

## **Public Hearing**

## **Audience publique**

### **Commissioners / Commissaires**

The Honourable / L'honorable J. Michael MacDonald,  
Chair / Président

Leanne J. Fitch (Ret. Police Chief, M.O.M)

Dr. Kim Stanton

### **VOLUME 38**

#### **Held at :**

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Truro, Nova Scotia

Monday, June 20, 2022

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## II Appearances / Comparutions

Mr. Roger Burrill	Commission Counsel / Conseiller de la commission
Ms. Emily Hill	Commission Counsel / Conseillère de la commission
Mr. Jamie VanWart	Commission Counsel / Conseiller de la commission
Mr. Joshua Bryson	Counsel / Conseiller
Ms. Jane Lenehan	Counsel / Conseillère
Ms. Sandra McCulloch	Counsel / Conseillère

**III**  
**Table of Content / Table des matières**

	<b>PAGE</b>
<b>INTRODUCTION OF FOUNDATIONAL DOCUMENTS: INFORMATION SEEKING FROM FAMILIES AND NEXT OF KIN NOTIFICATIONS</b>	2
Presented by Ms. Emily Hill	2
<b>CST. NICK DORRINGTON, Affirmed</b>	15
Examination in-Chief by Mr. Roger Burrill	15
Cross-Examination by Mr. Joshua Bryson	74
Cross-Examination by Ms. Jane Lenehan	89
Cross-Examination by Ms. Sandra McCulloch	91

**IV**  
**Exhibit List / Liste des pièces**

<b>No</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
2222	(COMM0058972) Foundational Document "Information Seeking from Families and Next of Kin Notifications and related source material	2
2223	(COMM0059092) Revised 13 June 2022: Further Investigative Analysis of RCMP Involvement in the Portapique Community on April 19th	14
2322	(COMM0058987) affidavit of Donalee Williston	120
2323	(COMM0053812) SMI file of Big Stop timestamp footage corresponding to Exhibit P001094	121

Truro, Nova Scotia

--- Upon commencing on Monday, June 20, 2022 at 9:31 a.m.

**REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Good morning. The proceedings of the Mass Casualty Commission are now in session with Commissioner Michael MacDonald, Commissioner Leanne Fitch and Commissioner Kim Stanton presiding.

**COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Hello, and welcome. Bonjour at bienvenue.

We join you from Mi'gma'gi, the ancestral unceded territory of the Mi'kmaq.

We begin today by remembering those whose lives were taken, those who were harmed, their families and all those affected by the April 2020 mass casualty in Nova Scotia.

This week we continue our work by looking at different aspects of communication and support services. We are required to explore these responses as part of our mandate.

Today, Commission Counsel will start by sharing a Foundational Document on next-of-kin notifications and how families sought information about their loved ones during and following the mass casualty. We can layer what we learn this week with the understanding on what we have built from earlier Foundational Documents and from hearing from witnesses.

These were complex, difficult and critical hours and days for family members who were seeking information and learning about their loved ones and that of many others involved as well.

If at any time you or someone you know needs help, please reach out to your dedicated mental health team here at the proceedings or please get in touch with one of the support services listed on our website.

After the Foundational Document presentation this morning, we will

1 hear from Constable Nick Dorrington about his traffic stop of the perpetrator in February  
2 2022 [sic], his involvement in containment efforts at Highway 2 on April 19th, 2020 and  
3 his role in Portapique scene containment, in particular, his attendance on Cobequid  
4 Court on April 19th, 2020.

5 I will now ask senior Commission Emily Hill to begin. Thank you.

6 **--- INTRODUCTION OF FOUNDATIONAL DOCUMENTS: INFORMATION SEEKING**  
7 **FROM FAMILIES AND NEXT OF KIN NOTIFICATIONS**

8 **---PRESENTATION BY MS. EMILY HILL:**

9 **MS. EMILY HILL:** Good morning, Commissioners, Participants,  
10 and everyone viewing here in Truro and via the webcast. My name is Emily Hill, and I'm  
11 a member of the Commission Counsel team.

12 Today, I will be making a presentation about the Foundational  
13 Document called "Information Seeking from Families and Next of Kin Notifications".

14 I would like to ask Madam Registrar to mark that Foundational  
15 Document that we will be discussing today as an exhibit.

16 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** That's Exhibit 2222.

17 **--- EXHIBIT No. 2222:**

18 (COMM0058972) Foundational Document "Information  
19 Seeking from Families and Next of Kin Notifications and  
20 related source material

21 **MS. EMILY HILL:** And that's COMM No. 0058972

22 I would also ask that the related source material be marked.

23 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** So exhibited.

24 **MS. EMILY HILL:** Thank you.

25 One aspect of the Commission's mandate is to explore the steps  
26 taken to inform, support and engage those most affected. This Foundational Document  
27 is focused on that first part, steps taken to inform family members about what happened  
28 as the mass casualty was unfolding and in the days immediately after.

1 It also contains information about the discovery of victims on  
2 Cobequid Court, that is, Joy and Peter Bond and Aaron Tuck, Jolene Oliver and Emily  
3 Tuck. It will also mention the other victims of the mass casualty.

4 Not for the first time, today's presentation is about difficult  
5 information. I do want to say at the outset that this presentation is an overview of the  
6 Foundational Document. There is a great deal more information contained in that  
7 document, including details about the lengths that families went to try to get answers.  
8 And of course, the Foundational Document is our current understanding of this  
9 information. It will continue to evolve. But today, I want to share what we have learned  
10 so far with the public.

11 I'm going to begin just by briefly identifying the relevant legislation  
12 and policies.

13 Next of kin and NOK are terms used in the Foundational Document  
14 and in source material. It simply refers to the closest relative of a deceased person and  
15 is used by the RCMP to refer to the notification to a relative of a death.

16 The *Fatality Investigations Act* is Nova Scotia legislation. You will  
17 see here that the *Fatality Investigations Act* sets out who is next of kin. This legislation  
18 is also relied on by the Medical Examiner to determine who they may share information  
19 with.

20 The framework of the next of kin notification process is set out in  
21 the RCMP Operational Manual. You will see from this checklist that's on the screen that  
22 it requires collaboration with the coroner -- in Nova Scotia, that's the Medical Examiner -  
23 - to ensure positive identification before a family is notified.

24 You'll also note that it directs members to provide families with  
25 information about how to see the victim or to make arrangements to recover their body.  
26 It also sets out that families should be provided with information for Victim Services and  
27 for the Medical Examiner.

28 I just want to flag here that there is a separate policy and guide

1 when it comes to the death of an RCMP member and that it requires specific reference  
2 to the Strategic Communication Unit.

3 I'll just start talking about the events of the mass casualty by setting  
4 out some of the assignments as it related to communications with families over the April  
5 18th, 19th and 20th.

6 On April 19th, the RCMP Northeast Nova Major Crimes Unit, the  
7 MCU, became responsible for completing the next of kin death notifications.

8 Constable Randy Slawter was assigned as the family liaison for the  
9 Stevenson family. Constable Wayne (Skipper) Bent was assigned as the family liaison  
10 officer for all the other families.

11 Later in this presentation, you will see that some families received  
12 next of kin notifications before the Major Crimes Unit became responsible for ensuring  
13 the NOKs occurred.

14 The RCMP Operational Communications Centre and the RCMP  
15 detachments received messages from other 100 family members and Portapique  
16 residents. In most cases, callers provided contact information and were told that  
17 somebody would return their call. There was a huge volume of calls. There were many  
18 people seeking information and many people called repeatedly. All of these were  
19 funneled to the Command Triangle and to Constable Bent.

20 Calls from family are the focus of this presentation, but it's  
21 important to know that there were also calls from concerned family members and  
22 others, both locally, from other provinces and from across the United States.

23 Part of the Commission's investigation has included looking into  
24 when the houses at Cobequid Court were attended to by the RCMP. These activities  
25 fall outside the timeframe of other documents related to Portapique, and so I will provide  
26 some of that information now. This information is included in more detail in the  
27 Foundational Document, and also, in the supplementary report that will be tendered as  
28 a source document.



1                   This map and image is just a reminder of where Cobequid Court is,  
2 and how it relates to the other crime scenes in Portapique. For the figure on the left,  
3 you will see Cobequid Court near the bottom, closer to the water, and on the figure on  
4 the right, you'll see the other view entering into Portapique.

5                   There are two residences where families whose lives were taken by  
6 the perpetrator, [redacted] Cobequid Court, which was the home of Aaron Tuck, Jolene Oliver,  
7 and Emily Tuck; and [redacted] Cobequid Court, which was the home of Joy and Peter Bond.

8                   On the morning of April 19th, while events were unfolding in other  
9 locations, Sergeant O'Brien and Staff Sergeant Carroll went to Portapique.  
10 Sergeant O'Brien was directed to take charge of some of the scenes, and  
11 Constable Dorrington was directed to patrol inside the community.

12                   The information on this slide about Constable Dorrington's  
13 movements on the morning of April 19th is based on GPS and will be covered in more  
14 detail by Mr. Burrill when Constable Dorrington is a witness this afternoon. You will see  
15 that the GPS information shows that he drove along Cobequid Court and paused at the  
16 Bond residence.

17                   That afternoon, Corporal MacDonald became the Scene Security  
18 Commander on -- at about 3:20. At that time, he was receiving messages about people  
19 looking for information about their loved ones who lived in Portapique. That included  
20 calls from members of the Oliver/Tuck family and the Bond family. At 4:46, he travelled  
21 to [redacted] Cobequid Court and observed victims who were later identified as Peter and Joy  
22 Bond. A few minutes later, he went to [redacted] Cobequid Court and saw two bodies, those of  
23 Aaron Tuck and Jolene Oliver. The current understanding is that these observations  
24 were all made from outside the house.

25                   About an hour later, Constable Bent was directed to check all  
26 the homes in Portapique, and he and Constable Forrest checked homes on Cobequid  
27 Court. It was at this time that a third deceased person was located at [redacted] Cobequid  
28 Court, who was later identified as Emily Tuck.

1                   In this next section, I'll give a high-level overview of the steps  
2 families took to get information and when they received a next of kin notification, if they  
3 received one. We've organised this into three categories: families in Nova Scotia who  
4 were not in close proximity or at a crime scene, families in Nova Scotia who were in  
5 close proximity to a crime scene, and families outside of Nova Scotia.

6                   Every family had a different experience trying to obtain information  
7 depending on what they knew and what steps they took, but we do see some overlap in  
8 their experiences based on these categories. Because the information is organised in  
9 this way, it's not necessarily in the order that the individuals died or that their families  
10 were notified. And some families have members, both inside Nova Scotia and outside,  
11 so at the same time some family members were trying to get information, for example,  
12 from RCMP at roadblocks, others may have been trying to phone police detachments  
13 from another province.


14                   This is just a summary. There is more detail about the steps family  
15 took included in the Foundational Document, and neither can fully capture the  
16 numerous attempts made by many families to get information, the increasing panic, and  
17 the terrible hours that passed as families waited for confirmation that their loved one  
18 had been involved in the mass casualty. This summary shows a small amount of what  
19 we have learned so far. More is in the Foundational Document, and of course, we're  
20 still continuing our work.

21                   This section outlines the experiences of families who were in Nova  
22 Scotia as the mass casualty was unfolding, but were not at or near crime scenes. Many  
23 of them heard about the events from social media or from people in the area, and began  
24 to take steps to find out what happened.

25                   Greg and Jamie Blair lost their lives early in the mass casualty.  
26 Locating their family was especially urgent because their children were taken out of  
27 Portapique shortly after midnight. Tyler Blair, Greg and Jamie's son, was informed  
28 about what had happened shortly after 2:30 a.m. Other members of the family were

1 also in contact with the OCC and the hospital to find out what had happened and  
2 whether the children were safe.

3                   The McCully children were also taken to the hospital. Their aunt  
4 was working at the hospital, so she was located and informed what happened. The  
5 next morning, other family and friends began seeking information. Some of them  
6 learned about Lisa McCully's death from a Facebook post put up by the principal of the  
7 school where she taught.

8                   The next two slides are about the experiences of the Bond family,  
9 who, as I said earlier, died in their homes on Cobequid Court. Their two sons, Cory and  
10 Harry, started making enquiries on the morning of the 19th, calling both 9-1-1 and Truro  
11 Police Services. On the morning of the 20th, they still did not have any information  
12 about their parents, so after a call to the Bible Hill detachment, Harry decided to drive  
13 with Cory to Portapique to see what they could find out. He spoke with Constable Bent  
14 during the drive. When Harry and Cory arrived in Portapique, Sergeant Bill  
15 Raaymakers spoke to them. He explained that his team would process  Cobequid  
16 Court next since they had attended. He completed a next of kin notification using a  
17 photograph. The records of when exactly the next of kin notification was given to this  
18 family aren't clear.

19                   Alana Jenkins and Sean MacLeod were a married couple who lived  
20 in Wentworth. As the mass casualty unfolded, there were many different family  
21 members seeking information about them. Alana's parents, Dan and Susan Jenkins,  
22 heard from their neighbours and tried to reach Alana. When they couldn't, they called  
23 9-1-1, and when they couldn't get information from those enquiries they headed to  
24 Wentworth. Sean's daughter was also speaking with neighbours and calling 9-1-1.

25                   Sean's brothers, Chris and Scott, were also trying to find out what  
26 had happened in Wentworth and if Sean and Alana were involved. Unable to get  
27 information by phone, Chris went to Sean's house where he encountered RCMP  
28 members, who told him to leave. Scott MacLeod contacted someone he knew who

1 worked for the RCMP, as well as his managers at Springhill Institution where he worked  
2 to see whether they had information that they could share.

3                   When Dan and Susan Jenkins arrived in Wentworth, they  
4 approached the RCMP to ask for information and report that the member pointed her  
5 rifle at him. This is not the only account in the Foundational Document of families  
6 seeking information being met this way. Having travelled to the scene and received no  
7 information they turned back home. They were contacted hours later by  
8 Constable Harvey, who was unable to provide an official next of kin notification, but did  
9 provide an update that they believed that Sean MacLeod and Alana Jenkins were  
10 deceased.

11                   This slide sets out how the official next of kin notification was  
12 provided to this family. At 2:49 on April 20th, the RCMP was still trying to confirm Sean  
13 MacLeod and Alana Jenkins's identity, even as social media was already reporting on  
14 their death. That's another common theme we see where information was being shared  
15 on social media before the opportunity for a positive identification had occurred. It was  
16 on Tuesday, April 12th [sic], that Constable Bent provided the official next of kin death  
17 notification to Dan Jenkins, to Sean's father, Dale MacLeod, and to Sean's daughter,  
18 Taylor Andrews.

19                   Constable Heidi Stevenson was involved in the RCMP response to  
20 the mass casualty before her life was taken on the morning of April 19th. Her family  
21 was informed of her death in the early afternoon of that day. Assistant  
22 Commissioner Bergerman, Constable Randy Slawter, and Inspector Dave Chubbs  
23 delivered the news.

24                   Joey Webber was also killed at the Shubenacadie Cloverleaf. His  
25 sister, wife and father all attempted to find out what had happened to him by phone.  
26 Then, his sister and father drove in the area to try to find him. They both encountered  
27 roadblocks and asked for information there. That evening, Sergeant Legge and  
28 Sergeant Raaymakers delivered the next of kin notifications in person.

1                   The afternoon of April 19<sup>th</sup>, Tara Long, Aaron Tuck's biological half-  
2 sister, was seeking information about whether Aaron Tuck was involved in the events in  
3 Portapique. Her message was sent to RCMP who were working in Portapique.

4                   She learned in the early hours of April 20<sup>th</sup> that the residence was  
5 involved in the mass casualty, even though the RCMP could not yet confirm the identity  
6 of the occupants.

7                   The Tuck-Oliver family has family in Alberta, which will be  
8 discussed later in this presentation.

9                   This part of the presentation is about family members who were  
10 close to the crime scene and trying to get information. Some of them learned about the  
11 death of their loved ones almost immediately after it happened, while others knew that  
12 something terrible had happened, but could not obtain any details.

13                  Richard Ellison's son, Corrie, left his residence to investigate the  
14 fires in Portapique. Richard's other son, Clinton, followed him a short while later.  
15 Richard received a call from Clinton saying that he thought Corrie had been shot.

16                  Over the following hours, Richard Ellison spoke to 9-1-1  
17 dispatchers, both about Clinton's safe exit from Portapique, but also about what was  
18 known about his son Corrie.

19                  Cpl McKay's record of the Next of Kin Notifications shows that it  
20 was provided at 1:38 a.m. This is based on when Richard notified the 9-1-1 operator  
21 that his son Clinton had told him that Corrie was deceased.

22                  On April 19<sup>th</sup>, S/Sgt Greg Vardy interviewed Clinton Ellison at the  
23 Bible Hill Detachment.

24                  At the outset of the interview, he told S/Sgt Vardy that he heard that  
25 his brother was dead, but no one had confirmed the news to him. S/Sgt Vardy then  
26 confirmed Corrie Ellison's death to Clinton Ellison.

27                  Heather O'Brien was a resident of Debert, Nova Scotia. Her life  
28 was taken on April 19<sup>th</sup> as she was travelling on Plains Road to visit her family.

1                   The O'Brien family knew something had happened almost  
2 immediately because Darcy Dobson was contacted by Leona Allen, who had speaking  
3 with Heather O'Brien when she encountered the perpetrator. But they didn't know what  
4 had happened and they started their enquiries thinking that she had been in a car  
5 accident.

6                   Cst Fahie was one of the first officers at the scene. Shortly after  
7 arriving, he was approached by Michaela O'Brien. Cst Fahie told Ms. O'Brien that she  
8 needed to leave the scene because it was not safe.

9                   Because many members of the O'Brien family live close by, after  
10 attempting to get information by phone, they also attended both sides of the roadblock.  
11 Initially they were not given any information, even though they could see the car that  
12 Heather O'Brien had been driving.

13                   Just after 11:00 o'clock, Michaela O'Brien returned to the scene  
14 and again asked for information. Csts Coleman and Fahie say they decided to share  
15 with her that her mother was deceased. Michaela says that Cst Fahie gave her a card  
16 and told her that this was now being investigated as a homicide.

17                   The official Next of Kin was provided just before 5:00 o'clock when  
18 Andrew O'Brien, Heather's husband, was shown a picture taken at the scene.

19                   Tom Bagley was at his cottage in Wentworth with his wife, Patsy  
20 Bagley, on April 19<sup>th</sup>. His life was taken near his neighbour's home while he was out for  
21 a walk.

22                   RCMP learned who Tom Bagley was almost as soon as they  
23 arrived at Hunter Road and Cst Bray determined that they had enough information to  
24 notify his wife, Ms. Bagley, who they knew was close by. By the time they provided the  
25 official Next of Kin, his wife Patsy said she already knew something was really wrong.

26                   Lillian Campbell was also out for a walk when she was killed by the  
27 perpetrator. Neighbours found her and covered her body with a blanket. When RCMP  
28 arrived, the neighbours identified her.

1 Her husband, Michael Hyslop, arrived at the scene a short while  
2 later. He told the RCMP that he was looking for his wife and described what she was  
3 wearing. He was asked to wait in his car.

4 When additional officers arrived, they identified her and provided  
5 Next of Kin. They then drove him to a family member's home.

6 Kristen Beaton was driving on Plains Road and had been texting  
7 and speaking with her husband, Nick Beaton, throughout the morning. He was another  
8 family member who knew something was wrong very early on. As soon as his wife  
9 stopped returning the texts, he began to take steps to find out what was going on.

10 Over the course of the day, he called 9-1-1, hospitals, and asked  
11 friends to go to Plains Road to find out other information.

12 By 3:30, he still had not been told anything. He'd been in touch  
13 with an RCMP member, Cpl Kuchta, and he called again.

14 Between 4:20 and 4:25, Csts Jeff MacFarlane and Mike Woolcock  
15 arrived at the Plains Road scene.

16 After another call to Mr. Beaton, Cst MacFarlane used vehicle  
17 information registered to Kristen Beaton to identify her.

18 He then went to Mr. Beaton's house, where the family had  
19 assembled, and told them that Kristen Beaton had been killed. This happened just  
20 before the RCMP held their media briefing.

21 Amelia Butler had been in touch with her mother, Gina Goulet, on  
22 the morning of the 19<sup>th</sup>, exchanging text messages about the unfolding events. When  
23 her mother stopped responding, she and her husband headed to her mother's home.  
24 They had to take a detour because of road blocks.

25 When they arrived, David Butler realized that Gina Goulet was  
26 deceased and they all went to get help.

27 They were not contacted by the RCMP to do a Next of Kin  
28 Notification and they did not know where Ms. Goulet's body was until a funeral director

1 assisted them with this.

2                   While all this was going on, families outside of Nova Scotia were  
3 trying to get information as well.

4                   Bonnie Oliver called her daughter, Jolene Oliver, from Alberta to  
5 talk with her on April 19<sup>th</sup>. When she couldn't reach her after a second call, she turned  
6 on the T.V. and saw the news out of Portapique. She and the rest of the family began  
7 calling the RCMP in the Bible Hill Detachment. They were not able to receive any  
8 information.

9                   As the day progressed and they did not receive a phone call about  
10 Jolene, Aaron, or Emily, not knowing who else to call, they found a contact number for  
11 Cpl Lisa Croteau, who they had seen on T.V. speaking about the mass casualty.

12                   We know the bodies of Jolene Oliver, Aaron Tuck, and Emily Tuck  
13 were identified -- were discovered in the late afternoon, at the same time as emails were  
14 being sent about the calls they were making seeking information.

15                   The family had two calls that even with Cpl Rose-Berthiaume.  
16 They have different accounts of the time and content of those calls, but by late evening  
17 on April 19<sup>th</sup>, they had learned the news. The next day, they spoke to Cst Bent.

