. So we were able to adjust the organizational chart so
27 we had two supervisors per team so that each of the teams would be responsible for six
28 to seven people, and it was much more manageable for them.

1 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. So in terms of the OCC, one branch
2 you have your OCC commander, which was Mr. Byrne?

3 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Correct.

4 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And so he's reporting to you?

5 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Yes.

6 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And what sorts of things is he
7 reporting on with respect to operations at OCC? What would be briefing that would take
8 place?

9 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** We're very fortunate in H-Division in
10 that we have -- Glen Byrne is running the team. He's a national subject matter expert in
11 everything Operations Communications Centre. He's relied on across the country to
12 offer guidance and support advice. He's developed a multitude of initiatives within the
13 OCC that have actually gone national and become national standard. So we're very
14 fortunate to have him here. And I was very fortunate to have him. He was my second
15 hand -- my right hand.

16 So he would report up on any issues that he felt I needed to be
17 aware of. For example, we would talk daily, multiple times a day on subjects, anything
18 from human resources or challenging calls that our teams had dealt with and just
19 making sure that they had the support if they needed it after the fact. He would arrange
20 critical incident stress debriefs for our team. So he would brief me and let me know
21 that, you know, say, night shift had a -- had to deal with a difficult situation and he had
22 called the wellness team and that he had arranged for CIS debriefs for them.

23 We talked about new initiatives; we talked about -- we would talk
24 about ideas that he would have to make operations better, not just for the Division but
25 for the entire region. So because Glen has been here for so long and has so much
26 experience, he would work hand in hand -- or does work hand in hand with our
27 Operations Communications Centre in L-Division. So you would have -- the
28 Commissioner would have met civilian member Darryl Macdonald; he and Glen worked

1 very closely together, as does Glen with the OCC Commanders in New Brunswick and
2 in Newfoundland. So we would talk about -- really, there wasn't nothing that we
3 wouldn't talk about. It's just a constant communication with him.

4 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And that was just calls, kind of on a
5 daily basis, essentially, in terms of reporting structure?

6 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Yeah, absolutely. It could be calls.
7 We'd meet -- again, if I was at the office, we'd meet multiple times a day, just to catch
8 up. And if there's any -- if there was any resources that I could provide to support
9 whatever he needed, and quite often I would go to him for advice because he -- I was
10 new to the Division so I would often turn to him for his advice, and he would point me in
11 the right direction.

12 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. So who would have been
13 responsible for overseeing the training and the ongoing, I guess, training, on-the-job
14 training of call-takers and dispatchers; would that be yourself or would that be Mr.
15 Byrne?

16 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** That would have been Mr. Byrne.

17 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

18 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Again, because he was so
19 experienced and dialled-in with the Province, both Glen and I would work very closely
20 with EMO, and specifically on their emergency 9-1-1 side of the house, with the OCC.
21 So we had a really good -- we have a really good working relationship with them. So
22 Glen would oversee that.

23 We had a training coordinator and supervisors that would also, you
24 know, keep tabs on training for new employees, but then also there's mandatory
25 training, mandatory recertification that they have to go through. So that was just a
26 constant monitoring.

27 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And from your vantage point, what
28 are the primary responsibilities or duties that are facilitated or taking place in the OCC?

1 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I'm sorry; one more time?

2 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** I'm sorry. What, from your viewpoint, are
3 the primary duties and responsibilities that are being carried out at the OCC?

4 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Oh.

5 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Yeah.

6 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** We are a -- the provincial dispatch
7 centre for RCMP for the province, save for the Halifax District, which the RCMP officers
8 within the Halifax District, they're dispatched out of what's called the IES, which is in
9 Halifax area. So everything outside of the HRM is our responsibility, if it's in RCMP
10 jurisdiction.

11 We're also a -- what's called a 9-1-1 Primary Safety Answering
12 Point. I'm sure you've heard of the term PSAP by now. So we're one of four in the
13 province. So on top of our RCMP dispatching and call-taking responsibilities, the team
14 would also answer initial 9-1-1 calls for the province within our area, and then those
15 calls would be downloaded to whatever agency or area of jurisdiction that would be
16 responsible to take that call.

17 In addition, our team also dispatches for Fisheries and also for
18 Environment Climate Change Canada.

19 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. So OCC, this particular PSAP, would
20 handle 9-1-1 calls.

21 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Correct.

22 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Dispatching is -- and the OCC is under -- I
23 understand, responsible for BOLOs?

24 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Yes.

25 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

26 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** That's correct.

27 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Would the OCC be responsible for public
28 communications?

1 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** In -- as far as strategic
2 communications go, no.

3 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. So tell me about that. Strategic
4 communications is not connected to the OCC?

5 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** No, and it's -- unfortunately because --
6 maybe because our names are similar, there's the Operational Communications Centre,
7 which is specifically RCMP dispatching and 9-1-1 call-taking, that kind of thing. There's
8 also the Strategic Communications Unit, and their sole responsibility is public
9 communications. So they deal with the media. They Tweet. They send out Facebook
10 messages. That is not us. That is very separate -- two separate different -- completely
11 different units.

12 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. All right. So I understand that when
13 you took on this role, part of what you were overseeing was this transition of the OCC
14 from Prince Street in Truro to the new location in Dartmouth in the headquarters. Can
15 you tell us a little bit about that transition? Why it started, how it was rolling out?

16 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Certainly. So that project had started
17 in the Division before I arrived.

18 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

19 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** And when I got the position, I was told
20 that one of the main focuses of my job would be to oversee the project of moving the
21 OCC from Truro to our headquarters.

22 So by the time I got there in 2018, just not -- the initial part of the
23 project had been started, but it was still in the very infancy stage. So I was lucky to be
24 able to build a team including Mr. Byrne and the subject matter experts from HR,
25 relocation, finance, IT, procurement. There's a whole team with me. And Strategic
26 Comms was involved in that as well. And so we were able to, as a team, move --
27 literally build the centre, support our employees through that transition, and then move
28 into the new centre and launch operations from that point.

1 So I started in the OIC position in, I want to say maybe, perhaps
2 May or June of 2018. And in February 2021 is when our operations at the new OCC
3 started.

4 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. February 2021 is when the new -- or
5 the transfer was complete to the new location?

6 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Correct. There was still quite a bit of
7 work to do on the project, but essentially, yeah, we started operations out of the new
8 centre at that time.

9 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. All right. I'm going to ask you a little
10 bit about the risk managers that you mentioned. You oversee the risk managers as part
11 of the OCC as well? oversee the risk managers as part of the OCC as well?

12 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Correct.

13 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. Can you tell me initially just how risk
14 managers are selected for that position?

15 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Certainly. And that was part of my
16 role, is selecting risk managers to work in the OCC. And it's very -- it's a very
17 demanding role. And so the right member for the right job is key when it comes to the
18 risk managers.

19 If you had asked me if I could ever be a risk manager, I would say,
20 "No, thank you," because it takes a certain member with a very strong operational
21 background, a lot of experience, a lot of experience in managing multiple situations,
22 multiple priorities simultaneously, and be able to make quick decisions, sound
23 decisions, based on the information that's in front of them, and then take in a whole
24 bunch of information, make the decisions, and direct operations.

25 So it's not uncommon for the risk managers, because we oversee
26 the Province, RCMP jurisdiction, to be overseeing multiple priorities at the same time.
27 So it's certainly -- it's a very demanding and challenging role and you have to have the
28 right person in there for the job.

1 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Yeah, no doubt. I wonder though, how do
2 you select a person to take on that role? What was your process for deciding who gets
3 hired on in that position?

4 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** So I would say in the last three years,
5 I've promoted three, perhaps four of our risk managers into those units. So that's
6 through our RCMP promotions process. So just like any other promotions process in
7 the RCMP, there's an exam involved. Once the exam -- once the candidate passes the
8 exam, then they write up a -- it's basically a competency-based application. It's quite
9 involved. And in that document, they have to talk about their experiences related to
10 certain competencies. So for example, the risk managers would have to write to
11 knowledge of general duty policing, conducting safety -- so specific, certain, operational
12 competencies. And they would have to give examples for that. It's quite an involved
13 document that they have to come up.

14 And then my job, once the resumes went through our National
15 Promotions Unit, they would come to me, and then I would go through all the
16 documents very carefully, compare them to the competency dictionary, and then from
17 there, choose the best fit.

18 Knowing the role is important. So having that background in the
19 back of my head, knowing what would be asked of these people and what's needed to
20 get the job done, that would be the person that I would choose.

21 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And is this exam and the
22 competency-based document, is that specific to applications to be a risk manager or is
23 that just within the general promotional application of the RCMP?

24 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** It would be in the general promotion
25 process of the RCMP.

26 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. Is there any -- so are there any
27 formal prerequisites that are specific to becoming a risk manager?

28 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Definitely experience, and ability to

1 meet all of those requirements that I had just mentioned were always top of mind for me
2 when I had to choose ---

3 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

4 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** --- somebody to go into that role.

5 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** And I guess what I'm asking is, there's no
6 specific training program for risk managers or standardized training program or
7 application process to become a risk manager? Is that fair?

8 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Unfortunately not. There are -- there's
9 still detachments -- or pardon me, Operational Communications Centres across the
10 country that don't have a risk manager position -- or process unit within those OCCs. I
11 think it would be incredibly important for that to happen, and so that it could be on a
12 much more national scale, that there could be a nationally developed course for them.

13 But yeah, certainly there's quite a few OCCs that don't have that
14 support. We're very fortunate here in H Division that we've had risk managers in our
15 OCC for years. So they know their job, they're very good at what they do, and they
16 work very well within the OCC.

17 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** So you've told us broadly about the role of a
18 risk manager. I'm wondering if I can narrow in on that and ask you what you view the
19 role of a risk manager to be during a critical incident?

20 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Certainly. So I think S/Sgt Bruce
21 Briers and S/Sgt Brian Rehill really laid out the role of the risk manager well. They are
22 the senior NCO, so the senior non-commissioned officer supervisor in the event that
23 there's an emergency and there's no supervision on scene. So for example, if a pursuit
24 is initiated and the member's direct supervisor doesn't jump on the radio right away,
25 perhaps they're tied up or in a meeting or whatever. The risk manager will come on the
26 radio and monitor whatever situation that is, take control if they need to, direct
27 resources, call in extra resources from other areas, surrounding areas if they need to.
28 They will liaise with our support units. So for example, if a police service dog needs to

1 be called out, they'll call out PDS. They could be liaising with MC -- our Major Crime
2 Unit, Forensic Ident, other -- pardon me, other police forces. That kind of thing.

3 In the event that there is a supervisor on scene, the risk manager
4 will take a step back and turn into a support position. If the incident continues to -- then
5 continues to escalate to a point of where the Critical Incident Package is called out, the
6 risk manager will assist in facilitating that, if need be. And then the CIC will -- or pardon
7 me, the risk manager will continue to support that operation with the CIC in charge.

8 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. All right. So I'll ask you a little bit
9 more about that when we get into the specifics of April 2020. But before I move on, I do
10 want to ask you about the Emergency Management Section.

11 So this also fell under your purview in 2020?

12 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** It did, yes.

13 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And what is that section responsible
14 for?

15 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** That section, it actually has quite a
16 large scope in responsibility. I think one of the most -- one of the most demanding roles
17 is being -- overseeing our Ground Search and Rescue Program. There is also Amber
18 Alert, there is our DEOC.

19 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Can you explain DEOC to me?

20 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** DEOC is the Division Emergency
21 Operations Centre. So it's a location that is equipped already for -- to be able to operate
22 an incident out of that one room, we have the ability to dispatch out of that room as well,
23 and it's based on -- based on ICS. So there's -- there is the Operations -- so whoever is
24 running the DEOC, it's usually a senior NCO, with experience, again, with the
25 operational experience to back them up. There is an area for planning, logistics,
26 communications, there's a place in there for MCU if we need their support. It's basically
27 one location where in the event of an incident that we could call resources into to
28 support whatever is happening.

1 So DEOC works very well for situations that are planned. For
2 example, there is -- there is a VIP visit coming to Halifax, and they would need support
3 for that, or we use DEOC significantly for the fisheries disputes, and for COVID. DEOC
4 was the centre of us being able to support our division with COVID. So there -- it's very
5 effective for planned events.

6 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** And maybe that answers my question. But
7 my question is what's the difference between DEOC and a Command Post?

8 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** There is different responsibilities. So
9 DEOC is there to support whatever the situation is, whereas the Command Post is
10 where -- it -- that's the heartbeat of the operation. So -- so DEOC, we would also have,
11 say, our Finance Section in there. If there was a need for us to call -- we needed -- say
12 we needed multiple roadblocks for Hurricane Dorian or something like that, where we
13 would -- we were supporting the Operations, whereas the Command Post is actually
14 directing the operation.

15 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. So DEOC would fall under
16 Emergency Management Section.

17 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Correct.

18 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Amber Alerts fall under Emergency
19 Management Section, Ground Search and Rescue?

20 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Yes.

21 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Engagement with EMO?

22 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Absolutely.

23 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

24 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Yeah. There was -- on the EMO side
25 of the house, there's the Emergency 9-1-1 side, and then there's the Incident
26 Management side. So I would liaise often, regularly with Jason Mew, as he is on the
27 Incident Management side of the house. So we did a -- I would do a lot of work with
28 Jason.

1 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. So in terms of the Emergency
2 Management Section, what was the staffing makeup of the -- of this section while you
3 were in this position?

4 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Historically, before I got -- several
5 years before I got there, from what I understand it used to be five members, and it was
6 reduced. So by the time I got there, there was one Sergeant position and one Public
7 Service employee, and they were -- they were also responsible for emergency
8 operations plans for the division and also for our business continuity planning for the
9 division, which that was -- that's a big responsibility in and of itself.

10 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. So it was at one time five, and then
11 when you came in as OIC, it was down to two?

12 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Correct.

13 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And were those staffed at the time
14 that you came into your position?

15 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** They were staffed, but not with
16 permanent positions, not with permanent employees. The challenge with EMS is
17 because it is such a specialty, again, you need the right -- the right fit in there. So it --
18 we had always struggled with that. For somebody to be able to come in and manage
19 that unit, it needed to be somebody that knows emergency management, somebody
20 that has a solid understanding and background and education in business continuity
21 planning, and obviously be able to manage -- it's a high-risk file, so -- pardon me, a
22 high-risk unit in that. Amber Alert, you can't get anymore high-risk than that, and
23 Ground Search and Rescue as well.

24 So it was always a challenge that I found getting the right people in
25 there to really make the unit what it needed to be, and it took -- it took until last year we
26 were finally able to get a really strong team in there, and they have turned the unit
27 around to -- it's an amazing difference to what they have been able to do with it.

28 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And currently staffed by two

1 individuals?

2 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Correct. There's a Sergeant and a
3 Public Service employee.

4 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** All right. And so at the time of the mass
5 casualty, in April of 2020, EMS was staffed by a single person; is that correct?

6 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I'm sorry, one more time?

7 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** I'm sorry. In April of 2020, there was only
8 one staff member in EMS; is that correct?

9 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Correct.

10 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And that was Glenn Mason?

11 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Correct.

12 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And do you recall how long
13 Mr. Mason had been in that position prior to the mass casualty?

14 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** It was a very short period of time.
15 Maybe a -- maybe a couple of months.

16 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And do you -- I don't know if -- I
17 know you mentioned there were two acting people when you had first come in. Do you
18 recall after those two or how long it was after you had taken over as OIC that those two
19 acting people had left that position -- those positions?

20 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** There was quite a bit of turnover in
21 that unit, and again, that led to the challenges in needing to get the right people in there
22 to really push that unit to where it needed to be. So in April 2020, Glenn Mason was the
23 only employee, but it wasn't for lack of trying. I had gone through several rounds of
24 staffing processes trying to get a permanent Public Service employee in there, and for a
25 -- unfortunately for a variety of reasons, no fault of anybody's, no -- out of everybody's
26 control, it took a long time to get to the employee that we have now.

27 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. Okay, so in April of 2020, Glenn
28 Mason takes on the role of Manager of EMS as the civilian member. Is that -- that's in

1 April 2020; correct?

2 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Yes. He was placed in the Sergeant
3 role.

4 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

5 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** So it's the Emergency Coordinator I
6 believe is the title.

7 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And so he would have reported to
8 you?

9 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Yes.

10 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And how often did he report to you
11 regarding activities or information from the EMS Section?

12 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Well, at the time, we're now getting
13 into February/March, so COVID ramped up, and that was our focus. We were really
14 doing some research trying to get the pandemic plan up-to-date and -- with the new
15 information that we had from COVID and determining how that was going to impact our
16 division. So that was the main focus when we -- when we first got there with only he
17 and I. I, myself, had taken on many of the roles in EMS just because we didn't have
18 capacity. There was nobody else to do it, but the work still had to be done. So Glenn's
19 main task at that time was really focussed on the COVID piece.

20 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. Any other tasks, or COVID was kind
21 of it?

22 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** At the time, COVID was the priority.

23 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Yeah. And is there any specific training,
24 similar to my question about the Risk Managers, any specific training for
25 people/employees going into the Emergency Management Section?

26 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** There's a laundry list of training,
27 specifically with respect to business continuity planning, and that kind of thing. Those
28 are outside training -- it's outside training that ideally that employee would come to the

1 unit with. Within EMS, we put on several courses, ICS200/300 courses. We were
2 trying to plan a ICS400 course. Unfortunately with COVID, that fell off the desk. We
3 also had training in DEOC, running DEOC, so Emergency Operations Centre training.
4 We actually brought a -- an SME from the Justice Institute of British Columbia to come
5 out and teach, so we -- that was very successful. That was just -- I want to say just
6 shortly before COVID, so we were able to get quite a few people trained on that.

7 We also brought in subject matter experts from NHQ to teach our
8 team on the computer system, which connects to national headquarters, so if DEOC is
9 up and running, our team can keep -- it's basically a file management system for
10 DEOCs and it connects to national headquarters. So there was quite a bit of training,
11 and we were really trying to push rebuilding that section and getting people up and
12 running, so that if there was an event that we needed DEOC, we had a large pool of
13 people to choose from. Unfortunately, when COVID impacted the division, a lot of that
14 was off the table for us.

15 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. So it's fair to say in April of 2020,
16 EMS was kind of in a state of flux?

17 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Absolutely.

18 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And do you feel that the status of
19 EMS in April of 2020 had any bearing on any of the response to the mass casualty in
20 April 2020?

21 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** No, I don't think so. At the time, the
22 question was posed to me would we consider, or did we want to open DEOC. In that
23 instance, in that -- at that time, it was being considered, but it wasn't a focus for us.
24 Shortly after, once the incident was over, it was perfect time to open DEOC because we
25 knew we would have a lot of work to be able to do to support the frontline, and so that's
26 what we did. We did initiate DEOC, and it was instrumental in helping us bring in
27 resources from all across Canada and make sure that they had the -- they knew where
28 they were going, they had the equipment they needed, they had the PPE for COVID

1 that they needed. We had -- and I say we, it was the team in DEOC. I had nothing to
2 do with it. They did an amazing job just making sure that all of the members coming in
3 to each division to be able to support the frontline knew where they were going, they
4 had liaisons, they had lodging, they had food, they had equipment, that was -- the
5 DEOC team did an amazing job.

6 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. So that was post event obviously?

7 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Post event, yes.

8 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. Okay. So we've talked about the
9 status of EMS in April of 2020. I want to take you to April 18th, 19th, 2020, some of the
10 challenges that were faced in your other departments, OCC, risk managers, in the
11 course of that event. So one thing that you had already sort of touched on in your
12 description of the risk manager as a -- in a critical incident, the role they carry, is
13 carrying on that role until supervision arrives. And we know that in this particular case,
14 we had senior NCOs from Northeast Nova attend the scene. So you've had a chance to
15 review, I would assume, all of the radio transmissions and relevant notes that came out
16 of that incident; correct?

17 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I've listened to the radio transmissions

18 ---

19 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

20 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** --- and then the Foundational
21 Documents that have been presented.

22 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And so I'm wondering, from your
23 perspective, as someone who oversees the risk managers, did you have any comment
24 with respect to the division of labour that took place between those uniform, you know,
25 senior NCOs and your risk managers on April 18th in particular, in the initial hours of the
26 incident?

27 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Well, first of all, I can't comment on the
28 decisions that were made because I wasn't there. If there was a decision made that the

1 command structure felt that it would be most appropriate for the risk manager to
2 maintain oversight of, say, our general duty, there was obviously a reason for them to
3 make that decision. But to say that -- I think it was Bruce Briers that said it was like
4 drinking from a firehose. I would go one step farther and say he was standing under a
5 waterfall. It was a lot. There was a lot of information for both of them, for Bruce and for
6 Brian as well. There was a lot of information, and with such a fluid dynamic event, they
7 were wearing multiple hats, and we have now -- we've since made a huge list of
8 changes that we've already implemented within the OCC, within the Alert Ready file,
9 and I'm happy to talk about those because I think it's important for the Commission and
10 for the families to understand that.

