

Public Hearing

Audience publique

Commissioners / Commissaires

The Honourable / L'honorable J. Michael MacDonald,
Chair / Président

Leanne J. Fitch (Ret. Police Chief, M.O.M)

Dr. Kim Stanton

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Appearances / Comparutions

Ms. Rachel Young

Commission Counsel /
Conseillère de la commission

Ms. Patricia MacPhee

Counsel / Conseillère

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Halifax, Nova Scotia

--- Upon commencing on Monday, July 25, 2022 at 9:33 a.m.

REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND: Good morning. The proceedings of the Mass Casualty Commission are now in session, with Commissioner Michael MacDonald, Commissioner Leanne Fitch and Commissioner Kim Stanton presiding.

COMMISSIONER FITCH: Bonjour et bienvenue. Hello, and welcome.

We join you from Mi'gma'gi, the ancestral and unceded territory of the Mi'kmaq.

Please join us in remembering those whose lives were taken, those who were harmed, their families and all those affected by the April 2020 mass casualty in Nova Scotia.

This week we will hear from two more senior officers about their roles in the RCMP's response to the mass casualty.

As the Support Services Officer for "H" Division in April 2020, Superintendent Darren Campbell joins us today to talk about his role, including how information is managed during a critical incident and public communications made following the mass casualty.

We've also reserved the day tomorrow so we can continue to hear from Superintendent Campbell as needed, ensuring there is plenty of time for questions from Commission Counsel and Participant Counsel.

On Wednesday, Chief Superintendent Chris Leather will be here as a witness to talk about his role as Criminal Operations Officer for the RCMP in Nova Scotia at the time of the mass casualty. We have reserved more time to hear from Chief Superintendent Leather on Thursday if needed.

Later in August, we will also hear from retired Assistant Commissioner Lee Bergerman and Commissioner Brenda Lucki.

1 Hearing from these senior RCMP officers at this stage means
2 questions for them will be informed by everything we have learned to date about what
3 happened, how and why. As you know, all of that information is captured in the many
4 Foundational Documents, supporting materials, Commissioned Reports, recorded
5 proceedings and other resources on our website.

6 By hearing from these senior officers, we also hope to learn from
7 them about lessons learned, changes made to date and opportunities for additional
8 changes and improvements.

9 I will now ask Senior Commission Counsel Rachel Young to begin.
10 Ms. Young.

11 And just as a reminder, I did hear a couple of devices going off in
12 the room, so for housekeeping, if you could make sure that your phones are on silent,
13 please.

14 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Good morning, Ms. Young.

15 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Good morning, Commissioners,
16 Participants, Nova Scotians and everyone. Today, Commission Counsel is calling now
17 Chief Superintendent Darrin Campbell to the stand.

18 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** We'll have the witness come
19 forward.

20 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** I understand that Chief Superintendent
21 Campbell wishes to be sworn.

22 **--- SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL, Sworn**

23 **--- EXAMINATION IN-CHIEF BY MS. RACHEL YOUNG:**

24 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Good morning, Chief Superintendent
25 Campbell.

26 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Good morning.

27 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** You were interviewed twice by the Mass
28 Casualty Commissioner on June 28th and July 12th, 2022, each for full days.

1 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

2 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** We discussed a number of topics already
3 in those interviews, and those transcripts will be made available on the Commission's
4 website and they've been made available to the media.

5 So we've discussed your background, your role at "H" Division,
6 your involvement in the events of April 18th and 19th, 2020 and their aftermath, "H"
7 Division critical incident preparedness, RCMP public communications, your role in
8 communicating with victims' families and those most affected, the treatment of crime
9 scene evidence and emergency operational plans. So I don't intend to go over a lot of
10 that same ground today.

11 What I want to ask you about today is to explain your role within the
12 RCMP to give us some context and in the mass casualty events and their aftermath and
13 then I'm going to ask you some questions that we didn't get to in your interview about
14 the Family Liaison Officer, how information is managed in a critical incident using some
15 examples from the events to discuss that and to go through some statements you made
16 in the media, post-event learning and any recommendations you may have for
17 improvement in the RCMP based on what you saw during the events.

18 Starting with your role and professional background, can you
19 please tell the Commissioners what education you have?

20 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Sorry?

21 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Your education?

22 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Police education or just general
23 education?

24 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Both. Well, your general education and
25 then just quick highlight -- we're going to file your training records as an exhibit, so you
26 don't need to go through all that.

27 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Sure.

28 I spent my formative years in the Province of New Brunswick. I

1 graduated from high school in New Brunswick, attended the University of New
2 Brunswick, and then I joined the RCMP in 1990. Following joining the RCMP, all
3 members of the RCMP are trained at the RCMP Training Academy in Regina for a six-
4 month period of time.

5 And of course, subsequent to that basic training, there's a degree
6 of courses and training that are offered to officers depending upon the roles that they
7 occupy within the RCMP and their progression through the organization, so several
8 courses within the RCMP and also outside of the RCMP as well.

9 I also graduated the FBI National Academy in Quantico, Virginia. I
10 also instruct and teach at the Canadian Police College as well as instruct or lecture at
11 the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia as well.

12 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** So you've had a number of roles in the
13 RCMP which we discussed in your interview.

14 Most recently, starting in 2019, you were Officer in Charge of
15 Support Services in Criminal Operations "H" Division, so I believe the Support Services
16 Officer role is known as SSO. Is that right?

17 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, that's correct. There's no
18 shortage of acronyms in the RCMP, and you will have heard the acronym of SSO for
19 the Province of New Brunswick -- or sorry, for Nova Scotia.

20 And specifically, I started that SSO role here in Nova Scotia in mid-
21 September of 19 -- or sorry, 2019.

22 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And until what date were you in that role?

23 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I was in that role until
24 approximately December of 2021.

25 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Okay. And then I understand you were
26 Acting Chief Superintendent standing in for Janis Gray. Can you give us the dates that
27 you were in that role?

28 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** That's correct. I was -- I went

1 down to Halifax District as Chief Superintendent Gray had retired. That started at the
2 end of December of 2021 and it went to -- I stayed in that position until I departed Nova
3 Scotia for New Brunswick just -- mostly recently. In fact, I just started in New
4 Brunswick.

5 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** What was the date that you started your
6 new role?

7 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I believe that my last date in the
8 province here in Nova Scotia was the 28th of June.

9 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And you were promoted from
10 Superintendent to Chief Superintendent and you're now CrOps officer, which is Criminal
11 Operations Officer in J-Division in New Brunswick; is that correct?

12 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** That's correct. I'm the interim
13 Criminal Operations Officer, filling for the Criminal Operations Officer that's currently
14 away on long-term.

15 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** The intention is that you stay in J-Division,
16 though, for the moment?

17 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I hope so.

18 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Okay.

19 Madam Registrar, I'd like to ask that Darren Campbell's training
20 record be made an exhibit. It's COMM0042103

21 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** And that's Exhibit 3889.

22 **--- EXHIBIT NO. 3889:**

23 (COMM0042103) Training record of Superintendent Darren
24 Campbell

25 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Commissioners, before we continue, I'd
26 ask Madam Registrar to also please mark two Superintendent Campbell's witness
27 interview transcripts, his notes and transcripts of two related witness interviews as
28 exhibits, or one related witness interview.

1 So the interview of Darren Campbell of June 28th, 2022 is
2 COMM0059847.

3 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** And that's Exhibit 3890.

4 **--- EXHIBIT NO. 3890:**

5 (COMM0059847) Interview of Superintendent Darren
6 Campbell, dated June 28, 2022

7 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** The second day of interview, July 12th,
8 2022, is COMM0059935.

9 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Three-eight-nine-one
10 (3891).

11 **--- EXHIBIT NO. 3891:**

12 (COMM0059935) Second interview of
13 Superintendent Darren Campbell, dated July 12, 2022

14 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** The Commission witness interview
15 transcript of Chief Superintendent Chris Leather of July 8th, 2022 is COMM005982 [sic].

16 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** And that's 3892.

17 **--- EXHIBIT NO. 3892:**

18 (COMM005982) Witness interview of Chief
19 Superintendent Chris Leather, dated July 8, 2022

20 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And I note, this is not a new exhibit, the
21 Commission interview of District Policing Officer Archie Thompson was already made
22 an exhibit last week, which may pertain to this witness. And some of Darren Campbell's
23 notes have already been exhibited. I'd like to file the remainder that we have at the
24 moment.

25 So there are notes of then Superintendent Campbell from
26 June 17th, 2020 to August 6th, 2020, which is COMM0058641.

27 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Three-eight-nine-three
28 (3893).

1 **--- EXHIBIT NO. 3893:**

2 (COMM0058641) Notes of Superintendent Darren Campbell
3 from June 17, 2022 to August 6, 2022

4 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Then the notes from August 6th to
5 September 23rd, 2020 are COMM0058642.

6 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Three-eight-nine-four
7 (3894).

8 **--- EXHIBIT NO. 3894:**

9 (COMM0058642) Notes of Superintendent Darren Campbell
10 from August 6, 2022 to September 23, 2020

11 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** The notes from September 24th, 2020 to
12 November 18th, 2020 are COMM0058643.

13 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Three-eight-nine-five
14 (3895).

15 **--- EXHIBIT NO. 3895:**

16 (COMM0058643) Notes of Superintendent Darren Campbell
17 from September 24, 2020 to November 18, 2020

18 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** The notes from November 19th, 2020 to
19 January 7th, 2021 are COMM0058644.

20 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Three-eight-nine-six
21 (3896).

22 **--- EXHIBIT NO. 3896:**

23 (COMM0058644) Notes of Superintendent Darren Campbell
24 from November 19th, 2020 to January 7th, 2021

25 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** The notes from January 8th to April 13th,
26 2021 are COMM0058645.

27 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Three-eight-nine-seven
28 (3897).

1 **--- EXHIBIT NO. 3897:**

2 (COMM0058645) Notes of Superintendent Darren Campbell
3 from January 8th, 2021 to April 13, 2021

4 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And lastly, Superintendent Campbell
5 compiled a summary of his draft electronic notes from April 18th and 19th, 2020. That's
6 COMM0059133.

7 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** That's 3898.

8 **--- EXHIBIT NO. 3898:**

9 (COMM0059133) Summary of draft electronic notes of
10 Superintendent Darren Campbell from April 18th and 19th,
11 2020

12 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** To Superintendent Campbell, can you just
13 explain to us a bit more, the role of a Support Services Officer, so that's the role you
14 were in at the time of the mass casualty events; right?

15 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** That's correct.

16 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And so the support -- so that's for
17 H-Division, so for all of Nova Scotia; right?

18 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, that's true.

19 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And the support of the job title refers to
20 supporting Operations; is that correct?

21 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes. There's a number of
22 programs that the Support Services Officer has under their umbrella of a variety of
23 supports that are provided across the province.

24 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Yes, and you did outline that in your
25 interview. And for our purposes today, what does Operations mean exactly?

26 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** It would fall basically under all
27 Criminal Operations. So the Support Services Officer reports -- is a direct report to the
28 Criminal Operations Officer. The Support Services Officer would be one of five

1 superintendents within the Division. And essentially, to break it down as simply as I
2 can, the Support Services Officer would have a number of programs that would help
3 support Operations outside of the general duty or the patrol operations across the
4 Division. Now, every district has some investigative support units; however, the Major
5 Crimes Unit, for example, provincially, would fall under the Support Services Officer.

6 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Who are the officers who reported directly
7 to you?

8 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** The Support Services Officer has
9 four officer equivalent direct reports.

10 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And who would those have been in
11 April 2020? Was it -- Dustine Rodier was one of them?

12 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Dustine Rodier was in charge of a
13 number of programs, including the Operational Communications Centre. There is what
14 they would call or what we called the Assistant Support Services Officer, that was
15 Inspector Don Moser; and then also there was the Behavioural Sciences and Major
16 Crimes inspector, which at that time was named, however he wasn't in place, which is
17 Inspector Murray Marcichiw. There was an actor in that position at that time.

18 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Are you able to spell Marcichiw for us?

19 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yeah, I can spell me. It took me a
20 long time to learn it; M-A-R-C-I-C-H-I-W.

21 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Thank you. And which members were you
22 ultimately in charge of, which teams?

23 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I'm not ultimately in charge of
24 any teams. There are -- those officers I had mentioned are responsible, their -- they
25 would be called the line officers for a number of teams. So each of those officers that I
26 had mentioned had certain teams that reported up through them, and then there would
27 be team leaders attached to each of those teams as well reporting to those line officers.

28 So I'll give you an example: Under Inspector Don Moser, he would

1 have a number of supports services functions, technical or tactical sections. For
2 example, the Emergency Response Team would report, you know, through a team
3 leader to Inspector Don Moser and then it would filter up to me. Police Dog Services
4 would be another under Inspector Moser. The Tactical Support Group, which other
5 people would understand to be like a Public Order Unit, would report to
6 Inspector Moser. Provincial Traffic Services, Forensic Identification Section, that would
7 all fall under Inspector Moser.

8 Under Inspector Marcichiw would be all the investigative services.
9 Those would include the Major Crimes Unit, the Vi-Class Unit, anything that would
10 relate to the Behavioural Sciences Units; Sex Offender Registry; Commercial Crime;
11 Proceeds of Crime Clandestine Drug Unit, we call it Synthetic Drug Unit, would also fall
12 under Inspector Marcichiw. So they're -- we're -- we're basically sectioned off into
13 tactical versus investigative, and then communications, operational support.

14 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Whereas for Chief Superintendent Chris
15 Leather, he's the Criminal Operations Officer, would the general duty members fall
16 under his bailiwick?

17 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, ultimately all Criminal
18 Operations are managed by the Criminal Operations Officer. So Chief
19 Superintendent Leather, as the CrOps officer that we would call it, would be like the
20 second in command of the Division in charge of all Criminal Operations. I report to
21 Chris -- to Chief Superintendent Leather, but there are other direct reports to Chief
22 Superintendent Leather, which would include the district officers.

23 At the time of April -- of 2020, we have three districts within the
24 province. Northeast Nova at that time was Superintendent Archie Thompson;
25 Southwest Nova was Inspector or Superintendent Julie Moss; and Halifax District was
26 Chief Superintendent Janis Gray.

27 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Of importance to this Commission, as
28 SSO you had the authority to approve a Critical Incident package?

1 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, and that remains to this day.
2 The Support Services Officer is the approval authority for activation of the Critical
3 Incident Program.

4 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And you did, and you were the one to
5 approve it in this case; right?

6 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, that's correct.

7 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And then, just generally-speaking, once a
8 critical incident is underway you told us that you would be briefed as to what was
9 happening by the Critical Incident Commander, as that person had time, as things were
10 unfolding. Is that how it works?

11 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, that's correct. I received
12 many phone calls day and night from the on-call Critical Incident Commander over the
13 course of my time here in Nova Scotia, and it was always a very quick conversation. It
14 was -- it was just seeking approval authority. By that -- by the time that call was made,
15 in all cases, the Critical Incident resources had already been notified to start to get
16 ready, and then those conversations or that approval conversation, they are always very
17 short.

18 I always ask that when you have time, can you please provide me
19 an update when you're available, or when you're able to do so.

20 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** In turn, it's your responsibility to then
21 update the CrOps Officer as you learn new information?

22 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yeah, so my normal practice would
23 be as soon as I would receive the call, then I would activate the Critical Incident
24 Program. I would send a message to the Criminal Operations Officer, Chris Leather,
25 notifying him that we have activated the Critical Incident Program somewhere in the
26 province.

27 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** You've given more detail about the role of
28 the SSO both in your witness interview and also in feedback you provided to a draft

1 version of the Structure of Policing Report that was filed as the first exhibit to this
2 Commission.

3 And I'm going to ask Madam Registrar, could then Supt Campbell's
4 feedback on the Structure of Policing Report please be made an exhibit? It may be a
5 supporting document already to that report, but it's COMM0043164.

6 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** That's Exhibit 3899.

7 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3899:**

8 (COMM0043164) Supt Campbell's feedback on the
9 Structure of Policing Report

10 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Thank you.

11 Turning then to the Family Liaison Officer, in your interview you
12 talked about the RCMP liaison to the families, the victims, and those most affected.
13 You met with the families yourself at times, and then there was an officer assigned for
14 that role; right?

15 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, there was an officer assigned.
16 Yes.

17 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And you told us that after the mass
18 casualty, Cst Bent was assigned to that role?

19 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes. Not by me, but by the
20 command -- or I call it the command triangle, and if it hasn't been explained, that would
21 include the team commander, the primary investigator, and file coordinator would assign
22 which roles to which individuals within the team.

23 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Do you know why Cst Bent in particular
24 was chosen for that role?

25 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Do I know why he was? I believe
26 that Cst Bent was chosen for that role based on his personality. He seems to be an
27 individual who is easy to talk to and he seems to get along with others.

28 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Other than his personality, did he have any

1 specific training for that role?

2 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Not that I'm aware of, no.

3 However, Major Crimes members, for every homicide investigation, you know, a
4 singular homicide investigation, or if there were, you know, more than one victim,
5 normally not to this scope, there will always be one of the members of the coordinated
6 investigative team that's assigned to liaise with the victim family.

7 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Does the RCMP have training specific to
8 family liaison work?

9 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Not that I'm aware of, no.

10 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** How is it decided that only one officer
11 should be assigned to this role?

12 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well as I mentioned earlier, in a
13 normal case, where there's a single victim, it normally wouldn't require any more than
14 one.

15 In this particular case, obviously there were several victims, and I
16 was -- I was concerned about the fact that with so many victims, that we would require
17 more than one for a number of reasons.

18 One, because of the fact that with all of those families, they would
19 have -- they would require a significant amount of connectivity and attention.

20 And secondly, for the individual member themselves, it's a heavy
21 burden to carry, even with a singular, you know, victim incident.

22 And I did have a bit of discussion with the investigative team about
23 that, and that included, you know, commentary from Skipper, and they felt that Skipper
24 was capable of being able to do this.

25 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Skipper is Cst Bent?

26 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Sorry, yes. My apologies.

27 Everyone seems to have a nickname here. And I don't know if Skipper even responds
28 to his own name. I've always called him Skipper.

1 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Do you think it was too much for one
2 officer?

3 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I think that it's a lot. As I
4 mentioned, it's a very heavy intensive job for one person to do.

5 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** From where you sit today, can you give us
6 your assessment of the RCMP's family liaison work after the April 2020 mass casualty
7 events?

8 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, sitting here today, I mean,
9 clearly there have been many questions and concerns that have been raised with
10 respect to that. And in retrospect, when it comes to a mass casualty incident, there
11 always needs to be a police liaison, because the victims and the families will -- and
12 survivors and the public, but particularly what we're talking about is liaising with victim
13 families and survivors, they will always have a number of questions, and the source of
14 information that they're looking for will come from the police. But there needs to be a
15 very focused and purposeful machine, a team, that is brought in that would combine
16 both police resources, as well as professionals who have been specifically trained and
17 have perhaps experienced similar situations before in the past that could be
18 immobilized, whether it be a natural disaster where there's catastrophic loss of life, like
19 a plane crash, or a weather event, or fires, to a criminal event. There needs to be a
20 combined effort.

21 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** You mentioned specialized training. Is
22 there further training that you've identified to assist family liaison officers since the mass
23 casualty events?

24 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well I would imagine that -- and I'm
25 not fully aware, because it's never been a stream, a career -- a part of my career
26 progression, but I would suspect that within the federal policing environment, under
27 national security, the prospects of a mass casualty incident through a terrorism event, I
28 would -- I would imagine that there has been some work or some thought put towards

1 the management.

2 I would think also that the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police
3 may have some committee work that they have done in the past on supporting victims,
4 survivors, post a mass casualty event.

5 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** If the Commission did want to learn more
6 about what, if any, training is in place for that role, would the Chief Learning Officer be
7 the right person to ask?

8 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I'm sorry?

9 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Because you're telling us you're not
10 aware, yourself, necessarily, of what might be in place. Is the Chief Learning Officer the
11 right person to ask?

12 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I'm not aware of any specific
13 training that has been focused specifically on managing victim family liaison in a mass
14 casualty event. And that might be -- and again, it's not my area where I have spent any
15 time in my career, but I would imagine that if they haven't done much work around that,
16 it would be because of the fact that mass casualty events are not that frequent.
17 However, that doesn't mean that you don't still proceed further with identifying
18 appropriate training in the event of a situation like this.

19 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Turning to information management during
20 a critical incident, you'd agree with me that during a critical incident, there's a high
21 volume of information coming in to the critical Incident Commander; right?

22 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** That's correct.

23 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And so the CIC is the officer who is in
24 charge of the scene and making important decisions; right?

25 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes. The CIC is, to frame it
26 properly, it wouldn't be the CIC is in charge of the scene. The CIC is in command of the
27 operation. And there would be, in a normal critical incident, where you would have a
28 singular individual or a small group of individuals that were localized, there would still be

1 a lot of information and the decision making will go ultimately up through that Critical
2 Incident Commander.

3 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** So the CIC should be receiving important
4 information from the witnesses, from general duty members, in as close to real time as
5 possible; right?

6 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes. In an ideal situation,
7 absolutely.

8 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And who is responsible for ensuring the
9 CIC gets crucial information?

10 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well I know that the CIC is
11 supported. We don't have a single person that would be in a command post. There
12 would be a team of people that would be supporting that Critical Incident Commander.
13 For example, the Critical Incident Commander is in charge of the Critical Incident
14 Package, as we call it. So they would have command authority over every resource,
15 but they would be relying on the expertise and the input from other individuals, for
16 example, crisis negotiators, who might be part of that Critical Incident Package.

17 So there would be a number of individuals that would be supporting
18 the CIC in their decision-making and their awareness.

19 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Who triages the information and decides
20 what's important, both before and after it gets to the CIC?

21 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I think it's important that everyone
22 understand that I'm not a Critical Incident Commander. I've never been trained as a
23 CIC. So in fairness, a lot of the things that you're asking me are things that I, myself,
24 would -- I don't want to mislead anyone by giving information that might not be exactly
25 how it works within that structure. My background has mainly been in homicide
26 investigation, which does follow another -- a parallel type structure, but the way I would
27 understand it in terms of who is responsible, I think that everyone that's involved is
28 responsible for feeding information to the Critical Incident Commander.

1 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** But you were the senior officer being
2 briefed by the CIC, and so that is another responsibility the CIC has while the critical
3 incident is going on to brief up the chain; right?

4 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** It is, but the Critical Incident
5 Commander at any time can delegate the responsibility to someone. For example, if --
6 and to me, this just makes sense. If it's an unfolding and an active incident, and the
7 Critical Incident Commander needs to make sure that they are completely free to make
8 their decisions, if there is a notification that needs to take place, then they can delegate
9 that to someone to actually make that call.

10 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Sometimes the CIC simply doesn't have
11 time to brief senior officers in real time.

12 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, the reality is, is that I -- you
13 know, in the course of my time in Nova Scotia, often, I'm waiting to hear more
14 information, and there are times when by the time that I've been updated, the incident is
15 over, and I'm being notified of how that incident had actually finished. And that's largely,
16 I think, based on the fact that they are very occupied.

17 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** If you get the sense there might be
18 important things going on that you don't know about, are there things you should be
19 doing to proactively get information as a critical incident unfolds, or is it completely
20 passive while it's happening?

21 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I've always -- when you're
22 talking about active or proactive versus passive, me phoning in to the Critical Incident
23 Commander, I could be phoning in at the most inconvenient time, and I really respect
24 the authority of the Critical Incident Commander and that fact that they're to make
25 decisions. And it's always clear, as part of that activation phone call, when you have the
26 time to update me, then please let me know what's going on.