18                   John Zahl and Joanne Thomas have family in Nova Scotia, the  
19 United States, and Manitoba.

20                   Commissioners, in the Foundational Document at paragraph 82, I  
21 want to clarify that John Zahl and Joanne Thomas have two adopted adult grandsons.

22                   One of those grandsons, Justin Zahl, lived in Nova Scotia and  
23 heard about what was happening. He began making frantic calls to friends, family, and  
24 police requesting wellness checks and asking for information.

25                   John Zahl's oldest daughter, Jennifer, who lives in the United  
26 States, became aware of what had happened in Portapique and also began trying to get  
27 information.

28                   Just after 8:00 a.m. on the morning of April 20<sup>th</sup>, a friend of Justin



1 Zahl drove to the area, but was unable to get anymore information or learn anything  
2 about what had happened.

3 The family received the official Next of Kin Notification in the  
4 afternoon of April 20<sup>th</sup>.

5 Dawn Madsen's two adult sons live in Ontario. Dawn Madsen and  
6 Frank Gulenchyn were residents of Portapique and they were in their home on Orchard  
7 Beach Drive when their lives were taken at approximately 10:20 on April 18<sup>th</sup>.

8 The sons began to make -- made frequent attempts to get  
9 information, calling Bible Hill Detachment and 9-1-1 after they were unable to reach  
10 their parents and had heard what was happening in Portapique.

11 Eventually, having received no official information, Ryan Farrington  
12 called the RCMP detachment at Bible Hill and demanded to know if his parents' address  
13 was one of the houses involved in the mass casualty. At that time, he was told that it  
14 was.

15 A message was sent to Cst Bent, who then called Ms. Madsen's  
16 sister, and then John Farrington to complete the Next of Kin at 11:30 a.m. on April 20<sup>th</sup>.

17 That concludes the presentation. I'm aware that this is difficult  
18 material and I appreciate everyone's attention.

19 We'd remind everyone that what is presented today is an overview  
20 of the Foundational Document, which contains a great deal more information, including  
21 source material showing the many calls received throughout April 19<sup>th</sup>, 20<sup>th</sup>, and 21 from  
22 family and community members.

23 We will continue sharing information about the experiences of  
24 family and community members in the presentation tomorrow morning about the  
25 supports and services that were provided.

26 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you so much, Ms. Hill.  
27 That's a very difficult document to present, and for many, much more difficult to hear.  
28 We think it's appropriate that we take a break at this time. We'll take 10 minutes.

1 Thank you.

2 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Thank you. The  
3 proceedings are now on break and will resume in 10 minutes.

4 --- Upon breaking at 9:59 a.m.

5 --- Upon resuming at 10:11 a.m.

6 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Welcome back. The  
7 proceedings are again in session.

8 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you, everyone.

9 Mr. Burrill, whenever you're ready.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yes, thank you, Commissioners. And  
11 before we commence with the witness, there is one preliminary matter I just wanted to  
12 address for the Participants and the Commissioners, and that is, some weeks ago we  
13 presented Exhibit 1624 into evidence, and that exhibit was entitled "Further Investigative  
14 Analysis of RCMP Involvement in the Portapique Community on April 19<sup>th</sup>, 2020." Since  
15 that time, that document has been revised. It's now entitled "Revised 13 June 2022:  
16 Further Investigative Analysis of RCMP Involvement in the Portapique Community on  
17 April 19<sup>th</sup>." It is itemized as COMM Number 0059092.

18 Madam Registrar, I am going to move that that revised document  
19 be exhibited into proceedings this morning, if you please.

20 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** That'll be Exhibit  
21 002223.

22 **--- EXHIBIT NO. 2223:**

23 (COMM0059092) Revised 13 June 2022: Further  
24 Investigative Analysis of RCMP Involvement in the  
25 Portapique Community on April 19<sup>th</sup>

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Thank you. The reason I did that,  
27 Commissioners, is I expect that I will be presenting that to the witness, so for purposes  
28 of ensuring we're on the up and up, I would now ask to call Constable Nicholas

1 Dorrington to the stand.

2 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you, Mr. Burrill. We'll  
3 have Constable Dorrington come forward.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** He's coming forward now.

5 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** You are Nicholas Dorrington?

6 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's correct.

7 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** I understand, Madam Registrar,  
8 that Constable Dorrington has expressed a desire to be affirmed.

9 **--- CST. NICHOLAS DORRINGTON, Affirmed:**

10 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Thank you. Be seated,  
11 please.

12 **--- EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR. ROGER BURRILL:**

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** The first thing I'm going to try to do,  
14 Constable Dorrington, is spell your last name right. It's D-O-R-R-I-N-G-T-O-N; is that  
15 correct?

16 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That is correct.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And what I propose to do,  
18 Constable Dorrington, is just go through a little bit of your background and some of your  
19 training for purposes of the proceedings here today; is that agreeable with you?

20 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Sure.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So I understand, Constable  
22 Dorrington, that it was not until 2015 that you attended and enrolled in the RCMP; is that  
23 right?

24 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That is correct.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And before that, I understand that you  
26 spent 17 years in the Canadian Armed Forces; is that correct?

27 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That is also correct.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I understand that you were enrolled or

1 involved in the infantry division of the Canadian Armed Forces?

2 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Recognized infantry, yes, that's right.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yes, thank you. Constable, you had  
4 deployments in Germany, in the Balkans, and in the Persian Gulf during your time in the  
5 infantry; is that correct?

6 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That is correct.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. I understand that you left the  
8 infantry in or -- on or about 2000; is that right?

9 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That is correct.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And then you spent some time in the  
11 private sector; correct?

12 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's correct.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And then we're going to get to your  
14 experience at the RCMP, so 2015 you attended and graduated from Depot; correct?

15 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That is correct.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And I understand that you were then  
17 posted to the Surrey, British Columbia District or Detachment; is that correct?

18 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That is correct.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I understand that that enrollment or your  
20 job there was as a general duty member?

21 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That is correct.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** But that that was in an urban setting; is  
23 that right?

24 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That is true.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And you were there for about 3  
26 years until in 2018 you transferred to the Colchester District at the Bible Hill  
27 Detachment; is that correct?

28 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That is correct.

1                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. And you were also involved as a  
2 general duty member at that time, Constable Dorrington, at the Colchester District?

3                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's correct, yes.

4                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So on April 20<sup>th</sup> -- sorry, April 18<sup>th</sup>,  
5 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup>, you were -- of 2020, you were enrolled as a general duty member at the  
6 Colchester District; is that right?

7                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That is correct.

8                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. Let's then move on a little bit to  
9 some of your training. I understand at Depot you would have received training in  
10 something called IARD; is that correct?

11                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That is correct.

12                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Can you tell us about that, please,  
13 Constable, without a great deal of detail, but what type of training you would have got  
14 with respect to IARD?

15                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So the IARD training is a program  
16 that's admitted through the course of our training at Depot in Regina, so that would  
17 entail training member on how to respond effectively to an active shooter scenario,  
18 whether it be in a school, in some sort of a building complex, and how it would be that  
19 we respond to that appropriately, and the measures that we'd typically take as they  
20 pertain to a first person or active shooters.

21                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And you say you took that at  
22 Depot. Would you have required some updating and/or recertification with respect to  
23 that type of training?

24                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So every division is -- requires  
25 recertification and training. Typically, it's every two to three years, depending on which  
26 division you're in.

27                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And when you were in H-Division,  
28 how long was that?

1                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** My understanding is it's every two  
2 years. I could be mistaken. I believe it's every two years ---

3                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right.

4                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** --- in H-Division.

5                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Any different from your experience in  
6 B.C.?

7                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** I think it's every three years in B.C.

8                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Any other training, in particular, I'm  
9 going to focus here on carbine training, did you get that at Depot as well?

10                  **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So that's correct. So the carbine --  
11 the implementation of the carbine training was -- that's a new insertion, which took place  
12 while we were going through the process at Depot, as a result of findings from Moncton.  
13 So that was just starting to be implemented during my time there.

14                  **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And how about recertification or  
15 qualification for carbine training?

16                  **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So the carbine training is done  
17 annually, so that's an annual recertification along with your nine-millimetre pistol. Those  
18 are done annually.

19                  **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And were you up to date on your  
20 carbine training?

21                  **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Of course.

22                  **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. Tell me, I think as well that you  
23 had CEW or taser training; is that right?

24                  **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's correct. So it's -- so CEW taser  
25 training, so it's an intermediate range, non-lethal weapon that I was trained on as well.

26                  **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. We've heard some evidence from  
27 other witnesses who have talked about them taking instructor status training. Did you  
28 ever receive any type of training in that regard?

1                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No, I never received instructor status  
2 training.

3                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Very good. I want to go back to  
4 the IARD training a little bit more and I want to ask you about your views with respect to  
5 the training in terms of anticipation for something of the nature that we experienced on  
6 April 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup>, 2020. Do you have any comments in that regard, Constable  
7 Dorrington?

8                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So I would suggest that the training  
9 that was implemented through the course of my time at Depot for IARD was good  
10 training. It was well presented, it was effective. I would suggest that there was some  
11 limitations within the scope of that training ---

12                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

13                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** --- such as their ability to conduct  
14 IARD training in an outdoor setting seemed to be -- there seemed to be some limitations  
15 with their ability to either facilitate that.

16                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. What do you mean by that?

17                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So the focus primarily for the IARD  
18 training at that time seemed to be as it would -- as it would pertain to some form of  
19 active shooter within a building or a complex and how to respond to that appropriately,  
20 i.e. active shooter within a school or some sort of workplace environment, and how to  
21 make entry, have your command and control and so forth to locate and neutralize the  
22 threat as it pertained for your IARD.

23                   So the focus as it would pertain to outdoor settings, I would  
24 suggest, was limited at that time.

25                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Did you receive any training in H  
26 Division with respect to outdoor IARD experiences?

27                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Not that I can recall specifically for an  
28 outdoor setting.

1                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Let me ask you about training and  
2 IARD training with respect to darkness or nighttime training.

3                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So there was some training with  
4 limited or low light settings. Again, minimal.

5                   So there was no training within the IARD spectrum at Depot that  
6 would utilize things, for instance, like night vision capabilities for assistance, so that was  
7 not integrated at all.

8                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. Any training like that at -- in H  
9 Div?

10                  **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No.

11                  **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. Tell me about multiple IARD  
12 team training or multiple IARD team response training. Are you able to comment on  
13 that in your experience?

14                  **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Sure. So within the scope of the  
15 IARD training, there was instruction as to the insertion of multiple teams for IARD and  
16 how that would be implemented in an IARD setting. So there was instruction on that,  
17 albeit limited.

18                  So the focus was primarily on the insertion of your initial team and  
19 how your initial team would move forward to locate and neutralize the threat.

20                  **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. So with respect to your experience  
21 that you had on April 18th and 19th, are you able to express any concerns with respect  
22 to your training that you had?

23                  **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So I would suggest that as it pertained  
24 to my training as it was applied or that I received from the RCMP that would be some  
25 significant limitations within the scope of the training that we received and the  
26 environment that we are currently faced with for an active threat.

27                  **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And in terms of the  
28 Commissioners getting some information with respect to looking forward, do you have



1 any suggestions in terms of enhancement and/or development of training with respect  
2 to this type of situation?

3 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So there are -- I would have a number  
4 of recommendations, realistically.

5 So as the two points in particular that you've just brought forward,  
6 so there should -- there should be the capacity and scope to include IARD training  
7 within both urban and rural -- obviously not urban settings. The bulk of RCMP policing, I  
8 would suggest, is of a rural setting, and so therefore, our requirement to be able to be  
9 proficient in that manner is certainly necessary.

10 In addition to that, there's a high likelihood that any contact that  
11 we'd have in an IARD setting could be equally during the day and/or night, so we need  
12 to be proficient in that kind of environment as well and the tools that would -- we would  
13 need to use to facilitate that effectively.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And when you say "tools", I don't want to  
15 get into a great discussion about that, but can you make some reference to what you  
16 mean by that?

17 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Sure. So a tool that would be easily  
18 utilized by the RCMP would be something, for instance, as night vision goggles or night  
19 vision capability and/or handheld FLIR, so those devices can be used at an individual  
20 basis and we don't have to wait for a specialized team such as ERT to arrive, so we  
21 could have those locally at a detachment level and they should be at a detachment  
22 level.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So on April 18th-19th, did you have  
24 access to the handheld FLIR when you responded to the incident in Portapique?

25 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** We had no night vision capabilities  
26 whatsoever.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** On April 18th-19th, did you, yourself,  
28 have access to night vision capacity or night vision goggles when you responded on --

1 to the Portapique incident?

2 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** The detachment didn't have any.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Sorry?

4 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** I said the detachment did not have  
5 any.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Thank you.

7 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Sorry, Officer. Could you just  
8 speak a little more loudly, please?

9 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Sure.

10 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. Let's talk about April 18th, 2020,  
12 if we could, please. That was a Saturday. I understand that you were on duty that day.  
13 Is that correct, Constable Dorrington?

14 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That is correct.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. And am I right to say that you  
16 were -- or had worked a full day shift on that day?

17 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That is correct. So I was on call, so  
18 that would mean that I was on call from 5:00 until 7:00 in the morning, and then we -- I  
19 do a duty shift from 7:00 in the morning till 5:00 in the evening, which I had completed,  
20 albeit late. I didn't finish my shift until some time after 8 o'clock that evening.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So 7:00 a.m. you started your shift  
22 on Saturday and finished your shift at 8:00 p.m., about then?

23 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's correct.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Why the length of the shift? Any  
25 idea?

26 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** I can't recall specifically. There was --  
27 there was some file that caused me to be delayed.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Is this something that was

1 unusual, usual or periodic?

2 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** I would suggest periodic.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. You had indicated that there was  
4 an on-call status that you were undertaking at that time.

5 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Right.

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I'm a little unclear about what that is. Can  
7 you give us a better sense of how the on call worked at Colchester District?

8 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So Colchester -- sorry, Colchester  
9 County has a 22-hour policing model, so clearly not a 24, so what'll happen is from 7:00  
10 in the morning until 5 o'clock the subsequent morning, there's members that are actively  
11 out policing the community. So from 5:00 in the morning until 7:00 in the morning,  
12 there's what's referred to as on-call status.

13 So there'll be two members that are placed on call for Colchester  
14 County and then in the event that a call comes in to our dispatch, then they would  
15 subsequently push that out so the two on-call members.

16 So the on-call members, they would be clearly at home. They  
17 would have a police vehicle with them at home at their disposal, and along with that,  
18 they would have all their gear and equipment with them ready to roll. So that's kind of  
19 how that works.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And the idea of having the gear and the  
21 car at home is so if there's a call at 5:00 a.m. in that sort of on-call period, you can get  
22 up and running quickly. Is that it?

23 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's correct.

24 So to get to the detachment without the gear and equipment and so  
25 forth, you're looking at a significant delay, I would suggest easily 15 to 20 minutes if  
26 you're not at the detachment.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

28 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** And then subsequent to that,

1 Colchester County is massive in its geographic, so the detachment can easily be 30 to  
2 45 minutes away from a prospective call, so we want to try to reduce that time as much  
3 as possible.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Very good. I got a sense now of  
5 the on-call situation in Colchester.

6 You arrived home at around 8 o'clock after your shift.

7 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That is correct.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** You had some personal time, I  
9 understand, and then something happened a little later in the evening. Is that right?

10 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That is correct.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Can you tell me about that, please,  
12 Constable?

13 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Sure. So I arrived home shortly after  
14 8 o'clock and had supper with my wife. In around, I believe it was -- I think it was  
15 around 11:40 -- 11:40ish, we had -- were shutting it down for the night. I was just  
16 getting into bed, I received a call from one of my co-workers at the time.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And that co-worker was?

18 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So that co-worker was Constable  
19 Rodney MacDonald.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And if I can just go back a little bit,  
21 Constable, Colchester District is composed of different shifts. Is that right?

22 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That is correct.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And you would have worked on a  
24 particular shift with some regular co-workers; right?

25 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That is also correct.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And you would have worked on that day  
27 shift with those regular co-workers; right?

28 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's true.

1                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And those co-workers, just for the record,  
2 were?

3                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So there was myself, obviously, there  
4 was Rodney MacDonald, Constable MacDonald. There was Constable Lafferty.

5                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** That's Trent Lafferty?

6                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's Trent Lafferty.

7                   There's Constable MacNeil and Constable Dillen \* and there's  
8 Corporal Rodney Peterson.

9                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And the team leader for that shift  
10 was Corporal Rodney Peterson. Is that right?

11                  **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's correct.

12                  **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So on that day, how many  
13 members on your shift were working -- actually working?

14                  **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Actually working?

15                  **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

16                  **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So there'd be Corporal Peterson,  
17 Constable MacDonald, Lafferty, MacNeil and myself.

18                  **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. All right.

19                  So I interrupted you. You tell us that you had a call from Constable  
20 MacDonald. Please ---

21                  **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Right.

22                  **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- tell us about that, Constable.

23                  **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** About -- so I receive a call about  
24 11:30.

25                  **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

26                  **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** He says, "Have you heard what's  
27 going on in Portapique?" I said, "No." I said, "I'm going to bed. I don't know what  
28 you're talking about." He says, "There's an active shooter situation going on in

1 Portapique right now.” I said, “All right.” I said, “I’ll be rolling in five minutes.”

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Now hold on. Why did you say that? And  
3 why would you undertake that commitment at that early stage in the process?

4 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So to me, it made sense. So I’m paid  
5 by the public to serve and protect. I’m -- myself and Cst Lafferty, we were both the on-  
6 call members for Colchester County.

7 So I know that currently within Colchester County, at the time that  
8 the call would be ongoing, there would be, likely, four to five members trying to respond  
9 to this call and cover all of Colchester County at the same time. So their ability to do  
10 that would be challenged, to say the least.

11 In addition to that, I know that one of the members that they had on  
12 that team had just come to that team. And she, with no disrespect to her, her job, she  
13 was with the ICE unit, and her familiarity with the geographic and general duty policing  
14 may or may not have been limited to some degree.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Just to be clear, when you’re speaking of  
16 “she”, you’re responding to Cst Colford, are you?

17 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That is correct. Yeah.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Continue on.

19 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So from the training that we received  
20 with respect to IARD, the doctrine is that we were to push as many members in as are  
21 necessary until we can locate and neutralize the threat.

22 So if my being there could assist to facilitate that, then I would  
23 gladly be there.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So I am trying to get a sense of  
25 whether there had been an official call out, or unofficial call out, or even whether it was  
26 a call out of Cst ---

27 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** There was not an official call out. So  
28 the call I received from Cst MacDonald I would not classify as an official call out. It was

1 a call making me aware of an ongoing situation that was unfolding within the Portapique  
2 area.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

4 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** And nobody seemed, at that point, to  
5 have a whole lot of information as to the scope of what was transpiring, ---

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

7 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** --- other than the fact that it was  
8 transpiring.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Just give me a little assistance  
10 then. Is there any reason why you might not have waited for an official call out or in fact  
11 made efforts to initiate an official call out?

12 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So I'm not much of a waiter. I know  
13 that time is crucial. Especially in an active shooter situation. So lives can be dependent  
14 on seconds. So my goal is to get out and try to locate and neutralize that threat as  
15 quickly as possible.

16 So in my mind, it would make sense to me that the logical  
17 individuals to be called out at the earliest opportunity would be the two individuals that  
18 are at home, on call, with all their gear at the ready, with two vehicles already ready,  
19 and that are familiar with the geographic of Colchester County.

20 So it's a logical step for me to move forward with or without an  
21 official notification from a supervisor.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Now I've learned a little bit over  
23 the past few months about something called chain of command.

24 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's correct.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And I'm getting a sense from you that  
26 your team leader, your corporal, would have been Cpl Peterson at that stage. Did you  
27 make efforts to contact Cpl Peterson?

28 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No, I did not.

1                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. I'm also given the impression that  
2 the Ops NCO for Colchester District at that time would have been Sgt O'Brien. Does  
3 that sound right?

4                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That is correct.

5                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And did you make efforts to contact Sgt  
6 O'Brien to give him the heads up of what was going on?

7                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No, I did not.

8                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. What did you do after you received  
9 this information and got rolling? How long did it take you get rolling, you said?

10                  **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** About two to three minutes.

11                  **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. And it's going to take you some  
12 time to get geared up and so on. Are you saying two to three minutes to get geared up  
13 and out the door?

14                  **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's correct.

15                  **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So what do you do?

16                  **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So I get in my vehicle. So I don't  
17 know where this is taking place in Portapique specifically, but I know where Portapique  
18 is and I know it's a ways out. So I'm trying to make best speed to get there as quickly  
19 as possible, at the same time as listening to the radio, that's the transmissions that are  
20 taking place, to try to get an insight as to what's transpiring and to log into my mobile  
21 workstation on the move so I can get the proper updates on my mobile workstation, and  
22 which should also provide me with a mapping geographic of where the incident is  
23 actually taking place.

24                  **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And were you able to log in to your  
25 MWS?

26                  **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Of course.

27                  **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

28                  **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Yes.



1                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And I'm getting the sense that much was  
2 going on as you're making your way to Portapique?

3                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** There was a tremendous amount that  
4 was going on.

5                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Give us a sense then, please, for the  
6 general duty member responding to Portapique, what the inputs are, what information  
7 you're receiving, and what information you're delivering, if any?

8                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Sure. So I come on the radio. I make  
9 a statement that I don't know where we're at within the scope of the event, because it's -  
10 - it has come into effect prior to my being on duty.

11                   And so immediately when I log on, I ask if there's any air support  
12 available to assist members that are currently on scene. So that was my first request.

13                   I received a response from the Ops NCO O'Brien that that request  
14 had already been inundated for and dispatch comes back and says that no air support  
15 with flare is available.