11 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** And we'll talk about that for sure, but one
12 thing that I want to ask you about is sort of that initial 9-1-1 call comes in at 10:01, and
13 Risk Manager Rehill is handling multiple things out of the gate; right? He's handling
14 taking in information from 9-1-1 calls, setting up containment, and you've indicated that
15 the risk manager takes that position of sort of ad hoc incident commander until other
16 supervision arrives.

17 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Correct.

18 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And so in this particular case, other
19 supervision -- well, I'll ask you, do you feel other supervision came in such that your risk
20 manager was able to take a supporting role, or do you feel that the risk manager carried
21 out the ad hoc incident commander role until 1:30 in the morning roughly?

22 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Again, it's tough for me to say,
23 because I wasn't there that night, so I don't know what was happening in the command
24 post, other than just from what I've read. So all I can say is if there was a reason why
25 decisions were made for -- by the command team to keep Brian in that role, they
26 obviously had a reason for it. Normally, what happens, say it's an armed and
27 barricaded person, the risk manager will engage immediately, making sure if there is a
28 site commander on scene, that person would be in charge of the incident, and then the -

1 - pardon me, the risk manager would transition into a supporting role, calling -- like I
2 said, calling in extra resources. In this particular case, all I can think of was that there
3 was so much going on that I know what the temperature was like in the OCC when I
4 went in the next day. I can just imagine what it was like the night before as well.

5 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Sure. And in your sort of post-review of the
6 event, are there tasks that Risk Manager Rehill had in those first several hours that you
7 feel would be more appropriately delegated elsewhere, or is that something that you
8 can't comment on?

9 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** No, it was certainly apparent to me
10 how busy he was when I listened -- I listened to all the 9-1-1 calls and all of the radio
11 transmissions, and it wasn't until that time that it -- I realized how much was being asked
12 of him. And this was within, you know, the week or -- and two weeks after the fact. So I
13 was surprised to see how many calls were being transferred to him within the OCC, and
14 I know that he was taking on duties such as dealing with Children Family Services. So
15 position -- or pardon me, tasks like that, a lot of the times, the -- well, the dispatchers
16 will take care of. However, again, I don't know -- I'm -- all I can think of is that they were
17 so busy as well, that if the job had to be done, then Brian made the decision to take on
18 those tasks as well.

19 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. So 9-1-1 calls being transferred to
20 the risk manager isn't standard operations?

21 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** In my experience, it's not the norm. It
22 should be -- those calls should be dealt with by the call taker, and they are. They are. If
23 there's extenuating circumstances or if the risk manager asks to speak to that person,
24 then, certainly, absolutely. If he needs more information to be able to pass on to the
25 road, then certainly, he can do that. But in this reviewing the calls, I was a bit surprised
26 to see how much of those calls he was receiving.

27 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And then you mentioned as well, sort
28 of other tasks like contacting Child Services?

1 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Correct.

2 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** That wouldn't be something that would
3 normally fall under the umbrella of risk manager responsibilities?

4 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I mean, it could.

5 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

6 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** There's no set rule that they make
7 these phone calls and not these ones. But in a situation such as what he was dealing
8 with. Perhaps tasks like that could be assigned to somebody else.

9 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Sure. I wanted to ask your thoughts too
10 about the issue that arose of the risk managers, as well as some senior NCOs,
11 believing the OCC had capabilities that weren't as they envisioned, such as the reverse
12 9-1-1 calling or mapping.

13 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Correct.

14 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Do you have any concerns, having looked
15 through the file and read the Foundational Documents, concerns with respect to the risk
16 managers' understanding of the tools and technologies available in the OCC?

17 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** We've never used -- we've never had
18 reverse 9-1-1, that I know of. So it may have been -- it may have just been something
19 that they -- it's never come up, so they didn't realize that we don't have it, or maybe a
20 lack of -- a miscommunication, pardon me. But in that particular case, our call takers
21 were researching residences and calling those residences. We don't have reverse 9-1-
22 1.

23 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And did you have any concerns
24 about risk managers thinking that there was one?

25 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Well we know now. They know now. I
26 guess just because it's never come up before.

27 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And I was just wondering as well if
28 you had put any analysis into losing or having the information pertaining to the Andrew

1 and Kate MacDonald 9-1-1 call kind of falling through the cracks? Having done an
2 analysis of what was taking place in the OCC and relaying information to the Command
3 Post, do you have any thoughts to respect to how information like that, and the
4 challenges in relaying that information can be addressed?

5 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** With that particular situation, I actually
6 didn't find out that that had happened with that caller -- or pardon me, with that 9-1-1
7 call, until, I would say, three weeks ago. And it was through the course of the ESDC
8 investigation. And that's when I found out. And I was surprised to -- and -- I was
9 surprised to see that that had happened. Normally emergency calls all go through the
10 dispatcher. The call taker will create a file on our CAD system and it's automatically
11 sent to the dispatcher for dispatching. So I don't know how that happened, but I do
12 know that there is -- there is going to be more work in determining how and why.

13 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And you already mentioned, and I'm
14 not going to ask you to second guess other people's decisions, but you had mentioned
15 and made reference to Risk Manager Briers being tasked with coordinating the general
16 duty members on April 19th. And is that something that you would expect to see a Risk
17 Manager be tasked with in the course of a critical incident?

18 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Well they certainly -- they certainly
19 have the capability to do it. I can see -- I can see both sides. I can see that Bruce was
20 extremely busy, extremely busy, but then on the other hand, he also had all of the
21 technology in front of him in the OCC to be able to do that. So I could see why, without
22 knowing the reason for that, that that decision was made, I could see why the command
23 team felt that Bruce would be the most well-situated supervisor to be able to take on
24 that task.

25 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. So I'll ask you kind of broadly, in the
26 course of the mass casualty, having reviewed the radio transmissions, did you observe
27 risk managers taking on tasks that, in your view, it wasn't appropriate for them to take
28 on?

1 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** There's so many transmissions. Off
2 the top of my head, I'm sure there was. They were both extremely busy. I can't think of
3 an instance right off the top of my head.

4 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Sure. I guess I'll ask you the opposite
5 question. In the course of the mass casualty, did you observe any tasks that you felt
6 were impossible to perform by the risk managers or that were overlooked by the risk
7 managers?

8 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Again, nothing is coming to my mind.
9 Sorry.

10 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** No, that's okay. You've had a chance to
11 look over how communications were flowing from OCC to Command Post and how
12 information was coming into the OCC. Based on your review of that, have you identified
13 things that you thought were issues that you feel have since been addressed?

14 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Certainly. We now have several new
15 processes that we've initiated in the OCC. And again, on the Alert Ready file itself. But
16 we now have a policy, a standard operating policy, that if there is another incident like
17 this, hopefully never, but, our risk managers, they know that they can call in a second
18 risk manager to help them.

19 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** So that happened on April 19th; correct?

20 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Correct.

21 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. Had that ever been done before?

22 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Not that I know of.

23 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And who initiated that on the 19th?
24 Do you recall?

25 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I don't -- I remember talking to Bruce
26 and I don't recall ---

27 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

28 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** --- suggesting that he call in a second

1 risk manager to help him. I obviously did. I don't recall doing that, but I'm glad it
2 happened.

3 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

4 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Just knowing -- knowing the amount of
5 responsibility that he had and the amount of information that was coming fast and
6 furious, I'm glad that Steve Ettinger was there to take some of that off of Bruce.

7 And so that's standard operating procedure for us now, and we've
8 used it and it works very well.

9 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. Any other changes to the OCC that
10 are a response to the events of the mass casualty?

11 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Absolutely. I actually have a list.

12 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** What would be your -- after the second risk
13 manager, any that are specific to the issues that perhaps I've raised that are some sort
14 of glaring issues that took place over the 13 hours?

15 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Certainly. So again, we'll call in extra
16 resources. Glenn was very good about that. He doesn't need my permission to call in
17 extra resources. Neither does the risk manager. It was obviously -- there was a reason
18 why I suggested that. I don't remember, other than him being so busy. But they are
19 welcome to call in as many resources as they need.

20 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** And sorry, when you say "resources", are
21 you ---

22 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Employees. So call takers,
23 dispatchers, ---

24 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

25 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** --- and if they need a second risk
26 manager as well.

27 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

28 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Our new centre is night and day

1 compared to the place that we came from. So the whole centre is centered around
2 situational awareness. So it's a large open space. Call takers on one side of the room,
3 dispatchers are on the other side of the room. The supervisor and the risk managers
4 are up on a platform in the middle of the room so they can hear and see everything
5 that's going on around them.

6 We have electronic situational boards set up on all -- well three
7 walls. And they're (technical issue) by 24 feet. And the supervisors and risk managers
8 have full control on what can be displayed on those screens. It could be any of our
9 screens in the OCC, any of our tools in the OCC, they can flash up on the screen so
10 that everybody in the room knows what's happening.

11 We also have a standard operating procedure that if there's going
12 to be an incident such as an Alert Ready deployment, we will embed Strat Comms in
13 our OCC with us so that we're getting prime information that they're getting and vice
14 versa. We also have a room now off the OCC that, thankfully to Glenn Byrne, has built -
15 - it's called the Critical Incident Operations Room. So it's a separate room right beside
16 the OCC, but it has all the capabilities of the OCC, minus the 9-1-1 ---

17 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Would that replace the Command Post?
18 The Critical Incident response room?

19 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** It could, depending on the situation, if
20 that's what they chose to use. You could have the Critical Incident operations up and
21 running and also have an incident command post set up somewhere, so it could be that
22 the -- CIOps, we call it. Could be CIOps would be like an area command and then we'd
23 have the command post set up anywhere in the province and we would be able to run
24 an operation -- a critical incident out of that room if we need to.

25 So again, there's situational boards that are surrounding the room.
26 Any of the feeds from the new OCC can be fed into that room. There's radios. There's
27 a station already set up for dispatch.

28 Our Critical Incident Commander boards -- I'm sure you heard them

1 talk about the SMEAC boards -- those are already up on the wall ready for them, ready
2 to go.

3 So it's -- it's just a matter of walking in the room. Even the lights
4 come on automatically, so.

5 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** All right. Well, perhaps what I'll do,
6 Superintendent Rodier, is ask you about your own experience and engagement on April
7 18th and 19th.

8 So I'll ask you, when did you first become aware of what was
9 happening in relation to these events?

10 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** So on the evening of the 18th, I was
11 home and I got a call from Glenn Byrne letting me know that there -- we're dealing with
12 multiple homicides and fires and that the Critical Incident package was being rolled out.

13 I remember checking in with Brian Rehill, and I knew he was busy.
14 I didn't realize how -- to the extent of how busy he was because it was just a very short
15 conversation. And I let him know that if he needed anything, I'm here. Let me know
16 what needs to be done or if he needs any support from me.

17 And then I reported up to our Support Services Officer to make sure
18 that he knew. And quite often, any critical incident, Superintendent Campbell knew well
19 before I did because he would have received the calling-out of the Critical Incident
20 package anyways, but just to be sure, I would phone him and let him know that I'd
21 spoken with Glenn.

22 And then later on in the evening, I remember Glenn calling me
23 again and saying that he was done for the night. He checked in with the OCC. They
24 were good. They didn't need anything else, and that he was on his way home.

25 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Do you recall what time that was?

26 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** It was -- it was late. I don't remember
27 what time, but it was late.

28 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** And so then -- sorry. I didn't mean to

1 interrupt you.

2 From there, was that the last you heard until the next day?

3 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Correct.

4 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And what happened on the next
5 day?

6 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Again, Glenn phoned me and said that
7 it had started again, which was incredibly unusual. It's very, very rare that something
8 like that would happen.

9 He had also told me that there was potentially a police car involved,
10 which was also very concerning. My first -- my first thought was, oh my gosh, one of
11 our -- one of our members has been, you know, hurt or killed and -- and their police car
12 was stolen.

13 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** That was the first you'd heard of the police
14 car, was on the morning of the 19th?

15 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Correct.

16 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

17 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** And I checked in with Bruce. I knew
18 he was very busy. And then my phone started ringing, so I was -- received a call from
19 Superintendent Campbell, who was already at headquarters. And he was with our
20 Chief Superintendent Leather, and they were just checking to make sure that
21 information was being disseminated through all of the police agencies in the province.

22 So I remember calling Bruce and asking him about if BOLOs had
23 gone out, which they had. And I wasn't surprised because the OCC's very good at
24 doing that. They do it all the time, so I wasn't surprised to hear that that had been done
25 already.

26 And then I don't remember if it was a second call in to Bruce where
27 I had been -- I think Darren may have called me a second time and asked about
28 Cobequid Pass. And I can't remember if the same -- part of the same conversation I

1 had with him or if it was a second call.

2 Anyways, I remember talking to Bruce about that as well and he
3 said yes, Cobequid Pass had been -- the toll booths had been addressed already. And
4 I could tell -- I could tell from his voice that it was not good.

5 So I made the decision to go into the office to support him and
6 knowing that more information would need to be passed along, I didn't want to have to
7 keep bothering Bruce, so I made the decision to go into the OCC myself.

8 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. So you travelled to Truro from the
9 Halifax area?

10 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Correct.

11 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And do you recall what time you
12 would have left for the OCC?

13 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I don't remember. It ---

14 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Do you recall what time you arrived at the
15 OCC, maybe?

16 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I would say I got there about 10:40-ish.

17 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And so you made the decision to go
18 to the OCC. And again, the purpose for that was -- was for what, Superintendent
19 Rodier?

20 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** It was to make sure that Bruce -- that
21 any phone calls that were coming for more -- for information from him weren't going to
22 him so I could -- I could take those calls. I could be the conduit to the senior
23 management team and keep that off his table so he could concentrate on what he
24 needed to concentrate on.

25 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Did you think about going to the command
26 post?

27 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** No, because that wouldn't be my role.

28 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. So perhaps what I'll do, Madam

1 Registrar, if you wouldn't mind pulling up paragraph 138 of the Foundation Document
2 that was tendered this morning. That's Exhibit 2001.

3 So Superintendent Rodier, what these are, are the Foundational
4 Documents. This one specifically is the RCMP Public Communications on April 18th-
5 19th, 2020.

6 Have you had a chance to look at this document?

7 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I have, yes.

8 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. All right.

9 So I'm just going to refer you to paragraph 138, which states:

10 "Inspector Rodier's notes indicate that the only call she
11 answered from Glen Mason was at 10:21 a.m. asking
12 about activating the DEOC."

13 So do you recall getting that phone call?

14 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I do, because I was on my way to

15 Truro.

16 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. So 10:21, you're en route to Truro.

17 Okay.

18 "Her notes indicate that she responded that the decision
19 was up to the Support Services Officer and was already
20 being considered. Inspector Rodier told the Mass
21 Casualty Commission that she told Mr. Mason to contact
22 the SSO (at that time Supt Darren Campbell). In her
23 interview with the Mass Casualty Commission, Inspector
24 Rodier noted that the DEOC was not activated on April
25 18th and 19th and that she did not think it would have
26 been responsive to the need at the time. Mr. Mason told
27 the Commission that, in hindsight, the DEOC could have
28 been used during the mass casualty event but that it

1 would be rare to do so for an ERT callout.”

2 So we've talked a lot about DEOC and understood what that
3 means.

4 You recall getting the call from Mr. Mason. And is this your
5 recollection of your instructions to him?

6 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Correct.

7 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And Mr. Mason reports to you;
8 correct?

9 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Yes, he does.

10 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

11 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Or he did.

12 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Or he did.

13 So would it be strange for you to refer him to speak to
14 Superintendent Campbell at that stage?

15 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** At that stage I was driving and I
16 wanted to get to the OCC. And I don't recall if he called or if I ended up calling Darren
17 myself, but I -- however that happened, I knew that they were -- I learned that they were
18 already considering DEOC.

19 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. All right.

20 So you said you arrived at the command post around 10:40. Is that
21 correct?

22 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** At the OCC.

23 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Oh, sorry. OCC at 10:40?

24 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Correct.

25 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. Thanks.

26 And so upon your arrival there, did you take on any operational role
27 at the OCC?

28 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** When I first walked in, I went right up

1 to the OCC floor and I knew it wasn't good just from the look on Bruce's face, so I went
2 over to -- the supervisor and the risk manager were sitting side by side. And I don't
3 remember if I called Darren or if he called me. Regardless, I was on the phone with him
4 and he asked about the helicopter.

5 And I was surprised because I thought we already had the
6 helicopter up in the air, but Darren told me no, that they'd grounded. It could be for
7 refuelling, I don't know what the reason was, but that we needed to get another aircraft
8 up in the air as quickly as we could. So I recall asking Brian Green, who was the
9 supervisor sitting beside Bruce, what was the status of -- how are we doing with getting
10 an aircraft, had he reached out to JRCC to see if their -- that would be an option for us.
11 So those phone calls were ongoing -- or pardon me, those tasks were ongoing.

12 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. So you're on the phone with
13 Superintendent Campbell?

14 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Correct.

15 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And who else are you speaking to on
16 the phone or is it just him?

17 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** It was just Darren, and I knew he was
18 at headquarters, and I knew he was with Chris Leather. So instead of them needing to
19 call constantly to get information, it just made more sense to stay on the phone, so that I
20 could be that real-time conduit into headquarters and that they didn't have to keep
21 calling in or phone the risk manager, who was already busy.

22 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. So Superintendent Leather was with
23 Superintendent Campbell?

24 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** From -- that was the impression I got.

25 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And aside from the request for
26 facilitating aircraft, were you given any other tasks or roles while you were there at the
27 OCC?

28 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** No, there was a lot going on. So my --

1 going into the OCC, I don't go in and take over operations. That's not what I do. Our
2 people know their jobs, the risk manager and the call takers and dispatchers, they all
3 know their jobs, and they were all fully tasked. And is -- six years as a dispatcher
4 myself in the largest RCMP detachment in Canada, I've never seen the OCC, any OCC
5 that busy before. So every desk in -- on the dispatch side was full. Thankfully, for the
6 few years prior, Glenn and I had done a -- put a lot of effort into building our resources
7 up to where they were come April 2020. It had been I want to say 16 years since we
8 had our resources that stacked, and thank goodness we did, because at -- come that
9 day, it was all hands-on deck. So we were very fortunate to have a full team, the full
10 team that we did, and they were -- every one of them was busy.

11 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And so do you recall Glenn Mason's
12 call coming in to Risk Manager Ettinger that morning?

13 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I do.

14 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

15 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** So the way our dispatch side of the
16 house at the old OCC was set up was there was four pods, two of them the risk
17 manager supervisor and then two other dispatchers, and then there's a space on the
18 floor, and then four more pods behind me. So I moved from over -- speaking with the
19 supervisor over to behind one of our employees, who was dispatching for ERT, so that
20 way I was standing in the middle of the room. I could hear her dispatching for ERT, and
21 I could hear the other dispatcher, who was just over my shoulder, dispatching for the
22 Colchester County channel.

23 So I was standing there and talking to Darren, and keeping him
24 updated, and at the time, there was a lot going on. I remember hearing Dan McGillvray
25 come on over the over the air saying that he was CIC in charge. And I don't know -- I
26 can't remember if it was before or after that call from Glenn Mason into Steven Ettinger,
27 but there was also word of we didn't know where the perpetrator was, and that we had
28 information that he was farther south, but then all of a sudden, calls started coming in

1 about the Sobey's in Truro, and that there was a possible sighting at the Sobey's in
2 Truro. So all of this information was coming -- was going on. So I don't recall if that
3 phone call was before or after that happened, but regardless, Steve Ettinger yelled at
4 me from the other side of the room, and he said that he had Glenn Mason on the phone.

5 And it's interesting, if you read the -- and listen to the radio calls,
6 when Glenn Mason called him, he thought Glenn was calling about the helicopter
7 because that's what we were trying to do was trying to get, you know, trying to get the
8 helicopter back up in the air. And then their conversation continued, but I couldn't hear
9 what they were talking about, other than when Steve yelled at me and said he had
10 Glenn Mason on the phone and they're offering some kind of public alerting, and did we
11 want to use it, the EMO was offering. I wouldn't even call it a conversation between
12 Steve and I. It was perhaps 30 seconds, if that, yelling at each other across the room,
13 and then that was it.

14 And I remember him saying, because I was on the phone, I
15 remember him saying, "Don't call her. She's busy." So in my mind, that was the end of
16 that conversation. And then I remember yelling at him, "Go through Strat Comms."
17 Because the reason for that is I didn't know -- I don't have social media myself, I wasn't
18 following Twitter, I did not know what information Strat Comms was putting out to the
19 public. I knew that they were, but I had no awareness of what that message was --
20 what messages they were sending out. And I wanted that if this public alert messaging
21 was going to go out, I didn't want it to be contrary to what Strategic Communications
22 was putting out on Twitter or Facebook or wherever. So I distinctly remember saying
23 that to Steve. And then they hung up, and then shortly afterwards, my phone started
24 ringing, and I thought, well, that's weird. How come EMO's calling me, because in my
25 mind, that had been dealt with. So by the time that call came in through Steve Ettinger,
26 we had that conversation. It was 11:17, and then by 11:25, the perpetrator was in
27 custody, so it was very quick.