27 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Where is the training for RCMP CICs
28 done?

1 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Training for all Critical Incident
2 Commanders in the RCMP is done at the Canadian Police College. And, in fact, it's not
3 just the RCMP. There are many police forces across Canada that train at the Canadian
4 Police College that take the actual -- I think it's a 10-day program, Critical Incident
5 Commander training. That training is -- or the instructors are both RCMP members as
6 well as members from other police agencies across the country.

7 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Chief David MacNeil of Truro told the
8 Commission about ICS training. Can you explain what that is and how it's different from
9 the CIC training at the Canadian Police College?

10 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, very different. In fact, there
11 are -- they're not the same thing.

12 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** What does ICS stand for?

13 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Incident Command Systems. So
14 ICS training is more about -- it's training that deals with multiple agencies. There's
15 various levels. There's a 100 level, 200 level, 300 level and 400 level. And a lot of that
16 training would surround activations of things like ground search and rescue,
17 multiagency responses to natural disasters, hurricanes, fires, floods, that type of
18 incident. And it's a common operating system or, you know, constant or -- not constant,
19 but equivalent language that's used, clue and structures. It's very logistical based. It's
20 operations based. There's a number of programs under ICS. Critical Incident training
21 and Critical Incident Command is very different. It's specific to an unfolding critical
22 incident, things, like, when you have an armed and barricaded individual, hostage
23 taking, an active shooter, et cetera. You will not use ICS to respond to a Critical
24 Incident. You will use a Critical Incident Commander.

25 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Do you have ICS training yourself?

26 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I do have ICS training. I believe I
27 have ICS training levels 100, 200, and 300, and the reason why I have that training is
28 that I'm also an accredited major case management team commander, and as part of

1 my accreditation process for an awareness level of ICS, I was required to take the
2 levels 1, 2 and 3.

3 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** I appreciate you told us you don't have the
4 CIC training yourself, but are you able to describe the training, the gist of the training
5 provided to RCMP members and officers about information management specifically
6 during a Critical Incident?

7 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No, I don't, because I've never
8 attended that training. As I mentioned, it's -- I believe it's a 10-day training program
9 which would be over a 2-week period, 10 days meaning the Monday to Friday. That
10 would take place at the Canadian Police College, and then that would be followed by an
11 understudy period, where a newly trained Critical Incident Commander would be paired
12 up or partnered up with an experienced Critical Incident Commander. But specifically in
13 terms of flow of information, what they cover during the course training standards, I
14 wouldn't have any awareness in and around that specifically in terms of the training.

15 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** You said in your interview that it's the
16 CIC's decision what to make public during a critical incident. Prior to the mass casualty,
17 was there any training in the CPC CIC course about public alerting?

18 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** So as far as I'm aware, there was
19 not. And the reason why I can say that is that when I went to Halifax District, there was
20 a -- one of our staff sergeants that had actually attended the Canadian Police College
21 Critical Incident Commander's course. And upon his return to the division, I was
22 interested in what the public notification or public alerting components of the Critical
23 Incident Commander course looked like. And he told me, at that time, that there was no
24 component on terms of public alerting.

25 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And that was after the events?

26 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** That was after the events, yes.

27 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And did you do anything after you learned
28 that?

1 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I did. I had conversations with
2 what we call Contract and Indigenous Policing -- you might hear the acronym C&IP -- in
3 Ottawa. Under that, there is a unit that's called Operational Response and Readiness,
4 or ORR, if you hear that acronym. ORR is responsible for all of the Critical Incident
5 components. For example, ERT, CICs, negotiators, et cetera. And I flagged that
6 because I saw that as a significant issue.

7 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Who did you flag it to?

8 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** At that time, and it might be still to
9 this day, Superintendent Phil Lue's in charge of the Critical Incident Program.

10 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** That's L-U-E?

11 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** L-U-E, yes, that's correct. Out of
12 Operational Response and Readiness, which then resulted in a teleconference that I
13 participated in with principals within the Canadian Police College, as well as
14 Superintendent Lue and others from National Learning and Development were -- we
15 had a discussion in and around the absence of public alerting during Critical Incidents
16 from that Critical Incident Command course.

17 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Do you know whether it's now been added
18 to the course?

19 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I'm sorry, there's a ---

20 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Do you know whether that's been added?

21 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** --- there's a really bad echo in this
22 room.

23 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Do you know whether that's been added to
24 the course?

25 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, I am aware that it actually has
26 now been added to the course. I believe that there's a module that prospective
27 candidates have to complete. And the reason why -- as I understood it through that
28 teleconference, I wouldn't call it a reluctance, but the fact that that was missing from

1 their course training standard was, is that every province has some nuances in terms of
2 public alerting. And what they've asked the candidates to do is to do a module in terms
3 of their provincial alerting systems, because some provinces have direct access now,
4 where other provinces to this day, as I understand it, do not. So there's -- those
5 nuances need to be explored before they come to the course, and then they discuss it,
6 as I understand it now, during the course, because ultimately, these Critical Incident
7 Commanders are going to have to work within the frameworks, within each of their
8 prospective provinces.

9 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** The challenge of dealing with the influx of
10 information in a Critical Incident has been identified before, and it was identified before
11 these events, for example, after the 2014 shooting in Moncton. In the MacNeil review
12 after that case, just want to take you to something that was said.

13 Madam Registrar, could I please ask you to pull up Exhibit P-
14 001628, which is COMM 0050842, which is the MacNeil Review -- Report, at page 65 of
15 the PDF counter, please?

16 So this is under Command and Control. It says,
17 "The greatest impediments to providing command and
18 control during this incident was a lack of
19 communication and poor situational awareness.
20 Supervisors require information to direct and manage
21 resources, members require it for tactical decision-
22 making, risk assessments and safety. This
23 information-sharing did not always take place,
24 hampering proper management of the incident at all
25 levels.
26 Research on active shooting incidents found that
27 when command and control is not formally
28 established, the failure to share information across

1 responder groups increases. This results in potential
2 information gaps, causing substantial delays in
3 response. Delays subsequently stem from the lack of
4 a Common Operating Picture (COP) necessary to
5 effectively manage available resources. The safety of
6 first responders can also be compromised without
7 clear communication regarding secure zones and the
8 status of the shooter or shooters.”

9 Between this MacNeil review from the aftermath of the 2014
10 Moncton shooting and the mass casualty event April 18th and 19th, 2020, are you
11 aware of any changes the RCMP made to better prepare for interpreting, acting upon
12 and sharing information during a critical incident?

13 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I would say that the implementation
14 of the risk manager program within the Operational Communications Centre would have
15 been a measure to hopefully reduce the amount of confusion and situational
16 awareness.

17 I -- the risk managers were in place before I arrived here in Nova
18 Scotia, so I'm not sure exactly when they were implemented, but I understand that New
19 Brunswick was one of the first divisions to implement the risk manager program
20 because the reality is, is that when an active event commences the first responding
21 member's the patrol members and the Operational Communications Centre will be the
22 first people aware of the incident that's unfolding and it will take some time for the
23 activation of all these specialized resources like the critical incident program, so there
24 will be this natural disadvantage, I would say, that you're coming into a situation after it's
25 already started.

26 So I would say that the application of the risk manager program
27 was designed to help alleviate some of that, but there's no such thing as perfect, and
28 clearly there were things that were missed along the way that weren't necessarily fully

1 understood by the Critical Incident Commander by the time the Critical Incident
2 Commander was in a position to take command authority.

3 In terms of other things that might have been implemented specific
4 to that, I don't believe that there was much other than maybe just awareness.

5 I think that one of the issues is that when we think about -- like a lot
6 of our training, we're training with respect to critical incident response. The normal
7 critical incident response is usually a singular individual who is barricaded in a
8 residence. It's fairly controlled, it's fairly contained. The information would be -- and if
9 you're dealing with not as much carnage, there would be less confusion.

10 But in this particular case with the level of devastation and how
11 things were unfolding in the manner in which they were, I think that that added to the
12 complexity and it certainly added to the challenges in terms of communicating that
13 information and funnelling that directly to the Critical Incident Commander.

14 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** So I understand you to be saying that the
15 fact that the shooter was mobile in this case was unusual and perhaps not the scenario
16 that people would have been training for when they think about critical incidents.

17 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I would say. And again, I'm not a
18 Critical Incident Commander, so what scenarios the Critical Incident Commanders play
19 out in terms of their training, but I would say that their -- the majority of their experience
20 would be contained, focused critical incident ops.

21 I do believe that a mobile active shooter who has been active,
22 dormant, reactivated is not a common event. And since April 2020, I've been scouring
23 the internet looking for similar events and circumstances to try to see how those events
24 played out, and there is not much out there in terms of active, dormant, active, mobile
25 and then, of course, you add in the fact that an offender is operating a fully-marked
26 replica police vehicle. I could find one incident in Albuquerque, New Mexico where an
27 individual had stolen a police car that, of course, they could track, but this was a unique,
28 very unique, circumstance.

1 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** By April 2020, was the RCMP in Nova
2 Scotia any better prepared to deal with gathering and reacting to the flood of incoming
3 information in a critical incident as a result of the MacNeil review?

4 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, we are. And to expand on
5 that, we will always establish a command post and we have the ability to establish
6 command post at a fixed location during a critical incident. There are many Critical
7 Incident Commanders that it might be best -- and it's often left to the Critical Incident
8 Commander to establish that command post somewhere near the scene in a safe zone.

9 Of course, we cover a lot of territory. I think there's 55,000 square
10 kilometres that we cover in this province. And when you set up a command post in a
11 remote location that is separated from your Operational Communications Centre, then
12 naturally that separation is going to create some issues for you from a communications
13 perspective.

14 And then, of course, our headquarters is in Dartmouth, so there's a
15 physical separation or a geographic separation amongst individuals who might have
16 some level of responsibility or need for awareness, so one of the things that has
17 changed since that time -- I'm sorry for going on at length setting the response to your
18 question up -- is that when we moved the Operational Communications Centre from
19 Truro to our headquarters in Dartmouth, that move was in play prior to April of 2020.
20 But what we've created is a room, and I know there's a -- it's a Critical Incident
21 Operations Room. I think that's what it's -- CIOR, again another acronym.

22 That's been established and it's right outside of the Operational
23 Communications Centre, and what that allows is a number of things.

24 It allows for the Critical Incident Commander to be able to enter that
25 room directly as opposed to actually physically having to go to the scene. It allows for
26 support personnel from the Operational Communications Centre to go directly into that
27 room as well and then, if there's need for awareness by anyone within management of
28 the division, they can actually attend that room as well so you would have some -- a

1 variety of necessary resources that are within a room that has access to all the
2 mapping, all the CAD data, all the information and also access to the risk manager as
3 well because it's physically co-located. So that is a significant improvement.

4 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And are you aware whether that move had
5 anything to do with the MacNeil review or was that just something that was happening
6 anyway?

7 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, this -- that move was a result
8 of our move from Truro to the OCC. However ---

9 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** That move happened after these events in
10 2020; right?

11 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, that's correct.

12 But of course, identifying the issues in terms of challenges with
13 communication or missed opportunities due to challenges in communication through
14 this incident was a driving factor behind trying to streamline and increase our
15 capabilities in terms of communication during critical incident operations by creating this
16 room.

17 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** So does the new setup allow the Critical
18 Incident Commander to have more direct access to things like being able to rehear what
19 a witness said or, you know, look at CAD and things like that?

20 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, it does. And it also allows for
21 additional resources if required because our headquarters building, obviously, has a
22 significant number of resources attached to a variety of different units, and if we needed
23 to scale up the number of resources for taskings, it would be easier to do from that
24 location.

25 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Are there different schools of thought as to
26 whether a setup like that, a centralized location with a lot of resources attached to it, is
27 better or worse than a command post set up closer to the scene?

28 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I think it's case specific depending

1 upon what incident that you are involved in. What I would say is that close proximity to
2 the Operation Communication Centre is significantly important and I think it's an
3 improvement.

4 But you may find that there's a Critical Incident Commander that
5 feels that the best Command Post -- we also have a Mobile Command Post that's
6 outfitted that we can actually take and drop into a certain area. If the Critical Incident
7 Commander feels that it would be best to manage an operation from the location close
8 to the critical incident, we would leave that to the Critical Incident Commander for the
9 Critical Incident Commander's decision.

10 At the same time, though, we would still open up this Critical
11 Incident Operations Room because if, for example, I wanted to go down to get real time
12 information, I'd be able to do that in a location like that. So we would still open it.

13 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** So it's not an either/or, right? You could
14 have both.

15 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** We could have both, yes.

16 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And so I understand you to be saying the
17 centralized space allows senior officers as well to have more direct access to
18 information. And does that mean you might be able to get access to information without
19 having to disturb the CIC who's in the middle of a lot of other things?

20 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, you definitely don't want to be
21 disturbing that CIC in terms of their decisions that they have to make. And it would be
22 more for senior officers, just for situational awareness. And, for example, if they're -- if it
23 was obvious that, you know, we needed to call in more resources, we could alleviate
24 some of those pressures for the Critical Incident Commander, but it would be more from
25 a situational awareness perspective for the senior managers.

26 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** The Commission has heard from the two
27 on-calls CICs on April 18th, 2020, S/Sgt. West and S/Sgt. Kevin Surette. It doesn't
28 appear from their testimony that the MacNeil Report was required reading for them. I'm

1 just going to read you what they said; this is from the hearing transcript of May 18th,
2 2022 at page 189. Madam Registrar's got it up onscreen there.

3 Ms. Miller asked -- they were testifying together. Ms. Miller asked:

4 "Did either of you have an opportunity to read the
5 MacNeil Report after it was published?"

6 S/Sgt. Surette replied:

7 "I read parts of it."

8 Ms. Miller said, "Okay." S/Sgt. Jeff West said:

9 "I did as well, but it was quite some ago."

10 Ms. Miller asked:

11 "And did you read parts of it on your own or was it in
12 the context of training that was provided to you
13 through the RCMP?"

14 S/Sgt. Kevin Surette said:

15 "On my own in my case."

16 S/Sgt. Jeff West said, "On my own."

17 So is it correct, to your knowledge, that CICs weren't required to
18 read the MacNeil Report?

19 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I'm not aware of myself in terms of
20 their requirements with respect to the MacNeil Report; I can't answer to that. But I do
21 know because I had attended and met with our Critical Incident Commanders shortly
22 after I arrived here in Nova Scotia, they would often have -- I wouldn't call them training
23 sessions but almost like debriefings in terms of the program, succession planning,
24 things that were new on the horizon. They would meet, and I don't know exactly how
25 many times per year that they would meet together, all of them collectively, I know that
26 they still do this to this day. At the time of the mass casualty event, S/Sgt. West was the
27 coordinator of the Critical Incident Program and I think before that it was S/Sgt.
28 MacGillivray that was, so it had been passed over to Jeff West. So Jeff would have

1 been one of the key individuals that would have communicated changes or
2 communicated issues. And, of course, they would also communicate issues with the
3 Operational Response and Readiness Group out of Ottawa, the Contract and
4 Indigenous Policing, ORR that I mentioned. There's connectivity between the Critical
5 Incident Program and ORR because that's where they get their direction, in terms of
6 critical incident best practices.

7 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** So the ORR is a potential source of
8 accumulating wisdom and making sure people are trained on it, right?

9 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** They are but under Contract and
10 Indigenous Policing -- I'm quite aware because I was in Ottawa at that time serving in
11 our National Headquarters -- the National Criminal Operations Officer of the day was
12 responsible for responding to all of the MacNeil recommendations, and that National
13 Criminal Operations Officer is one of several Chief Superintendents that report up to the
14 Assistant Commissioner of Contract and Indigenous Policing.

15 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Do you think that CICs should have been
16 required to read the MacNeil Report and -- or be trained on it as a mandatory thing to
17 learn from past experiences with information management challenges?

18 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I do believe that there is a lot of
19 value in reading the reports. Like any policy instrument or report, it's part of your
20 ongoing learning, you should be reading through them, whether it's -- I mean, for
21 investigators, it's case law or best practices or advancements in science, DNA analysis,
22 whatever the case might be. Critical Incident Commanders, you would want to pay
23 attention to looking at after-action reports or independent reviews as a common practice
24 to better position yourself as a Critical Incident Commander.

25 So I do believe that there should be a requirement to make sure
26 that you've read through it. You've read Jeff West's statement where Jeff said that he
27 had read it at one point in time and that S/Sgt. Surette had read portions of it as well.
28 But a formalized process to ensure that they're signed off that they've read it, I think

1 would be of value, yes.

2 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** In your interview, we discussed what type
3 of debriefing you had with the CICs; that was your witness interview transcript that's
4 COMM0059935 that was made an exhibit this morning.

5 Just bring that up onscreen, looking at page 32.

6 And I was asking you -- so this is on your second day of interviews,
7 and I was saying -- you told us last time there wasn't an after -- an overall after-action
8 report. Did you ever receive a report from S/Sgt. West or MacGillivray in the nature of a
9 debrief or other report from the CIC perspective? And you said that:

10 "The only thing that I received, I never received
11 anything in writing, but I know it would have -- I would
12 have it in my notes and I just don't remember the day,
13 but I remember asking all of the principals, meaning
14 many of the people that were involved in the
15 response, just to get into rooms so that I could get my
16 head around the timing of everything. So we did have
17 a meeting and, you know, there were several that
18 were in attendance, the CICs, Jeff West, MacGillivray,
19 Surette. I remember, you know, a number of the
20 advisory NCOs from Northeast Nova." (As read)

21 And so in that meeting, were there gaps discussed or areas where
22 you talked about where the response went well?

23 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yeah, so there were actually -- you
24 know, when I look at that, they weren't formalized meetings, per se, but I remember
25 attending Bible Hill Detachment after I'd been to a few of the scenes. So I made my
26 way to Bible Hill, and I did have a conversation with -- there were a number of people
27 that were in the room; there was S/Sgt. West, S/Sgt. MacGillivray, S/Sgt. Surette, S/Sgt,
28 I believe, MacCallum. There were the Division Advisory NCOs that were in the room,

1 Inspector Bell, S/Sgt. Halliday. I went to see how they were, and then they talked about
2 it. It was clear to me, the level of devastation on their faces, and the tone -- and I had a
3 couple of one-on-one conversations with a few of those individuals as well.

4 But what I was speaking of in my interview was a meeting that I had
5 called to try to bring everyone that seemed to have played a role in the critical incident
6 response, not necessarily the first responders but those that were in some level of
7 management, to essentially go through a timeline. And it would be in my notes, and I
8 don't remember the specific day, but the focus of that was to get my head around what
9 people knew and when they knew it, and what they did about the things that they knew,
10 to try to get a better sense of the timeline of the events, because it was -- it was
11 complicated. There was a lot of information out there that I was trying to understand
12 and distill and that was one of the best ways for me to be able to try to have that
13 conversation with those individuals, the principals, as I called them, in the room. And I
14 remember we had that in the Burkholder Briefing Room in the Headquarters in
15 Dartmouth, and there was probably at least 20 people in the room at that time including
16 some of our emergency response team members.

17 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Other than your notes, are there any
18 reports or memos that came out of that meeting?

19 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I would imagine that all those
20 that were in the meeting may, or should, have made some level of notes about that
21 meeting as well. Again, the focus for me was to try to get my head wrapped around the
22 response and the key points of it.

23 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** But there was no central memo or
24 anything summarizing any key learnings, for example, that might have come out of that
25 meeting?

26 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Okay. So I understand the
27 question that you're asking. No, not specific to that. But I would like to offer that on a
28 number of occasions, I had approached our Contract and Indigenous Policing in Ottawa

1 Operational Response and Readiness, and what I felt I needed as a manager of
2 multiple programs, which included the Critical Incident Program, was an independent
3 assessment of the response that would be done by our accredited and trained Critical
4 Incident Commanders, particularly from outside the RCMP, trained at the Canadian
5 Police College, to look at the response. And I'd asked for that on a number of
6 occasions.

7 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Who did you ask?

8 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** That request went through, at that
9 time, I know that C/Supt John Robin was liaising with NHQ in Ottawa, Critical Incident
10 Program, or our C&IP about that request. I'd sent a number of emails, they should be
11 as part of my disclosed emails as well, where I laid out what it is I was looking for. That
12 would be all in my disclosed emails.

13 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Would there be any other documents like
14 a formal request that might have recorded this request?

15 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I did -- I did author a formal letter.
16 And further to C/Supt Robin, I did have a conversation with C/Supt Jamie Solesme -- I'll
17 spell the name. S-O- -- S-O-L-E-S-M-E -- about this request. I believe that C/Supt
18 Solesme is just recently retired. I would have had at least one or two conversations.
19 And I did forward a memo formalizing my request that ---

20 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And you disclosed ---

21 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** --- would have went in through ---

22 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** --- that letter -- have you produced that to
23 the Commission?

24 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well it would be all part of the
25 investigative holdings that would have been disclosed to DOJ. I can't speak to where
26 that is.

27 But the reason why I brought up C/Supt Robin is that C/Supt Robin
28 was fully aware that I was making a request for that review.

1 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** As the SSO, or even when you were
2 Acting C/Supt after that, could you not have ordered a review of the events?

3 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I think that my memo made it very
4 clear. I had articulated the rationale for why I wanted that review to be done. And as I
5 mentioned before, ORR, or Operation Response and Readiness fell under Contracts
6 and Indigenous Policing and C/Supt Solesme. And they were in agreement.

7 But I also sensed, from the responses that I was receiving, is that
8 that was being elevated up through to the Assistant Commissioner in Contract and
9 Indigenous Policing, to the Deputy Commission of Contract and Indigenous Policing.

10 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Who is that?

11 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Deputy Commissioner Brian
12 Brennan was the Deputy Commissioner and the Assistant Commissioner Dennis Daley
13 is the Assistant Commissioner of Contract and Indigenous Policing. And the responses
14 that I was receiving at that time was that, you know, the Mass Casualty Commission
15 had been established and that part of the role of the Mass Casualty Commission was to
16 look at the response. And there was some questions in and around are we not
17 duplicating efforts here?

18 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Did you receive a formal response? A
19 formal no?

20 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I don't think I ever received a
21 formal response in writing. There might be an email. I can't recall exactly. But I'll be
22 honest, I was disappointed because for me, as a program manager, I saw utility and
23 value in having other Canadian Critical Incident Commanders look at what we did to
24 identify what we did properly and to identify any gaps that could be addressed
25 immediately.

26 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** That's your request through National
27 Headquarters, but could you not have ordered at least an H Division level review?

28 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well to order an H Division level

1 review would require that I would have to go outside this division. I think it's critically
2 important to have individuals who were not one, involved, or two, have no connection.

3 And the reason why I feel that's important is that in my -- one of my
4 previous roles, I was the officer in charge of the National Office of Investigative
5 Standards and Practices, which is a major case review body that would look at major
6 cases, particularly homicide cases or serial predator cases, and do reviews of those
7 investigations. But I would always select individuals that had no connection, because
8 that objectivity and independence is very important. That's why I needed the
9 engagement of the national program to be able to independently identify the proper
10 individuals to be able to do that important review.

11 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And so for the aftermath of the mass
12 casualty events, did you appeal directly to that body you were telling us about in Ottawa
13 for a review or is that just not the channel to take?

14 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I formalized it. I put it in writing that
15 I wished to have that review completed by independent and objective Critical Incident
16 Commanders, to look at that response.