16                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So is this your first understanding  
17 that Ops NCO Sgt O'Brien is involve din the undertaking at this time?

18                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That is correct.

19                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. All right. How fast are you going?

20                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** About 207 kilometres an hour.

21                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And how do you know that, Cst?

22                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** I would suggest 211, but apparently  
23 GPS reading says 207.

24                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** It's very fast.

25                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** It's quick.

26                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. You had capacity to operate the  
27 MWS and obtain this information that you're dealing with?

28                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's correct.

1                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Was anybody with you at that  
2 time?

3                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Personally in my vehicle? No.

4                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. Okay.

5                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No. We travel alone.

6                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And did you have an awareness of  
7 where Cst Rodney MacDonald was at this time?

8                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** I knew exactly where he was.

9                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. All right. So did you receive any  
10 instructions at this time with respect to what your involvement would be at Portapique?

11                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So I received instructions from the  
12 Ops NCO, Sgt O'Brien.

13                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

14                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So he directed myself and Cst Lafferty  
15 to conduct an outer perimeter ---

16                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

17                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** --- on the eastern side of Portapique  
18 on the number 2 highway, approximately, I would suggest, about four kilometres to the  
19 east of Portapique.

20                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. As a general duty member, you're  
21 familiar with containment duties?

22                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's correct.

23                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** You're familiar with the fact that  
24 containment points are important, obviously, in an investigation/engagement like this?

25                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Yes, they are.

26                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And when you took these  
27 instructions, you understood them?

28                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** I understood them, yes.

1                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Did you have any difficulty with  
2 them?

3                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Personally, yes, I had a challenge  
4 with those ---

5                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

6                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** --- with that direction, yes.

7                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. And your personal challenge  
8 was what, please, Constable?

9                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** It's in contravention with the IARD  
10 doctrine.

11                  **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Meaning what?

12                  **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** The IARD doctrine states that as  
13 many teams as are necessary to move into locate and neutralize the threat are to move  
14 in to locate and neutralize the threat.

15                  **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Did you have any other  
16 conversation with Sgt O'Brien with respect to your placement in containment?

17                  **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Not as it pertains to placement and  
18 containment.

19                  **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Sorry?

20                  **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** I said not as it pertains to placement  
21 and containment. Just the fact that he wanted us there on the eastern side of  
22 Portapique on the Number 2 ---

23                  **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

24                  **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** --- and we were screening vehicles as  
25 they were to leave the Portapique area heading eastbound and they were not to return  
26 until we had an understanding of when it would be safe for the public to return.

27                  **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So you did attend at this  
28 containment location on direction?

1                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That is correct. Myself and Cst  
2 Lafferty both.

3                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Thank you. Madam Registrar, I'd like to  
4 just bring up the Foundational Document entitled "Containment Points in and Around  
5 Portapique". In particular, paragraph 23, which is found at page 13, therein. And this is  
6 from the Portapique document. If we could just scroll down a little bit, please? The  
7 other. Scroll up, I guess, is the proper instruction. And that shows Figure 7 at 7787  
8 Glooscap Trail containment point on Highway 2. And Highway 23 -- sorry, paragraph  
9 23 reads,

10                                           "Highway 2 was contained near [this address at 12:01  
11                                           and -- between] 12:01[...] and 4:58..."

12                                           Does that accord with your understanding, Constable Dorrington?

13                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Yes, that'd be accurate.

14                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And can you tell us then, please,  
15 what it was that you were doing specifically at this location? You may have touched on  
16 it a little earlier, but I want to make sure it's clarified.

17                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Sure. So myself and Constable  
18 Lafferty, we were out of our vehicles. We were searching vehicles and clearing them as  
19 they proceeded from west to east out of the Portapique area, giving limited information  
20 that we could to the public that was concerned about what was transpiring, and  
21 informing them that, at this point, they would not be allowed back into the area until we  
22 had a better understanding of when it would be safe for them to return.

23                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Did you have any difficulty carrying  
24 out your responsibilities at that containment point?

25                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No. No.

26                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Are you able to give us an  
27 estimate of how much contact you may have had with vehicles over those four, five  
28 hours?

1 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** I would suggest a few dozen ---

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

3 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** --- vehicles ---

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Anything out of the ordinary in terms of  
5 your contact with those few dozen vehicles?

6 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Nothing out of the ordinary.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. I understand as well that you had  
8 continuous monitoring of the Colchester radio transmissions?

9 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That is correct.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And the purpose for that, Constable  
11 Dorrington, is what?

12 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So we need to be aware at all times of  
13 what's transpiring ---

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

15 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** --- within the scope of the event itself.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

17 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** It's -- it was certainly very dynamic.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Am I right to say that at some time you  
19 had or became aware that you had had some contact previously with the perpetrator  
20 and that information became obtained and distributed throughout the membership; does  
21 that sound right?

22 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That is correct.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Tell us about that, please.

24 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So it became -- one of the members  
25 that had responded I believe was Constable Patton. He was one of the initial members  
26 that had responded to Portapique area call. An individual that he had spoken to had  
27 said that the perpetrator, he believed his name was Gabriel. And this was prior to my  
28 logging on and being privy to that information. So I suspect that with that information

1 and in addition to, I guess, information was disclosed that this Gabriel individual lived  
2 within the Portapique area, checks were made to make a determination that the  
3 perpetrator was believed to be Gabriel Wortman.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

5 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** I subsequently get a call from the Ops  
6 NCO, which would be Sergeant O'Brien. He or somebody had run checks on Gabriel  
7 Wortman, and the last interaction with him was from myself.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm. Okay. Tell us then about your last  
9 interaction with the perpetrator, what you recall.

10 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Sure. So as an active duty member  
11 within Colchester County, I do a lot of proactive traffic enforcement. So what -- despite  
12 what may have been put in different publications that we wouldn't be out enforcing traffic  
13 regulations on the Number 2 Highway in February at 6 o'clock at night, I do; right? So I  
14 was out there that evening, in particular, serving paperwork to another individual on the  
15 Number 2 Highway for their previous traffic infraction that they had made. So I was out  
16 there on the Number 2 Highway in February with, as it would happen to be, Constable  
17 Colford, who had come out with me because I anticipated that the interaction with this  
18 client may not go the best.

19 So that interaction transpired, and I was heading back to Bible Hill  
20 Detachment, heading east on the Number 2 Highway when a white Taurus with the  
21 pinstriping, the subdued metallic pinstriping on the side of the vehicle kind of flew by  
22 me, going from east to west on the Number 2 Highway. So that was -- that caught my  
23 attention. So that is not a typical area for our Traffic Enforcement Unit to be conducting  
24 traffic enforcement. So I do a status check on my mobile workstation for all of  
25 Colchester County and including traffic, and there's nothing there.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Nothing there meaning what, please,  
27 Constable?

28 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So that means that that vehicle is not

1 logged in or does not have a mobile workstation that's reporting to our OCC, and  
2 therefore it doesn't come down to our mapping system.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So what does that mean to you?

4 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** It's not a police vehicle.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Why would you have thought it  
6 was a police vehicle?

7 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So it's a white Ford Taurus. These  
8 kind of exact same make, model is what we would currently drive. In addition to that, it  
9 had notable metallic pinstriping on the vehicle, identical to what the RCMP use with their  
10 service vehicles.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

12 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So that was why I initially thought it  
13 may have been a traffic vehicle. So our traffic fleet have pinstriping on the vehicles, and  
14 they have subdued markings on the sides of the vehicle, so that's why my initial thought  
15 was that it may have been a traffic enforcement vehicle ---

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

17 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** --- but it was not.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. And I'm curious, you say that it -  
19 - what did you say, it blew by you or something of that nature?

20 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** It went by me in a fairly significant rate  
21 of speed. So the speed limit there is between 70 and 80, and I think it went by me at  
22 115.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Now how did you know that?

24 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So I always have my radar -- I'm  
25 always using my radar all the time.

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** What do you mean you're always using  
27 it?

28 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So I'm always checking traffic as I

1 drive. So as -- if a vehicle's approaching me, then there -- and I believe it's in excess of  
2 the posted rate, the radar will be activated, and it shows me a clear reading of what that  
3 vehicle -- the speed of the vehicle is captured on the radar.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So is this an unusual thing for you  
5 to be doing then?

6 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No.

7 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. When you saw the vehicle go  
8 by, what did you do after you made your checks? Forgive me, I should have made that  
9 clear.

10 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So after I made my checks and  
11 ascertained that it was not one of our vehicles, I advised Constable Colford I was going  
12 to turn around and attempt to conduct a stop on the vehicle.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. How'd that go?

14 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So I turned around. It took me a bit to  
15 try to close up with where I believe the vehicle should have been, but at this time, it was  
16 dark and I couldn't see the vehicle, and I was just about to stop when the vehicle  
17 actually put their brakes on, and the vehicle was turning into Portapique Road. So the  
18 vehicle was driving with no daytime running lights, so therefore, it had no taillights on,  
19 so that's why I couldn't see it. So once I re-acquired the vehicle, I pulled in to  
20 Portapique Road behind the vehicle, activated my emergency equipment to initiate a  
21 stop, and almost immediately upon doing so, a male individual exits the vehicle.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. So I assume the car stopped  
23 after you activated your -- where exactly were you physically, please, Constable?

24 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So right as you turn off the Number 2  
25 Highway right onto Portapique Road ---

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

27 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** --- I would be 50 feet within  
28 Portapique Road.



1                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. All right. Then describe your  
2 interaction please with this ---

3                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Sure.

4                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- person.

5                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So I initiate the stop, so I have a male  
6 that gets out of his vehicle almost immediately, which is not common. So I conduct  
7 hundreds of traffic stops a year, and I would suggest over the course of my seven  
8 years, probably upwards of a few thousand, and I can count on probably two hands how  
9 many times somebody has come out of their vehicle back towards me.

10                  **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. What did that mean to you then,  
11 Constable?

12                  **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So that's a threat to me; all right? So  
13 that's a clear threat to me.

14                  **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

15                  **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So traffic stops are inherently  
16 dangerous to begin with, so they're high risk. We don't know who we're dealing with.  
17 We have no idea if they do or don't have any weapons, for instance, or whether they are  
18 or aren't under the influence, so they're a very high-risk piece of business for us. So  
19 with this individual getting out of the vehicle coming back at me directly, it was certainly  
20 a concern. So my nearest backup would have been Constable Colford, and my  
21 understanding of roughly where her geographic was, was she would be approximately 5  
22 to 10 minutes away to assist me if necessary.

23                  **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

24                                 So what did you do in response to that person getting out of their  
25 vehicle?

26                  **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Sure. So because I conducted a lot of  
27 traffic stops, I always have my microphone, external microphone for the vehicle, right  
28 beside me at the ready. So I clearly told him that it would be in his best interest to

1 return to his vehicle.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. You want to tell us what clearly  
3 told him means?

4 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** I don't know if you really want to hear  
5 that on ---

6 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Well, did you -- how direct were you,  
7 Constable?

8 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** I told him to get back in his fucking  
9 vehicle.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. Thank you. And did that have  
11 an impact on his actions?

12 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** He turned around and went back in  
13 his vehicle.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And why did you feel it was  
15 necessary to use that direct type of language, Officer?

16 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So the way he approached the  
17 vehicle, it was very direct, purposeful.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

19 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** He looked infuriated. I had no idea as  
20 to who this individual was. I had no idea why he would be conducting himself in such a  
21 manner. To me, he presented as clearly motivated. And my ability to -- so there's no  
22 ability to negotiate with him. So he had closed the distance between his vehicle and my  
23 vehicle within the span of, I'd say, three seconds.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

25 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** He was approximately two feet away  
26 from my vehicle at the time.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. After you made that direction,  
28 what did that person do?

1                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So he returned to his vehicle. He was  
2 compliant. There was no issue with that.

3                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm. Okay. And you had some  
4 interaction with him then?

5                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Sure. So I got out of my vehicle and I  
6 approached him. And he wanted to know what the nature of the stop was for. I told  
7 him, "The reason I pulled you over is for your speed tonight. Can I have a copy of your  
8 license, insurance, and registration," which is common practice.

9                   So he proceeded to tell me that he felt that he was being targeted,  
10 that he had just had an interaction with the Halifax Police Department, that he's a  
11 dentist in Dartmouth, I believe it was, and that he had some altercation with members  
12 there about some parking dispute.

13                   I told him I didn't have a clue what he was talking about. I had no  
14 understanding or information about the altercation or incident that he had within Halifax  
15 or Dartmouth. I just replied back to him that this is strictly a traffic stop as it pertains to  
16 his speed.

17                   So at that point, he handed me the required documentation and he  
18 seemed to deescalate quickly.

19                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. I understand you had some  
20 additional conversation with him; did you?

21                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Sure. So I went back and I processed  
22 the ticket for him. I came back to issue him the ticket. We had a conversation about the  
23 Ford Taurus. He asked me what I thought of them. I said they're okay. He indicated to  
24 me that he had a number of these Ford Tauruses that he picked up at auction. Three or  
25 four. It was kind of non-specific. And he indicated that he actually liked the vehicles  
26 quite a bit.

27                   I didn't have a whole lot to offer other than the fact I thought the  
28 vehicles were okay.

1                   And I did suggest to him, I said, "Juist so that you are aware," I  
2 said, "You don't have your headlights on." I said, "You have no daytime running lights in  
3 the back of your vehicle. The back of your vehicle is pitch black in the dark and you run  
4 the risk of being hit from behind."

5                   So that was the end of the interaction with him.

6                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Did you take anything to be out of order  
7 or unusual about his conversation with respect to these Ford Tauruses that he was  
8 speaking about?

9                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Well to me, I mean, it strikes me as,  
10 you know, odd. I mean, I don't -- I don't collect four of any kind of vehicle.

11                  **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Pardon?

12                  **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** I don't collect four of the same kind of  
13 vehicle. I understand somebody can be -- have an affection for vehicles and so forth.

14                  **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

15                  **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** It struck me as a little bit odd that  
16 you'd want to have three or four of the same ones, other than the fact that, you know,  
17 police cars are inherently driven pretty hard. If you would want to have multiples for  
18 spare parts, then that would make sense for me.

19                  **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Did you, at this time, have any concern  
20 about the fact there might be improper usage of these type of vehicles?

21                  **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No, it never even crossed my mind at  
22 that point.

23                  **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Did anything come to your mind about  
24 public safety issues in terms of this person's interest in these types of vehicles?

25                  **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No, that wasn't a concern of mine at  
26 that point.

27                  **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. How long was your conversation  
28 with respect to his interest in the Tauruses?

1                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** I would suggest probably less than a  
2 minute.

3                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Was there any other conversation  
4 with respect to police paraphernalia or anything of that nature?

5                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** I believe he made a comment to the  
6 effect that he collected police -- he either collected or he had -- I believe he said that he  
7 collected police paraphernalia.

8                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Did he give you any particulars  
9 with respect to the type of paraphernalia?

10                  **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No.

11                  **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Did you ask for any particulars?

12                  **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No, I did not.

13                  **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Did this strike you as unusual or raise any  
14 concerns about public safety issues for you, Constable?

15                  **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No, there was nothing that would  
16 suggest to me that there was anything particularly out of the ordinary ---

17                  **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

18                  **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** --- as it pertained to public safety.

19                  **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

20                  **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Individuals that have ---

21                  **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right.

22                  **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** --- collections of any number of things.  
23 Nothing to alarm me as it pertained to public safety.

24                  **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. I understand then that you carried  
25 out your procedure with respect to the preparation and presentation of a summary  
26 offence ticket?

27                  **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's correct.

28                  **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. I'm going to ask the Registrar for

1 raise for us a photograph, COMM number 12145. I ask if you can give us some  
2 commentary on this particular photograph that ---

3 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Sure.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. Could you just comment on that  
5 for us, Cst Dorrington, what we're seeing in this photograph?

6 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Okay. So that is a picture that I took  
7 personally from within my vehicle. So that is the radar that I use within the vehicle. It's  
8 called a Raptor, obviously.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

10 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So it shows, on that digital display,  
11 that my patrol vehicle speed was 85 kilometres an hour at the time when I was  
12 proceeding from west to east. And it also shows that the approaching vehicle, as is  
13 designated by the downward arrow, was going 115 kilometres an hour.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

15 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** And so that vehicle was Wortman's  
16 vehicle.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right.

18 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** And it shows that it's a lock and it's on  
19 my front radar. So all that information is there. So it means that Wortman was  
20 approaching me from the front at 115 kilometres an hour. I was going towards him at  
21 85 kilometres an hour. And we have a definitive lock on that. And I subsequently take  
22 a picture of his valid driver's license, in conjunction with the digital display on the radar.

23 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. And I see perhaps a faded  
24 image in the background of that photo. Are you able to comment on that?

25 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Sure. So I take a picture that you see  
26 displayed here. And I take a secondary picture, which would capture the back of the  
27 vehicle to include the plate. So in this instance, what you see is the back of Wortman's  
28 vehicle. So it's a white Ford Taurus. It still contained a significant amount of the

1 reflective decaling that was attached to it when it was sold at auction. And that's the  
2 identical reflective decaling that is used by the RCMP vehicles. So that is why my initial  
3 impression was that it was an RCMP traffic service vehicle with the subdued markings.

4 It also had a small Canada flag on the rear of the trunk as well.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And the purpose for taking this  
6 photograph again, just for clarity, Cst Dorrington?

7 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Sure. So anybody I give a summary  
8 of offence ticket to, I take a picture of both the license -- their driver's license in  
9 conjunction with the radar, which you see here, ---

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

11 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** --- and a secondary picture of the  
12 back of the vehicle. So that's done for evidentiary purposes so that in the event that  
13 individual contests the ticket, as did Mr. Wortman, then I can take that to court and  
14 provide that for evidentiary purposes within court.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. All right. Thank you.

16 Madam Registrar, perhaps the next photograph, if we could bring  
17 up, please, which I believe is a photograph of a summary offence ticket.

18 And I'll ask you to comment on that for the record. This anything  
19 you recognize, Cst Dorrington?

20 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Sure.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

22 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So that is the summary offence ticket  
23 that I wrote to Mr. Wortman on the 12<sup>th</sup> of February. As you can see, the time of the day  
24 was almost 6 o'clock, so 5:59. So at that time in February, it was just coming on to dusk  
25 and it was -- it was complete darkness by the time the ticket -- by the time the  
26 interaction was complete.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Anything unusual about the summary  
28 offence ticket in this case or was this a relatively routine filling out process that you

1 would do in a normal way?

2 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's standard.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. I'm going to ask you directly,  
4 was there any other purpose for you, Constable Dorrington, to stop and interact with the  
5 perpetrator in February of 2020 other than a motor vehicle stop and to issue this  
6 summary offence ticket?

7 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So I had no idea that it was the  
8 perpetrator. It was a normal traffic stop, same as I would do for anybody else. It wasn't  
9 till after I conducted the stop that I had a realization that it was Wortman.

10 And even after the stop, I had no idea who Wortman was. He  
11 meant nothing to me.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. All right. So the photograph that  
13 we spoke about -- and I'm going to take us back to the morning of April 19th when  
14 you're at the containment process. Did you retrieve that photograph in some effort or  
15 some manner?

16 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's correct.

17 So that was brought to my attention by the Ops NCO, Sergeant  
18 O'Brien. He asked me what my recollection was with my interaction with Wortman.

19 I said if I wrote him a ticket, then I have the picture of him. So  
20 Sergeant O'Brien told me that I had written a ticket. It was on February the 12th. So  
21 my RCMP-issued phone has those photos on it.

22 I informed Sergeant O'Brien that -- "Just give me a second. I'll  
23 retrieve the photos", which I had. So of course, his driver's licence has his physical  
24 descriptors on that, including his picture.

25 There was the vehicle there with the licence plate and he asked  
26 that I push that out to the members that were -- that had responded within Portapique  
27 proper, so that would be Beselt, Merchant and Patton, which I did.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Sorry. And I want to -- I just want to slow



1 you down on that. "Push it out" to Beselt, Merchant and Patton, what does that mean?

2 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Sorry. So I sent that through secure  
3 text message to those members so that they would have an understanding of who the  
4 perpetrator was and the physical descriptors of that individual to assist them.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And secure text means from your  
6 RCMP issued telephone or phone ---

7 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's correct.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- to another RCMP issued secure  
9 phone?

10 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's correct.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. And did you do anything else  
12 with the photograph that we had just reviewed here a few moments ago?

13 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So I -- there was -- I was instructed to  
14 send that to members of the ERT team that were also starting to respond to the event  
15 and were making their way to Portapique, so I sent that one or two of those ERT  
16 members.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** How about the command post? Do you  
18 recall at any time forwarding or pushing out this photograph to anybody at the command  
19 post location or in a position of command?

20 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Not at the command post specifically.  
21 I can't recall if I sent a copy to Sergeant O'Brien or not.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. Very good.

23 The next area I want to ask you about is something that arose in a  
24 recorded interview of November 9th, 2021 with Mass Casualty Commission  
25 interviewers.