28 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** So what was your understanding of the

1 request that was coming in and what you were saying to refer to Strat Comms?

2 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I didn't -- if you had said to me on April
3 19th what's Alert Ready, I wouldn't have been able to answer you. We had no -- I had
4 no knowledge of it. I knew Amber Alert, because that was part of my job, my role was
5 to oversee Amber Alert. I didn't know that an Amber Alert could be sent out on the -- or
6 be sent out on the Alert Ready platform. I had no idea. I want to say five days prior to
7 this, the province sent out a message on COVID, and I received that message myself,
8 but I had no idea that that was a tool that would, could be used for policing. It was just -
9 - it was not something that we had any training, any awareness of. It had never been
10 mentioned to me. I'd never seen it used. Even in British Columbia, I'd never seen it
11 used in policing. So when he mentioned that, I thought, well, that sounds -- it sounds
12 like a tool that we could use in this situation. Go through Strat Comms, because I knew
13 that they would be plugged into whatever messaging -- into the CIC team and whatever
14 messaging was coming out of that team.

15 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Do you recall passing on any suggestions
16 with respect to content of bare minimum or keep it basic?

17 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Yeah, I do. Again, because I didn't
18 know what Strat Comms was putting out there, I believe at the time the perpetrator was
19 no longer in the police car. So without confusing -- not wanting to confuse the public,
20 my goal was they would go through Strategic Communications and mirror whatever
21 messaging was already going out.

22 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Commissioners, I'll take my direction from
23 you and yourself, Superintendent Rodier, if you'd like to take a break, if not, I can
24 proceed onwards, but would you like a break, Superintendent Rodier? You're fine?

25 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I'm okay.

26 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** How much longer do you think
27 you'll ---

28 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** I probably have another -- lawyers are the

1 worst at guessing time, but I would say 45 minutes.

2 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Then we should probably take a
3 break; don't you think? Yeah. We'll take a 15-minute break. Thank you.

4 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Thank you.

5 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Thank you. The
6 proceedings are on break and will resume in 15 minutes.

7 --- Upon breaking at 3:15 p.m.

8 --- Upon resuming at 3:34 p.m.

9 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Welcome back. The
10 proceedings are again in session.

11 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you.

12 Ms. Mancini, we'll ask our witness to return.

13 **--- SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER, Resumed:**

14 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you.

15 Ms. Mancini, whenever you're ready.

16 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Thank you.

17 **--- EXAMINATION IN-CHIEF BY MS. ANNA MANCINI: (Cont'd)**

18 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Thank you, Superintendent Rodier. I want
19 to pick up with where some of the comments that you had made prior to the break with
20 respect to prior knowledge of Alert Ready.

21 And so the first document that I'm going to refer you to is a
22 document—Madam Registrar, COMM0020391, which is a briefing note. And it's dated
23 from 2012, January 4th, and the investigator at the time was Staff Sergeant Mark Furey.

24 And the briefing note—if we scroll—the purpose was:

25 "To update the SSO on the EMO Nova Scotia..."

26 And the issue discussed was:

27 "...EMO is reaching out to 'H' Division, RCMP..."

28 Sorry, the second half of the issue -- paragraph:

1 "...EMO is reaching out to 'H' Division, RCMP to utilize
2 the 'H' Division OCC (Risk Managers) as a central
3 repository of timely information, and distribution point
4 for incidents that meet the guidelines/policy
5 requirements of a Public Alert."

6 And towards the end, underneath the Recommendations section:

7 "Managed properly, the availability and application of
8 a PAS in Nova Scotia could/would be considered an
9 asset to front line police service providers, in
10 response to emergency situations (i.e. forest fires,
11 floods, meteorological events, etc.)."

12 So that was submitted in 2012. Was it ever brought to your
13 attention, this document, prior to April 2020?

14 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** No, it wasn't. Actually, when -- right
15 after April 19th, we in the division began researching what is this Alert Ready. Could it
16 be used in policing? We needed to find out, we wanted to find out more about it and
17 fast. And in doing that research, I believe it was Glenn Mason was tasked with looking
18 through any of the old documents in EMS, the CrOPS office, anywhere we could think
19 of that there could possibly be documentation from previous years. And I believe this
20 was one of the memos that he found.

21 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And that was the first time that you
22 saw that document then, at that time?

23 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Correct.

24 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And then, if I could,
25 Madam Registrar, go to COMM0043684, and specifically -- I'll ask you to pull that up if
26 you can. And actually, Madam Registrar, if we can go up to the first page, just so we
27 can orient ourselves. Thank you very much.

28 So these are minutes from a PSAP Managers Quarterly Meeting

1 from 2015. So again, this is prior to your assumption of the role, but the representative
2 attending on behalf of the RCMP was Glen Byrne.

3 And if we could go to page 6, Madam Registrar, you are ahead of
4 me, and then go down to, yes, this discussion about public alerting:

5 "A national project tested by CRTC to Pelmorex to
6 develop a national public alerting process. National
7 meetings are held every six months.

8 Provincially we have been working on this since 2010.

9 Initially this request was voluntary for the radio
10 stations. EMO bought the boxes and partnered with
11 32 radio stations but had little luck with the radio
12 stations adhering to the request.

13 In August of 2014 a new ruling by the CRTC no
14 longer made the request voluntary. The onus is now
15 on the radio stations to install the boxes and make
16 sure they work. EMO has partnered with the Valley
17 PSAP as this service is required to be a 24 hour
18 service. If there was [an] alert the radio stations will
19 send them out.

20 Rod Legge is in the process of developing a binder
21 with 32 events. The idea of the binder is to enable
22 the call taker to flip to an event and it will show what is
23 required for an alert to go. If an alert is required to go
24 out the PSAP will contact EMO, the Executive
25 Director makes the decision to send out an alert.
26 EMO will notify Valley communications to have an
27 alert sent to Pelmorex. This should be coming on
28 stream within the next few months.

1 If Environment Canada sends an alert this will go
2 through our public alerting as well. Environment
3 Canada will not require our permission to send out
4 alerts.

5 If an Incident Commander on an event wants to use
6 Public Alerting for updates we can are able to provide
7 this with an ask from the [Incident Commander].”

8 So was this -- were these PSAP minutes ever brought to your
9 attention prior to April 2020?

10 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** No. And I believe I only received a
11 copy of this particular one this morning, perhaps. I find it interesting that they note
12 Valley PSAP as potentially a test PSAP.

13 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Yeah.

14 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Valley, I'm fairly certain, doesn't
15 dispatch for any policing agencies. They do for fire. And potentially that's why they
16 were chosen, that it could be used in a fire-based scenario. But it had certainly never,
17 across Canada, that we've ever been able to find that's been used in a serious police
18 incident outside of Alert Ready.

19 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. So you hadn't seen any of this
20 discussion with respect to an incident commander using public alerting for updates?
21 You didn't see this document prior to April 2020?

22 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** No.

23 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. I'll turn, if I can, Madam Registrar, to
24 COMM000992. There might be an extra zero in there, sorry, 0000992.

25 This is a presentation from June 2016 that the EMO offered to
26 delegate trusted user status or when the EMO was offering trusted user status to
27 RCMP. They offered a presentation.

28 And if we go to slide 6, so this is the:

1 "Broadcast Intrusive Message (32)
2 Must be an imminent threat to life and property
3 (immediate, observed or likely):
4 There are thirty-two identified broadcast intrusive alerts
5 (Law Enforcement Related Examples):
6 Civil Emergency (Riot, Demonstration, etc)
7 Criminal Activity (Terrorism, Active Shooter, etc)
8 Amber Alert
9 Explosive(s) Hazard Alert
10 Chemical [...] Hazard Alert
11 Radiological Hazard Alert"

12 Had you ever seen this presentation or the content of this
13 presentation prior to April 2020?

14 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Not until this morning.

15 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And Madam Registrar, if I could go
16 to COMMS0043666?

17 And these will be minutes from a May of 2019 presentation at a
18 Departmental and Emergency Management Office Executive Committee Meeting.

19 And the representative for the RCMP is Elliot VanDusen, who is
20 attending on behalf of the RCMP. Would you know him, Supt Rodier?

21 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** So Elliot was one of the employees I
22 was telling you about. It was temporarily -- he was temporarily placed in EMS.

23 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** I see. So he would have been acting in the
24 EMS section in 2019?

25 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Correct.

26 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And he would have been reporting
27 to you; correct?

28 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Yes.

1 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And if we can go to Item 5 on that
2 agenda, Madam Registrar, if you don't mind? Thank you.

3 “Rod Legge, Manager of Information Systems, gave a
4 brief presentation on the National Public Alerting System
5 (Alert Ready)

6 NS EMO is responsible for sending alerts to the public.
7 NS EMO and Environment Canada are currently the only
8 departments who have the capability of sending alerts.
9 2015 was the first year that television and radio had a
10 mandatory requirement to broadcast alerts. This was
11 built into their licensing.

12 May 2018 was the first time Public Alerts were sent to
13 mobile phones operating on the 4G network. Devices
14 connected to the 4G network and running off Nova Scotia
15 cellular towers will receive these mobile alerts.

16 The system allows the operator to pick and choose which
17 areas/locations the alerts can be sent to.

18 It only takes a matter of seconds from the time an alert is
19 sent, for it to be received.

20 Broadcast intrusive alerts would used in events such as
21 terrorism, industrial/wildfires, flooding, amber alerts, or
22 anything that may have an eminent threat to life.

23 The system is very robust and resilient.

24 There is a possibility in the future that Police will be able
25 to send out alert messages. This is something Police
26 and NS EMO Would need to work on and discuss
27 further.”

28 So do you recall whether you were briefed or whether Elliot

1 VanDusen reported to you from this 2019 meeting?

2 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I don't. And I actually went back
3 through my notebook when Mr. Legge was testifying and this came up in his testimony,
4 because I wanted to double check that I hadn't been briefed on that. This was -- this
5 2019 meeting, this was the first I'd heard from Mr. Legge -- in his testimony, sorry.

6 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. Perhaps if we could, Madam
7 Registrar, pull up the testimony of Mr. Legge? And I'm going to ask to go down to the
8 bottom of page 88 for me. I think 88 in the document. Sorry about that, Madam
9 Registrar. So a few more down. Thank you. Just down to line 24, if you don't mind.

10 Okay. So this is where Commission Counsel, Rachel Young, is
11 asking Mr. Legge some questions about Alert Ready. She says:

12 Okay. And there was a Nova Scotia email meeting on
13 May 31st, 2019, where you give your presentation on
14 Alert Ready, and the minutes summarizing [...]
15 presentation say that you talked about alerts such as,
16 you know, you give the examples of terrorism, wildfires,
17 flooding, Amber Alert, or anything that could be an
18 imminent threat to life. Do you recall that presentation?"

19 Mr. Legge:

20 "I've given a lot over the years."

21 "Okay."

22 "I'm not sure."

23 "Okay. So this would be a fairly regular type of thing..."

24 "Yes."

25 "...[you're] doing a presentation on?"

26 "Yes."

27 "Okay."

28 "And sometimes I was called in on very short notice.

1 There'd be a quick meeting and they'd say, 'Could you
2 come in and quickly give a overview of the Alert Ready
3 system?' So that was not uncommon."

4 Rachel Young says:

5 "Okay. [...] then you did mention a meeting you recalled
6 from February 12th of 2020."

7 Mr. Legge said:

8 "Correct."

9 "And who was that meeting with?"

10 "Paul Vickers."

11 "Where is Paul Vickers from?"

12 "He's from the RCMP."

13 "Okay."

14 "I believe a risk manager at the OCC at the time."

15 "And what did you discuss at that meeting?"

16 "The RCMP had reached out to the incident -- Director of
17 Incident Management to request a meeting on how to get
18 an Amber Alert out through the Alert Ready system."

19 "And did you discuss with Mr. Vickers then that there
20 were other types of alerts the police could ask for, not
21 just Amber Alerts?"

22 "Yes. Towards the end of the meeting, I did bring it up.

23 But to be fair, the meeting was specifically around getting
24 an Amber Alert out through the Alert Ready system."

25 "So when you say you brought it up, what did you say?"

26 "Oh, just it was kind of as we were wrapping up. I said,

27 'You know, there's other police alerts there too that we --
28 you know, you might be interested in getting out.' I

1 remember that specifically.”

2 “Did you mention active shooters as an example?

3 “I can't say.”

4 Do you recall have any discussion with S/Sgt Vickers with respect
5 to his meeting with Mr. Legge?

6 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** So at the time of this particular
7 meeting, we were in the process -- we had put together -- revitalized, really, the Amber
8 Alert Working Group, the provincial working group. So at the time, it was myself, HRP
9 representation, Cape Breton Regional Police representation, DOJ, Strat Comms, and
10 our risk managers, and Glen Byrne from the OCC, with the focus of updating the
11 provincial Amber Alert standards. They were outdated and there had been some
12 changeover at the DOJ office. So we were trying to get them to put a new focus on
13 Amber Alerts.

14 And part of that, one of the tasks that Paul Vickers would have
15 been assigned is to talk to EMO about how does that Amber Alert -- how -- getting out
16 the Amber Alert. So we -- there were forms that we would have to fill out and send
17 those to -- through to EMO, and EMO would get the Amber Alert out.

18 At the time, I had no idea it was the same platform. I didn't know
19 what platform they used for Amber Alert. I do now. But that's what that meeting was
20 about.

21 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And in this working group with
22 respect to Amber Alerts, is there any discussion with EMO about broader uses of the
23 Alert Ready system?

24 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Not to me.

25 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

26 Madam Registrar, if I can be a pain again and get you to pull up the
27 same day of testimony, the transcript, and this time page 69. Thanks.

28 So this is Mr. Mason's testimony, and he's being asked about the, I

1 guess, profile of the Alert Ready, and he says -- he's asked about why he referred to it
2 in his interview as a high profile program. And he says:

3 "The reason why I would consider Alert Ready..."

4 Sorry, I'm at line 16, I think there. Yeah:

5 "The reason why I would consider Alert Ready a high
6 profile program is because we're doing these test
7 alerts very, very frequently. And along with these test
8 alerts, we're, you know, updating our partners, not just
9 police, but all of our partners regularly.

10 I've presented at conferences on it on emergency
11 management. We're doing these 16 tests. We're
12 meeting at the PSAP level. We're having discussions
13 with our DPOs. You know, there's a lot of public
14 education, plus you have the advertising campaigns.
15 It's a -- along with 911, it's our highest profile
16 program."

17 So would you disagree, then, with Mr. Mason's description of the
18 Alert Ready Program in 2020 as a high-profile program?

19 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I'm not -- this is -- pardon me, Glenn
20 Mason we're talking about?

21 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Sorry, Paul Mason. My apologies.

22 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Paul Mason. Oh, okay. Potentially for
23 them, it certainly wasn't for police. It wasn't on our radar. It certainly wasn't on any
24 police radar, really, across the country. He's referring to test alerts, and they're:

25 "...updating our partners, not just [the] police, but all
26 of our partners regularly."

27 So I agree that they do tests. We all get the tests on our phones.
28 However, knowing what we know now about the system, as far as raising awareness,

1 for me, public awareness, with the use of Amber, pardon me, Alert Ready, is absolutely
2 fundamentally key. People need to understand, now that it's being used in policing, it is
3 high risk, it's high risk to the public, it's high risk to the police.

4 There's a great deal of mitigation strategies that we have had to put
5 into place to be able to even consider using this, and one of them, one of those that we
6 have been pushing EMO, because it's their program, we've been really working hard on
7 a list of strategies that I'm happy to talk about, but one of them that relates to that
8 particular paragraph is the imminent need for a fulsome public awareness campaign,
9 and I'm talking TV, radio, news, schools.

10 You heard from an expert in from Australia, talking about the Alert
11 Ready system and why it works there. It works there because they have all of those
12 processes in place and they're robust and they're fulsome. We do not have that here.

13 So it's been -- it's been a challenge to all of a sudden be launched
14 into the -- this world of Alert Ready and policing that none of us had any knowledge of.
15 There is no governance, there is no legislation, there is... At the time, we didn't have
16 standard operating procedures, we didn't have policies, we didn't have training, we
17 didn't have any of that groundwork laid. We do now, and we've even gone one step
18 farther and conducted, with EMO, in partnership with EMO, a risk analysis on the
19 feasibility of using Alert Ready. And if we're -- if policing is going to use it, these are the
20 laundry list of recommendations and mitigation strategies that you have to have in
21 place, and it's just not a matter of hitting a button and hoping for the best.

22 The use of Alert Ready has impacts, far-reaching impacts, and
23 there is -- there is -- there has to be the knowledge of those impacts, how that affects --
24 how that can affect public safety, how that can affect officer safety. We've seen it affect
25 the subject's behaviour, and we've seen how it impacts the 9-1-1 system.

26 And the calls -- the calls that have come into our OCC, after hitting
27 the button, air quotes, hitting the button on an Alert Ready, and it's not -- they're not
28 calls from the public calling about the operation, to give us information, they're people

1 calling because they don't know what to do with the information. They don't know.
2 "Can I leave my house? Can I go to work? Can I take my dog out? How do I get this
3 message off my phone?" Those are the calls that, in our experience, that have flooded
4 into the 9-1-1 system immediately after issuing alerts.

5 And so that's why we -- I -- I'm very thankful, I'm thankful to EMO
6 that they brought this tool to our -- to our attention because now we've been able to
7 develop the -- lay the -- lay the groundwork that -- to use this tool, and there's no --
8 there's no guarantee that in every single police operation situation we, the RCMP, will
9 use it. We will certainly absolutely consider it, absolutely consider it. But to guarantee
10 to the public that it's going to be deployed in every police response is -- it's just not the
11 case.

12 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** And I'll ask you more in a bit about what you
13 view as the mitigation strategies. But I guess what I want to ask you about is, is you've
14 indicated that EMO sort of laid the groundwork for this program. Is that fair? Initially,
15 we've seen these presentations of, or these meeting minutes where discussions are
16 starting to happen around the program, Alert Ready?

17 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Prior to -- prior to me, perhaps.

18 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Sure.

19 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I had -- none of us that I know of
20 anywhere in policing this was ever a thing that we would use.

21 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Sure. And I guess my question is, how
22 would we make sure that members who are coming into these positions familiarise
23 themselves with programs and developments that are happening at external agencies?
24 I realise that's a broad question, but ---

25 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** M'hm.

26 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** --- this one seems to have slipped. And do
27 you have a sense of how someone in your position or, sorry, in your former position can
28 familiarise themselves with programs that are being developed elsewhere?

1 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** We have -- we have a very good
2 relationship with EMO. I personally worked with Jason Mew often, very often, and this
3 never came up as a tool for us. That's not to say that they made attempts prior to my
4 arrival, but certainly since then, we have been working hand-in-hand with EMO to raise,
5 you know, to raise awareness in the policing community. There is a Divisional Working
6 Group, there's a Provincial Working Group.

7 Paul Mason sits on SOREM at the national level, so he's been
8 helping us push the national message that if the expectation is from, in the public view,
9 in government, whatever that looks like, that Alert Ready is going, or not going to, can
10 be used as a tool in critical incidents, then that awareness piece, the training, the
11 policies, the standard operating procedures, all of that has to be in place before an
12 agency should even -- could even consider using this.

13 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And I understand that the RCMP
14 now has direct access to issuing alerts?

15 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** That's correct.

16 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And tell me about that process. How
17 did that unfold?

18 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** So I would say it was the summer of
19 2020, our -- my conversations with Jason continued before, not to do with Alert Ready,
20 but immediately after following the incident, about our relationship, mine with the CMP,
21 him with EMO, and once this happened, our focus, my focus turned to finding out about
22 Alert Ready. We in the division were very open to the possibility of obtaining direct
23 access. Jason and his team were amazing. We had had many conversations, Jason
24 had -- he had the training material all ready to go. He said, "Yeah, you tell us when
25 you're ready, and we'll train you on it." And I want to say the first time we tried to
26 organize training would have been the summer, I believe, of 2020. Again, Jason was
27 ready to go. We were ready to take it. And unfortunately, the management team, I'm
28 not sure at what level, at EMO, there was some issue there, matter there that prevented

1 -- whatever that situation was, you would have to talk to Jason, but unfortunately, that
2 training didn't happen. But it certainly -- he wasn't closing the door on us at all. He
3 really did want to help us. He wanted to train us. And so the second time we tried to
4 arrange training, I want to say was perhaps October. It was the fall-ish. Again, we tried,
5 and again, it didn't happen, not for lack of trying on Jason's part, and we certainly were
6 very willing to.

7 So it wasn't until January, I want to say January 2021, that we
8 finally got approval. There was a lot of attention in the media, and the public eye, and
9 government eye on the -- on -- surrounding an alert -- or surrounding Alert Ready and
10 policing. And I don't remember when, but it was shortly around that time, maybe the
11 winter perhaps, the premier at the time did a news release about Alert Ready and
12 saying how the RCMP could have/should have used it in Portapique, and that we didn't
13 want direct access, which was completely not the case. We had been -- we were
14 welcoming it.

