

## **Public Hearing**

## **Audience publique**

### **Commissioners / Commissaires**

The Honourable / L'honorable J. Michael MacDonald,  
Chair / Président

Leanne J. Fitch (Ret. Police Chief, M.O.M)

Dr. Kim Stanton

### **VOLUME 55**

#### **Held at :**

Halifax Marriott Harbourfront Hotel  
1919 Upper Water Street  
Halifax, Nova Scotia  
B3J 3J5

Tuesday, July 26, 2022

#### **Tenue à:**

Hotel Marriot Harbourfront d'Halifax  
1919, rue Upper Water  
Halifax, Nouvelle-Écosse  
B3J 3J5

Mardi, le 26 juillet 2022

INTERNATIONAL REPORTING INC.

[www.irri.net](http://www.irri.net)  
(800)899-0006

## II Appearances / Comparutions

Ms. Rachel Young	Commission Counsel / Conseillère de la commission
Mr. Robert Pineo	Counsel / Conseiller
Mr. Thomas Macdonald	Counsel / Conseiller
Ms. Tara Miller	Counsel / Conseillère
Ms. Nasha Nijhawan	Counsel / Conseillère
Mr. Joshua Bryson	Counsel / Conseiller
Mr. James Lockyer	Counsel / Conseiller
Ms. Patricia MacPhee	Counsel / Conseillère
Ms. Lori Ward	Counsel / Conseillère

**III**  
**Table of Content / Table des matières**

	<b>PAGE</b>
<b>SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL, Resumed</b>	2
Cross-examination by Mr. Robert Pineo	3
Cross-examination by Mr. Tom Macdonald	56
Cross-examination by Ms. Tara Miller	76
Cross-examination by Ms. Nasha Nijhawan	109
Cross-examination by Mr. Joshua Bryson	125
Cross-examination by Mr. James Lockyer	151
Cross-examination by Ms. Lori Ward	162
Re-Examination by Ms. Rachel Young	175

**IV**  
**Exhibit List / Liste des pièces**

<b>No</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
	None entered	

Halifax, Nova Scotia

--- Upon commencing on Tuesday, July 26, 2022 at 9:05 a.m.

**REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Good morning. The proceedings of the Mass Casualty Commission are now in session with Commissioner Michael MacDonald, Commissioner Leanne Fitch and Commissioner Kim Stanton presiding.

**COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Bonjour et bienvenue. Hello, and welcome.

We join you from Mi'kma'ki, the ancestral and unceded territory of the Mi'kmaq.

Please join us in remembering those whose lives were taken, those who were harmed, their families and all those affected by the April 2020 mass casualty in Nova Scotia.

Today we will continue to hear from Superintendent Darren Campbell about his role as Support Services Officer for "H" Division at the time of the mass casualty, including his perspective on lessons learned and changes that could be implemented to help make our communities safer.

Senior Commission Counsel Rachel Young will continue to facilitate today's questioning, which will include questions from the counsel for Participants.

Whenever you are ready, Ms. Young. Thank you.

**MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Good morning, Commissioners, Participants and everyone. This morning we will have a full day of cross-examination by Participants, starting with Mr. Pineo for about two hours, followed by Mr. MacDonald for about 20 minutes, Tara Miller for about 20 minutes, Ms. Nijhawan for about 20 minutes, Mr. Bryson for about an hour and a half, possibly Mr. Lockyer, and then Ms. Ward.

I may have questions for about 20 minutes, and then it would be any questions that the Commissioners may have.

That is today's schedule.

1                   **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you so much.

2                   And let me take this opportunity to thank counsel, Commission  
3 Counsel and Participant Counsel, for working together yesterday to coordinate today in  
4 an orderly fashion and for agreeing upon the various outside -- as I understand it,  
5 outside timelines. And we're fortunate to have very experienced counsel in all aspects,  
6 and I trust that we'll be able to maintain those timelines.

7                   So thank you to all counsel.

8                   **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And Commissioners, before Mr. Pineo  
9 comes up, I just have a couple of very minor housekeeping matters.

10                  When we made exhibits yesterday at the end of the day, there was  
11 one document that was given two exhibit numbers, so I just wanted to free up the extra  
12 exhibit number. It was COMM0035713. That was given an Exhibit No. P-003905, but  
13 then also inadvertently P-003948, so if we could vacate the "948" number and that can  
14 be the next document to be exhibited.

15                  The next thing was, there were two -- there was a COMM number,  
16 there was an email chain between Superintendent Campbell and to Superintendent  
17 Chris Leather dated April 19th, 2020. And I think I had read COMM0017262. I missed  
18 the "7", so the correct COMM number is 0017262. I think I said "1262", so just  
19 correcting that for the record.

20                  And then lastly, COMM0051944, which was exhibited yesterday,  
21 that was a letter from the Department of Justice Canada to Commission Counsel about  
22 emergency operations plans. I gave the date as February 22nd, 2022 and the date  
23 should be February 27th, 2022.

24                  So that was all I had this morning.

25                  **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you.

26                  So we're ready for the witness, please.

27                  --- **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL, Resumed**

28                  **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Good morning, Chief

1 Superintendent Campbell.

2 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Good morning.

3 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Have a seat. You're still under  
4 oath.

5 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

6 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** And as I mentioned yesterday,  
7 counsel for the Commission and counsel for the various Participants met and they met  
8 again, and they've agreed on a process for questioning you in order in a way that would  
9 avoid duplication but, of course, have you respond to all appropriate questions.

10 So each counsel will come up in order and identify themselves and  
11 who they represent.

12 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Thank you.

13 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** So Mr. Pineo.

14 **--- CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. ROBERT PINEO:**

15 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Superintendent Campbell, I represent,  
16 along with my colleagues at Patterson Law, a majority of the families who lost family  
17 members in the mass casualty event as well as, I think, almost all of those victims who  
18 directly suffered harm and are still living.

19 So I'm going to ask, Madam Registrar, if you could bring up COMM  
20 No. 0059133.

21 Superintendent Campbell, do you recognize this document?

22 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, I do.

23 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And those -- that is the timeline that you  
24 produced; correct?

25 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** It was a timeline of some of the  
26 things that were happening over the 18th and 19th that were based on other source  
27 documents.

28 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Fair. So it is a document that you produced

1 yourself, though.

2 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, it is.

3 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. And as you mentioned, this  
4 document was made retroactively, wasn't it?

5 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** It was, based on looking at various  
6 source documents, as I mentioned before, for example, Critical Incident Commander  
7 notes, text messages, emails, et cetera.

8 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And Superintendent, I'm going to ask -- I  
9 understand you want to give a full answer, but I think our -- we're going to be here quite  
10 a while and if you could just answer the question that I'm actually posing and then you'll  
11 have an opportunity on re-direct if more information is needed to be given.

12 So my question, and I think you've agreed to it, is that you  
13 produced these records, this timeline, retroactively.

14 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

15 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And as you said, you did that by looking at  
16 other sources such as emails that you were involved in, text messages that you  
17 received or sent; correct?

18 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** That's correct.

19 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And you -- another source that you looked  
20 at was Staff Sergeant West's scribe's notes; correct?

21 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** That's correct, yes.

22 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And I take it that in producing this timeline,  
23 you looked at those scribe's notes and you found them to be accurate to the best of  
24 your recollection.

25 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** To the best of my recollection, yes.

26 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And in fact, you adopted the information  
27 contained in West's -- Staff Sergeant West's scribe's notes.

28 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.



1                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And getting ready for your testimony before  
2 this inquiry yesterday and today, did you have an opportunity to review both your  
3 timeline and the source -- sources of information that you based it on?

4                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Not immediately, no. I have looked  
5 at much of this information over the course of a lengthy period of time.

6                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Thank you.

7                   Now, you understand as a police -- that's former police officer and  
8 current police management that there is an importance to contemporaneous notes;  
9 correct?

10                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** That's correct, yes.

11                  **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** That is, notes taken at the time of the  
12 events are generally considered more accurate than those produced later in time from  
13 memory; correct?

14                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** That's correct.

15                  **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And in fact, I believe in your statement you  
16 said that it would have been preferable -- you would have preferred to have been able  
17 to have made these notes at the time, that is, on April 18th and 19th, 2020.

18                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

19                  **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And I understand that despite being a  
20 Superintendent, you did not have a scribe overnight April 18-April 19.

21                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No, I did not.

22                  **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And I think you described that as -- or the  
23 reason for that as being that there wasn't a scribe available, that there was a lack of  
24 resources.

25                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I wouldn't say there was a  
26 lack of resources. It's not normally something I would have had access to. I don't have  
27 a staff member to act as a scribe for me.

28                  **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** I'm going to ask, Madam Registrar, if you

1 could bring up COMM No. 0059847, and turn to page 12.

2 And Superintendent Campbell, I'm going to refer you to the ninth --  
3 eighth and ninth lines down, and the eighth line, Ms. Young asks you -- I guess to back  
4 up two more:

5 "MS. YOUNG: I mean, your idea of a scribe is  
6 interesting because the Critical Incident Commander  
7 has a scribe; right?"

8 You responded, "Yes."

9 Ms. Young then posed the question:

10 "Is this something you think might be useful for more  
11 senior officers to have scribes, too, like the SSO in  
12 that scenario to have a scribe?"

13 And just for information, you are the SSO in that situation; correct?

14 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** That's correct.

15 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Yes. Your answer was:

16 "Oh, absolutely, but again, it's all about resources,  
17 right."

18 So you did attribute the lack of a scribe to a lack of resources.

19 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, that's true, and I said that I  
20 don't have anyone assigned to me to act as a scribe, so it is a resourcing issue.

21 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And I take it as a Superintendent if you  
22 wanted a scribe, you could simply ask or order a member to be your scribe.

23 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I think that I probably could,  
24 but it would depend upon who I was asking for and what business line they actually  
25 reported to.

26 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Sure. But you had the authority to do that.

27 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Not under the circumstances, no.  
28 There were many people who were occupied at the time.

1                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** We'll get into that in a little bit.

2                   Now, you gave as an excuse or -- sorry. You gave as a reason that  
3 -- for not making your notes contemporaneous to the 18th and 19th as being that you  
4 didn't have a moment, and I think in your -- in your interview, you emphasized the word  
5 "moment" and then later you said, "I was too busy, very, very busy. The busiest I've  
6 ever been, and I've been in some busy places."

7                   Is that your recollection?

8                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** That is correct.

9                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Yeah. You simply didn't have the time to  
10 take your own notes on the 18th and 19th, did you?

11                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I was very occupied.

12                  **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Sorry?

13                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I was very occupied.

14                  **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Yeah.

15                  It's not clear from your interview when you started producing this  
16 timeline.

17                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** It would have been some time  
18 much later. I can't remember exactly when I did, but I felt it was important to be able to  
19 get my head around what it is I knew when I knew it, and the only way I could be able to  
20 do that is to look at other source documents to understand that.

21                  **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. Do you have an estimate of time for  
22 the start date of this timeline?

23                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I don't have an estimate of time.  
24 No, I don't.

25                  **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Was it approximately a year later?

26                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** It probably was before that, but I  
27 can't remember.

28                  **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Close to a year?

1                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Again, I can't remember to pinpoint  
2 an exact amount of time. I'm sorry; I can't do that.

3                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And you completed this timeline, I believe,  
4 in the summer of 2021. Does that sound correct?

5                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** It's possible, but again, as I said, I  
6 don't remember exactly when I did it.

7                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Madam Registrar, if you could bring up  
8 COMM No. 005135 -- sorry, 1376.

9                   And is that your handwriting on that document?

10                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** It does look like my handwriting,  
11 yes.

12                  **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And I'll tell you that this document has been  
13 entered into evidence here at the Commission as your handwritten notes.

14                  And can you at least review enough of that -- of that page to  
15 confirm that that makes up part of your handwritten notes?

16                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I can tell by looking at it those  
17 are -- that is my handwriting, yes.

18                  **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. And were these handwritten notes  
19 taken contemporaneously to the 18th and 19th, the portions that relate to the 18th and  
20 19th?

21                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I don't believe that these would be  
22 from the 19th. I'd have to see -- you'd have to bring up the date that I would have at the  
23 top of the page to be able to tell you exactly which date, and it doesn't show that on  
24 here.

25                  **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. I'll rephrase that question.

26                  When you were taking these notes, were they taken  
27 contemporaneously with the event that you're recording?

28                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

1                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** So for example, if you sat in on a witness  
2 interview and it's entered in these notes, you were taking the notes as the interview was  
3 going on?

4                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I never sat in on any witness  
5 interviews.

6                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. So you do have several places  
7 where witness information is listed. Was that being relayed to you from another  
8 member?

9                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, that's correct.

10                  **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. Madam Registrar, if I could ask you  
11 to bring up the timeline again? And that's COMM number 0059847.

12                               Supt Campbell, the first entry in your timeline is 22:46, or 10:46  
13 p.m. on April 18<sup>th</sup>. Do you recall creating that entry?

14                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, I do.

15                  **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And I'll sum up the -- I'll sum up that entry  
16 as I believe you were home sleeping, you received a telephone call from S/Sgt West, he  
17 gave you the first information about the shootings in Portapique, and that information  
18 was:

19                                       "Shooting in Portapique. Two dead. One near fence.

20                                       One on road. And possible domestic dispute." (As read)

21                                       Do you recall him providing that information to you?

22                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, I do.

23                  **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And based on that information, you  
24 activated a full CIC?

25                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, that's correct.

26                  **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Now I'm going to suggest to you, and you  
27 can think about it and let me know your answer, that in that first telephone call at 10:46  
28 p.m., S/Sgt West did not tell you that it was a possible domestic dispute?

1                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well it's possible, but that would be  
2 my recollection, that there was something about a possible domestic.

3                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And based on the evidence that you gave,  
4 you understood that the domestic dispute was between the shooter and Lisa McCully?

5                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No, I don't believe it was between  
6 the shooter and Lisa McCully. I don't think that there was any names that were  
7 provided to me at all ---

8                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay.

9                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** --- at that time.

10                  **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. I'm going to suggest that because  
11 you looked at and adopted S/Sgt West's scribe's notes, that you understood that S/Sgt  
12 West had information that the dispute was between Lisa McCully and the shooter? Do  
13 you recall that?

14                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I don't recall that, anything specific  
15 to Lisa McCully. No.

16                  **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. In reviewing the evidence that has  
17 been disclosed to this Commission, I'll tell you that I could not find at least any entry  
18 regarding the identity of Ms. McCully's remains being found until 10:59 p.m. Does that  
19 sound right to you?

20                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Her remains being found until  
21 10:59?

22                  **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** P.m. on April 18<sup>th</sup>.

23                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** In terms of an identification of Lisa  
24 McCully being at that location?

25                  **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Yes.

26                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I don't believe that Lisa McCully  
27 was ever ID'ed at that time, but I believe that in and around that time, from what I  
28 understand with respect tot eh timeline, that there was the body of a female found near

1 the property, which ultimately would later be identified as Lisa McCully.

2 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. I'm going to suggest to you also that  
3 the information about this potentially being a domestic dispute involving Lisa McCully  
4 came originally from Sgt Lilly, and from Sgt Lilly to Halliday, from Halliday to West, and  
5 from West to you. Do you understand that chain of information passing?

6 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I understand the chain, but the  
7 origins of who brought forward Lisa McCully's name as a potential for a domestic, I don't  
8 have any awareness of that.

9 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. So you didn't know that at the time?

10 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No.

11 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. So several times in your text  
12 messages to Chris Leather and others who you based your timeline on, you used the  
13 word "domestic dispute", "domestic dispute with an ex-girlfriend", that language. You do  
14 recall that?

15 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I believe that I did, yes.

16 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay.

17 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** And that would have been based  
18 on what information, little information, I was receiving.

19 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Sure. And would the fact that it was  
20 considered to be a domestic dispute have changed the plan of action for trying to  
21 contain the shooter?

22 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No, I don't believe it would. No.

23 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** So why is it that you relayed that  
24 information to the people you were reporting to or providing information to?

25 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well I think it just provides a little  
26 more context as to what it is that we have at that particular scene or that incident.  
27 What's the origin of it?

28 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** You said a few moments ago it wouldn't

1 have changed the RCMP response, but I'm going to suggest to you that in a domestic  
2 dispute, a domestic dispute is generally between a very small group of people, usually  
3 one partner or a family, or a very, you know, a very close group of people. So would  
4 that have informed whether or not you started looking outside of Portapique earlier?

5 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I don't believe so. And of course, I  
6 wasn't part of that decision making process, and that would be a question, obviously, for  
7 the Critical Incident Commander in terms of what effect that might have had on the  
8 Critical Incident Commander's decision making.

9 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** In block 3, the third line in your timeline,  
10 after saying:

11 "I approved CIC with ERT with minimal details, MCU  
12 resources stretched thin." (As read)

13 What did you mean by "stretched thin"? Were people off on  
14 illness? Was the MCU unit not sufficiently large to your way of thinking? Can you give  
15 us some reasons why you used "stretched thin"?

16 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Oh, absolutely. The reason why I  
17 said that is that the Northeast Nova Major Crimes Unit at that time was involved in a  
18 major project-based investigation. They were heavily tasked at that time with respect to  
19 that.

20 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And you go on to say that:

21 "We'll have to get SWN MCU to assist." (As read)

22 That's Southwestern Nova Scotia's MC unit?

23 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, it is.

24 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** MCU?

25 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

26 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And did they assist?

27 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, they did.

28 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Approximately what time did they arrive on



1 scene? Do you recall?

2 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I don't know. I don't have that time  
3 that Southwest Nova arrived on scene. But what I'll say is that there's a lot of  
4 connectivity amongst the Southwest Nova and the Northeast Nova teams. They often  
5 back each other up.

6 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Back to the domestic dispute with an ex-  
7 girlfriend, I'm going to suggest to you that S/Sgt West's scribe's notes do not mention a  
8 domestic dispute or an ex-girlfriend.

9 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Again, I don't have the -- if you  
10 would bring up S/Sgt West's scribe's notes, I could look at them. If it's not there, it's not  
11 there. But as I said, or I testified earlier, I remember some commentary in and around a  
12 domestic dispute. And I don't even believe it was with an ex-girlfriend. It was just a  
13 domestic dispute. And I think the word "girlfriend" was used.

14 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** If you look at the final block on the first  
15 page of your timeline, and this is at 3:35 a.m., and you're -- this is based on a  
16 screenshot that you captured, you said:

17 "Looks like it may have been a domestic with an ex-  
18 girlfriend." (As read)

19 See that?

20 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

21 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. And you can't say, sitting here  
22 today, where that information came from?

23 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well it would have come from a  
24 conversation. I say there in that text I just got off the phone with Jeff West, meaning I  
25 just had a conversation with Jeff. And this is being done just shortly after that  
26 conversation with S/Sgt West, because you can see the line or the box above the calls  
27 at 3:25 and my text message to Chris Leather is at 3:35. So it would have been as a  
28 result of that conversation with Jeff West.

1                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Sure. So going back to my first line of  
2 questions on this document, you didn't have that information at 22:46 on April 18<sup>th</sup>; did  
3 you?

4                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well it's possible that I didn't have  
5 that specific information, no.

6                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Probably just an error when you  
7 reconstructed your timeline?

8                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** It could be, yes.

9                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Back down to the final block on page 1 of  
10 your timeline, you said:

11    "We'll need to start discussing with J-Division ERT  
12 relief resources." (As read)

13                   So is it around that 3:35 timeframe that you began to think that  
14 perhaps we have to bring in the New Brunswick ERT unit?

15                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I would imagine that the  
16 Critical Incident Commander had already considered that, but for me, knowing full well  
17 that the Critical Incident Program was activated near 11 o'clock at night, they had  
18 already been on the ground for several hours, and if this incident was going to continue  
19 we would have to make sure that we had adequate resources to relieve those that had  
20 been out for a larger period of time.

21                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Was it your call to make to call in ERT?  
22 Sorry, J-Division ERT?

23                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, the way that it works in  
24 H-Division is that when we make a request to another division for resources it's called a  
25 CrOps-to-CrOps request. So essentially, someone from within my units would prepare  
26 a written submission that would follow a phone call, and normally it's the CrOps officer  
27 to the CrOps officer of another division to say, "Listen, we need some resources. Can  
28 you get them rolling, please? The paperwork will follow."

1                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Yeah. But was that your call to initiate that  
2 process?

3                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Someone within my program area.  
4 I know that it had already started or it was initiated by the Critical Incident Commander  
5 already, because they lean forward into that type of situation. But the approvals and the  
6 paperwork would have been handled by office and then approved by Chief  
7 Superintendent Leather.

8                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** You testified yesterday that the ERT unit in  
9 Nova Scotia is understaffed, I think you actually used the word "understaffed", and one  
10 of the first things you did after the Portapique incident was to increase the number of  
11 full-time staff to that unit. Had the -- H-Division ERT had a full complement, I believe it's  
12 18, would they have operated in two different shifts so you wouldn't have to bring in  
13 J-Division?

14                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No, they wouldn't. One shift would  
15 be a minimum of 12. And to go back to the -- your earlier point, the first thing that I did  
16 was not to increase the resources, the first thing I did was to move resources from those  
17 pressure-funded, what I called surplus-to-establishment positions in the districts and  
18 brought them into the ERT team. And then subsequent to that, there were a number of  
19 business cases that were written to the Province to increase to normalise those surplus-  
20 to-establishment positions, and then ask for an increase in resources, which, thankfully,  
21 the Province has approved.

22                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. But your first action there of moving  
23 people, the result of that was to increase the size of the ERT?

24                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No.

25                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** No?

26                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** The -- that action was a direct  
27 result to having more management control over those resources.

28                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. So how many -- how many ERT

1 members would you have to have so that they could operate in two shifts?

2 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** For ERT members to operate in  
3 two shifts, I would essentially have to double 18, so 36, and the reason for that is that  
4 there is no unfettered time off, and I need that buffer of at least three resources to  
5 ensure that for those that are not on call, or they have that necessary time off, and the  
6 training as well.

7 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And that would be ideal to have two shifts,  
8 would it?

9 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** That would be more than ideal.

10 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Can you turn, Madam Registrar, to the third  
11 page; sorry, the final page of the timeline.

12 And I'm looking at the second last block, 1936, and this is on  
13 April 19th. And you have it listed as:

14 "Incoming text from Chris Leather. "Are you free for a  
15 call-up on the blue-on-blue?""" (As read)

16 And I take it that was the Onslow Firehall incident, was it?

17 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, it is.

18 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** That was the only blue-on-blue incident  
19 during the rampage; correct?

20 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** That's the only one that I'm aware  
21 of, yes.

22 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And what did you and Chris Leather  
23 discuss during that conversation?

24 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I don't think that we actually had a  
25 conversation. I recall that it was difficult to raise Chief Superintendent Leather at that  
26 time. He was occupied in other matters.

27 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. So you and Chris Leather never  
28 discussed the blue-on-blue incident at the Onslow Firehall?

1                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** We would have done it much later,  
2 but I don't believe that it was at that time.

3                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. And what did you discuss when you  
4 did have that conversation?

5                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I recall having a discussion to  
6 determine whether or not Chris Leather had an awareness. First off, because of the  
7 fact that if there was a discharging of a firearm incident that would've necessitated a call  
8 to SiRT to conduct an independent investigation, which would have been handled by  
9 the Criminal Operations Officer's Office.

10                  **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And did you have any further investigation  
11 into that incident?

12                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No, I didn't personally, no.

13                  **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And the RCMP -- did the RCMP have a  
14 review of that incident internally?

15                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** If you would classify a conduct  
16 investigation as an internal review, the answer would be yes.

17                  **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And what were the results of that conduct  
18 review?

19                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I'm not specifically aware of the  
20 conduct review, but I believe that the conduct review did not result in any conduct  
21 charges against the two officers involved.

22                  **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** You were involved in press conferences on  
23 April 24th, 28th, and June 4th, 2020?

24                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, I was.

25                  **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And for the first two of those, you were the -  
26 - well, you were the member that was giving the information to the -- to the media?

27                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, I was. Myself and  
28 Corporal Jenn Clarke was with me as well.

1                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** She was translating your words into French  
2 though; correct?

3                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** That's correct.

4                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Yeah. And on the June 4th press  
5 conference, there was Brenda Lucki and -- or it's Brenda Lucki and Chris Leathers [sic]?

6                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No, it was ---

7                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Lee Bergerman?

8                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** --- Assistant Commissioner Lee  
9 Bergerman, Chris Leather, and myself.

10                  **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. And why is it that you became the  
11 person to address the public, the primary person to address the public?

12                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, as I testified yesterday, I think  
13 it was just a natural fit because of the fact that I was, perhaps, more so connected with  
14 some of the investigative activities. So I was trying to keep abreast of what was being  
15 learned at that time, so it just made sense.

16                  **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And in preparing for each of the press  
17 conferences, you produced several drafts of your speaking notes?

18                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I wouldn't say there were several  
19 drafts. The process was that, of course, I would consult with the Command triangle of  
20 the H-Strong investigation, and then I would sit with one of the Strategic Comms Unit  
21 individuals, there were two of them, well one in particular, Cindy Bayers, and we -- and  
22 Cindy would take notes and then she would produce a script based on those  
23 conversations.

24                  **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** So your speaking notes were her words or  
25 your words? Who produced the -- who produced the script?

26                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** The script was produced by our  
27 Strategic Comms people, based on input from the investigative team, and myself as  
28 well.

1                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. And you reviewed the draft or the  
2 information that was provided to you to ensure that it was fact-checked and correct?

3                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Not just myself that would review it,  
4 but the process that we would follow is that we would send the drafts to the investigative  
5 team or the Command triangle and they would review it as well.

6                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Did you have the final say on what would  
7 be provided to the media by you?

8                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No. I actually didn't have final say.  
9 The final say really rests -- that authority rests with the team commander of the  
10 investigation. If there's something that they're not comfortable with, that team  
11 commander really has that veto power on what should or shouldn't be said.

12                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Would you have said something that you  
13 didn't believe to be true?

14                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No, I wouldn't say anything that I  
15 did not believe to be true.

16                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And the words in your speaking notes and  
17 that you ultimately used to the media were very carefully chosen by the drafters, you  
18 included.

19                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I would say it would be  
20 irresponsible to not carefully choose the words because if you -- if you provide  
21 information that's not accurate, that wouldn't be good.

22                   Also, if you provide information that might offend people, that  
23 wouldn't be good as well.

24                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** So your answer's yes, the words were  
25 chosen very carefully.

26                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I would say that that is a fair  
27 statement to make, yes.

28                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And I think you touched on it there, but

1 you'll agree with me that it's very important when you're conveying sensitive information  
2 like this to the public that -- you know, that the words are chosen carefully to convey  
3 proper meaning and to not cause further trauma.

4 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I agree, yes.

5 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** You also testified in your statement to the --  
6 to this Commission that you would never hold back information that would cast the  
7 RCMP in a negative light.

8 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I believe that, yes.

9 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Yeah. And you wouldn't do that, would  
10 you?

11 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No, I wouldn't.

12 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** You wouldn't hold it back and not tell the  
13 public if it was negative to the RCMP.

14 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I think I've demonstrated that.

15 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Well, my question is, you wouldn't do that;  
16 correct?

17 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No, I wouldn't.

18 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Madam Registrar, if you could bring up  
19 COMM No. 005772.

20 Sorry, 0057762.

21 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** And that's a marked  
22 exhibit, 3532.

23 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And if you could look at page 37, please.  
24 That's 37 of the document, not of the PDF. And down to paragraph 23.

25 Superintendent Campbell, this is a transcript of the April 24th press  
26 conference. And in the -- if you look at paragraph 23 and the third paragraph under  
27 that, you're setting the context for the actions taken by the RCMP overnight.

28 And one of the things you say -- said was, "These homes are set



1 back from the roadways.” And I’m going to suggest to you that that was -- that was a  
2 generalization, wasn’t it?

3 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, it is a generalization because  
4 I’m talking about several things. And that’s based on how the scene was described to  
5 me.

6 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Leaving that aside, they are your words.

7 So what you -- what was being conveyed here was the homes in  
8 Portapique on Orchard Beach Drive and Portapique Beach Road, et cetera were not  
9 close to the roadway on which they were located.

10 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I think what I was trying to convey  
11 is that this is a rural area and rural properties have those characteristics.

12 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Well, you didn’t say that, though, did you?  
13 You said they’re set back from the roadways.

14 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, I did. And I’m not describing  
15 how far they’re set back from the roadways.

16 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Right. So the -- what was meant to be  
17 conveyed there, the import to the listener, was that the homes were set back from the  
18 roadways so that it would take some time to get from the roadway to the home; correct?

19 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I don’t think that there’s anything in  
20 there that’s intended to lead anyone to believe anything other than a general description  
21 of the area.

22 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. So that’s your position on that  
23 statement.

24 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

25 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** So you understand that some of the houses  
26 were very close to the roadway on which they were located; correct?

27 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I really don’t know. I’ve been to  
28 Portapique. I’ve been through that area. I guess it would depend on how some people

1 would depict a roadway that's close to the house. For example, in the city there are  
2 homes that are right on the sidewalk.

3 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Sure. So you visited the crime scenes, did  
4 you?

5 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Not all of them, no. I've been to  
6 Portapique and I -- the only crime scene that I physically visited on my way to Bible Hill  
7 detachment that morning -- there were two of them, actually. One was the Big Stop and  
8 the second was the cloverleaf in Shubenacadie.

9 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** So during the investigation in the days  
10 following April 19th, you didn't go into Portapique to visit the scene -- the crime scenes?

11 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I never went into any of the  
12 Portapique crime scenes, no.

13 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Did you go into Portapique and drive on the  
14 roadways near the crime scenes?

15 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I did, yes.

16 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. And you understand that the Zahl-  
17 Thomas house was relatively close to Portapique Beach Road, wasn't it?

18 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I believe that -- if I recall correctly  
19 which residence that is, I think it's on a corner property and I would say -- and of course,  
20 it was no longer standing. But based on the debris that was left at that scene, 30, 40  
21 feet from the roadway, perhaps.

22 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. And similarly, the McCully home,  
23 you'll agree with me that it had a circular driveway and it wasn't very -- it wasn't a great -  
24 - it wasn't any further from the road than the Zahl-Thomas house, was it?

25 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** It appeared to be similar in terms of  
26 the distance up to, at most, 50 feet.

27 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And you'll agree with me that the  
28 Gulenchyn home was, in fact, very close to the road.

1                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I've never seen the Gulenchyn  
2 home, and I don't know if I actually -- perhaps I'd driven by it, but it was no longer  
3 standing so I wouldn't be able to comment on that.

4                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. And did you -- the people that wrote  
5 your words for the April 24th press conference, did you specifically ask them how close  
6 the houses were to the roadways?

7                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No, I didn't.

8                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Next, if you could turn over to page 38 of  
9 the document. And under cluster 1, there's French translation, the heading, and then  
10 cluster 1 going down four paragraphs, you say:

11                                   "Officers arrived on scene at 10:26 in the evening  
12                                   where they located a male who was leaving the area  
13                                   with an apparent gunshot wound."

14                   And you understand that to be Andrew MacDonald?

15                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

16                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. And further down in the paragraph,  
17 you stated to the public that Andrew MacDonald noted or stated that there was only way  
18 in and out of the community, and then you state, "That's important to note."

19                   And why was that important to note? Why is that sentence in this  
20 press conference?

21                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, that is based on the  
22 information that was provided to me by Gerry Rose-Berthiaume, who was the primary  
23 investigator at that time. And it was Gerry that had mentioned that to me, which --  
24 which is relaying information that was known to the officers or believed to be known by  
25 the officers at that time.

26                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** But I'm asking specifically about why is it  
27 you asked the public to note that, that you said that was important to note?

28                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, because I believe it provides

1 greater context in terms of the response.

2 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** That's correct. And that helps explain why  
3 -- why Brown Loop, for example, wasn't closed down earlier than it actually was;  
4 correct?

5 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Correct. As I understood at that  
6 time, the responding members believed that there was one way in and one way out to  
7 the community.

8 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** You understand that immediately behind  
9 Andrew and Katie MacDonald's car was a car driven by David Faulkner, and in the car  
10 was his wife and daughter?

11 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I do know that, but the identity of  
12 the Faulkners wasn't known to me. I remember being informed that there was a vehicle  
13 -- in fact, I think it was a white vehicle -- that was following behind the MacDonald's  
14 vehicle.

15 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Yes. And that information was not taken  
16 from them as to their identities and their contact information, was it?

17 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I don't believe it was, no.

18 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Or why they were in Portapique at that  
19 time.

20 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I can't speak to the actions of other  
21 officers that were at the scene and why they did or didn't do something, but ---

22 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** I didn't ask you that, sir. I asked you if it  
23 was done.

24 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I don't believe that it was done, no.

25 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** You'll agree with me that what's known now  
26 is that the Faulkner family used to live at the home that, at the time of this incident, was  
27 owned by Leon Joudrey.

28 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I don't know that. I've never

1 actually read the Faulkner statement.

2 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. You'll agree with me that being a  
3 local, though, who was not in an understandably traumatic state from just being shot,  
4 might have been able to have provided better information about whether there was only  
5 one way in and out of Portapique; correct?

6 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I would agree, yes.

7 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Yes. And likewise, your officers did have  
8 the identity of Katie MacDonald, Andrew MacDonald's partner, and she wasn't followed  
9 up on in that, you know, 10 to 11 o'clock timeframe either; was she?

10 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I don't know the timeline of when  
11 she was interviewed. I'm not familiar with that.

12 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** You'll agree with me that having lived, at  
13 the time living in Portapique, she might have been able to have provided important  
14 information about whether there was a second way in and out of Portapique?

15 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I agree, yes.

16 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Could turn to page 39, document page 39.  
17 I'm looking at the first full paragraph on page 39, and one of the statements made at this  
18 April 24<sup>th</sup> press conference was,

19 "Over a lengthy [period] of time, first responders  
20 engaged in [cleaning -- sorry,] clearing references,  
21 searched for suspects, provided life saving measures  
22 to victims."

23 And I take it in first responders, you actually mean the RCMP;  
24 correct?

25 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, no, that would be the RCMP,  
26 and I believe there was also EHS that were called ---

27 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Yes. EHS --

28 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** --- to the scene.

1                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** --- EHS did not enter Portapique though  
2 until the next morning; correct?

3                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I seem to recall that there was EHS  
4 that was standing by, and that Andrew MacDonald actually had been transferred over to  
5 EHS. Again, I wasn't there. I don't know exactly where that transition took place.

6                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** So even at the time when Andrew  
7 MacDonald was there, you understand that EHS did not go into Portapique? They  
8 stayed out on Highway 2; correct?

9                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I don't know exactly where EHS  
10 made that transition with Andrew MacDonald and our officers.

11                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** In terms of providing life-saving measures,  
12 you'll agree with me that at least until 6 a.m. or 6:30 a.m. when Lisa Banfield was  
13 alleged to have come out of the woods, the only people injured that received any  
14 treatment at all were Mr. Ellison, who spent 2 or 3 hours in the woods, and he was  
15 removed and treated for hypothermia. You understand that?

16                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

17                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And that treatment was done outside of  
18 Portapique?

19                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I have no awareness of where that  
20 treatment occurred.

21                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. And Andrew MacDonald, who was  
22 shot by the perpetrator, you understand that he received some first aid treatment?

23                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, that's correct.

24                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And you understand that Andrew  
25 MacDonald's injuries were not life-threatening?

26                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I know that now that they  
27 weren't life-threatening, but I don't know -- I had no information with respect to the level  
28 of his injury at that time.

1                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. But to say that -- do you have any  
2 information to suggest that what he was provided was life-saving measures?

3                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I would think that any kind of  
4 emergent care could be considered a life-saving measure.

5                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** You understand that Aaron Patton  
6 described the gunshot wound to the arm, it was in and out and didn't require a  
7 tourniquet?

8                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I do know that now, but I didn't  
9 know that at that time, no.

10                  **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And did you know about it on April 24<sup>th</sup>  
11 when this press conference was ---

12                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** In terms of the level of the injury? I  
13 don't believe ---

14                  **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Yes.

15                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** --- I did, no.

16                  **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. So I take it then that the RCMP  
17 didn't know if or what life-saving measures were provided to any victims that evening?

18                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I would say that the -- what  
19 we did know is that EHS was called, that people were injured, so it's a general term of  
20 life-saving measures.

21                  **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Sure. You could have just as easily said  
22 provided first aid or provided treatment to victims; correct?

23                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Provided treatment would probably  
24 be a more accurate statement as opposed to providing first aid.

25                  **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Sure. The term life-saving measures was  
26 provided, you know, to glorify the rescue efforts that evening; wasn't it?

27                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No, that would suggest that there  
28 was an intent to characterize something inaccurately. It was just the choice of words

1 that were used.

2 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. But not an accurate or careful  
3 choice of words; was it?

4 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, you, yourself described that  
5 there -- the words are chosen carefully.

6 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** But, no, you agreed to that, sir. I  
7 suggested it to you, and you agreed to it.

8 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yeah, and I think that that's an  
9 appropriate thing to do, but in this case, it was just how it was characterized. There was  
10 nothing intentional in terms of trying to mislead anyone, no.