17 There were a number of -- and I think it will be fair to provide some
18 additional context. In terms of independent reviews, there were several independent
19 reviews that were ongoing, many of which were focused more on safety areas. ESDC,
20 Employment and Social Development Canada, does investigations, independent
21 investigations, when there is a workplace death or an injury. So that was ongoing. That
22 wasn't what I needed. That wasn't what I was looking for.

23 There's the what we call the HOIT Team, which is the Hazardous
24 Occurrence Investigative Team, which is internal that looks again at workplace injuries
25 and deaths and they try to implement recommendations to increase the level of safety
26 and functionality going forward. That was ongoing, but HOIT's focus would not be what
27 I needed on the Critical Incidence side.

28 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Right. Back to your meeting with the

1 Critical Incident Commanders, you told us there wasn't a formalized summary coming
2 out of that, other than people might have taken their own notes. But were there any
3 recommendations coming out of that meeting?

4 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** There were a lot of issues, when I
5 say issues, gripes, concerns that were relayed, as well as just a sense of dissolution by
6 people, because I can say this, I looked every one of them in the eye and I do believe
7 that every one of them did everything that they could possibly do. They did their best.
8 And they felt awful about what had happened.

9 You know, for example, when I talk about gripes or issues that were
10 raised, it was about just the scale and the scope and the enormity of the event and how
11 possibly we could respond then and into the future with so many factors. There was a
12 sense of that there.

13 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** You said you went into that meeting
14 wanting to get your head around it, and have a debrief, and learn about who knew what
15 and when and so on. From the information you gathered from the CICs at that meeting,
16 was there anything that you did as a result?

17 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well I can tell you I walked away
18 from that meeting with a much greater level of understanding of what everyone had
19 been through. And I think an appreciation for, individually and collectively, many of
20 them actually had made and what they had personally encountered.

21 There were many things that I did after the fact in terms of
22 resourcing and moving of resources in and around to better support the Critical Incident
23 Program, because that's what I was responsible for.

24 In terms of, you know, the general duty responses on the front line,
25 not my -- that was not my area of responsibility. That would have fallen under the
26 District Policing Officers. So I would have had much less involvement in implementing
27 any changes post April of 2020. But specific to my area, there were a number of
28 changes particularly in and around Critical Incident Program resourcing and support.

1 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Can you describe any changes that were
2 made since the events that you know of?

3 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, there's been a number of
4 changes. As I mentioned earlier, I believe it's 54,000 or 55,000 square kilometres that
5 we cover. And one of the immediate changes that I made post Portapique was moving
6 certain resources that were, I would call them part-time resources attached to the ERT
7 team, into the -- into the ERT team as a full-time resource.

8 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Just to stop you there for a second. So
9 when you say part-time resources, am I correct that what that means is these are
10 members, RCMP members who have a regular day job and then they're also on the
11 ERT team to be deployed as necessary; is that -- is that right?

12 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** There are many programs within
13 the provincial policing environment that are what I would call "hybrid teams". You will
14 have a certain level of full-time resources, and then we will train members to a certain
15 level to become part of a team as an ad hoc member, called upon when -- if and when
16 required. They will have a substantive position, and then if there is a -- if there is an
17 activation they will leave that substantive position and they will join the Critical Incident
18 Team.

19 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** I interrupted you to explain that, but please
20 carry on to tell us more about the changes that took place in H-Division.

21 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** So -- yeah, many changes,
22 particularly in and around critical incident or ERT resourcing. At that time, there were
23 six fully-funded positions. When I say fully-funded positions, they call them FTEs or full-
24 time equivalents funded... The reason we were funded through the federal program
25 because the federal footprint of the RCMP in Nova Scotia uses the ERT team. So
26 federal policing would fund three positions for full-time. The contract or the province at
27 that time were funding three full-time positions, provincially. So we had six resources
28 that were dedicated as full-time ERT resources, which would include the team leader.

1 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** When you say resources, you mean
2 people.

3 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** People.

4 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Yeah.

5 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, people. So on top of those six
6 resources, we had partially-funded six what we call STE, or service to establishment
7 positions. That means that there is no funding attached to those positions. We would
8 basically do -- not do something else to fund the salary dollars for individuals. And to
9 alleviate the pressures that we put on our frontline resources, these STE or pressure-
10 funded positions, with their level of training that they're required to do within the ERT
11 Program, with the number of callouts that they're always out on, even though they would
12 have a substantive position, we were pressure-funding six of these positions across the
13 province. I believe that three to four of them were in the districts, within an hour's drive
14 of Halifax or Dartmouth; probably two of them might have been in Halifax District, and
15 one in Southwest Nova and one in Northeast Nova; and then the remainder of the
16 positions were under Support Services, programs that I would have under my area of
17 responsibility, like Provincial Traffic Services Unit.

18 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And how many ERT team members are
19 there supposed to be total?

20 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, in a perfect world, there was
21 a modernisation, there were two iterations of a modernisation review that were
22 completed, I think the last one in either 2018 or '19, and the recommendation was is that
23 each provincial ERT team should have 18 resources, full-time.

24 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Have there ever been 18 full-time
25 H-Division ERT team members?

26 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Full-time? No. No. So at the time
27 of April 2020, you had six full-time; three funded by the federal government, three
28 funded by the province. The RCMP internally were pressure-funding six positions, and

1 then we had additional part-timers. So we were sitting in and around 12 to 14 ERT
2 members.

3 So in answer to your question, the first thing I did is I communicated
4 with those district policing officers, and I dragged those STE resources within the
5 districts and made them full-time. Like I was done with having them responding in a
6 general duty capacity in a district, because in reality between their mandatory training
7 and between their callouts there really weren't resources attached to those units. They
8 were, I would say, probably 70-percent of the time occupied, if not better, within the
9 ERT callouts in the ERT Program. So I brought them back, you know, to the centre.

10 And then we started building. Again, resubmitting business cases
11 for normalising, we use the terminology "normalising". If you take a pressure-funded
12 position, you need to go to the province and ask for funding to normalise that position.
13 So re-establishing the business cases to start building up the capacity over on your
14 Emergency Response team. Side that was a focus area by myself and Don Moser, and
15 the team leader within the ERT Program, and other individuals within the ERT Program.

16 Because I did believe in that modernisation study. The
17 expectations of the police in terms of critical incident response are high, and they should
18 be, and these teams need to be prepared and ready. And the only way we can be
19 prepared and ready if we -- is if we have the necessary number of resources to ensure
20 that we have adequate coverage and that they are given the opportunity to be able to
21 train, deploy, and then rest. Because this team does not get any rest.

22 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** The training is significant; isn't it? It's
23 something like 40 hours a month that they have to do it to maintain their specialisation
24 in the ERT team?

25 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Sorry. You're ---

26 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** It's a high -- what -- do you know the
27 number of hours, roughly, that an ERT team member has to train for?

28 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, every ERT team member

1 goes through a selection process, and that selection process is actually quite rigorous.
2 So they determine their suitability for the program. And then once they are selected
3 they are brought on to the team, not full-time, but they will train with the team and they'll
4 prepare for their basic course, which is done in Ottawa, that's the basic ERT training
5 course. And I believe it's now sitting at 9 weeks, where they will train to become a basic
6 assaulter in the ERT team.

7 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** What about on an ongoing basis?

8 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Ongoing basis. So -- and this
9 might be part of the modernisation study, as well as the MacNeil recommendations, but
10 our ERT teams, I have a lot of faith and confidence in them, and I do believe in their --
11 the level of training that they receive, they train, at minimum, as a team, together, for
12 40 hours per week. That is mandatory training.

13 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Per week or per month?

14 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Sorry, I'm sorry. Forty hours per
15 month, which means that one week out of every month is spent specifically on training.
16 In addition to that, there is a number of specialties within the ERT Program. There are
17 snipers, there is tubular assault, there is air traffic interjection, there is marine
18 operations and ship-boarding. There are a number of things that -- and repelling. So
19 there is also add-ons to that 40 hours that they're required to train, and not only do they
20 have to do that, but they also have to maintain their Operations skills maintenance
21 training, which is the OSM training or the ongoing mandatory training that every
22 Operational member of the RCMP has to fulfill. So they do all of that training as well, on
23 top of all the ERT training. So between their mandatory training and their callouts, there
24 is no downtime for these individuals.

25 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Are there any other changes since the
26 events that you wanted to tell the Commissioners about?

27 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I mentioned the area that we have
28 to cover. So one ---

1 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Sorry, I didn't hear you. You mentioned?
2 I didn't hear what you said.

3 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I mentioned about the
4 geography that we're required to cover.

5 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Yes.

6 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** And the first -- the first element to
7 try and make a change in terms of critical incident response, specifically ERT is what I'm
8 talking about right now, was building up capacity and ensuring that we had unfettered
9 access to the necessary numbers of ERT members. Further to that, is to be able to get
10 them faster to all points within the province, which would be everywhere from the
11 northern tip of Cape Breton Island to the southern tip of the province. We need to be
12 able to get those resources and their equipment to those locations much quicker. And -
13 - and it's not just the ERT team, it's the Critical Incident Commanders, it's the Police
14 Service Dogs, it's the emergency -- the EMRT, the Emergency Medical Response
15 Technicians, who are part of the ERT team. It's all of those resources.

16 So we had done a fair amount of work, and thankfully with the
17 province, with the Department of Natural Resources, in securing an MOU between the
18 Department of Justice Nova Scotia and the Department of Natural Resources for
19 accessing their fleet of helicopters to be able to move those resources a little bit quicker
20 amongst the province. We're never going to get around the amount of time that it's
21 going to take to transport a tactical armoured vehicle or a rescue armoured vehicle to a
22 scene. If I need to go to Meat Cove, it's going to take several hours to get there. If I
23 have to get them to Yarmouth, it's going to take several hours for that equipment to get
24 there, and we can't get around that. But we might be able to get what we call an
25 Immediate Action Response Team to an area a little bit faster, because they have some
26 specialized equipment and some specialized training. Not ideal, because we want that
27 package to roll as a full team but getting them there a little bit quicker is better. So
28 we've done that.

1 And, of course, we have our existing agreements that we have with
2 other RCMP Emergency Response Teams across the province. We've smoothed out
3 some of the logistical wrinkles in terms of engaging backup teams. Since April 2020,
4 we've relied on teams from the National Headquarters region to backfill because the
5 reality is, is that if you're involved in a protracted Critical Incident operation, your people
6 need to be on shift for a certain period of time, then you need to stand them down or
7 replace them with another team that's ready to take over. So there's a rotating
8 operational period that you need to make sure you maintain those operations and keep
9 those people safe and fresh.

10 So we've ironed out a lot of those logistical issues in terms of
11 backfilling. We continue to utilize our Emergency Response Team relationships with
12 the Emergency Response Team in New Brunswick. We are often co-training with them.
13 There's been a focussed effort. I've asked Inspector Moser to ensure that we have
14 more training and familiarity with the other two Emergency Response Teams in this
15 province, that being the Halifax Regional Police Service Emergency Response Team as
16 well as the Cape Breton Regional Police, inviting each other to some of their training
17 sessions, so that we have greater level of familiarity with those teams, in an effort to
18 reach what I would hope to be true interoperability, where we can actually deploy teams
19 either together in an integrated fashion or at least be able to hand off through
20 operational periods as well.

21 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** I don't need to take you to it, but you did
22 mention in that same interview that we just saw on page 33 about your request to
23 Ottawa for an independent review. Would that request have gone through the CROPS
24 officer, Chris Leather, or the Commanding Officer in H-Division, or did you send it
25 directly to National Headquarters?

26 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No, I sent that directly, but I'm
27 convinced that Chief Superintendent Leather would have had awareness.

28 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Did you advise them that you had made

1 that request?

2 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Oh, yes, I would have had
3 discussions with Chris Leather about that.

4 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Do you recall his response?

5 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I don't know, other than, you know,
6 we were -- I wouldn't want to say at the mercy, but we were depending on Ottawa to be
7 able to independently identify those resources to be able to do that review. I can't
8 remember Chris's perspective on the outcome of that, and then the fact that that did not
9 move forward as I wished, but I do remember that Chris was supportive of the fact that
10 that review was being requested.

11 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Do you know if he did anything to escalate
12 the request?

13 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Chris Leather?

14 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Yes.

15 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I can't speak for Chris Leather. I
16 don't know whether Chris had engaged in further discussions about it. I do know that,
17 as I mentioned earlier, Chief Superintendent John Robin was sort of the connection
18 point between Contract Division's Policing in Ottawa and DOJ Canada. He was
19 engaged in conversations specific about that.

20 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** What about Assistant Commissioner Lee
21 Bergerman, was she supportive and aware of this request?

22 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I'm not aware if Chief
23 Superintendent -- or Assistant Commissioner Bergerman was fully dialed in to that
24 request. I don't know.

25 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Would it not have assisted to have her
26 support for this request if you were going to National Headquarters?

27 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yeah, certainly it would. And, you
28 know, Chief Superintendent Leather reported directly to Assistant Commissioner

1 Bergerman, so I would imagine that they may have had conversations about that. But
2 to speak to the level of support, what conversations took place, I would have to leave
3 that to Chief Superintendent Leather and Assistant Commissioner Bergerman to provide
4 that evidence.

5 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** But what was your thinking in not enlisting
6 her in this effort? Wouldn't it have made sense to have your CO involved in asking for
7 an independent review?

8 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** It does, and it could very well have
9 come up within -- the CO would have weekly briefings, I believe it was Wednesdays that
10 she would have them, where we would just report on a variety of issues. I could
11 imagine -- I can't imagine that I didn't mention my intent or my request to have an
12 independent review done.

13 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** But you had that autonomy ---

14 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I would be surprised if she didn't
15 have any awareness of it.

16 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Okay. But you did have the autonomy,
17 obviously, to make that request on your own?

18 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I do, yes.

19 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Okay.

20 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** And even if I didn't, I would
21 anyway.

22 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** So next I'm going to actually take you to
23 some examples from the mass casualty events of pieces of information, so that we can
24 try to do a bit of what you were trying to do in that meeting with the CICs to look at who
25 knew what when, and break it down a bit, and discuss it in the larger context of how we
26 can improve information flow in Critical Incidents.

27 Since I'm moving into a different area, Commissioners, it's almost
28 11, and is this a convenient time for the morning break?

1 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Yes, it is. Thank you so much.

2 We'll break for 15 minutes.

3 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Thank you. The
4 proceedings are on break and will resume in 15 minutes.

5 --- Upon breaking at 10:57 a.m.

6 --- Upon resuming at 11:15 a.m.

7 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Welcome back. The
8 proceedings are again in session.

9 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you. Ms. Young?

10 Thank you. Chief Superintendent, you can have a seat.

11 Ms. Young?

12 **--- SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL, Resumed:**

13 **--- EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MS. RACHEL YOUNG, (Continued):**

14 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Good morning again, Chief
15 Superintendent Leather *[sic]*. I'm going to take you to a couple of examples where it
16 appears that information during the mass casualty events was not passed on in real
17 time. I realize you weren't there, and as explained, the goal here is to help us break
18 down how the information should be passed on during a Critical Incident, so that
19 everyone can be best placed to manage the information next time, if there is a next
20 time, unfortunately. And so one example is the information about the blueberry field
21 road, that there may have been an alternate exit out of Portapique. On April 18th,
22 eyewitness Kate MacDonald spoke with Constable Colford about another potential exit
23 out of Portapique while they were waiting for an ambulance just outside of Portapique.
24 The Commission has heard that at 10:48:21 p.m. on April 18th, 2020, Constable Colford
25 broadcast the following information over the Colchester radio.

26 Madam Registrar, if we could bring up COMM 0003806, that's
27 Exhibit 54, at lines 423 to 25.

28 Constable Colford says,

1 "Mill Brook, if you guys want to have a look at the map
2 we're being told there's a road, [some] kind of a road
3 that someone could come out, before here. Ah, if
4 they know the roads well."

5 What the Commission has not heard is any evidence of an
6 acknowledgement over the air of Constable Colford's comments about an alternate exit.
7 My question to you is, who is responsible for monitoring the radio at this time?

8 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I would say, from my
9 experience as a police officer, if I was responding to any kind of event, it's every
10 member's responsibility to be listening to radio transmissions, because there might be
11 something that's said that is quite important to hear. But also in my experience as a
12 police officer, sometimes, particularly if you're responding to a Critical Incident or an
13 unfolding incident, you can end up with tunnel vision, or you might hear -- not hear the
14 things that you are hoping to hear, depending on what's going on around you.

15 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Is there a better way to relay information
16 such as this to ensure that it's heard?

17 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I think the better way would
18 be an acknowledgement. For example, if I was broadcasting something that I felt was
19 important, I would rebroadcast -- and I'm not saying this to be critical of Constable
20 Colford or anyone, but you might want to rebroadcast waiting for an acknowledgement if
21 you believed it was important information.

22 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And I suppose if the listener repeated
23 back, for example, they could say, you know, copy alternate exit or something like that?

24 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yeah, exactly. I mean, you know,
25 radio time is limited in terms of responding to any evolving or critical situation so you're
26 trying not to tie up the radio channels if someone has something very important to say.

27 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And of course, this particular piece of
28 information was very important because, as we know, for hours the response was

1 based on a more typical type of scenario thinking that the perpetrator was contained in
2 Portapique; right?

3 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** In my conversations with the
4 Critical Incident Commanders and others that had attended the scene, there was a
5 belief that the offender was still in the area.

6 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And so potential sources of information
7 were Kate MacDonald, Andrew MacDonald and there was also a driver of the car, a Mr.
8 Faulkner, who saw the perpetrator in his vehicle and survived, and had some interaction
9 with the general duty members on scene very early on, so should it have been a priority
10 to get information from these witnesses as soon as possible related to the risk manager
11 and/or the Critical Incident Commander?

12 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** So my answer to that question
13 would be absolutely. I mean, if you have an opportunity to gain as much information
14 from an individual that was witness to an event or was a victim, certainly you wouldn't
15 want that.

16 To provide a little more context, in the conversations I've had or the
17 -- you know, I certainly didn't know of this information prior to and I've learned of this
18 information since that time. But in terms of the individual that was following the
19 MacDonalds out of Portapique, I -- you know, I try to put myself in the situation those
20 members found themselves in, a number of them rushing in as an IARD team, and then
21 Constable Colford and one other member at that time dealing with the MacDonalds and
22 their focus being making sure that the -- that Mr. MacDonald was going to be given
23 some emergency medical assistance and transported to hospital as well as that other
24 witness that was leaving the area.

25 I would imagine if I'm trying to put myself in the shoes of those
26 members that were there particularly, they're just trying to move these people out of
27 there. If they've confirmed that it's not the offender, if they believe there's an active
28 threat in the area, they want to get them out of that area. But ideally, you would want to

1 be able to make sure that you could come back to them, interview them as quickly as
2 you can ---

3 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Right.

4 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** --- so that you can get that
5 important information.

6 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Because they did tell him to call back and
7 say he was a witness, but the RCMP never actually interviewed him. The Commission
8 interviewed him.

9 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I'm not aware of the fact that he'd
10 called back. I -- but if he had called back, that should have been passed on to the
11 investigative team.

12 Now, if he'd called back that evening, I would imagine that there
13 were a number of calls, so I know the Operational Communications Centre was
14 inundated with calls. It's not an excuse, it's a reality.

15 However, they should have followed up, tasked that and then sent
16 that to an investigator to actually have a conversation with that individual.

17 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And you'd agree with me that it would
18 have been preferable for Mr. MacDonald to be interviewed prior to 5:00 in the morning
19 on April 19th when he was interviewed.

20 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes. But again, once -- once
21 again, to provide some context, I've been in the situation myself many times when an
22 individual has been injured and they're receiving medical treatment. I've been
23 successful in actually taking a statement from them while they were in the middle of the
24 medical treatment and then there are other times when I've been kicked out of an
25 emergency room or an operating room trying to get critical information.

26 So I don't know what transpired there or what that environment
27 looked like, so I really can't speak to what may have led up to that delay till 5 o'clock in
28 the morning.

1 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Another piece of information that's worth
2 tracing is the information about the replica cruiser. And the Commissioners have
3 already seen the Foundational Document detailing that.

4 What I want to ask you about is just looking at how this information
5 was gathered and shared among the police.

6 Madam Registrar, if we could please see the Foundational
7 Document "Confirmation of Replica RCMP Cruiser". It's already an exhibit, P-001036,
8 beginning at paragraph 20 on page 19 of the PDF counter, page 18 of the document.

9 And so this is what the Commission has learned so far. So at
10 paragraph 20 it says:

11 "At 10:01 p.m. on April 18, 2020, Jamie Blair called 911 to report
12 that her neighbour was at her home and had shot her husband.

13 She stated that there was a police car in her driveway:..."

14 And so this is a quote from the transcript of the 9-1-1 call:

15 "[Jamie] BLAIR: there's a police car in the fucking driveway

16 ..."

17 [Jamie] BLAIR: There's a police car... but he drives, he's a
18 dentist and drives like a

19 ..."

20 [Jamie] BLAIR: There is an RCMP... it's decked and labelled
21 RCMP [inaudible] but it's not a police officer."

22 Paragraph 21:

23 "The RCMP Operational Communications Centre is a Public Safety
24 Answering Point (PSAP)..."

25 And we see here the information being relayed.

26 The operator initially stated that there was a 9-1-1 call about a
27 shooting in Portapique, to which Constable Beselt responded, "Bravo-06."

28 The operator then said:

1 "...it says here 911, husband shot and lying on the deck, SOC
2 Grabriel [sic], but it says (inaudible) [com said] there was an RCMP
3 car in the yard – ..."

4 Constable Merchant responded, "Copy."

5 And then at paragraph 33, which is at page 23 and 24 of the PDF
6 counter, in the 9-1-1 call from Kate and Andrew MacDonald at 10:25 p.m., Kate
7 MacDonald said, "Oh my god that's not a cop, that was posing a cop."

8 And we did talk about this in your interview. The first interview that
9 was exhibited this morning dated June 28th, 2002 is COMM0059847. And we did
10 discuss the flow of information in respect to the replica cruise. You recall that.

11 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

12 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And so I just want to circle back to some
13 of that with you and check your perspective on that.

14 So on page -- I believe it's page 65 of the June 28th interview, we
15 were talking about the cruiser and the fact that there were early reports that a police car
16 was involved. You said:

17 "Again, a police car, what does that mean? And for me, what does
18 that mean? I could drive down the road and I can pick out what I
19 think is a police car."

20 And then page 67, you said:

21 "And I can also empathize with anyone else that was trying to
22 interpret what a police car meant to them and justifiably or
23 reasonably what that could have been. What is reasonable, what is
24 realistic that we're looking for a fully-marked police car, and what's
25 the most likely scenario is that it's either a vehicle that looks like
26 something like -- that looks something like it, but to the degree in
27 which the perpetrator created a fully -- full replica police car, that's
28 not very normal. That's not what normally we would ever

1 encounter. Should we be open to those possibilities? Absolutely,
2 absolutely. But how realistic is that possibility? Much less realistic
3 than a subdued marked vehicle -- looking marked vehicle or a
4 ghost car looking vehicle because people call those police cars.”

5 So my question to you is, based on the quote from Jamie Blair in
6 the Foundational Document, would you say -- would you still say it's not clear that the
7 vehicle appeared to be an RCMP vehicle and not a ghost car or a decommissioned
8 vehicle?

9 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, you're asking me to interpret
10 how the call-taker ---

11 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** No.

12 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** --- received that information.

13 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Just you looking at what we just saw a
14 direct quote from what Jamie Blair said, that it's a decked car labelled RCMP.