15 And our Chief Superintendent Leather actually did a series of
16 media interviews, clarifying that point exactly. So it was very, very quickly after that,
17 after those media releases that we finally got the green light to obtain direct access. So
18 we jumped at it. We had the training in -- I think it was January, like I said, and we didn't
19 want just those who would be actually typing the message and sending it to get the
20 training. We wanted to make sure that our senior management team, those who would
21 be the decision makers, would be involved in that training, so they knew what -- how the
22 system worked, they knew its capabilities, they knew its limitations. We want -- we felt
23 that was very important. So that included the criminal operations officer, it included our
24 district policing officers, myself, and Glen Byrne in the OCC, our risk managers, all our
25 critical incident commanders, we all took the training.

26 And shortly after that, within the next -- once we got the green light
27 to go ahead, we worked with EMO to develop an MOU to use that tool. And then
28 following that, we developed shortly after -- or actually, about the same time, we

1 developed divisional policy on the use of serious incidents in policing. The -- we
2 assisted in developing the national policy, and then further to that, we also developed
3 vulnerable persons policy with respect to alerting, and also updated the Amber Alert
4 policy to reflect Alert Ready.

5 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And were these policies shaped and
6 informed by the KPMG report that was retained by the RCMP?

7 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** No, that was well after.

8 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Well after, okay.

9 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Yeah, the KPMG report actually came
10 at a very good time because we had already implemented all of these mitigation
11 strategies, getting SOPs, working with our partners in the province at EMO, working
12 with national. And then once we had all of that already in place, it just happened that
13 the time it took to get KPMG to -- identified to come and do this risk analysis for us. So
14 they were able to walk in, we gave them everything we had, EMO did the same, and
15 then we walked through a series of risk meetings where we would identify risks, what
16 are the mitigation strategies we have in place, everything was mapped on a heat map.
17 We gave them all of our -- the steps that we'd taken to date, all of the risks that we still
18 see that are out of our control to address, and they put that all together, and that's -- you
19 have the risk analysis, the final risk analysis report from them.

20 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And I'm going to bring up, Madam
21 Registrar, if I could, COMM-0058467. I believe it is a summary of the risk analysis and
22 mitigation strategy related to activation of the Nova Scotia Public Alerting System. My
23 understanding, Commissioners, just for the record, is that there's a complete report and
24 supporting material that's the subject of a subpoena. But maybe what I'll do, Madam
25 Registrar, is mark -- ask to mark and tender this as an exhibit for purposes of these
26 proceedings?

27 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** It's Exhibit 2040.

28 **--- EXHIBIT NO. 2040:**

1 (COMM0058467) HDIV - IMIT - Alert Ready Feasibility Study
2 and Risk Assessment - FINAL - 2022-05-10.pdf

3 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Thank you. And if you could, Madam
4 Registrar, flip to page 19 in the document? Sorry, you're familiar, I would assume, with
5 the ---

6 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Yeah.

7 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Yeah, okay. And if you don't mind going
8 down to RCMP H-Division mitigations? So this is outlining, I would assume, or I'll ask
9 you, Superintendent Rodier, is that this is outlining some of the policies that have been
10 established with respect to H-Division and alerting; is that correct?

11 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** That's correct, but if you actually go up
12 to the paragraph Alert Ready Governance Mitigations ---

13 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Sure.

14 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** --- the mitigation strategies really start
15 from there and go down.

16 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** I see. Okay. Well, I wanted to ask you
17 specifically, just in terms of the practicalities, about number nine, so,

18 "Protocols at the RCMP/OCC have been updated as
19 of January 27th, 2021, to include the following during
20 alerts..." (As read)

21 And I think this is what you had touched on earlier. So,

22 "Immediately notifying the OCC, Officer in Charge,
23 calling in extra 9-1-1 call take resources, calling in a
24 second risk manager, notifying all PSAPs and other
25 police jurisdictions surrounding RCMP divisions of the
26 impending alert, embedding an employee from the
27 Strategic Communications Unit in the OCC, and
28 sharing public messaging with PSAPs to help ensure

1 consistency as well as within the OCC on what the
2 messaging of the alert will entail." (As read)

3 So those are some of the SOP changes that you've described
4 already post-2020; is that -- that's fair?

5 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Absolutely.

6 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay.

7 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** We also send out a BOLO to all the
8 police agencies through CPIC to let them know. If we're working on an operation that
9 we determine that we're going to deploy a Alert Ready, that could potentially impact
10 their operations in a neighbouring jurisdiction, so we want to make sure that they know
11 what's going on. In addition, EMO will let DOJ know that this is happening. We also
12 have developed a Halifax District Standard Operating Procedure. So if you recall
13 earlier, I was talking about how in the Halifax District we have RCMP that are
14 dispatched by IES. We now have -- or for a while now have had a standard operating
15 procedure where if it's an RCMP jurisdiction in the HRM, the OCC and the risk
16 managers will manage that Alert Ready deployment as opposed to it going through IES.
17 So that's also been done since as well.

18 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And one question I have about this
19 particular paragraph is to include the following, the word "during alerts". And I'm -- I just
20 want to have a sense, do all of these itemized things have to be in place before an alert
21 is issued, or is this something that can be sort of instigated following an alert, if you
22 understand my question?

23 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Certainly. So the reason for all of
24 these steps was on April 24th there was a report of a potential active shooter in
25 Tantallon -- in Tantallon in the HRM, and Alert Ready was deployed in that scenario.
26 And Glen Byrne and I got about five -- five, 10 minutes -- not even 10; I would say five
27 minutes' notice that the alert was going out, and instantly our 9-1-1 phones lit up, as did
28 IES felt the impact of that as well with their 9-1-1 system.

1 So that's why we really started looking at, if this is going to happen,
2 there is going to be -- there potentially is a very real influx of 9-1-1 calls, we need to do
3 something about this. So ideally if there is a situation that we even think Alert Ready
4 may be deployed, we will take -- we will start enacting these steps.

5 It takes time to call people in, whether it's call-take or dispatch or a
6 second risk manager. And we will -- and, again, admitting Strategic Comms in the
7 OCC, that all takes time. So the more lead time the decision-makers or the command
8 team can give us, the more time it takes us to get ready for it.

9 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Sure, and I appreciate that, but given the
10 nature of alerts and critical incidents, would these be necessary prerequisites if there's a
11 rapidly evolving situation? Would that be necessary to have all of this in place as a
12 precondition to issuing the alert?

13 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I wouldn't say it's a precondition.

14 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay

15 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** But that certainly -- like I said, if there's
16 a situation we even think is going down that road, we'll start actioning these. To say
17 that we won't put out an alert until A, B, C, D, E, and F are done? That's not -- that
18 wouldn't be the case.

19 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. So you had touched on the OCC
20 capacity issue, and I want to talk a little bit about this, recognizing I'm certainly not an
21 expert in the subject matter.

22 I'm wondering, Madam Register, if you would mind, having just
23 clicked out of that, if you could flip to page 29 of that same report?

24 So this is in reference to what you were just referring to with
25 respect to the April 24th, 2020 alert that was issued?

26 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Correct.

27 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** And in this report, it indicates that 29
28 percent of the calls were abandoned by the caller and required follow-up by dispatchers

1 or 9-1-1 operators? Can you provide for us the source of where you're getting these
2 numbers or where this information is coming from?

3 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** This is call data from the OCC.

4 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And what was the call data
5 suggesting; do you recall? Was it that calls were -- can you expand on -- for us what
6 this means in terms of abandoned or...?

7 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** It could be that the call was hung up
8 before it got to us; it could be that before -- it was abandoned before it was answered. It
9 could be -- in situations like that, we don't have any way to determine who the caller is.
10 So when we're saying "Abandoned" at this time the overflow -- the 9-1-1 system
11 overflow that Darryl Macdonald had spoke about had kicked in, which was why we were
12 getting calls, even though it was a Halifax Regional incident.

13 So to put it in perspective, on April 24th, we were seeing a 29
14 percent in abandoned calls. We have an MoU, a provincial MoU with EMO to operate
15 the 9-1-1 system on their behalf. And that EMO dictates -- pardon me; that MoU
16 dictates that we have to -- there's a benchmark that we have to meet. We have to
17 answer our 9-1-1 calls in the first 10 seconds. Well, when this happened it became very
18 clear that we weren't able to do that.

19 So we compared these numbers from April 24th on top of the
20 numbers from April 18th and 19th, and we were already -- there was already about a 29,
21 28, 30 percent of the calls that were coming in on April 19th -- 18th and 19th that were
22 being abandoned. And then if you take this stat and layer it on top of that, it could
23 potentially mean that people were not going to be able to get through to 9-1-1 and so
24 that, to us, was a huge risk.

25 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. So this statistic about the 29 percent,
26 we've heard some evidence, and my understanding is that if I call 9-1-1 and I call the
27 OCC and all the calls are busy, I would go into an overflow PSAP; is that correct?

28 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Yes, that's correct.

1 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And so with the statistic that is in this
2 summary, would those phone calls be calls that are being diverted to other PSAPs out
3 of the OCC, potentially?

4 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Potentially, but unfortunately when a
5 call is -- goes into the overflow and is answered by a separate PSAP, that PSAP then
6 still has to stay on the line with that 9-1-1 caller until they can get it back to the agency
7 that it belongs to. For example, if a -- because we're a PSAP, if we take a 9-1-1 call for
8 a small police agency somewhere in the province, they may have only one or two
9 dispatchers. If there's an emergency or if they were to choose to deploy Alert Ready,
10 and they only have one person to answer all the phone calls, we're going to be waiting
11 on the phone a long time with that client. And because we don't have the same
12 dispatch systems, we're not -- in the province, we're not -- all on the same dispatch
13 systems, we're not on all the same records management systems, there's -- other than
14 sitting on that phone with them and talking to them, we can't start the process of
15 creating a dispatch file and sending it to that police agency for them. So our caller -- our
16 call-taker will have to stay on the phone until that police agency is able to answer, to
17 pick up the phone and take the call from us, and then we can move on to another call.

18 So there's no way -- from what I understand, there's no way of
19 determining out of that 29 percent were they calls that were hung up prior to and so we
20 therefore have no idea who the caller is, or if they were calls that went into the overflow
21 and then hopefully came back into our centre.

22 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And so would it be fair to say -- my
23 understanding of this is that this is a risk that pertains more to personnel than it does to
24 the actual technology, as in having enough bodies at desks answering phones, as
25 opposed to a technological overwhelming of the system?

26 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** It's interesting you ask that because
27 we asked the same question of EMO when we were doing this risk analysis; what is the
28 maximum capacity of the 9-1-1 system in the province? And they weren't able to

1 determine that, and it is certainly not something that we are prepared to test, for obvious
2 reasons, so the best we could do was the information that we have in front of us.

3 And so to answer your question; it's certainly is a -- it's a human
4 capacity. There's only -- one person can only answer one call at a time. And so for us
5 in the OCC, we're one of the larger agencies in the province, and as busy as we were
6 on April 18th and 19th, or for example, on the April 24th in this instance, we were maxed
7 out. So I would caution any of -- any small police agency anywhere in Canada to use
8 this tool without having the groundwork laid because there is potential that it could have
9 negative impacts in the amount -- it could be that there, all of a sudden, is an influx of 9-
10 1-1 calls and you have to be prepared for it.

11 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** I wonder, Madam Registrar, if we can go to
12 page 3 of summary; and, in particular, I'm wondering if I can go down to the fifth
13 paragraph, "RCMP may issue".

14 So I think this is outlining some of the criteria and the policies with
15 respect to issuing an alert. So:

16 "RCMP may issue public alerts in response to certain
17 police-related emergency incidents per
18 Chapter 37.155 *Serious Incident Alert*, of RCMP
19 'H' [Division] Operational Manual, section 1.3 states
20 'Police-activated alerts include active shooter /
21 immediate action rapid deployment (IARD) incidents,
22 terrorist attacks, chemical / biological / radiological /
23 nuclear and explosive incidents...with an established
24 criminal nexus, civil disobedience / rioting, and
25 dangerous animal incidents.' [Section] 4.1.2 and
26 4.1.3, include further criteria for us and state that for
27 an alert to be issued 'the serious incident is believed
28 to cause imminent threat to the public of serious

1 bodily harm and/or death' and 'there is sufficient
2 descriptive detail and information of the threat and the
3 geographical location involved, to provide clear
4 direction and guidance to the public.'"

5 So these would be the criteria that have been set up post 2020 with
6 respect to issuing alerts?

7 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** For the RCMP.

8 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** For the RCMP.

9 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Yes.

10 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Thank you.

11 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Yes, so absolutely. When we were
12 developing this policy, we also shared it with the Provincial Working Group and HRP,
13 knowing that they were going to be prepared to develop their own policy as well. And
14 Nova Scotia Chiefs of Police, I believe, were on -- are on that working group as well.

15 So yes, we have a policy, but what we have been really advocating
16 for is provincial standards when it comes to the use of Alert Ready and governance and
17 legislation. Because for us to issue an alert will impact other police agencies in the
18 province, and vice versa.

19 For example, there was an incident on -- in Amherst that it was
20 Amherst Police, and we were there, our Critical Incident Commander Package was
21 there to help them. In addition, "J" Division, so the New Brunswick RCMP, were also
22 involved. So in that particular incidence, you had three agencies all working on a
23 border, all dealing and helping with the same situation, and in that instance, New
24 Brunswick, the incident -- the incident started in New Brunswick, they issued an alert.
25 The perpetrator came into Nova Scotia territory, and -- which is why Amherst Police
26 were involved, and then our Critical Incident Package came out to help them.

27 And there was -- there was a lot of discussion and determining
28 whether an issue, or pardon me, an alert should be issued and by who. So there was a

1 lot of -- there was a lot of time that those discussions had to take, and so that's where
2 provincial standards would be very beneficial.

3 So if it's clear to any police agency in the province -- and DOJ
4 would develop those standards, with input from all of us. We're not saying this is an
5 RCMP standard, you have to follow our policy, that's not what we're saying at all when it
6 comes to any provincial standard, but at least if there was something that was clear to
7 all agencies "if you're going to use Alert Ready, it would be for very serious incidents" so
8 that it -- so that all agencies understood the threshold if they were to use it. And the
9 same with governance, and so that there is -- there is an external body overseeing the
10 use of this, and legislation to back it up.

11 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. But these are -- these are the current
12 policies that you -- that the RCMP is operating under?

13 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Correct.

14 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. And the first portion of this, I guess
15 4.1.2, a "serious incident is believed to cause imminent threat", this seems fairly
16 straightforward to me, but there's the second one, 4.1.3, which states:

17 "...there is sufficient descriptive detail and information
18 of the threat and...geographical location involved, to
19 provide clear direction and guidance to the public."

20 Can you explain what the rationale is behind this 4.1.3, if I'm
21 reading that correctly?

22 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Certainly. So the reason we're --
23 we've used this language is because of our -- the experiences that we've learned from
24 deploying Alert Ready. If you don't give the public enough information and a clear call
25 to action for them, that's when -- that's when we're going to start getting questions.

26 So the more information we can give them, whether it's, you know,
27 "Situation A is going on in this particular area. Shelter in place.", and direct them to our
28 social media feed, for example, for more information. That way they understand that

1 this is what's going on that there -- there is a situation, "This is what you need to do.",
2 i.e. shelter in place, "And if you're looking for further information", redirecting them
3 somewhere else other than the Alert Ready site, or pardon me, other than the use --
4 continued use of an Alert Ready through a -- an incident, then they can go to places like
5 our social media sites, Twitter, Facebook, whatever that looks like for continuing
6 information, and that's where we keep the updated information going for them to keep
7 looking at.

8 There was an incident in, I believe it was "K" Division, so Alberta,
9 where an alert was issued, and knowing that we were trying -- they -- they had learned
10 from us in what we saw to the 9-1-1 calls, so they were trying to direct the public
11 somewhere else. So they directed them to the RCMP info webpage for more
12 information, and it crashed the page. The influx of -- the volume of influx crashed the
13 page, which doesn't sound like a bad thing, but if people can't get the information they're
14 looking for they're going to come back to us and need it.

15 So the more -- the -- quick -- there's only 600 characters that we
16 have to use, so the more detailed succinct information that we can give them direction
17 and then channel them to somewhere where they can get continued updates, that's
18 ideal.

19 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** And so I understand that for sure with
20 respect to the clear direction and guidance to the public, but for the first portion of that:

21 "...sufficient descriptive detail and information of the
22 threat and the geographical location involved..."

23 And I think some Nova Scotians feel that in the course of the mass
24 casualty there was quite descriptive detail coming in, there was certainly a geographical
25 location, and that there was a hesitancy on the part of the RCMP to share information
26 with the public, whether through the alert or whether through other means.

27 And what can you say about something that's a subjective thing
28 here with respect to addressing those concerns about hesitancy with sharing

1 information?

2 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Well now, we know with -- I should
3 back up. So as far as Strategic Comms and the information they put out, I think I've
4 clarified that I had no involvement, I never have been involved in any of the messaging
5 from Strategic Comms, contrary to what was out in the media. I don't have access to
6 the RCMP Twitter page, I've never used it. I don't have Twitter myself. So that was not
7 my job.

8 I can speak to the Alert Ready piece in this, and "sufficient
9 descriptive detail" would be for the case of, say it's an active shooter. We will say,
10 "Active shooter in such and such an area. Shelter in place.", or whatever the call to
11 action is. "For more information, go to RCMP, Twitter or Facebook.", whatever that
12 looks like. So I can -- I can tell you that. We have used it for other incidents, not just an
13 active shooter situation.

14 The problem is there's a -- there's quite a few things that need to be
15 updated with Alert Ready if policing are going to use it. And I think you heard from an
16 expert at the CACP, Canadian Association Chiefs of Police level, that the opportunity to
17 have input into that at the beginning wasn't, wasn't there, which is highly unfortunate.
18 But for us, we have used it, but we've had to modify how we've used it to make it work.

19 For example, we've had two instances of missing children this year.
20 One was in Preston and one was in, I believe Pictou just recently. And in both of those
21 cases, Amber Alert -- it didn't -- neither case met the criteria for Amber Alert, and Amber
22 Alert has a very strict, very strong criteria. In these two cases, it didn't meet that, but we
23 wanted to get the word out there.

24 So what we had to do is use a civil emergency alert. That's the
25 type of alert we had to use. And we chose that one because it's broadcast intrusive.

26 And feel free to jump in if I'm not making my -- the acronyms or
27 anything like that clear. But there are certain types of alerts that are broadcast intrusive,
28 meaning that they will go to your TV, your radio, your cell phone, and there's those that

1 are non-broadcast intrusive which won't go to that but will go to, say, the Weather
2 Network.

3 In these particular cases, we wanted to get the word out there so
4 we wanted a broadcast-intrusive alert.

5 Well, there's no other -- there's no other broadcast-intrusive alert
6 that would fit this -- these particular cases, so what we did was sent out a civil
7 emergency. We called it a missing person. We gave the same information, i.e.
8 description, where to call, where to get more information, and we sent it out that way.

9 So we took two kinds of -- two kinds of types of alerts and meshed
10 them together, so it wasn't really an Amber Alert because it didn't fit the criteria, and it
11 wasn't a civil emergency, but we made it work.

12 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Okay. So if the events of April 18th and
13 19th were to happen again, is it your view that the RCMP would issue the Alert Ready?

14 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I can certainly tell you with the efforts
15 that we've made over the past two years, the amount of work we've done, the standard
16 operating procedures, the policies, the training, the mitigation strategies, with all of that
17 in place, I can absolutely tell you that Alert Ready would be considered by everybody
18 because we know about it now. We know what happens. We know how it works.

19 Every time we use it, we learn something new and we share that
20 information with everybody around us so they know, heads up, this is what happened
21 the last time we used it.

22 So absolutely, it would be considered. I can't guarantee, as I said
23 before, that Alert Ready is going to be used in every single police incident. That's --
24 you're -- the decision-makers have to weigh the pros of using it and -- the risks and the
25 benefits of using it and to ensure that utilizing the system is not going to negatively
26 impact public safety and police safety.

27 So it absolutely would be considered.

28 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Commissioners, that's -- those are my

1 questions for Superintendent Rodier.

2 I know my friends will have some, so if we could engage in the
3 caucus process.

4 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you, Ms. Mancini, and
5 thank you, Superintendent Rodier, for being here so far.

6 And the process we'll follow is we'll break now. We'll say 20
7 minutes. If you need more time, Ms. Mancini, certainly let us know.

8 And Superintendent Rodier, Ms. Mancini and other Commission
9 Counsel will meet with Participant Counsel to determine further questions to ask you
10 and who will ask them.

11 So thank you, and we'll break for 20 minutes. And again, if you
12 need more time, let us know.

13 Thank you.

14 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Thank you.

15 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Thank you.

16 The proceedings are now on break and will resume in 20 minutes.

17 --- Upon breaking at 4:33 p.m

18 --- Upon resuming at 5:06 p.m.

19 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Welcome back. The
20 proceedings are again in session.

21 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you, everyone. We'll ask
22 Superintendent Rodier to return, please.