11 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** In the fourth -- oh, sorry, could you bring  
12 page 39 back up, please? And this is the paragraph that deals with Lisa Banfield  
13 emerging from the woods after 6:30 in the morning. And I'm just going to refer you to  
14 the last two sentences, and they are,

15 "This included the fact that he was in a possession of  
16 a fully marked and equipped replica RCMP vehicle  
17 and was wearing a police uniform." (As read)

18 Sorry, no, I'll stop it there, but I'm going to suggest to you that Lisa  
19 Banfield did not say that he was wearing a police uniform in her first interviews with the  
20 RCMP.

21 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, that's possible, but this was  
22 the information relayed to me, and then, of course, provided to the command triangle for  
23 clarification.

24 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** So if we could have Exhibit 43, please,  
25 page 20, and line 587, I believe. Lisa Banfield -- sorry, this is a transcript of Lisa  
26 Banfield's recorded statement, and she said,

27 "He had black jeans on, a burnt orange vest, a black  
28 hat. But, that's what he had on, I don't know if he



1 changed..."

2 So the information that Lisa Banfield relayed shortly after 6:30 a.m.  
3 was that he was not wearing a police uniform; correct?

4 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** In terms of this statement by  
5 Constable Brown, I believe that was taken at the scene. I wasn't aware of the details,  
6 the specific or finite details of that interview, and I know that there were subsequent  
7 interviews that took place after that initial interview as well.

8 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. So despite not knowing those facts  
9 though, you still -- you or your writer still made the statement that he was wearing a  
10 police uniform and that Lisa Banfield conveyed that when she come out of the woods;  
11 correct?

12 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I would have to look at all Lisa  
13 Banfield statements and I haven't read all of her statements, so I don't know at what  
14 point in time that that may have even been said. Again, as I already testified, this would  
15 have been based on the information that was provided to me, and the interpretations of  
16 those that provided that information.

17 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. You'll agree with me that putting it  
18 out there to the public that the gunman was wearing a police uniform though helped  
19 explain some of the obfuscation that he was able to commit against the RCMP trying to  
20 find him; correct?

21 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Sorry, can you repeat that  
22 question?

23 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Sure. It was advantageous to the RCMP to  
24 have the public believe that the shooter was wearing a police uniform to evade them;  
25 correct?

26 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I don't think it would have been  
27 advantageous to the police. I think the reality is, is that prior to that press conference,  
28 there had already been a video of the perpetrator stopping and getting out of a vehicle,

1 showing him wearing parts of a police uniform, so I don't think that there would have  
2 been any advantage. It just was at some point in time during the course of events, it  
3 was a reality.

4 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Sure. But the words spoken to the media  
5 were that he was wearing a police uniform and that was attributed to Lisa Banfield when  
6 she came out of the woods. So the implication there is that he was wearing a police  
7 uniform from the time she saw him last, which was sometime around 10 p.m. the night  
8 before onwards, and that wasn't correct; was it?

9 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, obviously, at the time that she  
10 gave her initial statement, that wouldn't be correct, but, again, I don't really see how that  
11 would provide any advantage or disadvantage.

12 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. I believe that one of the things that  
13 has been provided to the media by the RCMP is that an emergency alert was not -- one  
14 of the reasons that an emergency alert or more detailed information about the replica  
15 cruiser and what Wortman was -- sorry; what the gunman was wearing was that you  
16 didn't want -- the RCMP didn't want any harm brought to their own members by the  
17 public or others. That's been stated; correct?

18 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I -- I've never said that myself, no.

19 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Are you aware of anybody else saying it?

20 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** There might have been other  
21 individuals that had testified here at the Mass Casualty Commission that might have felt  
22 that way, but ---

23 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Or otherwise, to the media?

24 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I'm sorry?

25 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** You're not aware of anybody saying that,  
26 then; is that what you're saying?

27 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, no, I'm saying that I believe  
28 that some have testified that that would have been a contributing factor. I have other

1 views on that, but others may have said that.

2 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. And if we could go back to  
3 COMM0057762, and to page 41?

4 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** And that's Exhibit 3532?

5 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Yes.

6 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** And you indicated page  
7 41?

8 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Forty-one (41), yes.

9 And in the fourth paragraph started with, "The gunman travelled":

10 "The gunman travelled south on Highway 224, coming  
11 to the Big Stop...in Enfield."

12 And I'm going to submit that he didn't travel directly from Highway  
13 224 to the Big Stop in Enfield; he stopped in Elmsdale, the exit before, to the PetroCan  
14 to try to get fuel, didn't he?

15 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** That's correct, yes.

16 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And RCMP members saw him there;  
17 correct?

18 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, that's correct.

19 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And that fact was left out of the April 24<sup>th</sup>  
20 press release, wasn't it?

21 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** It was, but not intentionally. I had  
22 zero awareness that there was that other -- I would call it a close encounter at the  
23 PetroCanada. I did not know that.

24 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And in the April 24<sup>th</sup> press conference, you  
25 didn't, in your speech or in your initial speech to the media, you didn't mention the fire --  
26 the Onslow Fire Hall incident, did you?

27 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No, I did not.

28 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** In fact, it was brought up by Todd Battis of

1 CTV for the first time during that interview -- during that press conference, wasn't it?

2 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I don't remember who the reporter  
3 is, and I'm assuming that there was a question that might have been posed to me about  
4 that, but I don't recall. I'd have to look at the transcript.

5 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. If you could turn over to page 42 of  
6 Exhibit 3532? And if you turn about three -- two-thirds of the way down the page, the  
7 Moderator says:

8 "Thank you. The next question is from Todd Battis,  
9 CTV News....go ahead. Your line is open."

10 And Mr. Battis says:

11 "Good morning, Superintendent. Thank you very  
12 much. I wanted to ask a question regarding the  
13 shooting at the fire hall in Onslow."

14 And then he goes on. So you'll agree with me that that was the first  
15 time that the incident in Onslow was raised by -- raised at the April 24<sup>th</sup> press  
16 conference.

17 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, without reading the full  
18 transcript it probably is, yes.

19 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Yeah. And missing from your speaking  
20 notes and the speech that you gave to the media was any mention of the three  
21 firefighters who were inside the Onslow Fire Hall during that shooting; there was no  
22 mention of them, was there?

23 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No, and in fact, I don't think I even  
24 had any level of understanding as to what transpired there at that time.

25 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. And likewise, the civilian, Richard  
26 Ellison, who was also in the Fire Hall, there was no mention of him, was there?

27 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No, there was not.

28 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** So Madam Registrar, if we could keep the

1 same exhibit up and turn now to page 52?

2 And this, starting now into the transcript of the April 28<sup>th</sup> press  
3 conference. And, again, you were the speaker for the RCMP, with the translation  
4 assistance of Cpl. Clarke, is that ---

5 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** That's correct, yes.

6 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Yeah. And in this press conference -- and  
7 just for your reference, I'm looking at the fifth paragraph down, you say:

8 "At this time, priority areas for us are to determine  
9 how the gunman obtained access to the equipment  
10 that he used, and to establish the gunman's  
11 movements before and after April 18th and 19th. We  
12 also want to determine if anyone had knowledge of  
13 the gunman's plan, if any, and if they assisted him in  
14 any way."

15 And a couple of questions following up from that. We do know that,  
16 ultimately, charges were laid against three individuals for providing ammunition.

17 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** That's correct, yes.

18 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And we know that the RCMP conducted an  
19 investigation, or assisted in an investigation by the FBI in the United States.

20 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** That's correct, yes.

21 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And, ultimately, no charges were laid  
22 against Mr. Conlogue or others in the United States; correct?

23 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** By US authorities, no.

24 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Were others investigated as well that I  
25 haven't mentioned; that is, the three that charges were actually laid against and the  
26 Americans; were there other -- were other people investigated?

27 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

28 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Would you tell me who those were?

1                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, there would have been an  
2 investigation in terms of the procurement of certain things like the decals. So Peter  
3 Griffin was subject to further investigation.

4                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And I take it that that investigation has  
5 concluded?

6                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I believe that there's nothing in that  
7 investigation that would have warranted any additional charges.

8                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Anybody else besides Mr. Griffin?

9                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Not that I'm aware of, no.

10                  **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** If we could turn over to page 53 of the  
11 same exhibit?

12                  I'm looking at the last full paragraph on page 53 starting with, "This  
13 information". In that first sentence, you state:

14    "This information, gathered since the incidents  
15    occurred, lead us to believe that the gunman had  
16    actually left the Portapique area through a field at  
17    approximately 10:35."

18                  So the first part of that is that he left through a field, and what you  
19 didn't say there and in other -- well, we'll just deal with this right now, what you didn't  
20 say there was that he drove through a field -- through a field on a road-like structure, did  
21 you?

22                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** The way it was always described to  
23 me is, is "The blueberry field"; that's how I was always provided information from the  
24 Command ---

25                  **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Was it described to you as the "Blueberry  
26 field road"?

27                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I remember the blueberry  
28 field.

1 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay.

2 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** A road, you know, I guess it would  
3 be what you classify a road to be.

4 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Yeah. We've had that debate as well.  
5 Madam Registrar, could I have you bring up COMM number  
6 0050894, and if you would turn to page 24?

7 And this is the First Responders Foundational Document that's  
8 been tendered in evidence before this Commission. And the Foundational Document  
9 provides that this is a photograph of the blueberry field road, and you'll agree with me  
10 that you, in your press conference on April 28<sup>th</sup>, did not describe a roadway, well, at all,  
11 but certainly not a structure such as what is shown in this photograph; did you?

12 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No, I provided no description of the  
13 road. No.

14 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Your only statement was that he escaped  
15 through a field?

16 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, that's correct.

17 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And you'll agree with me that one possible  
18 import from that is that he drove over land that had no road structure at all? That's a  
19 possible import from your statement; isn't it?

20 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well some may have considered it  
21 that way.

22 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And the second part of -- sorry, you can set  
23 that exhibit aside and go back to the previous exhibit, which is 3532. And the final full  
24 paragraph where I read into the record earlier:

25 "Left the Portapique area through a field at  
26 approximately..." (As read)

27 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Excuse me. Which  
28 page number?

1                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Oh, my apologies. Page 53.

2                   And back to that, the end of the sentence that I have read a couple  
3 of times:

4                                   “Left the Portapique area through a field at approximately  
5 10:35.” (As read)

6                   My second question on that is, at a later point in time, the RCMP  
7 changed that timeline to 10:45, as they received more information; correct?

8                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** That’s correct. But I also believe  
9 that that is more than likely either an error on my part, or based on the interpretation of  
10 the timing of the Command Triangle at that time, it was later -- I know that there was  
11 some debate in and around the witness statements that apparently seen some  
12 headlights on the blueberry field road and the timing of that was not necessarily locked  
13 down well.

14                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. Regardless of the reason, the  
15 RCMP, to your knowledge at least, didn’t go back to the media and correct that timeline  
16 to 10:45; did they?

17                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No, I believe that there was a  
18 correction actually on the 10:45 time. I seem to recall that. And I believe that they -- the  
19 determination of that time was based on when the perpetrator was seen on video at the  
20 Great Village area.

21                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** I’m going to suggest to you that it was the  
22 independent investigation of Sarah Ritchie from Global News that found out that the  
23 timeline had been changed to 10:45, and after she reported it, the RCMP corrected the  
24 timeline officially? Is that your recollection?

25                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well you asked me whether or not  
26 the RCMP corrected the timeline, ---

27                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Yes.

28                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** --- and I said I believe that we did,



1 and now you're suggesting that it was Sarah Ritchie that reported that based on an  
2 RCMP correction. So I'm not sure what your question is.

3 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** My question is that it was -- that the  
4 correction was not made public by the RCMP, that it was made public by Sarah Ritchie  
5 at Global News?

6 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** It may have been. I'm not sure. I  
7 mean, there were multiple media requests. And it might have been corrected via a  
8 question from the media. But I'm not certain how that took place.

9 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** If you could go back to the same page of  
10 the same exhibit? And I'm looking at the paragraph immediately under the heading  
11 "Car". And I'm looking at the last full paragraph in which you stated to the media:

12 "However, at this stage in the investigation, we have not  
13 uncovered any information that the police had knowledge  
14 that he had possession of these vehicles, or he had  
15 possessed a replica police vehicle." (As read)

16 And I'm going to suggest to you before we go to documents that in  
17 fact Cst Dorrington in February 2020 had knowledge that the perpetrator had a  
18 decommissioned police vehicle?

19 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I learned that much later, that that  
20 was a factor in terms of, I believe it was a February 12<sup>th</sup> vehicle stop that was conducted  
21 by Cst Dorrington.

22 But specifically I think what it is that I was trying to convey there  
23 was knowledge of the replica police vehicle, there was no information that I was aware  
24 of that the RCMP had awareness of a replica police vehicle.

25 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. And that's well and good. That's the  
26 second part of that sentence. But your actual words were that:

27 "The police had no knowledge that he had possessed  
28 these vehicles." (As read)

1 By "those vehicles" you were referring tot eh other decommissioned  
2 police vehicles? Not the replica cruiser; correct?

3 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I can see how that might be  
4 interpreted that way.

5 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Well how else could it be interpreted?  
6 What did you mean then?

7 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Exactly what I said there. I was  
8 under the impression that we had no knowledge of the fact that he had possession of  
9 one, the replica police vehicle, and it's not intentional, but I can see your point in terms  
10 of it being confusing.

11 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Yeah. Well, choosing your words carefully  
12 and trying to inform the public properly, wouldn't the sentence have been: "The police  
13 had non knowledge that he possessed a replica police vehicle"?

14 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well as I understand it, if we're  
15 speaking about the multiple decommissioned police vehicles, ---

16 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** You're not responding to my question.

17 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Let him answer the question,  
18 please, Mr. Pineo.

19 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** So as I understood it, the  
20 registration on all those vehicles was registered in a company name. I don't believe that  
21 they were registered in the offender's name.

22 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** You're talking about possession though, sir,  
23 not about registration or ownership.

24 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, ---

25 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** You used the word "possession".

26 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** --- possession and -- okay. Well, I  
27 mean if you want to -- if you want to describe it in that way, again, as I said before,  
28 there's no intention there to mislead.

1                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. You do understand that Cst  
2 Dorrington, around midnight April 18/April 19, had provided the information about the  
3 decommissioned police vehicle that he had stopped in February of 2020, he provided  
4 that to the Critical Incident Commander?

5                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I do know that now, yes.

6                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** So certainly at that point in time, if we're  
7 talking only about the decommissioned vehicles, the RCMP did have knowledge that he  
8 possessed decommissioned -- at least one decommissioned ---

9                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Some would have, yes. Yes.

10                  **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** I'm going to turn now to the June 4<sup>th</sup> press  
11 conference. This is the press conference that you attended with Lee Bergerman and  
12 Chris Leather.

13                                 And if we could have the same exhibit and turn to page 66?

14                                 And under heading "Transcript of Supt Campbell's Statement", first  
15 paragraph, you speak -- further in the paragraph, you say:

16   "Through the assigned RCMP family liaison officers,  
17 families have been advised in advance of when and what  
18 information we are providing publicly." (As read)

19                                 And the first part of that sentence, "RCMP family liaison officers", I  
20 just want you to confirm that in regards, all of the victims, except for Heidi Stevenson's  
21 family, they had one family liaison officer; correct?

22                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I do know that Cst Wayne or  
23 Skipper Bent was assigned as the victim family liaison, but it was always communicated  
24 to him that if he required additional liaisons to assist him, that he had all the authority to  
25 be able to do that.

26                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** There was only one family liaison officer for  
27 all of the victims, excluding Heidi Stevenson; correct?

28                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Skipper Bent was the main family

1 liaison and he was the one that was assigned.

2 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** He was the only one?

3 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, he was the one that was  
4 assigned.

5 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Yes.

6 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** And he certainly could have -- and

7 ---

8 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** I'm not asking what he could have done.

9 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yeah.

10 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** He was the only one assigned. He was the  
11 only one that took the job. Correct?

12 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well I actually believe that there  
13 was another family liaison that was discussed for one of the victim family members  
14 because there was ---

15 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Did you say discussed?

16 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

17 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay.

18 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** There was.

19 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** But not assigned?

20 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well I think that there was one,  
21 actually, assigned to ---

22 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Who was that?

23 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I think -- I don't know who it was. I  
24 wasn't intimately involved in those discussions.

25 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay.

26 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** But I do remember having a  
27 conversation with one of the family members about some issues that they were  
28 experiencing with having Cst Bent as their family liaison.

1                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And ultimately, there was not another  
2 family liaison officer assigned tot hat family or any others; correct?

3                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I don't know off hand, no.

4                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And it's true that Heidi Stevenson's family  
5 had two family liaison officers; correct?

6                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** There were two officers, Cpl Randy  
7 Slaughter and Cpl Ronnie Robinson that were dealing with Heidi's spouse, Dean. I  
8 believe it was Randy Slaughter that was dealing with Dean, and the other officer was  
9 dealing with Heidi's biological parents.

10                  **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Commissioners, I'm not sure when you'd  
11 like to take the mid-morning break. I probably have about another 20 minutes of  
12 questioning. We can -- I can go right through and we can take the break, or we can  
13 break now.

14                  **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** I'll give you the choice.  
15 Chief Superintendent Campbell, you're fine to carry on?

16                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Whichever ---

17                  **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** If you're going to be ---

18                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** --- the preference is.

19                  **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** --- 20 minutes we might as well  
20 break at 11 o'clock and you can continue on.

21                  **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay.

22                  **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** If that's okay with the  
23 Commissioners. Yeah. Okay.

24                  **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** If I could have one second just to confer  
25 with my colleagues.

26                  **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Absolutely.

27                  **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Commissioners, I gave notice yesterday  
28 during our caucus that I intended to ask some questions of Superintendent Campbell

1 regarding the investigation and charges against Lisa Banfield, just the factual basis of  
2 those charges. And I understand that she is now being discharged from her restorative  
3 justice process that took place this morning. We have a colleague attending who has  
4 given us that information. It was part of the reason that I suggested perhaps a break  
5 right now to confirm that.

6 But there wasn't any strong objection to me asking those questions,  
7 but I note that Mr. Lockyer here is not here and he is her -- or unless he's slipped in in  
8 the last couple of minutes, that he is not here to make any objections that he might want  
9 to make. He indicated to me -- well, I'll leave that for him.

10 So ---

11 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Well, maybe it is a good time to  
12 take a break.

13 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay, sure thing.

14 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Yeah, we'll take 20 minutes.

15 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Thank you.

16 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Sorry, 15 minutes.

17 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Fifteen is good, yes.

18 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Thank you. The  
19 proceedings are now on break and will resume in 15 minutes.

20 --- Upon recessing at 10:22 a.m.

21 --- Upon resuming at 10:41 a.m.

22 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Welcome back. The  
23 proceedings are again in session.

24 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you. I'll have the witness  
25 back, please.

26 **--- SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL, Resumed:**

27 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you, Chief  
28 Superintendent Campbell.

1 Mr. Pineo, whenever you're ready.

2 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Thank you.

3 **--- CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. ROBERT PINEO (Cont'd):**

4 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** If I could have Exhibit 3532 back up.  
5 Superintendent Campbell, I'm still referring to the June 4th press  
6 release or press conference.

7 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** And which page  
8 number?

9 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Sixty-eight, please. My apologies, it's  
10 actually the very bottom of page 67.

11 And the last paragraph there, it does go on to the next page, but I'm  
12 looking at the first sentence where you talk about the perpetrator leaving Portapique  
13 shortly after the first officers arrived. I just wanted to confirm that, at least according to  
14 the RCMP's timeline, that was approximately 19 minutes?

15 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I believe that the first members that  
16 responded arrived at 10:26, and that it would have been between 10:26 and around  
17 10:45.

18 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Now, on page 68, a little more than halfway  
19 down the page, there's a heading, it says, Gunman Did Not Pull Over Vehicles, and you  
20 go on to state that through witness accounts you could confirm that the gunman didn't  
21 use the replica cruiser to pull over any other victims. But I'm going to ask you, you  
22 weren't suggesting, though, that the replica cruiser didn't play a role in victimizing those  
23 killed?

24 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No, I'm not suggesting that at all  
25 there. That comment is -- it's based on conversations that I would have had with the  
26 primary investigator, Gerry Rose-Berthiaume, about initial reports, and I think there was  
27 social media reports in and around the gunman using that replica vehicle to physically  
28 pull people over, as in -- as in a traffic stop.

1                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Put on the lights, follow them, get them to  
2 pull over, that stuff?

3                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes. But I would agree  
4 wholeheartedly with what you said, that it certainly provided an advantage for him, a  
5 significant disadvantage to the public, yes.

6                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Because we do know that in the case of  
7 Heather O'Brien, she was on the phone with her friend and she references hearing  
8 gunshots, and then she says to the effect, "Oh, there's a -- there's a police car here  
9 now", and her friend says, you know, to the effect of "stay put", and then she hears the  
10 gunshots that ---

11                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I haven't physically listened to  
12 those calls, but that's how I understand it, yes.

13                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Thank you. Are you familiar with  
14 Constable Wiley?

15                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Personally or just the name of  
16 Constable Wiley?

17                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Did -- well, personally, first of all.

18                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No. No, I'm not.

19                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. Did you know him in the course of  
20 your duties with the RCMP?

21                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No, I did not.

22                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** You just know his name because of the  
23 incidents surrounding the mass killings?

24                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I've seen his name surface since  
25 that time and became aware.

26                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. Now, on page 69 of your -- of the  
27 transcript of the June 20 -- of the June 4th press conference, you state:

28                                    "'In terms of a relationship between the gunman and



1 the RCMP itself, as another point of specific interest,  
2 the gunman was never associated to the RCMP as a  
3 volunteer or an auxiliary RCMP officer, nor did the  
4 RCMP ever have any special relationship with the  
5 gunman of any kind." (As read)

6 And I'm going to suggest to you that Constable Wiley testified that  
7 he -- sorry, by testify, meaning in his -- he gave in his statement that he would use the  
8 perpetrator as a community contact to find out what was going on in the community.  
9 Are you are aware of that?

10 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I've since become aware of that,  
11 but with respect to that passage it's more related to some allegations that were being  
12 made through the media with respect to a special relationship.

13 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. So you're not denying that at least  
14 Constable Wiley had a relationship with the gunman in which he would, you know, seek  
15 to get local information from him?

16 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Based on what Constable Wiley  
17 was saying, I understand that, that he had that contract or interaction with the gunman  
18 for that purpose.

19 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. And I don't know if you've reviewed  
20 Wiley's -- Constable Wiley's statement, but he testifies that over the period of time, from  
21 approximately 2008 to 2011, he would have visited the gunman between 10 and 20  
22 times. He couldn't put an exact number on it.

23 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I didn't review that statement, but if  
24 Constable Wiley said that, then I would accept that as being accurate.

25 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay.

26 And further on down in the last paragraph of page 69, first sentence  
27 of the last paragraph says,

28 "What can be confirmed is that the gunman had

1 acquired all of these firearms illegally."

2 And before we even get to the stage of where the guns came from,  
3 I'm going to suggest to you that because the gunman didn't have a PAL, possession of  
4 any gun by him was illegal; correct?

5 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** That is correct, yes.

6 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Except under special circumstances such  
7 as being at a gun club or having possession of somebody else's gun while they were  
8 hunting, and that person was with him. Other than that, him possessing guns was  
9 illegal just by that fact?

10 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** The transfer or the possession  
11 would have been illegal, yes.

12 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. And from your knowledge of  
13 investigating matters and your role as a senior RCMP officer, if somebody is alleged to  
14 be suffering from a mental disturbance and that they have guns, would it be standard  
15 procedure to immediately check and see if that person has a PAL, to even to be allowed  
16 to possess a gun?

17 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** It wouldn't be just for that scenario.  
18 For example, if police were called to any type of file, they would do -- they would  
19 conduct an inquiry to determine whether the person had lawful possession of any  
20 firearms.

21 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And I know we're getting into a bit of a  
22 hypothetical here, but I'm sure somebody will object if I go too far. So I'm referring  
23 specifically to the BOLO, the Officer Safety Bulletin that went out in 2011, and the  
24 allegation in that bulletin was that Gabriel Wortman was suffering from a mental crisis  
25 and had possession of guns. And I'm asking when an investigating officer received that  
26 information, would or should one of the first steps have been to see if he had a PAL to  
27 allow him to legally possess guns?

28 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I believe so, and I think at that point

1 in time they would have called that an FAC or a Firearms Acquisition Certificate, and  
2 that would be a standard or a normal course of inquiry that an investigator would make,  
3 yes.

4 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And if the allegation was that the subject  
5 had possession of guns and no PAL or FAC was found, would it then be procedure to  
6 get a search warrant to go to that person's place to see if they in fact had guns?

7 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, it would be very case  
8 dependent on the information provided, and as you would know as an experienced  
9 counsel, it would require specific information in terms of locations, time in which they  
10 were seen, and, of course, you just don't get a search warrant. You have to make an  
11 application based on grounds, and if there's sufficient grounds for a justice to issue a  
12 warrant, then that warrant would then be authorized.

13 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Sure, and I won't get you to speculate on  
14 what information would be required to get the search warrant, but to your knowledge, no  
15 attempt to get a search warrant was made in relation to the Officer Safety Bulletin in  
16 2011?

17 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I have very limited knowledge as to  
18 what transpired in 2011 specific to that complaint. I know that there were two different  
19 police forces involved in that. The level of available file material from at least the RCMP  
20 is limited, so it's hard for me to make any further comment on it.

21 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** I'm going to move on from the media  
22 conferences now. I'm going to ask to have COMM 0051376 brought up on the screen  
23 and go to page 13. And while that's taking place, Superintendent Campbell, I'm going  
24 to be very fair to you here and let you know why I'm bringing this document up and  
25 asking a question. This will be your handwritten notes, and there's an entry when you  
26 were dealing with the information that was relayed to you regarding Leon Joudry, and  
27 you attribute to him that Lisa was banging on my door at four a.m. And I can say that  
28 that's the only bit of evidence we've seen in this entire commission that she might have

1 been a Joudry's door at four a.m. And I'm just asking, is that an error, or a typo, or can  
2 you say?

3 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Can you let me know when these  
4 notes were taken and if you can show me what it is that ---

5 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Sure.

6 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** --- was transpiring in order for me  
7 to take these notes? As I said, I was not involved directly in any interviews. This would  
8 have been probably being briefed up on the summary of an interview by another officer.  
9 So if we could go to the top of it, so I can see whether or not I'm just sitting in on a  
10 briefing by way of teleconference.

11 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Seems to be your running handwritten  
12 notes.

13 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yeah.

14 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** That's the best I can do for a timeframe.

15 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** So this would have been, I believe,  
16 on the 20<sup>th</sup> of April, and that would have been the very first investigative briefing that I  
17 didn't physically attend, but I attended via teleconference. So I was in my office,  
18 listening to a number of investigators who were providing updates on the statements  
19 that they were taking. If that is contrary ---

20 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Sorry, Mr. Pineo, you can't see.

21 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Oh, sorry, Counsel. Yeah.

22 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Excuse me, Commissioners. I just --  
23 before the witness continues, could he be shown the actual line that he's being asked ---

24 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Yes, that's what ---

25 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** --- about? Thank you.

26 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Yeah.

27 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you.

28 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** I have in my notes page 13. There's a

1 heading Leon Joudry and it's underlined, so it might not be -- perhaps -- there it is.

2 There's Leon Joudry. It says 3:30 -- I think it says,

3 "3:30 a.m., heard a couple of pops

4 - [goes to work --] goes to look, finds house on fire at

5 Gabe's

6 4 a.m., Lisa banging on my door"

7 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

8 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And, you know, first of all, is that a four or a  
9 six?

10 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, it's -- it looks like a four to me,  
11 and I don't know whether or not on fire at Gabe's four a.m., it could be Gabe's house is  
12 on fire at four a.m. and then Lisa banging on my door, it could be two separate things. I  
13 don't know. I was listening to others that were ---

14 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Sure.

15 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** --- imparting information and  
16 feverishly writing and trying to ---

17 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay.

18 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** --- to understand that information.

19 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Sure. It just -- was just a nagging piece of  
20 evidence that I ---

21 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yeah.

22 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** --- I wanted to have cleared up so. Okay.

23 You stated in your interview with the -- your first interview with the  
24 Commission that on April 19, 2020, you had absolutely no knowledge of the Alert Ready  
25 system.

26 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I didn't, no.

27 Now to expand on that, the Alert Ready system as I would --  
28 specifically, in terms of the police use of Alert Ready system, I didn't. I was aware of a

1 weather alert system. I didn't know the term Alert Ready. I just knew of a system that  
2 had been used for weather alerts, I'd heard it before, and, of course, there was the  
3 COVID alert that went out just prior to April 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> of 2020. That would be my  
4 only level of awareness of the Alert Ready system.

5 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. Thank you. In terms of -- and we've  
6 touched several times in your cross-examination of -- or your examination, of resources,  
7 you know, a lack of resources, and I think you testified in your direct that there are areas  
8 in the RCMP, contingent in Nova Scotia, that are lacking resources. And you might not  
9 know this, but I'm going to ask you, in terms of the Colchester area, who's responsible  
10 for providing more resources? Is that the RCMP? Is it Ottawa? Is it the province, or is  
11 it a combination?

12 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I believe it's the county itself that  
13 enters into the negotiations with the province in terms of resourcing all this.

14 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. I believe that the County of  
15 Colchester is not under the new agreements, that it's still part of the provincial police  
16 force. Do ---

17 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Provincial Police Service. They  
18 call it the PPSA or the Provincial Police Service Agreement.

19 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Yes, and my understanding is that  
20 Colchester is grandfathered under the older system?

21 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I don't deal specifically with those  
22 contracts, so in terms of grandfathering under PPSA contracts and what that, you know,  
23 specifically includes, that would be a question from ---

24 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Sure.

25 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** --- you know, individuals that work  
26 within our planning units that deal with the contracts.

27 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. Now you've had an opportunity to  
28 review and hear information from the victims' families, and I'm wondering, are you able

1 to make comment on whether or not you feel the level of assistance provided through  
2 the Liaison Officer was -- is sufficient, that it's meeting the families' needs?

3 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** In fairness to the families, I don't  
4 think that we could ever provide enough assistance. I think that there is always more  
5 that we could do.

6 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** In your assessment, does it meet the  
7 minimal level of care, level of ---

8 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, in my assessment based on  
9 what I've heard in terms of the feedback, I would say no because if it was good, there  
10 would be no complaints.

11 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Now, overnight April 18-19, and I guess  
12 primarily on the 19th because you -- by the time you got into action it was pretty close to  
13 midnight, you would have relatively long periods of time where you were waiting for  
14 information?

15 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** There were periods of time, yes.

16 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Yes. And during those periods of time,  
17 what were you doing when you were waiting for information?

18 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, after I received the first phone  
19 call, like many of those phone calls in the middle of the night, and I received several of  
20 them, I approved the Critical Incident package. I asked for updates when time  
21 permitting and when Jeff West would be available.

22 I remember going back to bed and I wasn't sleeping well, and then I  
23 was woken up again, I believe, some time in around the middle of the night and then,  
24 from that point forward, some time around 3 o'clock, I was up and I was starting to  
25 prepare to try to get back to the office because clearly I knew that even though it was  
26 over a Saturday night into a Sunday morning, I was going to need to go to the office.

27 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. And I think you testified yesterday in  
28 your direct that one of the -- one of the reasons that the RCMP was not looking for a

1 fully, you know, decked-out replica police cruiser is the information that trickled down  
2 from OCC didn't include a statement that the perpetrator's vehicle was exactly like the  
3 RCMP's vehicles.

4 Do you recall ---

5 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, I do recall.

6 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. And you -- in your first interview with  
7 the Commission, you offered an explanation that basically the information probably got  
8 water down from OCC by the time -- you know, from -- when the information was taken  
9 from the 9-1-1 calls to the time that it got to command or the officers on the ground, that  
10 information became watered down. Do you recall giving that explanation?

11 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I'm not sure if I used the exact  
12 words "watered down". I could very well have. I don't recall. But clearly, I think in every  
13 case when someone receives information, they interpret that information and then, in  
14 turn, if they communicated, that communication is based on what that interpretation  
15 was.

16 So if I used the terminology "watered down", watering down is the  
17 passing on of information based on interpretation.

18 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. Could I have COMM0059847?

19 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** And that's been marked  
20 Exhibit 3890.

21 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And page 67.

22 And the second full paragraph, and I'll start in the centre. It says:

23 "I'll be honest with you, and I'm not going to be a very  
24 popular guy for saying this. I can understand how that  
25 happened. I can certainly understand how that  
26 happened given, you know, the urgency of those calls,  
27 the quickness of those calls, the words that were  
28 used, how the -- how the individuals that were trying



1 to communicate their interactions with the call-takers.  
2 They're getting a certain amount of information and I  
3 know that, you know, when information gets passed  
4 on to other people it can sometimes become watered  
5 down. So, I have an appreciation for the fact that  
6 things can get missed or things that might be really  
7 important are not fully understood and communicated  
8 properly."

9 So that -- you adopt your previous testimony that that's a pretty  
10 good explanation for how details got lost from the 9-1-1 callers down to the RCMP  
11 officers.

12 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

13 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And overnight April 18-19, you didn't listen  
14 to the 9-1-1 calls firsthand, that is, you didn't -- you didn't request copies of them so you  
15 could listen to them?

16 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No, I didn't.

17 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And to your knowledge, nobody else did,  
18 did they?

19 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I don't know if anyone else did.  
20 Not to my knowledge, no, and I have no access. Like I -- I was in my home here in  
21 greater Halifax and what was happening was happening in the OCC in Truro.

22 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** So there was nothing preventing you from  
23 requesting, you know, recordings of those transcripts so you could listen to them  
24 yourself.

25 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, there ---

26 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Nothing prevented you from that.

27 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, the only thing that I don't  
28 know if there would be a transcript of that call.

1                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** I said recording.

2                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Sorry?

3                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** I believe I said a recording.

4                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, you said a transcript. Yeah.

5                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Then I amend my question to say nothing  
6 prevented you from listening to a recording of those 9-1-1 calls.

7                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I would imagine that the OCC  
8 and the risk manager were very occupied. I would be cognizant of not wanting to reach  
9 in and ask them to do something that might take them away from the task at hand, and I  
10 can tell you over 32 years I've never, in the middle of the night, called a dispatch centre  
11 to say, "Play me back a 9-1-1 call".

12                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** In your 31 years, though, you've also never  
13 dealt with a mass casualty like this, did you?

14                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I've actually dealt with ---

15                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Like this?

16                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** --- other mass murders, but nothing  
17 like this, no.

18                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** So had you wanted to, though, you could  
19 have -- you could have gone to OCC in Truro and listened to those recordings or you  
20 could have delegated somebody else to do that on your behalf, couldn't you?

21                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** If I wanted to, I could have gotten  
22 in my car and driven to Truro, but at that point in time, there was nothing that was  
23 imparted on me that would suggest I would have to listen to the 9-1-1 calls.

24                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** And because you didn't listen to those  
25 recordings and, to our knowledge, nobody under your command did -- is that correct?

26                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No, I would imagine that -- well, for  
27 one, the risk manager has access to listen to those calls, but I had no idea what was  
28 happening or transpiring or what knowledge the risk manager had at that time and

1 whether they were reviewing those calls.

2 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Yeah. You have no knowledge whatsoever  
3 of whether the risk manager listened to those 9-1-1 calls overnight April 19th.

4 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No, I didn't at that time and I  
5 actually don't right now know whether or not the risk manager had gone back and  
6 relistened to those calls.

7 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** I'm going to ask to bring up Exhibit 1036.  
8 That's the mock cruiser Foundational Document.

9 And page PDF 23, paragraph 29.

10 Okay. And this information taken from the 9-1-1 transcript of one of  
11 the four children who were -- you know, who stayed several hours. You know the  
12 incident I'm talking about without me going into ---

13 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

14 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. And this is being relayed as part of  
15 the conversation between the operator and the child identified as AD. The operator:

16 "Did you see what kind of vehicle?

17 AD: Um, it was a police car. I -- I couldn't find -- I  
18 couldn't find the um, the um, the licence.

19 Operator: Okay. Did you see anything else about the  
20 vehicle? You said it was a police car.

21 AD: Yes, it was.

22 Operator: It was?

23 AD: Just like the um, the -- like a police car." (As  
24 read)

25 And then farther down, AD says:

26 "It's a police car. It's not -- it's not Gabriel. Guys, it's  
27 not Gabriel. Oh, by the way, he's probably gonna  
28 blend in with the cops because he has a cop car."

1 (As read)  
2 OCC:  
3 "Okay." (As read)  
4 AD:  
5 "I just don't know what my parents did." (As read)  
6 OCC:  
7 "How do you guys know -- how do you guys know it  
8 was a cop car? Did it have lights and stuff on it  
9 or...?" (As read)  
10 AD:  
11 "Yes, it did. No, it looks like just that. Yeah, it -- and  
12 it had the cop symbol on the side. Like, he owns a  
13 cop car." (As read)

14 So I'm going to suggest to you that in terms of having to know that  
15 the perpetrator's replica cruiser was identical to an operational police vehicle, I'm going  
16 to suggest to you that the words of that child make it pretty clear that it's -- that's it's  
17 identical. He says it will blend in. Do you agree with that?