15 She didn't say a white Taurus or a decommissioned vehicle, so you
16 know, would you agree, looking at that, if you had received that information, would you
17 have understood that we're looking at a replica RCMP vehicle?

18 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No, I wouldn't.

19 And with all due respect to Mrs. Blair, she was encountering the
20 most evil that she could ever encounter and her ability to communicate, obviously, she
21 was trying to do that desperately with the 9-1-1 operator, but what I didn't hear in that is
22 she says, "It is an exact police car".

23 So for me, personally, if someone says it's a police car -- and I'll
24 give you an example. My new posting in Fredericton, my route to work I take every
25 morning goes near a -- it must be a provincial facility that has fleet vehicles, and there
26 are a number of Ford Tauruses that are lined up along the roadway, and they have
27 push bumpers on the front, they have cages in the back, there's an emblem on the side
28 of it. And to me it's a -- it looks like a police car.

1 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** But she said RCMP, so how do you
2 explain the specific reference to RCMP and saying it's decked, and there's a symbol on
3 the side? These are -- this is all information that was provided by the eyewitnesses.

4 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yeah. Well, I mean, it could have
5 RCMP written on the side of it, it could have some decals, but you know, if I was to hear
6 "It is exactly like your cars", and again, with all due respect to Ms. Blair, getting that
7 information out is difficult, it would have been very difficult. And the questioning by the -
8 - by the 9-1-1 operator wasn't specific. They didn't drill down into that, because clearly
9 they didn't have time to start drilling down into that specific piece of information because
10 she was essentially faced with the threat right in front of her.

11 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** But she was able to identify him by first
12 name and profession, that he was not a police officer, and that he had a large gun.

13 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yeah. There was a -- there was a
14 level of, if I was the complaint-taker, or the 9-1-1 operator, a level of urgency and
15 confusion. You know, is -- identifies him by his first name, he's not a police officer, he's
16 a dentist. He drives a police car, it's an RCMP, it's decked and labelled, all those
17 things are coming out in that. But you know, in fairness to the OCC operator or the
18 9-1-1 operator, what does that really mean to them? And it all builds -- is based on the
19 individual and how they perceive that information and they interpret it and how they
20 communicate that.

21 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Well, I mean, that's part of the problem
22 we're here to solve. I don't know what the level of confusion is that you're referring to
23 because Ms. Blair did clearly convey those facts. And so, you know, what we need to
24 look at now is when facts like that are conveyed how do we make sure that confusion is
25 not introduced by someone, like a call-taker, or a subsequent hearer of the information?

26 Do you know what colour decommissioned vehicles in Nova Scotia
27 are? Are they white?

28 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, that would depend upon the

1 type of vehicle that it is. There is a number of police forces across the country. Most of
2 them have your standard commercial white vehicle and they apply their decal packages
3 to them, and once they remove them, they can look like a -- and I think in my statement
4 I spoke of a ghost car. We have subdued marking vehicles, and then we have other
5 marked vehicles that are white that are unmarked. We also have other vehicles,
6 Tauruses, for example, that are different colours, black, et cetera.

7 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And -- so this is the very first 9-1-1 call.
8 So would you agree that from those first moments, earliest moments of the mass
9 casualty witness told the OCC and the RCMP that there was a replica cruiser out there?

10 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Not a replica cruiser, no. I wouldn't
11 agree with that. But the -- they had mentioned ---

12 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** They did use those words.

13 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** --- that there was a police car, and
14 it was decked and labelled RCMP. That's ---

15 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And it was not a police officer.

16 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** And it was not a police officer.

17 That one I agree with, but to characterise it as a replica police car, there is no
18 information in there to suggest that it was a replica police car.

19 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Well, there is something that looked like a
20 police car with someone who is not a police officer.

21 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Sorry, I didn't hear your question
22 because there was someone else that spoke.

23 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** There was information that there was a
24 vehicle that looked like an RCMP car that was not driven by a police officer ---

25 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

26 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** --- from the very beginning.

27 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

28 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Okay. And so do you see the failure to

1 pass on the details about the vehicle as a significant breakdown in the gathering and
2 sharing of information?

3 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** An assessment of the possibilities
4 should have been communicated more directly; however, from what I've been -- I
5 understand from the conversations I've had with those that were exploring the
6 possibilities, one of the first things that I was told they did was start trying to determine
7 whether or not we were missing any of our police cars. So there would have been a
8 recognition of the fact that could this be possible? So if it is, what's the most likely
9 scenario? It would be one of our cars that someone has gained access to.

10 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And the fact that that search was
11 happening shows that there was an understanding that it really looked like a police car
12 and it wasn't just a white Ford Taurus, for example?

13 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** It would have been one of the --
14 one of the possibilities that we were certainly exploring. And again, I wasn't there and I
15 wasn't part of that decision-making, but you're asking me to comment on how other
16 people perceived things and how they communicated those things. So I'm trying to
17 place myself in those individuals' positions at that time.

18 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** I'm not asking you to say what someone
19 else thought, I'm just asking you to assist the Commissioners in analysing what
20 happened based on what we now know happened and tracing that information a bit.
21 And you have indicated that you did make some efforts to go back and speak to those
22 involved. And have you assessed why this information was not better investigated and
23 shared?

24 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Have I assessed whether the --
25 why they did not share?

26 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Why the information wasn't better
27 investigated and shared? So investigated, meaning following up on speaking to
28 eyewitnesses promptly; shared, meaning relaying the information without introducing

1 confusion by the hearer, et cetera.

2 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, at that time, it was an
3 unfolding critical incident, and you know, the ability for people to follow up on things, the
4 priority was trying to stop whatever threat existed at that location.

5 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** But my question is whether you have
6 assessed what happened and -- because this is going to be the case always with a
7 critical incident. There always going to be a large influx of information, there's always
8 going to be good, hardworking, well-intentioned people trying to ---

9 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Sorry, Ms. Young, I hate to
10 interrupt.

11 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Yeah.

12 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Ms. MacPhee?

13 **MS. PATRICIA MacPHEE:** (Off mic)

14 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** We've already been -- oh, sorry. Did you
15 want to repeat that?

16 **MS. PATRICIA MacPHEE:** Thank you. I was going to suggest if
17 Ms. Young is going to talk about the steps that were taken or not taken with respect to
18 investigating the police car, then perhaps she should outline these to the witness.

19 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Perhaps she should what?

20 **MS. PATRICIA MacPHEE:** Outline them to the witness.

21 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** The witness seems to be
22 following along. But Ms. Young?

23 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Yes, it's what I've already spoken about,
24 so for example, not following up more quickly with Mr. MacDonald and Mr. Faulkner and
25 so on. That's what I was referring to. What we've already discussed.

26 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Okay. Thank you.

27 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** So as part of your debrief, was that
28 something you were looking at? So I'm asking about your own assessment of these

1 things.

2 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yeah. So the aspects in and
3 around the police car were really quite important to me and how that was communicated
4 and how that was understood. And as part of that debriefing, I was trying to understand
5 what it is we knew, and when we knew it, and how we -- how we, and I'm talking about
6 those that were responding at the time, interpreted that information. And through the
7 course of that conversation, what was imparted to me was is that they had this
8 information, they -- they looked at multiple possibilities of what it -- they thought it could
9 possibly be, everything from a decommissioned vehicle that might have had remnants
10 of markings on it, to one of our vehicles that had been stolen, or an officer had been,
11 you know, their vehicle had been commandeered, all those things were taking place,
12 and they were eliminating the fact that it wasn't one of our vehicles, that no one had
13 been reported injured or their vehicle stolen. Those things I was told were happening in
14 the background, and they were eliminating those possibilities.

15 What I think happened, which is I think an element of human
16 nature, and perhaps biases that are created through our own experiences, is that the
17 realistic possibility of someone creating a replica police car was probably lost on
18 individuals.

19 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And possibly hard to believe or hard to
20 accept.

21 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, the likelihood of someone
22 who had created that to a degree in which the perpetrator did, I would say, and again, I
23 don't want to speak for others, but my sense is, is that that was a factor that contributed
24 to that miscommunication.

25 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And the Commissioners have heard
26 roundtable discussions about critical incident decision-making, and so on. So I
27 appreciate we're not, you know, calling you as an expert witness in this regard but
28 looking for your insights.

1 As far as Andrew MacDonald not being interviewed until the
2 morning, you were speculating that perhaps, you know, it was to do with the medical
3 care he was receiving. But did you actually look into why he wasn't interviewed sooner
4 at all? Did you look into that after the fact? Did you ask anyone why no one got to him
5 until five in the morning, or whether they tried to talk to him at the hospital?

6 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No, I didn't get involved,
7 personally, in terms of the delay and speaking with Mr. MacDonald. I can say that I was
8 very aware that every resource was fully tasked through the course of the response and
9 then following it, but I didn't do any specific follow up myself to determine that. No.

10 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Do you have any thoughts on how this can
11 improved in future?

12 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well I have many thoughts. And
13 are we talking specifically about communications?

14 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Specifically about how best to receive and
15 pass one information during critical incidents.

16 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** So we're speaking specifically
17 about communications.

18 I do. Communications are important on every level, every aspect of
19 life. If you have a breakdown of communication, usually it will lead to challenges. It
20 doesn't matter whether its your marriage, or you're responding to a critical incident, or
21 you are investigating a crime. If you have a breakdown in communication, it will lead to
22 problems. Period.

23 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** But you said about human nature, that's
24 always going to be there, it's always going to be humans investigating.

25 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

26 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Is it a training issue or an education issue
27 to help people triage information and relay it accurately?

28 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well I just think that there needs to

1 be a mechanism where, you know, during an unfolding event, there's a lot of information
2 coming at the decision makers. But there needs to be some type of -- and I'm
3 projecting if we were to face, you know, a singular critical incident to a mass casualty
4 type incident, there needs to be someone tasked with reviewing all material, all calls,
5 doing that as quickly as they can to ensure that because, as you mentioned yourself,
6 there are frailties in humans and retaining information, understanding that information,
7 communicating that information. So the more people that you have that are reviewing
8 that information, the less likelihood it is that those human conditions or factors are going
9 to be lessened by greater objectivity by others reviewing it.

10 But that boils down to the number of people that you have available
11 to you and structures and systems that you put in place to be able to ensure that
12 happens.

13 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And so police interpretation of witness
14 information, would you call that a skill? Is it -- when receiving information from
15 witnesses, are members trained to relay it as they received it or to interpret it? Or a bit
16 of both?

17 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well I'd like to think that if you
18 receive information, you try to parrot that information back in its actual words. But I
19 think again back to just human nature. If someone is paraphrasing something, you may
20 paraphrase it incorrectly.

21 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** I'm asking because it does appear that
22 ideas were inserted as information was passed on that were not in the witness
23 statements. I'll just give you an example.

24 Madam Registrar, if we could pull up the Replica Cruiser
25 Foundational Document, which is already Exhibit P0011036 at paragraph 22, which is
26 page 20 of the PDF counter?

27 "S/Sgt. [...] Rehill told the Mass Casualty Commission
28 that OCC operators had personal knowledge of the

1 perpetrator and introduced the idea that they would be
2 looking for a decommissioned police car...”

3 Because they were aware that the perpetrator collected them.

4 S/Sgt Rehill said that after receiving this information:

5 “...everybody said, ‘Okay, that’s what we’re looking for,
6 one of these white, Ford Tauruses.’”

7 It appears that the information the perpetrator was driving a decked
8 RCMP car or that it was someone posing as a cop who was not a cop that was provided
9 by witnesses wasn’t passed on as what the RCMP should be looking for.

10 So would you agree that repeating second-hand information
11 provided by someone at the OCC, rather than statements from eye-witnesses was an
12 error?

13 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I would say that it was an
14 interpretation made by individuals that led to a belief. And you can call that an error in
15 their assessment of it, and that led to a belief that, you know, -- and it wasn’t just solely
16 based on, I think, assessing it on no information. You know, they, as I said before, were
17 looking at accounting for all of our police cars, and as they were building up an
18 understanding of what the perpetrator had access to or what vehicles he did have, that
19 the likelihood of it, you know, being a decommissioned police car with some level of,
20 you know, residual markings on it was more probable. And then they made that
21 judgement or that assumption and that became the reality, which was unfortunate.

22 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** So did that overlay of their interpretation
23 further the investigation in this case?

24 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Sorry?

25 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Did it further the investigation or hamper it
26 in this case?

27 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well I mean any deviation from the
28 reality is not helpful. If they had known that we were looking for -- if they had made that

1 assessment and communicated, "Everyone, we are looking for a marked police car,
2 whether it's real or not, we don't know, certainly that would have made a difference."

3 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** That would have been more accurate, we
4 now know; right? Or based on the first call. If that had gotten across?

5 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** It would, because it would have --
6 for example, without understanding that, any responding officer could have seen a
7 police vehicle in the area and just thought they were another responding police vehicle,
8 and we could have missed an opportunity for engaging the individual.

9 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And so this insertion of assumptions, or
10 interpretations, or let's call it a bias towards what is most probable, is that part of the
11 usual protocol for receiving and analyzing witness information?

12 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I just think it's a by-product of
13 human nature. I mean, we all have our biases and we all have biases based on our
14 personal or past experiences. And, you know, in 32 years of policing, I've never -- I
15 myself have never encountered someone who had created a replica police car. So
16 reason why I say that is that, you know, I myself could have been in that situation and
17 my biases may have taken over and led me to believe that that was not a realistic
18 possibility.

19 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Madam Registrar, if we could see the
20 same Foundational Document, Exhibit 1036, at page 21 or 22 of the PDF counter,
21 paragraph 26?

22 "[On his way] to the scene in Portapique, Cst. Beselt
23 called Sgt. [...] O'Brien [...] they discussed 'the possibility
24 that the Police Car was a retired unit bought at auction
25 with the decals having left a silhouette on the paint.'"

26 And so again this is a discussion of their assumptions or their
27 interpretation. Would you agree that it would have been preferable for the members to
28 be working with the words used by the witnesses, rather than their own speculation?

1 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I think it would have been helpful if
2 the individuals who are responding in real time did have access to the actual quotes of
3 what the witness or the caller was saying.

4 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And would they have had access through
5 the CAD system in their cars for example? Or would it just -- was it the call taker had to
6 put that into the system for that to be visible?

7 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** It would depend upon how the CAD
8 was updated. And again, those calls are happening real time. Yes, they're recorded.
9 They can go back and listen to them. I'm not sure whether or not they had inputted
10 verbatim what was said on the line. I don't know that.

11 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Madam Registrar, could we go to
12 paragraph 52 of the same Foundational Document, page 31 and 32 of the PDF
13 counter?

14 This is from the transcript of Jennifer MacCallum was the OCC
15 dispatch supervisor speaking with Cpl Sutton. And she's relaying what Jamie Blair said,
16 but then there's doubts. So Ms. MacCallum says:

17 "Possibly, there was possibly a car associated that we
18 know that it's white, and [that] the original caller and kids
19 were all saying that it was a police car but all the cars are
20 accounted for."

21 And then Sutton says:

22 "Okay that's why I was confused there. You said
23 something about a police car..."

24 And Ms. MacCallum says:

25 "Yeah. So that's still standing but we can't still get to the
26 bottom of that."

27 And Sutton says:

28 "Okay."

1 So they have the facts, but they're struggling with them, it seems.

2 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well I think it's very clear that
3 they're struggling with it. Again, back to my comments that I made about what are the
4 realistic prospects of someone creating a replica police car? They're struggling with
5 that.

6 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** So in your view, could training help to
7 clarify what's to be done with incoming information or filter out later speculation?

8 I mean, maybe just something as simple as telling people to expect
9 the unexpected, you know, because what if a perpetrator deliberately wore something
10 outlandish or did something very unusual to create confusion, for example. So my
11 question is, you know, working with human nature, wanting information to be conveyed
12 accurately, is that something that -- how can we work on that? Is that a -- overcomable
13 by training, for example?

14 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I think that the simplest
15 answer to that question is, is that if there is a direct quote that people are challenged by,
16 make sure that you share that direct quote with all of those. I can guarantee you that if I
17 was part of that response, and I'm just saying this because I'm not a Critical Incident
18 Commander, but if I was in the room supporting the Critical Incident Commander, and if
19 I was seeing that direct quote, I'm pretty convinced that there would have been a debate
20 in and around what does that mean, what could the possibilities ---

21 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Right.

22 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** --- realistically or not, be with
23 respect to what it is that's being said.

24 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And so would you agree that the
25 assumptions made compromise the ability of the members to understand the
26 information they were being given by the witnesses about the police replica cruiser?

27 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, the assessment that those on
28 the ground made would ultimately have an impact on going forward or what

1 considerations that the Critical Incident Commander would have made.

2 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** I mean, would you agree for Counsel it's
3 preferable to do what was recounted and say what the direct quote is and then say
4 we're not sure what it means as opposed to only passing on what the assumption is,
5 like, we're looking for a decommissioned vehicle.

6 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, absolutely. It's -- you know,
7 I've said this before to others, it's like that game you played in elementary school. You
8 form a circle, and someone whispers in one person's ear, and by the time it gets back to
9 you, it's different. So if you just blurted out what the direct quote was, everyone in the
10 room is going to be able to hear it.

11 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And you as a senior officer being briefed
12 by the CIC, would you have preferred to have that direct quote and that information that
13 it's a decked RCMP car as early as possible?

14 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I would, yes.

15 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** I'm going to move on to a different area.
16 I'm going to ask you about some of the press conferences that you took part in and the
17 public communications that bore your name connected to the mass casualty events.

18 Before we get into specifics, just generally speaking, when you do
19 speak to the media and the public, what is your approach, what is your understanding of
20 your obligation to inform the public about ongoing investigations?

21 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, it would be two things. I
22 mean, there's one element of the, one, the victims and the families, what they need to
23 know, and then there's the public in terms of what the public wants to know, and then
24 there's the element of being able to protect any ongoing investigation. You don't want
25 to taint witnesses. You don't want to disadvantage the investigation by releasing
26 information that might cause someone to destroy evidence, et cetera, things like that.
27 So you're trying to find that balance between saying as much as you can say without
28 negatively impacting your ongoing investigation.

1 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** In your witness interview, I did ask you
2 about RCMP policies to do with statements to the public, and you indicated you weren't
3 familiar with the policies. So where do you get your source and guidance for, you know,
4 what you're supposed to do when you're in front of the microphones?

5 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** So every RCMP division would
6 have a Strategic Communications Unit, and their job or their speciality would be to
7 support and assist any person, doesn't matter what level of rank they are in the
8 organization, if they're going to be speaking publicly on an incident, they would help
9 guide the individual that would be providing a public address.

10 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** But they're not telling you what your
11 responsibilities are; are they?

12 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I think that they're fully aware
13 of what the responsibilities are. When you ask me about the policy, I mean, for me to
14 be able to read every single policy in every area that's not really my area, I mean,
15 certainly I would have interest in it, but I'm -- I don't necessarily have the time to be
16 reading policy all day long. I'm involved in operations, so they would help guide an
17 individual because they would have full awareness. They would have input in what
18 those policies look like. So they would help guide the individual in terms of, you know,
19 trying to provide as much information as possible. And, of course, on the policing side,
20 the operational side, it's trying to, as I said before, protect the integrity of the
21 investigation by not disclosing information that might have an adverse or negative effect
22 on the ongoing investigation.

23 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** When you say guiding the individual, do
24 you mean the communications professionals guiding the RCMP officer who is doing the
25 speaking as a spokesperson?

26 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, now in terms of guidance,
27 maybe it might be helpful for me to break down exactly what that guidance might look
28 like. It would include discussions and conversations in and around what can we say,

1 and then they might actually prepare the script based on consultation with the
2 investigative team and the individual that might be doing the press briefing about what it
3 is that can be said. And they may prepare those speaking notes, which would then be
4 reviewed by the individual who's actually going to deliver those speaking notes and then
5 if there's any modifications that need to be made. In this particular case, the National
6 Headquarters Strategic Communications Unit was involved in discussions between
7 strategic communications in Nova Scotia as well, so they were sharing that information,
8 so they had awareness in and around what it is that was going to be said. And then it
9 was finalized and then given to the individual that was going to, you know, provide that
10 press briefing. And then of course, the -- that information would be delivered.

11 They would also do some preparations with the individual that
12 would be speaking to the public based on anticipated questions, things that might not
13 necessarily be covered within the speaking notes, but things that naturally might be
14 asked. And they often will help walk the individual that's doing the press briefing
15 through, okay, you may experience this question, or you may receive this question, how
16 would you answer that.

17 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Did you have any training on media
18 relations or what to say or not say to the public before you started giving press
19 conferences on behalf of the RCMP?

20 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No formal training, no.

21 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Chief Superintendent Leather was the H-
22 Division spokesperson at the earliest press conferences and then you took over on April
23 24th, 2020. Why was that changed?

24 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I think that was changed mainly
25 because of the fact that many of my programs were involved in the -- once the Critical
26 Incident Program was established and going forward, so I was obviously very involved
27 in trying to understand exactly what had happened and what was happening in terms of
28 the investigation. And it just seemed to be more of a natural or more efficient way to be

1 able to take over the press briefings from that point in time.

2 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** I'm going to take you through some of the
3 statements you made in the press conferences and ask you about them.

4 Madam Registrar, could we please have the document that is
5 already an exhibit, it's the appendix to the Public Communications Foundational
6 Document. It's the transcripts of RCMP press briefings, COMM0057762, and it's Exhibit
7 P-003532. And if we could go to page 39 of the PDF counter for the April 24th press
8 conference.

9 So you recall this press conference?

10 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, I do.

11 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Here you refer to the initial complaint as a
12 shooting and not a firearms complaint as it had been described earlier. What was the
13 reason for the change of the way that was referred to?

14 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Can you just point me to the line
15 that ---

16 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Yes.

17 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** --- you're referring to?

18 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** So the -- it's the paragraph starting,

19 "Following this, police received its first 911 call, with a report
20 of a shooting at a home in the area."

21 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** So if you can repeat your question,
22 please?

23 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** My question is at an earlier time, and I
24 believe in the first Tweet, it was referred to as a firearms complaint, and so why was it
25 that here you're referring to it as a -- that the first call was about a shooting and not a
26 firearms, shooting at a home and not a firearms complaint?

27 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, because it's the truth. It was
28 a report of a shooting. My husband's been shot. So for me, that is an accurate

1 depiction of how that call came in.

2 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** If we could go to the next page, please,
3 Madam Registrar, page 40 of the PDF counter.

4 There's a passage where you say that:

5 "...the police began looking at a number of possible
6 suspects as a result of information they were
7 receiving."

8 Madam Registrar, can you just scroll to the top? These paragraphs
9 aren't numbered, so it's hard to find them. And back down to lower in the page, please.
10 Okay, let's go back up, it might be on the previous page. Yeah, it's actually on the
11 previous page. It's here, page 39 of the PDF counter.

12 If you see there's a paragraph starting "Several police units", and at
13 the end there of that paragraph it says:

14 "...the police began looking at a number of possible
15 suspects as a result of information they were
16 receiving."

17 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

18 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** So I just wanted to ask you about that
19 because the first caller, Ms. Blair, who actually knew him, identified the suspect and that
20 it was one suspect, and then I believe it's confirmed by Andrew MacDonald, the first
21 person encountered by the responding officers. So why is there a reference here to
22 looking into a number of possible suspects?

23 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** That's based on the conversations
24 that we had had or I had had, actually, with those that I had spoken to about the critical
25 incident and those responders. So I was aware of the fact that obviously there was the
26 perpetrator that was named by first name, they were trying to chase that down and
27 determine who that individual was. Also, I think it's tied to the fact that there was the
28 information in and around the possibility that there was a police car, or a marked police

1 car that was used.