26 In particular, Madam Registrar, if we can go to page 11 of the  
27 November 9th, 2021 interview.

28 And the bottom at 00:46:36 hours, I just want to -- this is something

1 attributed -- or that you had indicated in that interview, and I want to talk to you. And it  
2 covers about the knowledge of the fully-marked replica RCMP vehicle while you were  
3 engaged at your containment post. And I'll read it just for us to familiarize each other  
4 with it. It says:

5 "So myself and Lafferty were on outer perimeter for  
6 hours while events were unfolding within Portapique.  
7 So there's reports of what they believed to be more  
8 shots fired, there's talk of another individual that  
9 they'd seen kind of located but subsequently lost. It's  
10 kind of a cat and mouse thing in the woods. ERT is  
11 on its way. We're screening vehicles as they exit.  
12 There's multiple structure fires that continued to burn  
13 and new ones that are being -- that seemed to be  
14 popping up. We still have no clarity as to the number  
15 of shooters that are involved or weapons systems that  
16 are involved. We had no clarity on vehicles, what we  
17 may -- or what our -- our subjects may be driving to  
18 look for. There's just the possibility that it may be an  
19 auctioned-off Taurus with pinstriping with a Canada  
20 flag on the back, all right, because it came into initial  
21 dispatch from the very first residence, the burgundy  
22 house that reports that there's an RCMP vehicle in the  
23 driveway with somebody with a huge gun or  
24 something to that effect. And so for myself personally,  
25 there was no connection that it was actually a fully  
26 decaded RCMP vehicle." (As read)

27 Can you comment on that, Constable Dorrington, in the sense that  
28 you would have been privy to information that's coming about over the radio, you would

1 have been familiar, as you had indicated here, about first complaints and your view was  
2 that it was a -- no connection to a fully decaled RCMP vehicle? How is that?

3 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So to make the leap mentally that  
4 we're dealing with an individual that has the capacity to have a fully-marked police  
5 vehicle is really quite the jump. So quite often we respond to calls from the public. The  
6 call could be one thing that we initially receive and then when we get there is absolutely  
7 nothing like that.

8 So it's not to say that it's anything wilfully done. It's just they're not  
9 always accurate. So for my mind to think that we have a fully-marked police vehicle  
10 representative of the RCMP out and about is a real jump for me.

11 And I was -- I don't even know how that would be possible. Like I  
12 just don't know how that would be possible.

13 So there's been no reports of any police vehicles that have been  
14 stolen or missing. It's not showing up on any of our mapping systems, so I don't see  
15 how that would be possible.

16 I do know how it would be possible how you would have access to  
17 vehicles similar to the one that I pulled over by Mr. Wortman, so those are ex-RCMP  
18 police vehicles with remnants of police pinstriping and so forth on the vehicle. So is that  
19 possible and plausible? Absolutely.

20 Is that something that I can get my head wrapped around? Yeah, it  
21 sure is. And it's something that I know the public has access to.

22 And that's not to discount what came in initially, but it certainly -- it  
23 had never happened before. Nobody -- nobody had any knowledge of how that would  
24 even be possible to re-create and produce a vehicle in that likeness.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Let's move on, then, Madam  
26 Registrar, back to the containment Foundational Document. In particular, I just want to  
27 draw your attention, Constable, to paragraph 27 because this moves us along in terms  
28 of the timing situation with respect to your movements.

1 Page 16, paragraph 27 in the Foundational Document  
2 “Containment Points in and Around Portapique”.

3 So the presentation in the Foundational Document indicates that:

4 “The intersection of the eastern prong of Brown Loop  
5 and Highway 2 was contained between 5:02:30 a.m.  
6 and 9:51 a.m. on April 19. Two general-duty RCMP  
7 members were stationed here: Cst. N. Dorrington,  
8 who arrived at 5:02:30 a.m., and Cst. T. Lafferty, who  
9 arrived at 5:02:47 a.m.”

10 Does that sound right or accord with your understanding of  
11 containment efforts, then, Constable Dorrington?

12 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That’s accurate.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Sorry?

14 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That is accurate, yes.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So how is it, then, that you move  
16 from your location four kilometres east to a western position at the eastern prong of  
17 Brown Loop?

18 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So that -- at that time, we were pulled  
19 in. We were requested by, I believe it was, Sergeant O’Brien, for us to move in to a  
20 closer proximity into the Browns Loop area. The initial insertion team, they were doing  
21 an extraction in conjunction with ERT, if I’m correct, of the youth that were within one of  
22 the residences within Portapique proper, so that was being facilitated, and so that the  
23 members that were -- that had been within Portapique, they were currently involved with  
24 that task, and they wanted members brought in closer to facilitate a tighter control point.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So when you moved to that location  
26 closer to the Portapique Beach Road location, were your duties any different at all?

27 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No, duties were the same.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

1                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** They were the same.

2                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. Would you have been aware of  
3 other containment efforts in and around the Portapique area by other members?

4                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** To some degree. So my ability to do  
5 updated status checks of where other members were was limited due to the fact that  
6 myself and Constable Lafferty, we were outside of our vehicles continuously because of  
7 the unknown location of the threat and because of interacting with the public.

8                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

9                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So our ability to get updated visual  
10 status checks through our mobile workstation was basically nonexistent at that point.  
11 So we had to rely entirely on the radio.

12                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Can you offer or provide any  
13 comment with respect to your knowledge, if any, of something called the blueberry road  
14 or access to the blueberry road?

15                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** I had no knowledge of the blueberry  
16 road.

17                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And would you have had any  
18 information or access to information about your colleagues, fellow member's  
19 involvement with Kate and Andrew MacDonald on April 18<sup>th</sup>? Did you know anything  
20 about that?

21                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No, I don't ---

22                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Sorry?

23                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No.

24                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

25                   Okay. Let's move on then to -- back, Madam Registrar, to the  
26 November 9<sup>th</sup> interview, in particular, I'm going to ask you to go to page 13. This is the  
27 Mass Casualty Commission interview of November 9<sup>th</sup>.

28                   So page 13 is a description that you have provided. And about 10

1 lines down, we're talking narratively, the word,

2 "So, it's around that point and shortly thereafter [...]  
3 we [...] get [a] call of the incident up in Wentworth."

4 That's what I want to just review with you a little bit. You got a call  
5 to the incident in Wentworth, and then,

6 "...we're in trouble, yeah, because clearly, he's  
7 outside [...] our containment."

8 Are you able to make any comment on that, Constable Dorrington,  
9 what you meant by that and what was going on at the time?

10 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So by that time, we had -- the children  
11 had been extracted, it's my understanding if I'm correct on timing, and ERT was in the  
12 process of starting house-to-house clearing ---

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

14 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** --- within Portapique proper.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

16 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** And we had an understanding of -- I'm  
17 not sure exactly when that was written, if the statement from Lisa Banfield was -- had  
18 been obtained by members at that point, but she had been discovered, and she was  
19 subsequently being interviewed. And through the course of that interview, we had clear  
20 indication and information that supported the initial description of the vehicle that it was  
21 a fully marked replica of an RCMP vehicle.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

23 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** And so now my concern is that our  
24 efforts to that point had been securing Portapique proper with the hopes that he was  
25 somewhere within that containment field, and now it's clear that that's -- that was not the  
26 case.

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. Now with respect to your  
28 positioning at the containment point four kilometres east and at Brown's Loop, were you

1 content with that responsibility and/or obligation that you were assigned at that point?

2 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No, I was not.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And why do you say that,  
4 Constable Dorrington?

5 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** From my perspective, based on the  
6 training that I had received, that would not have been the most effective use of my  
7 skillset ---

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

9 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** --- and/or personnel.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And keeping in mind you had received  
11 instructions and directions to do what you do, and you did, what was your view with  
12 respect to your skillset and what you should have been doing?

13 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** From my instruction and training on  
14 IARD, it would have been best suited for, initially, for multiple teams to have been  
15 inserted within Portapique during the initial phases of trying to locate and neutralize the  
16 threat.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** That caused you some frustration,  
18 Constable?

19 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Yes.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. With respect to what took place  
21 after the Wentworth call, did you yourself react to the Wentworth call, that is, did you  
22 attend to that direction in the north of Nova Scotia?

23 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No, I was not allowed.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. What do you mean by that?

25 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So my direction was to move within  
26 Portapique proper. Due to the new unfolding events in the Wentworth area, ERT was  
27 being pulled out of Portapique proper, and because of that, we wanted to have some  
28 scene containment at what we believed were three initial scenes, two for sure, and that

1 was the McCully residence and the Blair residence, I think it was.

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

3 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So we were -- myself and Constable  
4 Lafferty, we were directed to those two sites, which are a side-by-side ---

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

6 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** --- within Portapique by Sergeant  
7 O'Brien.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Did that cause you any frustration in any  
9 manner, Constable Dorrington?

10 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That was the direction that was given.

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Let's go then to Exhibit 2223, the  
12 exhibit that's just been tendered, in particular, we'll go to page 9 and 10. And this is a  
13 document that has been prepared by the investigators to the Mass Casualty  
14 Commission with respect to movements of a number of members within Portapique post  
15 the Wentworth call, i.e., sometime after 9:42 or 9:50 in the morning in terms of their  
16 responsibilities and their activities. And we're now looking at page 9, and I'm going to  
17 ask the Registrar to scroll down a little bit to a section called Constable Nick Dorrington.  
18 You've seen this document; have you, Constable?

19 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Yes, I have.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. In particular, I want to just look at  
21 the quote where this is a -- citation has been made from your notes. It says,

22 "I think at around that point, O'Brien pulls myself and  
23 Lafferty into Portapique proper. He wants Lafferty to  
24 hold the scene where Lisa McCully is, and he wants  
25 me to do kind of a quick drive through Portapique to  
26 see if anything is crazy -- to see anything crazy." (As  
27 read)

28 Does that accord with your understanding of what your



1 responsibilities were at that time, Constable Dorrington?

2 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's correct. Initially, that was the  
3 direction, you know.

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And did you have any difficulty  
5 with that direction at that time, Constable?

6 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No, that was -- I was just -- it was not  
7 unreasonable.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

9 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Our abilities initially to go through  
10 Portapique itself and have a better understanding of what had transpired was limited, to  
11 say the least.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Was what?

13 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Limited.

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. And limited by what, please?

15 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Well, initially, it was darkness. It was  
16 completely pitch black. So our ability to see anything was limited just by night,  
17 obviously.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. But in terms of your  
19 responsibilities and your undertakings after 9:42 ---

20 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Right. So this is one of the first  
21 opportunities to go around, and what part of the concern was that, given the scope of  
22 the event, that it would not be unreasonable or to think that there could be press and so  
23 forth that could be in helicopters or planes or whatnot, that could be flying over the  
24 Portapique area. And we really didn't want, in the event that there was any additional  
25 deceased, to be not given the proper respects and to be covered accordingly ---

26 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

27 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** --- within the Portapique area if they're  
28 out in the open.

1                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So the document goes on, as we'll scroll  
2 down, and says, if there's any -- if there -- your instructions were,  
3                                   "...to see if there's anything crazy, if there's any more  
4                                   fatalities on front lawns and so forth, any more  
5                                   structural fires that haven't been reported on." (As  
6                                   read)

7                   Was that your understanding of what you were to be doing at that  
8 stage?

9                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Yeah, that's correct.

10                   So there's approximately 50 structures within the Portapique area  
11 proper, and ERT had already commenced a door-to-door clearing within some of the  
12 structures, which it was unknown to myself which ones they had or hadn't cleared.

13                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

14                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So my instructions were simply to go  
15 around, do a basic drive around, if there's anything that's -- that really jumped out, then  
16 to explore that accordingly and record and/or cover any more deceased that were in the  
17 open and record any new locations for fires if there were.

18                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** What about specific checks at residences,  
19 that is, actually attending at residences and making observations of those locations in  
20 the Portapique area?

21                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No. So that was not part of the  
22 requirement at that time. We didn't have the capacity to facilitate such an in-depth  
23 check.

24                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

25                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** And to do it at a personal level would  
26 have been a significant risk.

27                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And in terms of your position there -- and  
28 we'll talk about risk in a second -- how many general duty members were at that

1 Portapique location while you were doing your drive-around, to the best of your  
2 knowledge?

3 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So there was myself and Constable  
4 Lafferty, realistically. There was -- and Constable Lafferty, he was stationary at the  
5 McCully residence doing scene security there.

6 Sergeant O'Brien was, to my understanding where I last seen him,  
7 which was right next door. And Staff Sergeant Al Carroll and another member were at  
8 the mouth of Portapique and the Number 2 Highway, was my understanding.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So you've just mentioned five members at  
10 this time in terms of your ---

11 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's correct.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- knowledge of their involvement in the  
13 Portapique scene management location. Is that right?

14 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's correct.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Any more come in that you --  
16 during your time there or any involvement with any other further members?

17 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** There wasn't until significantly later.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. All right.

19 Well, then, let's go, then, to the next comment and the document  
20 that's right in front of us here. The full -- first full paragraph says:

21 "Cst. Dorrington makes notation of the results of this  
22 task or reporting back to Sgt. O'Brien. Cst. Dorrington  
23 commences noting times and information about the  
24 perpetrator's movements in his memo book. These  
25 entries start at 9:36 a.m."

26 I'm interested in the fact that while you're doing this drive-through  
27 for structural fires and possible further fatalities, no reporting back to Constable[sic]  
28 O'Brien in the document. Is that actually correct or can you make any comment on

1 that?

2 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Sure.

3 So I'd say that's correct. There's no physical notation within the  
4 notebook.

5 So I ended up going back in person and speaking in person to  
6 Sergeant O'Brien and providing him with that update, that there no new undocumented  
7 fires, there were no other fatalities that, at that point, hadn't been discovered that we  
8 were currently dealing with.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. You would, obviously, know the  
10 importance of taking notes with respect to you carrying out your duties.

11 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Clearly.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Any idea why it was you made no notes  
13 of your observations during your drive-through in Portapique on this occasion?

14 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** There was nothing in particular that  
15 was noteworthy, so there was nothing to suggest that there was an additional residence  
16 that had a fire that hadn't been previously documented. There weren't -- there wasn't  
17 another residence that had individuals that had been deceased on -- within their -- the  
18 confines of their properties. There was nothing noteworthy.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. What I propose to do now,  
20 Constable Dorrington, is within a little bit more detail go through the document, in  
21 particular, going through each figure in terms of tracking your movement and your  
22 involvement in the -- in the Portapique scene management situation.

23 I'm going to bring you to Figure 1 on page 11 of the document. And  
24 this is from GPS tracking by one of the intelligence analysts at the Mass Casualty  
25 Commission, and it says from 5:28 to 9:51 a.m. your tracking is from the Brown Loop to  
26 the head of Portapique Beach Road. Does that sound about right to you?

27 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That'd be correct.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Let's look, then, to Figure 2 at

1 page 12.

2 9:52:27 you're at Portapique Beach Road and Highway 2. Is that  
3 right?

4 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That is correct.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Everything seemed correct in  
6 looking at that Figure 2?

7 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That'd be correct, yes.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Let's move to Figure 3 on  
9 paragraph -- sorry, page 13.

10 There's an indication by the marking on the figure that "Cst  
11 Dorrington enters Portapique at 9:57:55", and then "Dorrington is at Orchard Beach  
12 Drive in Cobequid Court" at 10:19, the marker 2 on that document.

13 If you can just scroll down a little bit more, please.

14 Marker 2 on that document figure shows Dorrington's vehicle  
15 located at the intersection of Cobequid Court and Orchard Beach Drive at 10:19:15.  
16 Does that sound right to you, Constable Dorrington?

17 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That sounds right.

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So you would have proceeded  
19 south from your location down towards Cobequid Court. Does that sound right?

20 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's correct.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Figure or marker 3 shows you at  
22 10:20:47 to 10:23 almost at the corner of Orchard Beach Drive and Portapique  
23 Crescent. Does that sound right to you?

24 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Yes.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Any recall of being there and your  
26 observations?

27 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Nothing of note.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Then Figure 4 is important for us --

1 sorry, marker 4 on Figure 3 is important for us. At 10:26:47 to 10:27:15, it would appear  
2 that your vehicle is marked at [ ] Cobequid Court for about 28 seconds.

3 Do you have a recollection of being at the end of Cobequid Court,  
4 on the western end, at around this time period?

5 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Recollection of being there, nothing in  
6 particular of note other than it's -- the residence appeared to be the same as other  
7 residences that I travelled past.

8 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Would you be able in your mind to  
9 differentiate between the residence at [ ] Cobequid Court and the residence at [ ]  
10 Cobequid Court?

11 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Not particularly, no.

12 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. With respect to your time on the  
13 28 seconds at [ ] Cobequid Court, do you have any recollection of any specific  
14 observations at that location?

15 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Nothing.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. We've heard some commentary,  
17 remarks with respect to the residence or the inside door of the residence at [ ]  
18 Cobequid Court being ajar. Any recollection or commentary you can make with respect  
19 to that?

20 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No, I couldn't speak to that. I couldn't  
21 speak to noting that.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Let's move, then, to page 14,  
23 Figure 4.

24 The marker at the bottom says Constable Dorrington's position at  
25 10:28:15 is at the corner of Orchard Beach Drive and Cobequid Court, leaving the  
26 implication that you would have moved from [ ] Cobequid Court east to that location  
27 past [ ] Cobequid Court.

28 Any recollection of that movement, Constable Dorrington?

1                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** I remember moving east on Cobequid  
2 Court. I'm not -- I haven't been in -- within Portapique area to that degree previous to  
3 this event, so I'm looking for means of access to closer to the beach for structures that I  
4 can see there. Nothing in particular of note.

5                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** No observations of [ ] Cobequid Court of  
6 note?

7                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No.

8                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Marker 2 shows you looping down  
9 onto the beach from Orchard Beach Drive. Marker 3, then, at 10:32 shows travel to  
10 Bayview Court and looping down onto the beach at that location. That sound about  
11 right to you?

12                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's correct.

13                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And the purpose of going to the beach  
14 was for what, please?

15                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Same thing. I'm just looking to see --  
16 make sure that we're not having fatalities that are -- that are on the beach that members  
17 may not have discovered in the night.

18                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Did you notice anything of note at those  
19 locations?

20                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No, nothing of note.

21                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. We'll go to page 15, Figure 5  
22 moving through chronologically.

23                   The markers on the figure indicate that -- shows your travel from  
24 the beach at 11:32 a.m. up to [ ] Orchard Beach Drive, which we know as the  
25 Gulenchyn residence, at about 10:38.

26                   Any recollection travelling north from the beach to that location at  
27 the burnt-out house at [ ] Orchard Beach Drive, Constable?

28                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** I remember stopping, I think it's at

1 [ ] I don't know if it's on this photo.

2 I remember stopping at one of the residences along that stretch.

3 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Sure. So marker 2, just for clarification.

4 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Yeah.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** That's Cst. Dorrington stops at [ ]  
6 Orchard Beach Drive.

7 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So I stop at [ ] So it's got a large  
8 front and back yard that are cleared, but I can't see the backyard clearly. And the  
9 adjacent property also has a fairly significant large backyard. I remember pulling into  
10 that residence, getting out of my vehicle to do a quick check of the backyard ---

11 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

12 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** --- at [ ] to make sure that there  
13 wasn't anything ---

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

15 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** --- there that would be ---

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Once again, are you checking the  
17 residences or just ---

18 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** --- the environment around the  
20 residence?

21 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No residences were being checked.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Sorry?

23 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No, the residence was not being  
24 checked.

25 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

26 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** There's nothing that would indicate  
27 the residences needed to be checked.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All right. We'll move then to Figure 16 --



1 sorry, Figure 6 on page 16. And this will indicate from 10:36 until about 11:08, Cst  
2 Dorrington was patrolling near on and about [C1 - Personal Information] and [ ] Orchard Beach Drives.  
3 That's in that what we might call and has been described by other witnesses as the hot  
4 zone or the red zone. Do you have any recollection of that, Cst Dorrington, being in that  
5 area between that time period?

6 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So I remember being there in  
7 particular. I didn't know at the time, but apparently that location is where Wortman's  
8 Quonset hut ---

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

10 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** --- garage facility was. And that was  
11 still on fire to some degree and the fire was spreading into the wood line. So I was  
12 involved with just trying to basically put out the small fires before they spread.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Now am I right to say that you're having --  
14 you're also listening to and monitoring Colchester Radio at this time?

15 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Yes, of course.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And the purpose of that is to do  
17 what?

18 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** The situation is dynamic and still  
19 unfolding, so we have no idea what it is that's transpiring. We're led to believe that  
20 Wortman is the single perpetrator, but that's not necessarily always the case.

21 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah.

22 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** And there's nothing to say that he  
23 wouldn't return.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. I was going to ask you earlier, and  
25 I neglected to do so, sorry. You had mentioned something about officer safety concerns  
26 while you're conducting these recognizance efforts, if I can say so?

27 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Yeah.

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yeah. What would that be, Constable?

1                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So Wortman strikes me as an  
2 individual that's clearly motivated and well prepared. So you don't procure a fully  
3 marked police vehicle overnight. So this is a significant amount of dedication. He has  
4 unlimited fiscal resources and -- so there's nothing to say that there couldn't -- this  
5 situation couldn't be a whole lot more dynamic than what they're currently dealing with  
6 in Wentworth. There's nothing to say that he couldn't have things like IEDs or -- that  
7 would be an improvised explosive device. There's nothing to say he wouldn't have  
8 booby traps set up within the residence. So he's clearly motivated and the extent to  
9 what it is that he's willing to inflict casualties is unknown.

10                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. All right. So at around this period,  
11 and I'm going to take a break from the figures that we have here, we have discussed  
12 you being at around 10:36 to 11:08 in that area. I want to turn now to the Colchester  
13 radio and some information that you would have gained during this time period.

14                   Madam Registrar, are we able to raise the transcript of the small  
15 select portion and the audio of a portion of Colchester radio around this time period?

16                   **[AUDIO PLAYBACK]**

17                   So Cst Dorrington, do you recall this exchange of information with  
18 respect to Brookfield information?

19                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Yes, I do.

20                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And this is around 10:41 while  
21 you're conducting your undertakings in the Portapique area?

22                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's correct.

23                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And you had received some  
24 information with respect to a sighting in Brookfield?

25                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That is correct.

26                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And can you give us some commentary  
27 or insight about how you attempted to have that information get distributed and how you  
28 feel about how its distribution actually occurred?

1                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So once members had discovered  
2 Lisa Banfield, she indicated that Wortman had a list -- a hit list of individuals that he  
3 planned on executing. So my concern was that I was the last individual that had contact  
4 with Mr. Wortman and it would not be unlikely that I would be on that list. So I had  
5 made contact, I believe through text with my wife, to ensure that she proceeded to the  
6 basement and shelter in place.