18 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I agree that that's a very descriptive  
19 account in the words of the child, yes.

20 **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Thank you. Those are my questions.

21 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you, Mr. Pineo.

22 Mr. MacDonald, I think you're up next.

23 **--- CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TOM MACDONALD:**

24 **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** Good morning, Chief Superintendent.

25 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Good morning.

26 **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** My name is Thomas MacDonald. I am  
27 counsel for two Participants, Tara Long, whose brother, Aaron Tuck, was lost in  
28 Portapique on the 18th; and Scott MacLeod, whose brother, Sean MacLeod, was lost in

1 Wentworth on the 19th of April 2020.

2 Before we start, I wanted to just get my bearings in terms of what is  
3 under your -- was under your management when you were the Support Services  
4 Officer, and then a couple of definitions to see if we can agree, just so we're sort of  
5 talking from the same terminology.

6 So as I understand it, you had different duties under the Support  
7 Services Officer role, but amongst those duties you were responsible, you managed the  
8 Major Crimes Unit and also Critical Incident Program; right?

9 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, there are two line officers. So  
10 it's an overall program.

11 **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** Okay. Sure.

12 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yeah.

13 **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** I understand. Now, it goes without  
14 saying, I think, but you'd agree with me that this incident, the mass casualty, the -- what  
15 happened in Portapique, and then the next day in Wentworth, in Glenholme, in  
16 Shubenacadie, in Stewiacke, was a critical incident?

17 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, it was.

18 **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** And the fact that an active shooter was  
19 mobile, that equals a critical incident; doesn't it?

20 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, that's correct.

21 **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** And as I understand it, when the critical  
22 incident began in Portapique, with the call from Mrs. Blair, if I can put it that way, so the  
23 Risk Manager is the first person who takes control, and the Risk Manager has  
24 command under the Critical Incident Commander not only arrives but broadcasts that  
25 he or she is in command; correct?

26 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I don't know if that would be  
27 completely accurate. The Risk Manager would have the responsibility to start calling  
28 out those additional resources. For example, if it -- if it's a critical incident or deemed to

1 be a critical incident that met this threshold, that Risk Manager would call the on-call  
2 Critical Incident Commander. The Risk Manager would be in control of all resources  
3 provincially so that they could move resources around, but there would be some level of  
4 command on the ground. Because a Risk Manager from a remote location might know  
5 what's coming into the Operational Communications Centre in terms of calls from the  
6 public, but might not know exactly what's happening on the ground. So there is -- there  
7 might be a little bit of confusion there in terms of who's in charge, but there should be  
8 someone on-scene that is commanding the response in terms of the active shooter  
9 response.

10 **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** And so if that person on-scene wasn't in  
11 Portapique, if it wasn't Staff Sergeant Rehill, who was it?

12 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Pardon me?

13 **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** Who was it if it wasn't Staff  
14 Sergeant Rehill?

15 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well normally, it would be -- the  
16 command would be, for example, the first officers that arrived that went into the IARD  
17 formation, they would -- they would command that element of the response, and then  
18 later is if other supervisors would attend the scene, they would take command locally at  
19 that location. But until such time as they all arrive, the Risk Manager would have the  
20 greatest level of awareness and the ability to at least control some of the resources that  
21 are responding.

22 **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** Registrar, could we have, please—I just  
23 want to show you something, Chief Superintendent—Exhibit P001461, and it's page 15,  
24 paragraph 31, please.

25 This will be brought up in a moment, Chief Superintendent. So I'm  
26 going to -- I'm going to focus on paragraph 31. I'm going to read this paragraph to you,  
27 and then if you need time to read it we can do that. This, by the way, comes from  
28 H-Division Risk Manager Program, so it's RCMP policy:

1 "When faced with a critical incident, the Risk Manager  
2 will immediately take command and control over the  
3 situation, deploy resources, and direct the response.  
4 They will also call in and/or redeploy resources to  
5 allow for an increased response while ensuring  
6 continued service delivery for the rest of the division.  
7 The Risk Manager also coordinates support units,  
8 provides oversight and direction, conducts continuous  
9 risk assessments, and maintains control of the critical  
10 incident until it ends or the CIC takes over from them."

11 (As read)

12 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

13 **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** So doesn't that mean Staff  
14 Sergeant Rehill was in charge until the Critical Incident Commander West took over ---

15 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Over the ---

16 **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** --- on the ---

17 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** The overall deployment of  
18 resources and in engaging the necessary support units, they would have a much  
19 greater level of awareness of the needs and the geography. But as I said before, like  
20 when members start to arrive on the scene, they're going to know things because  
21 they're experiencing and seeing those things in real-time, so someone has to command  
22 the response physically when they arrive. But if you're looking at it from a policy  
23 perspective, there is a handover of command from the Risk Manager to the Critical  
24 Incident Commander.

25 **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** Do you agree with the RCMP policy set  
26 out in paragraph 31 or not, Chief Superintendent?

27 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I do to an extent, but again, there's  
28 only so much that you can do. Command of the resources or the engagement of

1 additional resources or understanding where perimeters should be set up, that would be  
2 definite responsibilities of the Risk Manager until such time that the Critical Incident  
3 Commander arrives. So to a degree I agree with that, but on the other hand, there  
4 needs to be some local presence that has some level of command. And it sometimes  
5 may be two officers that arrive together, and they need to be able to take command of  
6 those resources during the critical incident response, meaning the IARD team.

7 **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** So the paragraph I just read to you from  
8 H-Division policy, that was the policy that was in effect that night in Portapique; correct?

9 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes. Yes. Yes.

10 **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** Those were the words that were in  
11 effect that night in Portapique?

12 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

13 **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** Now, the Critical Incident Commander,  
14 as I understand it, and we know that Staff Sergeant West arrived around a little after  
15 1:00 a.m. on the 19th, and then oriented himself for a few minutes, and then took  
16 command by broadcasting that he was in command; correct?

17 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** That's correct, yes.

18 **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** Yeah. And as I understand it, once the  
19 Critical Incident Commander assumes command, he commands the response and  
20 takes the decisions until the critical incident is either over or it's no longer deemed a  
21 critical incident; correct?

22 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** That is correct, yes.

23 **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** Okay. And he has, I understand,  
24 absolute authority with respect to the critical incident?

25 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

26 **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** And so that authority that night, or the  
27 morning of the 19th, that laid with Staff Sergeant West; correct?

28 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** From the time that he took



1 command ---

2 **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** Yes.

3 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** --- to the time that he relinquished  
4 the command to the next CIC.

5 **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** It rested with him, absolute authority  
6 with respect to the critical incident?

7 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** With respect to the Critical Incident  
8 Commander response, yes.

9 **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** Thanks. I want to try and understand a  
10 little bit about the active shooter scenario from a policy perspective in your role as the  
11 manager of the critical incident, so generally. So as I understand it, with an active  
12 shooter incident, and of course you were asked a little bit about that by Ms. Young in  
13 one of your interviews with her recently, one was on June 28th and the other was  
14 July 12th, two weeks ago, as I understand, the active shooter RCMP policy is if there's  
15 an active shooter, then whether it's an IARD team or an ERT team, they move to stop  
16 the threat and they keep going until the threat is eliminated. Is that broadly -- am I  
17 right?

18 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** That would be a very broad and  
19 general description. Yes, that would be correct.

20 **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** Okay. So we know in Portapique, the  
21 night of the 18<sup>th</sup>, that when the IARD team, which were the first responders to arrive, led  
22 by Cpl Beselt, when they arrived and they were directed by S/Sgt Rehill as Risk  
23 Manager that they came upon the scene at the Blair's house, they saw dead bodies  
24 around, they heard explosions, they saw fires, they heard what they thought were  
25 thoughts being fired, and the decision was made to hold that team in place waiting for  
26 reinforcements, ERT maybe, and a decision was made or not considered to send in a  
27 second IARD team.

28 So the first IARD team, the only IARD team, didn't go farther into

1 Portapique, they were held. As I understand, the reasoning behind that was no one  
2 wanted a blue-on-blue incident, and so for those who may not know what that is,  
3 although most of us would by now, a blue-on-blue incident is when police officers fire on  
4 one another mistakenly. Am I right?

5 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Blue-on-blue would be two -- or  
6 groups of officers or two officers firing upon each other, mistaking each other for the  
7 offender, but ---

8 **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** Right.

9 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** --- there was a lot that you led up to  
10 in terms of the question.

11 **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** Well I'm going to -- I haven't asked the  
12 question yet.

13 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Okay.

14 **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** I'm coming to the question. So that's  
15 the scene they encountered. They were held. And as I understand the reason for  
16 holding them and not going farther in was because they did not -- the Risk Manager did  
17 not want to see a blue-on-blue incident. It was black, pitch dark, it was a rural area  
18 unfamiliar to them.

19 How does the RCMP, from a policy perspective, balance what we  
20 know in an active shooter situation is to advance to -- we have a mobile active shooter,  
21 to advance to where that shooter is and balance that against rural area, dark, blue on  
22 blue incident? How is that is balanced? Whether it's a Risk Manager, whether it's a  
23 Critical Incident Commander, the IARD people, how does the Force, from a policy  
24 perspective, balance those factors, when to hold and when not to hold?

25 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** So I mean, I'm going to have to  
26 revisit a few of the things that you've mentioned leading up to your question.

27 First off is that, as I understand it, the order in which you said that  
28 those officers were experiencing certain things or the things that they first came across

1 might not necessarily be the order in which I think it actually happened.

2           The second thing is that I don't believe that those officers were told  
3 to hold for the purpose of a blue-on-blue at all. From my recollection, from what I've  
4 read, and the conversations that I've had, and the statements that I've read of those first  
5 responding IARD officers is that they did move throughout Portapique and they were  
6 going towards the sounds of gunshots within Portapique. So I just wanted to make sure  
7 that that was clear before answering your question.

8           And I hate to ask you to go back specifically about your policy  
9 question, about managing IARD incidents in rural areas. I want to be able to give you a  
10 full and complete answer as best as I can. So can you maybe distill that question for  
11 me, please?

12           **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** Sure. So how does, from a policy  
13 perspective in a critical incident, how does the RCMP balance in terms of direction to  
14 their members that you come upon an active shooter situation, you don't see the active  
15 shooter, but you know the active shooter -- you're seeing, let's take Portapique,  
16 explosions, you're hearing explosions, you're seeing fire, they think they're hearing gun  
17 shots, they have reports already that there's been shooting from Mrs. Blair when she  
18 makes that 9-1-1 call. How do they balance that in terms of, "Well, we don't want to  
19 shoot one another"? But how do they balance it in terms of, "Should we hold? Should  
20 we go farther in?" How does the Risk Manager -- what policy -- how are they taught to  
21 try to balance all those things when it's all happening in real time rapidly?

22           **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** That's the challenge of real  
23 operations. They're unpredictable. And how do you balance that? Again, I don't think  
24 it's up to the Risk Manager to balance that. It's up to the individual who is physically on  
25 that scene, that is actually experiencing that event.

26           Having an individual from a distance that's not physically there to  
27 hear and experience those things to determine what the next move should or could be, I  
28 don't think that that is the best route to take. I think that that decision rests with those

1 that are physically in that environment, if they feel that they're safe, or if they feel that  
2 there's a risk to doing something, I think that that assessment rests or lands with those  
3 members, not someone that's directing from afar.

4 **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** Is that the same assessment -- so if I'm  
5 a member and I feel that I may not be safe, but I know the active shooter policy is go  
6 and confront the threat and stop the threat, is it left to me to decide whether I'm  
7 supposed to do that or not? Because I understood ---

8 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No.

9 **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** --- from the Critical Incident  
10 Commanders that we had, S/Sgt West and S/Sgt Surette, that public comes paramount,  
11 ---

12 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

13 **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** --- officer safety comes second.

14 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes. Yes.

15 **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** So how is that balanced?

16 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I don't think it does balance. And I  
17 think that there's a duty to -- if you believe that the threat -- if you can see the threat, if  
18 you're convinced that the threat is present, you engage that threat.

19 And I'll give you an example of that. From what I've read from the  
20 IARD team members in around the McCully residence, they had seen a flashlight. They  
21 thought that it was the perpetrator. They were prepared to engage the perpetrator. And  
22 then that flashlight went out and the individual ran into the woods. And I'm speaking of  
23 Clinton Ellison.

24 That decision and those actions speak to the fact that those officers  
25 were ready and prepared to engage.

26 **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** So are you aware of any training or  
27 changes that have been made since Portapique in terms of the way the IARD teams or  
28 the ERT teams or Risk Managers or Critical Incident Commanders deal with this type of

1 a situation?

2 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well there's a number of areas that  
3 you're speaking of. So for example, the IARD training, that would fall under our training  
4 program within the Division, the Administration and Personnel Officer, with input  
5 nationally from our Tactical Training Section in Ottawa, as well as our Contract and  
6 Indigenous Policing Unit.

7 I'm not aware of any changes to policy or training per say as a  
8 result.

9 I would say, though, that there's been a lot of debate in and around  
10 the policy of the definition of the Risk Manager being in control of a critical incident until  
11 such time that the Critical Incident Commander is on the ground. There's been a great  
12 level of -- or a great discussion in and around that. And I know that that's also an area  
13 of examination by the Hazardous Occurrence Investigation Team that I had testified to  
14 yesterday as doing an independent review in and around that response, risks, you  
15 know, internally within the organization, to member safety. That is being looked at by  
16 them as well.

17 **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** Are you personally aware of any  
18 information possessed by the RCMP that if something had have been done differently  
19 by the RCMP on the night of the 18<sup>th</sup>, lives could have been saved in Portapique?

20 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I'm not personally aware of  
21 anything, any documents, or anything like that. No.

22 **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** Sort of looking at the forward thinking of  
23 the Commission, and just to cover off this point, I know Ms. Young took you through air  
24 deployment resources in Nova Scotia in your interviews. But to cut through some of  
25 that just bottom line it, in an ideal world, we're now a province of a million people, we're  
26 the largest metropolitan centre east of Montreal probably. Having said all that, is it now  
27 time that Nova Scotia has a 24/7 plane available to the RCMP with the infrared flick  
28 technology, or the proper name for it?

1                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I think there's an immense amount  
2 of value in Nova Scotia having that capability, and I do believe that there have been  
3 efforts made by the Province, as well as the RCMP, in order to be able to increase that  
4 capability.

5                   I think it's important to also signal that the Department of Justice in  
6 Nova Scotia, not DOJ Canada, but DOJ Nova Scotia, which is Public Safety, have been  
7 very engaged in those discussions.

8                   Those capabilities are very important and there are assets in this  
9 province that already exist. They might not have infrared technology or an ability to fly  
10 at night, but I believe that they could build on the investments that they've already made  
11 to be able to provide that to the public and to law enforcement and other enforcement  
12 agencies in the province.

13                   **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** I want to turn to public communications,  
14 and with respect to that, we spoke about, a few moments ago, the role of the Critical  
15 Incident Commander, the absolute authority once ---

16                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

17                   **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** --- he's in place.

18                   Speaking of which, by the way -- I always want to say "He" or "She"  
19 -- have there ever been -- has there ever been a Critical Incident Commander in Nova  
20 Scotia who's a female?

21                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, since my time, no, but it's an  
22 interesting question that you pose because that was one of the first questions that I had  
23 when I visited the group of Critical Incident Commanders, and I had asked that one  
24 particular staff sergeant, who I believe is very operationally sound, be approached with  
25 respect to her interest, yeah, in that program. My understanding is that she wasn't  
26 interested, but I can tell you that in New Brunswick there are female Critical Incident  
27 Commanders.

28                   **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** And would there be, do you know, in

1 British Columbia as well?

2 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, it's been a while since I've  
3 been in British Columbia, but I would suspect that there definitely would be, yes.

4 **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** So just turning back to public  
5 communications and the absolute authority of the Critical Incident Commander. So my  
6 understanding is the decision for public alerting, public communications that night and  
7 the next day, so the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup>, it would have rested with the Critical Incident  
8 Commander?

9 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** It would have because every  
10 decision that you make, every action that you take, there will be a reaction to that. So  
11 the Critical Incident Commander, with that absolute authority, should approve whatever  
12 public communications or public alerting or public messaging that would go out, of  
13 course supported by individuals from the Strategic Communications Unit.

14 **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** And as I understand it, the Critical  
15 Incident Commander had/has authority not only to direct the Director of Strategic  
16 Communications about public communications in a critical incident, but what information  
17 to make public and when to make it public; agreed?

18 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I would agree, yes.

19 **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** And am I also right, and do you agree,  
20 that once the Critical Incident Commander directs the Director of Public  
21 Communications for the RCMP to make something public, and tells what that should be,  
22 then that's the only approval that's needed; it should be done then; correct?

23 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** That should be the only approval,  
24 yes.

25 **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** Okay. And would you also agree that  
26 from the time S/Sgt. West took command on the 19<sup>th</sup>, he then had the discretion to  
27 direct the RCMP Director of Strategic Communications to release public information,  
28 had he chosen to do so, at any point from the time he takes command?

1                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I would agree, yes.

2                   **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** I know that you said in your interview  
3 with Ms. Young, you had had a debriefing with your Critical Incident Commanders, and  
4 you said yourself, I believe -- I'm not trying to put words in your mouth -- no-one seemed  
5 to know about Alert Ready.

6                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

7                   **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** And you spoke to that; I heard you say  
8 that. Can you help us understand how that's possible, that no-one knew? When I say  
9 no-one, I mean the Critical Incident Commanders didn't know about Alert Ready?

10                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I think the simple answer to  
11 that question is, is that, you know, everything boils down to training and  
12 communications, and if it's not part of training -- and I'm not just talking about the basic  
13 training; I'm talking about ongoing or in-service training. If that tool -- and that's the way  
14 it was always described to me by the Critical Incident Commanders, if that tool was not  
15 understood, if that tool was not exercised or made available or practised, then they  
16 would have no awareness of it, they would have no practical experience with it. And  
17 that is a challenge because they all did say -- and I'll use a direct quote that they said to  
18 me, "That wasn't a tool in our toolbox."

19                                 And it wasn't just the Critical Incident Commanders that were on  
20 the ground that day, it was others from the province that were speaking about it as well.  
21 And I point out that it wasn't just Jeff West that was in the Command Post; there were  
22 some very seasoned Critical Incident Commanders, there was up to four that eventually  
23 made their way to the Critical Incident Command Post sometime on the 19<sup>th</sup>.

24                  **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** Okay. So now as I understand it, Alert  
25 Ready could be used, and not only would the Critical Incident Commander have  
26 authority to direct that it be used, a Watch Commander could do it as well; correct?

27                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, that's -- there's a number of  
28 individuals who have authority to issue, have -- we have direct access now, which we



1 didn't then, and there are a number of individuals that can. So there's a difference  
2 between -- if it's deemed a critical incident where we have engaged the Critical Incident  
3 Program, that CIC, Critical Incident Commander, is the authority to authorize the alert.  
4 If it's not deemed a critical incident, or there's enough information even beforehand by  
5 the Risk Manager or a Watch Commander, they can then still issue an alert based on  
6 the information known.

7 **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** To the best of your ability this morning,  
8 can you list for me your understanding of who those individuals are? To start we have  
9 the CIC, the Critical Incident Commander, we have the Watch Commander. Can the  
10 Risk Manager make that direction in a critical incident?

11 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, and since this time, the Risk  
12 Managers have been very much involved in issuing alerts. So the Risk Manager, the  
13 Criminal Operations Officer, the Support Services Officer can. If you receive the  
14 training, you have that ability to issue the alert. So there's a defined and established  
15 protocol now that is in place that was not in place in April of 2020.

16 **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** Going back to the 19<sup>th</sup>, had you  
17 sufficient knowledge of -- you, as Supply Services Officer in charge of the Critical  
18 Incident Program, you could have intervened to order the use of Alert Ready if you'd  
19 known about it, couldn't you?

20 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I wouldn't have intervened. I would  
21 have left that as the complete authority of Command -- to the Critical Incident  
22 Commander, but I could have had a conversation, if I was in a position to have a  
23 conversation.

24 **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** Right. Because you had the discretion,  
25 had you chosen.

26 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** If I was aware at the particular  
27 time, I could have had a conversation with the CIC, but the ultimate authority on that  
28 decision does rest with the Critical Incident Commander.

1                   **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** I understood there was a passage that  
2 you -- I don't think we need to bring it up; we can if we have to -- with Ms. Young where  
3 you said something to this effect, if the wheels went off, then you could have intervened  
4 that night, just in a general sense. Do you remember that?

5                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, I remember that. And what  
6 I'm saying is, is that if I felt that things had gone to a state where someone had to get  
7 involved, and to try to determine what needed to be done, I could do that; however,  
8 during a critical incident command -- incident, it's hardly helpful for someone to start  
9 injecting themselves, because I wouldn't have had the level of awareness or the  
10 complete picture, or as much of the picture as the Critical Incident Commander would  
11 have had.

12                   **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** Now, Ms. Young -- this is in your  
13 interview of July 12<sup>th</sup>, 2022, so two weeks ago -- took you through -- she asked you a  
14 question; a question about was the public emergency communications -- were the  
15 public emergency communications during the mass casualty adequate, and you listed a  
16 number of qualifiers before you answered the question. And I'm summarizing and if you  
17 think I'm unfair you let me know, but my understanding, in terms of your answer was,  
18 you would have liked to have seen earlier public communication.

19                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Specifically in and around the  
20 marked police vehicle.

21                   **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** Yes.

22                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** But, again, like, not having an  
23 intimate knowledge or awareness at that time, it's very difficult to say in that moment  
24 what my assessment was because I had limited information. But I would like to have  
25 seen earlier notification in and around once there was confirmation made about the fact  
26 that a marked police vehicle was unaccounted for; I would liked to have seen that.

27                   **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** Well, here we are today, two weeks  
28 later -- two-plus years later, ---

1                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

2                   **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** --- would you agree with me that the  
3 public communication was not adequate?

4                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, with the benefit of hindsight?

5                   **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** Yes.

6                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** There's always room for us to do  
7 better. And in terms of public communications, I do believe that additional information,  
8 specific information in and around the police vehicle would have been very helpful.

9                   **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** I want to turn for a moment to family  
10 liaisons, and these are questions, the beginning ones, specifically relating to the  
11 McLeod family. And, in fact, you had some conversations, I think, with my client, Scott  
12 McLeod?

13                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I did, yes.

14                   **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** Yeah, sure. So Constable Bent was the  
15 family liaison officer.

16                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

17                   **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** And I will phrase this as from my  
18 understanding, and I was not involved at the time, is that the McLeod family and  
19 Constable Bent suffered from a communication breakdown, if I can put it that way, and  
20 they made a request to you to have Constable Bent replaced as the family liaison  
21 officer. That request was denied. Why?

22                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I didn't deny that request.

23                   **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** Yeah.

24                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I actually asked -- I can't remember  
25 whether or not it was Sergeant Glenn Bonvie or Corporal Gerry Rose-Berthiaume,  
26 bringing up the challenges. And to provide further context, I was aware through my  
27 conversations with Mr. McLeod, about the fact that I believe it was the stepdaughter of  
28 Mr. McLeod, the victim, who was the designated family liaison, and there was some

1 friction there between those sides of the family. And that's where -- in my conversations  
2 with Mr. McLeod, there was a breakdown because there was a feeling that Constable  
3 Bent was siding with Mr. McLeod's stepdaughter. So I had asked the Command  
4 Triangle to try to sort that issue out and if they could assign a different family liaison, to  
5 do so.

6 **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** Now I also understand that Constable  
7 Bent made a request of Audrey McLeod, who was the mother of the McLeod brothers,  
8 for a DNA sample, which was given, but then came back and asked for another four or  
9 five DNA samples from both Audrey McLeod and also her husband, their father, which  
10 was very upsetting to the family and the family did not want to provide that, having  
11 already provided one from the mother. Do you have any explanation why the second  
12 request for four or five more samples was made after the first one was given?

13 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I don't have specific  
14 information, but I would just rely on my past experience as a homicide investigator. I  
15 would imagine that, given the state of that scene and that there was a fire there, the  
16 identification of victims is difficult, and sometimes, depending upon the state of condition  
17 of remains, that we would have to do DNA analysis in order to make a positive  
18 confirmation. Sometimes, the profiles that the lab receives from family members to do a  
19 familial profile comparison might not be enough, and they might need additional family  
20 members to be able to make that positive match.

21 **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** I understood from Constable Bent  
22 because I did examine him, that there is no specific RCMP family liaison officer training  
23 offered. Should there be?

24 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I do believe so, but, you know,  
25 there is a distinct difference between a singular homicide investigation where there  
26 might be one family or several family members versus a mass casualty incident. In  
27 terms of training and training people to respond to a mass casualty incident and to  
28 provide that service, I do believe that there needs to be a national level team, because

1 the frequency of these events wouldn't necessarily dictate that all officers would need to  
2 be trained in this area. I think that there needs to be specialists who are trained to  
3 respond, together with multiple resources, with multiple services, to be able to address  
4 the needs of families in cases like this. That's my personal belief. And I don't think that  
5 it would be an efficient use of training time on top of all the training that officers are  
6 expected to do today. I think there needs to be a specialized unit, a specialized skillset,  
7 where if this was to happen in another province, and God forbid that it would, and it  
8 could be anything from a plane crash to a terrorism event to a mass casualty incident by  
9 way of a criminal actions of an individual, I think that there should be a team that  
10 responds, that can address the needs of family, and that team should be trained.

11 **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** Yesterday towards the end of your  
12 questioning by Ms. Young, you were asked about a review by the RCMP of the mass  
13 casualty, and if I have it wrong again, correct me, please, as I understood it, you wrote a  
14 letter. There was not a written reply back, but the information that you subsequently  
15 gathered was basically there wasn't going to be a review because the Mass Casualty  
16 Commission was the review. Not to say there would never be a review but waiting for  
17 the Mass Casualty Commission. Do I have that right so far?

18 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yeah. So the letter, just to expand  
19 on that ---

20 **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** Yes.

21 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** --- the letter was actually a  
22 memorandum, and it was what I would call a mandate letter. Essentially, what it was, is  
23 it set out what it is that I was looking for and what it is that I needed them to do. So it  
24 wasn't, like, a formal request, please do this for me. It was a mandate letter saying, "I  
25 need this. This is what I want. Can you please assemble a team in order to do this?"

26 **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** Wouldn't you agree with me though,  
27 Chief Superintendent, I mean, you've been in the RCMP for 30 years. You've had some  
28 high-level jobs, including in this province now you're Criminal Operations head for New

1 Brunswick. Look, the Commission is going to try to do its best, everybody would agree  
2 with that, I think, but these things take time and we're, you know, over two years since  
3 this incident took place. There's no review by the RCMP. Isn't that unacceptable?

4 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** For me it is, and that's the basis for  
5 why I was at an impasse and a disagreement with Ottawa. Yesterday, I testified for the  
6 necessity of those reviewers to be independent because of the emotional impacts and  
7 the, I think, a potential lack of objectivity by those that were asked to conduct such a  
8 review. So I was not satisfied with that response.

9 **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** Yesterday you spoke of, in your  
10 personal opinion, H-Division probably isn't capable -- might not have been your word --  
11 of doing the review because of the emotion of the Mass Casualty Commission vis-à-vis  
12 H-Division, because of the emotion involved. If there was to be an internal review, what  
13 -- would it be another division that would do it, another RCMP division?

14 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I specifically what I set out in  
15 my request, in that mandate letter that I was requesting for that review was I definitely  
16 wanted Critical Incident Commanders trained, an accredited Critical Incident  
17 Commanders, outside of the RCMP who had been trained by the Community Police  
18 College to conduct that review. And further to that, you know, I did reference the  
19 emotions, but also, it's more about independence and it's more about objectivity. And  
20 you really want -- it's hard now to find someone who hasn't heard or seen some of this  
21 information, but ideally, you'd want to find someone who really hasn't followed this and  
22 who would be walking in from a very independent and objective perspective by not  
23 knowing much. Just give me the facts. Let me make an assessment and I'll tell you  
24 what it is you need to change right now.

25 **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** Coming to the end. You've been in the  
26 news with respect to your notes and the April 2020 telephone conference with the  
27 Commissioner Lucki and Ms. Scanlon and others in attendance, and you've read Ms.  
28 Scanlon's letter to the Commissioner sent about a year later, I guess; have you?

1                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I've seen it, yes.

2                   **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** Yes. And the Commissioner, as you  
3 might know, testified before a Parliamentary Committee yesterday. Did you hear her  
4 evidence or a summary of her evidence?

5                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I'm aware that she did.

6                   **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** Okay. So as I understand it, and I'm not  
7 speaking for the Commissioner, in the lead-up from when your notes became in the  
8 public forum somewhat famous or infamous, depending, the Commissioner, of course,  
9 says there's no political interference, and so did the Minister, and the Commissioner  
10 apologized for, I guess, maybe the tone of the meeting. Do you today accept there was  
11 no political interference in the Mass Casualty Commission -- sorry, in the mass casualty  
12 investigation by the RCMP? Do you accept that?

13                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** What I will say is that my notes are  
14 an accurate description of my recollection of that conversation, and some of the words  
15 that were used. What transpired between the Commissioner's office and anyone within  
16 government, I'm not privy to that. I was never part of that. I stand by my notes, and  
17 when I was asked a question earlier today in terms of whether or not I would be  
18 concerned about soiling the reputation of the force, my answer was, is that I think I've  
19 demonstrated that.

20                   **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** Okay. So I'm just not clear, so now  
21 we're two years post-incident. Do you feel it was political interference or not in regards  
22 to the investigation?

23                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I'll be subject to a  
24 Parliamentary Committee appearance in Ottawa in the coming days, which I will give  
25 evidence to that, but I -- I'll speak to that as best as I can at this stage:

26                   I was very concerned because for me, as a former team  
27 commander, who understands the need to protect certain information so that you could  
28 advance your investigation and hopefully meet your objectives, and I'd already outlined

1 what those objectives were, and the fact that we had an ongoing investigation that was  
2 both local or domestic and international, that there was a very good reason why we  
3 could not release those details. And we owed it to, particularly, the victims, the  
4 survivors, and their families, to do our very best to be able to meet those objectives.  
5 Period. And any interference, whether it be political or otherwise, that would have  
6 deterred us from properly investigating these offences and seeking the justice that the  
7 families deserved was unacceptable for me. So whatever that would have been,  
8 whether it was political or not, I was very concerned that if it was political, if it was  
9 politically motivated, how the families would perceive that. That bothered me.

10 **MR. TOM MACDONALD:** Thank you for your patience, Chief  
11 Superintendent, those are my questions. Thank you.

12 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you, Mr. MacDonald.  
13 Ms. Miller.

14 **--- CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. TARA MILLER:**

15 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Good morning, Chief  
16 Superintendent Campbell. My name is Tara Miller, and with my colleague, Alix Digout,  
17 we represent a family member of Kristen Beaton and her unborn child, who both lost  
18 their lives in the mass casualty on April 19th.

19 I'm going to start with just touching base on a few changes that you  
20 noted yesterday had been made within the RCMP post the mass casualty, and one of  
21 the things I wanted to just clear up was the implementation of the Critical Incident  
22 Operating Room. Did that come about -- so we know that the move of OCC from Truro  
23 to Halifax that was in motion, the plans for that were in motion before the mass casualty

24 ---

25 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

26 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- and it was executed afterwards. But in  
27 terms of the implementation of the Critical Incident Operating Room, was that part of the  
28 plan already prior to the mass casualty or was that executed as a response to the mass



1 casualty?

2 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** It was our OCC manager, Glen  
3 Byrne, that spearheaded that initiative, and I think it's called a Critical Incident  
4 Command Room. My understanding, though, is that it wasn't necessarily built into the  
5 plan pre Portapique, I'll call it, April 18th and 19th, 2020, it was determined to be  
6 something of great value after understanding how there can be issues with  
7 communication.

8 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And is it fair to say that that Critical Incident  
9 Command Room assists with the common operating picture issue by having easy  
10 access for folks, CICs, Division, Emergency Ops Centre, and any other individuals who  
11 need to quickly be able to access information?

12 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes. I -- from all of the feedback  
13 that I have received from those that are actually using that room now, they actually  
14 speak of it quite favourably. And I've had the opportunity to attend and see some  
15 demonstrations, and I think that it is, by far, better than what we had in place in April of  
16 2020.

17 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. And with respect to when you were in  
18 British Columbia, and now you're in New Brunswick, do the same type of operations  
19 exist? The Critical Incident Command Rooms, are they in existence in those  
20 jurisdictions?

21 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I'm not familiar because there are  
22 different Operational Communications Centres. My service in British Columbia was  
23 predominantly, although I covered the entire province in some ways, I spent the bulk of  
24 my time in the Greater Vancouver area, and during my early part of my service there  
25 were Operational Communications Centres; each of the detachments might have had  
26 their own Operational Communications Centre. I'm not aware of Critical Incident  
27 Command Rooms, as we described, what we have here now in Nova Scotia, and also,  
28 now, to this day, they have what's called e-comm, which is a centralised Communication

1 Centre, which I believe in terms of recommendations I think that all operational -- police  
2 operational communications should be centralised, because that would just ultimately  
3 increase the flow of information and situational awareness. Having multiple police  
4 dispatch centres is going to create a divide and delay in information.

5 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. And so in New Brunswick, are you  
6 able to share with us what the setup is in New Brunswick with respect to a Critical  
7 Incident Command Room, or a lack thereof?

8 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** So I'm very new to New Brunswick.  
9 In fact, I have only really been on the ground for less than a week, and at that time, I  
10 was in the middle of a relocation, and then also, getting ready to return to Nova Scotia  
11 for this purpose. But I do know that there is an Operational Communications Centre in  
12 the headquarters of the RCMP on Regent Street in Fredericton, and I do know that the  
13 Fredericton City Police has its own Operational Communications Centre. And they  
14 actually have the PSAP, or the Public Safety Answering Point with a 9-1-1 Call Centre  
15 there. I've been able to learn that since I arrived, and I know that the RCMP also has an  
16 Operational Communications Centre in the Codiac, or the Moncton area. But in terms  
17 of all the specific workings and what we have available to us in New Brunswick, I'm -- I  
18 still have to get there.

19 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. But what I heard you say is that from  
20 the Nova Scotia experience this Critical Incident Command Room, being situated where  
21 it is, is almost a best practice in terms of being able to enhance situational awareness  
22 and the common operating picture?

23 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I would say that it is, and further to  
24 that, I think yesterday I testified that we had the superintendent in charge of the  
25 Operational Response and Readiness Program in Ottawa, who is also an accredited  
26 Critical Incident Commander, that had relieved or taken a period of time, I think two  
27 weeks last summer, to be a Critical Incident Commander in this division, and he was  
28 shown this room for the first time, and he had many questions about it. So that would

1 lead me to believe that it might be unique within the RCMP, I can't say it's unique within  
2 other police forces, I don't know, but that was my interpretation is that it was something  
3 that he hadn't seen before. And he had served in because as a Critical Incident  
4 Commander in the North, I think in the Northwest Territories as a Critical Incident  
5 Commander, and was running the actual Critical Incident Program as a manager  
6 nationally in Headquarters, Ottawa.

7 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. Just a few tiny finish-off questions  
8 about that Critical Incident Command Room. I think you said that there is access to all  
9 the mapping and the CAD needs in that room?

10 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes ---

11 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And would that include Pictometry? Would  
12 that resource be available in the Critical Incident Command Room?

13 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, there should be Pictometry  
14 there because I attended that room once for a demonstration of ATAK and the use of  
15 the police dogs, and then actually following the track of the police dog while the police  
16 was actually on an active track, and I remember seeing that screen in that room. I've  
17 seen that as well in the Operational Communications Centre.

18 **MS. TARA MILLER:** So when you say there should be Pictometry  
19 in that room, you're not sure, but you're reflecting on an experience where you think you  
20 saw it in the room?

21 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes. I wish I could confirm  
22 100-percent, but I do know in conversations with Glen Byrne that Pictometry has been  
23 something that he has been ensuring that we actually have greater or better access to  
24 that within the OCC.

25 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And throughout different reports, policy  
26 review, we hear about web mapping service from the National Operations Centre.  
27 Would the web mapping service be available in that Critical Incident Command Room?

28 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I'm not sure. I don't know that, and

1 I'm not familiar with the web mapping service at, and I think what you're referring to is  
2 the National Operations Centre, or the NOC they call it ---

3 **MS. TARA MILLER:** NOC.

4 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** --- in Ottawa. I don't know. That  
5 would be a question for the manager of the OCC.

6 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Thank you. I want to move now to another  
7 change that you talked about in your statement, this is your June 28th, 2022 statement,  
8 and you talked about the -- this was with respect to general members' radios having  
9 GPS capability that had not been activated. Do you remember that in your statement?

10 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

11 **MS. TARA MILLER:** I can pull it up, but I ---

12 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No, that's fine.

13 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- you've got the context of it. Okay.

14 And certainly we heard that during the initial entry into Portapique  
15 by the IARD members, that was one challenge for them that prevented a second IARD  
16 team coming in because there was no situational awareness because members outside  
17 of their cars could not be tracked with GPS.