2 So a number of possible suspects that I was speaking about there
3 was they started to determine, or not determine, to exploring the possibility of whether
4 or not it was actually an RCMP member that was there that we weren't aware of that
5 was involved in some situation, so they were starting to look at that possibility. And
6 then I also saw, through some of the discussions in the Operational Communications
7 Centre, that they were looking at someone in the area that, I believe they called the
8 person a process server, who was operating a decommissioned or unmarked police
9 cars, Tauruses, that lived in -- in and around that area, so they were exploring those as
10 potential possibilities. So that's why I'm talking about a number of possible suspects.

11 The last part is, is that at that point in time, they didn't know where
12 Lisa Banfield was and they didn't know whether or not she was a victim, whether she
13 was involved, there was no idea. So they were exploring as many possibilities as they
14 possibly could in terms of suspects.

15 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Whether she was involved you mean?

16 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** We didn't know that because she
17 was unaccounted for.

18 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Madam Registrar, can we pull up the
19 same document again at page 47 of the counter?

20 And again, here, you're talking about the RCMP doing a work-up of
21 all possible suspects.

22 I don't see it on the part on the screen. Can we scroll down, and
23 now scroll up again? We'll get it, maybe, on the previous page. Yeah, it's on the
24 previous page. So, "a work-up of all possible suspects", it's in the large paragraph,
25 starting with "Well, I'll answer the question".

26 And so you're saying:

27 "...we were doing a work-up of all possible suspects,
28 obviously the gunman came up as one of them."

1 And my question is, you're talking about this in response to the
2 question above, which is about the perpetrator's police vehicles and equipment, and so
3 on that topic, what are you talking about here? What kind of work-up was done with
4 respect to other possible suspects in that context?

5 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** So are we speaking about the
6 National Post question, the one at the top of the page?

7 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Yes, because the reporter is asking:
8 "...I understand...you found two additional...mock
9 police cars that were burning? He had three in total?
10 What other police potential equipment did you find at
11 his home?"

12 That was the question you were answering.

13 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** So that question that I was asked
14 was specific to what equipment. It had nothing -- what you are saying, it has nothing to
15 do with other suspects. So I'm just trying to make sure we're on the right area.

16 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Oh, I see. Okay. So -- so you're saying
17 that "I'll" -- but you say:

18 "...I'll answer the question first in relation to the police
19 vehicles."

20 And then you say:

21 "\"When we were doing a work-up of all possible
22 suspects, obviously the gunman came up as one of
23 them. And we were aware that he did have access to
24 police-looking vehicles.\""

25 And then you carry on from there.

26 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Okay. So what I would say from
27 looking at the response to the question, the reason why I bring up possible suspects,
28 like clearly it would be inappropriate for us to believe that there might just only be one

1 person involved. So when we talk about possible suspects, did someone provide him
2 with something? Did someone help facilitate his access to this equipment? We don't --
3 we didn't know at that point in time where all of this actually had come from. So they
4 would be suspects in terms of not necessarily perpetrating the crimes, but perhaps
5 leading up to them and providing him with the equipment that he acquired in order to be
6 able to carry it out.

7 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Can we have page 47, please,
8 Madam Registrar?

9 You were asked by The Coast about the number of RCMP officers
10 normally in the Portapique area on a Saturday night or a Sunday morning.

11 So if we can look for -- so there's the The Coast. Yeah, so there at
12 the top of the page.

13 And so you said you didn't have those numbers available, and the
14 RCMP doesn't normally disclose them, but that over 25 units responded to the area.

15 My question is did you have concerns about the staffing levels on
16 April 18th and 19th, 2020 in Northeast Nova?

17 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I have concerns over staffing levels
18 all the time, every single day. I didn't know the exact numbers, like, because district
19 policing in Northeast Nova wasn't under my area of responsibility or I had no actual
20 awareness of that in terms of the general duty resources that were out there.

21 But to say it as simply as I possibly can, every single day I always
22 have concerns over the level of resources on our frontlines because I believe,
23 wholeheartedly, that we are considerably understaffed in order to be able to meet the
24 expectations that the public has of us, and our ability to make sure that our responding
25 officers out there are properly supported.

26 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** In your feedback to the draft Structure of
27 Policing report, at COMM0043164, which we made an exhibit this morning, at the
28 bottom of page 11, you set out some comparisons of number of officers per 100,000

1 residents, which looks like you got from Statistics Canada, 2018. And ---

2 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** 2019, I believe.

3 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** It just says Statistics Canada Police
4 Resources in Canada 2018 there in the middle of the page ---

5 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Okay.

6 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** --- which I am assuming is the source
7 you're citing. Does that sound right?

8 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yeah, I, I -- for some reason I seem
9 to think that the last time that Stats Canada actually -- they always do this I think every
10 three years ---

11 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And the numbers there do say 2019.

12 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yeah. So I think that might have
13 been a typing error of my -- me putting in there 2018.

14 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Okay.

15 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I believe they're 2019. And I'm
16 quite familiar, I do look at these quite often because I -- I do believe that this is a very
17 important aspect that needs to be examined and addressed and fully understood by the
18 Commission.

19 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Right. And you cited information that was
20 Halifax Regional Police Service, the 2019 average was 209 officers per 100,000
21 residents; the Truro Police 2019 average was 286 officers per 100,000 residents; and
22 the Colchester County RCMP 2019 average was 76 officers per 100,000 residents. So
23 regardless of the size of the community the ratio is the ratio. Can you explain why the
24 number is so much lower for the RCMP there?

25 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I can't specifically explain the
26 reasons why the numbers are so lower. I mean, certainly our resource levels are based
27 on the contracts and what communities are willing to pay and support in terms of their
28 police resourcing models. But it's not just about officers per population. What is

1 critically important for people to understand, particularly in a rural environment, is it's
2 even more so about the number of officers per square kilometre that they have to cover.

3 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Because that will affect response times?

4 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** It will have a negative impact or a
5 potential negative impact on our response times to calls to be able to deliver emergency
6 services, as well as the safety of our officers in terms of their backup.

7 So when you're already running, like, in that document that I put
8 together, there are -- Stats Canada will look at -- and I need to make sure that this is
9 fully understood and it is clear. Stats Canada will look at police forces that have
10 populations of 250 or greater. So those will be available publicly on Stats Canada's
11 website.

12 The Canadian national average of police officers per 100,000 is
13 180 officers per 100,000. That's across all police forces in Canada. So we can call that
14 1.8 per 1,000 people. Maybe that makes it a little bit easier for Nova Scotia, because
15 we have a population, I think, that just tipped the scale of one million people.

16 Nova Scotia averages 192. These are 2019 numbers. These are
17 Stats Canada numbers. It's 192 officers per 100,000 people, or 1.92. So someone
18 would say to themselves, well, that's not bad. That's better than the national average.
19 But the reality is that you have to look at breaking that down.

20 The municipal policing average, when you break the numbers down
21 based on the population that you serve versus the number of members that you have
22 on strength, is that the average should work out to 253 officers per 100,000 people on
23 the municipal side, or 123 officers for RCMP members per 100,000 people. But we are
24 largely policing rural areas, which means that we are policing municipal areas with half
25 the resources that our municipal counterparts do, who have a much more confined
26 geographic area of responsibility. Therefore it affects response times, therefore it
27 affects public safety, therefore it affects officer safety as well.

28 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And how are those numbers arrived at? Is

1 it from the PPSA? The Provincial Policing Contract? Is it also the model used by the
2 RCMP? The GD -- is it GDRM?

3 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** So it's a number of factors. There
4 are two different types of contracts and they're reflected in the McKnight report. One is
5 what's called a PPSA or Provincial Police Service Agreement. That's between the
6 department -- the Province of Nova Scotia and the Federal Government of Canada.
7 And then you have what's called MPSA, or Municipal Police Service Agreements. And
8 they're usually with a municipality and the Province of Nova Scotia directly through to
9 the Public Safety Canada. So those are the two mechanisms.

10 And often, the RCMP, through their multi-year financial planning
11 process, will identify how many resources we believe that we actually need to be able to
12 do the job, or increase establishment, or increase resources to be able to deal with
13 things like population increases, complexities, geography covered. We'll make those
14 requests to responsible levels of government for resources and we're either approved
15 for it or we're denied.

16 They also have what's called a GDPRM. Again, sorry for the
17 acronyms. General Duty Police Resourcing Model. There's another model that's
18 employed for Forensic Identification Specialists based on case load, population,
19 distance that they have to cover. I think that there's a lot of work that needs to be done
20 in that area.

21 And the other factors as well, when it comes to policing resource, if
22 we're not resourced well enough to be able to deliver the expected services and keep
23 everyone safe, ---

24 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And it does sound like you're moving into
25 a bigger picture question.

26 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Okay.

27 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** I will give you a chance at the end to
28 address bigger picture questions. I don't want to go too far afield because we were

1 talking about the press conference, although it was helpful to elaborate on what you
2 were saying there about numbers of officers.

3 But if we could just go back to the ---

4 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Sure.

5 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** --- April 24th press conference for the
6 moment.

7 If we could see page 48, Madam Registrar?

8 You were asked, with the benefit of hindsight, whether it was a
9 mistake not to have issued an EMO message. So in other words, an alert. And in your
10 answer, you said that a full review was done after every critical incident and that a
11 review would take place.

12 But my understanding from what you're saying today is that that
13 has not happened. Is that right?

14 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** A formalized independent review
15 has not happened. And as I -- as I testified to earlier, that is exactly what I wanted.

16 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And do you understand why not? Why it
17 hasn't happened?

18 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well I explained in my testimony
19 earlier that as I understood the response that I received, is that people above me felt
20 that the Mass Casualty Commission was going to be looking at the response. But I saw
21 it differently.

22 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Whose decision was it to say no?

23 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I don't know whose decision
24 ultimately it was to say no, and I don't think that, globally speaking, there were -- there
25 was a lot of support. Like, for the conversations that I had very specifically with Supt
26 Phil Lue, C/Supt Jamie Solesme, they agreed. And they were working on trying to
27 make that happen for me. But ultimately, whose decision it was at the end, I'm not
28 aware of whose decision that was.

1 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** So that wasn't communicated to you?

2 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Not directly, no.

3 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** You also said in the same answer that to
4 the reporter that:

5 “You have to appreciate that they believed that they had that
6 area contained.”

7 That's kind of in the upper third of that large paragraph there.

8 Is it -- are there a connection between those two things? Is it your
9 understanding that an alert was not issued because they thought the perpetrator was
10 contained?

11 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yeah, I do. I do believe that. And
12 the reason why I take that position is, for example, if -- well, I get all unfolding event
13 notifications now in my new job as Criminal Operations in New Brunswick. And when I
14 was traveling here yesterday, there was an unfolding critical incident in Moncton. And
15 as part of the unfolding event notifications, there will always now be a line about
16 whether or not an emergency alert was appropriate. In this particular case, the subject
17 was contained in the residence, they had evacuated that particular area. They felt that
18 a public alert was not necessary because they had confirmed that the individual that
19 they were looking for was contained within the residence, because they had
20 communications.

21 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** In this case, and we did talk about the
22 timing in your witness interview, and I think we agreed it looked like by around just
23 before 8:00 a.m. on the 19th, it appeared there was an awareness that the suspect was
24 not contained or that the investigators were beginning to realize that. Do you have any
25 insight as to why an alert wasn't issued at that stage?

26 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well my assessment or my sense
27 of why an alert -- like, you're speaking specifically about the Alert Ready system?

28 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Yes.

1 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I know there's been much
2 discussion in and around that through the course of these proceedings. And I would
3 say that the reason why that wasn't considered at that time, certainly my belief is the
4 Critical Incident Commander is the person responsible for understanding all the
5 information and making the decisions with respect to public alerting. And at that point in
6 time, it was described to me by others is that wasn't a tool that we were aware of that
7 we had in our tool box. So that, obviously, I believe, was a contributing factor as to why
8 the Alert Ready system was not used, because it wasn't in the front of the minds of the
9 individuals who would have been responsible for determining whether an alert was most
10 appropriate.

11 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Madam Registrar, can I see page 50?
12 This is my last question about this press conference.

13 You say that you're:
14 "...conducting a systematic investigation into all of those theories."

15 And this is about the perpetrator's motives.

16 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

17 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And can you tell us what those theories
18 were that you're referring to?

19 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well always there's going to be an
20 element in terms of a mass casualty incident like this. There has to be consideration as
21 to whether or not it's a national security incident, whether or not it's motivated by, you
22 know, extremism, hate, or whatever the case might be.

23 So those would be -- many of those inquiries.

24 So there was National Security from Ottawa that was engaged in
25 assessing the motivations of the individual.

26 So those were all parts of us trying to understand whether or not
27 this incident was connected to any specific thing. And if it was determined to be a
28 National Security incident, then it actually would have been National Security Federal

1 Policing that would have conducted the investigation.

2 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And this is on April 24th, 2020, so when
3 you say they're systematically investigating, that's what you mean, is enlisting national
4 resources?

5 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well there were national resources,
6 including others from Ottawa in terms of trying to understand the motivations of the gun
7 and the whys, like, why has this happened. Is it connected to anything that we don't
8 know anything about?

9 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Is there anything else as to how you were
10 systematically investigating each of these theories about the motives?

11 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, when I speak about
12 systematic investigation, in terms of major case investigations, they are very structured.
13 There is a command structure that's in place. There is a coordinated investigative team.
14 There are individuals that are tasked solely with coordinating all taskings within that
15 investigation. So if there are theories that present themselves, then we would need to
16 be able to create certain taskings to either disprove those theories or support those
17 theories. So that would all be happening through the structure that's applied in a major
18 case investigation, and that's what's systematic about it.

19 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Now I'm going to turn to the April 28th,
20 2020 press conference, which is in the same document, starting at page 52. You began
21 this press conference by noting that it was a National Day of Mourning for those who
22 lost their lives on the job, and you refer to Constable Stevenson and Constable
23 Morrison. You also refer to the families of the 22 innocent people who were killed. And
24 why did you not name them?

25 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I didn't name each and every
26 one of the victims. There were sadly so many of them. I wanted to make sure that I
27 recognized and acknowledged them in that way, or at least, at the very least in that way,
28 but I didn't name each and every one of the individuals, no.

1 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Onto the next page. You state that the
2 RCMP had.

3 "...a duty to complete this investigation by the same
4 standards that we would have if [the perpetrator] was
5 standing trial."

6 Why is that?

7 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I think that there often will be
8 this perception that, you know, some may say, well, clearly, it's obvious that this
9 individual did these things. Well, that's not good enough. We had to employ every
10 technique in terms of trace evidence recovery, to be able to individualize the
11 perpetrator's involvement in each and every one of those homicides. So there wasn't
12 going to be any difference in terms of the level or the extent of follow-up that we would
13 have completed in order to be able to determine his involvement in each of those
14 murders.

15 Secondly, as part of the objectives, it wasn't just about the
16 perpetrator and understanding or being able to definitively say that there is evidence
17 that associates him to every one of those crimes, is that our secondary objective was to
18 be able to investigate whether or not anybody had supported or assisted him in any
19 way.

20 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Are there any plans to make the results of
21 this investigation public?

22 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, absolutely. I think that the
23 reality is, is that in a case like this, there has been not just local but national and
24 international media attention on it. There are endless examples of learning lessons that
25 can come from examining things like this. Once the investigation is fully complete, there
26 should be really no reason why, aside from disclosing information that would normally
27 be protected under privacy for individuals, why the entire investigation would be open to
28 ATIP or other means for people to be able to gain access to that.

1 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Is the investigation not complete now?

2 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, the investigation in terms of
3 Gabriel Wortman's involvement, I would say, is complete, and being able to determine
4 which -- what evidence exists that support his involvement in all of the murders. In
5 terms of those that assisted him, I would say, for me personally, I'm not satisfied that we
6 have been able to conclude what I believe the expectations of survivors and victim
7 families would expect, and personally, me as a police officer and an investigator, what I
8 would wish to accomplish in terms of the provision of the firearms. That is the
9 outstanding element for me.

10 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** So how he obtained the firearms you're
11 referring to?

12 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** How he obtained the firearms and
13 how he brought those firearms into the country.

14 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** But to the extent that those suspects might
15 be in the United States, the RCMP has no control over -- as far as you're aware, those
16 American investigations are closed; correct?

17 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

18 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Okay. And there were some people
19 charged in Canada. Those court processes are almost finished, so there's no active
20 investigation here; right?

21 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, in terms of active -- any
22 investigation, if it's not concluded to the satisfaction of those involved or, you know,
23 those that have a vested interest in it, it's always open -- it's always available for being
24 reopened based on new information or a new direction.

25 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** So that's the status of the H-Strong
26 investigation now; right?

27 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** The H-Strong investigation is still,
28 you know, in a point where if any new information is received, the file coordinator is still

1 maintaining the investigation dataset. And then if there's anything that is still needed or
2 that -- the communications between the H-Strong 2 team and the investigative team,
3 those are ongoing and the file coordinator would facilitate any requests for information,
4 or if there's anything new, it will get funneled into the file coordinator for additional
5 tasking if required.

6 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** So by the H-Strong 2 team, you mean the
7 officers who are liaising with this Commission?

8 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, that's correct.

9 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** But there's no active investigation. It's ---

10 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** There's nothing ---

11 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** --- sitting there ---

12 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** --- there's nothing active that I
13 know of that's going on right now.

14 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And so ---

15 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** If you're talking about investigators
16 that are out there chasing down tips, conducting interviews, I'm not aware of any right
17 now, no.

18 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And so then what would be the prompt to
19 actually officially close the investigation, knowing that, as you say, it could be reopened
20 at any time if there's new evidence?

21 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I think just given the
22 magnitude of this investigation, it's not a normal or standard investigation. We still have
23 a command triangle in place. Those roles are firmly established. This file will remain in
24 a state where if anything new is received, it will be placed on the investigative file, and if
25 it requires additional follow-up, it will be tasked out.

26 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** That means it's indefinitely open then, or is
27 there a criteria to close it, or a certain period of time that passes and then it could ---

28 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** There is no ---

1 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** --- be closed ---

2 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** --- prescribed time that you assign
3 to closing investigation based on any certain factors.

4 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And the closing it is the point in time
5 where the RCMP would then make the results public?

6 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I think that, you know, as --
7 through part of this Commission, much of the results of the investigation are being made
8 public. I don't really know how to answer your question because I've been involved in
9 many large-scale investigations with multiple victims. And I'll give you an example. The
10 Picton investigation in British Columbia is not an active investigation, but there are still
11 people that are working on that investigation, and they're still maintaining it. So these
12 types of cases never go away.

13 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** But does that one still have missing
14 people that haven't been found?

15 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** There are still individuals who have
16 not been accounted for on that particular file. The reason why I reference it is I worked
17 on it for a number of years, and there were many tentacles to that investigation, and
18 there are still individuals who are -- there are still exhibits that they were just dealing
19 with on that particular case. So, for example, there will be exhibits attached to this case
20 that are still within our holdings that we'll have to deal with eventually. So this case is
21 not finished because there's much work that still needs to be done from a maintenance
22 and administrative perspective on it as well.

23 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** So back to the April 28th press conference,
24 you provided some details about the weapons of the perpetrator but also declined to
25 answer some questions.

26 Can we look at page 62, please, Madam Registrar?

27 You did confirm that there's a weapon that you referred to as a
28 military-style assault weapon. You confirmed that there were several semiautomatic

1 handguns, I think at page 60, and 2 semiautomatic rifles. And you -- but you -- there
2 was some details that you did not provide. And so can you say why you did not provide
3 full details?

4 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Absolutely, because there was still
5 -- at that time we were nine days post the April 18th and 19th events, we were still
6 involved in multi-agency investigations as part of those objectives that I mentioned; one,
7 determining what role Gabriel Wortman played in the murders, as well as any individual
8 that may have assisted him in any way.

9 So we had Canada Border Services Agency that was looking into
10 the possibility of the smuggling of the firearms across the Canadian border. We had the
11 ATF and the FBI that we were working with, with respect to conducting an investigation
12 as to how the perpetrator had obtained firearms on the US side of the border. So those
13 were ongoing aspects.

14 Why I would not give any particular details? I guess the best way I
15 can answer that is I'll give you a simple analogy. I talked about ---

16 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Well, can I just ask you -- not an analogy
17 but what I need to understand is; how would the release of information like the type and
18 calibre of the firearms, jeopardize the ongoing investigation?

19 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Our ability to assess the credibility
20 and the weight of any individual that would come forward with a witness statement was
21 going to be dependent upon the accuracy of the information they provide us. So what
22 does that do? One, we can determine whether or not they have firsthand or -- because
23 we had possession of those weapons, we knew about the make, model, calibre, serial
24 numbers, any additions that were placed on those weapons; all of those details were
25 very important to us keeping outside of a larger audience because we have a much
26 difficult time of assessing the weight of witness statements.

27 But not just that; if we went to a covert application, for example, an
28 undercover operation where we receive a confession from an individual, if they're able

1 to tell us the specific details that we've never made public, the weight of that confession
2 is significantly better. So the weight of the witness statements that are provided help us
3 narrow our focus on the value of certain witnesses, as well as the weight of any
4 confessions that an offender may make.

5 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And whose decision was it not to disclose
6 that information?

7 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I had spoken earlier about the
8 structure applied in major case investigations and the first principle; there are nine of
9 them in the major case management, the first one is command triangle. That command
10 triangle is comprised of a team commander, a primary investigator, and a file
11 coordinator. The three of them make the decision as to what information needs to be
12 held back that could potentially jeopardize an investigation.

13 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** So did you ---

14 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Those discussions ---

15 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** --- talk to them before the press
16 conference?

17 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I speak with those individuals all
18 the time. And I'm fully aware -- because I'm an accredited Major Case Team
19 Commander, I understand the importance of holding back certain types of information
20 and how that could negatively effect an investigation.

21 So I'd had previous conversations about the fact that we couldn't
22 release that information; for me, simply the way I can put it, it was a no-brainer. It was a
23 no-brainer. And through those conversations, I supported them in that position. And if
24 you were to ask where the buck stopped in terms of that, eventually it should be with the
25 team commander, but I was aligned with the team commander's perspective, so it was
26 ending with me because I was doing the press conference.

27 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** At the beginning of your witness interview
28 with the Commission on July 12th, 2022, which is COMM0059935, you told us that

1 immediately after this April 28th, 2020 press conference, you were summoned to a
2 phone call with Commissioner Brenda Lucki who expressed disappointment, among
3 other things, that the details of the firearms weren't released. Given that we spent so
4 much time on your interview, I'm not going to go over that ground with you today, but
5 others might in cross-examination.

6 I would be planning next to go to the June 4th press briefing, and I
7 see that it's 12:33. Would this be a convenient time for lunch?

8 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you. We'll break for one
9 hour.

10 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Thank you.

11 The proceedings are now on break and will resume at 1:30.

12 --- Upon breaking at 12:33 p.m.

13 --- Upon resuming at 1:34 p.m.

14 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Welcome back.

15 The proceedings are again in session.

16 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you.

17 Ms. Young?

18 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** We're ready for Chief Superintendent
19 Campbell again, Commissioners.

20 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you.

21 **--- SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL, Resumed:**

22 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Ms. Young, whenever you're
23 ready.

24 **--- EXAMINATION IN-CHIEF BY MS. RACHEL YOUNG, (Cont'd):**

25 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Good afternoon, Chief Superintendent
26 Campbell.

27 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Good afternoon.