7                   There was later, once the RCMP, I believe, had released on social  
8 media to some capacity, that my wife had subsequently made contact with a friend of  
9 hers who lived at that address mentioned in Brookfield. While she was talking with her  
10 on the phone, as fate would have it, her friend was looking out her front window, and at  
11 that time, Wortman's vehicle drove by her residence southbound on the Number 2  
12 Highway. And my wife's friend asked my wife, "Should there be an RCMP vehicle going  
13 southbound on the Number 2 Highway, given what's going on up in Colchester?" And  
14 my wife had informed her, "No, that shouldn't be happening. I'll get in touch with my  
15 husband." So my wife does.

16                   I run checks on my mobile workstation to see if there's any marked  
17 vehicles there and there are none. So I knew the answer to the question, but I asked  
18 dispatch for clarity just in case. So that's when I make the call to Dispatch.

19                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. There seems to be a lot going on  
20 on that audio clip that we heard when you were making that call. Does that sound  
21 right?

22                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** It was busy.

23                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Sorry?

24                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** It was very busy.

25                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. When you made the call with  
26 respect to that information, how did you feel about the distribution of that information?

27                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** There was a significant delay ---

28                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

1                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** --- which was a challenge. So there's  
2 information -- the information that I had, I felt was certainly pertinent and of high priority.  
3 And the -- there didn't seem to be enough consideration, perhaps, given to the  
4 magnitude of the information to allow for clear air space for my transmissions and for  
5 dispatch to subsequently confirm or deny my concerns and to allocate resources  
6 appropriately.

7                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right. Would you have expressed your  
8 concern at that stage to anybody else other than what we heard on the audio clip and  
9 saw on the transcript?

10                  **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No.

11                  **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. All right. As you are in Portapique  
12 and you're learning this information that's coming about and you're transmitting your  
13 information, what were your thoughts at that time with respect to your personal usage or  
14 how you could be used?

15                  **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So I had concerns on how to stop the  
16 threat ---

17                  **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

18                  **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** --- and the RCMP, not as an  
19 organization, but the RCMP's ability to stop threat based on -- just based on the  
20 vehicles that we are driving, which is problematic. Our vehicles are by and large fully  
21 marked RCMP vehicles ---

22                  **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Right.

23                  **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** --- which puts us at a significant  
24 disadvantage when we are trying to close with and engage and neutralize a threat who  
25 is also utilizing a fully marked RCMP vehicle.

26                  **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Were you operating a fully marked RCMP  
27 vehicle?

28                  **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** I was not.

1                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And what significance was that to  
2 you?

3                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So this gave me a clear advantage, in  
4 my mind, of being able to be -- to get close enough to close with and neutralize the  
5 threat prior to Wortman being successful in recognizing that I was RCMP.

6                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Did you make your position clear to  
7 anybody?

8                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So I expressed my desire and my  
9 concerns to Sergeant O'Brien, and I felt that given my skillset with previous military  
10 training in active theatre, with my -- or with my RCMP training, and coupled with the fact  
11 that I had a unmarked vehicle, that I would be perhaps best position to leave my current  
12 location to try to close and engage and neutralize the threat.

13                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Were you permitted to do so?

14                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** I was not.

15                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And let's go back then to the  
16 supplementary report to complete your movements in and about the Portapique area, in  
17 particular, the page 17 on that supplementary report, in particular, Figure 7, indicates  
18 that between at marker 2 that at 11:09 to 11:19, you were at  Orchard Beach Drive,  
19 marker 3, 11:13 to 11:15 you're at the head of Portapique Beach Road. Recollection of  
20 that, Constable Dorrington?

21                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That is correct.

22                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Figure 8, moving down, Madam  
23 Registrar, on page 18, there's indication at 11:15 you left Portapique Beach Road and  
24 travelled south, and then markers 2 and 3 show that stopped outside Faris Lane  Faris  
25 Lane and 293 Portapique Beach Road at 11:20:59, then travelled to the end of Faris  
26 Lane, and stayed there until about 11:33. You have any recollection in that regard,  
27 please?

28                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So that's accurate. So I remember

1 going to what would be indicated on number 2. The residence at 293 was -- clearly had  
2 been destroyed by fire and the structure was to the ground. And I remember also, I  
3 believe it was number [redacted] Faris, don't quote me on the number ---

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

5 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** --- so that residence caught my  
6 attention. The door which faces the road, Faris/Portapique Branch [sic] Road was  
7 open. It was blowing in the wind. And there didn't appear to be any activity at the  
8 residence.

9 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm. So what did you do at [redacted] Faris  
10 Lane?

11 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So I exited the vehicle at [redacted] Faris Lane  
12 and I cleared the residence as I had concerns that there may be something ---

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

14 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** --- within the scope of that.

15 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** When you say cleared the residence,  
16 what do you mean, please, Constable?

17 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So I went in that residence and I  
18 cleared it room to room ---

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

20 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** --- to ensure there was no fatalities  
21 within that residence.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. All right. So why is it then that you  
23 went in to [redacted] Faris Lane under these circumstances, and compare it for me, please, if  
24 you could, to [redacted] Cobequid Court where you did not enter that residence.

25 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Sure. So in comparison to [redacted] and [redacted]  
26 there was nothing of note in particular at either 1 of those residences that gave me  
27 cause for concern. I've learned obviously after the fact that there was. And all I can say  
28 in regards to that is my apologies. It just wasn't within the scope of what I was looking

1 for, and it certainly wasn't meant as any kind of disrespect to the families. And in  
2 regards to Faris Lane, so that residence certainly caught my attention. So that -- the  
3 door was wide open. It was blowing in the wind. So that was a significant departure  
4 from [ ] and [ ]

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Let's go then to page 19, Figure 9, just  
6 coming to a conclusion with respect to your movements. It would appear that you leave  
7 Faris Lane, proceed north, and stopped at a number of various locations as are  
8 indicated by the markers on Figure 9, in particular, 200 Portapique Beach Road [ ]  
9 [C1 - Personal Information] and then marker 7 would appear to be a time period afternoon hour when  
10 you're at the cemetery or the graveyard area. Do you recall being at these particular  
11 locations and what is it that you were doing at those locations?

12 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Sure. So I had gone back up  
13 Portapique Beach Road. So at that time, if I'm correct, I believe the threat was -- had  
14 been neutralized. So I'm looking for the same thing, any additional possible fatalities  
15 along that route. And I remember circling back at the end -- I remember stopping at  
16 Wortman's property. First of all, I wasn't aware initially that that was Wortman's  
17 property, which would be indicated, I think, by number 2. And I make my way up to -- all  
18 the way up to number 6, and subsequently, turning back around to clear the cemetery.

19 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And would you when you were at  
20 these particular residences, would you have entered the residences?

21 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** None of them, no.

22 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And why was that?

23 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** There was nothing of note.

24 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And when you're at these  
25 residences, what are you doing if you're not going into them?

26 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Same thing. So clearing the yards ---

27 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

28 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** --- making sure that there's no

1 fatalities or individuals that are ---

2 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Anything of note observed at any of these  
3 locations, Constable?

4 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No, nothing of note.

5 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. We'll then move on to page 19,  
6 Figure 9. It would appear -- excuse me, Figure 10. Yeah. Page 20, Figure 10. At  
7 12:06 you're at the cemetery and then you move on and return to the  Orchard  
8 Beach Drive at the scene area; you recall that?

9 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That is correct.

10 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And the purpose of doing that,  
11 please, was?

12 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So I'd completed basically the search  
13 of the Portapique area proper ---

14 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** M'hm.

15 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** --- just doing the cursory search as  
16 directed by Sergeant O'Brien, looking for any kind of things of note. As was indicated  
17 by my lack of notes, there was nothing in particular ---

18 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay.

19 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** --- of note.

20 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** And in an effort to wrap up this area of  
21 questions, I'll go back to page 10, please, Madam Registrar, and I want to look at the  
22 portion where it talks about wellness calls. Time of calls of well checks or wellbeing  
23 checks of community members. Do you recall receiving wellness or wellbeing checks  
24 while you were engaged in your drive-through of the Portapique Beach area?

25 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So I remember receiving calls for  
26 wellness checks. I'm not -- I was -- it was puzzling to me why the wellness checks  
27 would be pushed down to general duty members and not ---

28 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Why was that puzzling?



1                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** We were very, very busy. And it's not  
2 to say that wellness checks aren't important, but the scope of where we were as it  
3 pertained to the threat, we weren't in a capacity to be able to facilitate wellness checks  
4 at that time.

5                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. So the indications on the  
6 document are at 10:20, perhaps maybe some other time, 10:28 -- the time is perhaps  
7 not significant -- that there was a call from Justin to confirm well-being about parents  
8 Elizabeth and Thomas Zahl. Do you have a recollection of that, Constable?

9                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Yes, I do. I have a recollection of the  
10 call.

11                   I didn't have any information as it pertained to 293 at that point. I  
12 recall going past 293 later and seeing the fact that the house was burnt to the ground,  
13 but again, I had no capacity to confirm or deny what had transpired and if there were  
14 fatalities within -- within that structure or not.

15                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Were you able to comfortably or in any  
16 way process that call and provide any suitable answers?

17                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So it's a challenge in the sense I  
18 certainly don't want to give anybody false information. And at the time, I had no  
19 information that I received the call, so I wasn't aware of 293 at the time of the call.

20                   I couldn't -- I couldn't make any statement to him as it pertained to  
21 his parents and the well-being of his parents. And even after the fact, despite the fact  
22 that the house was burnt to the ground, I had no capacity to confirm or any the status of  
23 his parents.

24                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** I want to be clear in my own mind with  
25 respect to that wellness call.

26                   Did you actually speak to this person, Justin, or was this  
27 information that was provided to you from another location or from another service?

28                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** I believe I spoke to him directly.

1                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And did you have any idea how  
2 that call would have been routed to you and how you would have engaged in it?

3                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So that call would have been routed  
4 to me through dispatch, which -- which can take place.

5                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Given your circumstances, did you think  
6 that was an appropriate routing of the call to you?

7                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No.

8                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Why?

9                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No, I did not.

10                   We were not in a position to be able to respond to wellness checks.  
11 And I don't say that with any disrespect to the families.

12                   We were there -- at that point, we still had an active threat on the  
13 go. He had not been neutralized. We still had multiple structures that had not been  
14 cleared properly, so that was a challenge. And it should not fall within the scope of the  
15 individuals that are currently tasked with multiple tasks within the scope of trying to  
16 preserve the scenes and access points within Portapique itself proper.

17                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. 11:10 a.m., Cheryl Blackie  
18 requested a well-being check on Aaron Tuck at Cobequid Court. Do you recall that?

19                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Vaguely. I believe that came in -- I  
20 don't believe I spoke with her personally. I believe that came in as an electronic  
21 submission through my mobile workstation.

22                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Were you able to service that or attend to  
23 that request?

24                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No, I was not.

25                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. And you were not able to because  
26 why? Is it similar reasons as you had provided earlier?

27                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** It is the same.

28                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. All right. I am almost at the end of

1 my questioning, Constable. I just have one further area that I want to ask you about  
2 before wrapping up, and that's to go to your Mass Casualty Commission interview again  
3 from November of 2021, and direct you to page 17 with respect to some comments that  
4 you made in terms of communications and command structure.

5 So at the bottom of the first paragraph, we're scrolling down some,  
6 Madam Registrar. I'm going to ask you to comment on the following remark. So -- it's  
7 about eight lines from the bottom of that paragraph:

8 "So, I'm not sure why Sgt. O'Brien was on the air, in  
9 all honesty, he wasn't on duty. He wasn't even  
10 actively on duty, he was on COVID restrictions. He's  
11 not qualified. And what I mean by that is he's not  
12 IARD qualified. He doesn't have the training on active  
13 shooter situations, which is problematic. We all know  
14 that. And the directions that were being given are  
15 contrary to IARD doctrine, so, that's a challenge. So,  
16 I'm receiving direction, myself and Lafferty specifically,  
17 from a superior who's not on scene, who's not on  
18 duty, who's not qualified. So, that's where we were.  
19 So, that's what we did."

20 Did you wish to make any further remarks with respect to the  
21 command structure in particular, the Ops NCO that you were taking instructions from,  
22 Constable Dorrington?

23 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Sure. So I'd like to make a --  
24 probably a clarifying statement.

25 So from my perspective at the time when I made the statement, I  
26 was under the impression that Sergeant O'Brien was not IARD qualified. So I've come  
27 to learn that he was IARD qualified, so I'd like to retract that, first of all.

28 As it pertains to the other comments, I would say those were

1 accurate. So he wasn't on duty at the time. So what I mean by that is, Sergeant  
2 O'Brien, he works Monday to Friday kind of 8:00 to 4:00ish. And then after that time,  
3 the duties that would fall to the Operations NCO falls to what's referred to as the risk  
4 manager.

5 So in the event that we end up with situations that we need  
6 clarification on or guidance or, this instance -- this situation, for instance, then the risk  
7 manager is our go-to. And he or she will provide us with the direction that we require.

8 So to be receiving direction from Sergeant O'Brien, although I'm  
9 sure well-intentioned, was creating a few things in particular. One, additional air time on  
10 the radio, which was problematic, and it created, in my mind, confusion for the chain of  
11 command and who it was that I was responsible for -- to as it pertained to my scope of  
12 duties.

13 So he wasn't on current active duty. He was off because of COVID  
14 restrictions. That is -- that is accurate.

15 So I would say that's where I stand on that.

16 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Okay. Final question, then, is to take you  
17 to paragraph -- or sorry, page 25 and ask for your comment on some of your  
18 discussions.

19 At the 2:58 mark, you were asked about your job or is there  
20 anything that might assist you, and you say:

21 "Sure, sure, there's a number of different things. So,  
22 Portapique was unique, but something similar or  
23 equally or more complicated could certainly happen.  
24 So, the command structures are for a reason. People  
25 that aren't part of the command structure stay  
26 out...,it's not your place. We don't want you there.  
27 You're creating confusion. That's all I would say to  
28 that one in particular."

1 Do you have any further comment with respect to the command  
2 structure and how it operated on April 18th and 19th, 2020?

3 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** I would suggest, realistically, that it  
4 speaks for itself and with my previous -- with my previous comments.

5 Everybody that was there and everybody that had input was well  
6 intentioned and certainly trying their best, and I think that could have been achieved  
7 with the same individuals in a different mechanism or format.

8 For instance, if certain individuals had either gone to the OCC,  
9 which at that time was local, those same individuals that were trying to assist could  
10 have been providing that same assistance within the OCC building itself so you're not  
11 tying up air time and members that are responding on the ground aren't -- it's not  
12 creating confusion on the ground as to who it is that they're ultimately responding to.

13 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** So let me ask you more directly.

14 As a general duty member responding on April 18th and 19th, did  
15 you have any concerns with the command structure?

16 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Absolutely.

17 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** All Right. Constable Dorrington, those  
18 are my -- my questions for you at this stage.

19 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you very much,  
20 Mr. Burrill, and thank you, Constable Dorrington.

21 The process we'll be following now is we will break for lunch until  
22 1:15. Mr. Burrill and other Commission Counsel will meet with counsel for the  
23 Participants and discuss what further questions that will be had for you. And -- so we'll  
24 ask you to return then, please, at 1:15. Thank you.

25 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Thank you. The  
26 proceedings are now on break and will resume at 1:15.

27 --- Upon recessing at 12:01 p.m.

28 --- Upon resuming at 1:25 p.m.

1                   **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Welcome back. The  
2 proceedings are again in session.

3                   **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you, everyone.  
4 Mr. Burrill?

5                   **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** Yes. Thank you, Commissioners. We  
6 have met over the break and we would propose that a number of counsel be permitted  
7 to ask some questions. In particular, the order we propose would be Mr. Bryson, to be  
8 followed by Ms. Lenehan, and then Ms. McCulloch.

9                   **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you. We'll have the  
10 witness return then. As always, I'll ask counsel to kindly identify their retainer for the  
11 witness.

12 **--- CST. NICK DORRINGTON, Resumed:**

13                   **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Good afternoon,  
14 Constable Dorrington. Three counsel will be asking you questions and we'll beginning  
15 first with Mr. Josh Bryson.

16                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Okay.

17 **--- CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:**

18                   **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Good afternoon, Constable Dorrington.

19                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Good afternoon.

20                   **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** My name is Josh Bryson. I represent the  
21 family of Peter and Joy Bond.

22                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's correct.

23                   **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** They resided at  Cobequid Court in  
24 Portapique. So I just have some questions for you.

25                   So first, I just want to start with the -- with the text message of the  
26 photo that you had distributed to several members ---

27                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's correct. Go ahead.

28                   **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** --- that evening. That was roughly

1 12 o'clock at night?

2 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That sounds about right.

3 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. And so you're pushing this out by  
4 text; is that -- is that correct?

5 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's correct.

6 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. Is there another way that  
7 information can be disseminated to ensure that everyone gets it, including the  
8 Command structure?

9 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So the challenge would be -- so the  
10 quick answer to that would be yes. The challenge to that would be typically it would be  
11 done through -- via email and/or through our Mobile Workstation. And members that  
12 were responding on scene have access to neither of those, so that would be the  
13 challenge with that. So although not the most efficient, it was the most effective.

14 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Right. So if you push that -- so you  
15 would have had the ability to send it out via your Mobile Workstation?

16 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** I don't, but OCC does.

17 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** So how would that work? You would --  
18 you would text it or email it to them, and then they push it out via the ---

19 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's correct.

20 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** --- Mobile Workstation? So that -- if  
21 that's pushed out at midnight, and I'm a member coming on duty at say three in the  
22 morning, how do I make sure that that information is not lost?

23 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** It would be lost. That's also an  
24 additional challenge. So anything that is transmitted prior to you logging on, you would  
25 not be privy to, same as for myself. The events that started with Portapique, I was not  
26 privy to prior to my log in time. So information that was disclosed between members or  
27 members and OCC and so forth, I had no knowledge of per se, other than the initial  
28 CAD call they call it detailing just the initial events and then subsequent events from the

1 time I logged on.

2 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. So in terms of the CAD file itself,  
3 so that would involve you, and at that point the CAD could have already been 30,  
4 40-pages?

5 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No. So the -- so the CAD call, what  
6 happens is the members in this instance they get a call, a dispatch call for the incident  
7 in Portapique. So the CAD could -- typically consists of about seven or eight lines of  
8 what it is that they're responding to, specifically, in the best understanding of how it is  
9 portrayed by the caller. So that's what's pushed down initially to the responding  
10 members, and then from that point there's updates as they unfold, and then they are  
11 subsequently pushed out to the Mobile Workstations.

12 So the only thing somebody like myself, for instance, that logs in  
13 after the fact is privy to would be the CAD call, the initial CAD call, that tells me that  
14 there is an active shooter situation within Portapique, and I can't recall specifically the  
15 wording of the CAD call, but it consisted of about seven or eight lines that would give  
16 indication of an active shooter situation that's unfolding there.

17 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And so that's it, just the seven or eight  
18 lines of text. And any other development since that initial 9-1-1 call at 10:01 how were  
19 members getting updated with those developments?

20 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So those initial members, they're  
21 getting updated by the radio only. So Constables Beselt and Merchant and Patton and  
22 Colford, once they exit their vehicle they have no access to their Mobile Workstations  
23 anymore, and that's for any member that responds. Once they exit your vehicle -- once  
24 you exit your vehicle, you have no access to that information, you don't have easy  
25 access to your emails. So realistically, the only avenue for information update to  
26 responding members that are outside their work platform is through text.

27 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. So there's no database, then, that  
28 uploads all the most vital information that a member can go and look at that's coming on



1 duty at say one o'clock or two o'clock in the morning?

2 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No.

3 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. Yeah. So you mentioned you  
4 didn't know about the Andrew and Kate MacDonald shooting. They were the first  
5 survivors, well, amongst the first survivors of the -- of the perpetrator. You -- when did  
6 you learn that information?

7 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** It wasn't until -- I honestly couldn't say  
8 when it was exactly that I heard about that information. My understanding is that  
9 Constable Patton had an initial contact with a member of the public, and that he was  
10 injured in some capacity, I believe it was in the arm or shoulder. There was emergency  
11 first aid administered. It was deemed to be non life-threatening. That individual was  
12 sent back, my understanding was to EHS, and then Constable Patton re-engaged with  
13 Merchant and Beselt to go into Portapique proper. All that transpired prior to my logging  
14 in, so it's -- my apologies if I'm not entirely accurate.

15 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah. So when did you get that update?

16 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** I am not sure when it would be that I  
17 would have received that update specifically, and I don't even know, in all honesty, if it  
18 was during the event or it was after the fact that I became aware of the fact that  
19 Constable Patton had contact with an individual, with the MacDonalds I guess it would  
20 be, out at the Portapique -- the mouth of Portapique. So the -- so -- yeah.

21 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** I'm sorry. I hate to interrupt,  
22 Mr. Bryson, I apologise. I'm just having a little bit of difficulty hearing you. If you don't  
23 mind just ---

24 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Sure.

25 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** --- speaking a little more louder.  
26 Thank you.

27 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And I was just -- sorry, I'm still not clear if  
28 you learned of it at around midnight or if you learned of it mid-morning, or perhaps the

1 next morning, about Andrew and Kate MacDonald. Do you recall to the best of your  
2 recollection when you learned that information?

3 ' **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No, I can't. I can't even venture a  
4 guess. So...

5 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Well, for example, when you're  
6 performing your containment duties east of Portapique, prior to being redeployed, did  
7 you know, for example, that there -- that there was a shooting survivor that had a very  
8 close encounter with -- with the -- with the perpetrator, and saw the vehicle, and saw  
9 that the perpetrator was mobile and so on?