18 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** That's true. I became aware after  
19 the fact that our portable radios -- encrypted portable radios actually had a GPS  
20 capability that was not operational at the time.

21 I don't know the reasons behind why that wasn't, but I think it's  
22 important also to point out that even if you engage the GPS on a portable radio, it would  
23 be the Operational Communications Centre or that Critical Incident Commander that  
24 might actually see those locations. It might not necessarily be available to the officers  
25 that are actually on the ground. That's where ATAK would come in so they would have  
26 situational awareness on the ground of each others' positions.

27 **MS. TARA MILLER:** But certainly having the GPS on the portable  
28 radios for members on the ground, that is going to help with situational awareness for

1 knowing where they are and ---

2 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** It would ---

3 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- someone else deploying resources;  
4 correct?

5 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, from a Critical Incident  
6 Command perspective, at least if the commander knew where they were, the  
7 commander could help direct those resources.

8 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And in your statement on June 28th, you  
9 talked about Mr. Byrne implementing or looking at taking care of making sure that this  
10 GPS activation on the portable radios was taking place. You didn't know the  
11 compliance percentage or the status at that time and you said you'd have to check with  
12 Glen Byrne.

13 Do you know what the answer is to that question now?

14 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No, I don't. And in fact, it wouldn't  
15 just be Glen Byrne. We have a manager of what we call IM/IT, or Information  
16 Management/Information Technology that deals with -- under that area of responsibility  
17 has the radio shop program. That's Christian Gallant. So Christian and Glen would  
18 work on that together in terms of making sure that that capability was in place.

19 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. So in your statement when you said  
20 you'd have to check with Glen Byrne, have you checked with Mr. Byrne?

21 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No. When I -- when I provided that  
22 statement ---

23 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Two -- two years and a bit post the MCC, we  
24 still don't know if that GPS activation has happened on members' portable radios. Is  
25 that fair to say?

26 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, what's fair to say is that on  
27 Jun 28th, that was actually my last day in this division, and then I was transferred. And  
28 ---

1                   **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Apologies. I didn't --

2 Commissioner Fitch has just alerted me that Ms. Ward's standing.

3                   **MS. LORI WARD:** Just if I may interject, Commissioners, I believe  
4 that this information was covered in our response to the request for our written evidence  
5 on what the RCMP had implemented so far, and that was in response to the subpoena  
6 of June 2nd, I believe. So there was a lengthy response that covered radio capabilities  
7 as they stand now, and I believe it's been rolled out to ERT members and police dog  
8 services and it's in process for general duty members.

9                   **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Okay. Does that help you, Ms.  
10 Miller?

11                   **MS. TARA MILLER:** Thank you.

12                   But in your role as Support Services Officer, the third-highest officer  
13 in the RCMP in Nova Scotia from September of 2019 to when you left, you weren't --  
14 you weren't aware of whether or not that GPS portable radio activation had taken place;  
15 correct?

16                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, first off, I'm not the third in  
17 line for the hierarchy of the RCMP in Nova Scotia. There are several Superintendents,  
18 so I just want to clarify that first.

19                   But no, I wasn't aware.

20                   **MS. TARA MILLER:** You -- yesterday, in response to questioning  
21 from Ms. Young, I believe I heard you say you had four direct reports.

22                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Sorry. Which reports?

23                   **MS. TARA MILLER:** Yesterday, in response to questions from Ms.  
24 Young, I believe I heard you say you had four direct reports.

25                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

26                   **MS. TARA MILLER:** And you had indicated it was Justine Brodier,  
27 Don Mosher and Murray ---

28                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Marcichiw

1                   **MS. TARA MILLER:** Marcichiw.

2                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yeah.

3                   **MS. TARA MILLER:** You didn't identify the fourth and in ---

4                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yeah, I never got ---

5                   **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- your statement, it says that there were  
6 three, so I wanted to follow up with that piece.

7                   Was there a fourth, and who was the fourth?

8                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** So technically on paper, there are  
9 three. However, I made it a practice of involving Glen Byrne, as the OCC Risk Manager  
10 is someone that I treated as another direct report, so we would have -- if I had Support  
11 Services meetings, I would actually have Glen Byrne at those meetings with us.

12                   **MS. TARA MILLER:** Thank you.

13                   I want to move now to interviewing witnesses on the night of April  
14 the 18th. Ms. Young took you through yesterday the fact that Mr. Andrew MacDonald  
15 was not interviewed until 5:00 a.m., and as I understood your evidence, Chief  
16 Superintendent, you said that that was not abnormal because he was receiving medical  
17 treatment in that window of time.

18                   We also know that there were four children who ranged in ages  
19 from nine to 13 who had a front row view of the perpetrator and his actions for a  
20 considerable period of time. They were extracted from the home at 12:24 a.m., yet  
21 none of those children were ever interviewed in terms of what they saw.

22                   There was certainly an officer who accompanied them to the  
23 hospital, but they were never interviewed in any formal way.

24                   So from your perspective, what is the best practice for interviewing  
25 child witnesses?

26                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, there are -- there are a  
27 number of -- well, first off, I'm not aware that they were never interviewed.

28                   **MS. TARA MILLER:** They were not interviewed that night or that

1 morning.

2 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** That night, okay. No, I just wanted  
3 to clarify that because I seem to recall that they had been interviewed. I just wanted to  
4 clarify.

5 **MS. TARA MILLER:** No, but in terms of obtaining from them  
6 contemporaneous, timely information which would have helped identify more detail  
7 around the police car, they were not -- they were not interviewed that night or the next  
8 morning.

9 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** So specific to your question, there  
10 is a child interviewing course that certain officers -- they can be general duty officers  
11 that receive that training or General Investigations Section officers, Major Crimes  
12 officers may receive that training. It just depends.

13 But there is a specific course on child interview.

14 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. And what are your thoughts, Chief  
15 Superintendent Campbell, on the appropriateness of those children not having been  
16 interviewed that morning after they were extracted from the house?

17 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, ideally, if there's a witness to  
18 any crime, you want to be able to interview them as quickly as you can. On -- you  
19 know, to take that further, though, I do know that there was a lot happening at the time.  
20 So whatever decisions were made in terms of the taskings, the timings, the access, I  
21 wish I could speak to those, but I wasn't there in that moment to have a full  
22 understanding of what that looked like to be able to give you my true assessment of why  
23 that wasn't done at that time.

24 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Who would have had the authority to action  
25 the interviewing of those witnesses that night? Would that have been the Critical  
26 Incident Commander?

27 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I would say that the Critical  
28 Incident Commander, because it was still an ongoing or unfolding Critical Incident,



1 would want to make sure that appropriate witnesses were interviewed and would ask for  
2 a tasking of that to happen. So again, as I said before, ultimate authority would be the  
3 Critical Incident Commander, however supported -- it should be supported by  
4 investigative resources.

5 There's only so much -- that Critical Incident Commander,  
6 obviously, their job is to command, but their job is to also receive information so they  
7 can make appropriate decisions.

8 **MS. TARA MILLER:** You'd agree with me, though, Chief  
9 Superintendent Campbell, that obtaining timely information from firsthand witnesses  
10 immediate -- in the immediate aftermath as appropriate would have been very helpful.

11 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, I agree.

12 **MS. TARA MILLER:** I'm going to move now just to a title I heard  
13 said yesterday, and it may have been my friend, Ms. Young, asking you about a position  
14 called Chief Learning Officer.

15 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

16 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Is there -- who is this? Do you know who the  
17 Chief Learning Officer is, and what's their role? Is that a provincial role or a federal  
18 role?

19 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** It's a federal role of National  
20 Headquarters in Ottawa, and I believe the current Chief Learning Officer is Rob O'Reilly.  
21 He was not the Chief Learning Officer at the time of April 18th-19th, 2020. I believe that  
22 Rob O'Reilly was the Chief of Staff to the Commissioner.

23 If I'm correct, it might have been Assistant Commissioner Jasmin  
24 Breton who was the Chief Learning Officer.

25 And their role or responsibility would be for delivery of all training,  
26 whether it be online training or in-person training across the entire country.

27 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And across the breadth of the members.

28 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes. Each division will have a

1 Training Section and then it'll have individuals that deliver training and modify training.  
2 There will be nuances or differences from one province to the other. We may have to  
3 create a course to deal with provincial specific legislation. That will land on the  
4 province.

5 But the consistency in terms of application of training, the  
6 development of training. They also have -- National Learning Services would have  
7 access to our Tactical Training Section if it's tactical, for example. They have the ability  
8 to reach in to national policy centres to be able to draw upon that --...

9 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, those subject matter experts  
10 and those national policy centres for material for training.

11 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. Thank you.

12 I want to move now to, Chief Superintendent, to the Criminal  
13 Intelligence Service of Nova Scotia Officer Safety Bulletin that came out on May 4<sup>th</sup>,  
14 2011. Your evidence yesterday, as I understood it, was that, from your perspective, an  
15 Officer Safety Bulletin of that kind that contained information about illegal guns and a  
16 threat to kill anyone was really important information to retain for a long time. If I've  
17 mischaracterized your words, please tell me, but that's from my notes.

18 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I stand by those words today  
19 ---

20 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay.

21 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** --- in that assessment.

22 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And we know, of course, that that bulletin  
23 was purged, consistent with the RCMP purging policy, two years after it was issued ---

24 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I don't think it solely would be the  
25 RCMP purging policy. I think it might be the *Privacy Act* that dictates that we have to  
26 keep material for two years for the purposes of ATIP. And then there would be policies  
27 attached to the retention, and I'm not an expert in retention periods and retention  
28 policies in the organization, but it's all guided by the *Privacy Act* partly.

1                   **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. So you understand that the purging of  
2 that record may be tied to *Privacy Act* requirements?

3                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Not being an expert in that area,  
4 my answer is yes.

5                   **MS. TARA MILLER:** But from your perspective as a senior officer  
6 with over 32 years of policing, this is exactly the kind of information you think is very  
7 important to keep for a long period of time?

8                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I would think so, yes.

9                   **MS. TARA MILLER:** And so in addition to just retaining it, it needs  
10 to be accessible to members as well. And I wanted to get your input on how -- if we  
11 could leave aside the privacy concerns that would lead to purging, how do you believe  
12 this information could be not just retained, but preserved in a manner that could be  
13 readily accessible by members, so that they are on guard for the information that has  
14 been contained in such a bulletin? So in this bulletin, for example, it ended with use  
15 extreme caution when dealing with this perpetrator. What is -- in your experience, what  
16 would be the best way that that could be accessed by members as they're going out to  
17 respond to a call at a home?

18                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** So traditionally, there's the  
19 Canadian Police Information Centre. You've heard the acronym CPIC?

20                   **MS. TARA MILLER:** Yes.

21                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** A lot of the time, if someone is in a  
22 certain category, they're of special interest to police, they could be added onto CPIC.  
23 That is probably the one consistent database that any police officer across the country,  
24 because it doesn't matter whether that individual is in Nova Scotia, they could be on  
25 vacation in Manitoba, if there's interaction, if there was a CPIC query, any officer, any  
26 law enforcement or peace officer would have access through CPIC to be able to make  
27 that query and receive that information.

28                   So depending upon, again -- and you have to either maintain or

1 purge those based on whether the person's been charged, so I don't know whether it's  
2 feasible for there to be an indefinite entry into CPIC on something like that, or how fair  
3 that might be to an individual if, for example, they've changed their life. That's one  
4 avenue.

5                   The second avenue, obviously, would be records management  
6 systems available to police. And it makes it more difficult when there are multiple  
7 records management systems that officers do not have the ability to access fully if, for  
8 example, it's one records management system that has that information and the  
9 incident's happening somewhere else. So I'm a firm believer in one RMS or one  
10 records management system accessible to all police officers, because being able to  
11 access that information can make a significant difference. And in this province, there  
12 are at least two records management systems within the policing environment here.

13                   **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. And when you say accessible to all  
14 police officers, do you mean all police agencies, not just the RCMP?

15                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, absolutely.

16                   **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. I'm going to move now to air support.  
17 We know, of course, the helicopter in New Brunswick was off duty sick for maintenance.  
18 My friend, Mr. MacDonald, asked you a little bit about the possibility of Nova Scotia  
19 getting its own helicopter or air flight support with the FLIR, given the population we  
20 have now, and you talked about, yes, that would be a good idea, but there's some  
21 challenges around the execution of that and some work in place. What I wanted to ask  
22 you about, Chief Superintendent, is that when the helicopter that currently exists or any  
23 air support goes off duty sick for maintenance, who gets that information, and I'll be  
24 specific with H-Division, Nova Scotia, who would have been notified of the fact that this  
25 air asset was no longer available?

26                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** So that's a very, very good  
27 question. And during the time of April 2020, there was not a proactive sharing of  
28 information from our air base. When I say "our air base", maybe it's probably best to

1 describe Air Services and where it's located and who ultimately oversees it on a day-to-  
2 day basis. So Air Services is a shared resource. RCMP Air Services is a shared  
3 resource in the Atlantic region. So there are two assets, one being a fixed plane and  
4 one a rotary air helicopter that's stationed out of Moncton, the Moncton area.

5 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Both of them are in Moncton; correct?

6 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Both of them are in Moncton. Now  
7 having said that, Moncton is relatively central, as we all know, in the Atlantic. They  
8 have an ability to get to northern New Brunswick, to Prince Edward Island and Nova  
9 Scotia, I would say in short order, when we're talking about flight paths. So it's  
10 positioned there, but it's a federal program. And this was a question that was posed to  
11 me during my interview as to whether or not the Air Services in New Brunswick reports  
12 up to the Criminal Operations Officer, and since I arrived, that was one of the first  
13 questions that I asked, and it does not. It does not report to the Criminal Operations  
14 Officer. It reports up through the federal business line because it is a federal asset.

15 Air Services has a certain number of hours that they allocate to  
16 each of the Atlantic divisions, and our contract with the province pays for a portion of  
17 that. And sometimes one division will have a little more hours than another division will  
18 have, and we can actually beg, borrow, or steal hours from each other because there's  
19 a certain number of hours that they expect to fly per calendar year.

20 With one asset, there is always the reality that that asset will be  
21 down for two reasons: one, maintenance, which has to be scheduled because safety is  
22 very important in terms of flights, and I know that they're bound by Transport Canada  
23 rules; and also, air crew. So depending upon the availability ---

24 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Sorry, what was the second one?

25 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Air crew.

26 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Air crew.

27 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** The pilots ---

28 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Yeah, yeah.

1                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** --- and the engineers that support  
2 that -- the aircraft, and tactical flight officers. So depending upon -- you have two  
3 issues, maintenance and resourcing, human resourcing to fly those ---

4                   **MS. TARA MILLER:** Yeah.

5                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** --- those aircraft. Those would be  
6 two aspects as to why that -- those -- either of those two aircraft would not be available.  
7 They would have scheduled and predetermined flights for operational reasons, and then  
8 they would have emergency callouts.

9                   **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. So I appreciate that, and I guess I  
10 want to go back to my initial question that when, for either maintenance reasons or  
11 human resources reasons, the assets, the air assets are not available ---

12                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

13                   **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- who in Nova Scotia in the RCMP gets that  
14 information proactively, if at all?

15                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** So now it's the OCC in our  
16 headquarters. At the time of April 2020, it was the OCC in J-Division headquarters in  
17 Fredericton because that's where the line officer was. So we would always make a call  
18 first to either Air Services or to the Operational Communications Centre in Fredericton  
19 J-Division headquarters to determine whether that flight -- or those aircraft or those air  
20 crew were available.

21                   **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. So if in Nova Scotia today there was a  
22 need for an air asset for a similar event and that asset wasn't available because of  
23 either maintenance or human resource issues, knowing that that asset was not  
24 available would already be known by OCC, Nova Scotia?

25                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, that's correct.

26                   **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay.

27                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** They would already know.

28                   **MS. TARA MILLER:** And they would be told that in advance and

1 that would allow them, presumably, to make a plan B?

2 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, and the plan B could be, for  
3 example, as I mentioned or I testified yesterday, we've -- we worked with the  
4 Department of Justice as well as Department of Natural Resources for increasing our  
5 capabilities with aircraft on the ground tier, but we could also rely upon the Air Services  
6 Program to make sure that there could be another aircraft, for example, from Montreal  
7 that could make its way to Nova Scotia as well.

8 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Again, that was my point that plan -- this --  
9 the change in how this information is communicated from April of 2022 now allows, at  
10 least in Nova Scotia, allows us to be proactive ---

11 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

12 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- in terms of acting on plan B versus  
13 reactive, which is what was the reality for Nova Scotia in April of 2020.

14 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** That's correct.

15 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Fair to say?

16 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

17 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. I'm going to move now into the  
18 MacNeil Report, but just before I do that, I mean, I just want to -- Commissioners, if I  
19 can, I know that we've heard from C/Supt Campbell that there are another series of  
20 notes that are coming, and I appreciate that the rules allow this, but I do want to be on  
21 record in saying that we're going to get -- those notes are going to be produced to DOJ  
22 today and just to put on the record that we'd like to reserve the right, of course, to recall  
23 this witness when we have access to that further production, given the importance of his  
24 position.

25 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Yeah, rules provide for that. We  
26 -- like almost everything we've been doing in this Inquiry, we will take whatever action is  
27 appropriate, whether it's a follow up affidavit if necessary, or recalling, or whatever. But  
28 yeah, the rules provide for that and it's so noted on the record. Thank you.

1                   **MS. TARA MILLER:** Thank you. The last area I need to cover,  
2 Commissioners, I'm happy to keep going, in fact, that would be perhaps ideal, ---

3                   **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Yeah.

4                   **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- and then we can take our lunch break if  
5 that's okay?

6                   **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Sure.

7                   **MS. TARA MILLER:** Yeah, thank you.

8                   So I want to talk about, Chief Superintendent, the MacNeil review,  
9 and of course you know that, it was out of the Moncton tragedy in 2014.

10                   In your statement, you were asked did you ever receive or were  
11 you given any training on the MacNeil Report? And your answer in your statement, at  
12 page 20 of 143, that's Exhibit 3890 -- we don't need to bring it up, Madam Registrar, but  
13 just for reference -- your answer to that question was no, you'd never received or been  
14 given any training on the MacNeil Report?

15                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No, there was no training course.

16                   **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay.

17                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I had familiarity with it. I was  
18 serving in Ottawa at the time that the responses to the MacNeil Report were being  
19 prepared.

20                   **MS. TARA MILLER:** Yes. You've read the report?

21                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I have, but it's been some time  
22 since I read the report. I wouldn't be able to recite the report verbatim at all.

23                   **MS. TARA MILLER:** Did you read the report on your own initiative  
24 or was that part of your work in Ottawa at the time?

25                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** My work in Ottawa at the time,  
26 actually I was involved in some of the responses to a few of the recommendations,  
27 particularly in and around the after-care components. And I had provided material.

28                   **MS. TARA MILLER:** You were working for Commissioner Bob



1 Paulson at that time?

2 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I was, yes.

3 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And he would have been the equivalent of  
4 Commissioner Lucki now?

5 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** He was the Commissioner at the  
6 time.

7 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay.

8 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yeah.

9 **MS. TARA MILLER:** So the reason you read that report was  
10 because you were doing work around the report in terms of some of the  
11 recommendations?

12 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

13 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. And I believe from your statement,  
14 you played a role in input into the aftercare portion, which is section 12 of the report,  
15 and you created the Critically Injured and Fallen Members Guide?

16 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** That is correct.

17 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Outside of that, have you had the opportunity  
18 to look at the report, its recommendations, and status of implementation, certainly when  
19 you were in charge of the Major Case Management Oversight Unit, which is where you  
20 were -- you created that unit, as I understand it, and that's where you were from 2017 to  
21 2019?

22 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes. That's correct. So I had  
23 actually, at the time when the MacNeil Report and it's Assistant Commissioner -- or  
24 Retired Assistant Commissioner Alphonse MacNeil that, with a team, produced that  
25 report. I actually read the report itself and then as a result of that report, there were  
26 recommendations that were tabled, and I had looked at some of those  
27 recommendations, well one, as you asked me earlier, I was involved in some of the  
28 responses to some of those recommendations, and I had actually read the updates in

1 terms of the recommendations. And those are also available to all RCMP members on  
2 the website. And I think they're also publicly available as well. So I would have seen  
3 the report itself, and I would have seen the recommendations as well.

4 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And I believe it was either your evidence  
5 yesterday or in your statement, I think it was your evidence yesterday, Chief  
6 Superintendent, you said the National CrOps officer is actually responsible for  
7 responding to the recommendations?

8 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

9 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay.

10 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** It was the National Criminal  
11 Operations Officer, and at that time it was C/Supt Eric Stubbs, now Assistant  
12 Commissioner Eric Stubbs, who is currently posted to the RCMP in British Columbia.

13 And I'd like to return to your last question when you asked about  
14 my position in the National Office of Investigative Standards and Practices.

15 That is a Major Case Management Oversight Unit. It's not specific  
16 to anything like the Critical Incident Program or Critical Incident responses. It was more  
17 about investigation.

18 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Yes. Thank you. So what I'd like to do,  
19 Madam Registrar, if you could pull up Exhibit 3928, and this is a document, Chief  
20 Superintendent, titled "RCMP Update: Implementation of MacNeil Recommendations  
21 from January 2020". So this would have been the status of these recommendations in  
22 Nova Scotia, as I understand it, some four months before the mass casualty?

23 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I think not just necessarily Nova  
24 Scotia. Just nationally in general.

25 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Nationally. Yes.

26 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yeah.

27 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And I'm not going to take you through each  
28 and every one of them, but what I will do is direct you to the ones I would like to review.

1                   So, Madam Registrar, on page 2 I'm looking at 3.4. And these are  
2 two -- 3.4 and 3.5, Chief Superintendent, are recommendations that flow -- or are  
3 relating to the:

4                                   "...common operating picture [...] to be available for  
5 simultaneous monitoring by frontline supervisors, Critical  
6 Incident Command, Division Emergency Operations  
7 Center [...] and the National Operations Center..."

8                   Under "Timeline", we see that it says that this was actually a  
9 recommendation that was still in progress.

10                   And I'd asked you earlier about the Critical Incident Command  
11 Room and the importance and the uniqueness of it here in Nova Scotia, and how helpful  
12 it had been, and your sense that that could be a best practice.

13                   Would this be something that you would suggest would fall within  
14 the option or options that could allow for common operating picture to be developed  
15 during critical incidents?

16                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** It could be included, but when I  
17 read section 3.4, it doesn't necessarily frame it up in a way that's easily understood.  
18 But I interpret 3.4 to be related to common operating picture for those on the ground.  
19 So for example, an application like ATAK would fall, I think, directly into 3.4.

20                   **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. Would it also encompass the GPS  
21 activation on member's portable radios?

22                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** It could, but as I testified earlier,  
23 there's an element of some people knowing and there is a benefit of more people  
24 knowing than just a few. But ultimately, it's those on the ground, if they had a device  
25 that they could see where everyone is, that's the ultimate benefit, and that's where  
26 ATAK would probably come in.

27                   **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. 3.5. This is a recommendation:

28                                   "That Emergency Management System and the 'web-

1 mapping service from the NOC be considered for each  
2 Division and policy, training and supervision be  
3 established requiring their use in Critical Incidents, major  
4 events and disasters, by [Division Emergency] ...”

5 It says implemented in terms of its status, and I'd asked you earlier  
6 about your awareness of whether the web mapping service had been implemented at  
7 OCC and you were not aware of that. So are you able to say whether or not in January  
8 of 2020, or even now, when you finished, I think, your last day in your position in Nova  
9 Scotia was the date of your interview, your first interview?

10 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

11 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Are you able to say whether that has been  
12 actually implemented from your practical experience here in Nova Scotia?

13 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** So I don't know exactly what the  
14 web mapping system is. I may have actually seen it in play there, but how its -- the  
15 name that it's given, I'm not -- from a technical perspective, I would not be able to speak  
16 to that. I don't know.

17 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. But that -- you know, the web mapping  
18 service and critical incidents, major events, that fell under your Support Services Officer  
19 mandate to deal with operations; correct?

20 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, yes, but with a number of line  
21 officers between that would deal with the day-to-day issues within those -- the respected  
22 units.

23 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Madam Registrar, if we could go to the next  
24 page, which is 3.6?

25 And this, Chief Superintendent, talks about:

26 “...where it does not already exist, each Division  
27 establish a policy and protocol through an Emergency  
28 Operational Plan to identify entry/exit points and major

1 transportation routes that should be alerted and  
2 monitored in the event of a relevant crisis.”

3 The response from January 2015 was that the:

4 “Detachment Emergency Operational Plans will be  
5 amended to ensure entry/exit points and major  
6 transportation routes are included.”

7 And the timeline says that that was implemented.

8 When we had both of the Critical Incident Commanders who  
9 testified together, S/Sgt West and Surette, neither of them were aware that this had  
10 been done in Nova Scotia. Are you able to comment on whether or not this policy and  
11 protocol has been actually implemented from your experience in Nova Scotia?

12 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I don't have that information. To  
13 me, the person that would best speak to that would be the sergeant in charge of the  
14 Emergency management Section in the Division.

15 And when I read this ---

16 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And who is that?

17 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Sorry?

18 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Oh, I'm sorry. Who would that be?

19 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Sgt Sean Reynolds. He wasn't in  
20 that position at the time of April 2020, but he's currently in that position. He would be  
21 able to speak to whether or not this recommendation is implemented in H Division.

22 And when I read it, I'm a little bit confused as to exactly what it  
23 means in terms of entry/exit points for major transportation routes. To me, it sounds  
24 like, because when you put it in the context of Moncton, is how do you move emergency  
25 resources in and out of a containment or a hot zone, that's how I would read it. But I  
26 could be interpreted -- interpreting that incorrectly.

27 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Certainly. And in Nova Scotia, the issue  
28 came about in terms of the RCMP not establishing checkpoints at major entry and exit

1 routes. They did in some cases. There were -- was one at the Cobequid Pass, but  
2 there wasn't one at the Truro transition from northern Nova Scotia to southern Nova  
3 Scotia. That was the context in which the CIC commanders were asked this question.

4 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** And the -- and the CIC  
5 commanders, I'm not aware of their response.

6 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Well, they acknowledged that there was no  
7 checkpoint ---

8 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Okay.

9 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- and ---

10 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** So if they acknowledged that then  
11 there was.

12 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And also, that there had been no, to their  
13 knowledge, execution of identifying entry/exit points and major transportation routes that  
14 should be alerted and monitored in the event of a relevant crisis, which is what the  
15 recommendation was. You're not aware of their evidence on that?

16 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I'm not aware of their evidence on  
17 that, no. I actually didn't watch the evidence of Staff Sergeant Surette or Staff  
18 Sergeant West.

19 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay.

20 Madam Registrar, if we can move to 4.8?

21 And this recommendation was:

22 "In large scale events where Air Services is utilized,  
23 Air Services personnel with the appropriate training  
24 should be assigned to the Command Post as a liaison  
25 for air service support."

26 The timeline indicates that that was implemented. And I am  
27 interested in hearing from you, Chief Superintendent Campbell, in terms of how you  
28 believe this recommendation would have been implemented and actioned in April of

1 2020 with response to the mass casualty?

2 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I don't understand how we could  
3 have implemented that, personally, because really what it's saying is, is inserting  
4 someone from air services branch or a personnel from there into the Command Post as  
5 a liaison for air support. That would also suggest that air support was available. So --  
6 and I'm not intimately aware of the protocols that the CIC would have when we do call  
7 upon our Air Services support. Perhaps that is a normal course that they would take,  
8 but again, as I had mentioned, I'm not the Critical Incident Commander, so the nuances  
9 of who they notify and who actually would attend the Critical Incident Command Post, I  
10 see that logistically as being very difficult, personally ---

11 **MS. TARA MILLER:** To execute this recommendation?

12 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I do, because, as I mentioned, the  
13 Air Services personnel are in Moncton, and if there was a large-scale critical incident  
14 event, where there was a mobile Command Post that was being used, if we didn't have  
15 this -- the the new room in the OCC, it would be logistically challenging to get them to  
16 Yarmouth from Moncton, and I doubt very much -- unless they flew to that location and  
17 dropped them off, that could be a protocol that was discussed, but I'm not -- I'm not  
18 intimately aware.

19 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. So what I'm hearing from these last  
20 couple of recommendations, Chief Superintendent, is that you're not -- you're not certain  
21 what they actually mean, these recommendations, and then you have some hesitancy  
22 about how they would actually be implemented in any event. Is that -- I mean, that's a  
23 generalisation, but based on what you were just saying about these last ones we went  
24 through, is that fair ---

25 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I think that's fair, yes.

26 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay.

27 Madam Registrar, if we could go now to 6.1.

28 And this recommendation, Chief Superintendent, arose from -- my

1 question around it, actually, arose from your comment yesterday when you said, "we're  
2 human, we all have biases", and that was relevant in terms of the line of questioning  
3 about understanding the detail that was given to OCC about the police cruiser replica.  
4 And I think you said the likelihood of someone creating a fake cruiser was not  
5 considered which contributed to this miscommunication, and you indicated that was a  
6 bias ---

7 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** M'hm.

8 **MS. TARA MILLER:** --- a human bias. So when I read this  
9 recommendation it made me think of that:

10 "Trainers and supervisors take into account how  
11 cognitive biases undermine training and consider how  
12 to mitigate the effect of these natural and universal  
13 thought processes."

14 Would you say that that recommendation captures what you were  
15 articulating yesterday in terms of the bias, the human bias that prevented the digestion  
16 of very -- what we believe was very clear information about the mock cruiser by the  
17 RCMP and execution on that in the first sort of half-an-hour?

18 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I think that bias is always a  
19 by-product of, you know, personal experience, and it's something that we always have  
20 to be fully aware of at all times when dealing with any situation in life, let alone policing.  
21 So I agree that bias often plays a role in how people perceive things.

22 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And in terms of the response, it says:

23 "Awareness of cognitive biases undermining training  
24 will be incorporated into use of force courses, such as  
25 Incident Management Intervention Model...and  
26 Immediate Action Rapid Deployment (IARD)."

27 It says that that was implemented. Are you aware of that, any  
28 training that would have taken place in Nova Scotia with respect to this



1 recommendation?

2 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yeah. Well, just in the last few  
3 years, there has been a fair amount of discussion in and around bias and perception.  
4 There's been training courses that deal with it in terms of human interactions, not just  
5 specific critical incidents. So there have been online courses that discuss bias, as well  
6 as, I know that there has been national and divisional policy on bias-free policing and  
7 how bias can affect how officers interact with others or how they perceive things. So I  
8 would say that there's a level of awareness in and around the importance of bias and  
9 how it could affect how people respond.

10 In terms of bias being incorporated into certain training courses, like  
11 the IMIM, which is our use of force model, or the IARD course, I -- because I'm not  
12 responsible for developing and delivering that training, it wouldn't be a question that I  
13 could easily answer, it would be from a training unit perspective.

14 **MS. TARA MILLER:** You can't do that.

15 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No.

16 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. And then I'll move to 6.4,

17 Madam Registrar.

18 And your -- this may be the same comment from you, Chief  
19 Superintendent. This was:

20 Immediate Action Rapid Deployment (IARD) training  
21 be adapted to include various environments as well  
22 as decision making, planning..."

23 Et cetera, et cetera. It goes on the next page.

24 Under the response, well, it says this was implemented, and it says:

25 "The IARD course training standard and learning  
26 material will be modified to reflect this  
27 recommendation."

28 Are you able to say if in Nova Scotia there was a modification to the

1 IARD training that would have included rural environments and at night?

2 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** So I -- I don't know the specific  
3 timings. Again, I'm not a training specialist, per se, in terms of developing training, but --  
4 for IARD, or these tactical training courses, and I don't know of when it was  
5 implemented, but initially, IARD training was developed and first rolled out in more of an  
6 indoor IARD. For example ---

7 **MS. TARA MILLER:** It was in response to school shootings;  
8 correct?

9 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

10 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Yes.

11 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** So you're going into buildings,  
12 you're moving down hallways, you're learning how to move, how to interact, and then  
13 following that, there was the outdoor IARD training. And I -- as I have been informed,  
14 there are scenarios that are low-light scenarios and there's also outdoor, but it depends  
15 upon the time of day that you're actually training. So I would imagine that the majority of  
16 training for safety purposes on an outdoor IARD training is probably done during the  
17 day, whereas low-light conditions are simulated in a -- in a contained or an indoor  
18 environment. So I do know that that happened.

19 And at the time, when IARDs and carbines were rolling out, at that -  
20 - at that stage, I was a corps sergeant major in the RCMP, which made me a member of  
21 the Senior Executive Committee, and I remember being involved in a vote in terms of  
22 delivering this training specifically to cadets in Depo because their training calendar is  
23 very full, and there was a decision that was collectively made to ensure that all cadets  
24 were trained. Post their graduation and before they went to their first post, they would  
25 have received the IARD components as well as the carbine training before receiving  
26 their first posting.

27 **MS. TARA MILLER:** We heard evidence from those members, the  
28 IARD members, who indicated that there hadn't been a lot of training around going in at

1 night in rural areas. And I take your point that you're perhaps not the best person suited  
2 to add a comment on the implementation of this, but there may have been  
3 implementation of some IARD training but perhaps not as nuanced and specific with  
4 respect to the rural nighttime scenario; is that fair to say?

5 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Oh, I think it's fair to say, and I  
6 would suggest that it's quite -- probably quite important, because not only do we have  
7 municipal contracts in urban areas, but we, you know, largely police many rural or  
8 non-urban areas. So it would make sense to me that we incorporate some level of rural  
9 IARD response training.

10 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay.

11 I want to move now Madam Registrar, to 7.8.

12 And we talked about this a little bit ago, and I may predict your  
13 answer but 7.8 is a recommendation that:

14 "A high resolution mapping system, such as the web-  
15 mapping service from the...(NOC), be integrated  
16 within the Computerized Integrated Information and  
17 Dispatch System...."

18 It says it's been implemented.

19 Are you able to say, C/Supt. Campbell, if that has actually taken  
20 place in Nova Scotia?

21 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I'm not, and I've never worked in a  
22 general duty capacity here, meaning sitting behind the wheel of a marked police car that  
23 has a mobile terminal that might have mapping capabilities that I could look at. I haven't  
24 worked in that environment, so I don't have a personal experience to rely upon to  
25 provide an answer.

26 And, of course, I'm not personally familiar, as I testified earlier, with  
27 this web-mapping service through the National Operations Centre. I may have seen it  
28 but I just don't know the name attached to the maps that I've seen. I've been in the

1 OCC to see these screens that show maps, but for me, you know, the difference  
2 between Google Earth and high-resolution Pictometry, I'm not that technically  
3 advanced.

4 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Thank you. Moving to 7.10, you talked  
5 yesterday about the Risk Manager being a new position that, I think you said that was in  
6 response; that was one of the changes that had been made in Nova Scotia in response  
7 to the MacNeil Report; did I get that ---

8 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yeah, that was my testimony  
9 yesterday. However, someone from this Division corrected me, that was in this Division  
10 for a number of years, and I was told that it was 2005 ---

11 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay.

12 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** --- that they implemented that  
13 program.

14 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. Well, that would certainly -- that might  
15 help answer this question. It says:

16 "Operational Communications Centres (OCCs) should  
17 have an experienced non-commissioned  
18 officer...available to coordinate operations in critical  
19 incidents and to offer direct operational advice to call  
20 takers and dispatchers."

21 My question to you, Chief Superintendent is, from your perspective,  
22 is that the Risk Manager?

23 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

24 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay. So that has been implemented.

25 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

26 **MS. TARA MILLER:** There's a section of the MacNeil Report that  
27 deals with the implementation of recommendations from an earlier review -- two earlier  
28 reviews -- thank you, Madam Registrar, we can take that document down -- and the

1 implementation of recommendations from the Mayerthorpe and the Spiritwood reviews.

2                   And what I'd like to do, Madam Registrar, is to bring up COMM  
3 number 50843, which is the second part of the MacNeil Report. I apologize; I don't  
4 have the exhibit number. And I'm looking to be at page 63 of the 90-page document.

5                   **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** That's Exhibit 1629.

6                   **MS. TARA MILLER:** Thank you.

7                   So this, Chief Superintendent, is part and parcel of the MacNeil  
8 Report, which you read and done some work on, and one of the questions that was put  
9 to the -- through the report was:

10                                   "Are there any recommendations/lessons learned  
11                                   from Mayerthorpe that were particularly relevant to  
12                                   this file?"

13                   And it references the review team also examining  
14 recommendations stemming from the 2006 murder of two members in Spiritwood,  
15 because they shared key characteristics with what occurred in Moncton.

16                   And if we could go -- you're familiar with that section?

17                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I'm sure I've read it. I just don't  
18 remember this section, particularly, but I do remember references to Mayerthorpe and  
19 Spiritwood.

20                   **MS. TARA MILLER:** And Madam Registrar, if we could go to page  
21 64? This, exactly right there.

22                   There is a recommendation or there was a recommendation from  
23 Mayerthorpe under the heading, "Detachment Threat Coordinators" and the  
24 recommendation was that:

25                                   "Each detachment should designate a member (as  
26                                   distinct from other employees) to fill the role of Threat  
27                                   Assessment Coordinator [or a] (TAC)."