28 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** You gave a press briefing on June 4th,

1 2020. It's in the same exhibit we've been looking at, COMM0057762, starting at page
2 65. And I wanted to have a look at page 69, I think it's at the top of the page, and a
3 communication and request for assistance by other police agencies.

4 You indicated that -- and I'll just read this passage:

5 "Media reports have raised questions regarding the
6 level of communications between the RCMP and
7 other Nova Scotia police agencies, as well as, an
8 apparent lack of requests from the RCMP to other
9 Nova Scotia police agencies for assistance on April
10 18th and...19th. There is detailed information that
11 refutes these claims."

12 What is the information you're referring to there?

13 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** The information I'm referring to is
14 email communications that I had seen between the Chief of the Amherst Police Service,
15 and I believe it was somewhere in -- whether it be Colchester or Cumberland County or
16 the OCC Risk Manager about covering calls while some of the Cumberland County
17 officers were occupied in a response to Portapique, as well as the information with
18 respect to the phone calls and the communications that were transpiring between the
19 Risk Manager, the OCC, and other agencies in the province, particularly IES, which is
20 the dispatch centre for the Halifax District, as well as Truro Police Dispatch.

21 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** The Commission does have an email
22 chain between the Nova Scotia Chiefs and -- amongst themselves but it appears to be
23 in response to District Policing Officer Julie Moss reaching out. It's COMM0018202.

24 I believe Julia Cecchetto, Chief of Kentville was then head of the
25 Nova Scotia Chiefs, she's corresponding with Dwayne Pyke, Chief of Amherst and
26 others, to see whether FIS officers or EAS officers could be made available after the
27 fact to help out. Do you know who directed DPO Moss to reach out to the municipal
28 Chiefs?

1 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I'm sorry, if you could confirm what
2 the nature of the request was or email? I don't have it in front of me to see what the
3 context is.

4 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Are we able to pull it up, Madam
5 Registrar? It's 18202.

6 So you see this is a chain with the Nova Scotia Chiefs on it, and it's
7 a chain. She's referring to Supt. Julie Moss there and the chain is asking the Chiefs
8 who can send -- if you keep going down, we can see -- stop there.

9 So FIS, which is Forensic Identification Services, and what does
10 EAP stand for?

11 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** That's probably Employee
12 Assistance Program.

13 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Okay.

14 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I'm assuming.

15 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And then regular duty members. So this is
16 after the events asking for help for the RCMP. And ---

17 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** And, sorry; is this from Julie Moss
18 to others, or is ---

19 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** No.

20 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** --- this from others to Julie Moss?

21 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** This one is Julia Cecchetto to the Chiefs
22 saying, "Hi all," and, you know, saying, "As you've all heard, the RCMP have had a
23 tragic scene with multiple locations. They've asked me to see how many FIS officers as
24 well as EAP officers," et cetera. And then Chief Cecchetto told the Commission, the
25 municipal police were able to muster about 35 people a day after the events to help out.

26 And I'll just put that COMM number on the record; it's 15891, it's
27 Exhibit P001031, page 67 as Chief Cecchetto's interview.

28 And so I just want to know if you know -- so that looks like DPO

1 Moss reached out to municipal Chiefs. Do you know, would that have been on her own
2 initiative, or do you know whether anyone directed her to reach out?

3 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I would imagine that there
4 was probably multiple injects or inquiries made by other agencies into the RCMP
5 offering assistance. That's usually normal.

6 We would have received requests or offers from across the country,
7 in fact, to provide support or assistance as required, so I don't know who had tasked
8 Julie with doing that, but based on the three categories of the resources that are being
9 noted in that email, FIS is Forensic Identification Specialists, EAP would be individuals
10 who could either be peer-to-peer support officers or victim services, and the third would
11 be general duty or patrol officers.

12 Forensic Ident would fall under support services. EAP would fall
13 under the responsibility of what we call our Administration and Personnel Officer. And
14 the general duty resources would fall under the responsibility of the District Policing
15 Officer as well as the CrOps Officer, so everything funnelling up to the CrOps Officer.

16 I wasn't part of that chain. I don't know who initiated it. But I would
17 imagine that it was probably either tasked out or asked by Criminal Operations,
18 Superintendent Moss, to respond on that.

19 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Do you recall being consulted about that,
20 whether to take the Chiefs up on their offer?

21 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I don't recall being consulted on it,
22 no.

23 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Madam Registrar, could we please see
24 Chief Cecchetto's transcript at COMM15891.

25 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** And did you want that
26 email marked as an exhibit?

27 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Oh, is it -- yes, please. That was
28 COMM18202.

1 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** And that's 3900;

2 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3900:**

3 (COMM0018202) RCMP and NSPCA Emails

4 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And so what Chief Cecchetto said is,
5 although they were able to muster 35 people a day, the RCMP turned down that request
6 and told Chief Cecchetto that the RCMP was holding its own or had it in hand.

7 Were you aware of that?

8 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I was aware of the fact that --
9 I had conversations with our Forensic Identification Services manager about the crime
10 scenes and the resourcing that they had on the ground or available to them and I also
11 was aware that there were resources from the FIS unit in "J" Division or New Brunswick
12 that were also supporting that, particularly those that had no connection, for example, to
13 Heidi Stevenson and that scene because we would want to be able to separate those
14 that knew Heidi from examining that scene there as well.

15 So I'd had that conversation about adequate levels of resources in
16 and around Forensic Identification Services and I was assured that we had adequate
17 resources specifically for that.

18 In terms of anything else, as I'd mentioned before, with Employee
19 Assistance Program support people, that would have been a conversation that would
20 have taken place between our Administration and Personnel Officer and, on the general
21 duty side, that would have been Criminal Operations that would have had any
22 conversations about that.

23 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** In the June 4th press conference, you also
24 addressed the 2001 CISNS bulletin.

25 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Two thousand and eleven (2011).

26 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Two thousand and eleven (2011). Did I
27 say 2001?

28 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

1 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Two thousand and eleven (2011). I
2 apologize.

3 And you said that the bulletin had recently become publicly
4 available.

5 If we could just see -- there's an email, COMM0028244, and make
6 that an exhibit.

7 This is an email to you, Chris Leather, and Officer Popik from Mark
8 MacLeod attaching the CISNS bulletin, and it's April 21st, 2020.

9 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

10 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** So I think that's the cover email.

11 And the attachment is the next COMM No. 28245, if that could be
12 made an exhibit and brought on the screen, please.

13 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3901:**

14 (COMM0028244) Email attaching 2011 CISNS bulletin

15 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** So that previous
16 document was 3901.

17 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** That was 28244?

18 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Yes.

19 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And 28245?

20 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Is 3902.

21 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3902:**

22 (COMM0028245) Attachment to COMM0028244: 2011

23 CISNS bulletin

24 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Okay. Can we just see that one, please?

25 So this is the bulletin in question; right? And ---

26 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes. This is a -- it's a screenshot,
27 it looks like, of someone's cell phone that would have the bulletin on it.

28 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And this is a redacted form, but under that

1 redaction, you'll recall, was a picture of the perpetrator's face?

2 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

3 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And if we could -- so you were aware of
4 the bulletin from the day after the shooting; right?

5 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** The 21st. That's not the day after.

6 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Two days later.

7 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** That's two days later.

8 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Two days later.

9 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes. I had no awareness of this
10 bulletin prior to that time.

11 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And Madam Registrar, can we please see
12 another email, COMM28420, and make that an exhibit.

13 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** That's Exhibit 3902.

14 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3903:**

15 (COMM0028420) Email from C/Supt. Leather to Supt.
16 Campbell re 2011 CISNS bulletin, May 2, 2020

17 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** I think the previous one was 3902.

18 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Right. 3903. Sorry.

19 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** This was an email from Chris Leather to
20 you copying Costa Dimopoulos of the Issues Management Team asking when we, I
21 assume meaning the RCMP, became aware of the CISNS bulletin organizationally.

22 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Madam Registrar, can you make
23 the screen a little bit larger for us, please?

24 Thank you.

25 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And it said, "When it was through OCC or
26 HSU?".

27 And just to note -- I don't need to go back to it, but in the document
28 -- two documents ago, 3901, it did say it's come to light this morning "through HSU".

1 What's HSU?

2 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Human Source Unit.

3 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Okay. And the next document is another
4 internal email, COMM003709 [sic]. This is an RCMP internal email chain about when
5 the bulletin came to light, if that could be made an exhibit, please.

6 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Exhibit 3904.

7 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3904:**

8 (COMM003709) Email correspondence between C/Supt.
9 Leather and Supt. Campbell re 2011 CISNS bulletin, May 2,
10 2020

11 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** So at this time -- so this chain, the top
12 email -- so it has emails from April 23rd and then up to May 2nd. Was there any
13 discussion of releasing this information to the public at this time?

14 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Sorry. The question?
15 I was trying to read the email.

16 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Go ahead if you want to finish.

17 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No, I've read it. Thank you.

18 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And so my question is, this bulletin came
19 to light within days of the shooting to your attention. Was there discussion of making it
20 public at this stage?

21 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I don't know if there was
22 discussions in and around making the bulletin public. If you -- if we go back to the
23 original email that was sent from Jason Popik, as you pointed out, that was April 21st.
24 That was my first awareness of that bulletin, and Chris Leather was copied on that.

25 The second series of emails that you just showed were from May
26 2nd, and even though Chris Leather was aware of how it came in, it was through
27 individuals under the Federal Policing Program. Mark MacLeod was attached to the --
28 one of the portfolios on federal, which would include, I believe, CIS Nova Scotia and the

1 Human Source Unit. And Mark MacLeod, I believe, brought that forward to Jason
2 Popik. Jason Popik, in turn, forwarded it to Chris Leather and I for review or for
3 awareness.

4 Chris Leather obviously had forgotten how that came in, and Chris
5 Leather was inquiring with me as to how did we become aware of that even though he
6 had -- obviously had forgotten that it came through Jason Popik indirectly.

7 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And it appears there was some internal
8 investigation of how long it had been around.

9 On June 2nd, you received an email from Derek Santosuosso of
10 the Issues Management Team about the bulletin.

11 That's COMM0035713, if that could be made an exhibit, please.

12 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** 3905.

13 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3905:**

14 (COMM0035713) Email from Derek Santosuosso to Supt.
15 Campbell, June 2, 2020

16 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And if that could be made bigger.

17 And it is still quite small, so I'm just going to read it. It's a short
18 email from Derek Santosuosso to you, Chris Leather, Lee Bergerman, copying H-Strong
19 CrOps and Costa Dimopoulos. And it says:

20 "Good morning, all.

21 In discussing the Officer Safety Bulletin last week, it was
22 noted on an email provided by Truro PS that Cst. Kevin
23 O'Brien, RCMP, now retired, and Cpl. Densmore discussed
24 the bulletin. I asked for a scrub-down of intel files on the
25 federal side and an analyst located a digital copy of the
26 Officer Safety Bulletin in a folder on a shared drive. In
27 speaking with Sgt. Mick Simms, FSOC, it appears the
28 bulletin was one of many which were dumped in the folder.

1 I've asked for more details on it, including when, who, etc.,
2 however, in light of the press conference on Thursday, I
3 wanted to ensure you all had the most up-to-date information
4 should you be asked to comment on it." (As read)

5 So does the fact that the bulletin was found in a shared drive mean
6 that it was accessible to RCMP members and officers the whole time?

7 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Not those involved in the Critical
8 Incident response. So a shared folder, it depends upon what it is. And I don't know
9 which shared folder that Derek Santosuosso is speaking about, but some shared folders
10 are -- have restricted access and others might be openly available to other resources.

11 I don't know whether or not the shared folder that you're referring to
12 others had access to it, but as I understand it, there was no ability or there was no
13 awareness of the Officer Safety Bulletin during the course of the 18th and 19th.

14 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** If we could go back to that June 4th press
15 briefing, Madam Registrar, COMM0057762.

16 You did explain that, Chief Superintendent Campbell, at the press
17 conference. You said:

18 "The bulletin was not available to Critical Incident
19 Commanders or responding police officers as the
20 events were unfolding on April 18th and 19th. The
21 bulletin was forward days after the incident and exist
22 in the archives of another Nova Scotia police agency.
23 Generally, Officer Safety Bulletins are purged from
24 searchable police databases after two years." (As
25 read)

26 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

27 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** But it also existed in the archives of the
28 RCMP, didn't it?

1 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yeah. I wasn't -- I wasn't aware of
2 that. It was explained when I had a conversation with Superintendent Popik.

3 As I understood it at that time of the press conference is that our
4 awareness of that bulletin came from, I believe it was, an Amherst police officer who
5 was working within one of the Integrated Street Crimes Enforcement Units that it
6 actually saved the bulletin, who then forwarded it to an RCMP officer, who then
7 forwarded it through the channels over on the federal policing side.

8 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** But by June 4th you were aware of it
9 because June 2nd was the day that you've got the email saying that there had been a
10 digital copy on the shared drive.

11 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I can't say that I was aware of it.
12 The fact that I might have received an email doesn't actually mean that I had the
13 opportunity to read that email. Like I was incredibly busy.

14 And there are times when it takes me up to several days to actually
15 open emails. If they're not marked as an urgent email, I might actually not see them for
16 several days.

17 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** But he does say, "In light of the press
18 conference on Thursday, I wanted to ensure you had all the most up-to-date
19 information", so that's the very purpose that the email's being sent is two days ahead of
20 the press conference saying this is what you need to know for the press conference.

21 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** If you're suggesting that I was
22 trying to not say something that I knew, that's not correct.

23 I was giving the information as best as I knew it during that press
24 conference.

25 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** So just standing back a bit, what is the
26 significance of this bulletin? Is the reluctance -- was there a reluctance to mention it
27 even if it wasn't accessible to first responders because possession of the bulletin might
28 lead to an inference that the RCMP could have done more to investigate the perpetrator

1 prior to the events?

2 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No. The fact that the information
3 wasn't available to the Critical Incident Commanders, they told me that. They did not
4 have that information. It would have been helpful to have known that. It also would
5 have been helpful to understand the background of the offender leading up to, you
6 know, the 18th and 19th even though it was several years beforehand. It all would have
7 been helpful, but not -- there was no knowledge of the Critical Incident responders or
8 the Critical Incident Commander of that bulletin.

9 So it would have been helpful, but it was not known by those that
10 were on the ground. There was no intent to not speak to it. It was real and it existed
11 and we needed to understand it. And also, from an investigative perspective, that would
12 have potentially provided some leads in terms of background or individuals that might
13 have known more about the offender and that might have actually helped focus the
14 investigation.

15 So it became important to understand the origins of it, who was
16 providing that information that might have been able to translate into additional taskings
17 for the investigative team.

18 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** But was the origin of it being tracked down
19 because the existence of it was embarrassing in some way?

20 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No. No. I would say no to that.
21 Not that it was embarrassing. Certainly when I saw that, my reaction was you've got to
22 be kidding me when I saw it, but where -- so where was that and why did we not know
23 about it. That was my reaction to it.

24 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Once you did know about it, there was
25 also a period of time where the RCMP chose not to make it public and the RCMP had
26 meetings with the Nova Scotia Chiefs of Police about it. There was a meeting May
27 14th, 2020 where you and Chief Superintendent Leather met with the Nova Scotia
28 Chiefs, including Chief David McNeil of Truro, about the bulletin and we have the

1 minutes of that meeting.

2 Madam Registrar, can we see COMM0051644, please, and make
3 that an exhibit?

4 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** That's 3906.

5 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3906:**

6 (COMM0051644) Minutes of telephone meeting with some
7 of the NS chiefs, May 14, 2020

8 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And can we go to page 7, please?

9 Those are the attendees at the top, and then in the right-hand
10 column we see the speakers. And there was -- should be lower down where
11 Superintendent Campbell is speaking.

12 And looking for a passage that says, "Just want to mention one
13 quick thing here about the intent not to release at this time."

14 Oh, yeah. It's at the -- so it's at the first bullet point there. So it
15 says -- you mentioned the fact about the ongoing investigation it would be helpful just to
16 tell everyone that.

17 And as you mentioned, when you were first doing your
18 investigation, you were obviously running down the source of the American guns and
19 that:

20 "We're working with our counterparts in the State side.
21 The timing of that information contained in the bulletin
22 that he had access to weapons and/or that he had a
23 firearm. You know, the reason why we want to hold
24 back as much detail as possible about it is that's
25 because the ongoing investigation." (As read)

26 And you recall that meeting?

27 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** You know, I don't really have a
28 specific recollection of the meeting. I don't because there were so many meetings that

1 we were having on so many issues.

2 I do remember discussions in and around much of the background,
3 interactions with the police, whether it be through the Officer Safety Bulletin. There was
4 a threats file as well that was investigated by the HRP. Those were things that we were
5 trying to get a better understanding of. But as I -- as those -- there must be minutes that
6 were taken from the meeting.

7 Again, the focus was, you know, the guns that the individual had in
8 their possession, were they any of these guns that were mentioned within the Officer
9 Safety Bulletin. We didn't know that. We were trying to investigate that.

10 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** But the bulletin was nine years old at that
11 point, so why would releasing a nine year old bulletin compromise the investigation in
12 2020?

13 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, it might speak to how long we
14 might have to go back in terms of our inquiries or, you know, who might have had
15 awareness or knowledge. So you know, as an investigation unfolds there's a lot of
16 unknowns and you don't know what steps that you might take that could be a benefit or
17 they could be negative. There's a lot of "what ifs" within that environment.

18 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Could -- was there a discussion of the
19 information about the bulletin or the bulletin itself being released redacted without the
20 sensitive information?

21 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I can't remember anything in terms
22 of redacting. I just don't have a recollection of that specifically.

23 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** The bulletin was eventually made public
24 because Truro Police received a *Freedom of Information* request from the media and
25 they released it. I take it was the RCMP not happy about that?

26 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I wouldn't say that the RCMP
27 wasn't happy about that. I wasn't central to those discussions that were taking place
28 between the Truro Police Service and our Criminal Operations Officer, Chief

1 Superintendent Leather, and I wouldn't characterize it as we weren't happy.

2 Again, as I said before, like depending upon what information
3 released, it could have a benefit, but it also could have a detrimental effect on your
4 ongoing investigation.

5 Again, we were -- we were days into this. We had a very large task
6 ahead and we wanted to make sure that we were going to be able to do the
7 investigation as best as we possibly could.

8 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** A related issue is the "H" Division policies
9 about document retention, and you addressed that in the June 4th press conference.
10 You said that, generally, Officer Safety Bulletins are purged after two years. However,
11 you had some information that the policies were more complex than that.

12 I'll just bring up an email, COMM20645, if that could be made an
13 exhibit.

14 This is an email that you received two days earlier on June 2nd.
15 It's -- you're not actually on this chain, but you forwarded an email which we have next,
16 which I'll bring up next. You forwarded it the same day, which at the bottom -- so this is
17 talking about retention policies.

18 I'll just give you a minute to look at it. It's explaining different
19 retention periods for different documents. And then if you look at the very bottom, so
20 this looks like it's in preparation for the June 4th press conference. So it says:

21 "If pressed, more background information..." (As
22 read)

23 Which I take it would be if asked in a Q&A session. The last
24 sentence is:

25 "We have many different operational retention
26 periods. The lowest is two years." (As read)

27 So -- and then if we can just see the email where you've forwarded
28 that, it's COMM0020644. If that can be made an exhibit.

1 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** And that previous
2 document was Exhibit 3907.

3 **--- EXHIBIT NO. 3907:**

4 (COMM0020644) Chain of email dated June 2nd, 2020
5 about Retention Policies

6 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Before the last email, we saw as an
7 attachment to an email to Derek Santosuosso of the Issues Management Team and
8 Chief Superintendent Chris Leather—if we could make that a little bigger, please,
9 Madam Registrar—with a cover message saying you didn't find it overly helpful.

10 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

11 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** So I appreciate that it is a little
12 complicated explaining different retention periods for different documents, some of them
13 are governed by statute, but leaving aside the complexity of different retention periods,
14 would you agree it's different? Why did you change what it said in the email you
15 received that the lowest retention period is two years to saying the retention period was
16 generally two years?

17 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** That's the information that I was
18 given, that it was a two-year retention period. As I -- when I say in here that the
19 information wasn't very helpful, it's confusing, at the very least, in terms of retention
20 periods on many different types of files. There is different types of investigations that
21 have a longer retention period, and then there are others that have lower retention
22 periods.

23 I was making these enquiries because I expected questions in and
24 around "When did you know this?" "Why didn't you know this if you didn't know it?"
25 And I was trying to understand that, and I found that the information I, you know,
26 eventually received back from Ottawa wasn't helping me understand that, but as I was
27 understanding it is that they were -- and I had had conversations with others in the
28 CISNS world, I can't remember specifically who it was, about the retention periods on

1 some of these bulletins, and I was told there was a two-year retention period.

2 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Stepping back and looking at why you
3 were looking at the retention period at this point, was it that it was embarrassing that the
4 bulletin still existed?

5 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No.

6 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** That you were not happy that the bulletin
7 still exists?

8 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No.

9 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Like, it should have been purged after two
10 years?

11 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No, absolutely not. It -- it's central
12 to the question of "When did you know this?" "Why didn't you know this during the
13 unfolding critical incident?" Not that it was embarrassing, it's just that it would have
14 been helpful, and it certainly would have been helpful, even from an investigative
15 standpoint, to know about this before April 21st.

16 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** So then, is the significance of the retention
17 period that one wouldn't expect things older than two years to be out there, and
18 therefore, not looking for them, perhaps?

19 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I would think, I would like to
20 think that the retention period on an officer safety bulletin that suggested that someone
21 illegally possessed firearms and they had an intent to kill someone, it wouldn't matter
22 who it was, that would be important to retain for an extended period of time, in my view.

23 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** The last media statement I want to ask
24 you about was six months later. It was published to the RCMP's website on
25 December 4th, 2020. That's in that same appendix, which is COMM0057762, at
26 page 85.

27 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Ms. Young, that
28 previous email was marked as Exhibit 3908.

1 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Thank you. That was COMM20644.

2 **--- EXHIBIT NO. 3908:**

3 (COMM0020644) Email from Darren CAMPBELL, dated
4 June 2nd, 2020 in response to the previous chain of email
5 about Retention Policies

6 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** You say in this statement that:

7 "While there are outstanding issues about what
8 happened in April. To "ensure a fair trial for those
9 who have been charged and with the public inquiry
10 now ongoing", the "RCMP will respectfully refrain from
11 further commenting on these matters outside of the
12 Inquiry"." (As read)

13 Whose decision was it to have no further communications outside
14 the Inquiry?

15 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, what I'm saying there in that
16 release is that -- and if you can maybe just reference the date on this one again.

17 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** December 4th, 2020.

18 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** So is this the release that was also
19 outlying that there were certain charges that had been laid?

20 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** I would think so. Let me back up.

21 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Okay.

22 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** The timeframe is about right, and you do
23 refer to charges.

24 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** And does it name individuals that
25 were charged? I just need to see that.

26 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** I don't see it on the passage on screen,
27 but these are excerpts. It does. Thank you.

28 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Okay. So in fairness to any

1 individual that's been charged, we wouldn't make any further comment if they were
2 before the courts, specifically on that one matter. And at that time, I can't recall exactly
3 when we were notified that there would be the Mass Casualty Commission. I was also,
4 and others, wanted to remain respectful of not saying anything over and above what we
5 had already said in an effort to not influence anyone, we wanted to make sure that the
6 Mass Casualty Commission was able to carry out its work and be able to communicate
7 its findings to the public.

8 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Was that your decision or were you
9 ordered not to have any further media content?