23 **DUSTINE RODIER, Resumed:**

24 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you again,
25 Superintendent Rodier. Four counsel will be asking you questions and they'll come --
26 when they come up, they'll let you know who they represent.

27 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Thank you.

28 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you. And I think Mr.

1 MacDonald, you're first?

2 **--- CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. THOMAS MacDONALD:**

3 **MR. THOMAS MacDONALD:** Good afternoon, Superintendent.

4 My name is Thomas MacDonald, and I am Counsel to Tara Long, whose brother Aaron
5 Tuck was killed in Portapique on the 18th, and also Scott McLeod, whose brother Sean
6 McLeod was killed in Wentworth on the 19th.

7 I wanted to start out, and we have the reference with the Registrar,
8 with this morning's exhibit, the Foundation Document Exhibit 2001, RCMP Public
9 Communications April 18-19, 2020. If we could, to start, please, Registrar, at page 71,
10 paragraph 144, please?

11 Superintendent, you've read this document, have you, before?

12 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I have, yes.

13 **MR. THOMAS MacDONALD:** Perfect. So if you feel the need to
14 read it again, you'll let me know; otherwise, I'll just jump into it. In this paragraph 144,
15 you were giving a statement to the Mass Casualty Commission. And it says right at --
16 almost at the bottom, for about three lines from the bottom,

17 "Insp. Rodier also told the Mass Casualty
18 Commission that the decision to issue a public alert
19 should have gone through the CIC, not OCC,
20 "[b]ecause the CIC has overarching command of the
21 entire operation." "

22 Now I know what CIC and OCC mean, but could you just tell us for
23 the benefit of anyone watching what the acronyms mean?

24 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Certainly. So CIC is the Critical
25 Incident Commander.

26 **MR. THOMAS MacDONALD:** Right.

27 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** And the OCC is the Operational
28 Communications Centre.

1 **MR. THOMAS MacDONALD:** And so now, two years later, if there
2 was a critical incident of this type arising again, has this been changed in terms of who
3 makes the decision?

4 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** It depends. As you may recall, I was
5 talking earlier today about the training that we put our leadership and decision makers
6 through, so from the criminal operations officer, the district policing officers, Glen and
7 myself, the critical incident commanders, and the risk managers. So depending on the
8 situation, if the incident, whatever that incident may be, is being dealt with by the district,
9 so the critical incident package has not been called out, it could be the district policing
10 officer that authorizes the deployment of Alert Ready. In that case, the risk manager
11 would issue the alert. In the case of a -- when the Critical Incident Package has been
12 called out, a decision like that would go through the critical incident commander, and
13 then the request would be carried out by the risk manager and the OCC.

14 **MR. THOMAS MacDONALD:** Okay. So to jump a little bit, I heard
15 you say almost at the end of your evidence when Ms. Mancini was asking you
16 questions, she asked whether -- if there was a incident similar to Portapique, would
17 Alert Ready be used, and your answer, as I understood it, was it would absolutely be
18 considered. And I also heard your evidence in terms of what -- these are my words,
19 what flaws the RCMP sees potentially in the use of the Alert Ready system, and why it
20 may not be used, and what it would be used for.

21 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** M'hm.

22 **MR. THOMAS MacDONALD:** But going back to Ms. Mancini's
23 question and your answer, if it was to be used, who makes that decision in the RCMP?

24 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Again, it depends on the situation. So
25 if you're ---

26 **MR. THOMAS MacDONALD:** So Portapique again.

27 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Portapique again?

28 **MR. THOMAS MacDONALD:** I don't mean to interrupt you. Yes.

1 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** It would have been the critical incident
2 commander who made that decision.

3 **MR. THOMAS MacDONALD:** Okay. And the critical incident
4 commander has the authority to make that decision without going to above his or her
5 head?

6 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** He wouldn't -- they wouldn't need that
7 permission ---

8 **MR. THOMAS MacDONALD:** Right.

9 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** --- to go -- they could just ---

10 **MR. THOMAS MacDONALD:** Okay.

11 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** --- say this is what we're doing, and the
12 risk manager would make that happen.

13 **MR. THOMAS MacDONALD:** Did the RCMP since this incident
14 happen ever give consideration, special consideration to how the alert system, any kind
15 of an alert system with a critical incident would be rolled out in a rural area versus an
16 urban area? So for example, special considerations because it's a rural area, have they
17 turned their mind to that, the RCMP?

18 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Absolutely. So I'm going to back up a
19 little bit. So in addition to the other steps that we're taking provincially, nationally, also,
20 we've been lobbying for updates to the Critical Incident training. So the course training
21 standard, I'm sure you heard from Staff Sergeant Jeff West, that it's a national program.
22 It is accredited. And we saw the benefit of raising awareness at the national level. So
23 we've actually -- as of April this year, I just got confirmation that the Critical Incident
24 Commander Course Training Standard has been updated to include alerting, which is
25 fantastic. The more people we can train on this tool, the better. In addition to that, it's
26 going to be deployed in -- or not deployed -- it's going to be included in any of our Initial
27 Critical Incident Response training, and then further training from there. So there's also
28 going to be training for general duty members and training for risk managers that may

1 not have it yet.

2 So as far as the CIC in this particular case, they would have been
3 able to make that decision, had we had what we have now.

4 **MR. THOMAS MacDONALD:** And just to come back to the
5 scenario where the CIC would make the decision if it was a Portapique incident again,
6 can you offer any evidence based on your years in the RCMP and your role and now
7 you're a superintendent in terms of why would it be considered as opposed to
8 automatically triggered if it was Portapique again?

9 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** M'hm. It certainly has to be -- it has to
10 be considered, because there is a risk to using the system. It -- we already know, we've
11 talked a lot about it today, of the influx of 9-1-1 calls. There's also, if we put information
12 out using the Alert system, how is that going to impact victims? We could have a victim,
13 say, they're hiding in a closet somewhere and their only way to get a hold of us, they're
14 on the phone with us on 9-1-1, and if the perpetrator is in the house with them
15 somewhere searching for them, if we send the alert out, their phone is going to explode.
16 So that would be a direct risk to the victim. It could be -- so there's the public safety
17 piece and then there's also the officer safety piece.

18 So we have had experience with deploying it and the perpetrator
19 has had a cell phone on him, and using the alert and deploying the alert has changed
20 his behaviour and made him do something he potentially wouldn't have done. So we've
21 seen that, and we've had to adapt and that's certainly something that our critical incident
22 -- or whoever the decision maker is has to consider, has to consider the risk to public
23 safety and the risk to officer safety. And then if we're good, if we can mitigate the risks
24 and still send the alert out, then we can do it.

25 So it's not as simple of saying, like I said before, every police
26 incident we're going to send an alert out. We can't say that because every situation's
27 different, circumstances may change. A lot of these incidents are, as we all know in this
28 particular case, very fluid and very dynamic. So we may make a decision at one point

1 not to use it at this time, but if circumstances change in that same situation, we may
2 then make the decision, okay, this is the time we're going to use it because
3 circumstances have changed, the risk to public safety is no longer there, now we can
4 deploy it and we would.

5 **MR. THOMAS MacDONALD:** Okay.

6 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** So, sorry, I just realized, going back to
7 your other question about the rural piece ---

8 **MR. THOMAS MacDONALD:** Yes.

9 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** --- we have, we've actually used it in
10 urban and rural settings. You would have heard from Rod Legge from EMO talking
11 about the benefits of the system and also the limitations. So it -- as he said, it does
12 work off of cell towers. If there's no cell tower coverage, people may not get the alert. If
13 they don't have a cell phone that works with 4G, they may not get the alert. If they're
14 not -- if they have their phone off, or they're not listening to the TV or the radio, they may
15 not get the alert. There are situations that we've come across that have really
16 complicated things, but we've learned from it, where people will come into an area.
17 Their cell phone will hit the cell tower that we've sent an alert on, and they'll get the alert
18 six, eight hours later. And it's caused confusion because all of a sudden, people think
19 that there's a situation going on, when in fact, that was six or eight hours ago, and it's
20 done.

21 So it's not a perfect system, by any means, but it absolutely has the
22 benefits and we've seen the benefits of it. I've talked about situations where we've
23 deployed it and it's been great. It's a tool for us.

24 So there's all of these factors that need to be considered. And
25 every time we use it, we learn something new. So something simple as using the city,
26 because we have to say in the narrative what area we're talking about, so to use the
27 town -- the Sackville, to us, Sackville is Nova Scotia. Well, to other people, Sackville
28 might be Sackville, New Brunswick. So that is -- that -- all of these things have to go

1 into the decision -- pardon me, the decision-making process as to whether we're going
2 to deploy, and if we are, what -- when is the best time, the safest time to do that.

3 **MR. THOMAS MacDONALD:** So going back to your comments,
4 your evidence a moment ago about some of those folks in a rural area, I assume, who
5 for the reasons you've outlined wouldn't get an alert, what has the RCMP done to try to
6 ensure that they do get some type of an alert, especially in rural areas?

7 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Certainly. So the one particular
8 instance -- pardon me -- I'm talking about is we had a police incident in Meat Cove, so
9 very, very rural, very remote area. And as soon as, in that instance, we deployed the
10 alert, and found out that it wasn't effective as it could be, given the cell -- pardon me, the
11 cell tower coverage, we reported that up to the province, as we do with any time we
12 deploy the Alert Ready system. We always report to the province for best practices, for
13 identifying shortcomings that all -- every time we use it, I said we learn something new.
14 In this particular case, we learned that the remoteness of the area that we were working
15 in was a challenge not only for just communications in general, cell coverage in general,
16 but it also impacted the Alert system. So work is now being -- I'm not sure of the status
17 of it yet, but I know through our IMIT director that work was done to -- or work was going
18 to be looked at to see if they could improve cell coverage in that particular area.

19 **MR. THOMAS MacDONALD:** You mentioned this morning in your
20 evidence, you referenced Australia this afternoon, sorry, and your view was Australia
21 works with Alert Ready because they have -- and these are my words -- a system in
22 place. Do you know what the difference is? What do they have that we, as in Canada,
23 do not have? What does the Australian Federal Police, which I guess is the RCMP's
24 counterpart in Australia, have in terms of Alert Ready and its use that the RCMP doesn't
25 have?

26 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** So I would take it one step farther out
27 to say that I believe that it works there as well as it does for them because of the
28 governance and the structure they have at the federal level. So here in Canada,

1 Pelmorex, which is essentially the Weather Network, this is their system. So I think the
2 Australian expert that was here talking was -- that was surprising to him that a private
3 company would have overall governance over a public safety system. In Australia, the
4 difference is theirs is federal, and the federal -- the government oversees it. I believe
5 that there are changes that we can make in Canada to not mirror, essentially, but to
6 look at their systems and see why it works for them.

7 One of the other things that I talked about earlier today was their
8 public awareness. Everybody knows, from his -- from what he was saying, what public
9 alerting is. It's common language. Up until April 2020, it was not common language
10 here in Nova Scotia. We're doing the best we can to change that because we do see --
11 we want the public to understand when the police would use -- what -- first of all, what is
12 alerting, what can it do in public safety outside of weather events and floods or fires,
13 that kind of thing, wild brush fires? What can we do in Nova Scotia and across Canada
14 in public safety to raise awareness, to train people, to show them these are the
15 situations that alerting could be used, these are the -- these are the risks, these are the
16 benefits?

17 And when people are -- either come here or they live here and
18 they're -- the alert goes off on their phone, they know not to call 9-1-1. They know to
19 follow the instructions that is -- are given to them and then take action, whether it be
20 following social media.

21 And we're not just talking about police. This could be used for fire
22 agencies, it could be used for, really, any public service as long as all of those
23 processes are in place.

24 So we need that federal oversight. We need the support from --
25 from the federal government working hand in hand with agencies like Canadian
26 Association of Chiefs of Police to develop a robust system to support -- to support the
27 use of this tool.

28 **MR. THOMAS MACDONALD:** And do you know where that

1 potential or real federal government support stands today?

2 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I know there's work through the CACP,
3 that they've been working very hard to raise awareness, to get a seat at the table.

4 Here provincially, we've been doing this same. We have, like I
5 said, a strong working relationship with EMO and they get it. They get it because we
6 have done a lot of work with them to show them how -- how the using alerting isn't as
7 easy as it sounds when it comes to policing.

8 So EMO gets it, and they're doing what they can -- Paul Mason is
9 doing what he can at the SOREM table to get that word out there, but really, at the end
10 of the day, it's -- it -- this system belongs to a private company. Perhaps I feel like it
11 should be at the Public Safety Canada responsibility and that policing across the
12 country -- really, any public safety agency across -- organization across the country,
13 whether it's CCP or Paramedic Chiefs of Canada, whatever that looks like, that they
14 have a seat at the table and can work with Public Safety Canada to turn this into
15 something that Australia has.

16 **MR. THOMAS MACDONALD:** So is money the driver to come to a
17 bottom line? Is money the ---

18 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Money is always a driver, but in a
19 situation when it -- when it -- certainly when it comes to public safety, it has to be -- it
20 has to be the focus. The more we use it, we are happy to share all of our lessons
21 learned and we have done that all across the country. We've shared all our RCMP
22 divisions. We've shared with CACP.

23 And the more -- the more that police agencies learn, the better the
24 system is going to be to use as a tool.

25 **MR. THOMAS MACDONALD:** Those are my questions,
26 Superintendent. Thank you.

27 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Thank you.

28 **MR. THOMAS MACDONALD:** Thank you, Chief Commissioner.

1 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you, Mr. Macdonald.
2 Mr. Bryson?

3 **--- CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:**

4 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Good evening, Superintendent.

5 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Hi.

6 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** My name is Josh Bryson. I represent the
7 family of Peter and Joy Bond ---

8 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Nice to meet you.

9 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** --- who resided in Portapique.

10 Nice to meet you as well.

11 I'll try to be very expeditious. I know the hour, so I'll proceed with --
12 in haste here and try to communicate my questions.

13 So first, I just want to go back to the -- one of the concerns you
14 raised was the -- was the influx of 9-1-1 calls that would occur if the Alert Ready
15 program was used here.

16 So the local experience, are you relying on the April 24th incident
17 when the Ready Alert was used and then this other example where you said a website
18 crashed. Is that the empirical data you're using for the -- for the local experience of how
19 Nova Scotians would react?

20 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** There's more than that. There's more
21 examples than that.

22 So there's April 24th scenario that I already talked about, knowing
23 the call volume that we were dealing with on the 18th and 19th and then on June the
24 5th, there was an escaped prisoner that the province chose to issue an alert without
25 consultation with us. And in that case, we had another five minutes' notice, so we didn't
26 have time to call in extra resources ---

27 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Do we have stats on that one?

28 Sorry. I'll just interject as you're going through each example.

1 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Sure. Yeah. Certainly.

2 I don't have them right with me, but I can tell you just off the top of
3 my head because I presented to the province right after that incident -- shortly after that
4 incident and it was about the same 29 percent influx of calls that were abandoned.

5 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Can I just talk about the 29 percent
6 number and ---

7 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Sure.

8 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** --- then you can please continue, and I'll
9 make sure you can fully answer the questions.

10 But the 29 percent, my understanding of the 29 percent is you
11 referred to this number as abandoned calls. But essentially, what probative value does
12 the number have? Because it seems apparent that we don't know if these calls were, in
13 fact, processed or not.

14 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Yes, we can't tell that, but what it does
15 -- what the data does tell us is that there's an influx of calls and there's only so many
16 calls that we're able to answer and there's no way to go back and search some of those
17 calls if those people have hung up. But we do know that there is the overflow system.

18 So it tells us -- it tells us that there -- there is an influx of calls and
19 that in order to mitigate that, in order to make sure that we can answer as many calls as
20 we can, that we can meet the -- the benchmark of the Nova Scotia -- pardon me, the
21 EMO 9-1-1 MOU that we have, so that 90 percent calls in the first 10 seconds -- to be
22 able to mitigate that, we have now enacted all of these.

23 And we -- every time we deploy an alert, we do gather the stats
24 and, like I said before, there has been instances where there hasn't been that influx of
25 calls.

26 So for example, in the Meat Cove, there ---

27 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Sorry. Just before we move on ---

28 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Yeah.

1 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** --- again, just on the 29 percent, so
2 again, we don't know if, in fact, that 29 percent of calls could have been completely
3 processed.

4 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** We don't -- there's no way to tell.

5 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And it could also be that the overflow --
6 that that's a reflection of the fact that the overflow system actually works, that the other
7 call centres picked up the surplus of calls.

8 So I guess my point is, the 29 percent number's, I guess for our
9 purposes today, based on the information we have is kind of meaningless. Would you
10 agree?

11 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** No, I wouldn't agree with that at all,
12 actually. I would say that what it tells us, as I mentioned, is there is an influx of calls.
13 There's only so many that our call-takers can answer at a time. And hopefully any of
14 those calls that we have no -- no way to know if that person calling 9-1-1 and hung up
15 before we got to them was a legitimate 9-1-1 call where that person needed help.

16 So that's --- that's where the risk comes into play. It could -- we
17 would -- we don't want there to be a situation where somebody is calling 9-1-1 because
18 they need help and we can't get to them either because there's an influx of calls and
19 they hang up or ---

20 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** But do we know ---

21 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** --- we're already on the phone with a
22 9-1-1 caller, so that's where the risk lies for us.

23 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** But do we know that the 29 percent is
24 hang-ups?

25 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** We know that some of them will be
26 hang-ups and some of them will be calls that have gone to the overflow, but there's no
27 way to tell who hung up because that's -- that's the way the 9-1-1 system works.

28 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** So at this stage, we don't know if it's one

1 percent of callers, .1 percent of callers that hung up.

2 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** There's no way to tell.

3 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay.

4 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** We just get that -- that number.

5 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. So the June 5th experience ---

6 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** As far -- as far as I'm concerned, one
7 missed call is one too many.

8 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** The June 5th experience, you said that
9 there was an influx of 9-1-1 calls as well?

10 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** There was, yeah.

11 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah.

12 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** And so that was the escapee where
13 the province issued the alert. In that case, we also saw an influx and, as I mentioned, it
14 was about the same 29 percent. And that one we learned a lot from because -- as did
15 the province, because it showed them that there has to be structure. There has to be
16 who's going to be the decision-maker on this.

17 It can't be somebody else deciding for us because they have no
18 awareness, they have no training, they have no knowledge of the impact on police
19 operations, so that was very important -- a very important learning point for them.

20 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** So same thing with that, 29 percent,
21 we're not able to interpret ---

22 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Same thing.

23 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** --- that data?

24 Okay. Anything else besides the June 5th and the April 24th?

25 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** We have -- we've had several.

26 There was another situation where shortly after the province was
27 going to issue an alert for a dog that had, unfortunately, attacked its owner and she was
28 -- she died from her injuries, thankfully, the education that we have put in place for them

1 at that time, they learned that that was not a good idea.

2 So every time that there's an alert, we gather the stats and we look
3 at them. And as I mentioned, there has been times where [inaudible - audio failure] but
4 there certainly has been times when we have. And those are the -- those are the times
5 that are -- we are trying to raise awareness to show other agencies that this is a reality,
6 this is what you have to be ready for.

7 And certainly in a situation where there is more dense population or
8 the geographic area that's chosen to send the alert out in may be a small geographic
9 area, a small rural geographic area, so there's not a lot of people that it may impact,
10 those are situations where we tend to see the numbers -- we don't tend to see the
11 impact on the 9-1-1 system. Where we do see it is in the larger urban areas, or if we --
12 if an alert were to go out province-wide. That's when we get a huge influx.

13 So those are all the learning pieces that I have been talking about.
14 So every time we issue an alert, we really do concentrate on where the area is, what
15 kind of area is, are we talking rural or, you know, a densely populated area because if
16 that's the case, that's going to affect the 9-1-1 calls that are coming in and that's where
17 we certainly make the efforts to enact our SOP.

18 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Do we have any examples where the
19 data has been interpreted -- interpreted so we can -- we can apply some meaning to
20 the numbers?

21 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Through EMO, that would -- that would
22 be -- I would point you to EMO for that.

23 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay, yeah.

24 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I -- I don't think that they're going to
25 give you -- be able to give you any more information than I already have, but ---

26 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. But you don't have any sitting
27 here today, do you? Any examples where the data, the 29-percent has been
28 interpreted, defined to know exactly what percentages hang-ups, what percentage was

1 successfully transferred?

2 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** No, because we've asked for that -- we
3 asked for that data, actually, right after April 24th, and this was -- this was the
4 information that they could give us.

5 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah. Thanks. So my next -- my next
6 question, so here's the thing I wish to discuss. I don't know if we're giving Nova
7 Scotians enough credit in terms of how they're going to deal with an alert or with an
8 emergency situation or a critical incident and how they're going to react. So I just want
9 to pose this to you:

10 So we do have some experience, in fact, we can look at this mass
11 casualty as an experience; right?

12 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** M'hm.

13 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** We have -- from April 18th at 10:00 p.m.
14 to April 19th at 11:30, we have 1,500 9-1-1 calls, that's over thirteen-and-a-half hours,
15 and we saw firsthand how Nova Scotians reacted over the course of that thirteen-
16 and-a-half hours. So you would agree that 1,500 calls does represent an influx of 9-1-1
17 calls?