28                   And then it says:

1 The RCMP modified policy in March, 2013. It assigns  
2 the responsibility for analysis and maintenance of  
3 threat files to the Detachment Crime Analysis Unit,  
4 the Detachment Crime Reduction Unit, or the specific  
5 member responsible for threat coordination.”

6 And then it goes on to talk about the specifics in Moncton.

7 Are you able to say, C/Supt. Campbell, if that TAC, Threat  
8 Assessment Coordinator, was in place in Nova Scotia?

9 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I’m not in a position to say that  
10 because my area of responsibility, when we’re talking about detachments, that’s  
11 frontline resources, that would fall under the authority of a District Commander or a  
12 Detachment Commander, so I can’t speak to that. I have no ---

13 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Who would be in a position to speak to  
14 whether or not that had been actioned in Nova Scotia?

15 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I would imagine specifically if  
16 there’s a particular detachment that you’re interested in, it would be the Detachment  
17 Commander, followed by the District Commander, and then the Criminal Operations  
18 Officer, but I’m not -- this wouldn’t be an area that I would have delved into as the  
19 Support Services Officer.

20 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Thank you. Leaving that aside, but just from  
21 your experience, 32 years of experience in policing, it strikes me that the  
22 recommendation and the content of this recommendation is such that if there was an  
23 individual who was designated to look for documentation, for example, in this case for  
24 the perpetrator, we know that there was a 2010 threat to kill his parents; that was  
25 documented by the police. Of course we know about the 2011 Officer Safety Bulletin,  
26 which referenced the illegal guns and threat to kill, and then a report to police complain  
27 in 2013. It strikes me that those are the types of things -- and maybe I’m wrong on  
28 where I’m going with this, but I’m interested in hearing your perspective; that those are

1 the type of things that would fall under the jurisdiction of what was envisioned for a  
2 Threat Assessment Coordinator?

3 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** So when you read that back to me,  
4 it mentioned about Crime Analyst as well. So Crime Analyst would have access to  
5 certain databases for the purposes of identifying intelligence or information that would  
6 be specific for investigative purposes. So I'm just curious as to whether or not this was  
7 something that was being done by what we call DCAS, which is Division Criminal  
8 Analysis Section. But I have very limited visibility on whether this was in place or what  
9 that might have looked like in the Division.

10 **MS. TARA MILLER:** And the last item I want to take you to,  
11 Superintendent is found at -- Madam Registrar, page 72 of the 90-page PDF.

12 And the heading here is, "Additional Recommendations from  
13 Mayerthorpe and Spiritwood Previously Discussed in [the] Review include:" and they go  
14 on to reference a Canada Labor Code investigation which dealt with situational  
15 awareness for officers not being able to identify their direction of travel or location when  
16 in RCMP vehicles; that was addressed, that's been rectified.

17 But then it goes on to say:

18 "The RCMP has stated they have complied with this  
19 request. Mobile Work Station...[capacity] within the  
20 police vehicles, and or training in relation to  
21 communication by members with the OCC was  
22 deemed sufficient. As stated this incident, has  
23 highlighted the inability to track members once they  
24 leave their vehicles and set out on foot. In addition  
25 members on different MWS systems or from different  
26 Divisions could not be tracked by the local OCC. The  
27 lack of member locations once they were on foot was  
28 a major contributor to the OCC and CP [which I

1 understand to be Command Post] having challenges  
2 with situational awareness.”

3 My question to you, Superintendent, is that that issue -- and we  
4 talked about it a little bit earlier with the GPS activation on the portable radios, that was  
5 identified over 10 years ago and seems to have been still an issue in Nova Scotia in  
6 April of 2020. Is that fair to say?

7 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I think it's a fair thing to say,  
8 but there's a couple of things in that passage that I picked up on, and one is GPS  
9 capabilities. I'm not sure whether there was an actual capability at that time when that  
10 recommendation was made; I don't know. I wasn't involved in either of the Spiritwood  
11 or the Mayerthorpe reviews.

12 The second part that it speaks about is ability for the -- you know,  
13 from a common operating picture, the OCC, or Critical Incident Command Post to be  
14 able to see where units or vehicles are. I do know that what was in place in this  
15 Division, particularly in the Atlantic region, was an ability to be able to see other vehicles  
16 from, I believe, New Brunswick. I've had a conversation with Glen Byrne about that  
17 specifically.

18 One of the challenges here that we do have in Nova Scotia is that  
19 with the two different systems, one being Versadex and IES, which is the  
20 communication centre in Halifax, which is combining HRP and RCMP versus the  
21 remainder of the province, the RCMP, being dispatched out of the OCC in Dartmouth, is  
22 that I don't believe that there's an ability to see cars in real-time from Halifax District into  
23 outside of Halifax District and vice-versa.

24 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Thank you. I'm not talking about the cars, at  
25 this point. What I'm talking about is the situation where members have left their car and  
26 they are on foot, and then the note that that was a major contributor to the OCC and  
27 Command Post having challenges with situational awareness. And that was definitely,  
28 from what we've heard, that was the issue, or one of the issues on April 18th and 19th,



1 2020, in Nova Scotia.

2 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

3 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay.

4 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** But I was just trying to add a little  
5 more context, because in that passage it did speak to issues.

6 **MS. TARA MILLER:** Okay, thank you. Those are all my  
7 questions, Chief Superintendent. Appreciate your time.

8 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you, Ms. Miller. We'll  
9 break for lunch for one hour.

10 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Thank you. The  
11 proceedings are now on break and will resume in one hour.

12 --- Upon recessing at 12:48 p.m.

13 --- Upon resuming at 2:04 p.m.

14 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Welcome back. The  
15 proceedings are again in session.

16 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you.

17 Ms. Nijhawan?

18 We'll bring the witness back.

19 **--- SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL, Resumed:**

20 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Good afternoon, Chief  
21 Superintendent Campbell.

22 Ms. Nijhawan?

23 **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** Thank you, Commissioner.

24 **--- CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:**

25 **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** Good afternoon, Chief  
26 Superintendent Campbell. My name is Nasha Nijhawan, and my firm represents the  
27 National Police Federation, which you probably know is a union that represents RCMP  
28 members below the rank of inspector, including almost all of the officers who responded

1 operationally on the night of April 18th and 19th.

2 I wanted to ask you a few questions arising from your testimony  
3 yesterday, and in particular, to pick up on a comment that you made when asked by  
4 Ms. Young about staffing. And what I have in my notes is you saying is that you have  
5 concerns about staffing levels all the time, every day, and you spoke a little bit about  
6 some of the efforts that have been made to relieve staffing pressure by allocating full-  
7 time resources to the ERT team. So -- but that's a topic that I'd like to explore.

8 And I'm going to suggest to you that there's sort of two components  
9 to this question of staffing. One is filling existing positions with available members, and  
10 the other is determining whether or not there are enough positions allocated to provide  
11 the level of services that we want to provide. And so my questions are going to  
12 distinguish between those two, just so we can -- we can keep that on track.

13 Now, I understand that your experience is, most recently, in  
14 H-Division, with respect to your role as SSO, but that through your career, including  
15 your career as an officer, you would have also had some familiarity with general duty  
16 detachment staffing. Is that fair?

17 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** In terms of staffing general duty  
18 detachments, not so much ---

19 **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** Okay.

20 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** --- but I have been a general duty  
21 member in the past, yes.

22 **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** So I'm going to ask you some questions  
23 which touch on issues about general duty staffing, and if you're not comfortable to  
24 answer them, or you think there's someone else better suited, please just let me know.

25 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Okay.

26 **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** So I understand that on April 18th, on  
27 nightshift in Bible Hill detachment, the evidence has been to date that there were four  
28 members on duty, and that was less than the number which is generally allocated to

1 that shift, which is six members, and included in the vacancies was a vacancy above  
2 the rank of constable. So that we had a very experienced constable acting in a corporal  
3 capacity, that was Constable Stuart Beselt.

4 Will you agree with that me that this is a -- the evidence of  
5 Sergeant O'Brien, who was the sergeant responsible for Bible Hill detachment, was that  
6 he never had six members available. In your experience, is that a chronic problem  
7 among detachments in Nova Scotia?

8 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I don't have complete visibility  
9 on staffing levels at the general duty -- in the general duty environment, but what I  
10 would often get is the email strings where detachments would be putting callouts for  
11 additional officers for overtime shifts to increase those staffing levels, so I would see  
12 those constantly. And when I -- when I spoke of on a daily basis, concerned about the  
13 staffing levels, it was largely because I had awareness that there was always calls for  
14 members to be working overtime.

15 **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** And is that because there are absences  
16 to be expected in detachment staffing, including scheduled entitlements, leave  
17 entitlements, or parental leave entitlements, but also unexpected injuries or long-term  
18 disability leaves?

19 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, there would be two factors:  
20 Expected, meaning that sometimes you can plan for those expected vacancies. An  
21 example of that would be knowing when you may be required for court, and if your court  
22 is the following day, when you were supposed to be working a nightshift beforehand,  
23 that might be an expected vacancy. Other expected vacancies might be knowing that  
24 there's an upcoming transfer or there's an upcoming retirement, so attrition, or  
25 movement from one business line or one detachment to another. And then there's a  
26 host of unexpected vacancies, which would include things like, you know, maternity  
27 leave, paternity leave, members that are injured, whether it be a physical injury or an  
28 operational stress injury, those are much more difficult to predict.

1                   **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** And are you aware of how a  
2 detachment would determine what's the minimum number of officers we can run a shift  
3 on, as compared to what the normal staffing of that shift would be? Are there standards  
4 for minimum levels of staffing in detachments?

5                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, because I'm not a district  
6 policing officer or a detachment commander, I don't know exactly how they calculate  
7 their minimum numbers, but I would -- I feel fairly comfortable in saying that they have  
8 already established what those minimum numbers would look like, and that's largely  
9 based on the fact that you would see these requests for overtime shifts to be able to fill  
10 to make sure that they were at least at those minimum numbers.

11                  **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** So if I'm understanding your evidence  
12 correctly, your experience has been that detachment level commanders will seek  
13 overtime coverage up to a minimum level?

14                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Either commanders or shift  
15 supervisors, watch commanders, which wouldn't mean that they're the detachment  
16 commander, they're essentially the shift supervisor.

17                  **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** Okay. And if this is a chronic problem,  
18 which it seems like maybe from your anecdotal or general evidence it is, do you have  
19 any sense of why we don't have regular shift availability to meet minimum staffing  
20 requirements in the detachments? What are the contributing factors to that strain?

21                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I think that the contributing  
22 factors are, there's a number of things: One, if there are unexpected vacancies, that is  
23 a contributing factor. But I also firmly believe that the method in which we calculate or  
24 we are provided doesn't take into account those expected and unexpected vacancies. I  
25 think that we're resourced to the minimum level in the very beginning before we actually  
26 start to experience those other challenges that affect our resources levels.

27                  **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** So would it be your recommendation, if  
28 the Commission is forward-looking, in order to maintain appropriate staffing levels at the

1 detachment level that there be more full-time resources allocated in order to allow as a  
2 buffer for these vacancies?

3 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, and you know, I don't want to  
4 use too many analogies, but I've used this analogy before because I think it's fitting: If I  
5 was to replace the flooring in a room that was a hundred square feet. The person that  
6 I'm buying that flooring from would say I need 120 square feet because of the fact  
7 there's going to be waste and overage. There's no buffer, I believe, built in to those  
8 staffing -- minimum staffing levels that would account for those vacancies.

9 **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** So that's a question of having enough  
10 available people, I suppose, to fill those spots. Why don't we have those people  
11 available? Why don't we have that buffer?

12 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I think we don't have that  
13 buffer because if we ask, we often don't get what we actually ask for. And I -- in my  
14 experience, I don't play this game of asking for more than I need, because I don't think  
15 that that is honest or fair to those that make the decisions in terms of how they're going  
16 to fund operations. My experience is, is that when we ask for something, we're asking  
17 for it because we actually need it based on the priorities that the government gives us  
18 and the expectations that government and the public have of us. So when we make  
19 those requests, we're actually making them quite honestly.

20 **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** So when you say requests, do you  
21 mean requests for additional funding in order to create those positions needed to  
22 provide this -- the levels? Is there a problem also with finding officers, or is it really just  
23 about money?

24 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I always think there's going to be  
25 problems in finding officers. I mean, again, anecdotally, I don't have numbers or  
26 statistics that I would be able to draw from that I'm aware of, other than conversations  
27 that I've been present for where I've not just heard from within the RCMP, but, you  
28 know, a variety of police agencies, both in Canada and the United States that more --

1 most recently, there's been some significant challenges in attracting people to the  
2 policing profession, for a variety of reasons that I would more or less be speculating on,  
3 but I have some ideas as to why. So I do believe that the applicant numbers have  
4 reduced significantly within, let's say, the last four years.

5 **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** And that's talking about the first sort of  
6 branch of this question, which is can we fill the spots that we have created. The second  
7 question is, how many spots do we need? So do you have any awareness of how it is  
8 determined, for example, that a shift in Colchester County should be six officers for that  
9 population area or crime level or need level? How does that decision get made that we  
10 need six? And I'm asking because I would expect, and you can correct me if I'm wrong,  
11 that the number of available officers has an impact both on public safety and officer  
12 safety. As we know on the night of April 18<sup>th</sup>, there were only 4 out of 6 available  
13 members to attend immediately in Portapique. And I'd suggest that there might be --  
14 there might have been a different -- things might have gone a little differently if there  
15 were six instead of four.

16 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** So once again, in terms of the  
17 general duty or the patrol level of response at the regional or detachment level, I,  
18 myself, wouldn't be involved in those discussions, but as a manager of other programs, I  
19 look at a number of factors. One, what is the priority of whether it be a municipal or a  
20 provincial government, how does that fit into our priorities in terms of enforcement,  
21 what's the value in investments that could be made in a particular area, call volume for  
22 the units that I'm speaking of, if there are recommendations that stem from a review,  
23 ESDC investigation that dictate that we require additional resources, meaning human  
24 resources. Those would be all factors that would contribute to a business case that  
25 would be put before the province on the provincial side, requesting additional resources  
26 to be able to address the operational needs of that particular unit.

27 But in terms of the frontline general duty policing that -- I've never  
28 been involved in those discussions here in this province.

1                   **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** So who would be a better person to ask  
2 that question among the commanding officers?

3                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** So in this province, the best person  
4 to have that conversation with or the best people to have that conversation with would  
5 be the administration and personnel officer. We call that the A&PO. Because they  
6 have a planning unit that would help facilitate the creation or drafting of those business  
7 cases, and then, of course, the district policing officers who would have connectivity  
8 with the contracts, the counties, the municipalities that are requesting the RCMP service  
9 or contracting the RCMP service through the province.

10                  **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** And would Chief Superintendent  
11 Leather have some involvement in that line of ---

12                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I believe Chief Superintendent  
13 would have awareness ---

14                  **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** Okay.

15                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** --- but direct involvement, that  
16 would be between the administration and personnel office, the planning units and the  
17 district policing officers right down to the detachment commanders.

18                  **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** Okay. So I'll take that in fairness to say  
19 that that's not an area that you have specific knowledge in, but you do have specific  
20 knowledge and experience in terms of staffing these specialized services, like, ERT,  
21 and I believe you spoke earlier in your testimony with Ms. Young as well as in your  
22 interviews and in response to some questions from Mr. Pineo this morning about the  
23 staffing of ERT. So I just want to make sure that there's some clarity about what your  
24 evidence is about that. At the time of the incident, there were 13 people on the ERT  
25 team ---

26                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

27                  **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** --- 6 of which were full-time equivalents,  
28 3 of which were funded by the province and 3 of which were funded by the federal

1 program; is that accurate?

2 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** That is accurate, yes.

3 **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** And so I think what your evidence was  
4 in your interview, and again, I'm just trying to make sure it's clear for everyone, is that  
5 after the events, you ensured that the additional six, so there was six full-time and six or  
6 seven part-time members, that there were an additional six full-time members. And that  
7 means that those members don't have any other policing duties; is that correct?

8 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** That's correct. I took ---

9 **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** And that was pressure funded you  
10 described it?

11 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

12 **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** And since then, I understand you've  
13 made a plan, you've entered into an agreement with the province to fund overtime, a full  
14 complement of 18 full-time equivalent ERT members?

15 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Over a period of time and that  
16 would be through a business case prepared through my office, or the ERT team through  
17 Inspector Moser to myself, that would then be submitted to the administration and  
18 personnel officer for presentation to the province. And what I would say is most  
19 recently, we received an approval for four additional resources per year over three  
20 years, which we're quite grateful for.

21 **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** So if I do my math correctly, in 2025,  
22 Nova Scotia will have 18 funded, fully funded, full-time ERT positions?

23 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

24 **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** Okay. So that's ERT, which is  
25 obviously, you know, one of the major components of your portfolio, but you'll agree with  
26 me that there are a number of other important units under your purview which have not  
27 seen that kind of an infusion of funding or extra resources; is that fair?

28 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** That is fair, yes.



1                   **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** So I'm thinking in particular of the  
2 EMRT program, the Emergency Medical Response Team.

3                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

4                   **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** Those are still completely part-time  
5 staffed?

6                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** They are -- they have a substantive  
7 position, and they deploy or activate when the Critical Incident Program is activated, so  
8 they do go with the ERT team, but they will be leaving from their substantive position.  
9 They will be on call as well.

10                  **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** So I understand, for example, that  
11 Corporal Dwayne Ivany, who testified before the Commission, is a corporal, a general  
12 duty corporal, supervisor, shift supervisor in Cole Harbour. So if ERT gets called out,  
13 we're going to be pulling general duty resources off the road; is that fair?

14                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** That is fair, yes.

15                  **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** Okay. And similarly for his other team  
16 members, for example, Constable Mahar is a Lower Sackville Detachment member I  
17 understand. So any time ERT gets pulled, we've solved this problem, the ERT is now  
18 fully funded, but we're still having a draw on general duty resources; is that fair?

19                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** That is fair because there's a  
20 number of areas of specialty within the Critical Incident Program and outside of it that  
21 many of the teams are what I would call ad hoc teams. They are comprised of  
22 individuals who are given special equipment and training to perform a function on an as-  
23 needed basis, and they would have a substantive position. So when we deploy or  
24 activate those teams, we are pulling them away from their substantive duties.

25                  **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** And the same is true for the Critical  
26 Incident Commander Program, those are important players who occupy other roles. For  
27 example, I understand Staff Sergeant Surette was a DANCO at the time?

28                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** That's correct, yes.

1                   **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** And same is true for the Crisis  
2 Negotiation Team?

3                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, it's correct.

4                   **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** And is the same true for the Underwater  
5 Recovery Team?

6                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** The same is true for the  
7 Underwater Recovery Team with the exception that there is a full-time or dedicated  
8 coordinator.

9                   **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** Okay.

10                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** The remainder of the team is all ad  
11 hoc resources.

12                  **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** And the same is true, as I understand it,  
13 for some supplement or supporting roles to the Critical Incident Package like the driver  
14 of the TAV, who's a -- at the time of the incident anyway, a corporal in Enfield, so he got  
15 pulled off a supervisory role in Enfield that night?

16                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** That's correct, yes.

17                  **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** So has the RCMP taken any steps or  
18 made any consideration of allocating or seeking funding for additional full-time  
19 resources for those programs, at least in a coordinator position, so there could be one  
20 person who does this full-time?

21                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** There was a submitted business  
22 case for a coordinator for the Critical Incident Program. I don't believe that that  
23 business case was supported. There was also, I believe, a coordinator position in  
24 another one of the units that I was requesting that was not supported, either.

25                         Ideally, we would want to work to a place where we actually have  
26 all of those critical incident resources within reason that would be full-time within that  
27 area of responsibility, but again, you have to balance that against the number of call-  
28 outs versus the amount of training and if there's any gap there, then, you know, it might

1 become a matter of efficiency to have them occupy a substantive position that might not  
2 be as demanding.

3 **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** And so what do you mean by that?  
4 What substantive position may not be as demanding?

5 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I would say that many of the  
6 positions have significant demands placed on them, but trying to find the best example.

7 Not to say it's not a demanding position, but if I had someone that  
8 was working within the training section or -- not me. Under the Administration and  
9 Personnel Officer there's a training unit and that training unit would have scheduled  
10 hours based on regular training time. So their job is to mainly train members in their  
11 operational skills maintenance. If there -- if there is enough resources in there to  
12 maintain training -- the tempo of training required, we might be able to pull from those  
13 resources a little bit easier as opposed to from a frontline general duty position.

14 **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** So ideally, would you agree that if a  
15 member -- if a member is going to be part-time on one of these specialized teams, their  
16 other job or their main job shouldn't be a general duty job?

17 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I don't think so, but then there are  
18 some upsides to general duty members being cross-trained in some of these  
19 specialties. And the reason why I say an upside to that is that there would be a regular  
20 osmosis or connection. For example, if you have a trained ERT member occupying a  
21 general duty position, one, they would always be on the road, and two, they would have  
22 interactions with their colleagues on the road with them.

23 So you know, I would expect that there would be conversations,  
24 there would be examples that are positive examples tactically that those officers would  
25 be able to benefit from being around, but the reality is, in terms of ERT, specific to your  
26 question, between the amount of required training and the number of call-outs, it's very  
27 difficult to put them into a general duty position.

28 **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** And so we talked about the negative

1 impact that drawing general duty members out of a detachment to fulfil a specialized  
2 role might have on that detachment on policing levels. Are there any other -- is there  
3 any benefits to having full-time team members on these -- in these specialized units?

4 Like what's the upside of having a full-time EMRT Coordinator, for  
5 example, as opposed to asking Corporal Ivany to do it off the side of his desk?

6 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, clearly the upside to having a  
7 full-time coordinator -- and the specific example that you asked for is EMRT, which is  
8 the Emergency Medical Response Team -- would be that there would be someone that  
9 would have a line of sight on the issues that could manage that team properly if it was  
10 one of those hybrid or *ad hoc* teams.

11 The administration and the ongoing training and the scheduling of  
12 that, that all takes time. So if we had people as full-time coordinators, that's a step in  
13 the right direction towards creating that access to those specialized skills on a 24/7  
14 basis. At least you'd have someone coordinating that.

15 **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** And you mentioned that there had been  
16 business cases for some of these units, but they, you said sort of passively, were not  
17 supported. Can you give us some more information about what you mean? Who is not  
18 supporting them? What's the roadblock here in terms of moving those ideas forward?

19 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I would -- I would  
20 characterize it not necessarily as a roadblock per se, but it's just an exercise in priority  
21 setting. And for every ask that you make, you try to articulate the reasons for why that  
22 ask is necessary and then when you go to government, you lay out what that ask is and  
23 then government has to decide how much they're willing to spend. And at times, like I  
24 said, it's a matter of prioritization in terms of what's most important to fill or increase the  
25 establishment of that given time.

26 **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** And speaking specifically about your  
27 sort of -- the sort of suite of services that fall under the Critical Incident package, are we  
28 looking for provincial funding for that -- those positions, or is that federal funding from

1 Ottawa that we're talking about?

2 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** So it could be one of both, but  
3 largely speaking, it's provincial funding. As I mentioned or I testified earlier, the federal  
4 program or the federal policing program nationally will fund three positions within  
5 Emergency Response Team, but they're not funding any others.

6 I do not have any part-time or *ad hoc* ERT members within the  
7 federal policing program that are working a substantive position within federal. They're  
8 all coming from the provincial business line.

9 **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** Okay. Now, I understand that the  
10 RCMP's specialized services, for example, a lot of these Critical Incident package units  
11 that we're speaking of also support municipal police services. Is that correct?

12 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, that's correct.

13 **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** And so can you just tell me how that  
14 works?

15 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, how it would function is that  
16 normally the risk manager and the OCC would receive a phone call from another police  
17 agency that might require assistance from the RCMP because of those capabilities and  
18 the specialty, for example, ERT or Critical Incident. And that conversation between that  
19 agency, it's usually an Inspector or, you know, Watch Commander on that -- from that  
20 agency, would have that conversation with the Risk Manager. The Risk Manager, in  
21 turn, would call the on-call Critical Incident Commander. They would get details from  
22 the agency that was requesting that service.

23 Then I would be notified as to whether or not I would approve that  
24 call-out and then, later on, paperwork would follow just to account for our services being  
25 utilized by other agencies.

26 **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** And is there any funding agreement  
27 about the provision of those services to the municipal police forces?

28 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No, there's not.

1                   **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** So it's not -- in other words, there's no --  
2 no payment is received by the RCMP or no funding allocation is considered.

3                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** There's no contribution, whether it  
4 be in, you know, human resources or financial resources.

5                   **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** And so you'll agree with me that in  
6 addition to the ERT team which, you know, may in 2025 be three-quarters provincially  
7 funded, if we're sending an EMRT member every time we send out the ERT team, that's  
8 actually a Cole Harbour detachment member who's getting sent to Bridgewater or  
9 Kentville or New Glasgow or wherever. Is that -- that's another drain on RCMP  
10 resources, isn't it?

11                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** It is. And it's not -- it just doesn't  
12 land on the EMRT resources. It would be the tab driver. It would be the radio techs. It  
13 would be the OCC operator. It would be the crisis negotiators. It would be the Critical  
14 Incident Commander. Like all of those resources are coming from somewhere else,  
15 which would then leave a void somewhere else to be able to handle that call.

16                   **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** And is there a solution or improvement  
17 to that pressure or challenge that you can think of?

18                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, there is a solution, I believe,  
19 to that problem, and that is increasing the depth of our teams, the number of our  
20 resources. I do believe that there needs to be an honest conversation in around the  
21 cost of policing, and also where there would be a reasonable level of contribution  
22 because of the fact that every police agency in this province is required to have those  
23 services.

24                   **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** I'm just going to ask you one last  
25 question before I go because my time is close to up, and it's about integrated policing.

26                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** About; sorry?

27                   **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** About integrated policing.

28                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

1                   **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** Now, we know that there is some  
2 integration with the Halifax Regional Police in Nova Scotia and that otherwise there are  
3 sort of these islands of municipal police agencies in other parts of the province.

4                   You gave the example of the lower mainland as an integrated  
5 service that you're familiar with. In Halifax I know we have RCID section which is  
6 integrated with the RCMP, but the Critical Incident package isn't in any way integrated.  
7 Are they integrated in British Columbia?

8                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, they are.

9                   **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** So how does that work?

10                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Agencies have the option of having  
11 their own ERT team. And again, as I mentioned, it's very expensive. So from an  
12 economies of scale perspective and also just true interoperability desires, I would say  
13 that some of these other police agencies have opted to work alongside of the RCMP  
14 where they all wear the same uniform, they all use the same equipment. It just so  
15 happens that their patches are different.

16                  So the cost sharing would be the provision of the resource, some of  
17 the operating funding because the equipment is expensive, the training is expensive,  
18 but the -- it's almost like an insurance policy. You may have one or two resources  
19 embedded within an ERT team. You would pay towards some of the operating costs,  
20 but that would be based on a formula that has been established based on the previous  
21 calls and the ERT team may have serviced in that particular area. So it's like an  
22 insurance policy. You have access, full access, and you're contributing to it.

23                  **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** My friend, Mr. Pineo, asked you this  
24 morning about how many ERT members you would need to have two full ERT teams in  
25 order to have a relief team, in addition an initial responding team. And I think you said  
26 36. And I think when he asked you if that was ideal, you said more than ideal. Is it fair  
27 to say that it's -- given that we're working towards 18 -- unrealistic that in Nova Scotia  
28 we're going to get to 36 RCMP members as an ERT team?

1                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well again, I'd like to see that. You  
2 know, I doubled the number of 18 times two.

3                   **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** Sure.

4                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** IT may be, realistically, 24,  
5 between 24 and 36.

6                   **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** M'hm.

7                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Is it realistic? These changes and  
8 the support required is -- I hope that it happens quickly, but I can tell you it's not going to  
9 happen overnight.

10                  **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** And I understand that there are  
11 municipal ERT teams in Nova Scotia. There's one with Halifax Regional and one with  
12 Cape Breton. Is an integrated model for ERT a possibility for Nova Scotia?

13                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I think that it is, but that would  
14 require some careful and meaningful conversations between municipalities and the  
15 RCMP and it would all be based on addressing and agreeing upon what the standard  
16 would be. And one of the challenges would be is that the RCMP standards are very set.  
17 I can't speak to the other agencies and what they would actually look like. But it's not  
18 impossible, is what I would say.

19                  **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** What would be the benefits of doing  
20 that, if it were possible?

21                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I think that there's massive  
22 benefits, because what it would equate to is greater levels of cooperation, seamless  
23 application of tactics and communication, good relations would be built between  
24 agencies, and then just generally, it's the capacity, because as I've testified earlier, if we  
25 have more than one critical incident ongoing at the same time, I can give you a specific  
26 example, I had approved a critical incident call out in this province in an RCMP  
27 jurisdiction at the same time I was receiving a critical incident call out for a municipal  
28 agency or township agency here in the province. And we were lucky that the RCMP in



1 New Brunswick actually responded or deployed to the other Nova Scotia municipal  
2 agency because of their proximity to the event that was occurring in the municipal  
3 agency.

4 So having these municipal agencies involved, if we could get to that  
5 place where we're truly inoperable, we have an ability to actually respond to more than  
6 one incident at the same time, or spell each other off.

7 **MS. NASHA NIJHAWAN:** Those are all my questions. Thank you  
8 very much for your patience, Chief Superintendent.

9 Thank you, Commissioners.

10 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you, Ms. Nijhawan.

11 Mr. Bryson?

12 **--- CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:**

13 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Good afternoon, Commissioners.

14 Good afternoon, Chief Superintendent.

15 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Good afternoon.

16 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** My name is Josh Bryson. I'm here with  
17 my colleague, Erin Wagner. We represent the family of Peter and Joy Bond. They  
18 resided in Cobequid Court.

19 And I'm also working very closely with the -- with Steve Topshee  
20 and his team. They represent another family on Cobequid Court, the Oliver Tuck family,  
21 and also the Lillian Campbell family as well.

22 So I have about an hour worth of questions for you, so I'll try to get  
23 through it as expeditiously. I know it's been a very long day for you. So we'll do our  
24 best.

25 So I want to start off picking up on what my friend asked you about,  
26 Ms. Nijhawan, in terms of the staffing issues.

27 So in April 2020, at Bible Hill, did you know, when you were  
28 authorizing the Critical Incident Package, that Bible Hill had a complement of four

1 general duty members at that time?

2 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I didn't know the number. I do  
3 remember, and I think it's captured in my text messaging, maybe, with C/Supt Leather,  
4 like, "How are the members on scene?" Because I knew that there would have been a  
5 general duty response. But I didn't know the exact number, no.

6 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. And it does run normally with  
7 teams of six? It's supposed to, in theory?

8 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** As I understand it now, in that  
9 particular area, I believe that watch is of six.

10 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. And are you familiar enough with  
11 the police contract, for example, with Colchester County to say that the funding, that the  
12 numbers we looked at yesterday, which is 76 members per 100,000 is based on that 24  
13 general duty members?

14 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** It would be based on the number of  
15 members that are assigned to that PR contract. It wouldn't include, for example, the  
16 provincial resources in Major Crimes that are located with Bible Hill Detachment.

17 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** So, sorry, just to clarify, so would it be --  
18 would it be based on a team of four or a team of six?

19 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** It would be based on the total team  
20 -- or the total number of police officers assigned to Colchester through not just Bible Hill,  
21 but any other detachment that would be within Colchester County. The combination of  
22 those general duty numbers combined -- compared against the population.

23 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. And sorry, maybe it's just been a  
24 long day. I still don't know if you answered the question in terms of is it four or six?

25 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** In terms of what the number is ---

26 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yes.

27 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** --- that should be on?

28 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** When we look at these statistics for 76

1 members per 100,000 for Colchester County.

2 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, no, it would be the total  
3 number of officers assigned to Colchester County. So that would include Millbrook  
4 Detachment, Bible Hill Detachment. I think there's three. There's another detachment.  
5 I'm not as familiar with the general duty detachments within each of the districts. But it  
6 would be the combined numbers of general duty members compared against the  
7 population of Colchester County. That's how those numbers are calculated.

8 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And if I suggested to you that Colchester  
9 County was -- or Bible Hill, rather, was operating with teams of four for quite some time,  
10 would you agree with that or disagree?

11 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well I know that on that night now,  
12 there were four that were working that night. The length of time that they were  
13 operating with teams of four, I have no visibility on that because I'm not one of those  
14 district policing officers.

15 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** So if it helps you, for example, I'll refer to  
16 Cst Merchant's statement, for people following along, that's COMM1644, page 12. He  
17 indicates that:

18 "Supposed to be teams of six, but were operating with  
19 teams of four for a while as some positions were not  
20 filled." (As read)

21 "You don't have five on your best day." (As read)

22 Which appears to be an indication that normally they're operating  
23 with a team of four for his particular unit.

24 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yeah, that would be the experience  
25 of a member that was actually physically working there. So I would accept anything that  
26 he said as the reality at that time.

27 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** So when you're asked to implement or  
28 initiate the critical incident, you don't know if it's a team of four that's on the ground or a

1 team of six?

2 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** For a critical incident? For when ---

3 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yes, for this April 2020 ---

4 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** When I authorized?

5 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yes.

6 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I had no idea the resource

7 numbers, general duty resource numbers when I authorized.

8 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** So the current staffing levels on the  
9 ground do not impact your decision to deploy, or how quickly you deploy the Critical  
10 Incident Package?

11 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** It would have no bearing on the  
12 decision to deploy the Critical Incident Package. The threshold would be does it meet  
13 the threshold for CIP call out? It wouldn't matter how many were there, because they  
14 have special training, they have special equipment, and they're best positioned to deal  
15 with an unfolding critical incident.

16 In terms of the amount of time, it still wouldn't make any difference.

17 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And do we agree that a team of four for  
18 Bible Hill would be referred to as the minimal staffing complement for general duty  
19 members?

20 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** If that detachment had set four as  
21 their bare minimum, then that would be an accurate statement.

22 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay.

23 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** But I don't know -- as I said, I  
24 wasn't overseeing general duty operations in any of the counties. So I didn't know what  
25 their minimal numbers were, but I've been told that their minimal number was four, their  
26 usual complement should have been six.

27 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** So when you're speaking to S/Sgt West  
28 at 10:46 on the 18<sup>th</sup>. So you don't know that it's a minimum staffing complement of four.

1 Do you know that the -- that there's one member that's conducting perimeter  
2 containment that's not carbine trained, for example?

3 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No.

4 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Do you know that the members on the  
5 ground within Portapique do not have night vision goggles?

6 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I think it was a safe assumption to  
7 say that they don't have night vision goggles, because the only unit that I knew at that  
8 time to have night vision goggles, you'll hear people call them MVGs, was the ERT  
9 team.

10 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. And so you assumed they didn't  
11 have night vision then?

12 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I would have assumed that they  
13 didn't have night vision. No.

14 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And were -- would you be familiar with  
15 the terrain within Portapique at the time when you're authorizing the Critical Incident  
16 Package, that these three members without night vision are essentially proceeding into  
17 a dark area?

18 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I had no personal familiarity with  
19 that particular area, specifically what it would look like at night time.

20 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And what about the fact that there was  
21 no GPS on their persons. Would you have been aware of that fact?

22 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well I wouldn't be aware of  
23 whether or not they had in their possession an ability to look at GPS, for example. I  
24 would make a reasonable assumption that they might be carrying a phone, and phones,  
25 if there's enough cell coverage, you might be able to position yourself. But in terms of  
26 equipment given to them when they're out on foot to know exactly where they are, I do  
27 not believe that there was anything given to our officers to be able to do that, no.

28 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay, so that's somewhat surprising to

1 me that these aren't relevant sort of taken into consideration when you're deploying the  
2 critical incident. Like, would it not make a difference, for example, if the response was  
3 with a full complement of six Bible Hill members with night vision, with GPS, everyone's  
4 carbine trained? Does that not make any difference to ---

5 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No, it doesn't actually in terms of  
6 the threshold met. I do rely heavily on the assessment of the Critical Incident  
7 Commander, that is their specialty, and if they feel that the incident calls for the critical  
8 incident callout, I take their advice and their suggestion to me at heart. And it wouldn't  
9 matter what's on the ground because, as I -- as I stated earlier, the capabilities of an  
10 ERT team actually do far exceed the capabilities of our general leading members. I'm  
11 not saying that to devalue them in any way, it's just that the ERT team does have  
12 special equipment and they have significantly greater levels of training than our -- the  
13 general duty members have on the road.

14 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** So if I understand your evidence  
15 correctly, having this information at 10:46 wouldn't assist you in performing your role?

16 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** It wouldn't assist me in making that  
17 decision as to ---

18 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** But in any part of your role as Support  
19 Services Officer?

20 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Not really, because my role and my  
21 authority was to approve the critical incident callout.

22 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. And -- so how long were you a  
23 Support Services Officer for?

24 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I arrived in Nova Scotia on the, I  
25 think the 16th of September in 2019, and I remained in that position until I went into the  
26 Acting Criminal Operations Officer in Nova Scotia for a very short period of time, and I  
27 believe that might have been in October of 2021.

28 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** So besides this incident, how many

1 Critical Incident Packages do you think you authorised during your time?

2 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Here in this province?