10 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, no, I wouldn't say it was -- I
11 mean, I had a perspective on that. I felt that in terms of any information that we could
12 add that wasn't going to be prejudicial to an individual who had been charged, then we
13 should be able to do that. Any information relative to any of the subsequent charges,
14 that would be unfair to be able to comment further on that.

15 But specifically in terms of when you asked the question was I
16 ordered not to say anything further, there were conversations between our Strategic
17 Communications personnel here in Nova Scotia and those at our National Headquarters
18 in Ottawa, specifically in and around further commentary or documentary programs that
19 were asking for further information. I felt that as long as it dealt with things that were
20 staying away from any charges before the courts, and as long as it was related to
21 material that we had already spoken to that we might be able to answer further
22 questions on, because we had already released that information, I was comfortable in
23 doing that, but there was a ---

24 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** So there was an internal ---

25 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** --- decision internally from Ottawa
26 that we would refrain from participating further.

27 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** So the Commissioner didn't want you to
28 participate further, but you would have to the extent possible without jeopardising the

1 ongoing prosecution?

2 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I can't say it was the
3 Commissioner, all I know it was direction from National Headquarters in Strategic
4 Communications. Who would have provided that direction, I don't know.

5 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Who were you hearing it from in National
6 Communications?

7 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, it's -- our National
8 Communications employees were discussing that directly with, I believe it was Lia
9 Scanlan, who was our Strategic Communications Director in Nova Scotia.

10 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And who was speaking to Ms. Scanlan, do
11 you know?

12 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I don't know specifically who it was.
13 I would imagine it would have been some of the key individuals within Strategic
14 Communications nationally, Sharon Tessier possibly, I think she was the Director
15 General. But I can't say for sure it was Sharon, it could have been one of many of her
16 other employees.

17 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** You referred to the fact that you were
18 willing to cooperate with documentaries, for example. So before the charges were laid
19 in the fall of 2020, you recall there was some internal discussions about whether the
20 RCMP should participate in an episode of the Fifth Estate that was being prepared
21 about the mass casualty and its aftermath?

22 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, I remember that.

23 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And we're going to look, or I'm going to
24 exhibit some emails on the topic. I understand that you and others were initially in
25 favour of participating, albeit on certain conditions, but that this was vetoed at the last
26 minute by the Commissioner?

27 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes. I seem to recall that, you
28 know, as a Division we had made a decision that we would participate, and that I was

1 comfortable in doing that, but it might be a fairer characterisation, in the last minute that
2 was turned -- that was reversed by Ottawa.

3 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And so I would like to -- I don't think we
4 necessarily need to go through them all, but I would like to exhibit them all.

5 Madam Registrar if COMM0026690 could be made an exhibit,
6 please.

7 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** That's 3910.

8 **--- EXHIBIT NO. 3910:**

9 (COMM0026690) Email dated September 22, 2020, from
10 Superintendent Darren Campbell to Lia Scanlan, Strategic
11 Communications Director

12 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** That's an email from you to Lia Scanlan,
13 dated September 22nd, 2020, to discuss a proposed approach to an interview with the
14 Fifth Estate. So at that point you were contemplating granting an interview for that
15 program; right?

16 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

17 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And then, COMM0034761. Could that be
18 made an exhibit, please?

19 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Three-nine-one-one
20 (3911).

21 **--- EXHIBIT NO. 3911:**

22 (COMM0034761) Communications' Brief distributed by Lia
23 SCANLAN dated September 23rd, 2020

24 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And as well an associated document,
25 COMM34760.

26 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Three nine one two
27 (3912).

28 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3912:**

1 (COMM0034760) Supporting Document to Exhibit 3911

2 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And that's September 23rd, 2020, Lia
3 Scanlan distributed a communications brief about the proposed interview, which you
4 had approved, and Lee Bergerman had approved, and it appeared to be pending
5 approval by Chris Leather, which is indicated in red on the document.

6 And so that brief states, among other things, that the
7 announcement of an inquiry does not preclude the RCMP from speaking to the media.
8 Instead, it underlines the importance of knowing who should speak.

9 Do you know whether Chris Leather did ultimately approve that
10 particular communications brief?

11 **SUPT DARREN CAMPBELL:** I don't know. C/Supt Leather would
12 have to speak to that.

13 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And so why were you in favour of
14 participating in that Fifth Estate program?

15 **SUPT DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well I was in favour largely because
16 of the fact that it was clear to me that there was much interest in what had happened. I
17 mean, it was a catastrophic series of events that many people had questions about.
18 And my concern always was that if we don't say anything, there's this perception that
19 we're hiding something. And I didn't want that perception to become a reality. And I
20 think it's important to be able to speak to what you can speak to as fully as you possibly
21 can, considering all aspects of what had happened, as well as continuing with an
22 ongoing investigation, because of the fact that at that point in time, there -- as I
23 mentioned earlier, there was still the ongoing investigation that we were hoping to make
24 some advancements on in terms of the U.S. side. So trying to balance that.

25 But I think that it's fair and it's appropriate. And in my view, still to
26 this day, it's necessary to be able to say as much as you possibly can, because there
27 will be so many questions.

28 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** At that point in time, September of 2020,

1 were there some inaccuracies in reporting or in earlier statements from the RCMP that
2 you wanted to correct by participating in that episode?

3 **SUPT DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well you'd have to point out the
4 inaccuracies for me, because like anything, every day that goes by, an investigation will
5 progress, and what you thought you knew were facts sometimes can change and you
6 have to be open to those changes. So naturally, over the course of time, you learn
7 more.

8 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And so ---

9 **SUPT DARREN CAMPBELL:** And you might be able to clarify
10 issues as well.

11 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** But what do you recall right now? Was
12 there anything that, you know, you would have liked to have said that you weren't
13 allowed to say?

14 **SUPT DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I mean, you can always
15 anticipate what those questions might be, or you can prepare whatever material it is that
16 you're willing to actually say. but you have to be prepared for a multitude of questions.
17 So if you're -- if an individual is agreeing to submit to a national news interview, whether
18 it be taped or live, you have to be alive to the fact that you're going to be asked
19 questions.

20 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Right. And you were going to be the
21 person, right, being interviewed?

22 **SUPT DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well I think that, you know, Lia
23 Scanlan felt that I was probably one of the people that should have done that. As I said
24 before, I was prepared to do it. We never got to the stage where we actually did it. It
25 could have changed. It could have been C/Supt Leather that did it.

26 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** But you did get far enough along that
27 there was a communications brief that you had approved. So you must have had in
28 your mind types of things that you would have been willing to talk about, because there

1 were probably some things that you were also not willing to talk about at that point. So
2 can you tell us what you would have been willing to talk about that you didn't talk about
3 because you weren't allowed to in the end?

4 **SUPT DARREN CAMPBELL:** I can't specifically remember the
5 details of the communications brief without actually physically reading it right now and
6 trying to get my mind back to that period of time, but I would have, as you pointed out, if
7 there were things that had changed for us in terms of our knowledge or our
8 understanding, I certainly would have expected to be asked those questions, and as
9 long as it didn't impact on the ongoing investigation, I would have been more than
10 prepared to answer to those things, because they were things that we had already said.

11 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** COMM26698, if that could be made an
12 exhibit, please, Madam Registrar?

13 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** It's Exhibit 3909.

14 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3909:**

15 (COMM0026698) Email from the CBC to Darren Campbell,
16 forwarded to Lia Scanlan, dated September 28th, 2020

17 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** This is an email dated September 28th,
18 2020, where you forwarded an email from the CBC to Ms. Scanlan. The email indicated
19 that the meeting with the Fifth Estate had been cancelled and was asking
20 Commissioner Lucki, copying you, to reconsider. Whose decision was it to cancel the
21 meeting with the Fifth Estate?

22 **SUPT DARREN CAMPBELL:** Again, as I have already testified, I
23 don't know specifically whose decision it was. Obviously if there's an email that
24 references the Commissioner, I would imagine the Commissioner might have weighed
25 in, as well as the Deputy Commissioner of Contract and Indigenous Policing, because
26 the Commanding Officer of the Division would report up through Deputy Commissioner
27 Brian Brennan, who is obviously a member of the Senior Executive Committee in
28 Ottawa.

1 So between those individuals, I would imagine someone within that
2 core group had made that final decision, but I don't know who it was.

3 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** I think what you had previously testified
4 about was more the decision in December of 2020 not to have any further
5 communications with the media. So this is more about this incident. Perhaps I'll see if
6 you can refresh your memory from some of the emails. If we look at COMM0029199, if
7 that could be made an exhibit, please, Madam Registrar?

8 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Exhibit 3913.

9 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3913:**

10 (COMM0029199) Email from Jennifer Clarke to Darren
11 Campbell, dated September 20th, 2020

12 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Can you bring that up on screen, please?
13 Can that be made bigger, please?

14 So this is an email from Jennifer Clarke to you dated September
15 28th, 2020. Who is Jennifer Clarke?

16 **SUPT DARREN CAMPBELL:** Sorry?

17 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Who is Jennifer Clarke?

18 **SUPT DARREN CAMPBELL:** Jennifer Clarke is one of the Public
19 Information Officers. She is now retired. She was a regular member of the RCMP.
20 You might remember Jennifer Clarke as being the individual that I co-conducted the
21 April -- or the April 24th press conference with.

22 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Okay. And can we just scroll down and
23 see if there's a chain there? Okay. So can scroll back up again.

24 So I'll just read that. So this is Cpl Clarke's email to you. She was
25 "pretty much crushed". That's referring to the reporter:

26 "Elizabeth wants to be able to tell the whole story and
27 she can't do that if we don't play ball. I absolutely
28 understand her frustration with trying to give us an

1 opportunity to speak when we really need to for the
2 benefit of Heidi and the other victims, for our members,
3 and for their families. Over the weekend, I had dinner
4 with a friend of mine who retired five years ago. I was
5 shocked at how he was affected by all this. It just goes to
6 show how badly people need answers. But the
7 Commissioner has other ideas apparently. Thanks,
8 Darren. Jen.” (As read)

9 So does that refresh your memory as to whose idea it was to
10 cancel that?

11 **SUPT DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I mean that’s Jen Clarke
12 referencing the Commissioner. Sometimes people will assume that the Commissioner
13 is making decisions, when it could be someone directly reporting to the Commissioner.
14 I really can’t say. That’s Jen’s assessment of where that decision came from.

15 But as I said, I’ve already testified that I’m not intimately aware as
16 to where the final decision was made for us not to speak further.

17 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Let’s have a look at Commissioner Lucki’s
18 email then.

19 COMM0054861. If that could be made an exhibit, please?

20 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Three nine one four
21 (3914).

22 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3914:**

23 (COMM0054861) Email chain between Commissioner Lucki,
24 Jennifer Clarke, Elizabeth McMillan, Gillian Findlay and
25 Darren Campbell, dated September 29th, 2020

26 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Can that be brought on screen, please?
27 And so just scroll down to the bottom, please.

28 So starting at the bottom, there’s an email to Jennifer Clarke from

1 Elizabeth, who is the CBC -- Elizabeth McMillan, who is the CBC reporter.

2 And then if you could scroll back up?

3 And that's copying you. And then this is an email from Gillian
4 Findlay, the CBC, to Commissioner Lucki, dated September 28th, 2020. And that's
5 copying you.

6 And then above that, we have September 29th, 2020, email from
7 Brenda Lucki, RCMP Commissioner, to Ms. Findlay.

8 Oh, can we just stay there?

9 And she says:

10 "In order to protect the integrity of the Public Inquiry,
11 unfortunately we will not be participating in this interview."

12 (As read)

13 So that's Commissioner Lucki directly communicating with the
14 media.

15 And then if you could just scroll up?

16 That's the reporter's response, Gillian Findlay's response, to the
17 Commissioner.

18 And then if you can go up again, please, this is -- this gets
19 forwarded and Lee Bergerman says to you, Lia Scanlon and Chris Leather regarding
20 the reporter's response, "Saw that coming as soon as I read the Commissioner's
21 response."

22 So does that now refresh your memory that it was Commissioner
23 Lucki saying that?

24 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** It certainly does, and thank you for
25 showing that to me.

26 As I said before, I would have received multiple emails, so until I've
27 had an opportunity see that, it's quite clear to me that it was Commissioner Lucki's
28 decision not to.

1 And thank you for showing me that.

2 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And I think there are just a couple of other
3 internal emails, COMM0054920.

4 Madam Registrar, I don't think we've entered COMM54915, email
5 from ---

6 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** That'll be Exhibit 3915.

7 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3915:**

8 (COMM0054915) Email from Gillian Findlay from the 5th
9 Estate to Darren Campbell and others

10 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Thank you.

11 This is an email from Gillian Findlay of the Fifth Estate to you, Chris
12 Leather and Andrew Joyce referring to the cancellation of the Fifth Estate, asking for
13 another audience.

14 And then COMM0054920.

15 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Exhibit 3916.

16 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3916:**

17 (COMM0054920) Email from Lia Scanlan re Fifth Estate,
18 Oct. 14, 2020

19 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And that's Lia Scanlan's internal reply that
20 she has to answer that can't participate in it.

21 Then there's another thread, COMM0054895.

22 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** That's Exhibit 3917.

23 **---EXHIBIT No. 3917:**

24 (COMM0054895) Chain of emails between Lia Scanlan,
25 Darren Campbell and others in response to the 5th Estate
26 reaching out to individuals

27 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And this is in the immediate aftermath of
28 the cancellation. There's a thread involving Lia Scanlan, Steve Halliday, Lee

1 Bergerman, yourself and others in response to the Fifth Estate reaching out to individual
2 members. Steve Halliday suggests a communique from “H” Division leadership, and Lia
3 Scanlan takes a different view.

4 So would you say there was tension between the approach to the
5 media between National Headquarters and “H” Division?

6 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, there were polarized
7 perspectives. I don’t know if it was tension. I mean, as I have already testified, there
8 was willingness on our part to do it. I saw it as something that would have been helpful
9 to do, but we were being directed otherwise.

10 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And when was it the Commissioner’s
11 individual decision or do you know who else was involved in that strategy, to stop talking
12 to the media?

13 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I don’t know, but I would
14 expect that in the course of normal conversations and reporting up the Deputy
15 Commissioner of Contract and Indigenous Policing would have had some level of
16 awareness of these discussions between the Division and the Commissioner. And
17 again, I appreciate the fact that you’ve shown me these emails because it does help
18 me.

19 There’s been much that has happened over the last two and a half
20 years, and it’s difficult to keep all of it straight.

21 I don’t think that those decisions from the Commissioner are made
22 in a vacuum. I think that the Commissioner would be consulted by others or others
23 would consult with the Commissioner to help frame up the Commissioner’s perspective
24 on things before a decision was made.

25 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Would you say the Commissioner was
26 supporting “H” Division members and officers in their communication strategy?

27 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I don’t feel that we were not being
28 supportive. Central to this issue was whether we were going to participate in this

1 particular Fifth Estate interview. But going forward -- and when you brought up that
2 email that lays out specifically the Commissioner's perspective on it, the Commissioner
3 was signalling to us that with the Mass Casualty Commission being under way that
4 we're going to refrain from commenting further on that.

5 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** It appears that CBC tried to contact "H"
6 Division officers after the September 29th cancellation, so is "H" Division allowed to
7 have an independent communications strategy?

8 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I think there's a lot within the
9 organization, being a national organization, where if you're dealing with an event like
10 this that has national interest, national implications that you would have a lot more
11 involvement from Ottawa. Normally, day-to-day operations would be allowed to carry
12 on and there wouldn't be an inject from National Communications on a singular event or
13 a homicide file. But given the nature and the scope of what happened here, there was a
14 lot more oversight or a lot more interest and injects by Ottawa.

15 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Turning to post-event learning, what, if
16 any, internal investigation or analysis did the RCMP perform with respect to the incident
17 at Onslow fire hall?

18 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Internally -- well, for one, whenever
19 there's the use of force by a police officer in this province, the District Officer would
20 normally engage, or should engage, SIRT, which is independent, so that's external. But
21 also, if there's a SIRT investigation, there's often a parallel conduct investigation and
22 there would also be an assessment of the use of force. So for example, every time an
23 officer would use force, they have to account for that level of use of force. That's
24 documented. And then if there was any conduct issues arising from that use of force,
25 that would be investigated as a parallel or a separate investigation under the Code of
26 Conduct.

27 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** SIRT investigations are limited to whether
28 or not criminal charges should be laid; correct?

1 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** There would be an outcome by
2 SIRT, meaning that any accountability criminally, those -- those outcomes or any
3 potential charges would come from SIRT because it's an independent body that would
4 investigate the police in terms of a use of force incident that resulted in either injury or
5 death.

6 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** But even if criminal charges aren't laid,
7 would you agree there's more to be learned from mistakes that may have been paid at
8 the Onslow fire hall?

9 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** So as part of the -- I'd referenced it
10 earlier, the Hazardous Occurrence Investigation Team, they have examined that as well
11 as the shooting of Constable Chad Morrison and the shooting of Constable Heidi
12 Stevenson, so those are internal. That assessment, I don't believe that the final report
13 has been tabled yet, but there are a number of recommendations in and around that as
14 well as the ESDC investigation, which is external.

15 So specific to your question, internally, there's HOIT that would look
16 at that as well as the conduct investigation, which would be ordered by the line officer
17 within Northeast Nova because those would have been resources that were attached
18 under the authority of the District Policing Officer and the Superintendent of Northeast
19 Nova.

20 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** So you didn't order any review of that
21 incident yourselves.

22 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, when you -- when you talk
23 about me ordering a review, that is not my area of responsibility, Northeast Nova, or
24 those members that work within the general duty environment or the -- there's a SCEU
25 Unit, or Street Crimes Enforcement Unit, that falls under that Northeast Nova District
26 Policing Officer.

27 I didn't order the Code of Conduct investigation because that's not
28 my responsibility to do that. That would be Superintendent in charge of Northeast Nova

1 to do that.

2 The HOIT investigation that I mentioned before, the Hazardous
3 Occurrence investigation, that would be ordered through the Criminal Operations
4 Officer.

5 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** So while these other investigations are
6 pending, has there been any effort, though, to just have a look and see if anything
7 should be done differently so that nobody is placed in an unsafe situation again?

8 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I think that the entire situation
9 itself, like as I mentioned before, when I had requested the critical incident response
10 review, that would have included what challenges were presented by the fact that the
11 offender was operating what looked just like a marked police vehicle. And you know,
12 what transpired there would have been quite helpful to have that review to understand
13 the risks associated with a situation that -- like that if it was ever presented ever again.

14 So there really should be a more focused attention in and around if
15 we're faced with a similar situation, what can we possibly do to be able to prevent that.

16 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And so who would be -- who would be in
17 charge of ordering that or having a look at that?

18 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I would say, again, the level
19 of impact emotionally on every individual in this province, particularly, you know, I'm not
20 -- I have to recognize the families certainly have suffered the most, and that level of
21 trauma is highest there. But the ability internally in this division to conduct an objective
22 assessment of what happened I think is hampered by that level of emotion because
23 there isn't a single -- I don't believe that there's a single serving police officer in this
24 division in Nova Scotia that has the ability to do an external look and then make, like, an
25 actual objective assessment and recommendations related to that. It needs to be
26 handled outside of these resources here.

27 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** So I understand you to be saying there
28 should be someone having a look at it and it can't be someone from H Division.

1 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** And that's why that Hazardous
2 Occurrence Investigative Team was actually comprised of officers, experienced Major
3 Crimes investigators from the RCMP in British Columbia.

4 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Looking forward, do you have any
5 improvements to propose for the RCMP that the Commissioners could consider in
6 formulating their recommendations?

7 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** How much time do we have?

8 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Got the rest of the day.

9 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, there's always a need to --
10 there needs to be a culture, and I believe that that culture actually does exist in terms of
11 efforts to always try to do better. Every incident that you face, you're always going to
12 have to reflect on those things to understand what we could do better, what went well,
13 what didn't go well, where the gaps were, and how we can move forward. So I just want
14 to set up my response first, because I do believe that, you know, the organization that I
15 know the RCMP to be, there's always been a focus on trying to understand what we
16 could do better, because that's ultimately what we want to do, is that we always want to
17 do better, and there is no such thing as perfect, and that has to be fully understood and
18 exercised by every individual in the force and management as well, particularly.

19 So when we talk about improvements, I'd earlier spoke of
20 improvements in terms of Critical Incident response capability to get officers to remote
21 locations quicker. There will always be needs for improvements in that area. ERT
22 teams are not small. They carry a lot of equipment. And platforms that we have
23 available to us are not adequate to be able to move those resources.

24 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** What do you mean by platforms? Do you
25 mean the TAV vehicles?

26 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I'm talking about air
27 platforms.

28 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Okay.

1 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yeah, the aerial platforms or the
2 aircraft are not large enough to move full teams. The only way we could ever do that is
3 if we charter an aircraft at a considerable expense. An example of that would be when I
4 bring in teams from National Headquarters for an incident in Bridgewater, I paid a
5 \$50,000 bill for an aircraft to get a team to Nova Scotia to deal with a matter in
6 Bridgewater. \$50,000 for a one-way ticket. So we need capacity in that area because
7 we're covering a lot of ground, and time is important, and getting Critical Incident
8 resources on the ground as fast as you can is critical.

9 I talked about capacity issues, capacity issues in terms of resource
10 numbers, human resource numbers. We need to build in a buffer in terms of our ability
11 to actually keep people healthy, keep people in training cycles and keep people in
12 deployment or operational cycles. I don't believe that we're resourced on the Critical
13 Incident side, because I'd mentioned that 2018 and 2019 ERT Modernization Study
14 indicating that a minimum number for an ERT team should be 18, because callouts,
15 minimum numbers should be 12 at all times. That's to be able to deploy the techniques
16 and to do every operation, and that's just the ERT members. That doesn't include the
17 dog handlers, or the EMRT and medical technicians, or the negotiators. Those are --
18 I'm just talking about the ERT resources. We don't have enough to be able to respond
19 to multiple incidents that are ongoing at the same time. We don't have enough to
20 respond to incidents that are back-to-back, so we have to rely on relief teams to come in
21 and carry those operations over into the next operational period. That's more specific
22 on the ERT side.

23 There have been improvements that have been made in terms of
24 situational awareness. When it comes to responding officers and from a patrol
25 environment as well as Critical Incident response members, or ERT members, the
26 ATAK system is now back up and running in the division. That includes our police
27 service dogs. There were gaps there in terms of situational awareness and our ability to
28 actually see the locations of some of those critical resources on the ground that allows

1 you to be able to deploy more resources a little more efficiently, or I should say safely.
2 So that awareness is key.

3 In terms of our general duty responses and our patrol members,
4 like, we had talked briefly about police to population ratios, police to kilometre ratios.
5 And I talked about things like buffers. When we are resourced to provide minimum
6 numbers, and when we're faced with members who have to be off a shift because
7 they're appearing in court the following day, or someone has been injured at work, or
8 someone is on a maternity leave or a paternity leave, or someone is away on training,
9 that all creates drains on available frontline resources. And I see it every single day,
10 callouts for overtime shifts for frontline memberships, because I believe that we're not
11 resourced to provide that buffer in terms of whether it's a injury, or its an entitlement, or -
12 - and we also need to be able to make sure that our officers get the rest that they
13 deserve.

14 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And on the topic of resourcing, can you
15 describe your experience of more or less integrated models between provincial and
16 municipal policing? You know, if the pot of money isn't going to get bigger, are there
17 smarter ways to use the money that you can share with the Commissioners?