18 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Absolutely.

19 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And did you -- did you peruse the 9-1-1
20 calls?

21 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I listened ---

22 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah.

23 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** --- to every single one.

24 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And would you agree that of the 1,500
25 calls there might have been two or three that I'd put into the category of perhaps
26 diverting -- like -- for lack of a better term "nuisance calls"?

27 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I would -- I would say there was more
28 than that.

1 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** You would -- okay.

2 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I went through every one, and I
3 actually prepared a report of every call and the reason why they were calling, and it was
4 everything from -- it was -- it was interesting. On one of the Foundational Documents, I
5 don't remember which one, there was calls coming in from New York State Police, and
6 at the time we had no -- there -- the entire time there was no indication that the
7 perpetrator was headed that way. So we had repeated calls from them. We had calls
8 from people wanting to walk their dog. We had calls from people asking what's going
9 on, that they saw the Facebook messages. We had calls from, once the tweets went
10 out about the police car, we had calls saying -- and these certainly were not ---

11 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And we actually have them too.

12 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** --- what I would consider nuisance
13 calls.

14 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** We actually do have them too, so ---

15 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Okay, good.

16 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** --- they have been an exhibit. I won't
17 take you through them, but my -- and I was suggesting to you that there was a very,
18 very small percentage of calls that were actually what I'd put into the category of
19 perhaps wasting resources to some, but that would be a very small percentage.

20 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** You have to -- you have to bear in
21 mind there's the 9-1-1 calls that are coming in, but there's also the police emergency
22 line, so the hand-off calls. So when I was talking about the overflow, those calls come
23 back into our OCC from another PSAP on the overflow line so it doesn't look like an
24 E911 call when it comes in. So -- and then there is also the routine calls, which in the --
25 that particular case were the lowest priority calls. So there's the 9-1-1 calls, there is the
26 9-1-1 hand-off line, there is also a police emergency line.

27 So there's a bunch of -- there's a bunch of phone calls coming into
28 the OCC that we have to answer. It may not look like an E911, but it's just as important

1 as an incoming 9-1-1 call.

2 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** I'm going to move on to -- so the OCC,
3 so you have overall responsibility for the OCC; is that correct?

4 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** It's one of my units I was responsible
5 for.

6 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yes. So I just want to briefly take a few
7 minutes and talk about BOLOs.

8 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** M'hm.

9 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** BOLOs are issued by the OCC; is that ---

10 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** They are.

11 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. So perhaps we can just pull up
12 4025. It's been marked as an exhibit previously.

13 So I don't believe we've heard yet, in terms of -- so the content
14 that's used to generate a BOLO -- so this is a BOLO that was generated. I'll just give
15 you a moment to read it. I don't know if you've looked at this recently or not.

16 This is the first BOLO that was issued on April 19th, 1:07 a.m.

17 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Okay.

18 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And it went on CPIC.

19 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Okay.

20 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah. So who decides the content that
21 goes into this particular BOLO?

22 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** The dispatchers usually draft the
23 BOLOs. They don't need direction in what the content is. They do this multiple times a
24 day, every day, every shift.

25 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Who provides with with the situational
26 awareness to make sure that the BOLOs reflect the severity of the situation that's
27 unfolding?

28 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** It can come from multiple areas. It can

1 come from their catalogue. So there is, like a running log in the dispatch system, and
2 that's where all the updates come in. It could come from that. It could -- there could be
3 pieces from that, there could be pieces from phone calls being made. In this particular
4 case, there is obviously licence plates involved, so the information would come from the
5 JEIN system where we run the plates and find out who the registered owner is. It could
6 come from the Risk Manager, it could come from the District Supervisor, so in this case
7 it could come from the Command Post. There's a variety of different areas that this
8 information could come from.

9 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah. Okay. Do you know who
10 prepared this one?

11 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I believe it -- well, it says Allie on the
12 bottom, and she was an employee for us.

13 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** On the Dispatch side?

14 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I believe she worked Dispatch Support
15 Desk.

16 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. Do you know if she consulted with
17 the Risk Manager or anyone else in a Command position to ---

18 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I don't, no.

19 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay.

20 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Unfortunately, she's -- she's moved on,
21 so I couldn't even ask her if I wanted to.

22 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** So looking at this particular BOLO,
23 knowing what you know now, do you think it reflected the severity of the situation at the
24 time, as of 1:07 a.m. in Portapique?

25 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** From what I know ---

26 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah.

27 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** --- there is a lot of information in there.
28 And the purpose of BOLOs is to go out to other police agencies to let them to be on the

1 lookout, obviously, for these vehicles, this is what we're dealing with. So the -- the
2 reason for the BOLOs is to disseminate that information. There's certainly a lot of
3 information in there.

4 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah. Okay. So my concern is that at
5 that time, we can see through notes, that the Risk Managers and other Commanding
6 Officers were aware that were at least two to three deceased persons, and that's
7 actually in this Foundational Document at paragraph 47, I believe; there was two
8 attempted homicides; and there were multiple structures that were burning in
9 Portapique. The perpetrator, himself, was last seen being mobile after shooting at two
10 victims.

11 So that in your view is a -- based on those facts, that would be a
12 sufficient BOLO to advise other policing agencies of the severity?

13 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I would say yes, not knowing what was
14 going on in the -- in the situation at the time, but certainly from this BOLO there's --
15 there is a lot of information there.

16 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. Not knowing what's going on, but
17 I've just given you what's -- what was going on at the time.

18 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** M'hm.

19 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** So would you -- you -- you're still
20 comfortable with this particular BOLO?

21 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** The purpose is to get the information
22 about the vehicles and find him, so yes.

23 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah. So for example, what would the
24 perpetrator be arrested for here using this BOLO?

25 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Well, it doesn't say, but I'm assuming,
26 if looking at the time...

27 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** That stamp is wrong, we know.

28 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Is that midnight?

1 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** We know it's 1:07.

2 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** One o'clock?

3 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah.

4 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** So there is obviously the -- the SOC
5 subject of complaint, believed to be armed and dangerous and arrestable, so for the
6 incident in progress. So that would tell us, as police officers, that there's a -- knowing
7 what's going on, there's multiple homicides, he'd be arrested for homicide.

8 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. It doesn't say homicide there,
9 though, does it?

10 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** No.

11 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** I'm talking ---

12 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** But we, as police officers, especially in
13 the area that we're talking about, we would know that it was for homicide.

14 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** But this is for the benefit of other policing
15 agencies; right? This is a CPIC BOLO that goes out to HRM, Truro ---

16 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** M'hm.

17 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** --- right? So they might not necessarily
18 know, they may not have the situational awareness that your members on the ground
19 have; correct?

20 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Correct. However, knowing that it's an
21 active shooter situation, me, reading that, not knowing anything, anything about the
22 situation, if it's an active shooter as a police officer and that he is believed to be armed
23 and dangerous and arrestable, that tells me it's gun related and that, active shooter,
24 then there's farms, he shot somebody. So we can -- we can -- any police officer could
25 arrest him for one offence, and then update that if more information needs to be done
26 shortly after.

27 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And do you see a name there as to who
28 they're arresting?

1 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** SOC is the perpetrator.

2 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Is there a name?

3 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Yeah.

4 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And you don't have to read the name.

5 Am I missing that?

6 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Yeah, first line.

7 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Oh, yes, okay, yeah.

8 And so if this incident were to -- if there was another active shooter
9 incident where the perpetrator has murdered multiple people, set structures on fire,
10 attempted to murder other people, you'd be content with this BOLO going to other
11 policing agencies?

12 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** As an initial one, yes.

13 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** You wouldn't change anything on this
14 BOLO?

15 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** If that's the information they had, then
16 that's what they had.

17 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. Thank you. I'm going to move on
18 to -- I just want to look at the call-taking process.

19 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** M'hm.

20 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** So throughout this, we've heard some
21 evidence and many of us have raised some concerns about delays in the call-taking
22 process. Have any steps been taken to mitigate delays in the call taking and
23 dispatching process?

24 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I don't know that I'm following your
25 question.

26 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. So I can give you a few
27 examples. Okay. So let's start with the very first call, the 10:01 p.m. April 18th call.

28 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** M'hm.

1 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** That call came in at 10:01. It wasn't
2 relayed to the risk manager until 10:04; okay? The next morning, Wentworth, when the
3 perpetrator was once again active, we know that he called 9-1-1 at roughly 9:35, and
4 that wasn't dispatched until 9:42, roughly. And I'm going -- it's in that range. It might be
5 9:34, it might be 9:43 when it was actually relayed, but there's 7, 8 minutes there.
6 Going back to that night, we know that when Mr. Ellison called looking for his sons ---

7 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** M'hm.

8 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** --- reporting that one of his sons was
9 shot, he called at 10:59. We know that that wasn't relayed until 11:09 to dispatch.
10 Glenholme, the Fisher residence, 2896, we know that -- and that was a complaint of
11 ERT that the call wasn't dispatched promptly, that the perpetrator was on site, and that
12 the 9-1-1 caller had been on the phone with the 9-1-1 system for under 2 minutes, but
13 seconds matter, as we know ---

14 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** M'hm.

15 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** --- from this mass casualty. So there's
16 four examples of -- and I'm just picking four at random. So is there anything that has
17 been done to streamline this, to improve the call taking to dispatch side?

18 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** There's always -- we're always open to
19 improvement. That's the nature of public service and public safety and policing is no
20 different. So this -- thank you for enlightening me to those situations. I don't have the
21 exact times in front of me, nor could I comment, other than to say that when a 9-1-1 call
22 comes in, the call takers have an ability to start the file and send it to dispatch
23 immediately, bare bones, and then they can continue to work on the file, even though
24 it's over on the dispatch side. So in those circumstances, I don't know what was
25 happening around them. I don't know -- without actually digging into every single one of
26 those calls and looking at the seconds that were happening around it, and being able to
27 read the CAD log to know when it was posted, what information was being input at the
28 time, and then to go on to the dispatch side and be able to review the dispatcher's

1 actions and the calls -- or the -- pardon me, the steps that were used to process that
2 call, I couldn't tell you right off the top of my head.

3 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. So perhaps I should start with
4 this, do you identify that as an issue that should be addressed?

5 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** It depends. It depends on what's
6 going on. As I mentioned, there's only one person can answer one 9-1-1 call at a time,
7 so resourcing is always a challenge in the OCC. For the past several years, we've been
8 putting in business cases to the province to ask for more resources. Back in 2016, we
9 had a -- 2016 or 2014, we had a workload study to say that the RCMP/OCC was 7
10 positions short. Every year we would ask for more positions, more positions. In 2018
11 and 2019, I asked for a workload study to be able to compare the amount of work that
12 goes through our centre versus the amount of resources we have. And again, in both of
13 those cases, I believe it was 2018 was 8 people short, 2019 was 7 people short.

14 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** I'm just asking you if you identify it as an
15 issue that needs to be looked into.

16 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** It's -- every opportunity is room for
17 improvement, so ---

18 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay.

19 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** --- yeah, I would be happy to look into
20 that.

21 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah, and would you identify it as a
22 problem that should be addressed?

23 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** It depends what the situation is.

24 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. What about the situation that --
25 we don't know if the perpetrator was once again active, that we didn't know if he was
26 contained in Portapique until he once again committed a homicide, and they got a call
27 that he was in Wentworth at 9:34. That wasn't relayed until 9:42. So he -- that's one
28 example where he had a seven, eight-minute head start again after killing someone,

1 and the 9-1-1 call was reporting a deceased person on the side of the road. So I see
2 that as an obvious problem that the province is on hold, wondering where this individual
3 is. We now know he's once again active, and it takes seven minutes to get that relayed
4 to first responders. Do you now see that as an obvious problem?

5 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Ms. MacPhee?

6 **MS. PATRICIAL MacPHEE:** Thank you. I'm just going to object to
7 that question. My friend has asked that several times and the witness has answered it
8 already. He's asked several times about that particular call, and whether she views it as
9 a problem, whether she identified it as a problem, and I think she's answered it now
10 twice, maybe three times.

11 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Yeah, thank you. He's -- at least
12 for me, Mr. Bryson, I'm going to -- I would allow the question because you went around
13 it several times vis-à-vis that call, but you put it to the witness seven minutes, that
14 particular incident, and added the fact that more circumstances, so I'll allow it. But
15 you've pretty well gone through that ---

16 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Thank you.

17 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** --- aspect of it.

18 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah.

19 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** We'll allow that one question.

20 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Thank you. Thank you. Go ahead,
21 Superintendent.

22 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Sorry, can you ask the question again?

23 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Sure. The whole thing?

24 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Just the little bit.

25 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah. So I outlined the circumstances
26 that -- about the perpetrator not knowing if he was active, not knowing where he was, if
27 he was still contained ---

28 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** M'hm.

1 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** --- and then the 9-1-1 call coming in at
2 9:34 roughly. We can look at the call logs and confirm the time, but it was 9:34, and
3 then it not being dispatched until 9:42, so that's 7, 8 minutes that the perpetrator had a
4 head start on all first responders in the province. So my question is, so there's a
5 breakdown between the call taker's side and the dispatch, I'm asking you if that's an
6 obvious problem that should be addressed ---

7 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Well, part of that problem has already
8 been addressed. As I mentioned before, we now have a brand-new centre that's all one
9 room, completely open. There's much more situational awareness. We talked about
10 the boards that -- the large monitor screens, they're huge. They take up the whole wall.
11 And any information that we have can be broadcast up to those screens. In addition,
12 our new workstations have, we call them stop lights. There's lights on the desk that if a
13 call taker is taking an emergency call that they feel their supervisor or the risk manager
14 needs to know about right away, they can change the colour of that light to red, and you
15 can see it from a mile away. So the supervisor and risk manager will know that that
16 particular call taker is dealing with something significant, so that they would be tuned in
17 to that immediately. As far as the time, again, I don't have the data in front of me. I
18 would be certainly happy to look into that.

19 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** So steps have been taken?

20 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Yes, absolutely.

21 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** The other issue, just on the call taking
22 and dispatch side, I'm just curious, is it not the practice of the risk manager to ever listen
23 to 9-1-1 calls when there's some ambiguity as to whether this is a nuisance call or
24 whether it's in fact a real call?

25 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Unfortunately, we used to have a
26 quality assurance employee working with us. She would be able to listen to calls after
27 the fact. That was her job to -- so anything like a domestic, domestic violence or
28 anything -- any of the more serious calls, she would listen to after the fact. It's

1 interesting that you're asking me this question because I had the same question from
2 the ESDC team that interviewed me. Ideally, if we had the resources, we would have
3 somebody in the centre, in a situation like this, listening to all the calls right away. We
4 don't have that luxury. We just don't have the resources.

5 As far as the risk manager, if there are situations where there's
6 ambiguity or it's not clear to the dispatcher or the risk manager, they have the ability to
7 listen to that call after the fact. After the call's finished, they can listen to it. It doesn't
8 happen very often, because often in serious situations -- and it's certainly in this
9 particular situation, the risk manager was fully tasked.

10 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Did that raise any concerns with you?
11 Just looking back, you said you read the comms, and seeing that several people right
12 until 10:22 or so are surmising that this could be a mental health call, but no one's going
13 back and listening to the actual original 9-1-1 call where you can hear gunshots,
14 screaming, crying, "Help me" and the line being disconnected?

15 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** There's -- I don't think it's fair that you
16 pose it that way only because in policing, we need to be able ---

17 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** I'm sorry, Mr. -- I'm watching the
18 witness and I don't see you.

19 **MS. PATRICIA MacPHEE:** I'm going to object to my friend's
20 question here. I don't think he's laid a foundation.

21 I mean, the suggestion that the call-takers were some -- under
22 some misapprehension that it is a mental health call, I'd like to see the support for that
23 statement he's putting to this witness.

24 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Lay the -- more detail, Mr.
25 Bryson.

26 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Sure.

27 So we have -- there's been evidence before this Commission, and I
28 can refer you back to the very first Foundational Document and Mr. Burrill's presentation

1 -- I don't know the paragraph, but where Mr. Burrill -- and it's cited in the Foundational
2 Document that gunshots could be heard in the actual 9-1-1 call. Okay.

3 All we have transmitted in the Colchester comms is that the caller
4 reports hearing the sound of gunshots, so there's an objective observation that could be
5 made by a trained investigator in regard to the true extent of the call by listening to the
6 call, so that's -- that's the foundation. There is evidence.

7 And you've -- have you listened to the 9-1-1 call yourself?

8 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I have.

9 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Could you hear the gunshots?

10 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Knowing what I know now, yes,
11 certainly.

12 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. So there's -- Mr. Commissioner, I
13 would suggest the foundation's been laid.

14 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** You can pose the question.

15 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah. Thank you.

16 So knowing that, knowing you went back, heard the calls and so
17 given the ambiguity that it was apparent to several first responders and perhaps the risk
18 manager as to whether this was a nuisance call or not, i.e. mental health related, do you
19 have concerns that no one went back and actually listened to that 9-1-1 call?

20 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Again, I can -- I feel like I've answered
21 your question already a couple times.

22 We don't -- in -- having been a dispatcher myself and having taken
23 calls where people have been shot on the phone, I can tell you it's not easy to pick up.
24 It's easy to go back in hindsight and say, "Oh, yeah, that was -- that was a gunshot". At
25 the time in the heat of the moment, it's -- it's difficult.

26 And in this particular case, I think that -- I don't think it's fair and I
27 don't think I can agree with you that our call-takers, our dispatchers, our risk manager
28 were focused on the fact that this was a mental health call. That is certainly something

1 that they would consider just like any police -- any police officer has to be open to any
2 theory. That's what we do in policing. That's what -- how we run investigations.

3 We can't have tunnel vision. We don't go into an investigation
4 saying that's -- that's the perpetrator, I'm going to backtrack until I can prove that that's
5 the perpetrator. No, no.

6 We go in with an open mind and we gather the information, we
7 gather the evidence in front of us.

8 In this particular case, if the call-taker didn't pick up on the -- what
9 was a gunshot in the first place, it's easy to armchair quarterback. If, ideally, we had the
10 ability -- or pardon me, the resources to be able to listen to every single call, then we
11 would. We'd be happy to do it.

12 I'd be happy to hire that -- hire enough people right away to do that.
13 That would be fantastic.

14 But I don't think -- I don't quite agree with you, I'm sorry, for that.

15 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah. Okay.

16 So I'm not even sure if you addressed my question. I was just --
17 you read the comms and you see there's several references to mental health; correct?

18 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** That was one ---

19 **MS. PATRICIA MacPHEE:** Sorry. I'm going to renew my objection
20 here.

21 I think that -- let's be clear about what the comms said. I don't
22 believe the call-taker ever suggested this was a mental health call. I think there was a
23 question from a member.

24 Now I'm giving evidence as well, but I believe that is in the
25 Foundational Document, but perhaps we could bring it up if we're going to go back over
26 the same ground again and clarify.

27 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Yeah. I don't think it's -- I don't
28 think it's necessary to bring it up and I don't think it's giving evidence if you're laying a

1 foundation based upon evidence to that which has already been relayed either through
2 a Foundational Document or otherwise.

3 **MS. PATRICIA MacPHEE:** The point being is that Mr. -- my friend
4 is talking about the call-taker mistaking this or suggesting it might be a mental health
5 call. What I'm suggesting is that it was a member who ---

6 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Yeah, you're ---

7 **MS. PATRICIA MacPHEE:** --- asked whether it was, perhaps, a
8 mental health call.

9 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Right. You're absolutely right.
10 You're absolutely right. But I thought the question was it was noted
11 somewhere.

12 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** That's correct. And if I said the call-taker
13 said it was mental health related, then I mis-spoke. I didn't ---

14 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Yeah. It was not the call-taker
15 saying that, but I think you were referring to notes that were ---

16 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Notes and the -- you can see MHA in the
17 ---

18 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** All right. So how about making
19 that clear and we'll get an answer to that question.

20 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** So between 10:01, so -- between 10:04
21 and 10:22 there's several references to whether this caller was MHA or not. Okay?

22 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** And where are those
23 references?

24 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** So in COMM3886. I'm not sure the
25 exhibit number.

26 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** No, I'm sorry. I'm not asking you
27 which exhibit.

28 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay.

1 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Just tell the witness where the
2 call-taker would have seen those references or would have been aware of those
3 references.

4 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** So this would be on the dispatch side.
5 The dispatch side ---

6 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Yes, the dispatch.

7 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yes. On the dispatch side in one of the
8 first -- I don't have the document right here.

9 Three eight oh six (3806). I'm not sure what number I said.

10 There's -- I'm sure if I sat for a moment I could -- yes, okay. Here's
11 one here. Constable Merchant, "Did the call-taker think that this could be MHA?". That
12 was at 10:19. There's one example.

13 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Okay. So that would -- is -- was
14 mentioned. That would be one of the police officers making that comment.

15 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah. And then it says, "Nothing to
16 indicate that about the person being MHA". There's ---

17 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** So that would be ---

18 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Mr. Bryson -- I'm sorry,
19 Superintendent.