10 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So -- so what we knew from the initial  
11 CAD event was that there was a vehicle that was outside of -- I think it was  
12 [redacted] Orchard, and that it was believed to be a police vehicle in some capacity, and that  
13 vehicle had subsequently departed the scene, and that the perpetrator carried a large or  
14 a big gun., as the CAD event read, to my recollection.

15 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay.

16 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So I don't recall in the initial CAD  
17 event there being any mention of this initial contact, and none of that information -- I  
18 wasn't privy to any of that information because it -- it transpired prior to my log in.

19 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. I just want to go to April 19th now.  
20 I just want to talk about your brief stay at the -- at the Bond residence ---

21 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Sure.

22 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** --- at [redacted] Cobequid Court.

23 So I understand -- like do you have a memory, sitting here today, of  
24 -- of actually sitting in the driveway for 30-seconds, or you just -- or no?

25 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** All I remember, realistically, is driving  
26 down on a number of different roads work Portapique proper, and I -- I couldn't tell you  
27 specifically, you know, [redacted - Personal Information] I wouldn't be able to tell you specifically. I remember  
28 going down these roads looking specifically from residence to residence, checking front

1 lawns, back lawns when necessary, just visually within my vehicle itself. On the one  
2 occasion where I exited the vehicle, it was on No. [REDACTED] Faris I think it was, and that  
3 was due to circumstances that were different than any other residence that I happened  
4 to go -- go past.

5 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** So when we talk of [REDACTED] like are you  
6 actually envisioning [REDACTED] Cobequid Court?

7 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** I couldn't tell you what it looks like.

8 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. Or how many doors?

9 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No idea.

10 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Or what the driveway looked like?

11 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No.

12 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Any guess what you would have been  
13 doing for the 30 seconds?

14 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No idea in particular.

15 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay.

16 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No, could have been either -- could  
17 have been on my phone answering anyone and everyone, phone calls I was receiving.  
18 I could have been pushing out text messages, could have been anything in particular.

19 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay.

20 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So we had multiple, multiple tasks  
21 that were going on simultaneously, so that would not be without -- outside the scope of  
22 possibilities.

23 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Do you recall seeing any other police  
24 vehicles, marked or otherwise, on Cobequid Court ---

25 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No.

26 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** --- that morning?

27 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** There were not. Not that I observed.

28 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And as far as you know, that morning,

1 there was no discussions or plan to canvass Cobequid Court in particular; was there, at  
2 some ---

3 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Sorry, say again?

4 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Was there any plan that morning to  
5 canvass Cobequid Court, to the best of your recollection?

6 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** My understanding is that ERT was in  
7 the process of going house to house; right? So they were doing house to house  
8 clearing as per kind of their mandate, so that would fall within their spectrum. And those  
9 -- they're the ones that are -- have the capacity to be able to facilitate that as opposed to  
10 a single general duty member trying to cover 50 homes, so that would fall within their  
11 mandate, and they were in the process of facilitating that when it became apparent that  
12 Wortman was active again and they got called off of that. So that was in the process,  
13 and I can't say specifically where they were within conducting that, and I would suggest  
14 that Cobequid Court, being part and parcel of Portapique proper, would have been  
15 within the scope of their coverage.

16 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. And I think you had testified  
17 earlier that you don't know how far they went or what ---

18 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's correct.

19 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** --- homes they actually canvassed?

20 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That is also correct.

21 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** So that wasn't communicated to your  
22 team?

23 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No, it was not.

24 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** I'm just going to make some references  
25 to your statement now.

26 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Sure.

27 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** We do have your statement here. If you  
28 need your statement to see additional context as to the question that I'm posing, feel

1 free to let me know and we can certainly get it up on the screen for you to take a look at.

2 So the first question I have is in regards to just the comments you  
3 make about the push bar. So on ---

4 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Yeah.

5 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** --- page 14 of your statement, you're  
6 talking about the morning of the 19<sup>th</sup>. And you're noting that we have an individual --  
7 okay, and we're actually bringing it up there at the very top,

8 "...we have an individual that's in a fully marked  
9 police car, that has the push grill on front, which none  
10 of our cars in Colchester County have, and he's  
11 wearing a traffic vest style. Not a[n] RCMP jacket, it's  
12 more of a ... somebody that would be doing traffic  
13 control with a stop sign or yield sign..."

14 And then Corporal Peterson gets on the radio. So when I read this,  
15 this is suggesting to me that when you're going back in time in terms of what you knew  
16 at the time, that you -- were you familiar with the push bar at that point in time prior to  
17 Corporal Peterson coming on the radio and saying that he had an interaction with the  
18 perpetrator?

19 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Yeah, so by that point, we had -- Lisa  
20 Banfield had been -- she had come out. We had the debrief with her. Members had the  
21 debrief with her. And as part of that debrief, it was disclosed the picture, the actual  
22 picture of the perpetrator's vehicle was disclosed to members, and we had confirmation  
23 of exactly what this vehicle looked like. So we knew for certain that it was a fully  
24 decaled marked-up RCMP replica vehicle, but the differentiating features of that vehicle  
25 specifically would be the push bar in the front, and it also had a CB antenna on the back  
26 trunk.

27 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And that's the picture that came about  
28 from that meeting with Ms. Banfield, and you can see the top of the grill of the push bar,

1 like ---

2 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's correct.

3 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** --- you can see the top metal part?

4 Okay. What I find interesting, and I guess here's my question, some members have  
5 testified that they look at that picture and they didn't notice a push bar, so that's  
6 information that doesn't appear to be commonly known or spread about amongst the  
7 members, but you specifically made that observation yourself about the push bar?

8 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** I can't recall if it was an observation or  
9 if it was a statement that was made as part of a statement in disclosure. I can't  
10 remember how it was that that came about, but it was certainly -- I was aware of the fact  
11 that it had a push bar, and I can't remember ---

12 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And it was from that photo is what you're  
13 saying?

14 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So I can't recall specifically if it was  
15 from the photo, or if there was information that was passed along in conjunction with the  
16 photo as part of the debrief that indicated that there was a push bar on the front of the  
17 vehicle or not. Either way, it was part and parcel of that debrief with her, so either way it  
18 came from that.

19 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And did you do anything with that  
20 information yourself; do you recall?

21 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That information ---

22 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Push bar?

23 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** --- push -- that information was put out  
24 to everybody, so there was no requirement for me specifically to do anything with that  
25 information. That was a broadcast. That was across everybody broadcast, so  
26 everybody was made aware of that information.

27 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. I want to ask you a few questions  
28 about IARD.

1 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Sure.

2 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** That's the Immediate Action Rapid  
3 Deployment. And you said you're IARD trained?

4 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's correct.

5 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And your certifications are up to date?

6 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's correct.

7 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** As of 2022?

8 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's correct, yeah.

9 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. Now, one of the comments that  
10 was put to you -- the full comment, you were asked to comment on portions of what you  
11 had said in your interview, but there's one specific portion that I want to ask you to give  
12 some feedback on. When you note -- and this is at page 17 -- that Sergeant O'Brien  
13 was issuing directions that, in your opinion, were contrary to the IARD doctrine, what did  
14 you mean by that?

15 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So my interpretation and  
16 understanding of the IARD document is that when you have an active threat, doesn't  
17 particularly matter what the circumstance or scenario, indoor, or outdoor, or what have  
18 you, then there's certain parameters and procedures that are supposed to be followed in  
19 conjunction with that threat, and how to locate and neutralize a threat. And so from --  
20 my understanding of the training is that first responding members will attend the scene,  
21 and they'll make attempts to make entry, whether it be a school, or whatever, if it's a  
22 structure, or make entry -- in this case it was into Portapique proper. So you have one  
23 typically insertion team. You'll typically have an individual that will stay outside as your  
24 contact individual, so that individual relays information from the contact team up to in  
25 this case it would be the risk manager. They can also -- the contact point can also  
26 coordinate things like staging locations for EHS, and fire, and helicopters, and so forth.  
27 So that contact person can facilitate that and take the burden off of the contact team.  
28 Then in addition to that, any additional contact teams -- so if your initial contact team

1 doesn't have the capacity due to lack of personnel power to continue to move forward  
2 just because of the size and geographic of the area that they're trying to clear, then  
3 you'll keep pushing additional contact teams until you can locate and neutralize your  
4 threat.

5                   So in this case, we had an initial contact team, so that was done.  
6 We had our contact person, which was Constable Colford, so she was successfully  
7 placed at the mouth of Portapique proper for contact. She was additionally  
8 accompanied by I believe it was Constable Rodney MacDonald. And then from that  
9 point, instead of additional contact teams, then there were close and loose exterior  
10 perimeter points that were set. So then there were no initial additional contact teams  
11 that were pushed into Portapique proper to assist the initial insertion team. So you have  
12 three individuals that are within a massive geographic, at night, with unknown threats,  
13 with multiple fatalities, burning structures, things that are exploding. We have children  
14 that are now parentless, and they're trying to take care of everything by three of them.  
15 A tremendous task.

16                   **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** So I take it that's the decision then to  
17 deny the second team entry into Portapique, that's the IARD direction that your ---

18                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That is correct.

19                   **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. Yeah. What sort of situational  
20 awareness does someone need to make the decision to deny or grant a second team  
21 entry in an IARD scenario?

22                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** From the doctrine that we have been  
23 taught, it's not so much a matter of situational awareness to deny the entry of  
24 subsequent teams. The only change that would take place in the involvement of  
25 insertion teams would be as it pertains to the actions of the threat. So what I would  
26 mean by that is that if the perpetrator's still actively executing individuals, that we still  
27 have an active threat. So then all insertion teams make every effort to neutralise the  
28 threat. So if the perpetrator has moved in to something like a hostage situation, now



1 we're in a hold situation, so it's no longer active, so now we have a hostage or hold  
2 situation. So we can hold and the insertion teams can hold, and we can wait until ERT  
3 shows up and they can deal with the hostage situation and we can bring in negotiators.  
4 That's not the situation that we were faced with.

5 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** So it would not be a situation that was --  
6 well, I'm going to suggest this to you and just to have this brief discussion on this point.

7 We heard from Sergeant O'Brien, and I'm ---

8 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Yes, you did.

9 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** --- I'm just going to paraphrase. Did you  
10 watch his interview, his testimony?

11 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No, I did not.

12 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. I'm going to -- I'm going to do my  
13 best to be accurate to paraphrase a response to a particular question about a decision  
14 to deny the second team entry into Portapique.

15 His response was that "This was less a -- this really wasn't a  
16 decision, it was automatic. It was a reinforcement of IARD training. You don't send in a  
17 -- a second team." I'm paraphrasing, I'm not quoting verbatim. But what you're telling  
18 us is that there are many scenarios where a second team can be dispatched in an IARD  
19 scenario; is that correct?

20 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** I would respectfully disagree with  
21 Sergeant O'Brien.

22 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** On that same page, page 17, and you  
23 had talked a bit about this with Mr. Burrill when he was questioning you, about some of  
24 the confusion that appeared to exist with the -- with the -- with the Command --  
25 commanders on the ground. And you had made comments in your interview about it  
26 was not clear who the on scene commander was, and then you had something to the  
27 effect that even Staff Sergeant Rehill didn't seem to have clarity of who the onsite  
28 commander was. Do you recall making statements ---

1                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Yes, I do.

2                   **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** --- to that effect?

3                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Yeah.

4                   **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. So what -- why did you make  
5 those statements? Can you give me some examples or ---

6                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Yeah.

7                   **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** --- a basis for that?

8                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So as I explained earlier on, we have  
9 a 22-hour policing model. So anything after duty hours falls to what's referred to as the  
10 Risk Manager. And so we refer, as responding members, to the Risk Manager when  
11 need be for guidance or the Risk Manager, he or she may feel that we require guidance  
12 if we're kind of going offtrack. So if we have any questions we refer to the Risk  
13 Manager, and if the Risk Manager is not of the qualification and authority to make those  
14 decisions, then he or she goes higher within their chain, which is done internally,  
15 basically blind to the members. So the members don't need to know what's going on  
16 behind the scenes if the Risk Manager is going up and seeking higher or additional  
17 approval. Then the Risk Manager will subsequently come back to members and say,  
18 "This the direction that you're -- that I wish for you to take."

19                   So this was not the case for the incident and the events that  
20 unfolded with Portapique. So I've never had it prior to Portapique, and I've never had it  
21 after Portapique. So on this incident in particular, responding members were receiving  
22 direction directly from Sergeant O'Brien, who was currently off duty due to COVID  
23 restrictions, and then additionally with that, he was off duty -- he would have been off  
24 duty anyway in an an afterhours capacity, and those duties fall to the Risk Manager.

25                   So -- and this is my perspective only. So from my perspective, it  
26 crated confusion in my mind. To my understanding, I should be receiving direction from  
27 the Risk Manager, but I'm not, I'm receiving direction from Sergeant O'Brien, who's at  
28 home. So I'm receiving direction from him as it pertains to this threat, and the Risk

1 Manager is also putting out direction for the -- the three and four members that are  
2 within Portapique proper. And we can hear this over the radio, of course, because we  
3 were having Sergeant Rehill giving direction and we're also hearing Sergeant O'Brien  
4 providing direction. So it's clear that there's multiple people providing direction to  
5 members that are trying to attend and neutralise the threat.

6 So I'm not sure if that answers everything you want.

7 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And perhaps I'll -- you've talked about a  
8 few examples. I'll just point to another comment you made about -- and perhaps you  
9 can talk about this. That there were two other members, I think you were referring to  
10 your team, and I think you used the word that were "begging" to come in but wouldn't --  
11 weren't allowed to come in. Do you recall the ---

12 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's correct.

13 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Do you recall the statement I'm referring  
14 to?

15 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** I know exactly what you're referring  
16 to?

17 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. What -- what happened there?

18 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So with Sergeant O'Brien, he was off  
19 duty due to COVID restrictions. So this is the early onset of COVID, and so members  
20 who were told that in the event that they and/or immediately family members have  
21 restrictions due to possible exposure to COVID that they were to remain at their  
22 residence.

23 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** I should just make sure that this relates  
24 to April 18th or 19th ---

25 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's correct.

26 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay.

27 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** It does. So Sergeant O'Brien was at  
28 home due to these COVID restrictions, and two of my team members were also at

1 home for the identical COVID restrictions and they weren't allowed to come to work. So  
2 as the events unfolded within Portapique, and we had an understanding of the  
3 magnitude and scope of what was transpiring, Sergeant O'Brien attended, but he  
4 refused to allow the other two members of my team, who had the identical COVID  
5 restrictions, to attend, and they still suffer today.

6 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And it was -- when was that decision  
7 made?

8 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Throughout -- throughout both, I think,  
9 the 18th and the 19th. The 19th for sure.

10 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And who -- what are the names of those  
11 members?

12 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** It would be Constable McNeil and  
13 Constable Dillon.

14 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** I just want to move to mapping. You had  
15 made some comments about mapping during your interview ---

16 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Sure.

17 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** --- as well. Do you recall talking about  
18 mapping?

19 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Go ahead.

20 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. So in regards to mapping, you  
21 had noted, and this is on page 18 of your statement:

22 "I don't know what they have for mapping...but there  
23 seemed to be a huge...disconnect..."

24 Did you observe any problems with mapping yourself?

25 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So from information that I received  
26 from the ERT team, my understanding is that they do not have a Mobile Workstation  
27 with mapping capabilities within their TAV, their tactical armoured vehicle, which seems  
28 absolutely preposterous to me. So you have our highest risk, our most specialised

1 team going in on the highest risk calls within the province, and they have no mapping  
2 capacity, which is beyond ludicrous. So they don't have an accurate map of the area  
3 that they're going, but worse to that is that they -- their mapping -- they don't have a  
4 mapping system to see where -- where other supporting members are located so they  
5 can't map us. So they're completely blind.

6 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And that's any member that's outside  
7 their car?

8 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Sorry?

9 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Any member that's outside their car?

10 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So that's an additional problem. So --  
11 so there's no capacity currently within the RCMP to map members once they exit their  
12 vehicle. So we have no GPS'ing capacity per member. So the GPS is vehicle-specific,  
13 which is problematic because once we get to our location, we are obviously outside of  
14 our vehicle. And due to the fact that we do predominantly rural policing, the areas  
15 outside of our vehicle are -- are huge. So we could be 400 or 500-metres away from  
16 our vehicle, and if we're in trouble they don't know where to send anybody.

17 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Those are all my questions. Thank you  
18 very much.

19 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you, Mr. Bryson.  
20 Ms. Lenehan?

21 **MS. JANE LENEHAN:** Thank you, Commissioners.

22 **--- CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. JANE LENEHAN:**

23 **MS. JANE LENEHAN:** Constable Dorrington, my name is Jane  
24 Lenehan, and I represent the Goulet family. So I just have one area of question.

25 I think twice in your testimony this morning you made reference to,  
26 and the quote is, "an RCMP traffic vehicle with subdued markings".

27 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Yes.

28 **MS. JANE LENEHAN:** So as a layperson, I understand that

1 there's marked vehicles and unmarked vehicles.

2 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Right.

3 **MS. JANE LENEHAN:** Is this a third category?

4 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** I would suggest yes. So I'll explain  
5 what that means.

6 So "subdued markings", if anybody's seen the kind of reflective  
7 semi-translucent pinstriping on our vehicles currently, so that's, by and large, on 90-plus  
8 percent of our vehicles with the fully - normal decaled RCMP decaling on the sides.  
9 However, traffic -- our traffic component of the RCMP have not only the pinstripe  
10 decaling, but they also have the full RCMP decaling on the side in the same -- it has no  
11 colour, but it's translucent, the same as the pinstriping, all right. So it's almost silver.

12 So when Wortman's vehicle blew by me on the Number 2 Highway,  
13 all I saw was the pinstriping across the top of the vehicle and the trunk and I wasn't able  
14 to see the side, which were -- traffic would normally have their translucent decaling as  
15 well.

16 So my initial impression was perhaps it's a traffic vehicle with this  
17 translucent semi-transparent decaling.

18 **MS. JANE LENEHAN:** I'm still not sure if I completely understand.

19 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Sorry.

20 **MS. JANE LENEHAN:** The subdued markings, would that make  
21 these traffic vehicles look more like a decommissioned vehicle because they're not as --

22 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Yes.

23 **MS. JANE LENEHAN:** -- I guess, brightly marked?

24 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Well, there's no colouring to the  
25 marking, so -- so typically, a normal RCMP vehicle has the RCMP coloured decals on  
26 the side, so they're easy to identify so you know right away it's an RCMP vehicle. And a  
27 decommissioned police vehicle typically has those RCMP coloured decals taken off of  
28 the sides, okay.

1                   **MS. JANE LENEHAN:** All right.

2                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So that's typically what an RCMP  
3 decommissioned vehicle looks like and not always, most of the time -- or some, I'd say -  
4 - the pinstriping is also taken off of the vehicles once they're decommissioned. Not  
5 always.

6                   So the traffic vehicles, they are the -- they have the identical  
7 marking as a normal RCMP vehicle only there's no colour to the decals, so.

8                   **MS. JANE LENEHAN:** All right.

9                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So -- but they'd still be on, for  
10 instance, a white Taurus so they'd be on a white Taurus and the decals have no colour,  
11 so -- and that's part of the whole idea is so that the public don't pick them out as easily  
12 when they're on the highway.

13                   **MS. JANE LENEHAN:** Okay. I think that answers my question.  
14 Thank you.

15                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Okay.

16                   **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you, Ms. Lenehan.  
17 Ms. McCulloch?

18 **--- CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:**

19                   **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Good afternoon, Constable  
20 Dorrington. My name is Sandra McCulloch. I'm a lawyer with Patterson Law, and our  
21 firm represents the majority of the Participants under the those most affected  
22 categories, including families and a number of individuals.

23                   I want to follow up on a couple of areas of questioning, and I want  
24 to pick up from where Ms. Lenehan's left off with you a moment ago bringing you back  
25 to the traffic stop ---

26                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Sure.

27                   **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** --- of the perpetrator in February of  
28 2020.

1                   And my question for you relates to comments that were made by  
2 Constable Colford and her recollection of that experience.

3                   In your statement -- your statement to the Mass Casualty  
4 Commission -- perhaps, Madam Registrar, if we could bring that up, I'll read the portion  
5 to you at page 27 of your statement to the Mass Casualty Commission.

6                   And forgive me, if I can find the -- it's 21, please, Madam Registrar.

7                   Right up at the top, I'm -- the third line down beginning in the  
8 middle, you write -- you indicate in your statement:

9                                   "...I think she had stated something to the effect that  
10                                   would stay in ... stay in the area and stay close in  
11                                   case I needed her. So, she didn't attend the stop. I  
12                                   say that and I think it was ... maybe right as I was  
13                                   wrapping, I think he had already departed and I was  
14                                   walking back to my vehicle, I think she rolled up on  
15                                   me and to confirm that everything was all right. And  
16                                   but not during the actual stop itself."

17                   So Constable Dorrington, is -- does that continue to be your  
18 recollection of Constable Colford's attendance at the traffic stop in February of 2020?

19                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** She was not there when I had the  
20 interaction with Wortman.

21                   **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. So I understand from reading  
22 this, then, that he was leaving or had already gone by the time that she had arrived.

23                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** She came at the very tail end of the  
24 stop. I can't recall if he had already left or not.

25                   **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. So I want to speak to an  
26 affidavit which was lately provided by Constable Colford to the Mass Casualty  
27 Commission which was sworn by her on May 25th, 2022. And this has been entered as  
28 an exhibit in the evidentiary record.



1 It's COMM No. 58532, Exhibit No. P-2173.

2 And at item 35 of her affidavit, sir, which is -- it's Q and A, so it's a  
3 number of back-and-forth question and answers. But in this affidavit, she confirms her  
4 recollection is that she attended at the traffic stop with you, that she actually exited her  
5 car, came alongside the perpetrator's vehicle and watched the window and watched his  
6 hands while you interacted with him directly in the interests of officer safety.