18 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Absolutely. I would highly suggest
19 that the Commission look at the integrated models that exist within the lower mainland
20 district of the Vancouver area. The reason for that is that that is an environment I
21 worked in for 24 years. And I worked on many integrated teams in the lower mainland
22 of B.C. And they are comprised of police officers from multiple agencies, and they
23 receive the same training. They receive the same equipment. They have the same
24 provincial policing standards. They operate with one another. They have true joint
25 management teams that direct those resources. Essentially, it is an efficient, cost-
26 sharing model that ensures consistency of delivery service to those areas that they
27 serve. That is something that I think is achievable, because it exists. Again, there is no
28 such thing as perfect. There will always be challenges, but I think it's a great example

1 of true, integrated policing efforts that are ongoing right now this very day.

2 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Can you explain that connection with
3 integration between forces, there's the resourcing aspect but you also mention being
4 able to operate together. So what is the impact on interoperability when forces are
5 integrated?

6 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, when forces are integrated, it
7 has a massive impact on interoperability and that interoperability originates from clearly
8 defined and well thought through provincial policing standards. And if those standards
9 are implemented from a provincial perspective, all agencies are expected to meet those
10 standards first. That's the first key piece.

11 Following that, if you enter into an agreement where you are going
12 to create an integrated unit, if those standards are in place, that means that the policies
13 will be consistent. That means the training will be consistent. And then if their officers
14 are working together, that means they have familiarity with each other, they are
15 comfortable, they have practiced, they've exercised, they've responded together, so
16 they have that practical experience as well. It's challenging, if you were to take two
17 agencies who have never worked together and expect things to go very smoothly. And
18 in fact, it probably won't go smoothly, and it could create certain levels of danger if the
19 agencies haven't worked together before, if they haven't practiced together, and if they
20 haven't deployed together. So massive benefits in creating those units because I think
21 what it does is it enhances and develops better relationships between the agencies,
22 certainly a mutual level of respect and understanding, and you're sharing common goals
23 and you're sharing common platforms.

24 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Has any of that improved in Nova Scotia
25 since April of 2020?

26 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Interoperability?

27 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Interoperability, relationship between
28 police agencies. What do you think can and should be done to work on those

1 relationships?

2 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** So the answer to that question
3 would be yes and no. Yes, from the perspective of I -- I do have a lot of faith and
4 confidence in the police officers on the street who do want to get along, they do want to
5 work together, and they do have a complete understanding of each other's challenges
6 that they face every day, because they're very similar. And I've seen on many
7 occasions the ground-level members who really do need to rely on each other and
8 communicate with one another.

9 From the management perspective, that's the no part of the
10 answer. I don't think that those relationships have gotten any better, and in fact, I would
11 say that they have gotten worse.

12 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** What about with approaching
13 investigations on intimate partner violence and potential connections between violence
14 in the home and then violence that may carry outside the home? Do you see any areas
15 for improvement in the RCMP where they can pick up on behaviour that could be a red
16 flag that could nip further violence in the bud, potentially?

17 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I think there's awful -- there's
18 an awful lot of work that always needs to be done in terms of domestic violence or
19 intimate partner violence. I've said it before, I think my words that I've used before is it's
20 real, it's far too common, and I believe that the impacts of domestic violence, because
21 often there can be, I'm not saying it's the case all the time, but there can be barriers to
22 victims feeling comfortable in coming forward or sharing their experience and engaging
23 the police in terms of a hope to change that situation for themselves and ensure that the
24 offender is brought before the courts or provided with whatever necessary interventions
25 that might be required for that individual. So there's always areas for improvement, and
26 I believe that we always have to be looking at whatever it is that we can do to
27 understand it.

28 But I think there needs to be greater investments in terms of

1 conducting threat assessments of individuals. There needs to be greater -- and there's -
2 - there has been efforts made, for example, I believe they're called the situation tables,
3 where we just -- there is discussions in and around offenders by multiple agencies who
4 might have information on someone that is offending that other agencies have no
5 awareness of or actually might have offers of assistance or advice to be able to provide
6 to the police. It needs to be a holistic approach. It can't just be a policing approach and
7 it can't be an agency-specific approach because, as we all know, you can live in Bible
8 Hill today, and you can live in Halifax tomorrow, and you can live in Vancouver the
9 following month. So how do we track and manage these people? How do we compare
10 those notes? How do we make sure that people don't slip through the cracks?

11 So when I talk about holistic approaches, much like when it comes
12 to sexual offences, I think that there needs to be a lot more community or community
13 support agency involvement in the assessments, in interventions for those that are
14 exhibiting behaviours of domestic violence or actually committing domestic violence
15 offences, and then there needs to be a really focussed effort on the part of the courts to
16 be able to provide necessary, not just supports to the victim but also supports to the
17 offender to understand and get to the root of why they would want to act violently
18 towards someone they should care about.

19 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** You mentioned barriers that victims might
20 face. Is the RCMP making any efforts to think about whether there are any barriers on
21 the RCMP end that could be lowered?

22 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I think there needs to be a
23 willingness always to involve other agencies and community partners in those
24 discussions first. I don't want to make any excuses, but in order to be able to really drill
25 down and make meaningful change, it's going to require commitment, and that
26 commitment is going to mean that we are going to have to assign resources specifically
27 to carry these initiatives. And I do know from my experience that it's always
28 challenging, because there are multiple priorities that you're always juggling and you're

1 always trying to address, and those priorities will change. And you don't want to start
2 something that you don't finish.

3 So the RCMP, governments, other agencies need to really, if it's
4 important, and I believe it is, they need to make the investments in understanding the
5 scope of the problem. Because I don't think that the scope of many of these problems,
6 whether it be sexual exploitation and human trafficking or domestic violence, I don't
7 think we really fully understand it all because I believe that many victims just do not
8 come forward, and that includes male victims as -- of intimate partner violence.

9 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And what about victims in rural areas,
10 specifically?

11 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I think that rural always
12 presents challenges because, one, there may be barriers in terms of a victim's ability to
13 reach out, you might not have a neighbour who lives right next door, there could be
14 several kilometres between you and your nearest neighbour; they may have to travel
15 further; they may not have access to modes of travel to actually access supports and
16 assistance. There is always going to be additional layers of complexities when you're
17 speaking about responding in rural environments. Whether it's a fire department, or it's
18 a police service, or it's a social service, that just means that you know providers need to
19 travel further to get to those people and those that need that assistance need to be able
20 to travel or connect, which sometimes can be difficult for them to do.

21 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Before we wrap up, I wanted to ask you
22 about your notes. We received your notes in several batches, and you do have notes
23 taken after the last ones that we have, dated April 13th, 2021, that have not yet been
24 produced to the Commission. Can you tell us why that is and when we'll have them?

25 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes. The bulk of the notes that I
26 have disclosed were based on a request from the H-Strong2 Team, which was
27 essentially the disclosure team. I think there might have been five or six notebooks.

28 Early in the investigation, there was much -- the majority of my

1 notes were surrounding this investigation or peripheral aspects of it, and then over time,
2 my notes or my involvement in this matter would have certainly dropped off
3 considerably over a period of time. So the first batch of notes was based on the request
4 up until that point in time, and then of course, I just would continue making notes on a
5 variety of investigations and issues that I would have been handling over the course of
6 that period forward, with minimal entries related to this particular event.

7 In terms of the timing, I've already scanned all of my notebooks,
8 I've disclosed two more notebooks. I think in our statement, I had mentioned the
9 process that I use. I take my notebook, I scan it, or I -- sorry, I should say I first
10 photocopy each page, and then what I do is I red -- I'm a little bit old school in that
11 sense, I red pen, redact a box so that you could see what's in that area, but then I apply
12 national vetting codes. For example, if it's not relevant to this investigation, it'll get a V4
13 vetting code. If it's privileged information, a conversation between counsel and myself,
14 it'll get a V2; if it's personal information it'll get a V1.

15 I'll disclose that to the H-Strong2 Team, and then in turn, they will
16 disclose to the Department of Justice, as I understand it, and the Department of Justice
17 would apply redactions to that material based on not what I put but their assessment as
18 well, but I think in fairness they would need to see how I assessed them. Because
19 sometimes my notes would be just point form, and they might not understand that it's
20 connected or not connected to this investigation.

21 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** So did you say there was two more
22 batches coming?

23 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** There is two separate notebooks
24 that have since been disclosed to H-Strong2, and I think that the Department of Justice
25 has 1 or 2 of those, and then I have three more that I've already copied, and I'm just
26 finishing the vetting process on it. But largely, because they're not associated to this
27 event, they're largely redacted as V4, meaning irrelevant.

28 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Because these notebooks have your notes

1 about everything and not just this case; is that right?

2 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Everything that I'm doing within the
3 Support Services portfolio. So it's multiple investigations to a host of other issues.

4 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** So when will you have your notes to the
5 Department of Justice so that they can get them to the Commission?

6 **SUPT DARREN CAMPBELL:** I've already committed to the
7 Department of Justice that the remaining three notebooks will be with them before I
8 finish my testimony, and hopefully we'll be leaving back for New Brunswick as of
9 Wednesday.

10 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** So by the end of the day tomorrow, you'll
11 have your notes ---

12 **SUPT DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

13 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** --- to them, and then ---

14 **SUPT DARREN CAMPBELL:** The Department of Justice Canada
15 will actually have those three notebooks with my red boxed suggestions.

16 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And of course, as soon as the
17 Commission has them, they will disclose them as soon as possible.

18 And thank you, Chief Superintendent. Those are my questions for
19 you for today.

20 And I would just ask the Commissioners if I could enter a few more
21 exhibits before we finish?

22 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Yes, please.

23 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And so as far as I'm concerned, for the
24 moment, if C/Supt Campbell could be excused? I just need to read some document
25 numbers in.

26 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** All right.

27 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Just for right now.

28 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** I presume it makes sense to

1 take what would be ordinarily left of this afternoon to caucus with counsel to determine
2 an order of participation tomorrow?

3 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** We may be able to use some of the time
4 today. I just mean he doesn't have to sit there right now. But I don't think he should
5 necessarily be excused for the day. We may -- some Participants may wish to start
6 questioning today. We can discuss that during caucusing.

7 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Okay. Thank you. Why don't
8 you -- you're free to go for now, at least from where you're sitting. And just stand by
9 and we'll be back to you.

10 **SUPT DARREN CAMPBELL:** Thank you.

11 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you, Chief
12 Superintendent.

13 Sorry, go ahead, Ms. Young.

14 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Thank you, Commissioners. I do have a
15 number of documents to tender related to this witness, and rather than hand the
16 Registrar a list, I did just, for the benefit of the Participants, want them to know which
17 documents are going in. These are almost all, I believe, on the Rule 46 summary.

18 And so the first is a policy document. It's COMM39705,
19 Administration Manual Chapter 13.1, Communication Services.

20 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** It's 3918.

21 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3918:**

22 (COMM39705) Administration Manual, Chapter 13.1:
23 Communication Services

24 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Then COMM008544, H Strong Situation
25 Report.

26 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** It's 3919.

27 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3919:**

28 (COMM008544) H-Strong Situation Report

1 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** COMM0059587, Transcript of the Mass
2 Casualty Commission Witness Interview of C/Supt Janis Gray. And that's J-A-N-I-S G-
3 R-A-Y.

4 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Three nine two zero
5 (3920).

6 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3920:**

7 (COMM0059587) Transcript of the Mass Casualty
8 Commission Witness Interview of Janis Gray

9 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** COMM0058995. This is a letter from the
10 Department of Justice to Commission Counsel explaining the email address with the
11 word "dummy" in it. May already be an exhibit.

12 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Three nine two one
13 (3921).

14 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3921:**

15 (COMM0058995) Letter from the DOJ to Commission
16 Counsel, explaining the email address with the word
17 "dummy" in it

18 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** COMM0017262, Email Chain between
19 Supt Campbell and C/Supt Chris Leather, Dated April 19th, 2020.

20 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Three nine two two
21 (3922).

22 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3922:**

23 (COMM0017262) Email chain between Supt. Darren
24 Campbell and Chief Supt. Chris Leather, dated April 19th
25 2020

26 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** COMM0006876, which is a screen shot of
27 text messages provided by Supt Campbell.

28 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Three nine two three

1 (3923).

2 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3923:**

3 (COMM0006876) Screenshot of Text Messages, provided by
4 Chief Supt. Darren Campbell

5 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** COMM0015959, emails between Dustine
6 Rodier, Chris Leather, and Darren Campbell.

7 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Three nine two four
8 (3924).

9 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3924:**

10 (COMM0015959) Emails Between Dustine Rodier, Chris
11 Leather and Darren Campbell

12 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** COMM16870, email correspondence
13 between Darren Campbell and Chris Leather, dated April 19th, 2020.

14 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Three nine two five
15 (3925).

16 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3925:**

17 (COMM0016870) Email Correspondence Between Darren
18 Campbell and Chris Leather, dated April 19th,2020

19 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** COMM17257, which is also email
20 correspondence between Campbell and Leather, April 19th, 2020.

21 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Three nine two six
22 (3918).

23 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3926:**

24 (COMM0017257) Another Email Correspondence Between
25 Darren Campbell and Chris Leather, dated April 19th,2020

26 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** COMM0051382 is notes of Janis Gray
27 from April 19th to April 28th, 2020.

28 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Three nine two seven

1 (3927).

2 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3927:**

3 (COMM0051382) Notes of Janis Gray from April 19th, 2020
4 to April 28th, 2020

5 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** COMM0059132, RCMP update on
6 implementation of the McNeil recommendations from January 2020.

7 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Three nine two eight
8 (3928).

9 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3928:**

10 (COMM0059132) RCMP Update on Implementation of the
11 MacNeil Recommendations from January 2020

12 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** COMM0056204, RCMP response to
13 written evidence Priority 1.

14 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Three nine two nine
15 (3929).

16 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3929:**

17 (COMM0056204) RCMP Response to Evidence, Priority 1

18 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** COMM0056098, list of national mandatory
19 training, December 2020.

20 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Three nine three zero
21 (3930).

22 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3930:**

23 (COMM0056098) List of National Mandatory Training,
24 December 2020

25 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** COMM0059441, H Division multi-year
26 financial plan, 2021 to 2023.

27 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Three nine three one
28 (3931).

1 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3931:**

2 (COMM0059441) H-Division Multiyear Financial Plan, 2021
3 to 2023

4 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** COMM39857, OM Chapter 13.4,
5 Emergency Operational Plans.

6 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Three nine three two
7 (3932).

8 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3932:**

9 (COMM0039857) OM Chapter 13.4: Emergency Operational
10 Plan

11 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And Commissioner, some of these
12 documents were referred to in the witness' interview, but not today, which is why they're
13 going in this way.

14 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you.

15 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** I'm about halfway through.
16 COMM0040397, H Division, Violent Crime in Progress Operations
17 Plan.

18 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Three nine three three
19 (3933).

20 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3933:**

21 (COMM0040397) H-Division: Violent Crime in Progress
22 Operations Plan

23 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** COMM0051944, letter from the
24 Department of Justice to Commission Counsel regarding emergency operations plan,
25 February 22nd, 2022.

26 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Three nine three four
27 (3934).

28 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3934:**

1 (COMM0051944) Letter from DOJ to Commission Counsel
2 regarding Emergency Operations Plan, February 22nd, 2022

3 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** COMM59130, Tactical Operations
4 Manual, Chapter 7.1, Critical Incident Program Activation Policy.

5 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Three nine three five
6 (3935).

7 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3935:**

8 (COMM0059130) Tactical Operations Manual, Chapter 7.1:
9 Critical Incident Program Activation Policy

10 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** COMM0059656, draft crisis
11 communications SOP, April 2022.

12 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Three nine three six
13 (3936).

14 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3936:**

15 (COMM0059656) Draft Crisis Communications SOP, April
16 2022

17 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** COMM0039871, Operations Manual,
18 Chapter 27.1, Media Relations.

19 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Three nine three seven
20 (3937).

21 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3937:**

22 (COMM0039871) Operations Manual, Chapter 27.1: Media
23 Relations

24 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** COMM0039705, Administration Manual,
25 Chapter 13.1 -- oh, Communications Services. I think we already did that one at the
26 beginning, so not do that one again.

27 COMM0008559, SITREP re: vehicle returned to victim family with
28 alleged exhibits.

1 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Three nine three eight
2 (3938).

3 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3938:**

4 (COMM0008559) Vehicled Returned, Victim Family with
5 Alleged Exhibits

6 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** COMM0016812, Email from Cst Bent re:
7 family meeting, June 23rd, 2020.

8 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Three nine three nine
9 (3939).

10 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3939:**

11 (COMM0016812) Email from Cst. Bent, Briefs on Family
12 meeting, June 23rd, 2020

13 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** COMM0022210, which is also an email
14 from Cst Bent re: family meetings, dated June 23rd, 2020.

15 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Three nine four zero
16 (3940).

17 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3940:**

18 (COMM0022210) Email from Cst. Bent, June 23rd, 2020

19 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** COMM0028916, email about family
20 meetings, July 22nd, 2020.

21 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Three nine four one
22 (3941).

23 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3941:**

24 (COMM0028916) Email About Family Meetings, dated July
25 22nd, 2020

26 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** COMM0028481, email from Matt Logan to
27 Supt Campbell.

28 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Three nine four two

1 (3942).

2 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3942:**

3 (COMM0028481) Email from Matt Logan to Supt. Campbell
4 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** COMM0034822, H Strong key messages.
5 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Three nine four three
6 (3943).

7 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3943:**

8 (COMM0034822) H-Strong Key Messages
9 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** COMM0020592, email from C/Supt
10 Leather to Supt Campbell re: IMT summary 2011 CISNS bulletin, May 26th, 2020.
11 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Three nine four four
12 (3944).

13 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3944:**

14 (COMM0020592) Email from Chief Supt. Leather to Supt.
15 Campbell, dated May 26th, 2020
16 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** COMM0051721, email correspondence
17 regarding CISNS bulletin information, May 26, 2020.
18 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Three nine four five
19 (3945).

20 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3945:**

21 (COMM0051721) Email Correspondence regarding CISNS
22 Bulletin information, dated May 26th, 2020
23 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** COMM0021306, Task Report of DC Bruce
24 Lake re: CISNS bulletin, May 26, 2020.
25 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Three nine four six
26 (3946).

27 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3946:**

28 (COMM0021306) Task Report of DC Bruce Lake Via CISNS

1 Bulletin, May 26th, 2020

2 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** COMM0025465, email correspondence
3 regarding the release of the 2011 CISNS bulletin, May 27th, 2020.

4 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Three nine four seven
5 (3947).

6 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3947:**

7 (COMM0025465) Email Correspondence concerning the
8 release of the 2011 CISNS Bulletin, May 27th, 2020

9 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** COMM0035713, email from Derek
10 Santosuosso to Supt Campbell, June 2nd, 2020. We may have covered that one today,
11 but we can put it in now and double check.

12 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Three nine four eight
13 (3948).

14 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3948:**

15 (COMM0035713) Email from Derek Santosuosso to Supts.
16 Campbell and Leather dated June 2nd, 2020

17 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Thank you. COMM0054858, agenda,
18 October 1st, ARS Senior Officials Group, September 28th, 2020.

19 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Three nine four nine
20 (3949).

21 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3949:**

22 (COMM0054858) Agenda October 1st ARS Senior Officials
23 Group, September 28th, 2020

24 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** COMM0059693, letter to Commission
25 Counsel from the Department of Justice Canada, July 4th, 2022.

26 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Three nine five zero
27 (3950).

28 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3950:**

1 (COMM0059693) Letter from the DOJ of Canada to the
2 Commission Counsel, dated July 4th, 2022

3 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** COMM0024134, email correspondence
4 between Darren Campbell, Gerard Rose-Berthiaume, and Angela McKay, dated June
5 17th, 2020.

6 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Three nine five one
7 (3951).

8 **--- EXHIBIT No. 3951:**

9 (COMM0024134) Email Correspondence Between Darren
10 Campbell, Gerard Rose-Berthiaume and Angela McKay,
11 Dated June 17th, 2020

12 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And there are four -- five documents that
13 did not have COMM numbers until today, so these are newly available in the
14 Participant's workspace, in relativity. This is the response to written evidence number
15 two. This is the answers to the question of what the RCMP has done and changed
16 since the mass casualty events. That's COMM 0059949.

17 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** That's 3952.

18 **--- EXHIBIT NO. 3952:**

19 (COMM0059949) Response to Written Evidence Number 2

20 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Then COMM 0059945 are the notes of
21 Cindy Bayers, B-A-Y-E-R-S, who's a Communications official.

22 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** 3953.

23 **--- EXHIBIT NO. 3953:**

24 (COMM0059945) Notes of Cindy Bayers, Communications
25 Official

26 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** COMM 0059946 are audit documents.

27 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** 3954.

28 **--- EXHIBIT NO. 3954:**

1 (COMM0059946) Audit Documents

2 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** COMM 0059947 is a 2017 presentation to
3 the Town of Antigonish.

4 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** 3955.

5 **--- EXHIBIT NO. 3955:**

6 (COMM0059947) 2017 presentation to the Town of
7 Antigonish

8 **MS. RACHEL WOOD:** COMM 0059948 is sexual assault audit
9 documents.

10 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** 3956.

11 **--- EXHIBIT NO. 3956:**

12 (COMM0059948) Sexual assault audit documents

13 **MS. RACHEL WOOD:** Thank you. That's everything. Thank you
14 for your patience, Commissioners.

15 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Yeah, thank you so much, Ms.
16 Young.

17 Let's take a break, let's take a mid-afternoon break. It'll afford
18 Counsel for the Commission to meet with Counsel for the Participants and determine
19 whether or not our time would be better spent with the various Counsel organizing for
20 tomorrow or whether it would be necessary to or preferred to try to get some in today.

21 So we would normally take a 15-minute break and it would be a
22 little unfair to adjourn just for 15 minutes and no time for caucusing, so let's take 30
23 minutes and we'll see where we are at 3:30. Thank you.

24 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Thank you.

25 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Thank you. The
26 proceedings are now on break and will resume in 30 minutes.

27 --- Upon breaking at 3:01 p.m.

28 --- Upon resuming at 3:44 p.m.

1 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Welcome back. The
2 proceedings are again in session.

3 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you so much. Could we
4 have the witness back, please?

5 **DARREN CAMPBELL, Resumed:**

6 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you for today, Chief
7 Superintendent Campbell. Our Counsel has had an opportunity to meet with Counsel
8 for the various Participants and it seems like we would all agree that our time for the
9 rest of the day is better spent preparing for tomorrow and making sure it's done in as
10 organized a fashion as possible. So we'll let you go for the day. We're going to start
11 tomorrow at nine o'clock, so we would ask you to come back then, and you will be
12 questioned by various Participants. And you're still under oath, so we would ask you
13 not to discuss your testimony with anybody until you're through. And thank you again,
14 and thank you all for participating today, and we will adjourn then until nine o'clock
15 tomorrow morning. Thank you.

16 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Thank you. The
17 proceedings are adjourned until July 26th, 2022, at 9 o'clock a.m.

18 --- Upon adjourning at 3:46 p.m.

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14**CERTIFICATION**

I, Sandrine Marineau-Lupien, a certified court reporter, hereby certify the foregoing pages to be an accurate transcription of my notes/records to the best of my skill and ability, and I so swear.

Je, Sandrine Marineau-Lupien, une sténographe officiel, certifie que les pages ci-hauts sont une transcription conforme de mes notes/enregistrements au meilleur de mes capacités, et je le jure.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "S. Marineau-Lupien", is written over a horizontal line.

Sandrine Marineau-Lupien