3 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah.

4 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well over 60.

5 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Sixty? Okay. I just want to spend a few  
6 minutes on getting a sense of the threshold to meet the critical incident definition. So  
7 for example, in this particular casualty, tragedy, we know that the 9-1-1 call came in at  
8 10:01 from Ms. Blair advising the particulars that we've discussed today about her  
9 husband being shot, there are sounds of gunshots, there is screaming. Would that  
10 constitute a critical incident that the Risk Manager could have then contacted you to  
11 initiate the package?

12 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** The Risk Manager wouldn't contact  
13 me. The on-call Critical Incident Commander would contact me. But yes ---

14 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yes.

15 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** --- to answer your question, it  
16 would -- it would constitute the -- or it would meet the threshold to call for a Critical  
17 Incident Package.

18 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Of the 60 Critical Incident Packages, I  
19 think you said 60 ---

20 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

21 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** --- in your time here, so you've had ---

22 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I would say at minimum. It was -- it  
23 was close to 60 in one year alone.

24 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** So you've initiated the package based on  
25 those facts that I've just indicated ---

26 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, it would depend. There was -  
27 - there are planned operations and then there are reactive operations. So a reactive  
28 operation would be the call in the middle of the night from the Critical Incident

1 Commander saying this is what we have, this is what I think, this is what we need, can I  
2 go? And the answer has never been no, it's always been yes. And then there's the  
3 planned operations. So an example of that would be that one of the units is going to  
4 affect a high-risk arrest or a search warrant, or there's a threat or a VIP or a VIP security  
5 detail that would require ERT, then the Critical Incident Commander would engage me  
6 for an approval for that planned operation as well.

7 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** So if the Critical Incident Package, if that  
8 chain of events was initiated, that after the 10:01 9-1-1 call, obvious that would have  
9 minimised further delays in the package being requested from ERT and all the other  
10 resources; right?

11 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, right after the call, and once  
12 they determined that it would have met the threshold, the faster that they can get on to  
13 those calls the better so that we're making sure that those resources are mobilised.

14 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. And I believe you indicated that  
15 had you received a call at 10:04 after this 9-1-1 call, based on these facts I've just  
16 indicated to you, you would have been comfortable in initiating the Critical Incident  
17 Package?

18 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, but I would have been  
19 seeking information, for example, like where is the target? These would be normal  
20 questions. Like do you have containment? Where is the target? You know, what's the  
21 status? Those would be things that would factor into that decision-making, but those  
22 would all be factors that the Critical Incident Commander would -- should know before  
23 making that phone call to me.

24 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** So let's just continue with the  
25 chronology, then. So we know, then, at 10:16, the children called at 10:16, saying "the  
26 neighbour killed my parents, burning my house down, burning the house down, and a  
27 male left in a police car." That's at 10:16. So the 10:01 and 10:16 calls, does that  
28 further strengthen the fact that the Critical Incident Package could have been requested



1 at that time, 10:16?

2 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** It could have, but again, back to  
3 what I stated earlier, I would want to know how is the -- do we know where the offender  
4 is? I would want to make sure that we had a better understanding of that, but I certainly  
5 would have readied those resources if I had received a call at any time that was similar  
6 to that.

7 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Ready, meaning greenlit the resources?

8 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, often those resources are  
9 readied even before I get that call because it's quite usual for the Critical Incident  
10 Commander to call the ERT team leader to say, "Get it ready, fired up. I'm calling the  
11 SSO to get my approval."

12 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** All right, so let's continue then. So we  
13 know at 10:25, and we can look at COMMS2886—Madam Registrar, we do not have to  
14 pull it up—but at 10:25, we know that there's a 9-1-1 call saying:

15 "...two houses on fire on Orchard Beach Road..."

16 The male caller, who we now know as Andrew MacDonald, was shot  
17 by the neighbour, so that's further evidence in support of a Critical Incident Package  
18 being initiated at that time; right?

19 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

20 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah. So around 10:27, the members  
21 do arrive on-scene, and I'm going to suggest to you that the only observations they  
22 actually make to assist the request for Critical Incident Package, if in fact it was  
23 communicated to Critical Incident Commander, was that structures were on fire.

24 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Okay.

25 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Would the fact that they made  
26 eyewitness observations of a structure on fire, given the chronology that I just read to  
27 you, be required to initiate the Critical Incident Package?

28 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Just a structure on fire?

1                   **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yes.

2                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No, that would be activation of the  
3 fire department if that was the only information we had.

4                   **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. Because what we found out  
5 through the course of this Inquiry is that actually the -- the DANCO officer,  
6 Staff Halliday, is that correct?

7                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I believe that Staff Halliday was  
8 acting as the Operations officer for Colchester.

9                   **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Right.

10                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I think my mic is cutting in and out.

11                  **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah, you're just cutting in and out.

12                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yeah.

13                  **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Yeah, that's right. Just wait one  
14 second.

15                  Okay, Mr. Bryson.

16                  **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** So were you aware that the Critical  
17 Incident Commander and Staff Halliday actually didn't learn about the Andrew  
18 MacDonald, Katie MacDonald -- the fact that the IARD members had encountered a  
19 shooting victim survivor at roughly 10:26:27 p.m.?

20                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Am I aware that they became  
21 aware of that?

22                  **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** That, sorry, that Staff Halliday, that  
23 Critical Incident Command West were not aware, were not made aware of the fact that  
24 Andrew and Kate MacDonald ---

25                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I'm aware of that now, but at that  
26 time, I had no visibility on their awareness of that particular incident at that time.

27                  **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. Now, does that concern you that  
28 this important information is lost in the chain, that your Critical Incident Commander is

1 not learning until roughly 6:00 a.m. the next morning, that Staff Halliday is not learning  
2 until 3:30 a.m. the next morning that IARD actually interacted with shooting victims that  
3 survived and were next to the perpetrator and his vehicle?

4 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I would expect that they should  
5 have been aware of that, but the individuals that had contact with Andrew MacDonald  
6 were, I believe, the three, or two of the three IARD members that entered Portapique,  
7 and I know that there was a period of time before the were able to get to the Command  
8 Post and be debriefed by Staff Sergeant West and others that were there.

9 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And finally, with the -- with the critical  
10 incident -- so the call to you was made at 10:46, and that's roughly 45 minutes after the  
11 9-1-1 call was made; right?

12 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** From channel 1 to 10:26?

13 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Sorry, 10:46 is when the call was made  
14 to you; right?

15 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** To me, yes. That would be 45  
16 minutes.

17 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And at the time of being authorized,  
18 again -- well, actually, we've covered that. You had no idea what was occurring on the  
19 ground in terms of the members' operational awareness, how many members there  
20 were, and so on?

21 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** That's correct.

22 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah. That seems to me to be an area  
23 that -- for improvement, that when initiating Critical Incident Package or deciding to  
24 deploy resources, that that awareness should be with the support service officer; would  
25 you agree that would be helpful?

26 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** To know about the number of  
27 resources that are on the ground?

28 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Exactly. And ---

1                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yeah.

2                   **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** --- their operational awareness and so  
3 on.

4                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** It could be helpful, but not  
5 necessary in terms of the assessment to determine whether to activate the program.

6                   **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** I'm going to move to your role as Major  
7 Crime officer. So as support services officer, part of your role was overseeing the Major  
8 Crime Units in the province; correct?

9                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, with a inspector that was in  
10 charge of the Major Crime Unit that would report to me.

11                   **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Would report to you?

12                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

13                   **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah. And when does the Major Crime  
14 Unit become involved in a mass casualty event?

15                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I believe the Major Crime Unit was  
16 involved fairly early on, because of the fact that there was information that, you know,  
17 someone had been shot and potentially killed, which would then, you know, meet the  
18 threshold of deploying the Major Crimes Team because it would be a homicide.

19                   **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** But typically ---

20                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** So sometime in the evening, but I  
21 didn't make those calls myself. Those calls are made through the risk manager to notify  
22 the Major Crimes Team when a new file comes in. So the exact time that they became  
23 aware, I wouldn't be able to tell you that.

24                   **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And they did attend crime scenes in  
25 Portapique on April 19<sup>th</sup>; correct?

26                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I do believe so, but I can't account  
27 for the movements of multiple people on the 19<sup>th</sup>. But from what I understand, they had  
28 attended crime scenes on the 19<sup>th</sup>, yes.

1                   **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And their role as Major Crime attending  
2 crime scenes in Portapique is to process the crime scenes?

3                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** The Forensic Ident specialist would  
4 process the crime scenes. The Major Crimes Teams would have some level of  
5 involvement in those, sometimes as an exhibit officer and as a liaison between the  
6 Forensic Identification Teams and the investigative team.

7                   **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Is their role to canvass the  
8 neighbourhood and look for witnesses and other survivors, other people that are injured  
9 as well?

10                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** In terms of a Major Crimes  
11 response to canvass itself, would be a tasking that would come out through the  
12 Command Triangle to the coordinating investigative team. That would be a standard  
13 procedure.

14                  **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Staff Carol testified at this Commission,  
15 and that's found on page 96 of his evidence, that he expected that when Major Crime  
16 came into Portapique and took over, that they would canvass the neighbourhood. Do  
17 you recall that direction being given to anyone, or that information being given to Staff  
18 Carol?

19                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No, I wasn't involved in those  
20 conversations, but in a normal circumstance, there would always be a neighbourhood  
21 canvass. But I think it's fair to say that what happened in Portapique and in other parts  
22 of this province was not normal.

23                  **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Are you aware of any directions to Staff  
24 Carol or to anyone else that when they got to Portapique to just simply secure the crime  
25 scenes and not to canvass the neighbourhood or not to look for other victims or  
26 survivors?

27                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No, I'm not aware of that.

28                  **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And there'd be no requirement that a

1 general duty unit or members would, in fact, have to wait for Major Crime before they  
2 started canvassing a neighbourhood looking for witnesses, looking for survivors, those  
3 injured; correct?

4 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Sorry, can you repeat your  
5 question?

6 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Sure. So there would be no reason why  
7 a general duty member that's stationed in Portapique on the 19<sup>th</sup>, that that member  
8 would have to wait until Major Crime arrived to start canvassing the neighbourhood?

9 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, ideally, in terms of a normal  
10 response, the canvass would be coordinated because we'd want to ensure that we  
11 actually covered the full canvass area. So there's normally a canvass coordinator  
12 assigned to that specific task. There's two things that might be helpful for me to  
13 mention to respond to your question. If the purpose is canvass, that canvass needs to  
14 be coordinated. If the purpose is for looking for victims, that's a little bit different. It  
15 wouldn't require someone to look at it from a systematic process of canvassing. I hope  
16 that that helps frame up a little bit of a better answer for you.

17 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** So in this particular case, you're not  
18 aware of any direction given to Staff Carol to not look for survivors or not look for those  
19 injured within Portapique when he was in Portapique; is that fair to say?

20 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No, I'm not aware of that, no.

21 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** I just have a few questions on the  
22 residence of Peter and Joy Bond, given your experience with Major Crime, and perhaps  
23 you can help me. So they resided at 46 Cobequid Court, and Peter Bond was found  
24 deceased in the doorway. The door was ajar. Joy Bond was set back roughly 10 feet  
25 into the residence. And the family has questions about the fact that on the perpetrator's  
26 boot, that Joy Bond's DNA was in fact found on the boot. Shell casings were near the  
27 doorway. To my knowledge, they were not in the residence. If they were, they might  
28 have been just near the threshold. So the question the family has is if the theory is that

1 the perpetrator did not enter the residence, are you aware of how DNA can enter, for  
2 example, the perpetrator's boot if the perpetrator is not, in fact, entering the residence  
3 and interacting with Joy Bond?

4 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, if there's DNA, whether it be  
5 through transfer of a victim on a piece of clothing, if it's blood, that blood can be  
6 analyzed by a blood spatter expert, which would look at things like blow back or spatter,  
7 but also transfers. That would help form an understanding of whether or not a  
8 perpetrator had actually entered the premises. Also, the crime scene examination, if  
9 there's blood found on the boot, there might be tracks that could be linked back to an  
10 offender that they actually entered a scene. I did look at all the scene photos, so I do  
11 recall looking at the Bond photos as well as the others, and I have some vague  
12 recollection. I did remark on a number of consistencies from those scenes on Cobequid  
13 Court, because of the fact there weren't fires there.

14 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Pardon?

15 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Because there weren't fires on ---

16 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Fires.

17 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yeah, on Cobequid Court, so there  
18 were scenes actually to examine as opposed to a burnt scene. So they were -- in my  
19 view, they provided a lot more information. And again, I wasn't actively involved in the  
20 investigation, but I do take interest in that because I've done it for many years. It always  
21 -- it seemed to be consistent that the offender would attend the residence. Usually a  
22 male would be answering -- would answer the door. There would be an interaction, and  
23 I'm trying to be sensitive in my description here. There would be an interaction between  
24 the offender and the male at the doorway. And it would either appear as if the other  
25 subjects within the residence would either retreat or in another part and that the  
26 offender would enter the residence. That was just my assessment based on me looking  
27 at the photos. I didn't attend the scene. I wasn't in regular conversations or any specific  
28 conversations with the Forensic Identification Specialist about their assessment of the

1 scene. That's just me based on my limited examination of the photos.

2 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. Thank you. That's helpful.

3 I just wanted to jump to another area here. Are you aware of the  
4 Provincial Department of Justice's role in performing police audits, one, as a result of a  
5 directive from the Minister of Justice in around 2016, but the police audits have been  
6 ongoing for a few -- for at least a decade, if I understand it correctly, so do you have  
7 familiarity with these police audits that have been occurring?

8 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** So I have familiarity with reviewing  
9 the *Nova Scotia Police Act* and the authorities and the Minister, and within those  
10 authorities are a number of things which include the setting of standards, as well as  
11 auditing of police agencies to ensure that they were meeting some level of the standard.  
12 And I had testified earlier about the fact that currently underway in this province there is  
13 a move to write provincial policing standards, and it's very difficult, I would say, for any  
14 of the -- or governing body to conducting an assessment if you don't have anything to  
15 measure that assessment against, i.e. standards. So when I arrived here, I was aware  
16 that there was at some point in time or a period of time when the provincial government  
17 or the Department of Justice, Public Safety, was conducting audits of police forces in  
18 the province, but in my time I wasn't aware of any audits that were ongoing.

19 Now, there was some movement within resourcing within the  
20 provincial government Department of Justice and there's a new Executive Director in  
21 place now who, in my view, is actually very competent and is really looking at a number  
22 of these key areas like provincial policing standards, adequacy standards and auditing  
23 mechanisms.

24 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** So here's my question, and I'll see if you  
25 know anything about it. So I understand that there's topics related to these audits.  
26 They include sexual assaults, domestic violence, exhibits and major crime, and that on  
27 certain occasions there's been an apparent lack of cooperation from the RCMP to  
28 voluntarily participate in some of these audits.



1                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I don't know where you're getting  
2 that information from. I've never been subject to a request for an audit in my time here  
3 in Nova Scotia, so I'm not sure where the source of that information in terms of RCMP  
4 reluctance.

5                   The best person to speak to that would be the Department of  
6 Justice, and if that's what the Department of Justice would give evidence to, then I  
7 would accept that. But ---

8                   **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** So you simply -- so you don't know, then.  
9 You can't comment one way or the other?

10                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I can't because from a  
11 personal perspective, I've never received a request for an audit within Support Services.  
12 I can only speak to my own personal experience.

13                  **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Can you tell me what audits the RCMP  
14 participated in in relation to domestic abuse since 2017?

15                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I wasn't in this province until  
16 more than nine months, almost 10 months into 2019, so from 2017 to 2019 I can't speak  
17 to that, almost 2020.

18                  **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** You can use hearsay if you wish. I'm  
19 just asking you what you know.

20                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yeah. I really -- I don't know  
21 because, as I said, as far as I understand it, the provincial government was not auditing  
22 any police force during the time that I was here in Nova Scotia.

23                  **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Can you tell me what, if any, audits the  
24 RCMP participated in in relation to sexual assault since 2016?

25                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** The RCMP nationally and  
26 provincially?

27                  **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Provincially. This is all provincial I'm  
28 talking.

1                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I was in Ottawa in 2016 and I  
2 know that there was a very focused effort in and around sexual assault review. And I  
3 can't speak for what was happening in the province at that time, but I do remember that  
4 all RCMP jurisdictions were conducting reviews of sexual assault cases, but the content  
5 and the scope of those reviews, particularly for Nova Scotia, I wasn't involved.

6                   **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** I'm not asking about reviews, sir. I'm just  
7 simply asking about audits, provincial audits by DOJ.

8                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Okay. So my apologies. I thought  
9 you said was the RCMP involved in any audits. I was speaking about internal ---

10                   **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** I am, sorry, but in the context of DOJ  
11 audits.

12                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I'm not aware, no.

13                   **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. And that would be the same --  
14 your answer would be the same in relation to exhibit audits?

15                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Within the RCMP?

16                   **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yes.

17                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I'm not ---

18                   **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Conducted by ---

19                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** --- aware of any exhibit audits as  
20 well.

21                   **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** I just wanted -- there's a couple of  
22 issues, loose threads we want to pick up on in terms of the press briefings.

23                   If we could pull COMM57762, Madam Registrar, at page 40.

24                   Chief Superintendent, we can certainly scroll back if you need more  
25 context, but what we're producing here is your speaking notes from April 24th press  
26 conference.

27                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Okay. That would be the first one  
28 that I did?

1 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Pardon?

2 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** That would be the first press  
3 conference that I did.

4 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yes. Yeah.

5 And the reference to Glenholme, paragraph -- the second  
6 paragraph -- for context, feel free to read above the second paragraph.

7 And again, these are your speaking notes. This is what you  
8 communicated to the public on April 24th.

9 Sorry. You're shaking your head "yes". That's a yes?

10 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** This is from the 24th, I believe, yes.

11 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And these are -- this is what you said to  
12 the public?

13 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** It would have been a prepared  
14 statement that I would have read.

15 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. So you can read that first  
16 paragraph for context starting with "Our investigation", but what I'm most interested in is  
17 the second paragraph:

18 "The gunman continued southbound on Highway 4  
19 from Glenholme to the Wentworth area. On the way,  
20 he encountered a woman who was out walking and he  
21 shot the woman at the roadside." (As read)

22 So this description on April 24th is suggesting that he went to -- the  
23 perpetrator went to Glenholme and then encountered Ms. Lillian Campbell. We know  
24 that to be an error; correct?

25 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes. So I'm recognizing that now  
26 because to go south from -- on Highway 4, it would be from Wentworth to Glenholme  
27 versus Glenholme to Wentworth.

28 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And we understand that Ms. Campbell

1 was killed before the visit to Glenholme.

2 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, that's correct.

3 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yeah.

4 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** As I understand it certainly now.

5 And that obviously would be an error in terms of the placement of the words Glenholme  
6 and Wentworth. They should be exchanged.

7 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And just while we're on this topic, do you  
8 have any familiarity or knowledge with some of the what I'll refer to as delays that  
9 morning with communicating information to various members?

10 I can give you examples if -- yeah.

11 So for example, in Corporal Mills' after-action report he's critical of  
12 certain aspects of the response, and one issue he picks up on is the delays in  
13 dispatching the Glenholme response to him and his team so that he could get there  
14 because time was of the essence.

15 Are you aware of that particular issue?

16 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I'm aware of the -- I believe the  
17 time in on the Lillian Campbell -- Hyslop Campbell murder was some time in and around  
18 9:48, I think, or 9:38.

19 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And we can talk about that as well.

20 So the 9-1-1 call came in at roughly 9:34, 9:35 a.m. and it was not  
21 dispatched until 9:42 a.m.

22 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yeah. And at the same time, I  
23 believe that there were other calls that were coming in with respect to the McLeod --  
24 Jenkins-McLeod residence further north on Hunter Road. So those two things were  
25 happening at the same time.

26 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Were you aware -- like were you  
27 monitoring the comms yourself while ---

28 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No, I wasn't actually monitoring the

1 comms. No.

2 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** So when did you become aware of some  
3 of these delays that had occurred during the course of this event on the morning of the  
4 19th?

5 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Much later because, as you would  
6 imagine, there was a significant amount of data that needed to be reviewed and  
7 understood, so it was quite some time afterwards, after spending time and looking at  
8 that timeline and, of course, relying upon others to do all that work. It was a lot of  
9 material to go through to understand that.

10 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. And I just want to go back to that  
11 June 4th press release, COMM9148, please. That's Exhibit 1482, page 5.

12 And this sort of feeds into we were talking about the critical incident  
13 response, and this is the press release that was issued on June 4th, so if we can take a  
14 moment and read it and I'll have a few questions about it once it's up on the screen.

15 Okay. It starts with, "Within minutes", so Madam Registrar, if we  
16 can scroll up a bit so we can continue to read, "Within minutes". If you could please  
17 read:

18 "Within minutes of receiving the initial call, the on-duty  
19 RCMP Risk Manager stationed within the RCMP  
20 Operational Communications Centre notified  
21 Northeast Nova District on-call management, who  
22 immediately initiated the call-out of a full Critical  
23 Incident package."

24 And we'll stop there for a moment.

25 So within minutes of receiving the call, immediately initiated the  
26 call-out of a Critical Incident package.

27 Sir, you'd agree that the call-out as we previously went over wasn't  
28 immediate, was it?

1                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, no, not based on -- but again,  
2 I wasn't the individual that was making those phone calls or trying to connect with  
3 people in order to initiate that call-out and, as it was described to me, is that they were  
4 very quick to be able to initiate the call-out for the Critical Incident package.

5                   **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** So 45 minutes is quick, in your ---

6                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, there are times when -- an  
7 incident can be ongoing for several hours before I actually get a call for initiating the  
8 Critical Incident package. There might be members who are attempting to negotiate  
9 and contain and then finally, after some time, that call is finally made to the CIC to  
10 initiate the Critical Incident Package.

11                   **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** So let's just stick with the words used in  
12 the press release here, and I think we agree that the words used that the on-call  
13 management, who immediately initiated the callout of a full Critical Incident Package,  
14 really isn't reflective of that timeline and chronology that we went through, is it?

15                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, it depends upon how you  
16 interpret the words, but if you're speaking specifically about actually placing a phone  
17 call, no, it's not, but if they are contemplating it to start that process, one could consider  
18 it that way.

19                   **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Now, reading further:

20                                   "The Critical Incident Package consisted of..." (As  
21                                   read)

22                   And then it lists the resources, and then it picks up, "In additional",  
23 just a typo. So:

24                                   "In [addition], to the first responders who were already  
25                                   on-scene and continuing to arrive, the Critical Incident  
26                                   Package added more than 30 additional highly  
27                                   specialised resources to the response."

28                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

1                   **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Right, so we see that. We know that it  
2 took well over two hours for the ERT team to arrive; correct?

3                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I don't know the exact time, I'd  
4 have to look at the documents to be able to say it was over two hours, but I know that it  
5 takes time to move all of those resources to have them all in place together at once.  
6 And it was -- I know for a fact it was well over an hour because it takes well over an  
7 hour to make that drive from Halifax ---

8                   **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** But if you rely on the after action report,  
9 ERT was noted as arriving at -- started to arrive on-scene, Mills says 12:50, EMRT is  
10 12:55, the TAV is noted as 1:00 a.m. in this document, that's what I'll put to you. So  
11 that's certainly, that's several hours, almost three hours after the initial 9-1-1 call; right?

12                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** From the initial 9-1-1 call, yes.

13                   **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Yes, yeah. You'd agree that this press  
14 release can give the impression that the resources were deployed immediately, that  
15 they were onsite forthwith, and it can contribute to a misunderstanding in the public  
16 about the police response times in this mass casualty event?

17                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, there could be -- that could  
18 be an outcome, but in terms of the greater context, the immediacy of the callout  
19 procedures in terms of my involvement, it was immediate. It was a two-minute  
20 conversation, and those resources were already staging and getting ready to roll by the  
21 time I even said yes.

22                   **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Are you comfortable with this paragraph  
23 now?

24                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, no, I'm not now, because  
25 clearly in reading it I can understand why some would think that that was misleading.

26                   **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay.

27                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** But no intent to mislead.

28                   **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** In your July 12th, interview, you talked at

1 length about, for example, ERT response times, and you said words to the effect that  
2 you have to factor in if there was a call to the northern tip of Cape Breton in Meat Cove,  
3 and you could be looking at a response time of say six hours. Here, we're talking about,  
4 you know, a community that's 30 minutes away from the second largest town in Nova  
5 Scotia, Truro; right?

6 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

7 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And are you critical of the ERT response  
8 time in this mass casualty event, arriving at 12:50?

9 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I can't be critical of their time to  
10 gear up, mount up, and get to the scene because they needed to be able to get to that  
11 scene, they had a need to arrive safely to that scene. I don't think that there was any  
12 laissez-faire attitude applied. I do know this team, and I know how professional and  
13 dedicated they are. I believe that when they were mobilised that they made every effort  
14 to get there as quickly as they could.

15 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And similarly, with EMERT, at 12:55, the  
16 TAV at 1:00 a.m., the Critical Incident Commander, 1:00 a.m., roughly, I think it was  
17 1:19, and -- by the time the -- West reached the Command Post. So we're talking, you  
18 know, three plus hours in some cases before these assets are arriving to respond to a  
19 critical incident at a community that's, again, 30 minutes outside of the second largest  
20 town in Nova Scotia.

21 So my question is this: So I'm going to ask you if you're familiar  
22 with the Canada Labour Code investigation that pertained to the RCMP and their  
23 involvement in this mass casualty in April 2020?

24 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I'm not intimately familiar with the  
25 ESDC's investigation. I have yet to be interviewed by ESDC, and I believe that my  
26 interview is scheduled sometime either this month, I'm just in communications with them  
27 now.

28 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay. Are you aware of any findings



1 that have been made by the Canada Labour Board?

2 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** There have been some findings  
3 which have been communicated to each division RCMP through the H-Strong2 team.  
4 Chief Superintendent Mike O'Malley has been a contact point between ---

5 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Sorry, who is that?

6 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Chief Superintendent Mike  
7 O'Malley.

8 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay.

9 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** So he's been the contact point on  
10 ESDC recommendations, and in turn, through his unit, any of those recommendations  
11 are then sent out to appropriate units for tasking. The specifics about those, I don't  
12 have enough awareness, per se. I've been in a few meetings, and I'm aware that some  
13 of those recommendations have come into the division and they've been tasked out for  
14 completion.

15 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Would you agree or do you have any  
16 knowledge that the Labour Board, I'm using the term "Labour Board", just for lack of ---

17 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I understand what you mean.

18 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** --- familiarity with the entity. I think it's  
19 Occupational Health and Safety. It's a -- might be a labour relations officer that signed -  
20 - that issued the directive or the order. But my question is do you have familiarity with  
21 the fact that there were findings that were adverse to the RCMP in relation to ERT's  
22 response, in relation to other issues that formed the RCMP response during this mass  
23 casualty?

24 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I haven't seen a final report,  
25 but I would expect that there's going to be recommendations, there always are. What  
26 exactly what those recommendations, as I said, I haven't seen a final report. There's  
27 two elements that -- one is internal, one is external. ESDC, the Labour Board that  
28 you're talking about, is the external one, and then there's the Hoyt that you might have

1 heard of before, that's the internal one. And they have almost parallel mandates, but  
2 one, as I said, is internal. There's going to be two reports specific to both of their  
3 assessments.

4 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** And I'm just wrapping up here, couple  
5 more minutes. So besides the Canada Labour Code investigation, you mentioned  
6 another internal audit review. Are you aware of any other reviews that have been  
7 conducted in regards to this mass casualty event by either third party agencies or the  
8 RCMP themselves?

9 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I am aware, although I've had  
10 limited involvement in them. I do believe that there was an Alert Ready feasibility study  
11 that was conducted by an external agency, I think that was KPMG, there was that  
12 review that was done. There was also, at both Inspector Marcichiw's request, who is  
13 the OIC or Officer in Charge of the Major Crimes Unit, had requested that the National  
14 Office of Investigative Standards and Practices commence a review in terms of the  
15 major case investigation.

16 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** For April 2020?

17 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

18 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Okay.

19 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yeah. But as I understand it, that  
20 review has not been completed. And then of course, I had testified earlier in terms of an  
21 external review that I requested in terms of the critical incident response, but that was  
22 not actioned.

23 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** I'm sorry, I missed that last sentence.

24 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** That was not actioned, my request  
25 for an independent critical incident review.

26 **MR. JOSHUA BRYSON:** Thank you. They are all my questions.  
27 Thank you.

28 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you, Mr. Bryson.

1 Mr. Lockyer, do you have any questions?

2 **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** Yes, I do.

3 **--- CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. JAMES LOCKYER:**

4 **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** Yes, sir. My name's James Lockyer, and  
5 I represent Lisa Banfield.

6 Did you play a role in the decision to charge Lisa Banfield?

7 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I didn't play a direct role in the  
8 decision to charge Lisa Banfield, but I was engaged in conversations in and around the  
9 charging of Lisa Banfield. So in terms of making that decision, no, that decision would  
10 have been made in conjunction with the investigative team with their advisory Crown  
11 from the Province.

12 **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** All right. And who was the investigating  
13 team, first of all?

14 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** So as you would be probably more  
15 familiar with, the Command triangle would be the team commander at the top, which at  
16 that time when these charges were laid would have been Corporal Gerry Rose-  
17 Berthiaume; the file coordinator, which was Constable Shawn Stanton; and -- sorry, I  
18 should -- I should back up. The primary investigator was Gerry Rose-Berthiaume, the  
19 file coordinator was Constable Shawn Stanton, and the team commander was  
20 Sergeant Glenn Bonvie.

21 **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** I didn't hear who the team commander  
22 was.

23 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Sergeant Glenn Bonvie.

24 **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** All right. And did you participate in any  
25 of the discussions about whether or not charges should be laid?

26 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, I did.

27 **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** And can you tell me, first of all, when  
28 they were?

1                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I can't tell you exactly when they  
2 were unless I was actually referring to my notes, but it would have been much earlier  
3 into the investigation, somewhere before November or close to November of 2021.

4                   **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** 2020.

5                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Is it '20?

6                   Sorry, 2020. Thank you. Yes, November 2020.

7                   **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** Would you say somewhat before  
8 November '20?

9                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Somewhere in and around  
10 November of 2020, yes.

11                  **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** All right. Were you engaged in any  
12 discussions at any time between March and July of 2020, say?

13                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I might have had awareness. I'm  
14 sure I was engaged in the discussions in and around what evidence the investigative  
15 team had uncovered in terms of the provision of ammunition and whether or not there  
16 could potentially be charges. I'd have to review my notes for that particular time to  
17 acquaint myself with when my conversations would have taken place, but I certainly  
18 would have had conversations, yes.

19                  **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** Would we have the notes of these  
20 conversations, sir, at the Commission?

21                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, you would.

22                  **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** Okay. So if we look, we'd find them?

23                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** You should, yes.

24                  **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** All right. And you would have made  
25 notes of all these discussions; would you?

26                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I would hope that I made notes of  
27 most of the discussions, but at times, depending upon what I'm in the middle of when  
28 someone phones me and I pick up the phone, but I would probably point you to a

1 discussion I remember specifically having with Chief Superintendent Chris Leather,  
2 Inspector Marcichiw and myself in and around specifically the challenges and the  
3 perceptions of the charging of Lisa Banfield and her brother and brother-in-law.

4 **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** And when was that?

5 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Again, without looking or referring  
6 to my notes from that date, I wouldn't be able to ---

7 **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** Okay.

8 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** --- pinpoint the exact time.

9 **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** Approximate.

10 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** But it would have been just prior to  
11 those charges being laid.

12 **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** Well, you -- in your examination by  
13 Commission Counsel, they referred you to your press release of December 4<sup>th</sup> of 2020,  
14 which is when you advised the media that the charges were being laid; do you  
15 remember that?

16 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, I do remember.

17 **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** So you would have discussed this with,  
18 sorry, is it Superintendent Leather? I'm not good at ---

19 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Chief Superintendent Leather.

20 **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** Chief Superintendent. All right.

21 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Inspector Marcichiew, who would  
22 have been essentially the monitoring officer of the major case investigation, and also,  
23 the officer in charge of the Major Crimes Unit.

24 **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** So this discussion would have been late  
25 November, early December; is that what you're saying?

26 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** It would have been prior to the  
27 release of the charges, yes.

28 **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** You said it was very close to the date.

1                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I would say it was close. It was  
2 fairly close. I wasn't having direct interactions with the Public Prosecution Service here  
3 in Nova Scotia, the Command Triangle, particularly, the primary investigator would have  
4 been doing that. But I would have been notified by the investigative team that through  
5 their interactions with the Prosecution Office and their Advisory Crown, they felt there  
6 was sufficient evidence to proceed with a charge, and then I would have had a  
7 conversation -- I remember specifically the conversation, I was in the Criminal  
8 Operations boardroom -- with Chief Superintendent Leather and Inspector Marcichiw,  
9 specifically about that.

10                   **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** All right. And who was the Crown that  
11 had been assigned to this?

12                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Shauna and Mark I think are ---

13                   **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** Heerema?

14                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** --- the first names.

15                   **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** Shauna MacDonald and Mark Heerema?

16                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, I believe so.

17                   **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** All right.

18                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** But I could be wrong. That is my  
19 sense as to who was involved, because I know that they had some involvement.

20                   **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** It's all right. So they were part of the  
21 decision to charge? Combination of the officers and the two Crowns?

22                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I don't want to speak for  
23 others in terms of what evidence they may be able to provide, but I -- what I can say is -  
24 --

25                   **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Sorry, Officer.

26                   **MS. PATRICIA MacPHEE:** Thank you. I just ---

27                   **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** There's an objection. I'm sorry.

28                   **MS. PATRICIA MacPHEE:** Yes, thank you. I just object to Chief

1 Superintendent Campbell discussing here any discussions that were had with Crown  
2 Counsel with respect to laying charges. I believe they'd be protected by solicitor/client  
3 privilege.

4 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Mr. Lockyer?

5 **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** Well, Mr. Commissioner, I would submit  
6 that this wouldn't be a question of privilege as to whether or not to lay charges,  
7 particularly because the two prosecutors that the witness has mentioned became the  
8 two who actually conducted the prosecution, although subsequently a year later they  
9 dropped out. And this is certainly potentially a material issue for the Commission to  
10 consider whether or not it was appropriate to lay charges in the first place, and who  
11 came to that, or who was part of that decision is, in my submission, relevant to the task  
12 that you have.

13 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Well, if you're exploring  
14 conversations about whether or not to lay charges involving Crown Counsel; isn't that a  
15 privilege?

16 **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** I'm sorry, I didn't hear you, Mr.  
17 Commissioner.

18 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** If you want -- if I understood your  
19 response to the objection, you were indicating a desire to get into the conversations  
20 about why charges would be laid and whether charges would be laid with Crown  
21 Counsel. Is that not ---

22 **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** Not the conversations. I'm asking ---

23 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Well, this is what you asked.

24 **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** No, I'm asking ---

25 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** So he was -- they were part of  
26 the conversations to lay charges I thought your question was.

27 **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** Well, what I'm really interested in were  
28 they part of the decision. That's what I'm really asking. That's what I'm trying to find

1 out. I mean, the witness has already said they were, so that's why I followed up. I  
2 wanted to know who the Crown was.

3 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Well, the witness said they were  
4 because I didn't see the objection on time, but in response?

5 **MS. PATRICIA MacPHEE:** Thank you. I do. I think it's kind of a  
6 distinction without a difference. I mean, there's no problem with him asking Chief  
7 Superintendent Campbell about the RCMP's discussions, but when we're involving  
8 Crown Counsel, I mean, there's an element here of prosecutorial discretion that we're  
9 wading into here. So I don't think the provincial Crown has Counsel representation here  
10 but nevertheless, where, you know, they're engaging and in discussing the charges and  
11 their position, I believe that is protected by privilege.

12 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** You've put on the record as an  
13 officer of the court that they were part of the prosecution?

14 **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** Yes, they were. Mr. Commissioner, they  
15 ultimately handed over the file in -- they conducted judicial pretrials, or a judicial pretrial  
16 with me, and they -- but they went off the file in the fall of 2021.

17 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** All right. We'll allow what's on  
18 the record already but that's it.

19 **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** You will allow the question? Thank you.  
20 Thank you.

21 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Well, the question has been  
22 asked and answered. The question before the objection, before we recognized the  
23 objection, so there's no need to re-ask it. It's on the record. We will allow it to remain  
24 on the record.

25 **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** Okay. I thought the witness had  
26 vacillated a little bit on whether or not they were part of the decision. Maybe I'm wrong.  
27 If you don't think so, I'll carry on. I'll move on.

28 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Carry on, please.



1                   **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** Sure.

2                   Do you know, sir, if a part of the decision to charge Lisa Banfield,  
3 do you know if Constable Bent was consulted?

4                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I don't know if Constable Bent was  
5 consulted.

6                   **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** You don't know?

7                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No, I don't.

8                   **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** Do you know if any victims service  
9 organization was consulted, sir?

10                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I don't know. I wasn't part of those  
11 conversations.

12                  **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** Do you know if anyone other than the  
13 two Crowns you've named and the police officers you've named were consulted?