7 And my question for you, sir, is do you agree or disagree with that  
8 or have any other comment as to the recollection she has offered to the Commission  
9 about that traffic stop?

10 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Yeah, I couldn't suggest that that --  
11 my recollection is the same.

12 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** So having heard the general  
13 description that I've provided of her recollection, do you have anything to add in relation  
14 to the traffic stop or do you maintain that what you've told us already is your recollection  
15 and so, therefore, you would disagree with her.

16 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That is my recollection.

17 She did attend the traffic stop. There is no question. So if she was  
18 there and she walked up alongside the vehicle while I was writing out the ticket, is that  
19 possible, sure it's possible. I can't observe everything.

20 That's not my recollection of her involvement, but I may not have  
21 observed everything that she did while she was there, so it's entirely possible that  
22 exactly what she said is exactly what she did.

23 That's not to say that what she's saying is inaccurate. It's -- all I  
24 can say is what I observe. So if she did things without my knowledge or without my  
25 ability to observe, then I would -- I wouldn't be able to comment that.

26 I wouldn't want to say that her recollection is inaccurate. She was  
27 there at the stop. There is no question.

28 My perception of when she arrived and what she did there is

1 different than hers and, in all honesty, it really has no bearing per se. She was there.

2 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** So just to be clear, though, you  
3 don't have any recollection of her being outside of her vehicle.

4 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** She was outside of her vehicle. She  
5 spoke with me at the stop.

6 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** While you were interacting with the  
7 perpetrator.

8 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Not to my recollection, no.

9 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. And you don't have any  
10 recollection of her being at the vehicle while you were interacting with the perpetrator.

11 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** I didn't observe her at the vehicle, no.

12 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay.

13 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** I don't have a recollection of  
14 observing her at the vehicle, no.

15 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** And if I understand the evidence  
16 you gave earlier that -- my impression was that this was a fairly standard traffic stop.  
17 There was a speeder and you chose to initiate a stop.

18 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That is correct.

19 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. And so can you enlighten me  
20 as to would there be any reason for -- in a standard traffic stop for another officer to  
21 accompany you and actually exit the vehicle and attend at the violator's vehicle with  
22 you?

23 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So I would suggest, realistically, any  
24 officer that is a decent officer would do exactly what Constable Colford did, and that is  
25 they don't wait to be asked. We're out in the middle of nowhere at night out in the  
26 Portapique area. Could be anywhere.

27 But we're out in the middle of nowhere at night. It's a Friday  
28 evening. There's a good possibility that we could be dealing with an impaired. We

1 have no idea what we're getting involved in.

2 So I would suggest that Constable Colford did exactly what any  
3 good officer should have done, so.

4 I've done it multiple, multiple times myself.

5 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Constable Dorrington, in your  
6 statement you provided a number of comments in the spirit of recommendations, so  
7 when you were asked if you had any recommendations and you spoke.

8 You spoke with Mr. Burrill earlier today about comments about  
9 command structure and there was also a number of equipment-related  
10 recommendations that you spoke to the Commission about, and I wanted to ask you  
11 about two of them.

12 You spoke about something called -- that you described as hand-  
13 held FLIR.

14 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's correct.

15 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** I wonder if you can provide a  
16 description of what that is.

17 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Sure.

18 So FLIR is a device typically the only capacity that we have that  
19 can utilize it for members is on a helicopter. And so what that is, is Forward-Looking  
20 InfraRed. It's for heating sourcing.

21 So unlike night vision goggles or night vision apparatus, which  
22 assist you seeing at night, FLIR is a device that you can use to assist you with picking  
23 up heat signatures, and that could be any heat signature.

24 So people use this in a commercial aspect for finding out where  
25 they may lack insulation in their house, where it's leaking heat. Police can use it to try  
26 to find out where a perpetrator may be finding or where a vehicle may be parked in the  
27 middle of the night when the engine is roaring after driving it at high speed and it would  
28 stand out like a beacon.

1                   So these things would be advantageous to members, which we  
2 don't have.

3                   **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Have you had opportunity to use  
4 FLIR in any other capacity before, this handheld FLIR device you're describing?

5                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So I've used -- we referred to them  
6 as dismounted FLIR at that time, which speaks to my age. So that was 30-plus years  
7 ago in the military, and they would be a dismounted FLIR and they were large and  
8 cumbersome. And they were used for the exact same purpose.

9                   So they were -- they were used on the battlefield to pick up heat  
10 signatures from enemy personnel or vehicles.

11                   Now, thankfully, due to the technology, we have small handheld  
12 FLIRs, so an individual can easily carry them around. They're about the size of, I would  
13 suggest, a cell phone, really. Just slightly larger than a cell phone for individual use.

14                   They are expensive, but they would provide members with the  
15 capacity, at least, to try to pick up heat signatures.

16                   **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** You also described in your  
17 statement a device you've referred to as infrared night vision goggles and infrared cam  
18 lights.

19                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's right.

20                   **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** And I was -- I was wondering if you  
21 could provide us with a concise description of those devices.

22                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Okay. So there's commercial night  
23 vision goggles that you could procure on the public market to assist you with hunting  
24 and so forth, and those are fairly standard.

25                   There's also other night vision capacity which has infrared, and so  
26 those night vision capabilities could be procured. What that allows is for responding  
27 members to have night vision capability with infrared enabled, and what they can do is  
28 they can use infrared markers, so glow sticks, which most of us are familiar with, your

1 common, you know, green or orange glow sticks. There are infrared glow sticks.

2 So to the naked eye at nighttime, you see nothing, okay. However,  
3 if you have an infrared night vision set, they'll shine just like a normal glow stick, right.

4 So you could mark your team members, right. Each one of your  
5 insertion team members could have an IR glow stick on their body armour, for instance,  
6 okay, and if responding members are equipped with the IR night vision set, then they  
7 can -- you can see each other.

8 So even though we're not GPS'd, we don't need to be GPS'd.

9 So I've worked in the battlefield with hundreds and hundreds of co-  
10 workers. None of us are GPS'd.

11 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** And so similar question I'd asked  
12 about the FLIRs.

13 Is this technology that you personally have had experience using or  
14 seen in use before?

15 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** I've used it personally.

16 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** During your time with the RCMP or  
17 prior to?

18 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** I've used the handheld FLIR during  
19 my time in the RCMP.

20 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. And what about the infrared -  
21 - the goggles and the cam lights that you had described?

22 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That was in my time in the military.

23 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. And you haven't had  
24 occasion to use them -- use that technology during ---

25 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** I've never seen the technology within  
26 the RCMP yet.

27 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. Thank you.

28 You had spoken earlier in relation to your role during -- in the

1 containment efforts in an around Portapique and you'd spoken about screening vehicles  
2 as they exit the community.

3 To be clear, when you say "exit", exit the area, from where to where  
4 were you screening vehicles? Coming from where and going to where?

5 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So we had no idea per se where they  
6 were coming from other than I knew that they should have all been -- if they're coming  
7 to myself and Lafferty, I knew -- we knew that there was a similar containment post on  
8 the west end side of the Number 2 Highway of Portapique, so anybody that was coming  
9 to us on the east side should have been between our containment points.

10 And so all that basically fell within Portapique itself and the few  
11 houses that were on the Number 2 Highway, which would be about four kilometres from  
12 Portapique to where myself and Lafferty were stationed.

13 So any of those individuals would have been exiting out coming  
14 from west to east out of our containment point.

15 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. So coming from in or around  
16 -- immediately around Portapique.

17 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's right.

18 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. And I understood from  
19 reading your statement to the Mass Casualty Commission that, essentially, you were  
20 checking these vehicles for the perpetrator or signs of the perpetrator, and that's it. Is  
21 that correct?

22 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Well, that would be the obvious thing.  
23 Anything else that would stand out as being abnormal, obviously would be -- we'd be  
24 wanting to be aware of any kind of victims and so forth that would be exiting the scene.  
25 But the perpetrator was our -- was our primary focus.

26 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** And in terms of communications that  
27 you were having with these individuals that were exiting the Portapique area, were you  
28 tasked with gaining any sort of -- or seeing if you could gain any sort of information from

1 these individuals about Portapique or any information that might have been relevant to  
2 the RCMP response?

3 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So at that point, realistically, it wasn't  
4 an intel gathering session, so we didn't have the time to try to do an intel gathering  
5 session. That's not to say that if somebody said, "I have something I need to tell you"  
6 that we would gladly have taken that information. But we're not canvassing each  
7 individual as they go through, so our focus is to make sure our containment is tight, that  
8 nobody's coming in and our concern also is for our personal safety.

9 We are highly exposed on an open roadway with open fields of fire  
10 with lights on us specifically. We are easy targets. So my desire is not to be conducting  
11 side-of-the-road statements that would also put those members of the public at  
12 significant risk.

13 So there's a better place for that and there's the command post  
14 which was set up, and they're much better situated to address those concerns.

15 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** So were you tasked with directing  
16 these people to the command post so that ---

17 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** If need be.

18 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** --- intelligence could -- any  
19 intelligence they might have had could have been gathered from them?

20 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That would have been the basis. It  
21 never even presented itself. The only thing we had from the containment point was  
22 questions about what was going on, when can they return. That was -- those were the  
23 questions that were fielded to us.

24 I didn't have one instance of anybody saying that "I had information  
25 that needed to be shared". That's not to say that it couldn't have happened, but I never  
26 had one.

27 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. So do I understand you  
28 correctly that had they suggested that they had any kind of intelligence, then you would

1 have referred them to the command post ---

2 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's correct.

3 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** --- so that they could share it, but  
4 otherwise, you wouldn't have referred them to the command post?

5 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's correct.

6 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. And you weren't gathering  
7 any sort of identifying information from these individuals that were exiting; correct?

8 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's correct.

9 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. So you didn't know their  
10 names or ---

11 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No, no.

12 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** --- exactly where they came from.

13 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No. We weren't taking any kind of  
14 logs. We weren't -- you know, that wasn't our focus.

15 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. And I believe you indicated  
16 earlier today, and I didn't get the exact quote, but you spoke of giving the limited  
17 information that you could provide to these individuals that were exiting.

18 So what was that limited information that you were sharing with  
19 these vehicles that you screened?

20 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So basically, we'd tell that right now  
21 we have an unfolding event, we're not able to disclose exactly what's going on. It's not  
22 currently safe for you to return. Watch -- I'd suggest that you watch your local news  
23 feed to provide the best information as to when it might be that it's safe for you to return  
24 back to your residence.

25 So that's kind of where we stood at that point, you know, because  
26 we had no idea the scope and the magnitude of what we were getting involved in and  
27 we had -- I wouldn't even hazard a guess as to the duration of what we're looking at for  
28 these people to be outside of the -- outside of the residences -- and so those -- the



1 information that they need to get clarity on, how soon they can return can be best  
2 addressed by individuals that are certainly much senior ranked than I am outside of the,  
3 I would suggest, the hot zone. IARD had the capacity even, fathom a guess, and/or  
4 access the resources that they require, like Red Cross and so forth, to help assist them;  
5 right? That's not to say that I'm not concerned, and I don't want to hear their concerns.  
6 I'm not in a position to address it, and there's other people that are much better position  
7 to do that.

8 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay.

9 I wanted to follow up on an area of questioning, sir, that you had  
10 spoken to earlier today in relation to the list, that the perpetrator has ---

11 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Sure.

12 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** --- some sort of list that he was  
13 intent upon completing. And I wasn't clear on how it is that you came to believe that the  
14 perpetrator had a list. How was that communicated to you and by whom?

15 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So that information came to light as a  
16 result of the debrief with Lisa. So there was a bunch of information that was relayed in  
17 conjunction with that debrief. So the picture was disclosed, so we had -- we knew  
18 exactly what we were looking at for a vehicle. She gave information of the fact that he  
19 had multiple weapon systems. She disclosed that he had a very large cache of money  
20 at his disposal. She disclosed that he had weapons caches located in multiple locations  
21 throughout his different residences. And she had also disclosed that he -- she disclosed  
22 that he had a list of individuals that he planned on executing.

23 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** And you weren't involved in the  
24 debrief with Ms. Banfield? You ---

25 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** I was not.

26 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** --- weren't a participant in that? No.  
27 So how did that -- who conveyed that information to you about the list?

28 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** All that information came out part and

1 parcel with the photo and I -- like I said here a colleague. I can't recall if it came over  
2 the radio or if it came through a mobile workstation, note on the mobile workstation. I  
3 couldn't tell you specifically, but one way or the other.

4 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** It wasn't information that was  
5 directed to you specifically by a specific person but general information that -- the  
6 summary of that -- of the information that Ms. Banfield provided that was conveyed to all  
7 responding members.

8 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That was my understanding it was  
9 conveyed to all members.

10 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** And did you discuss this list with any  
11 other RCMP member?

12 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No, there was no need to discuss it. It  
13 was given to everybody, so there was nothing to discuss.

14 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Were you privy to any discussions  
15 between other RCMP members about the list specifically?

16 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No, other than the fact that my  
17 understanding is that there was a list. There was no specifics as to who was on the list.  
18 All I heard is that there was allegedly a list.

19 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** So to the point you made a moment  
20 ago that you didn't receive specifics about who was on the list, you independently came  
21 from the conclusion that you were a likely candidate for that list because of your prior  
22 interaction with the perpetrator?

23 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** I came to the conclusion that there's a  
24 possibility, yeah.

25 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** That was something you determined  
26 yourself?

27 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's correct.

28 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. And can you confirm roughly

1 what time it was that you came to this conclusion that there's a list and maybe I'm on it?

2 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So as soon as we -- as soon as Ms.  
3 Banfield came out of the debrief and then we subsequently got the information pushed  
4 to us. So as soon as I heard that there was a list, this is -- that's exactly when I felt that  
5 there's a good possibility I could be on it.

6 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** And so was it shortly thereafter that  
7 you came to this conclusion that you communicated that to your spouse?

8 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** I wouldn't say shortly thereafter, I  
9 don't think. Probably a couple hours really.

10 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** And when you communicated this  
11 information to your spouse, am I right to assume that you advised her of the perpetrator  
12 being out in the open, and that he was driving a replica RCMP cruiser?

13 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** I don't think I gave her that  
14 information. All I told her was to shelter in place. She had asked me through a text if I  
15 was okay because I left, obviously, at 11 o'clock at night and she hadn't heard from me  
16 in 8, 10 hours, something like that. So she asked me, I think, if I was okay, and I think,  
17 you know, I imagine I answered back something yes. So we were very, very busy. And  
18 once I found out that there was a list, I just informed her to shelter in place. And I  
19 believe I just informed her that he has a list and to shelter in place.

20 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Sorry, that the perpetrator has a list  
21 and that your spouse should shelter in place?

22 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's correct.

23 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. And you didn't give her any  
24 other detail about the nature of the risk?

25 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** She knew it was an active shooter, so  
26 she knew that's why I was deployed out so. So my wife, she's smart, so, yeah, so she  
27 knows I'm getting deployed out for an active shooter. I'm busy. She hasn't heard from  
28 me in eight plus hours. I've got a lot on the go. And so if she needs information, she

1 knows how to find it. So my understanding is that she went on -- she got the newsfeeds  
2 from the RCMP and the Twitter feeds, or whatever they put out, and that's what -- the  
3 information that she got so.

4 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Now I want to follow up on a couple  
5 of comments that were made in your statement.

6 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Sure.

7 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** So forgive me if this seems like I  
8 bounce around a little, but I wanted to circle back to a comment you've made this  
9 morning when you first receive this call from I believe you said Constable MacDonald,  
10 just advising you of the events in Portapique, and that's when you mobilized. In two,  
11 three minutes you were ready to head out. And you had indicated to Mr. Burrill that you  
12 did not contact your -- who I understand to be your immediate supervisor, that was  
13 Corporal Peterson, and you did not contact Sergeant O'Brien. And do I have that  
14 summary correct?

15 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's correct.

16 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. And so why would you not  
17 have contacted Sergeant O'Brien?

18 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** There was no requirement to contact  
19 him. He's not on duty.

20 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. And why would you have not  
21 contacted -- excuse me, Corporal Peterson?

22 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** He's not on duty either. So for myself  
23 personally, it makes sense for me to be called out. I am on call, so I'm classified as on-  
24 call, on duty. So that is the nature of me being at home with a vehicle. So when we get  
25 called out, when we're on call, we never call our supervisor. I would never call Sergeant  
26 O'Brien or Sergeant -- or Corporal Peterson. You just don't. You're on call. You  
27 receive a call. You go out to the call. That's all there is to it. So that's not un-normal,  
28 so it's not an intentional circumvention of the chain of command. That just isn't done.

1 So I'm on call. I get notified of a situation. They need assistance. I'm the on-call duty  
2 member. I respond to the call. So that was the nature of that.

3 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. So it wouldn't have been the  
4 norm for you to contact either of those individuals ---

5 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** It would be ---

6 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** --- or those positions?

7 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** --- terribly abnormal for me to actually  
8 contact them. I've never done it before, nor I've never done it since. Nobody, to my  
9 knowledge, has ever done it really.

10 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** And so I just want to understand a  
11 remark that you had made in your statement to the Mass Casualty Commission, and  
12 this is at page 22 of your statement. And my impression from reading this, and you may  
13 correct me, but my impression from reading this was that you made a decision not to call  
14 Corporal Peterson, not because he wasn't on duty. You -- and this is at the bottom of  
15 the page, you say,

16 "So, for myself, I chose ... it was a choice not to call  
17 him because I ... my perception, and this is my  
18 perception, is that he is not particularly tactically  
19 sound."

20 So when I read that, sir, it sounds as though you made a deliberate  
21 decision not to call Corporal Peterson, but that's different from what you're telling me  
22 now, and I just want to ask if you can address that.

23 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No, they're both true. So am I  
24 obligated to call him? No, I'm not. It's not my position to call him, so that would fall to  
25 the risk manager and so forth. So that's their duty to call him, if they need more  
26 personnel. I'm a constable. It's not my position to allocate personnel. So I'm the  
27 person on duty, on-call person, and that's what I'm there for, and that's where I  
28 responded, and that's why I respond. So Corporal Peterson, he wasn't on call, and it's

1 not my responsibility to call him. So I can't speak to the powers that be, what their  
2 rationale was for calling out anybody, or not calling out anybody. That's decisions that  
3 they made, for whatever reason. I'm sure they had reasons for whoever it is that they  
4 did or did not call out. I can't speak to that. As it pertained to my statement within that,  
5 that's also true.

6 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Are you able to provide -- and I don't  
7 want to -- back at the point in time of April of 2020, so not now, but back as of April  
8 2020, what would you have prompted -- what would have prompted you to conclude  
9 that Corporal Peterson wasn't tactically sound in terms of any knowledge or experiences  
10 that you had had to inform that opinion?

11 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** I don't know necessarily if that's in the  
12 best interests for the -- the mass casualty to dissect my personal impressions of  
13 Corporal Peterson's tactical abilities.

14 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay, and that's fine if that's just  
15 your impression as opposed to, you know, an experience of fact that you can point to  
16 that led to that conclusion.

17 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** As I stated within my Foundational  
18 Document, that's my personal perception.

19 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay, thank you. Also, in your  
20 interview to the Mass Casualty Commission, and this on page 23 of this document, you  
21 describe bringing to -- prior to the mass casualty event, you describe having a  
22 detachment commander to whom you brought, quote:

23 "..."a host of officer safety issues, and all of them were  
24 denied, all of them."

25 And I want to know if you can tell me what sorts of officer safety  
26 issues you had raised prior to the mass casualty event which were denied?

27 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Sure. Well, I asked initially for, upon  
28 arrival, whether or not we could procure a restraint chair within the detachment for

1 clients that we have that are absolutely beyond and we have no capacity to restrain  
2 them. They become a physical danger to themselves, to the guards that are present,  
3 and to members. They become extremely physically violent to the point where they can  
4 do serious, serious harm to themselves and/or to multiple members. They tie up a  
5 significant amount of resources unnecessarily. When there's the capacity to use  
6 something like a restraint chair to facilitate securing the client safely within the  
7 parameters for their safety with that chair, and that it allows members to deal with the  
8 individual in a safer more respectful manner, it significantly reduces the likelihood of  
9 stress to members, the guards, and to the client themselves. It's very cheap, less than  
10 \$5,000. Denied. I would suggest that one workplace safety claim for a member that  
11 would get hurt in -- in an incident that pertains to a client within a cellblock or a client  
12 that sues the organisation for possibly alleged mistreatment and so forth, would cost  
13 significantly more than \$5,000. It was denied.

14 I asked for rotatable spotlights on the vehicles. So we do rural  
15 policing, we have no capacity to see up long driveways, down alleyways. So we have  
16 fixed lights on the vehicles, on our lightbar on the top of the vehicle, that don't move  
17 unless the vehicle moves, so -- so it's problematic. So the rotatable spotlights are a  
18 great asset to have, especially when you're doing traffic stops, so they're very, very  
19 useful. I was informed that they were used in his time of policing, he didn't see any  
20 need for them. It was denied.

21 I asked for push bars in the front of the cars, and I said it  
22 significantly reduces the likelihood of significant damage to our vehicles and it helps  
23 prolong the longevity of our fleet, and have respect to the taxpayers' dollars that are  
24 paying for our vehicles. So a cost of a push bar is about \$1,200. It was denied. A  
25 week after that, two vehicles in the Bible Hill detachment were written off; one vehicle  
26 backed into another. I would suggest of that accident was probably close to \$100,000.  
27 It was denied.

28 I asked for -- they wanted members to spend more time on the road

1 for public safety so we could do more traffic stops, we could be there for the public, and  
2 spend less time in the office. I asked for dual monitors for the general duty personnel.