20 Mr. Bryson, you're going to have to -- if you're going to pose the
21 question, it has to be something that the -- that the person -- the dispatcher was aware
22 of as opposed to what a police officer may have been aware. And that's what I thought
23 was the premise of your question.

24 Is that the premise of your question?

25 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** No. No, the premise of my question,
26 Commissioner, is the fact that there was some speculating early on as to whether -- by
27 responders, by everyone that this call would be mental health related and that the risk
28 manager did not go back and listen to the actual 9-1-1 call that could have disabused

1 him of the notion that this, in fact, was MHA and remove that from the ---

2 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** So you're talking about
3 knowledge that the risk manager had.

4 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** I'm talking about the ability of the risk
5 manager to go back and listen ---

6 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Okay.

7 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** --- and that's what I'm putting to the
8 witness, that this speculation about mental health certainly occupied the airwaves. We
9 can see it in the comms, and I'm asking the witness about policy around the risk
10 manager going back and listening to the actual 9-1-1 tape to disabuse himself and his
11 other responders of that belief.

12 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Ms. MacPhee.

13 **MS. PATRICIA MacPHEE:** First of all, I think it's important, and I
14 think my friend has mentioned it, that at the outset when the question was posed to Mr.
15 Merchant -- or Constable Merchant that there was a response that there's nothing to
16 indicate that this is an MHA call by the call-taker.

17 Further, I think I have to question the relevance of the line of
18 questioning because is there a suggestion that, you know, this early question by
19 Constable Merchant slowed down the response. I think we've covered that ground. I
20 think it's been established that when the call went out, the members were on their way
21 there immediately.

22 There was no delay and there was -- this ground has been covered
23 in earlier testimony, so putting it to Inspector Rodier in a piecemeal fashion isn't fair for
24 her to comment.

25 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you, Ms. MacPhee.

26 I'll take one final attempt to allow you to have the answer to I think
27 the question you're asking.

28 If you want to ask the witness if the risk manager is speculating or

1 concerned that it might be a mental health call, should the risk manager go back and
2 listen to the tape. Is that your question?

3 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** That's -- that's fair, Commissioner.

4 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** All right.

5 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Thank you.

6 So go ahead, Superintendent.

7 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Not necessarily because that wouldn't
8 change how we respond to any call. Even if turned out to be an MHA call, we're still
9 going to respond the same way.

10 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. It's not going to impact your
11 decision to deploy assets, resources?

12 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** No. No.

13 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Whether it's mental health or not?

14 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** No. It comes into our risk assessment
15 once we get there, certainly. It's -- it may affect how the members think as they're doing
16 their risk assessment approaching the scene, that kind of thing. It's a factor that they
17 have to take into consideration, but it's certainly not going to change their response.

18 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Or anyone's response.

19 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Pardon me?

20 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Or the risk manager's response.

21 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** No.

22 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay.

23 **SUPT DUSTIN RODIER:** No. We're going to treat it just as
24 seriously as we would anything else.

25 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah, yeah. Thank you. So my next
26 question is in regards to -- we'll stick with the Comms for a second. So we have a
27 transmission from Constable Colford about another way out of Portapique, another way
28 out. That's it's apparent from evidence we've heard, no one apparently heard that

1 particular transmission.

2 So my question to you is where is this information supposed to go?

3 When a member comes across this new information, like this important detail that
4 there's another way out of Portapique, when one of your objectives is containment ---

5 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** M'hm.

6 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** --- where in the OCC is this supposed to
7 go?

8 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** So that would come over the radio.

9 The dispatcher would take any -- any information that comes from the members to the
10 dispatcher, the dispatcher takes that information and will ensure that they -- it's updated.

11 Whether that information was passed on to the Risk Manager, I don't know, I wasn't -- I
12 wasn't there and I would love to have the call log in front of me to be able to explain it.

13 But ideally, if there is a situation where information is coming in, it's going to everybody
14 on the road so everybody hears it, and then if decisions need to be made with that
15 information then so be it.

16 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** So it's broadcast and there is no other
17 mechanism to ensure that this information is maintained and the continuity and the flow
18 of information, no other systems in place?

19 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I would ask you if the dispatcher
20 responded to that request or responded to that information? Because I don't know off
21 the top of my head.

22 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah. Let's -- does it matter if they did or
23 not?

24 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** It does matter because ---

25 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay.

26 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** --- that would tell me that if a member
27 says something on the air and it's not -- it's something of importance that it's not
28 acknowledged, if it was me, I would go back on the air and repeat it or make sure that

1 the dispatcher heard me, and then the dispatcher would respond that they heard me.
2 So in this particular case, I don't know what the dispatcher said. If they said something
3 in response that would mean to me that they heard it ---

4 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah.

5 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** --- and whatever steps they took with
6 that information afterwards. But if that response wasn't there, then perhaps that
7 transmission didn't come through or wasn't heard.

8 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah. So my question is actually quite
9 simple, it's what's supposed to happen with this information upon its receipt.

10 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** It goes to everybody depending on the
11 situation. So in this particular case, I don't know -- I don't know off the top of my head at
12 what point in the night that was, so if the -- Staff Sergeant Halliday and, you know,
13 Sergeant O'Brien were in the Command Post at that point or it was still with the Risk
14 Manager, I don't know that. But certainly something like that would be important for
15 them setting up -- as they were -- you know, doing what they could to set up
16 containment, block all the entrances and exits. But I would -- I would be very interested
17 to find out if there was a response to that transmission.

18 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah. So where does the information
19 go?

20 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** It's just as I said, it would go to the
21 dispatcher, who would then pass it on to whoever was in charge, be it the Risk Manager
22 or ---

23 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Orally?

24 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Beg your pardon?

25 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Orally?

26 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** They would -- they would -- I would
27 expect that they would update the CAD and then say, you know, to the Risk Manager,
28 "Did you -- did you just hear that?"

1 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay.

2 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** "Did you hear that transmission?"

3 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** So the CAD system is -- that -- that's the
4 written record, then, that, if heard and received, it's supposed to be transmitted to CAD?

5 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** It could be, depending on the situation.
6 Again, I can -- I can sit here and "What if?", we can sit here and "What if?" all day but
7 without having the information, without knowing exactly the scenario that you're -- that
8 you're asking me to answer to, I don't have that information. I'm doing my best to try to
9 answer it for you.

10 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Did you see it in the CAD system, that
11 reference to ---

12 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I haven't read the CAD log.

13 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. Yeah, did you know about that,
14 the fact that apparently many commanding officers missed this information conveyed by
15 Constable Colford about a second way out?

16 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I didn't know that until, actually I
17 believe it was Staff Sergeant Rehill's testimony I think I learned that.

18 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah. And are there any systems in
19 place to prevent that from happening in the future, just off the top again?

20 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Certainly. We have -- you would have
21 heard them talk about Pictometry. We do have our Critical Incident Operations room.
22 We have got the situational boards in the -- in the OCC. If we want to put a map up on
23 the wall that's 12-feet by 24-feet tall and wide we can do that.

24 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah. Sorry, you're talking about the
25 actual substantive nature of the information. I'm just talking about the continuity of the
26 information itself, the fact that it was overlooked by many commanding officers. So my
27 question is have there been any changes in place to make sure that important
28 information that's received is maintained by the chain of command?

1 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Are you talking the Risk Managers?

2 Are you talking the Command Post? Because those are two different questions.

3 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah, both.

4 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** So I can't comment on the Command
5 Post. I can talk about the Risk Managers and the OCC. If that information was known
6 to Staff Sergeant Rehill, if he had heard it, yeah, if the dispatcher had heard it, if the
7 information was available to Staff Sergeant Rehill, then he would have taken action. I
8 don't know about the Command Post because I don't have involvement in that.

9 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Right. So if he heard it, he likely would
10 have noted it in a CAD?

11 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** He probably wouldn't have noted it in a
12 CAD, but he certainly would have noted it in the perimeter.

13 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah. Okay, I'm almost done. Thank
14 you. Just -- it wasn't clear, on the 18th, did you make any decisions on April 18th,
15 2020?

16 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Operational decisions?

17 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Any decisions at all in regards to this
18 mass casualty?

19 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** No. I wasn't involved on the 18th.

20 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. And what about the 19th?

21 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** The 19th? I made the decision to go
22 into the OCC myself ---

23 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yes?

24 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** --- and then I made the -- in
25 consultation with the Support Services Officer, to -- further attempts to try and get air
26 support back up off the ground. And then also, with respect ---

27 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Sorry, what was that decision you made?

28 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** To -- with the Support Services Officer.

1 It wasn't until I got there that I found out that the helicopter was no longer in the air. So
2 once I got there and learned that, then it was working with the supervisor to see if we
3 could get another option, JRCCs, somebody to get a helicopter up -- back up in the air
4 for us.

5 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** No. Sorry, I'm asking if you actually had
6 to make any decisions, though, in your role, if you had to make any decisions in regards
7 to this incident?

8 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Well, the only -- the only decision
9 would have been the call from across the room from Steve Ettinger about the alerting.

10 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And that was to go through Support
11 Services? Is that the ---

12 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Strategic Communications.

13 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Strategic Communications.

14 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Yeah.

15 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And just -- I keep seeing the name
16 Archie Thompson. It's superintendent?

17 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Retired.

18 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Retired? Okay. Did you see him on the
19 18th or 19th?

20 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** No.

21 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. Was he supposed to be at the
22 OCC or at the Command Centre?

23 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** There wouldn't be any reason for him
24 to be at the OCC. As far as the Command Post, I don't -- I don't know. I don't have
25 any involvement with the Command Post.

26 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Was his absence noted by anyone, that
27 he should be here?

28 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I don't know, I wasn't there.

1 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. Did you -- you didn't hear that by
2 anyone?

3 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** No.

4 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. And if he was there, do you know
5 what his role would have been?

6 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Well, as the District Policing Officer, he
7 would be there to support his -- the Northeast Nova Team.

8 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** That's all my questions. Thank you very
9 much.

10 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you, Mr. Bryson.
11 Ms. Miller?

12 **--- CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. TARA MILLER:**

13 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Thank you, Superintendent Rodier. My name
14 is Tara Miller. With my colleague, Alix Digout, we represent a family member of Kristen
15 Beaton.

16 Just a few things I want to go over.

17 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Sure.

18 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Your arrival as Inspector at the OCC came in
19 2018; correct?

20 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** To the role? Yes.

21 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Yes, thank you. And Glen Byrne would have
22 been before, like he would have been at OCC before your arrival; correct?

23 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** As the Commander, yes.

24 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Yeah. And my understanding from your
25 evidence is that he was pretty critical in terms of onboarding you and he's been sort of --
26 you two have worked very closely since that time, moving ---

27 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Yes.

28 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- forward on a variety of things? Okay. And

1 I also understood your evidence to be that prior to the mass casualty that you had no
2 understanding of any public alerting system that could be used by the RCMP?

3 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** That's correct.

4 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. Did you have an understanding that
5 there was a public alerting system?

6 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Only like everybody else when I would
7 get a test on my phone.

8 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. And did Mr. Byrne share with you any
9 information from his prior knowledge to your arrival about involvement with the public
10 alerting and the ability for the RCMP to utilise that?

11 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** No.

12 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. So I'm going to have Madam Registrar
13 bring up an exhibit, P1274.

14 And these are -- it's a series of minutes from the PSAP manager's
15 quarterly meeting, and this one was from March of 2016 with Mr. Byrne in attendance.
16 And if we could scroll down, Madam Register -- Registrar, and I apologize, I don't have
17 the reference right in front of me, but if you can ---

18 Sorry. I know it's been a long day and I'm making it longer here.

19 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** That's okay. I understand.

20 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. I'm going to -- this is a -- this is
21 commentary here, this page, Superintendent, about the use of the Pelmorex system to
22 see how many stations are signed up for public alerting. And then moving on to public
23 alerting is,

24 "Moving forward, the CRTC is moving on fairly
25 quickly. This feature will allow public alerts to be sent
26 to cell phones in the event of." (As read)

27 And then EMO -- sorry, further down,

28 "EMO's emergency planning officers will be receiving

1 public alert training on Thursday." (As read)

2 So, Mr. Byrne didn't share any of this information with you when
3 you arrived in terms of information of the Public Alert system?

4 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** We didn't have this conversation when
5 I arrived in 2016, but I can tell you that since then, since April 18th, 19th, 2020, we have -
6 - that was obviously top of mind for really everybody in the Division, and Glen and I did
7 have ---

8 **MS. TARA MILLER:** I appreciate that.

9 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** --- many conversations about ---

10 **MS. TARA MILLER:** No, I appreciate that.

11 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** --- alerting, so prior to that, he, like all
12 the rest of us, believed -- knew, the only thing we knew about alerting had to do with
13 emergency measures and weather alerts, fires, floods, that kind of thing.

14 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. And then, Madam Registrar, if we
15 could bring up P-1273? And these are minutes from September of 2017. Now in
16 fairness, it does say that Mr. Byrne was -- sent his regrets in. Inspector Bill Long was
17 also noted to send his regrets from the RCMP. Who was Inspector Bill Long?

18 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** He was my predecessor.

19 **MS. TARA MILLER:** He was your predecessor at the ---

20 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** At the OCC.

21 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- as the inspector at OCC?

22 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Right.

23 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. And if we can go to item number nine,
24 Madam Registrar? And this is public alerting process, Rod Legge, with further detail
25 about the public alerting. If you can scan down? Action,

26 "Paul Perry will check with supervisors to see if
27 there's interest in having Rod Legge come to Cape
28 Breton to give a presentation." (As read)

1 And they talk about providing an overview to the HRM on public
2 alerting. Are you aware from either Mr. Byrne or your predecessor that there was an
3 offer to make a presentation to the RCMP with respect to this public alerting?

4 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** No, not prior. Prior to April 2020, I had
5 no knowledge of that.

6 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay.

7 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I don't know who Paul Perry is either
8 so.

9 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And then lastly, Madam Registrar, this is a
10 document that has not been exhibited yet, but it is minutes from an October 17th, 2018,
11 PSAP manager's quarterly meeting minutes.

12 And, Commissioners, this has been distributed to Participants and
13 Madam Registrar has a copy of that to pull up. Oh, you can't pull it up on the screen.
14 Thank you for the reminder.

15 This is a Wednesday, October 17th, 2018, minutes. It says that Mr.
16 Byrne and you, yourself, were in attendance at this quarterly meeting. Do you
17 remember being in attendance at this meeting?

18 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I don't.

19 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay.

20 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I'd have to -- I don't know what you're
21 looking at, so I'd have to see.

22 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Oh, I'm going to give the witness -- apologies,
23 I ---

24 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** I assume she has a copy?

25 **MS. TARA MILLER:** I don't believe she does, no. Thank you.

26 This, if you look at the first page, just that's your attendance noted
27 with Mr. Byrne, and then on the second page, this is new business. "There will be
28 public alerting tests on November 28th, 2018, at 1:55." Is that what you had referred to

1 earlier, your only knowledge about the public alerting was that there would be alerts
2 received in terms of testing?

3 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** That's correct.

4 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. You mentioned in your evidence
5 earlier today that when you arrived at the OCC, and you talked to the support services
6 officer, there was a conversation about the Cobequid Pass.

7 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** That was before. That was before I
8 got to the OCC.

9 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. And can you -- my notes recall that
10 you had spoke with Darren, who was the services support officer, and that both -- there
11 was a concern about the toll booths, but you learned that they both had -- that they had
12 been addressed.

13 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Yes.

14 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And so my question for you was why was
15 there concern about the toll booths?

16 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Because it was an access point to the
17 province.

18 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. So you were ---

19 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** And in that area, the northeast Nova
20 part of the province, so the toll booth was one of the areas of concern for the risk
21 manager that day, in that if this person was to -- able to get out of containment and
22 head north, the toll booth would be the obvious blocking point.

23 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And so you were concerned about the
24 Cobequid Pass and the toll booth for that reason for containment going north; correct?

25 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Yes, and I believe they had -- I believe
26 they actually had police cars posted at the toll booth.

27 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Yeah, we understand that. And did you make
28 any inquiries about other containment efforts to prevent access of the perpetrator from

1 travelling south?

2 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Not at that time. My call with -- my
3 calls with Bruce Briers were the questions coming from support services officer.

4 **MS. TARA MILLER:** M'hm.

5 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** So once those were addressed, it was
6 time for me to get into the OCC as soon as I could, to be able to facilitate any further
7 inquiries.

8 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Sorry, I'm not sure if I understood why you
9 weren't concerned with any access or containment on any access points travelling
10 south. Is it because it wasn't raised with you, or you didn't raise it with them?

11 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Both.

12 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay.

13 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Both, yeah.

14 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And were you aware at that time that there
15 had been a victim in Wentworth with a report that it was an RCMP vehicle that was
16 heading towards Truro?

17 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I don't know if I knew about Wentworth
18 because I can't remember what time that was in relation to when I arrived. But I do
19 remember the Truro concerns, because the Sobeys's Truro, the false alarm at the Truro
20 Sobeys's was certainly being dealt with at the OCC.

21 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. You also mentioned that when you -- I
22 believe when you arrived at OCC, but again, it may have been in your conversations
23 with the support services officer, that you were investigating the accessibility of the
24 helicopter. I think you said you were looking to get in touch with JRCC. Why were you,
25 at that point, investigating the accessibility of a helicopter?

26 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** That was tasking the supervisor when I
27 first got there.

28 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Yeah, and that was around 10:40 a.m.?

1 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I think so, yeah.

2 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Was it your understanding that there was no
3 helicopter access at all?

4 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I hadn't been updated on that. I
5 assumed that the helicopter was up in the air. And it wasn't until I got to the OCC and
6 spoke with Superintendent Campbell that I realized that we didn't have that asset any
7 longer. It had -- it was on the ground. So our focus then turned to what other options
8 do we have.

9 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. And do you know how long it had
10 been on the ground for?

11 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I don't know.

12 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. And were you aware that it wasn't an
13 RCMP helicopter that had initially been used, it was one from the Department of Lands
14 and Forests?

15 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Yes.

16 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. I'll just touch briefly on the work that
17 the RCMP has done more recently since the mass casualty with respect to alerting.
18 And my friend, Mr. MacDonald, talked about the differences, and you as well, the expert
19 we'd had from -- I think Mr. Hallows from Australia ---

20 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** M'hm.

21 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- and the system there and how it works.
22 You said -- what I wanted to ask you about was with respect to something that Mr.
23 Hallows said was actually a cornerstone of making the public alerting system in
24 Australia successful and that being public education, starting really from grade school.
25 And you had said, I think in response to my friend, "It's not common knowledge in Nova
26 Scotia. We're doing our best to change this." So what has the RCMP done to engage
27 in that public education that Mr. Hallows talked about that was critical for making sure
28 that people weren't going to overload the system with can I walk my dog, those types of

1 -- I understand they're practical concerns, but, you know, his evidence seemed to
2 suggest that there is actually an offset to this and it comes with really concerted focus,
3 public education. So what has the RCMP been doing to engage in that public education
4 piece?

5 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Certainly. And as for your -- the
6 comments made by Mr. Hallows; I couldn't agree more. I think that is -- it has to be
7 done. Unfortunately, the public education surrounding the 9-1-1 system and alerting,
8 really it belongs to EMO. So we've been encouraging them as much as we can so -- to
9 follow through with that, and I know Paul Mason's team is looking at it. We've had a
10 divisional working group, but then there's also the provincial working group, and on that
11 working group was Paul Mason, Department of Justice, our leadership, Nova Scotia
12 Chiefs of Police. And we went through -- they went through 23, I think,
13 recommendations to go to the Province, one of those being a robust public alert
14 awareness campaign.

15 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay.

16 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** And out of that provincial working
17 group, there was also a sub-working group that our strategic communications team,
18 Halifax, I believe their communications team, and the communications team from EMO
19 would -- they were the sub-working group to action what would that look like.

20 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay.

21 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** So we talked -- we had talked about a
22 video campaign, commercials, getting into schools. We talked about social media; we
23 talked about one of the -- I believe it was Paul Mason suggested one of the things that
24 they could do is actually hire a video crew to shoot, like, a public awareness or public
25 service campaign, public service announcement specifically on alerting.

26 As far as the status of that, the last meeting we had I believe was
27 within the last month or two, and that hadn't moved forward yet. But we're still hoping
28 that it does and we're still going to continue to work with EMO to see that that happens

1 because it's -- it is critically important.

2 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. So definitely working with EMO,
3 Emergency Measures Office, the RCMP's been doing that, but have you -- has the
4 RCMP taken any of its own initiative, outside of that collaboration with EMO, to educate
5 the public through its own communication channels, be that social media, publications
6 to the public; anything that you can think of?

7 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** So through social media -- well, we've
8 actually used the system which, you know, the more we use it, the more people become
9 more used to it in what situations.

10 As far as -- as far as from what we've done externally, it's difficult
11 because it's not our -- it's not our programme to really speak to. It would be like telling a
12 fire department to -- we're going to do, you know, a fire -- a big fire awareness
13 campaign and not include them. You understand what I mean? So ---

14 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Are you not able to issue your own alert, now,
15 though, as a ---

16 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** We are.