14                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I don't have that information, no.

15                  **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** Were you also -- a stratagem was  
16 engaged, sir, in the questioning of Lisa Banfield, and as it happened, her brother and  
17 brother-in-law, that of -- enabled the police to avoid giving the 3 of them their 10B rights  
18 before they were questioned about the transfer of ammunition. Did you know that?

19                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** In terms of reviewing the actual  
20 transcripts of the statements, I have no awareness of what cautions or rights that they  
21 were provided. I can't speak to that because I wasn't part of those actual activities.

22                  **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** All right. It's not so -- actually, in Lisa's  
23 case it is, but in the case of the other two, it was a stratagem that was set up and  
24 discussed and recorded in writing before the interviews were ever conducted. Were  
25 you a part of those conversations?

26                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No, I was not.

27                  **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** In particular, that they would make sure -  
28 - for example, the stratagem, one runs into -- I think it's five pages long. A stratagem

1 that if they were told, each of them, immediately before being questioned about the  
2 transfer of ammunition that they didn't have to engage in the interview if they didn't want  
3 to, and they could leave any time they want, that was a part of the stratagem that was  
4 recorded in writing before the interviews, did you know about that?

5 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I never saw -- and what -- you  
6 keep referring to a stratagem. In my previous experience, as a member of an interview  
7 team in British Columbia, we would have what we would call an interview plan. So I'm  
8 assuming what you're referring to might be the interview plan?

9 **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** Call it what you will.

10 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** And the contents of the interview  
11 plan, I never had any eyes on those interview plans.

12 **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** All right. So you weren't privy to the idea  
13 that they would -- when they interviewed the three of them, they would try and make  
14 sure that they didn't have to give them their rights?

15 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No, I wasn't aware of any of that,  
16 no.

17 **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** Okay. Did you -- you say you didn't play  
18 a role in the decision, sir, so you're not the right person to ask about the decision, but  
19 did you venture an opinion on the decision, or did you just receive the decision and act  
20 accordingly?

21 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, to be clear, playing a role in  
22 the decision, the decision would rest always, between the command triangle and the  
23 advisory Crown, or the Crown -- the Prosecution Office if there was sufficient evidence  
24 to proceed. Certainly I'm not a lawyer but I've been around long enough to understand  
25 that there needs to be sufficient evidence to proceed, and that it would be in the public  
26 interest to lay a charge. Those were two considerations always at the front of my mind,  
27 personally, was; is there enough evidence or sufficient evidence to proceed, and would  
28 it be in the public interest.

1                   The conversation that I referenced earlier that I had with C/Supt.  
2 Leather and Insp. Marcichiw without the command triangle -- which is not normal;  
3 normally I would include the command triangle in a conversation like that -- was to get  
4 some feedback from the Criminal Operations Officer in and around how this might be  
5 perceived, the optics of charging Lisa Banfield and what that might look like and how  
6 certain groups would perceive that -- those steps.

7                   But the conversation that we had; and, again, without my notes in  
8 front of me, but they have been disclosed and you will find them, if you focus on that  
9 period of time just before the charges were laid, you'll see I did make notes about the  
10 conversation, not in great detail in terms of exact quotations made but the essence of  
11 that was in and around the debate of public interest, largely, because I believed, from  
12 what I was advised by the command triangle, that there was sufficient evidence that  
13 would support a charge.

14                   To me, the central issue was the public interest aspect. And  
15 included in that public interest aspect, would have been, one, the objectives that were  
16 set in the investigation; and, two, how the families may have perceived whether we  
17 charged or did not charge.

18                   **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** So the optics were discussed, is that  
19 what you're saying?

20                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, I would say that the optics  
21 were discussed, yes.

22                   **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** And did the optics include that it might be  
23 perceived as an attempt to divert attention from the responsibility of the RCMP for what  
24 had happened on the night of the murders?

25                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No. That actually never crossed  
26 my mind, personally. Although, in the media, it became an issue.

27                   **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** It crossed their mind, yes.

28                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, it crossed their mind.

1                   **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** Yes.

2                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** It didn't cross my mind. What was  
3 central to me, in terms of the optics portion was, for example, in terms of domestic  
4 violence victims, victim blaming. I thought that that would be a significant issue that  
5 would need to be addressed, in terms of the victim families and what their expectations  
6 were, or weren't; how sympathetic they might be, or non-sympathetic to Lisa Banfield,  
7 that was an area of concern for me. Those were the optic issues that I was thinking  
8 about.

9                   And, also, another consideration that I personally had was, you  
10 know, we were trying to advance the investigation in terms of the provision and the  
11 importation of the firearms. Firearms are only as dangerous as they can be, unless you  
12 have the ammunition to place into those firearms.

13                   So that was another consideration that I was, in my -- like,  
14 personally, I was weighing out optically how it would look. It's one thing to have a gun,  
15 it's one thing to have bullets; it's another thing to have guns and bullets together  
16 because then they can become lethal. You can certainly hurt someone with a gun  
17 without bullets, but you can't do -- inflict the same level of carnage if you don't have  
18 ammunition for them.

19                   **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** Okay, you've gone on a bit, so I just want  
20 to go back to the question I asked you that led to what you've been saying for the last  
21 several minutes. Did you venture an opinion as to whether or not charges should be  
22 laid against Lisa Banfield?

23                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** In that meeting?

24                   **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** Yes.

25                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, from C/Supt. Leather.

26                   **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** And did you support their decision, sir, to  
27 lay charges?

28                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I supported their decision, meaning

1 the decision that was made between the investigative team, the command triangle, and  
2 as I understand it, the Crown Prosecution Service, as well as the decision -- and  
3 certainly C/Supt. Leather will be appearing before the Commission; I would expect that  
4 he may be asked similar questions, and I can recall him supporting that decision as  
5 well.

6 **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** And this meeting that you're talking  
7 about, were the two Crown Prosecutors there at the time?

8 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No, they were not.

9 **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** So how did you know that they were  
10 involved in the decision?

11 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** That's been asked and  
12 answered, Mr. Lockyer.

13 **MR. JAMES LOCKYER:** Okay, sure.

14 All right. That's all. Thank you, sir.

15 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you, Mr. Lockyer.

16 We'll take a 10-minute break.

17 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Thank you.

18 The proceedings are now on break and will resume in 10 minutes.

19 --- Upon breaking at 3:38 p.m.

20 --- Upon resuming at 4:14 p.m.

21 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Welcome back. The  
22 proceedings are again in session.

23 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you.

24 Ms. MacPhee, I think you're up next?

25 **--- SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL, Resumed**

26 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you again, Chief  
27 Superintendent.

28 Oh, yes, Mr. Pineo.

1                   **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Yes. Just one issue for clarification,  
2 Superintendent.

3                   When you were being questioned by Mr. MacDonald, at one point I  
4 think you referred to Taylor Andrews as Sean McLeod's stepdaughter, and I just wanted  
5 to clarify that she is, in fact, Sean McLeod's daughter. So do you know that? Can you  
6 testify to that, or...?

7                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I was under the impression that  
8 there was a stepdaughter. I didn't know if she was an actual daughter. I didn't know  
9 that, no.

10                  **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** So you don't take any issue with that.

11                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No. No, I don't, and thank you for  
12 correcting me.

13                  **MR. ROBERT PINEO:** Okay. Thank you.

14                  **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you, Mr. Pineo.  
15 Ms. Ward?

16 **--- CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. LORI WARD:**

17                  **MS. LORI WARD:** Good afternoon, Chief Superintendent  
18 Campbell.

19                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Good afternoon.

20                  **MS. LORI WARD:** As you know, my name is Lori Ward and I  
21 represent the Attorney General of Canada and I have a few follow-up questions for you.  
22                  So as I understand it, under the Nova Scotia *Police Act* it is the  
23 responsibility of the municipality to provide and maintain an adequate, efficient and  
24 effective police department at its expense and in accordance with its needs. Is that your  
25 understanding?

26                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, I believe that that language is  
27 actually reflected within the Act.

28                  **MS. LORI WARD:** And is it your understanding that a municipality

1 can fulfil its obligation in this regard in a few ways, including they can constitute their  
2 own police force or they could contract with the province for the services of the RCMP?  
3 Is that correct?

4 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, and I also believe they can  
5 contract with another police force or amalgamate or regionalize policing services.

6 **MS. LORI WARD:** Thank you.

7 And as I understand it, in Nova Scotia there are 10 municipal forces  
8 and the other municipalities are policed by the RCMP pursuant to a contract with the  
9 Province of Nova Scotia. Is that correct?

10 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, I believe that there are 10.

11 **MS. LORI WARD:** And of those municipal forces, Halifax Regional  
12 Municipality has kind of a blended force in that HRP polices Halifax proper and the  
13 RCMP polices the, if I can call them, rural areas of Halifax County or former Halifax  
14 County?

15 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Not solely the rural areas. I would  
16 call it the areas outside of the peninsula and Dartmouth. The surrounding communities  
17 of Cole Harbour, Tantallon and Sackville, I would say, are more urban in nature, but  
18 then it extends beyond that into more rural communities.

19 **MS. LORI WARD:** So if it's a municipality's responsibility to  
20 provide for policing at its own expense, how does a municipality determine levels of  
21 policing? And is that where the general duty police resourcing model comes in?

22 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I'm not an expert in that general  
23 duty police resourcing model and exactly how that works, but in my limited experience  
24 in Halifax District, there would be a submission to Municipal Council for an increase in  
25 establishment and you would also engage the province based on whether or not the  
26 Regional Municipality would support an increase in establishment, meaning resources.

27 **MS. LORI WARD:** Thank you.

28 And so in that context, I just wanted to give you a chance,

1 yesterday you were talking about resourcing issues and I believe Ms. Young had said  
2 you -- kind of asked you to table the issue on big picture items like that and return to it if  
3 you wanted. And I don't think you had the opportunity to return to that issue later in  
4 your evidence.

5                   So you had mentioned -- you had been talking about ratios of police  
6 officers to population and you'd mentioned specifically, I think, Colchester County and  
7 Truro Police Service, and there seemed to be a striking difference between those ratios.  
8 And I wondered if you wanted to comment further on that, or. It's not necessary, but  
9 you had kind of left it at that.

10                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I think the only thing I would  
11 just comment on is why that difference makes a difference. And if we're talking about  
12 rural policing in particular, not only from my research or my -- what I've been made  
13 aware of in terms of those police-to-population ratio numbers is that the RCMP is  
14 resourced significantly at a lower rate than other agencies within the province. Those  
15 Statistics Canada statistics are their statistics in terms of provincial averages.

16                   And it's not a difficult calculation to make based on, you know,  
17 Stats Canada populations versus officers, and it's not -- it doesn't include all resources,  
18 meaning civilian resources. It's about police resources, so I'm talking about badges and  
19 guns.

20                   So it's an easy calculation to come to in terms of how many officers  
21 you have per population, but what seems to be missing in the conversation is the  
22 number of officers per square kilometre and how much ground they have to cover  
23 based on the geography. And as I said yesterday, it has a significant impact on  
24 response times, which would mean officers responding to citizens, and also has a  
25 significant impact on backup because if you are covering a large geographic area with  
26 an already lesser number of resources, I think you're certainly setting the organization  
27 up to not fulfil all expectations in terms of response times and adequacy of service.

28                   **MS. LORI WARD:** And can you comment in that regard on -- I



1 think you touched yesterday on -- you made a reference to a 24/7 policing model. How  
2 does that factor into this?

3 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, to run a 24/7 or a 24-hour  
4 schedule, it would require a minimum of four watches, and those watches would  
5 normally work within -- four or more watches, I should say, that would usually work a  
6 four-on/four-off schedule of 12-hour shifts to ensure that there was coverage from, let's  
7 just call it, 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.

8 So with that, you have to make sure that you have enough  
9 resources in order to be able to do that.

10 Sometimes in certain areas, if they look at call volume, frequency,  
11 timings of calls, those would be factors that would be considered in whether or not a 24-  
12 hour model would be the most efficient. And we're always looking for efficiencies. I  
13 mean, I think that's smart and that's important.

14 But if there's -- you know, there's a difference between what's  
15 needed and what's expected, and often we're criticized for not providing what's  
16 expected as opposed to sometimes what's actually needed, but I do believe that in  
17 terms of needs and expectations, we are under resourced.

18 **MS. LORI WARD:** So is it true then at current funding levels in  
19 Colchester County, it wouldn't be possible to have a 24/7 policing model?

20 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I don't know enough about the  
21 actual funding envelope and the discussions that have taken place between Colchester  
22 County and those within H Division Headquarters. If I did, I would comment on it, but  
23 I'm not fully aware, so I would rather refrain from commenting on that.

24 **MS. LORI WARD:** Okay. Thank you. Just one sort of follow up  
25 item on the Critical Incident Operations Room, if that's the correct term. You mentioned  
26 this earlier, and you mentioned it yesterday, as a place that could be used as essentially  
27 a fixed command post in a critical incident. Is that -- did I understand that correctly?

28 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, that's true.

1                   **MS. LORI WARD:** And I just wonder, we had heard some  
2 evidence previously about the DEOC, I think it's the Division Emergency Operations  
3 Centre?

4                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** That's correct.

5                   **MS. LORI WARD:** And I think that there was some evidence about  
6 the DEOC performing that function as a Critical Incident Command Post. And I wonder  
7 if you could just explain, what's the difference, you know, between the Critical Incident  
8 Operations Room and the DEOC? Why do we have both things?

9                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** So DEOC would have a different  
10 mandate, or the Division Emergency Operations Centre. And in fact, during April of  
11 2020, the DEOC was already activated and it had been activated for the purpose of  
12 ensuring that we were responding appropriately to the pandemic. And they had a  
13 number of duties within the DEOC that are very logistically heavy. Things like building  
14 reactive teams in the event that one detachment would go down because there were a  
15 number of officers or all the officers were infected with Covid-19.

16                   So they were building those plans, they were ensuring that there  
17 was appropriate levels of personal protective equipment or PPE for the following  
18 resources, working closely with our occupational health and safety people. There was a  
19 -- there's another version of incident command called Gold/Silver/Bronze, and they were  
20 -- there was a bronze level commander that discussing covid protocols, cleaning  
21 protocols. Any changes to operations as a result of the pandemic, the DEOC was doing  
22 that work.

23                   So it's very logistically heavy and it's designed for that purpose,  
24 planned events, response to natural disasters, planned emergency operation exercises.  
25 So they can use it for that reason.

26                   But the Critical Incident Command Post is very specific to the  
27 situational awareness and space for the Critical Incident Commander to be briefed to  
28 understand the situation and to make decisions from.

1                   And that would be the big difference between DEOC and the  
2 Critical Incident Command Post.

3                   **MS. LORI WARD:** Thank you. We've heard a lot about  
4 interoperability of police services and I wonder if you could explain what your  
5 understanding is, what are the elements of interoperability? What do forces need to be  
6 interoperable?

7                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well they need common platforms,  
8 and those platforms would include things like communications. You need to be on the  
9 same communications platforms. That's critical. You would need comparable levels of  
10 training. You would need to maintain service level and proficiency standards or  
11 adequacy standards that were the same. You would engage in integrated units where  
12 you would respond together. And that would require that there would be standards in  
13 place that you would be exercising in. So for example, you don't necessarily have to be  
14 integrated, but interoperability could mean two agencies responding together, critical  
15 elements like secure communications, consistent training, practicing together. So  
16 engaging in not just table top exercises, but actual physical practiced exercises together  
17 as well to build familiarity. You'd need some consistency in terms of the tactics that you  
18 would use. For example, in IARD, if there's a difference between how IARD would be  
19 executed, you'd want to be able to change that so that both agencies, or multiple  
20 agencies, were using the same process. That would just increase, obviously, officer  
21 safety, and if the officers were presenting a danger to each other, then ultimately if they  
22 go down, there's less officers to respond to the threat, which means that public safety is  
23 reduced.

24                   So those would be elements that would certainly -- or key  
25 ingredients to true interoperability would be a level playing field.

26                   I mean, in a perfect world, you would have all agencies that were  
27 trained to the same level, you would have all agencies that would have access to the  
28 same equipment. An example I would use is if I was responding to an incident with the

1 same, or to the same incident with an officer from a different jurisdiction, and if I was  
2 engaging in an active threat, I would want to make sure that that officer, I had some  
3 familiarity with, I knew that they had been trained to the same level that I was, and we  
4 knew what we were doing together. We wouldn't have to work out our plan. We would  
5 be able to intuitively know what each other was responsible for or doing. But then in the  
6 event of if I went down and I couldn't be saved, but my fellow officer from the other  
7 agency was out of ammunition, or they had an issue with their firearm, they would be  
8 able to strip me of my firearm and my ammunition and just continue on. That would be  
9 a perfect world scenario.

10 **MS. LORI WARD:** Can you give an example of a proficiency  
11 standard or an adequacy standard?

12 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well I know that there are  
13 provinces that do have adequacy standards that are, I think, well entrenched in place.  
14 Ontario is one of those provinces where they have adequacy standards. So when, you  
15 know, the -- earlier I was asked questions about auditing. And it's, I think, difficult to  
16 actually conduct a meaningful audit if you have nothing to measure that audit against.

17 So Ontario does have adequacy standards, and I believe that those  
18 adequacy standards are the benchmark of a measure for when they do those audits.  
19 Does that answer your question?

20 **MS. LORI WARD:** Well is an adequacy standard the same as  
21 policing standards in general or is it something more refined?

22 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well it depends upon how you  
23 would really -- policing standards shouldn't -- we shouldn't use the term "policing  
24 standards", because if each agency has its own standard, then there is no consistency  
25 in those standards. So I would prefer to use provincial policing standards, because that  
26 would suggest that the Department of Justice would have an ability to measure the  
27 performance of an agency against a particular standard that was consistent across the  
28 entire province. So that's why that's important.

1                   So provincial policing standards, I want to make sure that that  
2 terminology would be used.

3                   **MS. LORI WARD:** And I don't want to give the impression that a  
4 lot of work hasn't been done on this issue, but we don't currently have provincial  
5 policing standards in place in Nova Scotia; do we?

6                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well we don't have well defined or  
7 permanent provincial policing standards in place, but in fairness, I would say that the  
8 Department of Justice, within the last year and a bit, have been very actively engaged in  
9 resurrecting the working groups within the province, which would have representatives  
10 from all police agencies in Nova Scotia on the creation of provincial policing standards.  
11 And there's also an Executive Steering Committee, which is at the executive level that  
12 would approve those standards. So that work has been underway.

13                   I would be guessing in terms of assigning a percentage, but there's  
14 been a number of provincial policing standards that the group itself has agreed upon.  
15 But that work is still underway and is not complete.

16                   **MS. LORI WARD:** Thank you. Now we've heard from various  
17 witnesses that as far as general duty members go, they're used to working together  
18 quite well with the municipal forces in terms of day-to-day activities. Is that your  
19 understanding?

20                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well I do believe that, because I  
21 think that they have a common bond. They face the same realities on a day-to-day  
22 basis, and they would often, whether by way of being assigned through a dispatch  
23 centre to back each other -- back each other up, they may even at times proactively do  
24 that. I've done that over the course of my entire career when I worked in the lower  
25 mainland of Vancouver. I shared borders with the New Westminister Police Service, the  
26 Delta Police Service, and the RCMP detachment in Langley. That was when I was in  
27 Surrey. When I was in Burnaby, I shared a border with the Vancouver Police Service,  
28 as well as the New Westminister Police Service, the Port Moody Police Service, and the

1 RCMP Coquitlam detachment.

2                   There were many times when I would have interactions or we  
3 would show up on a border together to respond to something. There were many times  
4 when, for example, if we had a police service dog available they would require the use  
5 of that dog or vice-versa, because those standards were in place and we were used to  
6 working together. And those were good relationships.

7                   And I believe that -- I really truly believe that the officers on the road  
8 that are working here in this province have every intention to work alongside of each  
9 other; they know that that's important, and I'm happy for that.

10                   **MS. LORI WARD:** And I just want to clarify, though, that that's not  
11 necessarily an issue of interoperability; is that correct? I mean, is it fair to say that  
12 there's a difference between having, say, the RCMP engaged in a critical incident and  
13 asking a neighbouring municipality to cover general calls that come in?

14                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, then that would be very  
15 different. For example, the covering of general calls would mean that that agency would  
16 respond to the general complaints, but in terms of a critical incident it would be very  
17 important that you would establish protocols, you would ensure that -- in fact, there  
18 should be a service exchange, like a written service exchange agreement be in place or  
19 a Memorandum of Understanding that would cover off things like training, liability,  
20 conflicts, communications. All of those things should be in place, and then once those  
21 are in place, to be able to do that you should practice so that everyone understands the  
22 roles, the responsibilities, how you -- how you would deploy. That would be very  
23 important for public safety.

24                   **MS. LORI WARD:** So for the RCMP to seek assistance from, say,  
25 a municipal force to actually come help with the response to the critical incident, they  
26 would have to be interoperable in the way that you've described?

27                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, you should be. You certainly  
28 be, and you know, I'll reference back to one of my earlier points, is secure

1 communications would be a very important aspect to that. That's almost -- you know, in  
2 an unfolding event you would want to be able to at least make sure that you have that  
3 so that you can communicate on an encrypted channel. That would be very important.

4 **MS. LORI WARD:** And a minute ago, you mentioned integrated  
5 units. And I know Ms. Njihawan had asked you whether we have integrated ERT teams  
6 in this province. Do we have any integrated units in H-Division, or in Nova Scotia I  
7 should say?

8 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, there are integrated units. I  
9 didn't have carriage or any responsibility over the Criminal Intelligence Service in Nova  
10 Scotia, but I understand that to be an integrated unit, meaning that we have officers  
11 from a variety of agencies working within that environment. And often the management  
12 of that team or the leadership of that team will rotate from municipal -- serving a  
13 municipal commissioned officer to a serving an RCMP commissioned officer. That  
14 would be one example.

15 We have a number of what we call Street Crime Enforcement Units  
16 in the province, which I would consider to be integrated. So you have investigators that  
17 are targeting prolific offenders, various property crime offenders, drug -- street-level  
18 drug work to mid-level drug work, they're working alongside of each other, and they  
19 would have what's called a Joint Management Team that would set priorities and  
20 direction for those integrated teams.

21 Beyond that, there are very small pockets of integrated teams.  
22 When I say small pockets of them, small numbers of officers that would be assigned  
23 almost as if they're a secondment within some RCMP units that are managed and  
24 administered by the RCMP or the Provincial Police Service. Examples of that would be  
25 the Provincial Commercial Crime Unit, the Provincial Proceeds of Crime, I believe that  
26 there have numbers of the Halifax Regional Police service embedded within those  
27 provincial units. There is a Provincial Human Trafficking Team, which is made up of  
28 essentially 50-percent RCMP general, or not -- regular member resources as well as

1 50-percent Halifax Regional Police resources. And then another example of integration  
2 in Nova Scotia would be the Criminal Investigation Division of Halifax District, which  
3 would be the Halifax Police and members of the RCMP.

4 **MS. LORI WARD:** And a few times you've touched on -- you've  
5 commented that the integrated units in British Columbia are working quite well, and  
6 maybe you've covered this already. But are you able to comment on why you think that  
7 is?

8 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, because I've worked in them.  
9 For a number of years, well, I would say for more than 10 years of my service, I've  
10 worked in what I consider the high-functioning integrated units. Some of my closest  
11 colleagues in my policing career have been municipal police officers from agencies like  
12 the Vancouver Police, Delta Police Department, New Westminster Police Department,  
13 Abbotsford Police Department. I worked within a Provincial Major Crimes Unsolved  
14 Homicide Unit, which was a joint unit that predominantly included members of VPD  
15 Homicide and RCMP Major Crimes investigators, I did several years in that unit. Some  
16 of the very best investigators that I've worked with have come from municipal  
17 environments. And I also worked on the Integrated Homicide Investigation Team, which  
18 is comprised of a number of agencies that respond together under the same framework  
19 and the principles of major case management. There are at least I think four to five  
20 agencies that have opted into that integrated model, which I think is -- increases  
21 connectivity between the agencies, certainly communication, and consistent practices  
22 amongst agencies as well, and it also provides exposure to each others' ways of doing  
23 things, and also provides opportunities for both RCMP members to work in sometimes  
24 municipal environments, and also, for municipal officers to be exposed to the breadth of  
25 things or services the RCMP can offer them.

26 **MS. LORI WARD:** And so is it your observation that the reason  
27 those integrated units work so well are all the things you said about interoperability, that  
28 they work together, train together, have the same standards, et cetera?



1                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, when you work together and  
2 you train together, you share common goals. And sharing of common goals, and that  
3 should always be public safety, put down your badges, meaning your shoulder flashes,  
4 make it a less badge-less environment because the objectives and the goals are the  
5 same and the connectivity is increased, that, I think, translates into a more efficient and  
6 effective service.

7                   **MS. LORI WARD:** And so my last question about integration is --  
8 just has to do with HRM. So I think some people have called the HRM's blended  
9 policing model and integrated model, but from what you're describing it doesn't sound  
10 like that's what integration is. Can you comment on that?

11                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, from my perspective and my  
12 experience, it's not the same model that exists in the Greater Vancouver area. Some  
13 people call it an integrated model, that's the terminology that many use; others have  
14 described it as a dual policing model. I think that's probably a little bit more of an  
15 accurate description because they're -- even though there's always the ability to call  
16 upon resources and share those resources, there are also other teams that are  
17 standalone that each agency would have access to or have created.

18                   So for example, if the goal for true integration -- and perhaps Chief  
19 Superintendent Gray, I'm not sure if she's testified but I believe that she has -- she did  
20 provide a statement. If she wasn't asked these questions, I'm confident that she would  
21 answer them in these ways -- and the reason why I reference her is that she was the  
22 former District Commander for Halifax District -- is that there certainly should be and  
23 could be greater connectivity and efficiencies created through integration of resources,  
24 particularly in and around the areas of Forensic Identification Services, Emergency  
25 Response Teams, in my view. This is just my view and my opinion. Collision Analysis  
26 and Reconstruction Services, Underwater Recovery Teams, more so on, like, really  
27 effective joint management teams governing Major Crimes investigations. There's a lot  
28 of opportunities there that I think that, if I was in Halifax District, I would want to continue

1 to explore.

2 **MS. LORI WARD:** Thank you. I just have one more thing. Ms.  
3 Nijhawan was asking you about specialized services, and you talked a bit about the cost  
4 associated with providing those services to municipalities and I think, so we understand  
5 it, that cost comes out of RCMP budgets and is not recouped; is that -- do I understand  
6 correctly?

7 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, that's correct. There's no  
8 secret. Policing is expensive. And as expectations increase, not just expectations, but  
9 also legislation in terms of governing safety and equipment, all of those things cost a lot  
10 of money. And I can tell you that the budgets that I had responsibility over for those  
11 multiple enhanced support services programs, I would see constantly in the red,  
12 meaning that I don't believe that the funding was adequate to deliver on operations.  
13 Based on what I was allotted, we were always redlining on those budgets. There was  
14 no mechanism that the RCMP had to be able to ask for some level of contribution. And  
15 again, as Ms. Nijhawan had pointed out in her question, we do leave voids on the  
16 frontline when we action or enable these support services. You know, it could be  
17 something as simple as a request for an agency to recover a drowning victim to a crime  
18 weapon from the bottom of a lake. That will require a number of resources who have to  
19 be equipped and trained, which we maintain, and the maintenance and the creation of  
20 these teams is very expensive. But over and above that, often we were calling those  
21 resources in on overtime, or we were leaving vacancies on the frontline to be able to  
22 fulfil those requests, whether they were from within the RCMP detachment or a  
23 municipal detachment. It's very expensive and it does cause a drain on the frontline  
24 resources.

25 **MS. LORI WARD:** Are you able to comment on the scale or the  
26 magnitude of these, if I can call them, unfunded costs?

27 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I wouldn't be able to assign a  
28 direct number, but, you know, I think that there was a question that was posed to me in

1 the last two days about requests for these services. And it may have been covered  
2 through other's testimony about the RCMP asking for formalized paper form of a  
3 request from other agencies. The purpose for that was to be able to actually track those  
4 requests to determine the numbers.

5                   And I'll give you an example. Back to your comments in and  
6 around municipalities are responsible for providing adequate levels of police service  
7 including what I would call general duty or patrol responses, public order and enhanced  
8 services -- an enhanced service would be something like Forensic Identification  
9 Services. And I do know that in northeast Nova, based on analysis that I had tasked  
10 out, approximately 25 percent of our officer's time in northeast Nova in the Forensic  
11 Identification Section were actually being spent outside of their area of responsibility.  
12 There were only four officers in northeast Nova that are Forensic Identification  
13 Specialists. So what that really meant is that three were doing the work that our  
14 contracts were set aside for, while one was doing the work somewhere else. Simple  
15 math to that, that means that everyone has to work 33 percent harder just to fulfil your  
16 own organization's responsibilities.

17                   So there is a drain there, and I only bring that up as an example of  
18 25 percent of the budgets could be drained down by all of the activities by, you know,  
19 those individuals in that specific area of expertise.

20                   **MS. LORI WARD:** Thank you. Those are my questions, Chief  
21 Superintendent Campbell.

22                   **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you, Ms. Ward.  
23 Ms. Young?

24 **--- RE-EXAMINATION BY MS. RACHEL YOUNG:**

25                   **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Good afternoon, Chief Superintendent  
26 Campbell.

27                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Afternoon.

28                   **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** You mentioned a mandate letter or a

1 memo that you sent to National Headquarters in Ottawa to ask that they arrange for  
2 review.

3 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

4 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** And you said that you provided that to  
5 Department of Justice Canada to disclose to this Commission. We haven't been able to  
6 find it, so can you please undertake to assist DOJ Counsel in locating that?

7 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I do specifically remember, I  
8 believe that Chief Superintendent John Robin was involved in receiving that mandate  
9 letter. So I will follow up with the Department of Justice Canada to ensure that you  
10 receive a copy of that.

11 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Thank you.

12 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I also believe that I would have  
13 kept a copy of it as well.

14 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Yes, they may need a new copy, and I'd  
15 also ask for any related correspondence and emails, including any correspondence with  
16 Chief Superintendent Leather and any reply from Ottawa.

17 I wanted to ask you about your meetings in November 2020 with  
18 Chief Superintendent Leather and Inspector Marcichiw about whether to lay charges  
19 against Ms. Banfield, Mr. Banfield or Mr. Brewster.

20 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

21 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Did you consider in those meetings that  
22 this public inquiry had been constituted on October 21<sup>st</sup>, 2020?

23 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I -- obviously, it would have been a  
24 topic of discussion that the public inquiry would be underway.

25 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Specifically, did you consider that it might  
26 impact Ms. Banfield's ability to fully participate in the inquiry if she faced criminal  
27 jeopardy?

28 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I would have to refer to my notes

1 specifically to be able to determine whether or not that was brought up, but I would say  
2 that that would be a reasonable question to undertake during those discussions, yes.

3 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Do you recall whether that was  
4 discussed?

5 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I can't recall. I would prefer to refer  
6 to my notes, so that I could refresh my memory to be able to fully answer those  
7 questions. But I don't recall, but it's very possible that that was a point that was brought  
8 up.

9 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Did you and the others weigh the  
10 significance of this inquiry versus charges for supplying ammunition?

11 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Weigh the significance of the ---

12 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** The significance ---

13 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I don't ---

14 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** --- of the relative importance of charges  
15 that ultimately were diverted in provincial court and dismissed today versus a national  
16 provincial public inquiry?

17 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** So you're -- specifically your  
18 question, do we ---

19 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Did you weigh those two things? Should  
20 we lay these charges when there's this public inquiry going on?

21 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I think that that relates to the  
22 question that you just asked me. I think that that's very reasonable that that would be  
23 part of the discussion, but I'd have to refer to my notes to see if I have a -- I don't have a  
24 recollection specifically of all the elements of that conversation.

25 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Do you want to -- when you say  
26 you have to refer to your notes, I don't know what that involves.

27 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Commissioner, the notes -- we did look on  
28 the break. There are notes of November 12<sup>th</sup>, 2020, on page 88 of COMM 0058643,

1 which is Exhibit P-003895, and it says, "Notification from Inspector Marcichiw re Crown  
2 charge," followed by redactions. Page 90, an entry that says, "Canadian charges,"  
3 followed by redactions. November 16<sup>th</sup>, page 94, "Discussion with CROPS officer re  
4 Nova Scotia charges and provision of RCMP support services," followed by redactions.  
5 Page 100, November 18<sup>th</sup>, an entry called "Family communication strategy discussion re  
6 notification of Canadian charges," redacted. Then there's COMM 58644, Exhibit P-  
7 003896, page 3, November 19<sup>th</sup>, "CROPS supports going forward with charges." So I  
8 don't think, at this point, this witness can refer to his notes. It may be that in light of the  
9 fact that this prosecution ended today, perhaps Counsel for the Department of Justice  
10 Canada might have another look at those redactions, if any of them were redacted  
11 because of ongoing investigation as opposed to solicitor and client privilege.

12 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Okay. Thank you. That's  
13 helpful.

14 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Thank you.

15 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** I thought if it would be something  
16 that could be simpler, fine, but ---

17 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** We'll just stick to your recollection, what  
18 you recall, Superintendent Campbell?

19 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I've already testified, I don't recall  
20 about the specific details. I just do know I had those conversations, and I would prefer  
21 to refer to my notes to refresh my memory.

22 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Do you recall whether it was considered or  
23 discussed that paragraph g(ii) of this Commission's mandate directs the Commissioners  
24 to:

25 "perform their duties in such a way as to ensure that  
26 the conduct of the Joint Public Inquiry does not  
27 jeopardize any ongoing criminal investigation or  
28 proceeding or any other investigation and provide

1 notice to the government institution responsible for  
2 any ongoing investigation or proceeding about any  
3 potential jeopardy, identified by the Commissioners,  
4 that could result from the conduct of the Joint Public  
5 Inquiry.”

6 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Is that in the Order of Council?

7 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Yes.

8 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yeah. I would have read the Order  
9 in Council at one point in time, but, again, a specific link to that passage within the  
10 Order in Council, or the terms of reference, again, I'd have to look at my notes, and  
11 again, I'm going back to November of 2020, so, you know, my recollection is limited.

12 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Did you -- do you recall discussing or  
13 considering that the -- having outstanding criminal charges could result in the RCMP  
14 delaying or holding back production of documents to be subpoenaed by the  
15 Commission?

16 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No, I don't recall that.

17 **MS. RACHEL YOUNG:** Those are my questions.

18 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you.

19 Commissioner Fitch?

20 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Thank you, Commissioner MacDonald.

21 C/Supt. Campbell, I know it's been a long day, and thank you for  
22 your contributions thus far. I do have several questions, but I think some of them have  
23 been answered throughout the day by Commission Counsel and Participant Counsel,  
24 so bear with me as I go through and knock them off as we go along.

25 Just to confirm; your direct reports were the Inspector in charge of  
26 OCC, Dustine Rodier, Insp. Don Moser, and Insp. Murray ---

27 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Murray Marcichiw.

28 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** --- Marcichiw, and the latter being in

1 charge of investigative units, behavioural sciences, et cetera.

2 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

3 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** And that oftentimes you would also  
4 bring Glen Byrne into conversations, I expect specific to operational communications  
5 with Dustine Rodier?

6 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, that's correct.

7 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay? Just a point of clarification, when  
8 you rolled the CIC package, is there Strategic Communications included in that package  
9 rollout? I know that the Strat Comms reports directly to the Officer of the Assistant  
10 Commissioner; that's what I understood over the testimony, but is there a media  
11 component that gets rolled out with the CIC package?

12 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yeah, I believe that the standard  
13 operating procedure would be when the Risk Manager calls the Critical Incident  
14 Commander, and then there's a positive response and deployment. I believe they also  
15 notify the on-call Public Information Officer, who is connected to the Strategic Comms  
16 Unit.

17 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** So although Strat Comms doesn't report  
18 to you directly, there is some overlap when the CIC package is rolled out?

19 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yeah, they don't report directly to  
20 me whatsoever, but the overlap would be is that they would work together under their  
21 respective areas of responsibility as a team.

22 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. In your role as manager of a  
23 number of those teams and units, during a CIC rollout, I understand that you get briefed  
24 up; I certainly understand and appreciate that you wouldn't be calling in to the  
25 Command Post for briefings. My question to you is when you are being briefed up,  
26 when you do have those opportunities, are you asking any probing questions of the  
27 Commander, or providing any advice?

28 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, it depends upon the level of



1 briefing and how much information is known. That would dictate what questions I might  
2 ask. But I would just maybe relay, typically, what one of those conversations would look  
3 like, and those conversations, particularly -- well, actually, I'll speak to this case.

4 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Yes, please.

5 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I would have asked questions like,  
6 Is it still active? Do we have containment? Those would be the normal things. Is air  
7 support available? Those all would have been questions that when I was -- when Jeff  
8 West was in a position to give me more details or numbers of victims, what do we have.  
9 I'm trying to get more information about what was known by the Critical Incident  
10 Commander at that time.