3 So the general duty personnel in the Bible Hill detachment are the  
4 only personnel within the entire detachment that doesn't have a dual monitor. Right?  
5 So we actually require two monitors. So we have dozens of windows we need to open  
6 to go and create and do our Crown briefs and do our work, just our normal work. And to  
7 do so quickly and efficiently so we can get out on the road to be more efficient and to  
8 help represent the public I asked for two monitors. So there's four people that share a  
9 workspace, I asked for -- so we needed six. So I asked for six monitors, so that's less  
10 than \$3,000. It was denied.

11 So these -- these are things that I put forward for officer safety and  
12 for the public, so we can be out there for the public, so we can do our jobs, so we can  
13 be there to help protect the public, and they were denied. All of them.

14 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Constable Dorrington, one final  
15 comment. In your statement to the Mass Casualty Commission, you made some brief  
16 comments about the RCMP's relationship with the Truro Police Service, and you  
17 indicated in your statement in this brief quote:

18 "At the general duty level, realistically-speaking, it's  
19 not viewed as the best, and so we've had a number of  
20 challenges through the course of time of my being  
21 here that the relationship could improve considerably  
22 to everyone's benefit." (As read)

23 So that's just a piece directly from your statement. And I'm  
24 wondering if you're able to provide any examples, in general terms of course, any  
25 examples of the types of challenges you have observed or experience in relation to that  
26 -- that relationship between the RCMP and the Truro Police Service?

27 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's a very broad question. So I  
28 have nothing but the utmost respect for the general duty members that are working



1 within Truro Police Service. So I certainly don't want any of them to have the  
2 impression that I don't because that is not the case.

3 So the challenges that we have faced by and large are at a much  
4 higher level, much, much higher level than the general duty members that fall within the  
5 Truro Police Service. If you want an example:

6 So comments that are made by an individual here at the Mass  
7 Casualty Commission that's made comments to the effect that RCMP's response to the  
8 events of the 18th and 19th are nothing short of, I can't recall his exact words, they were  
9 a string of catastrophes that went together, coinciding catastrophes, and that was made  
10 by the Inspector in reference to the RCMP's, his perception of the RCMP's inability to  
11 either contain or neutralise the threat.

12 So that's not helpful. I think it undermines policing in general. It  
13 does his police service a disservice, it does all police services a disservice. So  
14 Mr. MacNeil needs to take a close look at himself, realistically.

15 He offered through his own deposition that at most he had  
16 12 people to offer if he was given the adequate notice that he said that he never  
17 received, which I would question. So if he had, for argument's sake, all 12 of his  
18 members out and about I'd like to see how well he did with Portapique.

19 So in answer to your question, right, the relationship with Truro  
20 Police Service is a challenge because of a certain few key individuals. By and large,  
21 90-plus percent of them, and the members within Bible Hill get along with them  
22 excellently.

23 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** So what I take from what you're  
24 saying here is -- my impression is that your statement is rooted in -- in comments that  
25 were made after the events at Portapique, the events of April 2020?

26 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Oh no, there's plenty more, but that is  
27 one, and you know that it's factual.

28 **MS. SANDRA McCULLOCH:** Okay. That's fine. Thank you,

1 Constable Dorrington, those are my questions.

2 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you, Ms. McCulloch.

3 Mr. Burrill?

4 **MR. ROGER BURRILL:** No additional questions. No need for  
5 further clarification from my point of view. Thank you, Commissioners.

6 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you.

7 Commissioner Fitch?

8 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Thank you, Constable Dorrington, and  
9 thank you, Participant Counsel, for your follow up questions that were helpful and  
10 Commission Counsel for laying out the foundation.

11 I do have several questions for you. And they are jumping over a  
12 bit of ground. You've covered a lot of material with us and some of my questions have  
13 been answered, so I ask that you bear with me as I go through my pages.

14 Just starting back with your history in training with the RCMP and  
15 prior to with the infantry, as you know, part of our mandate is forward looking, so some  
16 of my questions are going to be around potential recommendations for the future. So  
17 I'm going to be spring boarding off some of the comments that you've shared with us  
18 today.

19 And I'm just wondering, in your time in the infantry, or with the  
20 RCMP, have you been an instructor in any use of force options, IARD training tactics?

21 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No.

22 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** No? Any supervisory courses in terms  
23 of critical incident response?

24 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Within the RCMP, no.

25 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** With your prior infantry service?

26 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So don't classify it as critical incident  
27 response, but I was a qualified sergeant, so my duties would have been the same,  
28 realistically, as Sgt O'Brien's.

1 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay.

2 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Similar.

3 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** So you were in charge of your own unit  
4 in your previous experience?

5 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's correct.

6 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. Thank you. When you received  
7 the call from your colleague, you said that you were advised that there was an active  
8 shooter in the Portapique area. You said, "Two to three minutes I'll be ready to roll."  
9 Can you tell me what other information you would have had prior to getting in your car  
10 and driving to Portapique in terms of your understanding of what was unfolding? Or  
11 was it just what you heard from Cpl Mac -- or Cst MacDonald?

12 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That was it. That's all I needed to  
13 know.

14 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. and you've mentioned that when  
15 you were travelling to Portapique, you were travelling at speeds over 200 kilometres an  
16 hour?

17 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's correct.

18 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** And you were logging onto your mobile  
19 workstation?

20 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Prior to that, but yeah, I was on  
21 Salmon River Road, which is a 70/80 kilometre an hour zone. So it wasn't 200 at that  
22 point.

23 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay.

24 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So yeah.

25 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** So you were logging on though while  
26 you were driving?

27 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's correct.

28 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. And while you were driving, were


1 you able to access the original CAD call that gave any further information about the  
2 original call? You mentioned those seven or eight lines. I'm just wondering when you  
3 had the opportunity to read those seven or eight lines in CAD.

4 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Yes, that's correct.

5 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** And when did you read those lines?

6 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Ongoing.

7 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Ongoing? And do you recall what those  
8 seven or eight lines said?

9 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** My understanding is that there's an  
10 individual that showed up at  Orchard Beach Road, I believe it was. He was in what  
11 they believed to be a police vehicle. He had a long gun. And my understanding was  
12 that the line went dead, I think. I can't recall specifically, but something to that effect.

13 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. So while you were on route  
14 travelling to the scene, you had the information that there was possibly an old police car  
15 that was involved?

16 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Something to represent or have the --  
17 give the impression that there was something that would represent a police car. That's  
18 correct.

19 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. At that time, knowing that you  
20 had previously done a traffic stop on Portapique Beach Road with the perpetrator in  
21 February and this call was originating in Portapique, did that ring any bells for you that it  
22 could be one and the same?

23 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No. Sorry. No, I do hundreds of  
24 stops.

25 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** True.

26 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** And he's not the only individual out in  
27 that area that actually has a decommissioned vehicle. So you actually pass by another  
28 one on the way to Portapique. So they're not entirely uncommon. So it's not -- it wasn't

1 an actual go to. No.

2 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. As you were travelling to  
3 Portapique, were you keeping in mind to watch out for a potential look-a-like police car  
4 leaving the area?

5 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Not so much along 104 Highway,  
6 because it's a twin highway. There's no capacity at night to see that. But on the  
7 Number 2 Highway, absolutely.

8 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Did you recall passing any other  
9 vehicles while you were on route to Portapique?

10 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** I don't recall passing any other  
11 vehicles specifically. I'm sure I might have passed one or two, but I don't recall any  
12 specifically.

13 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. Thank you. Back to the stop in  
14 February of 2020, I understand it was February. The picture that you had, it was snow  
15 packed. Like snow packed conditions. And you had a little bit of time that you had to  
16 take to turn around to pursue the perpetrator. During that time, you said that you  
17 queried to see if there were any traffic units out in that area and you confirmed for  
18 yourself that there wasn't.

19 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That is correct.

20 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** In your statement, if I recall correctly,  
21 there was reference to decaling that was still visible on the back bumper, along with the  
22 Canadian flag?

23 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That is correct.

24 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** And I think that was reiterated in Cst  
25 Colford's statement that we just recently saw as well.

26 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Yes.

27 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** In your original statement that you gave  
28 to the Commission and you talked about seeing reflective decaling on the vehicle, were

1 you referring to the bumper or to the sides of the vehicle?

2 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Both.

3 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Both. And I know the type of car that  
4 you're talking about, they're like a stealth unmarked car.

5 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's correct.

6 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** So when you talk about the  
7 observations that you made, were they about the side of the vehicle or the bumper?

8 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** I couldn't see the bumper ---

9 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay.

10 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** --- when it went past me. So all I got  
11 to see was the decaling on the side.

12 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** On the side.

13 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Yeah.

14 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. Thank you. When you called up  
15 to the perpetrator, did you run his license plate?

16 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Of course.

17 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Do you recall what it came back to?

18 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** I think it came back to his dentistry.

19 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay.

20 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** I don't want to misquote. I honestly  
21 don't know for absolutely certain.

22 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. And his license, when you  
23 obtained his driver's license, did you do an in house CPIC check on his driver's license?

24 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Yes.

25 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Were there any positive hits on that, to  
26 your recollection?

27 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** There was nothing of note. Typically  
28 I'm looking for outstanding warrants and so forth. There was nothing.

1                   **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. And on your ticket, we had a  
2 picture of your ticket up ---

3                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Yeah.

4                   **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** --- on the screen. Do you typically make  
5 notes to jog your memory when you go to court in the future?

6                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** On every ticket.

7                   **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Did you note anything on the ticket  
8 about his aggressive behaviour?

9                   **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Yes, I did.

10                  **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. Thank you. When Sgt O'Brien  
11 inquired about the vehicle stop and if you had any further information, you say that you  
12 retrieved the photo from your RCMP issued phone?

13                  **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's the only phone I have.

14                  **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. And was that the only picture  
15 that was taken of that vehicle?

16                  **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** There was the one that you saw  
17 there, there was the secondary photo, I'm not sure why it wasn't included in your  
18 package, but it was submitted, and that's of the rear license and rear of the vehicle  
19 itself.

20                  **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay.

21                  **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Both are submitted.

22                  **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Right. Okay. Thank you. And were  
23 both of those photos pushed out via text?

24                  **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** I know the license for sure. I can't  
25 recall if I pushed out both to everybody or not. I honestly can't say for certain.

26                  **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. And just on the pushing out of  
27 the text, I know that in previous testimony we heard that you were asked -- members  
28 were asked to text you if they wanted a picture that you had. Do you have any idea of

1 how many people would have received that text?

2 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So it would have been approximately  
3 seven people total. Seven/eight people total, I would suggest.

4 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** And were they self-initiated to you or  
5 were they ones that you pushed out?

6 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** I think there was three that were self-  
7 initiated to me from what I believed to be ERT members that were coming online and  
8 attending the scene. I sent one to I think it was Cst Colford. I believe she had texted  
9 me because she was new to our detachment. I didn't have her as a contact, if I recall  
10 correctly. And I already had Patton, Merchant, and Beselt as contacts and I just sent it  
11 to them.

12 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** And what would your expectation had  
13 been about that information and the information that you had specific to the perpetrator  
14 making it to the Critical Incident Command. Did you have any idea how that would flow  
15 there?

16 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So I gave details specifically over the  
17 net, so everybody would have had access to that. So that went up to OCC. So I gave  
18 details on the perpetrator and his vehicle at the time. So I outlined specifically his age,  
19 what he looked like, the vehicle that he was driving, what it looked like, the license plate,  
20 so all that was provided over the net.

21 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** And when you say over the net, you  
22 mean over the ---

23 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Over the radio ---

24 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** --- radio?

25 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** --- Colchester County broadcast,  
26 yeah.

27 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. And knowing what we know now  
28 of course with the amount of radio traffic, is it fair to say that critical information



1 sometimes gets missed when it's going over radio transmission?

2 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** It's quite possible, yes.

3 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** When you and Constable Lafferty were  
4 assigned to containment points, first east of Brown Loop and then moved up, and I  
5 understand your exposure at those traffic points, did you and Constable Lafferty talk  
6 about any -- obviously, you were aware of your surroundings, did you have any concern  
7 that there were potentially other ways out of the Portapique area, like, Clarke Road or  
8 Brown Loop? Did you discuss that amongst yourselves?

9 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Well, there was concern that the  
10 perpetrator could depart the Portapique area in any capacity. It didn't have to be via a  
11 vehicle. He could have left on foot. He could have just swam across the small channel  
12 that's -- joins Portapique and the adjoining small peninsula. There's nothing to say, you  
13 know, what this individual or individuals were going to do. We had no idea how many  
14 there were. We didn't know where they were. We didn't know what their intention was.  
15 We didn't know if they intended to stay or not, if it was a suicide by -- we had no idea  
16 what we were dealing with. All we knew is that we had an active threat, we had multiple  
17 fatalities. It was ongoing. We had structures that were continuing to burn, rounds were  
18 going off, and my personal suspicion is that they were hot cookoffs of rounds in various  
19 houses, or Wortman's house, or warehouse that were hot cooking off with the fires.  
20 Everything -- I would say, realistically, 98 percent of everything was unknown. So is it  
21 possible that we could envision the perpetrator escaping? Absolutely, a hundred  
22 percent. Is that a concern of mine? Absolutely. So but do we have the capacity to put  
23 that to rest? Absolutely not. And we didn't have nearly the amount of resources to be  
24 able to cover all egress points, and there was egress points that I wasn't and other  
25 members weren't even aware of so.

26 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Thank you. I'm getting there.

27 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** It's all good.

28 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** You had mentioned recently in your

1 sharing with us that when you were down in the Cobequid Court area that you were  
2 driving and checking front yards, back yards and the beach area. I'm just wondering if  
3 at any point in time you were out on foot or were you doing your patrol, looking for  
4 suspicious scenes just in your vehicle?

5 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Yeah. So the only time I actually got  
6 out of my vehicle was on two occasions. So one would be on -- I can't remember if it's  
7 number [ ] number [ ] Faris ---

8 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** M'hm.

9 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** --- right in the corner. And that was to  
10 clear that residence because the door was wide open and blowing in the breeze. And  
11 then a quick step across to 293, that structure was down to the foundation only, and I  
12 had no desire to contaminate that scene. So I knew that GIS or Major Crime would be  
13 investigating that scene, and I didn't want anything with my presence to compromise  
14 that. And there's nothing that I could ascertain just by looking that would give me any  
15 indication of anybody that was or was not within that structure. And then the other was  
16 somewhere up along, I don't know if it's Orchard Beach, when I went and checked one  
17 of the residences, they had a very large open front and back yard, just to ensure that  
18 that was clear, we didn't have cause for concerns there, but at no other point did I leave  
19 my vehicle.

20 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Was there at any time from anyone in  
21 command that had instructed you or your partner in that area to be on the lookout for  
22 potential living victims?

23 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** No.

24 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Thank you.

25 And one final question, when you were asked about doing a  
26 wellbeing check, what did you think specifically you were being asked to do?

27 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** That's exactly what I thought I was  
28 being asked to do, a wellbeing check. So, I mean, and that's entirely reasonable for

1 somebody to be concerned about their loved one in a certain area, especially given the  
2 unfolding circumstances that were transpiring within the Portapique area. That's exactly  
3 what they wanted me to do was a wellbeing check, and I understand that completely.  
4 And all I can say to all the families that are involved is certainly my apologies in not  
5 being able to facilitate in the capacity that I either normally would have been able to or  
6 would have wished to have been able to. Given the circumstances, I was unable to  
7 perform.

8 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** And I thank you for your answers. I  
9 know those are difficult questions, and there is just one more that I have. You had  
10 mentioned that there -- you felt that there was confusion on the ground between who  
11 you should be taking your direction from, either the risk manager or Sergeant O'Brien.  
12 Presuming that's -- that that confusion was primarily before CIC was up and running, or  
13 did that continue after?

14 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** So I would suggest that there was  
15 kind of an ongoing level of confusion, although CIC came up and running. Although,  
16 initially when they tried to come up and running, it took them two or three minutes to  
17 actually get effective comms, so that was a challenge. And then subsequent to that,  
18 ERT is getting direction from CIC, and they're predominantly involved, although we're  
19 also getting additional smaller inputs from the risk manager and O'Brien, which doesn't  
20 pertain to the parameters which involve ERT. So we're still getting multiple  
21 commanders on the net at once. So one thing about being the lowest person on the  
22 totem pole, you follow everybody.

23 So that's the challenge; right? So we are -- we're responsible to  
24 answer and abide by the direction by any one of our superiors; right? So I've chosen to  
25 be a constable. I'll probably be a constable forever. And so that's why there's people  
26 that are sergeants and inspectors and so forth. They make the command decisions.  
27 And we as constables and so forth, we follow the direction given, and that's -- so that's  
28 where we're at. So in this case, we just had multiple people giving us direction.

1 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Thank you very much. I appreciate it.

2 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you.

3 Commissioner Stanton?

4 Commissioner Stanton has no questions, nor do I, Constable  
5 Dorrington, but it come -- falls to me to thank you so much for being here today and for  
6 answering our questions. We have a difficult challenge and it's been a difficult day for  
7 you, I'm sure, and for that we are greatly appreciative, and you've helped us in our  
8 important work, so we thank you and you're free to go, sir. Thank you.

9 **CST. NICK DORRINGTON:** Yeah.

10 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Mr. VanWart?

11 **MR. JAMIE VanWART:** Thank you, Commissioners. I just wanted  
12 to take this opportunity to deal with some documents that need to be tendered as  
13 exhibits. The first actually dates back to the Commissioner's decision from March 9<sup>th</sup>,  
14 where it was directed that Commission Counsel seek more information from Donalee  
15 Williston. We now have an affidavit of Donalee Williston that was sworn on the 9th of  
16 June 2022. The COMM number is COMM0058987. I'd ask that that be made an  
17 exhibit.

18 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** It's Exhibit 2322.

19 **-- EXHIBIT NO. 2322:**

20 (COMM0058987) affidavit of Donalee Williston

21 **MR. JAMIE VanWART:** Next relates to the surveillance footage  
22 from the Big Stop in Enfield. The surveillance footage from the Big Stop is -- was  
23 provided by Couche-Tard Company, which is -- which own the security cameras at that  
24 location. Each piece of footage consists of two files. There's an AVI file, which is the  
25 video, and then there's a SMI text file, which shows the corresponding timestamps.  
26 One of the SMM [sic] files needs to be exhibited, it is COMM005812 [sic], and this is the  
27 SMM file, or SMI file that timestamps an exhibit that's already been made, which is  
28 P001094. So if I could ask that that COMM0053812 be marked as an exhibit.

1                   **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** It's Exhibit 2323.

2    **--- EXHIBIT NO. 2323:**

3                                   (COMM0053812) SMI file of Big Stop timestamp footage  
4                                   corresponding to Exhibit P001094

5                   **MR. JAMIE VanWART:** And finally, there are a number of exhibits  
6 that pertain or are with regards to a roundtable that's scheduled for June 23rd later this  
7 week. It's a roundtable with regards to emergency communications within the RCMP  
8 and among the responding agencies, and interoperability among the agencies. There  
9 are 22 documents, I won't go through each document, but they all pertain to the  
10 forthcoming roundtable, and the list of documents has been provided to Participant  
11 Counsel. I'd ask if Madam Registrar could exhibit the 22 documents.

12                   **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** So exhibited.

13                   **MR. JAMIE VanWART:** And thank you, Commissioners, for your  
14 indulgence. Those are all the exhibits I wanted to address today.

15                   **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Thank you, Mr. VanWart.

16                                   So we continue to learn about what happened and why and how it  
17 happened, and witnesses, such as Constable Dorrington, help us build our  
18 understanding of how these events and the decisions taken occurred.

19                                   Thanks always to Participant Counsel and Participants and  
20 Commission Counsel for assisting us, along with the witness today. We do appreciate  
21 the questions, and it's helpful for us.

22                                   Please note, we have issued two new decisions that are posted to  
23 the Commission website. One decision is in response to Participant requests to directly  
24 question witnesses. The other is with respect to a media application to publish five  
25 surveillance videos from the Enfield Big Stop. These videos are now available in the  
26 Documents section of our website as source materials to the Enfield Big Stop  
27 Foundational Document.

28                                   Tomorrow in proceedings, we will continue focusing on

1 communications and supports following the mass casualty. Commission Counsel will  
2 present two more Foundational Documents. One looks at supports offered to the  
3 families and communities, and another looks at public statements made by the RCMP  
4 and governments. We'll also hear from Constable Wayne Bent, including about his role  
5 as family liaison for the RCMP.

6                   Please do make use of the extensive information that's available,  
7 along with many resources on the Commission website that help answer what  
8 happened, why and how it happened. Through those materials and webcasts, you can  
9 see that there's a fair bit of progress being made in terms of the -- the scope of the  
10 mandate, and please do think about potential recommendations you'd like to see to help  
11 make communities safer.

12                   And of course, please do remember there are wellness supports in  
13 the room for those of you who are here in person, and there are supports listed on the  
14 website as well if there is -- if you or someone you know does need some assistance.

15                   Thank so much, and we'll see you again tomorrow morning.

16                   **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Thank you. The  
17 proceedings are adjourned until June the 21st, 2022 at 9:30 a.m.

18 --- Upon adjourning at 2:59 p.m.

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**CERTIFICATION**

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4 I, Sandrine Marineau-Lupien, a certified court reporter, hereby certify the foregoing  
5 pages to be an accurate transcription of my notes/records to the best of my skill and  
6 ability, and I so swear.

7

8 Je, Sandrine Marineau-Lupien, une sténographe officiel, certifie que les pages ci-hauts  
9 sont une transcription conforme de mes notes/enregistrements au meilleur de mes  
10 capacités, et je le jure.

11

12

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'S. Marineau-Lupien', is written over a horizontal line.

13

Sandrine Marineau-Lupien

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