17 **MS. TARA MILLER:** You are.

18 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Yeah.

19 So you don't have to rely on the Emergency Measures Office to
20 issue the alert for you; the RCMP does have that capacity.

21 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** That's true.

22 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Right.

23 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** But as far as building this robust public
24 awareness campaign, it's not our program to speak to.

25 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay.

26 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** So we ---

27 **MS. TARA MILLER:** So is the answer that -- outside of the work
28 that the RCMP has done with EMO, is the answer that there's been no independent

1 work done by the RCMP to enhance the public education component around use of the
2 alert system?

3 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** As far as a campaign? No.

4 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay, thank you.

5 My last area for questioning, Superintendent, is with respect to the
6 MacNeil Report arising, of course, out of the tragedy in Moncton in June of 2014, and
7 then the subsequent report, which was reproduced in December, early January 2015.

8 When you assumed the role of Inspector, in 2018, of your
9 Communications Section, were you able to take a look at that report and see what, if
10 any recommendations had been implemented and actioned in your communications
11 report -- or in your Communications Division that you're responsible for?

12 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I didn't. But I also -- when I was asked
13 this question recently, it would have been difficult for me to comment on or answer that
14 question because I don't know what it was like in the OCC pre-2014. I know what it's
15 like when I got there.

16 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Yes.

17 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** And I know that the amount of work
18 that our OCC Commanders in the region and how much they work together, they sent
19 up CRUs to Fredericton, or CRU's employees to Fredericton to help when the -- in their
20 tragedy, and vice versa. We've had PEI employees come over and help us.

21 **MS. TARA MILLER:** No, fair enough. I get -- but ---

22 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** But as far as the actual
23 recommendations that were implemented, in the OCC post-MacNeil I can't speak to
24 because I don't know what it used to be like before that.

25 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. But from your arrival, from 2018
26 forward, did you take any steps to implement any of those recommendations?

27 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** No.

28 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. And you're not aware -- you can't say

1 whether or not the recommendations...

2 And Madam Registrar, if you could bring it up, it's Exhibit 1402, and
3 I'm looking at page 87? This is the section that deals with operational communications.

4 Have you read the report?

5 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** A long time ago.

6 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. So I'm at page 87.

7 This is Operational Communications, and my assumption, correct
8 me if I'm wrong, Superintendent, is this would be -- the Operational Communications
9 would fall within your purview and your responsibility as the Inspector of the OCC?

10 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** If it's speak -- if you're speaking of the
11 operations within the OCC?

12 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Yes.

13 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Yes.

14 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. Thank you.

15 One of the recommendations I want to go to specifically is
16 recommendation 7.8.

17 And, again, Madam Registrar, I apologize; I don't have the page
18 reference, but they are numbered there. Oh, and this is -- if you could go back up, there
19 it is.

20 So it starts with CIIDS mapping and situational awareness, and that
21 was an issue in Moncton, the lack of adequate mapping, which was used by both the
22 OCC and Operations NCO. And then I understand -- and I apologize; this is -- I'm
23 reading this from an RCMP website, it says that the technology exists to upgrade CIIDS
24 maps within the Divisions. Divisions will ensure that they have access to the most
25 recent mapping capabilities within the CIIDS programme, and that that was
26 implemented as of September 2017, which, of course predated your arrival there. But
27 what technology are you aware of that was used to upgrade the CIIDS mapping with in
28 the Divisions?

1 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** We work with -- I believe it's Bell. I
2 can't remember the company, but we work with them regularly. We actually just
3 updated our map again fairly recently to include not just our province but Nova Scotia --
4 or, pardon me; New Brunswick and PEI.

5 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay.

6 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** It used to be that when our officers
7 would go across the border into New Brunswick, on the map they would just kind of
8 disappear into a white screen. Now, we have the whole region on a map so that if one
9 of our officers was to go to New Brunswick, they would sign off with us, sign on with
10 Fredericton OCC, and we'd be able to track all of our members and vice versa.

11 **MS. TARA MILLER:** So with respect, though, to Nova Scotia and
12 dealing with containment and perimeters in Nova Scotia, Madam Registrar, if you could
13 scroll down, just a little bit to the recommendation? There.

14 "It is recommended a high resolution mapping
15 system, such as the web-mapping service[s] from the
16 NOC, be integrated within CIIDS, having the ability to
17 share such vital information as perimeters and
18 location data."

19 What is-- do you have an understanding as to what update has
20 been implemented to action that 7.8?

21 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I don't know web-mapping -- "Web-
22 mapping service from NOC," I don't know what exactly that's referring to. I know that
23 our maps are kept up to date. It's expensive but we see the -- we see the absolute
24 benefit in doing that, so we do keep our maps up to date. And we're trying to -- we're
25 trying to expand them.

26 From what I understand our -- I spoke about the HRM earlier, and
27 how we've got RCMP officers working in the HRM and that IES dispatches for them.
28 They're on a different CAD than we are. So when they go into the HRM, they go -- from

1 what I understand, go off into that white blank, there's no map.

2 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Right.

3 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** But as far as the RCMP, we keep our
4 maps up to date. I mean, within the province, except for the HRM. We keep our maps
5 up to date and we work very closely with the other Divisions to make sure that all our
6 maps are interoperable.

7 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. Well, we know from a number of
8 people and the evidence before the Commissioners that in April of 2020, there wasn't
9 good mapping to allow for appropriate perimeter control and containment that showed --
10 that would have been showed and certainly was accessible through the mapping tool
11 called Pictometry.

12 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** M'hm.

13 Were you familiar with Pictometry?

14 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I have seen it work. I don't have
15 access to it, but I've seen it in action.

16 Okay. So you're not able to tell the -- us and the Commissioners
17 what the implementation was of this 7.8 mapping system that was recommended in the
18 MacNeil Report and implemented according to the RCMP website by September of
19 2017?

20 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I don't know the answer to that.

21 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay.

22 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** I do know that we use Pictometry
23 often, and that our Risk Managers are proficient in its use, as are our supervisors, and
24 anytime there's an issue... Pictometry is usually up on our big screen on the wall 24/7,
25 we use it so often.

26 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And are you familiar with the evidence
27 around the access to Pictometry on the night of April 18th in Portapique?

28 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** It wasn't until well after that I heard that

1 Pictometry wasn't working or wasn't accessible. I didn't know that at the time.

2 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. All right, thank you, Superintendent.

3 Those are my questions.

4 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you.

5 Ms. MacPhee?

6 **--- CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. PATRICIA MacPHEE:**

7 **MS. PATRICIA MacPHEE** Good afternoon, and I'm going to be
8 really brief with you.

9 I'm just -- this afternoon, you mentioned that following the events,
10 the mass casualty, that you did a scan of internal documents to see what was in the
11 RCMP Holdings with respect to public alerting.

12 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Correct.

13 **MS. PATRICIA MacPHEE** Can you just summarise to me what
14 you found?

15 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Certainly. I found, or I found, Glenn
16 Mason found the briefing note from then Staff Sergeant ---

17 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yes, thank you. I'm going to object. This
18 witness is now describing what another witness located. I don't know what relevance it
19 would have. It's twice removed hearsay and I object to this evidence on that basis.
20 Thank you.

21 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Any response?

22 **MS. PATRICIA MacPHEE** I can say that I think during these
23 proceedings we've been hearing a lot of people talk about what other people told them,
24 what other people saw, and what other people did. So I'm simply asking in her position
25 -- I'll reframe the question perhaps and maybe it'll appease my friend's concerns here.

26 But in your position did you direct anyone to do or to review the
27 RCMP Holdings to determine what information you had with respect to public alerting?

28 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Certainly. So I don't remember if the

1 Criminal Operations Officer tasked Glenn Mason himself or if I -- or if that came through
2 me, but I do recall going through the EMS Holdings myself. I also contacted the OCC
3 and had the OCC do a full scrub to see if there was any historical documentation from,
4 back then, however long -- however far we could go back.

5 One of the -- I recall one of the documents was—was it a briefing
6 note?—I think signed by an inspector prior to me, two inspectors prior to me, and I
7 wanted to know if there was anything else in the OCC that, you know, would have --
8 would have had his signature on it or something from back then, but we couldn't find
9 anything.

10 **MS. PATRICIA MacPHEE** Okay. And what did you learn about
11 public alerting or what the RCMP in each division knew about public alerting prior to the
12 events of the mass casualty?

13 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Prior to, just from the documents that
14 we were able to find, the few documents, I -- in reviewing them I learned that EMO had
15 reached out to us and offered this as a tool. At the time, I believe it was 2012, I think, it
16 was recognised as potentially something that we could use. There was -- I don't
17 remember if it was that document or another one that said that we could look at this
18 perhaps at a time where we have more resources in the Risk Manager and OCC roles
19 that we would be able to support that operation.

20 **MS. PATRICIA MacPHEE** Okay. So did you find any documents
21 that showed that there was some kind of policy or protocols in place for the use of public
22 alerting for policing situations?

23 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** There was nothing. There was
24 nothing. We built that ourselves.

25 **MS. PATRICIA MacPHEE** Okay. And this work was done post
26 mass casualty?

27 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Correct.

28 **MS. PATRICIA MacPHEE** Okay. And just one final question, and

1 I'm just going to clarify something, actually. My friend earlier today was talking about
2 the KPMG Report, and just -- I'm not sure what the exhibit number is, but the COMM
3 number, I think, was 0058467. And I just want to clarify because I think that she
4 referred to it as a summary and ---

5 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** It's not. This is the final report.

6 **MS. PATRICIA MacPHEE** Okay.

7 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** There was -- sorry, I missed that in
8 what she said. No, this is the -- this is the report.

9 **MS. PATRICIA MacPHEE** Okay.

10 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** It's not a summary.

11 **MS. PATRICIA MacPHEE** Thank you very much. Those are my
12 questions.

13 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you.

14 Ms. Mancini?

15 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** Thank you, Commissioner. I believe those
16 are all of the Participant questions. I have one quick housekeeping note, which was
17 that my friend had introduced, I believe COMM0035866, which were the minutes from
18 the 2018 PSAP meeting. I wonder if we could just mark that as an exhibit,
19 Madam Registrar?

20 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Yeah, thank you. I had that on
21 my mind as well, and it slipped my mind. So yes, please mark it as an exhibit.

22 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Exhibit 2041.

23 **--- EXHIBIT NO. 2041:**

24 (COMM0035866) PSAP Managers Meetings.pdf

25 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you.

26 **MS. ANNA MANCINI:** I believe the Commissioners will have some
27 questions now as well.

28 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Commissioner Fitch?

1 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Thank you very much. Thank you,
2 Superintendent, for bearing with us today. I know it's been a long afternoon.

3 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Certainly.

4 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** I have just a couple of short questions,
5 one that is quite basic, so -- but I want to draw on your experience as a former OCC
6 operator, and then also, as being in charge of OCC. And it pertains just to basic radio
7 protocols.

8 Can you describe for me, please, and for those that are listening,
9 some of the basic radio protocols that both dispatchers and officers are trained in?
10 Because we've heard testimony over the last several weeks about failed
11 communication, and specifically, one that I'm thinking of is in relation to Vicki Colford,
12 who sent out a message ---

13 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** M'hm.

14 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** --- but it wasn't acknowledged, received,
15 understood, and shared.

16 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Exactly.

17 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** So if you could -- if you could speak to
18 us about what the proper training radio protocols are, and if there have been any steps
19 since April of 2020 to improve in that area within the RCMP.

20 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** So from the OCC side, there is
21 certainly -- we've got a robust course training standard, national training standard for the
22 OCC, and so the first part of that is learning how to take calls, and then the second part
23 of that is learning how to dispatch. So the whole process, it's very involved, it takes
24 approximately a year, sometimes a little bit longer. And between them being in class,
25 then they're placed on a floor with a field trainer and plugged in -- literally plugged in
26 with that field trainer.

27 So on the OCC side of the house, we're, we're very fortunate in that
28 we have that. On the members side of the house, I, I don't know off the top of my head

1 any radio protocol courses. I do know that certainly here in "H" Division, having the
2 TMR2 radio system, we do have regular courses for -- not just for -- refreshers for our
3 members, but also for people transferring in, we want them to know how to use the
4 system, or use the radio and to change back and forth between channels and talk
5 groups. But as far as a -- an RCMP course for members in how to talk on the radio, I
6 don't know that we have one.

7 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Thank you. I think you may agree that
8 that could be a -- an important, very basic recommendation, but one that may be helpful
9 in the future.

10 Another question that I have for you, and this is in reference to the
11 BOLO that was sent out at 1:07 a.m. on the 19th, and I noted that it only was sent out to
12 Nova Scotia agencies. My question is, at what point in time would Dispatch send out or
13 fan out a notice such as that outside of the province and/or to other agencies? What is
14 the determining factor, and who makes that decision?

15 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** That would be -- that would be a
16 decision that we could do in the OCC ourselves. They -- like I said, we work very
17 closely with the surrounding divisions, and them with us. So if we've got information
18 that could impact them, we'll share it, and vice versa.

19 So I don't know off the top of my head at what point that information
20 went outside to the other provinces, but I do know that it did to -- or -- New Brunswick
21 and PEI. I just don't know off the top of my head what time that information was shared,
22 but that's certainly a decision that could be done by the supervisors, and they do it all
23 the time.

24 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. Thank you. Those are all my
25 questions, Commissioner MacDonald.

26 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Commissioner Stanton?

27 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Thank you.

28 So you mentioned that a call taker can immediately push out an

1 incident in the CAD and then continue to fill it with information, populate it with
2 information. Is that a new direction since April 2020?

3 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** No, I believe that we've always been
4 able to do that. I remember doing that way back when as a dispatcher myself.

5 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** So that's the protocol is to do that
6 and then ---

7 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** If it's something, for example, a priority
8 one, so that being the most serious of an event, we have the ability to send just the bare
9 bones information to the dispatcher, and then continue to fill in the details, as they come
10 in.

11 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Okay. I mean, you said that -- you
12 mentioned all the training that you've done since April 2020, and you said there's been
13 lots of training. You mentioned that a few times. I'm just wondering if you could give a
14 couple of examples of how training has changed since April 2020?

15 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Certainly, on the Alert Ready side of
16 the house, it's brand new. We've implemented training for, as I said, everybody that is
17 able to issue an alert here in the Division. We've also, thankfully as I mentioned earlier,
18 have now Alert Ready included in the CIC course training standard, and soon to be in
19 general duty and risk manager training as well. And then there's also going to be further
20 training for -- on the initial critical incident response courses moving forward. So with
21 respect to the Division, we've -- any opportunity that we can include this in it, we're
22 going to.

23 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** For alerting; right? But so for call
24 taking and dispatch, has there been changes to the training for the call takers and
25 dispatchers?

26 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** It's a core training standard, so I've
27 been out of the OCC since -- for the last year and a bit, so I'm not sure. I know at the
28 national level, we have an OCC National Policy Centre, and they were engaged

1 immediately and have been the whole time. I'm -- I don't want to speak out of turn, but I
2 would -- it would not surprise me in the least if they're already all over that request.

3 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** So the review that you did of the 9-
4 1-1 calls from the mass casualty, was that aimed at improving procedures, or systems,
5 or training immediately? I understand you haven't been there for the last year, but there
6 was a year before that, so I'm just wondering what the actions were that were taken.

7 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** So that particular review that you're
8 referring to is -- was very shortly after the incident, and it was investigative, in gathering
9 information for the upcoming ESD investigation. There was also the hazardous
10 occurrence investigation that needed to be done, and then knowing that there was
11 going to be some form of review, inquiry, whatever that looked like, and then at the
12 same time, also supporting the MCU investigation. So there was ---

13 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** So it was for investigative purposes,
14 not to prompt changes in training then?

15 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Correct.

16 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** I see. And we heard from Kerry
17 Murray-Bates, who's the director of the Toronto Police 9-1-1 Communications Centre,
18 and she mentioned that they have a communications operator in the major incident
19 command centre to ensure that an incident commander has all the information in the
20 CAD, as it's accumulating, so that -- and that person's job is to brief the incident
21 commander about what's populating in the CAD as it's going through. Is that a change
22 that has been made here?

23 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Not yet, but I am certainly -- I think it's
24 a fantastic idea. I've actually been spending a lot of time thinking what could we do, and
25 that's certainly something that would be helpful. So in the command post, or with the --
26 whoever the critical incident commander is, we have an ERT dispatcher that has --
27 they're dispatching ERT. They also have access to our CAD, but that's a busy position.
28 If we could have another resource, a separate resource in that command post, whether

1 it's in SIOPs, or a room off to the side of the OCC, or actually in the command post, if
2 we could have an extra resource in there to keep that information flowing from the OCC
3 into the critical incident commander team, I think it would be a brilliant idea.

4 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** And so the thinking that you've
5 been doing about changes that could be made I'm hoping will be provided to Counsel to
6 make in their submissions and in our recommendations phase, so ---

7 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Certainly.

8 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** --- we wouldn't want to miss those.
9 You did talk to us a lot about the risks of issuing public alerts.
10 You've thought about that a lot. I wonder if you've also assessed the risks of not issuing
11 a public alert?

12 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** Absolutely. And that goes into our
13 decision making. I am sure that you're going to have a chance to read through the risk
14 analysis, but a lot of that is contained in the risk analysis. And we have to be able to
15 weigh the risks and benefits. Certainly, the -- on the risk side of the house, we -- I
16 talked about the public safety and the police safety. But on the benefits side of the
17 house, there's certainly the -- all the good reasons to put an alert out, all the benefits to
18 doing that. And if we don't do that, what could potentially be the outcome of that. So all
19 of that risk analysis is going on in the decision maker's mind. It's certainly -- if there's an
20 opportunity that we can use it safely and effectively, we're -- we will use it.

21 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Because your response to Ms.
22 Mancini's question about whether if -- whether an alert would be issued in the same
23 circumstances was that it would be considered.

24 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** M'hmm.

25 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** And it made -- I guess it's a
26 rhetorical question for me, but what would be the threshold in that -- if we're just
27 considering it so. Okay. Thank you very much.

28 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you. All my questions

1 have been answered, so thank you, Superintendent, for being here today, for what has
2 been a very long afternoon for you. We greatly appreciate it, as we continue our difficult
3 but important work, and you've certainly contributed to it, so for that we're grateful and
4 appreciative, so you're now free to go. Thank you.

5 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** If you don't mind, can I just take a
6 moment and just address the families, if I may?

7 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Certainly.

8 **SUPT. DUSTINE RODIER:** So I just want to take the opportunity to
9 say that I can't imagine the pain and the devastation that any of you have been dealing
10 with for the past two years. I -- my deepest condolences go out to all of you, and I'm --
11 with all my heart, I'm sorry for your loss. Thank you.

12 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you.

13 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Very long day for everyone. And I
14 just want to acknowledge all of the staff who have supported everyone all day, the tech
15 staff and back of house, the interpreters, security who've been on their feet all day, we
16 recognize that it's a long day for all of you as well and we're very appreciative.

17 Just a reminder that the Foundational Documents are
18 understanding of the facts as of the date that our Counsel submit those Foundational
19 Documents. And, of course, you can read them on the website, and you've seen today
20 how witnesses assist us in illuminating some of those -- some of the facts in the
21 Foundational Documents. And certainly, we have already, I think, thanked Corporal
22 Jennifer Clarke, Glenn Mason and Superintendent Dustine Rodier for being present
23 today. Also, thanks, of course, to Commission Counsel and to Participant Counsel for
24 all of your questions, which help us in building our understanding.

25 Tomorrow, we're going to continue our focus on the RCMP's public
26 communications. We'll hear from witnesses Lia Scanlan, who is the RCMP's Director of
27 Strategic Communications, and from Staff Sergeant Addie MacCallum, who will take us
28 back a bit to the Command Decisions Foundational Document material that we were

1 covering just before last week.

2 We do recognize and acknowledge that this inquiry as we move
3 forward means that there are harms that are being suffered by people, that the harm is
4 continuing as we're moving through this work and it's a heavy burden for people as we
5 work through this together. We just want to remind you that there are dedicated mental
6 health support people in the room. There are resources here for those of you taking
7 part in person. And there's a range of support service providers available on the
8 website for anyone who does need help. We want to try and assist people with
9 navigating those pathways.

10 So thank you again for being here today and we'll see you
11 tomorrow at 9:30. Thank you.

12 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Thank you. The
13 proceedings are adjourned until June the 8th, 2022 at 9:30 in the morning.

14 --- Upon adjourning at 6:52 p.m.

15

16

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

17

18 I, Wendy Clements, a certified court reporter, hereby certify the foregoing pages to be
19 an accurate transcription of my notes/records to the best of my skill and ability, and I so
20 swear.

21

22 Je, Wendy Clements, une sténographe officiel, certifie que les pages ci-hautes sont une
23 transcription conforme de mes notes/enregistrements au meilleur de mes capacités, et
24 je le jure.

25

26



27

Wendy Clements

28