11 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** So in your conversations with the  
12 Critical Incident Commander, and you're expecting that chain of command briefing up to  
13 you as a senior officer, one with extensive homicide investigation experience, although I  
14 understand you're not a Critical Incident Commander trained, specifically on the 18<sup>th</sup>  
15 and 19<sup>th</sup>, when dealing with the CIC Commanders that fall under your command, did  
16 you make any note of questions or advice that you either asked or provided to the  
17 Commanders?

18 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, no, I didn't. I didn't make  
19 specific note of it, and the reason being is that I actually -- I normally take my notebook  
20 home with me, and we were in the process of standing up -- well, we'd already stood up  
21 the DEOC for COVID, and I'd started a brand-new notebook that was largely containing  
22 a lot of COVID material. So when I was woken up on the 18<sup>th</sup>, I didn't actually have a  
23 notebook with me. So I don't have notes with respect to specific questions.

24 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. Do you, in your capacity, have  
25 access to a mobile radio 24/7 or a take-home police vehicle with a radio?

26 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No, I don't. And, in fact, as a  
27 matter of resourcing and funding, I had actually had a police vehicle assigned to me  
28 when I arrived here in Nova Scotia, and there was the creation of the Human Trafficking

1 Team and there were not enough vehicles to go around, so I actually gave that unit my  
2 assigned police vehicle so that they could actually conduct operations. So I didn't even  
3 have an assigned police vehicle. And I believe that to this day there still isn't an  
4 assigned police vehicle to the Support Services Officer.

5 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** So at no time over the 18<sup>th</sup> or the 19<sup>th</sup>  
6 were you in a position to listen to the radio communications of what was going on, on  
7 the ground?

8 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** There was, on the morning of the  
9 19<sup>th</sup>, when I attended Dartmouth Headquarters, when I was with Sgt. Laura Seeley, who  
10 had a portable radio with her.

11 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** What time of the morning, do you recall

12 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** That would have been later in the  
13 morning by the time that Laura arrived. I was on the phone from time to time with  
14 Dustine Rodier, and she was providing updates, because Dustine Rodier, you may  
15 recall that when she provided her evidence, she said that she attended the Operational  
16 Communication Centre.

17 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay, thank you.

18 I know that you had mentioned that you haven't had any direct  
19 training in media relations or were terribly familiar with the policy governing media  
20 relations with the organization. Did you ever have any courses, for example, that are  
21 offered by the Canadian Police College on crisis communications for police executives?

22 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I hadn't through the Canadian  
23 Police College. When I was asked about my background, I had spoken about the fact  
24 that I'm a graduate of the FBI National Academy, and there was actually a course there  
25 that I was quite interested in taking, which is essentially a public communications course  
26 for law enforcement executives. I wished to take that course; however, it was a very  
27 popular course, and it was full, and I didn't get the chance to do that. But I have  
28 received no special specific training on public communications for police executives, no.

1                   **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. So no media training and not  
2 familiar with the departmental policy on media. So you were relying on your Strategic  
3 Communications team for advice and direction.

4                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes, I was.

5                   **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay, thank you.

6                   On the issue of the holdback information -- and I certainly  
7 appreciate in a homicide investigation the importance of doing so when necessary. I'm  
8 unclear in the question that you provided yesterday around the decision to make that. I  
9 understand that over the course of a few days you had conversations with the command  
10 triangle and that it was, I think in your words, "a no-brainer" to hold back certain  
11 information.

12                   What I'm not clear about is when you talk about the command  
13 triangle, it's a triangle with a point on the top; I realize there's points on the two bottom  
14 ends as well, but typically you have your team leader at the top and then your primary  
15 investigator and your file coordinator as is the other points in the triangle. Did you have  
16 conversation directly with Sgt Angela McKay and did you take direction from her  
17 regarding what information to hold back?

18                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I would have had conversations  
19 with Angela McKay, as well as Gerry Rose-Berthiaume, or all of them on a conference,  
20 in and around the importance of protecting that information. Obviously we're speaking  
21 specifically about the central issue ---

22                   **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** M'hm.

23                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** --- of the firearms. I would have  
24 had conversations with term and I would have wanted to fully understand the  
25 importance of what they wished to protect and needed to protect to protect the integrity  
26 of the investigation.

27                   **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Right. And understanding your  
28 extensive background and experience in homicide investigation, you would have a lot of

1 experience with hold-back information, and I appreciate that. my question to you was  
2 directly, did you talk to the team lead, Sgt Angela McKay, about what she felt was  
3 necessary as a team leader? You had indicated several times in reference to both the  
4 command -- Critical Incident command structure, as well as the Major Case  
5 Management command structure, that it is the commander of those, or the team lead in  
6 the case of MCU.

7 So my question to you directly is did you take your direction from  
8 Sgt Angela McKay?

9 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I can't remember if it was directly  
10 from Angela McKay. If I received direction from her. I just know that we had  
11 conversations about the importance of -- and there's a difference between specific hold-  
12 back information or information that you would not want to release publicly. They're  
13 actually two ---

14 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** M'hm.

15 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** --- different things. And I would -- I  
16 realize you would know that, but I'm just explaining that for the benefit of others.

17 Hold-back information is often information that is identified by the  
18 Command Triangle and is actually not even shared with the rest of the coordinated  
19 investigative team. And then there's actually a hold-back form that's signed by anyone  
20 that knows of that information. So it's very sensitive. It's usually information only known  
21 by the offender.

22 Then there's information that you wish to protect, and that would  
23 have come out through general conversations.

24 Again, I'm trying to answer your question about a specific  
25 conversation that I can recall with Angela McKay. I can't remember a specific  
26 conversation with Angela McKay because often the conversations that I had, it would  
27 have been Angela McKay, Gerry Rose-Berthiaume, Shawn Stanton, or Glenn Bonvie as  
28 well. So there were multiple conversations I would have with them. I would tend to

1 have conversations with the Command Triangle, versus one individual.

2 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Right. But she was the team lead on  
3 that.

4 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** She was what is called the Team  
5 Commander.

6 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Yes.

7 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** But she was actually later replaced  
8 by Sgt Glenn Bonvie, who had returned from some leave. And then later, with Glenn  
9 Bonvie ---

10 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Right.

11 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** --- being transferred, it was Gerry  
12 Rose-Berthiaume. So there were three Team Commanders.

13 Again, like I said, my common practice would be is I would want to  
14 have a discussion with the Triangle, as opposed to just the TC.

15 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Yeah. No, and I appreciate that. the  
16 MacNeil recommendations that we've heard a lot about over the last couple of days, in  
17 particular today, had a number of recommendations, some of which you were familiar  
18 with, and some not so much.

19 Given the fact that the Critical Incident command structure is under  
20 your management, as you've pointed out, there's no re-evaluation available for Critical  
21 Incident Commanders in your -- to your knowledge?

22 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** When you're talking about re-  
23 evaluation of their skills ---

24 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Yes.

25 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** --- for their accreditation? Again,  
26 I'm not a Critical Incident Commander. All I know is that they attend the Canadian  
27 Police College for a two period of time, or, you know, 10 training days. They enter into  
28 an understudy program.

1                   In terms of a re-evaluation or a recertification, I wouldn't say that it's  
2 -- again, I'm speaking of a program that I'm not intimately involved in. I would say that it  
3 isn't as well defined as other programs I'm familiar with. For example, forensic  
4 identification. There is recertification of those specialists. Dive team members, there is  
5 recertification or requalifications.

6                   But in terms of Critical Incident Command, I'm not aware of a  
7 recertification, and that would be something that I think would be an important area to  
8 explore.

9                   **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Right. Thank you. I was going to ask if  
10 you felt that that would be an important improvement going forward. As you note, there  
11 are other specialized services that have mandatory recertification ---

12                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yes.

13                   **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** --- periods, and this being such an  
14 important role, certainly ---

15                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** And maybe if it helps frame up any  
16 recommendations, one of the issues -- and the reason why there's a difference, and I  
17 referenced Forensic Identification Services, they have a very well-defined training -- like,  
18 not just a training program, how they identify potential candidates, to how they load  
19 them on their course, and then put them through their understudy period, and then their  
20 qualifications. They have a progressive certification over a minimum of every three  
21 years. They call it EFA (Phonetic) training. They have a very structured program. And  
22 I think the reason being is that there's a separate policy centre that deals with the  
23 identification of those individuals and the training of those individuals and the  
24 maintenance of their training.

25                   On the Critical Incident side, there is a policy centre, but it gets a  
26 little fuzzier, because you involve the Canadian Police College in training, and then you  
27 have an external agency, which I think is a good thing, to help support accreditation, but  
28 there's not the same investments in terms of staffing, because there's a staffing

1 mechanism centrally to -- and I'm using Forensic Identification as a good example,  
2 there's staffing or personnel that are assigned to that portfolio.

3 I don't think that I'm -- to my recollection or my best information is  
4 that there is no staffing person assigned to the Critical Incident Program to identify  
5 candidates, staff candidates, move candidates around. You're always looking for  
6 someone who might fit the criteria, and it's managed at a local level, and I think that  
7 there would be great benefits from a more structured program in and around  
8 identification, training, recertification, and also staffing of these positions.

9 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Thank you. That's very helpful. And it  
10 actually leads me into my next point, when you had requested a review from National  
11 Headquarters, you had mentioned that you wanted an outside independent review, and  
12 my understanding is that you were looking at that Critical Incident Policy National  
13 Group, which would be made up of not just RCMP, but it's comprised of other Critical  
14 Incident Commanders from across Canada? Is that correct?

15 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yeah, I was asking specifically for  
16 individuals who had received Canadian Police College training who had experience,  
17 who were deemed as experts in their field, that had no connection to this province, had  
18 limited familiarity with what had happened here, and also would have some level of  
19 experience in Critical Incident Operations in rural environments. Those were the  
20 elements. And I was looking particularly for those outside of the RCMP.

21 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. thank you. The way that the  
22 model is set up for training, Critical Incident Response and Critical Incident Command in  
23 Canada is run through the Canadian Police College, as you've mentioned, which part of  
24 the National Police Services, which is under the auspice of the Royal Canadian  
25 Mounted Police, ---

26 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Specifically a Specialized Police  
27 Service. They call it SPS.

28 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Yes. So would you consider that still --

1 you're still being trained under the same model, the experts that you'd be bringing in,  
2 even though they might have different experience from across Canada, do you see  
3 value in having subject matter experts come in and share best practices and review this  
4 incident from more a global lens, knowing that there are other areas of expertise to draw  
5 on?

6 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yeah, no, absolutely I do. When  
7 that request was made, I was also mindful of the fact that we were in the middle of a  
8 pandemic and there were certain restrictions.

9 Now, I do know for operational reasons there were exceptions.  
10 They were allowed to bring people in, which we did on a number of different occasions.

11 But from an international perspective, I do agree that it's not just  
12 about how we do it in Canada. It's how we do it in other places that are important. But  
13 that was a consideration that I was -- or a consideration I was making, is that how easy  
14 it would be to be able to bring in, for the purposes of, you know, expediting a review, I  
15 might be presented with some challenges by getting someone internationally. But  
16 certainly a lot of value in international perspectives.

17 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. Thank you. And I know I'm  
18 jumping from subject to subject, but it's based on my two days of notes. So I appreciate  
19 your patience.

20 You had -- we talked a lot about the family liaison position, and you  
21 had mentioned at one point when we were talking about the benefit of a scribe, that  
22 would have helped you with making contemporaneous notes during the height of the  
23 18<sup>th</sup> and the 19<sup>th</sup> of April. And the question was put to you, you know, could you not  
24 have basically ordered or directed, being Superintendent, Chief Superintendent, one of  
25 those resources and you didn't feel that given everything that was going on that, no, you  
26 didn't have that capability and that authority to do so. However, when we were talking  
27 about the sole family liaison, Constable Bent, the offer was made for him to basically --  
28 he could have whatever it was that he needed. Knowing that Major Crime operations



1 falls under your management, and he was part of the Major Crime response, would it --  
2 is it reasonable to leave that decision making with the constable when you, yourself, as  
3 a superintendent didn't feel that you could reach out and ask for other resources? Is  
4 this a time that would be appropriate for a supervisor who's in charge of a unit to make a  
5 leadership decision that could have perhaps changed how the family liaison was  
6 distributed?

7 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** When you refer to the supervisor,  
8 like, at what level are you referring supervision?

9 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Well, you're in charge of -- you manage  
10 all these specialized units. We've established that. And there's a chain of command  
11 reporting up to you. And so when people report up to you as the manager in charge of  
12 those, based on your experience and your position, you would ask probing questions  
13 and offer some advice on how to help. Would this have been an opportunity for you to  
14 interject yourself to ensure that the families had the appropriate number of family  
15 liaisons? You know, just back to the simple math, 1 family liaison serving 22 families,  
16 and by extension, the number of family members, that's quite an incredible lift to leave  
17 with one constable.

18 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yeah, so I'll answer your question  
19 directly first. Yes, I could have interjected myself. And I did have conversations with  
20 the Command Triangle and Skipper about how he was doing, how he felt about that.  
21 And I can tell you that, you know, I do like to be able to trust in the assessments of the  
22 people that I work for. I think the trust is important and they were reporting back to me  
23 that, including Skipper and the Command Triangle, they felt that he was doing a good  
24 job at that, and he was -- he felt that it wasn't too much for him. In my heart, I was  
25 concerned about that, and I think I testified to that on a number of levels, one, for an  
26 adequate level of service for the family, but two, also for Wayne -- Skipper Bent. And  
27 I've had the chance to talk on a number of occasions to Skipper and he carried a very  
28 heavy load there, which I think is going to -- and not to take anything away from the

1 effects that it's had on so many, particularly, the families, but I do believe that it's had --  
2 it will have a lasting impact on Skipper, and that is something that I was also concerned  
3 about.

4 In retrospect, if we had enough resources to assign a individual per  
5 family, I think that that would have been an ideal situation, but Skipper was assigned  
6 solely to that. I know that there was a period of time when, as the amount of  
7 interactions were decreasing, he became more involved in some of the investigative  
8 aspects on this particular case and others. But I do know that he was fully occupied for  
9 a considerable period of time. And I want to acknowledge the level of dedication that I  
10 witnessed that Skipper had expended, and I think considerable emotional expense for  
11 everyone, including himself.

12 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Thank you.

13 This goes back to an investigative question around the CIS Nova  
14 Scotia bulletin in 2011, and the other day in proceedings, Commission Counsel Emily  
15 Hill shared with us -- it's on -- it has been exhibited, a CPIC printout of numerous entries  
16 where both the perpetrator and his common-law spouse had been queried over a  
17 number of years leading up to 2020. And I'm just wondering when officers on the  
18 evening of the 18<sup>th</sup> would have clearly done a CPIC query, they would have seen a  
19 number of those repeated hits on CPIC. And I don't know if we need to bring that up or  
20 not as an exhibit, but just purely from an investigative point of view, I would expect that  
21 where it was shown that there was -- that they were actually targeted through CBSA,  
22 through border crossings, and that was indicated on that printout, that that would have  
23 tweaked somebody's imagination or interest to look further into the Criminal Intelligence,  
24 either Criminal Intelligence Nova Scotia or Criminal Intelligence Canada bulletins. Are  
25 you aware if there was any close look at those CPIC queries leading up to -- the several  
26 years leading up to as late as early 2020?

27 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** So I know, you know, based on  
28 your previous profession, you would have an understanding of this, so I'll answer a little

1 more fully, for the benefit others.

2 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Thank you.

3 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I didn't see that printout that was  
4 entered as an exhibit, so I can't comment specifically on the contents of it. But what  
5 you're describing to me sounds like a CPIC offline query.

6 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** M'hm.

7 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** And the difference for those that  
8 might not understand it in the room is that when a general CPIC query is conducted by  
9 an officer, they will see immediate entries. They can query whether someone has a ---

10 (TECHNICAL DIFFICULTIES)

11 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** --- offline query. Now, whether or  
12 not there was a request to Ottawa that was made in the middle of the night between a  
13 Saturday and a Sunday during COVID, I can't speak to that. But I do believe that there  
14 would have been a delay, a significant delay in terms of receiving the response. That  
15 was -- that's -- usually, an offline query is more of a post-event investigative task that  
16 would be conducted. But, for example, if there is someone that could conduct an offline  
17 query during a Critical Incident 24 hours a day, it would be helpful to have that  
18 information.

19 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** M'hm. Thank you. So just for my own  
20 knowledge, CPIC based out of Ottawa, that doesn't operate 24/7?

21 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I don't know that.

22 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay.

23 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Someone from Ottawa would have  
24 to -- you know, the maintenance or ---

25 **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Right.

26 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** --- those that might conduct those  
27 offline queries, you would have to ask specifically that program area. I'm not familiar  
28 myself.

1                   **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Thank you. And I am getting there.

2                   Mr. Pineo earlier this morning had asked you questions about your  
3 notetaking and your contemporaneous notes. Did you -- have you taken -- obviously, in  
4 basic training, you would have taken the principles of good notetaking. Can you share  
5 with us your rationale for thinking it's okay to make your notes based on another  
6 officer's memory? I know that you made your notes based on some of your own emails  
7 and texts, and perhaps I misunderstood, but it sounded like you were also making your  
8 notes based on the memories and recollections of other officers.

9                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, it was a combined effort. I  
10 testified that I didn't have my notebook with me on the night of the 18<sup>th</sup>, so that's why I  
11 didn't have notes. And then by the time I arrived to the office, I grabbed a new  
12 notebook, because as I testified earlier, I had a notebook that had largely -- I had  
13 actually switched to a new notebook that had everything related to all of the COVID  
14 DEOC activities that we were engaging, so I grabbed a new notebook. But from the  
15 time I arrived at the office, it was constant phone calls, constant ---

16                   **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** If I could just interrupt you and just ask a  
17 very pointed question.

18                   Is it acceptable practice for one police officer to make notes based  
19 on another officer's notes?

20                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No, but if they agreed with what  
21 that officer wrote -- I wasn't making notes. I was making a timeline because there was a  
22 void in my notes for the 18th and the 19th.

23                   **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. Thank you.

24                   There's been a tremendous amount of talk over the course of our  
25 Commission around the Alert Ready and the duty to warn, and this next question is  
26 going back to the duty of care around the families and the family liaison, next of kin  
27 notification and so forth. And I know, again, we've talked a lot about the duty to warn  
28 and -- which is extremely important.

1                   But can you help me understand what some of the thoughts are  
2 around the duty to care when we're talking about interactions with victims and families  
3 and, in fact, those who have been charged or in our care?

4                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I think there's a responsibility  
5 to treat everyone with dignity and respect. You want to be as attentive as you can  
6 possibly be with someone who has experienced such a great loss.

7                   That would be, for me, the first duty of care, is dignity and respect.  
8 If there is information that you can share that you're confident is accurate based on  
9 what it is that you've confirmed, then you should be able to share that information.

10                  **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Thank you.

11                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** And further to that, maybe, I just  
12 would want to add is that if -- if we have access to contacts or resources that we believe  
13 that an individual who's suffered as a result of a criminal act, I do believe that we have a  
14 responsibility to ensure that they are pointed in the direction of those additional  
15 resources that we might not have the capacity or the responsibility to provide.

16                  **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. Thank you.

17                  And this is my last question, and I appreciate your patience. And  
18 this is based on a question from Participant Counsel Mr. MacDonald when he was  
19 asking for some clarification on -- regarding blue on blue.

20                  And would you agree with me that blue on blue is not just a concern  
21 about mistakenly shooting at an officer thinking it was a perpetrator, but there's also  
22 concern with blue on blue of somebody being caught in crossfire?

23                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Of course.

24                  **COMMISSIONER FITCH:** Okay. Thank you. Those are all my  
25 questions.

26                  **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you.

27                  Commissioner Stanton?

28                  **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Thank you.

1                   In response to a Commission Counsel question yesterday, you  
2 indicated that relations between police services management in Nova Scotia has gotten  
3 worse since the mass casualty. And in your June 28th interview, you suggested a  
4 dispute resolution process might be needed for policing agencies post the mass  
5 casualty. And I just wondered what you've observed that leads you to that conclusion.

6                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** It's not just something I suggested  
7 in my interview on it was either the 28th or the 12th. I can't remember which of the two.  
8 It's also a conversation that I had with Hayley Crichton, who's the Executive Director of  
9 Public Safety in Nova Scotia.

10                   And the reason why I believe that that's quite important is that the  
11 emotional impacts and effects that this has had, I think, has had -- is a contributing  
12 factor to those strained relationships.

13                   There's been a lot of finger pointing. There's been a lot of  
14 misunderstanding between agencies, which I think have created -- it's been a  
15 compounding effect on the strain of those relations. And I don't see it any differently  
16 than two people who care about each other or should care about each other because  
17 you have common goals and interests like a marriage. If they're experiencing  
18 difficulties, sometimes you can work those things out together and other times, it  
19 requires someone who can mediate that and keep things moving in the right direction,  
20 allow some respectful conversations. And I do believe that would be a valuable  
21 undertaking in this province on a number of levels, either through some level of therapy  
22 or ensuring that each other are truly understood without feeling that they couldn't  
23 actually be honest with each other.

24                   That's why I think that's so important, and I think it's necessary. I  
25 have to say that.

26                   **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** And so in order to improve the  
27 relationship -- well, I guess you're off to New Brunswick, but just wondering if you have  
28 any suggestions with respect to how the relationships between agencies might be

1 improved. Is it -- for example, I wonder about the lack of an after action report for "H"  
2 Division.

3 I understand that HRP, the Halifax Regional Police, did conduct  
4 one. Would sharing reports like that be a first step?

5 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I think that the sharing of those  
6 reports -- I've never seen that HRP ERT after action report and, in fact, I was down in  
7 Halifax District before I left here. That wasn't provided to me, so I never saw it.

8 I do agree that sitting down and sharing that information would be  
9 very important.

10 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Did you request it?

11 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I didn't even know it existed.

12 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Okay. And you said that there --  
13 there was also, I gather, an ERT after action report from "H" Division ERT?

14 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I believe there's a -- it was defined  
15 as a draft after action report. I don't think it was a finalized report.

16 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Okay. And in your July 12th  
17 interview, you mentioned that you were not aware of the contents of that report. Am I  
18 correct in that understanding?

19 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I don't think that I was ever given  
20 that report to actually physically read because I think it was in the draft stage.

21 Now, having said that, I receive reports and documents that -- on a  
22 daily basis, and some of them are very long in length. I prefer to see a finalized report  
23 rather than several drafts, and that really ties up my time because I have multiple  
24 programs that I manage. So that could have been why I might not have read it because  
25 it wasn't in its final stage ---

26 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** So ---

27 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** --- or finalized stage.

28 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** So if -- sorry.

1                   If I understand from Ms. Nijhawan's questions this morning, post  
2 the mass casualty you staffed up the ERT in "H" Division, but not some of the other  
3 programs such as EMRT? Did I understand that correctly?

4                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** No, there hasn't been any -- I don't  
5 believe there's been an increase in resources on the EMRT side, but -- and I may be  
6 mistaken, but I seem to recall that there was a business case that might have gone in  
7 the last multi-year financial plan for not necessarily stand-alone resources for EMRT,  
8 but we have two mechanisms to be able to ask for things that people need. And one is  
9 called the multi-year financial planning for resources and then there is the -- and my  
10 memory's escaping me, the terminology.

11                  **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** That's okay.

12                  I guess what I'm getting at is that if you -- if I understood correctly,  
13 you -- and there was a pressure something term that you used to ---

14                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Pressure funding.

15                  **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Pressure funding for improving the  
16 staffing of ERT; right?

17                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** There were already pressure  
18 funded positions for ERT and there was a business case submitted to increase -- or not  
19 to increase. To actually establish funded positions to move them away from pressure  
20 funding to actually funded positions.

21                  **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** So I guess I'm just wondering if it  
22 would have assisted in determining some of this resourcing to have -- to have reviewed  
23 the after action report of ERT.

24                  **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, it would, but the -- the  
25 modernization study that I spoke of was a national level study that subject matter  
26 experts from across the country would have contributed to. That report is the basis for  
27 establishing what I believe to be the key issues that need to be addressed within the  
28 ERT program as well as the actual resourcing issues, so that was the basis for those



1 business cases. The after-action report would be more granular in terms of gaps and  
2 issues in terms of the response, not necessarily reflective of the issues facing  
3 modernisation and resourcing levels, and that's why that modernisation review was  
4 used as a basis for that request.

5 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** In your June 28th interview, you  
6 mentioned the Critical Incident Policy Centre, and I'm very curious about what that might  
7 be. Can you tell me what that is, please?

8 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, I've spoken about that over  
9 the course of the last two days. I'm going to use the acronym and then I'm going to  
10 spell it out, just so that everyone's clear.

11 National Headquarters, we have a Deputy Commissioner, Brian  
12 Brennan, and he oversees -- he's in command over and above Assistant  
13 Commissioner Dennis Daley. Assistant Commissioner Dennis Daley is in charge of  
14 Contract and Indigenous Policing, CNIP. And under CNIP, there are a number of  
15 program areas, one of which is what we call the Operational Response and Readiness  
16 Unit, ORR. You might have heard me say that acronym. There's a Chief  
17 Superintendent in ORR that has multiple programs, and under -- and that's all about  
18 critical incidents, EMERT, negotiators, all those pieces of the Critical Incident Program,  
19 that would be Chief Superintendent Jamie Solesme that oversees that. Under OR or  
20 the Critical Incident Program there would be a superintendent, and that at that time  
21 would have been Superintendent Phil Lue, who was in charge of the Critical Incident  
22 Program that was in the Operational Response and Readiness Unit that was part of  
23 Contract and Indigenous Policing that was in National Headquarters under the Deputy  
24 Commissioner of Contract and Indigenous Policing.

25 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Okay, so what does it do? What  
26 does it produce?

27 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, what it produces is it's a  
28 policy centre, first, that would govern or create policies, modify policies on the national

1 level of all things related to the Critical Incident Program, negotiators, ERT, et cetera.  
2 They would have direct connectivity with the Tactical Training Section, or TTS, that was  
3 -- that's their acronym, and they would develop initiatives. They could do -- conduct  
4 those reviews that I referenced. They are involved in identification of subject matter  
5 experts that they would load across the country on the Critical Incident Commander's  
6 course, for example. They have trained subject matter expert in each of those fields  
7 that work within that policy centre, and they also have connectivity across the country  
8 with other police agencies, and they also would have international connectivity as well  
9 that would help form the basis of some of the policies that they create.

10 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** So does it review or analyse  
11 recommendations from past inquiries?

12 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I -- no, not that I'm in charge of  
13 CNIP or ORR, but I would feel very confident in saying that the recommendations of this  
14 Commission will eventually go into Contract and Indigenous Policing, and if they are  
15 related to critical incident response, Emergency Response Teams, negotiators,  
16 Operational Communications they will go into that Contract and Indigenous Policing  
17 environment and they will be shared and they would have work on actioning those  
18 recommendations at a national level. Because I've said this to many, this is a joint  
19 federal and provincial Inquiry, I believe that the recommendations are binding on all  
20 police agencies in Canada, and -- or if they're not, they -- I believe that they should be.

21 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** They're not binding, but yeah.

22 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I don't see this as just a Nova  
23 Scotia issue, I think that what comes out of this Inquiry will be important for all agencies  
24 to fully understand, and if there are adjustments or improvements that we need to make  
25 that we would make them.

26 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** So I guess that's what I'm trying to  
27 identify is, is there, and perhaps this is the unit, this policy centre, is there someone who  
28 reviews recommendations when they come out from, you know, whatever process it is,

1 whether it's a public inquiry or a review, and consider which recommendations apply to  
2 people in which relevant roles, and ensure that they are reviewed and actioned?

3 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** I would -- I would say that I would  
4 expect that policy centre, with those subject matter experts in it, to be a lead point for  
5 understanding, absorbing, and actioning on a national scale, and then divisions would  
6 then be given taskings from that body to be able to implement.

7 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Okay. Because it sounds like there  
8 isn't a mechanism right now for ensuring that people in relevant roles, for example,  
9 Critical Incident Commanders, to be provided with or to be required to review relevant  
10 recommendations. And given that it sounds -- it sounds a bit random whether people  
11 take it upon themselves, it seems to be self-driven whether people review some things  
12 like the MacNeil Report.

13 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Well, there will always be an  
14 element of people taking their own initiative to learn, but I do believe that if there is a  
15 critical aspect that needs to be communicated to the field, I know that there's  
16 connectivity from the Critical Incident Program to National Headquarters in Ottawa, as  
17 well as the Emergency Response Teams with that policy centre in Ottawa. So I  
18 wouldn't want to leave anyone with an impression that there isn't a channel of  
19 communication.

20 There's another -- there's another body that might be worth  
21 mentioning, is that every province that the RCMP has there's a Criminal Operations  
22 Officer on both the Corps side, which is provincial policing, and the federal policing side.  
23 So you have a Corps Criminal Operations Officer and you have a federal policing  
24 Criminal Operations Officer. There's a body in Ottawa that meets regularly called the  
25 National Integrated Operation Council, or NIOC. I don't know if anyone has mentioned  
26 that. NIOC is designed to bring Criminal Operations Officers from across the country to  
27 Ottawa in person and they have several teleconferences on a scheduled basis where  
28 they discuss Operational issues. It would be probably most simply described as the

1 senior most Operational decision-making body in the RCMP. That NIOC Committee  
2 would have several discussions in and around recommendations like this, and the  
3 implementation of them across the entire organisation.

4 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Okay, that's helpful. Because I  
5 guess it struck me when you said that after this mass casualty you were scouring the  
6 internet to find other examples of mass casualties with similar elements, and I wondered  
7 if, for example, anyone had reviewed an English translation of the Commission Inquiry  
8 in the Utøya incident in Norway. And of course, we were fortunate to hear from  
9 someone on a critical incident decision-making panel with respect to that, and again, we  
10 have a commissioned report from Dr. Dyb, who's with the Norwegian Centre for  
11 Violence and Traumatic Stress Studies, who provided helpful information on aftercare.

12 And it -- and I thought about your goal in Ottawa with respect to the  
13 -- I think you said with the MacNeil Report you worked on guidelines with respect to  
14 critically injured and fallen members, and so those kinds of things would be of great  
15 assistance. I'm just trying to determine if there is a process by which that kind of  
16 information is reviewed and analysed and provides a -- you know, implementation plans  
17 for the RCMP?

18 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** So I can't speak for that unit what  
19 their daily activities and their mandate would look like because I've never worked in it.

20 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** And -- sorry.

21 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** But I'm familiar with that incident in  
22 Norway that you spoke of. Maybe it would be fair for me to describe why I would have  
23 conducted my own researches, because I'm just driven that way. I'm curious, and I was  
24 searching for anything that I could find.

25 But I do expect that as a National Policy, they would have their  
26 eyes on other reports. And I had testified earlier about one of the roles I had in Ottawa  
27 in the National Office of Investigative Standards and Practices, and it was important in  
28 that environment to look at best practices, lessons learned. For example, there's a

1 website out of the RCMP in British Columbia that's called OISP, or Office of  
2 Investigative Standards and Practices, that distils a lot of these reports specific to major  
3 case investigations.

4 So I would hope that ORR has the capacity to be able to do that  
5 analysis and to be able to communicate that in a usable format so that people  
6 understand the important aspects of those reviews so that we can incorporate that into  
7 our policies, our training, because it's not just about what happens, as we all know, in  
8 Canada. It's what happens around the world that we should be familiar with, and what  
9 challenges that those that have gone and faced situations like this have faced. And  
10 there lies the importance of this report that you're charged with producing, is that my  
11 hope would be is that people around the world will actually read about that and take  
12 serious note of what recommendations you make.

13 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** So I think you said it's Phil Lue that  
14 was in charge of the -- was it the centre or the ORR that he's ---

15 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** ORR, which is Operational  
16 Response and Readiness. No, sorry, Critical Incident Program. ORR, Operational  
17 Response and Readiness was C/Supt Jamie Solesme.

18 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Oh that's right. Yeah. I know ---

19 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Who since retired just recently.

20 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Right. He's retired and I know we  
21 were interested with speaking with Phil Lue and I understand that he's moving to  
22 Thailand. So we are at a bit of a disadvantage with respect to trying to get more  
23 information about those things. So I appreciate you sharing what you know about them  
24 today.

25 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** There will be someone who is in  
26 acting capacity, if not someone identified to assume that role.

27 **COMMISSIONER STANTON:** Okay. And perhaps Department of  
28 Justice can assist us with that. Thank you very much.

1                   **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you so much, Chief  
2 Superintendent. It's been a long day and a lot of questions have been asked and a lot  
3 of questions have been answered. And I just have one thing that I'm having a difficulty  
4 getting my head around, and given your 32 plus years of experience and wide variety of  
5 experience, obviously, and particularly in Major Crime, and it involves what transpired  
6 on Sunday morning around 9:30 or so.

7                   So they were beginning extraction from Portapique residents and  
8 suddenly the calls started coming in that the perpetrator was elsewhere. And just  
9 please explain to me how it could happen that -- I can understand ERT going after the  
10 threat, and we've heard a lot of evidence about the threat is the priority, you go after the  
11 threat, but how could those people in Cobequid Court not be discovered until the  
12 evening, Sunday evening? Why was it that, in your experience, and you reviewed it all,  
13 you can help me understand how it came to be that -- abandoned is not the right word,  
14 but that the priority for the threat seemed to have overwhelmed what was going on in  
15 Portapique? And by Sunday morning, there would have been a lot of resources to  
16 follow the threat, but yet it was the evening before those bodies were found. And that's  
17 something I'm having difficulty getting my head around. So with your experience, your  
18 review, can you help me out there?

19                   **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Yeah, so I wasn't involved in fully  
20 understanding on the ground what was happening there, so I can only go with your  
21 questioning that is based on my experience, and my experience is based on one or two  
22 scenes, not 16 scenes. And from what I've seen through the course of your  
23 proceedings, or things that I have read, I seem to recall that there -- and it might have  
24 been maybe Cst Dorrington that was speaking about wanting to leave Portapique, but  
25 being instructed, "No, you had to stay." So I don't believe that every resource left that  
26 area. I believe that there were resources that were left there.

27                   But in terms of the scope and enormity of the situation, and the  
28 confusion that the perpetrator caused, and the excessive number of taskings, and the

1 necessity to establish one, just a fraction of awareness of the scope and magnitude,  
2 would have taken some time.

3                   And I'm not saying that to make an excuse at all, but I do have  
4 some level of consideration or understanding for the pressure that those resources  
5 would have been under. I don't know if anyone else from that investigative team had  
6 experienced anything like this. I doubt that they ever had. With experience comes  
7 some familiarity, and maybe a little easier opportunity to move quicker. I don't say that  
8 to take anything away from the efforts that those people made. I think that they tried  
9 their very best and it's clear to me that many feel that their efforts of trying their best  
10 was not enough.

11                   I would have hoped to have seen that we would have identified  
12 those additional crime scenes much earlier, because like everything, evidence can be  
13 perishable, and the sooner that you enter a scene or secure a scene, you can reduce  
14 the possibilities of losing evidence, and that's just a basic principle.

15                   But given the numbers, it seems the shock, I think, that so many  
16 people were in, and the fact that it took some time for efforts to be coordinated, may  
17 have been contributing factors to that delay.

18                   And I hope that that answers your question. I'm only answering  
19 that as honestly as I possibly can, based on the experiences that I've had.

20                   And I have a few scars over the years that I've built up, and some  
21 callouses as well, that I'm basing that assessment on.

22                   I do understand. Do I accept? Do I think it's appropriate? Do I  
23 think it's acceptable for there to be that delay? Personally in my heart, no. But I also try  
24 to put myself in the shoes of those that were on the ground trying to sort out the  
25 carnage. And that was a monumental task for so many.

26                   **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Well thank you. And more  
27 generally, thank you for assisting us with our challenging task. It's been a long couple  
28 of days for you and we really appreciate you being here and assisting us with our

1 important work. It's greatly appreciated. So thank you for that.

2 And tomorrow we will be hearing from C/Supt Chris Leather,  
3 beginning at 9:30. So we will break until then.

4 And C/Supt Campbell, thank you again for assisting us with our  
5 work.

6 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Thank you. And I'd also -- I know  
7 that there are a very few family members that are in attendance, but I would imagine  
8 that many are watching or monitoring the proceedings. I want to express my sincere  
9 condolences and I apologize for failing. I haven't cried for two and a half years. And I'm  
10 truly sorry that we failed you and I promise that we'll do better.

11 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you so much, sir.

12 **SUPT. DARREN CAMPBELL:** Thank you.

13 **COMMISSIONER MacDONALD:** Thank you. We'll break until  
14 9:30 tomorrow morning.

15 **REGISTRAR DARLENE SUTHERLAND:** Thank you. the  
16 proceedings are adjourned until July 27<sup>th</sup>, 2022 at 9:30 a.m.

17 --- Upon adjourning at 5:51 p.m.

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28



1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14

## CERTIFICATION

I, Sandrine Marineau-Lupien, a certified court reporter, hereby certify the foregoing pages to be an accurate transcription of my notes/records to the best of my skill and ability, and I so swear.

Je, Sandrine Marineau-Lupien, une sténographe officiel, certifie que les pages ci-hautes sont une transcription conforme de mes notes/enregistrements au meilleur de mes capacités, et je le jure.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "S. Marineau-Lupien", is written over a horizontal line.

Sandrine Marineau-Lupien